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The United Nations University was established as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations by General Assembly resolution 2951 (XXVII) of 11 December 1972. It functions as an international community of scholars engaged in research, postgraduate training and the dissemination of knowledge to address the pressing global problems of human survival, development and welfare that are the concern of the United Nations and its agencies. Its activities are devoted to advancing knowledge for human security and development and are focused on issues of peace and governance and environment and sustainable development. The University operates through a worldwide network of research and training centres and programmes, and its planning and coordinating centre in Tokyo.
Global multi-level governance
The United Nations University-Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS) is a research and training programme of the UNU that focuses on the role of regions and regional integration in global governance. The aim of UNU-CRIS is to build policy-relevant knowledge about new forms of governance and cooperation, and to contribute to capacity-building on issues of integration and cooperation, particularly in developing countries. UNU-CRIS is based in Bruges and works in partnership with initiatives and centres throughout the world that are concerned with issues of integration and cooperation.

The author worked at UNU-CRIS from September 2003 till March 2005 to compare the regionalisation of higher education in Europe and East Asia within a multi-level globalization context with funding from a post-doctoral grant from the Spanish Ministry of Education, co-funded by the European Social Fund.

www.cris.unu.edu
Global multi-level governance: European and East Asian leadership

César de Prado
Endorsements

“The author presents to us an excellent contribution to our understanding of the complex development towards global multi-level governance. His very well researched case studies focus on the regional integration in the European Union and in South-East/East Asia, the interlinkages between them and their potential to effect global change. Particularly interesting, because much less studied until now, is the chapter on the “advisory factors” that are stimulating and facilitating the regionalisation process as well as the chapter on the efforts in both regions to promote a more knowledgeable civil society through changes in higher education systems. The book ends with a visionary outlook on further developments towards a better, knowledge-based multi-level world. Indeed very impressive.”

Horst Günter Krenzler, Professor at Munich University Law Institute and former Director General for External Relations at the European Commission

“César de Prado has written an impressive book on the growing engagement between Asia and Europe. He argues convincingly that this could motivate the US, the indispensable superpower, and other stakeholders in the international system, to join hands in offering our diminished multilateral institutions a much needed injection of dynamism, leadership and new directions.”

Tommy Koh, Founding Executive Director of the Asia-Europe Foundation and Chairman of the Institute of Policy Studies
“A rich and interesting book, crammed with an astonishing range of detail about networked governance from Europe to Asia. His theoretical framework encompasses actors from international organizations to corporations, universities to think tanks, offering a way to map the new world order.”

Anne-Marie Slaughter, Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

“A carefully researched analysis of East Asian and European regionalism, their driving forces and the interaction between the regions. The study is remarkable both for its theoretical quality and its novel empirical data. A most valuable source for students of regionalism.”

Karl Kaiser, Visiting Professor at Harvard University and former Director of the German Council on Foreign Relations

“This timely book provides a highly comprehensive and illuminating exposition of the new fluidity of global and regional multilateral governance. César de Prado did an excellent job in providing a valuable analytical framework and persuasive cases for students of international relations and the new global order.”

Il Sa-Kong, Chairman and CEO of the Institute for Global Economics and Chair of the ASEM Vision Group, 1998–2000

“The demise of multilateralism has been announced prematurely. César de Prado demonstrates how increased regionalism in Europe and in Asia has assured its remarkable comeback. His book shows convincingly how this came about and why.”

Albrecht Rothacher, Editor in Chief of the Asia-Europe Journal

“This interesting book makes a strong case for the emergence of a multilevel global governance system that knits together regionally-based governments and non-governmental actors with specific reference to Europe’s and Asia’s knowledge systems. Interested readers will learn from de Prado’s analytical framework and some well-researched case material.”

Peter J. Katzenstein, Walter S. Carpenter Professor, Jr. of International Studies at Cornell University
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Geopolitical map of Europe
EAS and ASEAN+3 in East Asia

- ASEAN
  - Brunei
  - Burma (Myanmar)
  - Cambodia
  - Indonesia
  - Laos
  - Malaysia
  - Philippines
  - Singapore
  - Thailand
  - Viet Nam

- ASEAN+3 (ASEM-Asia, 2006)
  - All of the above, plus
  - China
  - Japan
  - South Korea

- East Asian Summit (EAS)
  - ASEAN+3, plus
  - Australia
  - India
  - New Zealand
## European Union governance

