Evolutionary Dynamics and Equilibria

Joosten, Reinoud (1994). Evolutionary Dynamics and Equilibria. UNU-MERIT Research Memoranda. UNU-MERIT.

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  • Sub-type Working paper
    Author Joosten, Reinoud
    Title Evolutionary Dynamics and Equilibria
    Series Title UNU-MERIT Research Memoranda
    Volume/Issue No. 16
    Publication Date 1994
    Publisher UNU-MERIT
    Language eng
    Abstract Weakly compatible population dynamics describe changes in the composition of a population in a competitive environment, driven by differences in fitness levels within the population. We introduce the saturated equilibrium and the evolutionary stable equilibrium as (dynamic) generalizations of the Nash-equilibrium and the evolutionary stable strategy of evolutionary games. We examine the dynamic properties of these equilibrium concepts and relate them to equilibrium concepts from noncooperative game theory. The issues of existence, multiplicity, dynamical stability, and computability of equilibria are addressed. A variable dimension restart algorithm to solve the nonlinear complementarity problem may be used to compute a saturated equilibrium.
    Copyright Year 1994
    Copyright type All rights reserved
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