Social interactions and complex networks
Opolot, Daniel (2012). Social interactions and complex networks. UNU-MERIT.
Document type:
Report
Collection:
-
Attached Files (Some files may be inaccessible until you login with your UNU Collections credentials) Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads wp2012-014.pdf PDF 
application/pdf 619.72KB -
Author Opolot, Daniel Title Social interactions and complex networks Publication Date 2012 Publisher UNU-MERIT Abstract This paper studies the impact of interaction topologies on individual and aggregate behavior in environments with social interactions. We study social interaction games of an infnitely large population with local and global externalities. Local externalities are limited within agents' ego-networks while the global externality is derived from aggregate distribution in a feedback manner. We consider two forms of heterogeneity, that due to individual intrinsic tastes and that due to ego-networks. The agents know the potential number of other agents they will interact with but do not posses complete information about their neighbors' types and strategies so they base their decisions on expectations and beliefs. We characterize the existence, uniqueness and multiplicity of equilibrium distribution of strategies. By considering arbitrary interaction topologies, we show that the interaction structure greatly determines the uniqueness and multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes, as well as the equilibrium aggregate distribution of strategies as measured by the mean strategy. Keyword Complex networks
Partial information
Local externality
Global externality
AdoptionJEL C72
D82
D84
033Copyright Holder UNU-MERIT Copyright Year 2012 -
Citation counts 
Search Google Scholar
Access Statistics: 411 Abstract Views, 84 File Downloads - Detailed Statistics Created: Wed, 11 Dec 2013, 17:05:31 JST