### Regional

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Intermediary</th>
<th>Private</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>The Federal Commission has 30+ directorates-general to lead or support the 9 councils that vote on 25+ broad policies, under qualified majority or unanimity (energy, culture, taxation, etc.)</td>
<td>Advisers; parties; churches; universities</td>
<td>Businesses; social organizations and movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmental</td>
<td>Originally market liberties (goods, capital; workers; some services)</td>
<td>Gradually expanded to other economic issues (mainly services)</td>
<td>As well as to some social and environmental matters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Global

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar 1 (Federal and intergovernmental)</th>
<th>Pillar 2 (Intergovernmental)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic, social, environmental</td>
<td>Foreign-political</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Global</th>
<th>Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troika (Commission, Council, Secretary-General) often lead the EU in:</td>
<td>Economic, Functional cooperation, Development, Humanitarian aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6+ decentralized agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups of core/leading countries</td>
<td>Pillar 3 (Purely intergovernmental)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transatlantic Partnership</td>
<td>Security and defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmental</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# East Asian governance

## Regional

### Actors

**Federalizing (Track 2s)**
- Network East Asian think-tanks
- East Asia Forum
- ERIA economic (proposal)

**Groups of leading countries (e.g., ASEAN-5)**

### Issues

**Socio-cultural**
- Agriculture, fisheries and forestry;
- energy; minerals; environment; tourism;
- disaster and emergency; social welfare;
- rural development and poverty eradication; youth; women; health; labour;
- culture and arts; science and technology; info-communication

**Political and security**
- Including transnational crimes

#### Economic
- Trade and investment
- Finance and macro-economic surveillance

## Intergovernmental

- ASEAN+3
  - summits (yearly)
  - ministerials and senior officials
  - working groups in key issues
- ASEAN+1 summits (yearly)

### Subregional coordinators

- ASEAN summits (formal and informal)
- ASEAN Secretariat (ASEAN+3 Unit)
- Tripartite cooperation (CN, JP, SK)

## Global

- ASEAN dialogue partners (ARF)
- East Asia summit
- Macro-Asian: ADB...
- Interregional processes
- Increasing presence in multilateral regimes

### Bilateral alliances (US-based, etc.)

---

**Other:** Businesses; social organizations; parties; people’s assemblies; universities

---

Evolution towards 3 ASEAN-based broad communities complemented by functional bilateral and regional agreements

---

### Economic
- Political
- Functional cooperation
- Development
- Preventive security
ASEM governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Actors</strong></th>
<th><strong>Interregional</strong></th>
<th><strong>Global potential</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Intergovernmental** | • Summits (biennial)  
• Foreign ministers (yearly)  
• Other ministerials (varied)  
• Senior officials’ meetings | **Asia-Europe Foundation** |
| **Coordinators** | • Europe: Commission and Council Presidency  
• Asia: ASEAN presidency; North-East Asia rotation; possibly South Asia rotation  
• Virtual Secretariat (at ASEAN Secretariat) | **Advisory groups**  
• Vision Group (1998–99)  
• Japan-Finland (2005–06)  
• CAEC (on the margins)  
**Business forums**  
**Universities**  
**Social forums** |

**Leading countries**

**Issues**

From 1996 to 2006: Scores of issues explored in 3 main pillars
From 2007: Trans-pillar priorities enhanced

**Political**  
• Diplomacy  
• Values  
• Security

**Economic**  
• Trade  
• Investment  
• Finance

**Cultural, intellectual, people-to-people, etc.**
Acknowledgements

This book synthesises over a decade of outputs in academic, business, governmental and civil society engagements across Asia and Europe.

My intellectual motivation emerged as I worked as an Icex trade officer at the Spanish Embassy in Tokyo in 1993–1994, years in which new global and regional governance regimes were enthusiastically forming. First-hand research materials then gathered induced me to embark in 1994–1995 on a new international economics and business programme at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid while writing Oriëntate en Oriente, a guidebook to understanding the Asia-Pacific from a European perspective.

The theoretical core of the book, and the chapter on info-communications governance, matured from my subsequent doctoral research at the European University Institute in Florence. Several years of study, debate and meditation at the arty Badia Fiesolana were captivatingly funded by the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Salvador de Madariaga Programme. Some crucial parts of the thesis defended in April 2002 were developed in 1997–1998 while working and researching at the European Commission’s unit dealing with international aspects of the information society, and in the autumn of 1998 in South-east Asia with a research grant from the European Studies Programme of Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok.

