Foreign Aid as Prize : Incentives for a Pro-Poor Policy
Lahiri, Sajal and Sayanak, Tejashree (2008). Foreign Aid as Prize : Incentives for a Pro-Poor Policy. UNU-WIDER.
Document type:
Report
Collection:
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Sub-type Research paper Author Lahiri, Sajal
Sayanak, TejashreeTitle Foreign Aid as Prize : Incentives for a Pro-Poor Policy Volume/Issue No. 2008/63 Publication Date 2008 Place of Publication Helsinki Publisher UNU-WIDER Pages 24 Language eng Abstract We develop a theoretical model of foreign aid to analyse a method of disbursement of aid which induces the recipient government to follow a more pro-poor policy than it otherwise would do. In our two-period model, aid is given in the second period and the
Keyword Economic assistance and foreign aid
Game theory
Public welfareCopyright Holder UNU-WIDER Copyright Year 2008 Copyright type Fair use permitted ISSN 18102611 ISBN 9789292301132 -
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