Foreign Aid as Prize : Incentives for a Pro-Poor Policy

Lahiri, Sajal and Sayanak, Tejashree (2008). Foreign Aid as Prize : Incentives for a Pro-Poor Policy. UNU-WIDER.

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UNU-WIDER Working Papers

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  • Sub-type Research paper
    Author Lahiri, Sajal
    Sayanak, Tejashree
    Title Foreign Aid as Prize : Incentives for a Pro-Poor Policy
    Volume/Issue No. 2008/63
    Publication Date 2008
    Place of Publication Helsinki
    Publisher UNU-WIDER
    Pages 24
    Language eng
    Abstract

    We develop a theoretical model of foreign aid to analyse a method of disbursement of aid which induces the recipient government to follow a more pro-poor policy than it otherwise would do. In our two-period model, aid is given in the second period and the
    Keyword Economic assistance and foreign aid
    Game theory
    Public welfare
    Copyright Holder UNU-WIDER
    Copyright Year 2008
    Copyright type Fair use permitted
    ISSN 18102611
    ISBN 9789292301132
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    Created: Fri, 12 Feb 2016, 15:08:12 JST