STRINGS ATTACHED:
THE IMPEDIMENTS TO MIGRATION

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Abstract

This paper details a theoretical framework to explain the impediments to migration. The paper argues that actual migration as a household livelihood strategy is impeded by the constraints imposed by the households' access to the institutions and the assets needed for migration within the welfare pentagon(s) of the household. The Welfare Pentagon embodies the five central institutions that households could use to assuage needs in a given society (family, markets, social networks, membership institutions and public authorities). Using data from Albania and Moldova, we then test the model predictions empirically. Utilizing a probit model for the decision to not migrate at the household level, we find strong support for the Welfare Pentagon framework. We find that having access to different parts of the Welfare Pentagon makes a difference for migration. We find that particularly the family, market and social network variables play a considerable role in the possibility for migration.

1. Introduction

Most people do not migrate. This paper seeks to explain why it seems that in general people hold preferences favouring not to move and why in the same society some people do <u>not</u> migrate while others do. The theoretical framework on which the analysis is based, links the impediments to migration[1] to institutional constraints and the lack of assets necessary to use migration as an income smoothing strategy for households and individuals. This paper introduces the theory and explores empirical evidence from Albania and Moldova.

Economic migration studies point to the fact that the poorest have the most to gain from migration as the potential income gain from migration is the highest for this group. However, empirical evidence shows that it is often not the poorest people who migrate. At the global level, we see that, even though a large percentage of the world population is poor and lives on less than $2 per day (United Nations Development Programme, 2007), only 3% of today's world population has migrated (Koser, 2007). On a country level we see a similar picture: in poor and migration-prone Albania, the very poor do not migrate; the poorest 20% of the population in Albania are least likely to consider migration (Reilly, Litchfield, & Castaldo, 2005).

Why do the majority of the world's population and especially the poor not migrate even though they would clearly gain financially? The answer usually given in the literature is that the costs of migration are high; the poorest can simply not afford to migrate (Chiswick, 1999, 2000). But it is not so clear whether the costs are really the most important factor in this context; for example, in Albania in 2002 only 9% of individuals never considered moving abroad because it was too costly, but 30% did not migrate because they found it too difficult (Carletto, Davis, Stampini, & Zezza, 2006).

What are the reasons for finding migration "too difficult"? This paper focuses on the impediments to migration beyond costs. It argues that considering migration is triggered by a shortfall in the consumption smoothing strategies for a household in the sending country leading to a negative gap between the needs that have to be fulfilled for the household and the actual potential of the household to fulfil these needs. The paper further argues that actual migration as a household livelihood strategy is impeded by the constraints imposed by the households' access to the institutions and the assets needed for migration within the welfare pentagon(s) of the household. The Welfare Pentagon embodies the five central institutions

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[1] The paper does not discuss forms of forced migration usually linked to refugees.

that households could use to alleviate needs in a given society (family, markets, social networks, membership institutions and public authorities).

In this paper section 2 first explores the theoretical framework of the Welfare Pentagon and how this framework can add explanatory power to the impediments to migration. Section 3 goes on to discuss an empirical application to the Welfare Pentagon framework by first giving the intuition behind the variables chosen and a description of the data followed by a discussion of the methodology and the results of the probit regression model. Section 4 concludes.

2. Theoretical framework

### 2.1 A general outline of the theory

We make use of the basic economic assumption that households maximise income. Furthermore all households face the risk of becoming poor. In other words, households face the risk that they are not able to fulfil the needs of their members, today as well as tomorrow. To prevent this risk from materializing, households smooth their consumption over time, setting aside part of their resources to finance future consumption. Additionally, when it becomes clear that income does (will) not suffice, households can seek alternative funding for the expenditures. When these measures are effective, households are able to maintain a particular welfare level, even when income falls short. The ability of households to smooth consumption over time provides an important indication about the households' potential to protect their members.

Being able to smooth consumption reflects an important dimension of well being as it reflects people's capacity to satisfy their (basic) needs today as well as tomorrow, despite the existence of risks and the occurrence of shocks. Studies analyzing the relationship between income and consumption show that, over time, household consumption is considerably smoother than income; a reduction (increase) in household income is not accompanied by a similarly large decline (increase) in consumption. Although there is considerable evidence that consumption smoothing takes place in both developed and developing countries, the underlying smoothing strategies actually used by households in different societies are highly context dependent, but basically follow a similar pattern. In this paper we argue that migration is an income maximising as well as consumption smoothing strategy.

The Welfare Pentagon represents the five core institutions that households may use to satisfy current and future needs in a given society: family, markets, social networks, membership

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institutions and public authorities (see Figure 1).[2] Even though historical and geographical appearances differ, these institutions are found in all societies across time and locations. The relevance of each institution and the exchanges between households and these institutions may differ by society and over time.

