Evolutionary Dynamics and Equilibria
Joosten, Reinoud (1994). Evolutionary Dynamics and Equilibria. UNU-MERIT Research Memoranda. UNU-MERIT.
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Sub-type Working paper Author Joosten, Reinoud Title Evolutionary Dynamics and Equilibria Series Title UNU-MERIT Research Memoranda Volume/Issue No. 16 Publication Date 1994 Publisher UNU-MERIT Language eng Abstract Weakly compatible population dynamics describe changes in the composition of a population in a competitive environment, driven by differences in fitness levels within the population. We introduce the saturated equilibrium and the evolutionary stable equilibrium as (dynamic) generalizations of the Nash-equilibrium and the evolutionary stable strategy of evolutionary games. We examine the dynamic properties of these equilibrium concepts and relate them to equilibrium concepts from noncooperative game theory. The issues of existence, multiplicity, dynamical stability, and computability of equilibria are addressed. A variable dimension restart algorithm to solve the nonlinear complementarity problem may be used to compute a saturated equilibrium. Copyright Year 1994 Copyright type All rights reserved -
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