A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games - An Experimental Study
Decker, Torsten, Stiehler, Andreas and Strobel, Martin (2002). A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games - An Experimental Study. UNU-MERIT Research Memoranda. UNU-MERIT.
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Sub-type Working paper Author Decker, Torsten
Stiehler, Andreas
Strobel, MartinTitle A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games - An Experimental Study Series Title UNU-MERIT Research Memoranda Volume/Issue No. 18 Publication Date 2002 Place of Publication Maastricht, NL Publisher UNU-MERIT Pages 32 Language eng Abstract In this experimental study we analyse three collective and one individual punishment rule in a public good setting. We show that under all punishment rules cooperation is stronger and more sustainable than reported from settings without punishment. Moreover, we present evidence and explanations for differences between the rules concerning punishment intensity, contribution and profit levels, as well as justice. Finally, we investigate influences crucial to participants' support for a collective rule when the individual rule is the status quo. We show that beside profit differences the degree of consent required by the collective rule is essential for the degree of support by the participants. Copyright Holder UNU-MERIT Copyright Year 2002 Copyright type All rights reserved -
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