Figure 1. The Welfare Pentagon

Source: de Neubourg (2002a)

Households use the institutions of the Welfare Pentagon in their livelihood strategy in order to generate income but also to smooth consumption; labour markets, product markets and capital markets allow households to trade and exchange in order to secure resources to satisfy the main needs at a certain moment. On the labour market households exchange effort for a (future) wage; on product markets households trade effort for a (future) profit; on the capital market households trade income for future income by investments, savings, insurances, borrowings and the like. Families, social networks and membership institutions address the livelihood risk by means of various (and different) mechanisms of solidarity. Membership institutions are institutions of which individuals can become a "member" and from which they can resign (households or individuals enter and exit membership institutions). Examples of such institutions are unions, mutual insurance companies, religious organisations, co-operatives or neighbourhood associations. As the fifth corner of the Welfare Pentagon, public authorities can assist households directly by means of public social protection (pension schemes, child benefits, unemployment insurance and other forms of social insurance) but also indirectly by enforcing contracts through a judicial system, introducing legislation aimed

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[2] The Welfare Pentagon is a central and distinctive element in the 'Social Risk Management' approach as developed by de Neubourg (2002) and de Neubourg & Weigand (2000). The Social Risk Management framework is formulated to analyze the role and scope of public interventions and foremost, but not exclusively, that of public social protection policies.

at correcting market failures (such as minimum reserve requirements for banks so that the savings of the households are guaranteed) and many other public actions. Although it is hard and unusual for households to go without the institutions of a welfare pentagon, households can also internalize income generating activities and consumption smoothing by autarchic home production, accumulating physical assets or holding cash savings.

In order to be able to follow a particular consumption smoothing strategy, households and individuals need *access to the relevant institutions* of the welfare pentagon. Obtaining a social security benefit requires access to the public authorities that control the social benefit; obtaining a (legal) wage depends on your access to the (legal) labour market; getting support from a family member implies having access to a family. In addition to access to a particular institution, a specific consumption smoothing strategies typically also *requires some kind of asset*. Assets can be financial (cash, money on a bank account, stocks), physical (land, house, life stock, machines, jewellery), human (education, skills), social (family ties, acquaintances, trust) or collective (citizenship, contribution record). For instance, households can buy insurance against certain risks on financial markets using part of their financial assets to pay the insurance premium. Alternatively, households can be insured for certain risks by public authorities through paying taxes or social insurance contributions or simply by being a citizen. On the other hand, they can rely on social networks or family to compensate them after a shock occurs. Depending on the characteristics of these arrangements a social input is required. This input can take the form of a promise of reciprocity, a 'good' reputation or a family relation.

So far we implicitly assumed that all households are equal. However, households differ in their initial endowments due to two main reasons: firstly, they are not equal in their capacity to produce wealth (e.g. for reasons related to household composition, health, intrinsic productivity etc.) and secondly, they are "born in an income distribution" (allowing for endowed wealth to be passed from past generations to present ones). These are important differences because their existence implies that households differ in the access to the institutions and assets of the welfare pentagon, thus in their access to the consumption smoothing channels and thus in their capacity to follow a successful livelihood strategy. Households also differ in their exposure to risks (meaning that some households are plagued by more "bad luck" than others) and in their preferences. Two sets of preferences are important in this respect: the preferences defining the "needs" of the household members (see

also footnote 11) and the preferences regarding to degree of risk aversion they find acceptable[3].

As a result of the differences spelled out above (initial endowment, needs definition and degree of risk aversion), households adopt different income generating and consumption smoothing strategies or in other words, households differ in their consumption smoothing portfolio or in their particular place in the 5-dimensional space defined by the Welfare Pentagon. The theoretical framework allows households to choose many "points of welfare production within the 5-dimensional welfare space" all leading to the satisfaction of their needs. As already indicated, several institutions are active in providing assistance with the same consumption smoothing strategy. A part of the population may not have access to a particular consumption smoothing channel because it lacks the required assets to establish an exchange relationship with an institutional counterpart. Figure 2 illustrates the consumption smoothing decision and the different factors affecting it.

Figure 2. The consumption smoothing decision

The results of the differences in the economic activities of households (production points in the welfare pentagon space), which can include migration, lead to an income distribution and a corresponding consumption distribution. In that distribution, some households can smooth

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[3] The degree of risk exposure of households is not just randomly distributed among households in a particular society but is positively biased towards the "poorly endowed" households, meaning that poor households run higher risks to be confronted with "bad luck" because they are concentrated in neighbourhoods with a higher than average propensity to e.g. crime, physical damage due to earthquakes, flooding, drought, bad harvests and health hazards due e.g. to bad water conditions.

consumption and satisfy their needs and some others are "poor" in the sense that they have not enough means to smooth consumption so that their needs are always satisfied.