The chapter on policy advisers builds on extensive interactions with many European and East Asian think-tanks and related Track-2 processes. Academic research on their activities took place in 2002–2003.
while a forskare at the Centre for East and Southeast Asian Studies of Lund University, funded by the Swedish government.

The chapter on higher education draws from my plural academic experiences. Greater understanding and formal research took place in 2003–2005, years obligingly funded by the Spanish Ministry of Education’s Secretary of State for Universities and Research and co-financed by the European Social Fund. The study benefited from historic academic and cultural cities: Bruges, where the Collège d’Europe’s new external dimension included helping to beget the Flemish United Nations University programme on Comparative Regional Integration Studies, a bold pilot project to advance academic and policy networks from where I learnt considerably; and Salamanca, whose secular University has given me the chance to help develop its East Asia Studies Programme (www.usal.es/asia).

The challenging idea of integrating the above research projects came as I delivered a lecture tour in the spring of 2004 in several North-east Asian intellectual centres thanks to the Asia-Europe Foundation’s Cultures & Civilisations Dialogue Programme. To accomplish that vision, I had to come full circle and return to East Asia. In 2005–2007 I greatly benefited from the research base offered by the University of Tokyo’s Institute of Oriental Culture at 東京. Funding was kindly provided by the Japan Foundation and the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.

Throughout those years and endeavours I enjoyed the rare opportunity of meeting hundreds of stupendous academic and think-tank researchers, public officials, business entrepreneurs and other civil society experts. This book is dedicated to the many of them who taught me well.

Y, naturalmente, una dedicación especial a mi familia en España porque sin su apoyo constante este libro no habría sido posible.

I must beg readers for their benevolence as they encounter my unintended flaws, for the book is but a humble attempt to help orderly map the world’s new dynamic transdisciplinary connections.

CdP  Tokyo and Salamanca  April 2007
Global multi-level governance

During the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union formed a bipolar world system in which they clashed to control larger areas through strong alliances or outright dominance of key countries (Gaddis, 2005). Few, if any, parts of the world could really claim to be non-aligned or independent of the power contest. But the fall of the Berlin Wall from 11/9 soon led the Soviet Union to give way to a Russia with only regional ambitions, while the relaxation of the US global projection allowed allies in Europe and East Asia to enhance or explore new international dynamics. During the 1990s a new paradigm of connectivity grew on flexible, functional coalitions driven by a mix of state and non-state actors that directly or indirectly connected most people across the globe. But the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington provoked the rage of the Bush junior administration; this was felt mainly in Central and Western Asia, leaving the rest of the world perplexed about how best to cope or help out. As much of the world increasingly worries that the US government may not judiciously lead a just peace and prosperity even in the face of unexpected tribulations, a plurality of public and private allies and friends increasingly find it necessary to reach out in novel ways and share their increasingly global multi-level experiences and wisdom.

In search of new theoretical paradigms of dynamic world order

Much of the Cold War international relations academic literature that developed in the United States, often written by European émigrés who had fled trouble at home, focused on the concept of the unitary or “Westphalian” power-maximizing state. Morgenthau’s (1948) six principles of political realism became the classical view that the chief units of analysis of an anarchic world system are and will for long remain the states, represented by their public authorities (governments), seeking rationally to maximize their power to influence or control others, a concept often now referred as seeking relative gains among states. States make and enforce their own laws in times of peace, but prepare for war and make it when their basic, mainly but not only material, interests conflict and threaten each other, regardless of the constraints from the growing corpus of international law, broadly defined to include principles, norms and specific rules. This approach, which matured during the Cold War, traditionally focused on the security dimension, which realists claimed determined the more flexible, “low-level”, economic and social power dimensions. Realism nevertheless evolved into several variants as realist authors had to concede that even during the Cold War states often coordinated and cooperated with other states in various ways. Some tried hard to explain existing world patterns. For instance, Waltz’s (1979) structural or neo-realist view argued that military stability comes from the teaming of independent states into a bipolar camp, while Gilpin (1981) presented a more dynamic picture in which states’ alliances constantly shift around a bipolar structure. More recently, Mearsheimer (2001) has become the more articulate advocate of an offensive strand of realism in which great-power cooperation is still very unlikely, thus possibly leading to a new bipolar confrontation.

