Elites and Institutional Persistence

Robinson, James (2010). Elites and Institutional Persistence. UNU-WIDER.

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UNU-WIDER Working Papers

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  • Sub-type Working paper
    Author Robinson, James
    Title Elites and Institutional Persistence
    Volume/Issue No. 2010/85
    Publication Date 2010
    Place of Publication Helsinki
    Publisher UNU-WIDER
    Pages 30
    Language eng
    Abstract

    Particular sets of institutions, once they become established in a society, have a strong tendency to persist. In this paper I argue that understanding how elites form and reproduce is key to understanding the persistence of institutions over time. I illu
    Keyword Elite (social sciences)
    Institutional economics
    Political science
    Power (economics)
    Copyright Holder UNU-WIDER
    Copyright Year 2010
    Copyright type Fair use permitted
    ISSN 17987237
    ISBN 9789292303235
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    Created: Fri, 12 Feb 2016, 15:41:22 JST