2.1 An application of the theory to the impediments of migration

When it comes to understanding why some people migrate and others do not, we now have defined a first element: people living in "poor" households (meaning not able to smooth consumption in order to fulfil needs) have an incentive to consider moving from the place they live in to another area or country. We thus follow classic economic migration theories that predict that "differences in net economic advantages … are the main causes of migration" (Harris & Todaro, 1970; Hicks, 1932; Mincer, 1978). Our theoretical framework is richer in the sense that it relates migration not only or purely to maximising earning capacities in various geographical contexts but relates the migration decision making to the more complex point of view of the "human capital theory of migration" as formulated by Sjastaad (1962). It is also refers to some of the "Laws of Migration" as introduced by Everett Lee (1966), which point to the selectivity of migrants. They are often linked to the arguments as explained here as having access to the institutions and the assets within the welfare pentagon. The theory provides also a systematic treatment of Kothari's contribution that explores the relationships between migration, staying put and poverty, especially emphasising the role of social relations, processes of exclusion and "poverty-related capitals", (Kothari, 2003).

There is a large strand of literature specifically dealing with migrant selection, which is founded in the Roy Model (1951) tradition. Borjas's (1987) negative selection hypothesis based on the Roy Model discusses the selectivity of migrants and their sorting across destinations depending on cross-country differences in the returns to skills. Many works have followed in this specific transition (Borjas, 1991, 1999; Borjas, Bronars, & Trejo, 1992; Chiquiar & Hanson, 2005; Grogger & Hanson, 2008; McKenzie & Rapoport, 2008; Moragas, 2008). Many selection studies have focused particularly on immigration to the United States, from Mexico (Caponi, 2006; Ibarraran & Lubotsky, 2007; Mishra, 2007). Our paper complements this work by approaching the phenomenon of migrant selection from a different angle (the Welfare Pentagon) as well as focusing on different migrant sending countries (Albania and Moldova). We discuss the impediments to migration with relation to the welfare pentagon next.

Many publications in migration studies point to the idea that there seems to be a general *preference for staying in the location* in which the person lives (DaVanzo, 1981; Faist, 1997; Fischer, Martin, & Straubhaar, 1997; Haug, 2000). In the consumption smoothing and welfare pentagon framework presented here, this preference (or "the value of immobility linked of the

accumulation of location specific advantages" as Fischer et al., 1997, called it) is explained by the access to the institutions that enable a household to smooth consumption in their home location. Access to institutions are in turn explained by the investment and the sunk costs that guarantee access due to location-specific investment in economic, human and especially social capital (DaVanzo, 1981). This provides an additional explanation of why a relatively small number of people migrate compared to the number of people that might gain from migration.

The argument above can also be expressed in other terms: a relatively high degree of social inclusion prevents most people from migrating. However, it will be argued below that a minimum of social inclusion in the sending country welfare pentagon is absolutely necessary to turn migration into a viable consumption smoothing strategy. Those who are socially excluded are on the one hand less restrained from migration but are on the other hand too constrained in their access to channels and assets of the welfare pentagon to make migration work.

Reviewing both the theoretical and the empirical studies on migration decisions, it becomes clear that we need to introduce the welfare pentagon for the receiving country as well. This welfare pentagon is important because it plays a role in shaping the decisions to move and the decisions to stay or return. The welfare pentagon in the sending (home) country of households that we discussed so far, provides potentially the first drive towards migration and it also provides the access to channels that turn migration into a viable option. The welfare pentagon in the receiving country plays a role as well; as will be argued below, (the perception of) the smoothing strategies in the receiving country and the (expected) access to smoothing channels in the receiving country is of crucial importance when explaining whether people actually migrate. The welfare pentagon of households, once they have migrated in the receiving country, is also necessary to explain why people remain in the receiving country or why they eventually return to the original sending country (or migrate to a third country).[4]

The simultaneous relevance of the welfare pentagon in the sending *and* the receiving country is an element that is found (at least implicitly) in much migration literature. Already in early contributions of Sjastaad (1962) and Lee (1966) and even Ravenstein (1885) this link is found but also more recent studies point in that direction: Doreen Massey's (1993)"power-geometry", King's (1995)"social relations across space" and Harvey's (1989) "friction of distance" all need the linkage between the two pentagons.

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[4] The decision to stay/return once emigrated is further analysed in de Neubourg, Beckers and Hercog (2008).

