Patent Height and Competition in Product Improvements

van Dijk, Theon (1994). Patent Height and Competition in Product Improvements. UNU-MERIT Research Memoranda. UNU-MERIT.

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  • Sub-type Working paper
    Author van Dijk, Theon
    Title Patent Height and Competition in Product Improvements
    Series Title UNU-MERIT Research Memoranda
    Volume/Issue No. 15
    Publication Date 1994
    Place of Publication Maastricht, NL
    Publisher UNU-MERIT
    Pages 21
    Language eng
    Abstract The stringency of novelty requirements that patent offices and courts use in judging infringement issues and patentability of inventions defines the height of protection provided to a patentholder. In this paper the effects of patent height are studied in a duopoly where firms compete in product improvements. Minimal steps of improvements, determined by the height, limit the strategy space of competitors who want to invent around a patent. It is shown that low patents do not affect the natural market equilibrium. A patentholder can lose with medium patent heights, but he becomes a pure monopolist if patents are high. The non-patentholder can gain with medium heights but is increasingly worse off with higher patents.
    Copyright Holder n/a
    Copyright Year 1994
    Copyright type All rights reserved
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    Created: Fri, 13 Dec 2013, 13:14:12 JST