Some Welfare Implications of 'Who Goes First?' in WTO Negotiations

Guha-Khasnobis, Basudeb (2003). Some Welfare Implications of 'Who Goes First?' in WTO Negotiations. UNU-WIDER.

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UNU-WIDER Working Papers

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  • Sub-type Discussion paper
    Author Guha-Khasnobis, Basudeb
    Title Some Welfare Implications of 'Who Goes First?' in WTO Negotiations
    Volume/Issue No. 2003/63
    Publication Date 2003
    Place of Publication Helsinki
    Publisher UNU-WIDER
    Pages 18
    Language eng
    Abstract

    We envisage a logical framework to explain why some trade negotiations are delayed because parties differ on who should `go first´. In our model, there are substantive welfare implications depending on which party sets tariff rates (or subsidies) first i
    Keyword International trade
    Negotiation
    Public welfare
    Subsidies
    Copyright Holder UNU-WIDER
    Copyright Year 2003
    Copyright type Fair use permitted
    ISSN 16095774
    ISBN 9789291905133
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    Created: Fri, 12 Feb 2016, 13:33:37 JST