As argued above, considering migration is triggered by a shortfall in the consumption smoothing strategies for a household (in the sending country) leading to a negative gap between the needs that have to be fulfilled for the household and the actual potential of the household to fulfil the needs[5]. The argument that optimizing consumption smoothing possibilities rather than net income differences are important is consistent with the New Economics of Labor Migration wherein risk-diversification arguments are prominent (Stark & Bloom, 1985). The latter theory states that migration is not just aimed at maximising income but rather at diversifying risks. This fits the consumption smoothing hypothesis: given the household risk aversion preferences and their endowment in smoothing channels and assets, households cover the risk of income smoothing by seeking wealth creation in geographical areas wherein the shocks and the opportunities are uncorrelated to shocks and opportunities in their "home" area. [6]

Whether (members of) the household actually migrate, depends on whether the migration is actively considered as an option and whether the household actually realises the migration. In order to adopt migration as a consumption smoothing strategy, the institutions and assets needed to realise the option should be available. Table 1 below outlines the assets needed in the receiving and sending pentagon. Generally, the following elements play a role:

- the ability to pay for the costs

- the ability to actually travel and arrive in the destination country

- and the expectation that migration may lead to a successful consumption smoothing strategy.

Table 1: Consumption smoothing channels for migration decision to move

Institutional counterpart	Assets needed in	
	Sending country	Receiving country

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[5] It should be noted that "needs" do not have to be set by an absolute poverty level; households themselves define what level should be covered by consumption smoothing. While it introduces a problem of endogeneity (see below), this is consistent with the theoretical and empirical findings that the poorest households in a society do not migrate, that the relative position of a household in the income distribution rather than the absolute income position of households defines the propensity to migrate (Doreen Massey, 1993; Stark & Taylor, 1991)and that the poorest countries of the world are not responsible for the largest migration flows.

[6]The gains from migration are not defined in absolute terms but are defined by the consumption smoothing standards defined by the household itself. This relatively inelegant assumption has to be made to allow high skilled migration and relates to the relative deprivation motives that underlie the New Economics of Labor Migration theory (Stark, 1991; Stark & Bloom, 1985). The assumption is relatively inelegant since it introduces a problem of endogeneity. Households with a low level of endowment in terms of access to the welfare pentagon channels are adopting a behaviour that traps them into this low welfare level in two ways: firstly, they choose an ambition level which is lower than potentially could be reached and secondly they choose consumption smoothing strategies that are less effective. The endogeneity in terms of channel choices and risk exposure do not change the theory, but complicates both empirical analyses and policy interventions.

	Pentagon 1	Pentagon 2
Markets	Access to - Traffic market (legal, illegal) - Financial markets (assets) - Labour (time, skills, competences)	- Access to labour market Legal and illegal - Access to capital market - Access to housing - Access to insurance - Integration - Cultural market
Families	Access to family ties (social capital) for - Informal borrowing - Support - Representing family	Social capital for - Informal borrowing - Support
Networks[7]	Access to social capital for - Informal borrowing - Information - Support	- Access to social capital - Support to start - Facilitate access to markets - Friendship, - community
Membership organisations	Access to social capital in migration organisations	- Access to social capital - Access to cultural capital - Religion - Cultural life
Public Authorities	- Permission to leave - Legal documents - Incentives to leave - Information	- Permission to enter and or to work - Access to public goods - Access to social security - Taxes - Social security contributions

For the above elements both institutions and assets are needed. Paying for the travel and documents assumes either having the money yourselves or having access to the capital market where the funds can be borrowed: alternatively having access to family members or network members who are able and prepared to give or lend you the money, is a substitute. Access to social capital in the form of membership organisations and networks that can provide information on how to arrange the documents and travel may play a role as well as. So do the sending country public authorities since they can impede, stimulate or facilitate the emigration (by providing legal documents and information). This means that households will only migrate when they have migration-efficient access to welfare pentagon channels that allow them to pay for the costs (formally or informally) and to provide assistance in deciding where to go and how to arrive. Note that this applies to both legal (documented) and illegal (undocumented) migration. Assuming that access to social and financial capital and to markets (legal travel market, human trafficking market) are positively related to household endowments, it can already be understood why less well endowed families ("poor" households) are less likely to migrate. This is consistent with the self-selection process (Chiswick, 1999, 2000). Discrimination in the sending country can act as a incentive to leave, but at the same time it can also deprive the discriminated group of the essential smoothing

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[7] For more information on migrant networks, see: (Dolfin & Genicot, 2006; Douglas Massey, 1988; Orrenius, 1999)

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channels that allows them to migrate or even to consider migration as an option (e.g. because they cannot get the necessary documents or they lack access to the capital market or a sympathetic network). Access to social capital and the availability of family and friends also reduces the transaction costs

While the (relative[8]) position of a household in the welfare pentagon of the sending country is important in providing access to consumption smoothing strategies and thus providing the incentives and the means to migrate, the expected position of the migrants in the welfare pentagon of the *receiving* country is important as well. Household (members) will only migrate if their potential place in the welfare pentagon of the receiving country can at least be roughly assessed. All migrants understand that immediately after migration the need for consumption smoothing abilities in the new society will be extreme. This means that they either need to have direct access to the labour market (having a job) or access to other forms of funding provided by their own savings, by family- and network members in either the sending or the receiving country. Expectations about the consumption smoothing options open to the migrating households are positively influenced by the formal access to all the markets in the receiving country ranging from the labour market to the capital-, housing-, education-, health services- and insurance markets and by the availability of family members, networks and membership organisations open to migrants (including NGO's serving migrants). The public authorities in the receiving country play an important role as well; they define the legal access to the markets and the public goods but also to the social protection arrangements. Families, networks, membership institutions and the public authorities provide the economic and social capital that is urgently needed by migrants immediately after migration to smooth consumption. Informal welfare pentagon channels are often especially important; they reduce the migration risks, counteract information asymmetries and provide direct and indirect access to legal and illegal markets. There is a vast literature on the role of networks in shaping migration decisions all pointing in that direction[9].

To summarise there are three main mechanisms that influence the decision to migrate:

- the household is constrained in its ability to smooth consumption below a level that it deems necessary to fulfil its needs in the sending country;

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[8](Stark & Taylor, 1991)

[9] See (Bauer, Lofstrom, & Zimmermann, 2000; Bauer, Pereira, Vogler, & Zimmermann, 2002; Boyd, 1989; Faist, 1997, 2000; Fawcett, 1989; Gurak & Caces, 1992; Heering, Van Der Erf, & Van Wissen, 2004; Koser, 1997; Koser & C.Pinkerton, 2002; Martin & Taylor, 1996; Douglas Massey, 1988, 1990; Douglas Massey et al., 1993; Ritchey, 1976; Wilpert, 1992)

- the household has access to the welfare pentagon institutions and assets that allows it to consider migration and to overcome the costs related to leaving the sending country;

- the household perceives to have access to the welfare pentagon institutions and assets in the receiving country that will enable it to smooth consumption after having migrated.

The combination of these mechanisms can explain why some (members of) households migrate while others do not. Figure 3 below illustrates the flow of constraints that impede migration.

Figure 3. The migration decision making process

In the next section we will attempt to apply this theoretical framework for Albania and Moldova. We will compare access to the different corners of the welfare pentagon for households with migrants and households without migrants.

3. Empirical illustration

No data have been collected to reflect the specific access to the migration-relevant institutions and assets within the welfare pentagon. Data on the household situation before and after migration is difficult to find[10]. It is therefore impossible to investigate the mechanisms as described above. However, we use two existing data sets to see whether it possible to confirm at least the direction of the associations that we have outlined. The two data sets do not allow us to construct fully meaningful variables that would reflect access to markets, families, social networks, social membership organisations and public authorities, but for each of the corners of the welfare pentagon we have several variables than can be used as proxies. We first provide descriptive statistics and then estimate a probit analysis to see how the variables behave when used together as estimators for the probability <u>not</u> to be a migrant (or to have not been one).

We use data from Albania and Moldova which have similar migration histories after the fall of communism. Both countries have seen a massive outflow of migrants in the last 15 years

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[10] See Beegle, Weerdt & Dercon (2008) for a very original paper that tracks migrants 12 years after migration and measures the exact change in consumption.

and are located in South East Europe. Both Albania and Moldova have from one fourth to one third of their labour force abroad. Remittances are about 15 percent of GDP in Albania about one third of GDP in Moldova. Due to their similar situations, Albania and Moldova make good cases for comparison.

3.1 Data

We use data from household surveys in the migrant sending country as the basis of our empirical analysis. For Albania, we use the Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) collected by Albania's statistical agency INSTAT in 2005, with technical assistance of the World-Bank, which is representative on a national level and has a sample of 3640 households. This is a standard household survey and includes extensive modules on education, migration, consumption, labour etc. We compliment the household level data with information from a detailed community questionnaire in the communities of the households, which was collected at the same time.

For Moldova we use the CBSAXA 2006 Survey. The opinion research company CBSAXA conducted this migration household survey for the International Organization for Migration in Moldova. One important purpose of the CBSAXA survey is to compare households with migrants to those without. Therefore, the survey was designed to be representative of Moldovan households at the national level (excluding Transnistria), for each major geographic region (North; Center; South; Chisinau), and for each major type of locality (large cities: Chisinau and Balti; other towns; villages). The total number of households interviewed was close to 4,000, resulting in a sampling error of approximately 3 percentage points for the share of households with migrants nationwide.

3.2 Descriptive statistics

The following tables show whether there are significant differences in access to the different parts of the welfare pentagon for households that have migrants and those that do not.

Table 2 provides the results for proxies that reflect the family institutions. The variables tells something about the extent of the extended family or about the wealth of the household in terms of the Morris index, the household savings or the land owned. Families with migrants are significantly smaller in Albania, but significantly larger in Moldova. Families with migrants in Albania have significantly larger extended families. One the one hand this is unexpected, because one would expect that these household scan rely on their extended families for consumption smoothing and do not need to migrate. On the other hand, extended families give access to migration as a consumption smoothing strategies through network

effects. By construction migrant households have a higher number of migrants than non-migrant households.

There are significant differences of the expected sign for the Morris index and the household savings pointing to the fact that families with migrants hold more assets than households without migrants. The area of land owned by the household is not significant. We see that savings are larger for households with migrants, but we can not draw any conclusions on causality.

Table 2. Differences between households with migrants and without migrants: Family institutions

	Albania			Moldova		
Migrant hh	*Yes*	*No*	*Total*	*Yes*	*No*	*Total*
Household size	3.99***	4.42***	4.18	4.41***	3.37***	3.58
Number of migrants	1.12***	0.00***	0.62	1.30***	0.00***	0.26
Number of extended family members (siblings, adult children)	9.42***	7.90***	8.74			
Morris score index[11]	2.55***	2.38***	2.47	84.14***	61.28***	65.88
Household savings at least $500				0.27***	0.11***	0.14

Stars indicate whether the mean for each group is statistically different from the rest (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%)
Unit of measurement: in percentages, unless other unit specified
Source: Own calculation based on ALSMS 2005 and CBSAXA 2006

When trying to explore the differences between households with a migrant and those without in their access to market institutions, we use income and consumption, the years and type of education, employment, farm activities and the availability of a bank in the community (table 3). Income and consumption can be regarded as "outcomes" of market process rather than an indication of the access to the market institution. Moreover, the direction of causality cannot be concluded from the table: in both countries we see that household income and expenditures of non-migrants are lower: it could indeed be that households with migrants are richer (thus financing the costs of migration and providing access to a larger range of resources) and that non-migrants do not have access to funds to finance migration. It may also be the case that the households are wealthier because the receive remittances from the migrant (ex)household member.

In both countries we see that there is negative self-selection of migrants, i.e. those households with a higher education level do not migrate. These households are probably better connected to the domestic labour market. We see in both countries that non-migrant household heads are more likely to be employed than migrant household heads. This could be an indication that migrant households did not have access to the domestic labour market and thus had to

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[11] The Morris score index is a weighted asset index that weighs each asset owned by the household by the reciprocal of the number of households that own the asset (Morris, Carletto, Hoddinott, & Christiaensen, 1999).

migrate. Non-migrant households are less likely to be employed in agriculture in Albania, thus having more access to other employment options.

Table 3. Differences between households with migrants and without migrants: Market institutions

Migrant hh	Albania			Moldova		
	Yes	*No*	*Total*	*Yes*	*No*	*Total*
Monthly per capita income Leks	10841.51***	9067.80***	10045.11			
Monthly per capita consumption Leks/Lei	10585.78***	9569.54***	10129.58	422.10***	240.07***	276.68
Years of education of adult hh members	8.73***	9.23***	8.96			
Primary education				0.21***	0.26***	0.25
Secondary education				0.35***	0.30***	0.31
Vocational education				0.27	0.29	0.28
University education				0.18**	0.20**	0.2
Whether hhh employed	0.62***	0.71***	0.66	0.08*	0.10*	0.1
Whether hhh working on farm	0.46***	0.27***	0.37			
Whether bank is a possible source of credit in this community	0.62	0.62	0.62			

Stars indicate whether the mean for each group is statistically different from the rest (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%)
Unit of measurement: in percentages, unless other unit specified
Source: Own calculation based on ALSMS 2005 and CBSAXA 2006

Looking at social networks people coming from households with a migrant seems to be better connected in some ways: they have more friends and but they socialise less often (table 4). However, the only significant difference is that non-migrant households participated less often in communal activities, which means they are less connected and possibly have less access to migration networks. The migration intensity of the community and the fraction of households in the community with international migrants are the only variables in the databases that tell us something about the welfare pentagon in the receiving country; the differences are significant and have the right sign. Migrant households (at least in Moldova) are significantly more likely to have access to the migrant networks.

Table 4. Differences between households with migrants and without migrants: Social network institutions

Migrant hh	Albania			Moldova		
	Yes	*No*	*Total*	*Yes*	*No*	*Total*
Number of friends	1.82	1.78	1.80			
Number of times joined other people	1.23	1.37	1.29			
People can be trusted	0.20	0.18	0.19			
Migration intensity of community	0.77	0.75	0.76			
Fraction of households in community with international migrants	21.65	21.10	21.40			
Fraction of individuals in community who are international migrants	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.10***	0.06***	0.07
Participated in communal activities	0.47**	0.44**	0.45			
Can get credit from friends etc in emergency	0.09	0.10	0.10			

Stars indicate whether the mean for each group is statistically different from the rest (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%)
Unit of measurement: in percentages, unless other unit specified
Source: Own calculation based on ALSMS 2005 and CBSAXA 2006

Only the Albanian data set has variables that may be used as indicators for the access of the households and individuals to membership institutions and to public authorities, illustrated in tables 5 and 6 below.

Table 5. Differences between households with migrants and without migrants: Membership association institutions

	Albania		
Migrant hh	*Yes*	*No*	*Total*
Number of groups household belongs to	0.36**	0.30**	0.33
Number of community organisations in community	5.07	5.25	5.15

Stars indicate whether the mean for each group is statistically different from the rest (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%)

Source: Own calculation based on ALSMS 2005 and CBSAXA 2006

Table 5 shows migrant households belong to more groups, so possibly have more access to migrant networks. However there is no significant difference in the number of community organisations in the communities of migrant or non-migrant households.

From table 6 it can be seen that households with no migrants live more often in communities with public lighting, public phones, mail, a police station and a relative high number of community organisations; people from households with migrants participate more often in these organisations. It could mean that since these households have access to public consumption smoothing possibilities, they do not need to migrate. The variable "receiving public transfers" indicates that households with a migrant are more likely to receive a public transfer, which is counter-intuitive given the results just discussed on public institutions. However, most public transfers take the form of a basic social pension and it is likely that a large fraction of these migrant households are elderly pensioners whose children are abroad.

Table 6. Differences between households with migrants and without migrants: Public authority institutions

	Albania		
Migrant hh	*Yes*	*No*	*Total*
Household receives public transfers	0.59***	0.54***	0.57
Community has public lighting	0.56***	0.62***	0.59
Community has piped water	0.79**	0.82**	0.80
Community has sewage\ drains	0.57***	0.64***	0.61
Community has garbage collection	0.56***	0.63***	0.59
Community has public phones	0.48***	0.55***	0.51
Community has mail	0.50***	0.58***	0.53
Community has police station	0.42***	0.46***	0.44

Stars indicate whether the mean for each group is statistically different from the rest (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%)

Unit of measurement: in percentages, unless other unit specified

Source: Own calculation based on ALSMS 2005 and CBSAXA 2006

In the next section we look at the combined effect of the most important variables just discussed

3.3 Econometrics

In this section we test the determinants of not migrating (a dichotomous variable taking on the values of 1 for not having a migrant in the household and 0 for having a migrant in the household). To do this we use a probit model since we assume a normal distribution of the error terms. As a robust check, we also ran a logit model which assumes a slightly different distribution and found similar results. We also ran a tobit model using the number of migrants in a household as the dependent variables but significance was consistent with our probit model.

Table 7 gives the results of a probit regression for households without migrants versus households with migrants using the significant variables from the descriptive analysis as well as a small number of control variables. From the analysis it can be seen that many of the variables are significant but that some of the variables that were significant in the bi-variate analysis do not have explanatory power in the regression. This applies both to data for Albania and Moldova.

The control variables such as average age of the household and locality are significant. Average age of the household is negative and significant although age squared turns positive showing that much older people are less likely to migrate. Urban households are less likely to have a migrant in both Albania and Moldova, which means that most migrants are coming from rural areas.

Moving on to the welfare pentagon variables, household size is negative and significant in Moldova meaning that smaller households do not have migrants. The same is the case with regard to the number of extended family members in Albania. The wealth variables in both countries (Morris index and households with saving greater than $500) show that poor households are less likely to have migrants. This means that households with less wealth and fewer members of the household or extended family members will not migrate which supports out Welfare Pentagon framework.

When looking at the market variables, we see that monthly expenditure per capita, level of education and the household head being employed are significant. Lower expenditure (like lower wealth) is linked to less migration, although the effect is small and is only significant in Moldova. In Albania, lower education is also correlated with more staying while in Moldova higher education is correlated with staying. However, when years of education are squared in Albania we see a preference for staying of the highly educated. In both countries, the household head being employed is significantly linked to staying.

We now move along to social networks in the Welfare Pentagon. Due to lack of data for Moldova, we were only able to use one indicator for social networks but we have several proxy variables for Albania. The variable that we do have for both countries is migration prevalence in the home region which we find significant in both countries. Households in Albania and Moldova living in regions of higher migration are much more likely to have a migrant. Therefore, areas with few migration networks are less likely to have migrants. In Albania those households that where more active in collective action are less likely to migrate

Membership associations and public authorities where only possible to test with the Albanian data. Having many community organizations is associated with higher migration. Households receiving public transfers, those that have piped water and a post office in their area are more likely to have not migrants.

 The empirical tests are in line with the welfare pentagon theory. Those households with less access to different parts of the welfare pentagon seem to be less able to migrate. Family, market and network variables, in particular, showed that not having access to these sections of the welfare pentagon make a different in migration behaviour.

Table 7: Probit analysis estimating the probability of households to not have a migrant

	Albania			Moldova		
	Coefficient	Standard error and significance	Marginal effect	Coefficient	Standard error and significance	Marginal effect
Individual control variables						
Average age of household	-0.025	0.00***	-0.01	-0.10	.01***	-0.02
Average age of household squared	0.00	0.00**	0.00	0.00	0.00***	0.03
Urban/ rural status (base rural)	0.47	0.94***	0.19	0.15	0.06**	0.00
Welfare pentagon variables						
Family						
Household size	0.10	0.01	0.01	-.015	0.02***	-0.03
Number of extended family members	-0.07	0.01***	-0.03			
Savings >$500				-0.37	0.07***	-0.07
Morris index	-0.51	0.01**	-0.20	- 0.00	0.00***	-0.00
Morris index squared	0.06	.16*	0.02	0.00	0.00**	0.00
Market						
Monthly consumption per capita	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00***	-0.00
Years of education	-0.15	0.03***	-0.06			
Years of education squared	0.01	0.03***	0.00			
Secondary education				0.14	0.10	0.03
Vocational education				0.26	0.09***	0.05
University education				0.34	0.11***	0.06
HHH employed	0.30	0.05***	0.12	0.29	0.09***	0.05
Access to bank as form of credit in community	-0.00	0.05	-0.00			
Social networks						
Number of friends	0.00	0.01	0.00			
Participated in collective action	0.17	0.05**	0.06			
Can get credit from friends/ family	-0.02	0.05	-0.01			
Fraction of individuals/ households in community with international migrants	-0.00	0.00**	-0.00	-8.64	0.51***	-1.58
Membership associations						
Number of membership associations of hh	0.00	0.03	0.00			
Number of community organisations	-0.02	0.01**	-0.01			
Public authorities						
Household receives public transfers	0.13	0.06**	0.05			
Community has public lighting	-0.09	0.09	-0.04			
Community has piped water	0.14	0.07*	0.06			
Community post office	0.17	0.08**	0.07			
Community has police station	-0.11	0.07	-0.04			
Number of observations	3524			3,865		
Pseudo R^2	0.11			0.25		
Log Likelihood	-2164.88			-1444.83		

Stars indicate significance of the coefficient (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%)
Source: Own calculation based on ALSMS 2005 and CBSAXA 2006

4 Conclusions

While many people in the world would gain from migration, relatively few actually migrate. Consumption smoothing behaviour or livelihood strategies combined with a welfare pentagon framework mapping the institutions and assets (capitals) that are needed to use the smoothing strategies can explain why so many people show a preference for staying and not migrating. More importantly, the same framework can also explain why some people do migrate and others in very similar circumstances do not.

Some people are actually *restrained* from migration because of their age (too young, too old), their health or their care responsibilities for the old, the young and the ill. The analysis in this paper has been focussed on the rest of the people who have the free choice to migrate (excluding thus forced or restrained migration). It has been argued that the migration behaviour of these people is *constrained* by the lack of access to the welfare pentagon channels, resources and assets that are necessary for considering and actually implementing migration as a livelihood strategy. The differences in the degree of access to the welfare pentagon channels and the related assets in both the sending country welfare pentagon and the receiving country welfare pentagon are the crucial variables in explaining why some people migrate and others do not. The sunk costs of embeddedness in the welfare pentagon of the sending country explains the preference of most people for staying in the country they live in.

Descriptive statistics and regression results for Albania and Moldova using national sample data are largely encouraging for empirical research using the theoretical framework presented in this paper. It seems that people migrate less than would be beneficial because they are attached by too many strings to the home welfare pentagon.

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