Nevertheless, many critics have been reflecting to counter these types of potentially very fatalistic world views based on the nation-state (Keohane, 1986). Woodrow Wilson’s ideal hopes for strong and efficient international organizations could not advance much during the Cold War, but many authors argued that international institutions, law and/or ideas, driven by both state governments and private actors, are decisive for the long-term restructuring and stabilization of the international system. Krasner’s (1983) regime theory focused on a broad plurality of international (or intergovernmental) institutions and more or less written laws of state conduct that help shape the global system. Many of these regimes are nowadays linked in various ways to the UN system of organizations, treaties, funds and programmes. But other regimes, especially the liberal
ones promoted by the Bretton Woods economic organizations, envision a greater role for private business actors.

Other authors viewed world development still differently. Wallerstein (1974) argued from a Marxist approach that the world has historically been divided into developed capitalist areas controlling the fate of feudal developing ones, with only minor possibilities for the latter to become fully developed. But as the Cold War ended, constructivists like Wendt (1992), focusing on identities, beliefs, attitudes and actions of individuals and groups of peoples, began catching more people's attentions by arguing that it is possible to construct a peaceful world government bound by a mix of political, economic and social institutions and norms.

In retrospect, the above mainly US-based academic theories seem like the sophisticated articulations of the contending ideological frameworks of different domestic actors. I hypothesize that realists and neo-realist upgrades were in general favoured by military strategists eager for a long-lasting US power dominance; liberal regimes were preferred by diplomats and business people; social constructivists were promoted by social democrats and less profit-oriented international civil society organizations; and critical approaches were closer to the working classes although very distanced from Stalinist or Maoist incongruities.

In the end, these theories of international relations failed to predict or explain the demise of the Cold War and what the future may bring (Carlsnaes, Risse and Simmons, 2002; Wight, 2005). Nowadays, anarchic international relations academics in the United States are giving increasingly similar weight to realist, liberal, constructivist and eclectic theories (Peterson and Tierney, 2005). Some corporativist research disciplines remain focused on finding simple explanatory theories based on independent and dependent variables, while others are more discursive in presenting a plurality of causes and effects. Despite the rise of e-learning technologies, most of these paradigms are still basically constructed in the domestic circuits of publications and conferences, and it is remarkable how little attention the academic networks centred in the United States continue to pay to the growing corpus of ideas from most of the rest of the hyperlinked world.

The classical understanding of international diplomacy, as well as the distinction between high politics (security, diplomacy) dealt by government officials and low politics (economics, culture, social interactions) dealt by profit-oriented businesses and broader civil society, are becoming less relevant as more public, private and, especially, mixed actors get used to communicating transnationally and develop their own informal systems of functional control. The aim is now to harness
knowledge for competitive innovation. Much information may be coded and shared globally, but much knowledge remains tacitly localized at lower levels as formal and informal actors nurture their functional investments.

Inspired by the “consilient” thinking of Wilson (1998), I argue that one should try to make sense of the many interrelated analytical levels that jointly transform the current hyperconnected world system. Traditional nation-states are now embedded in a new global multi-level governance framework in which a plurality of public and private actors competitively interact in a refined dimension of territorial power where not only the United States but world regional processes have become particularly salient. To understand my proposed framework better one first needs to reassess the nature of the state and its usefulness as a world unit of analysis, since states are increasingly exploring and advancing both internal and external multi-level patterns of regional collaboration. Secondly, one then requires an understanding of the nature and behaviour of the many non-state actors that engage and influence the multi-level dynamics still governed or organized by state actors.

Evolving multi-level states

When one quickly flips through an atlas of human history one sees how areas of political control broadened and shrunk in seemingly unpredictable ways, but often as the result of fighting. The experiment of sustaining a system of states began in seventeenth-century Europe as sovereign rulers, tired of battling each other, agreed to limit political and military control over clearly delimited territories. In the following centuries there were still many wars and redefinitions of state boundaries, but the concept of territorially sovereign “Westphalian” nation-states is nowadays very relevant to organizing the life of most citizens and residents, not only in Europe but also increasingly in other parts of the world. The number of internationally recognized states has grown from 74 in 1948 to about 200 in 2006 due to decolonization and partitions (that of Serbia and Montenegro being the last one at the time of writing).

All around the world states are subdivided in unique and more or less clear successions of smaller administrative and/or political units, all the way down to cities and villages, and then to neighbourhoods, households, citizens and residents. Some examples of how the competitive but peaceful resolution of intrastate federal tensions for legislative and executive powers could serve as inspiration for the increasing interactions between countries.
Local tales of two superpowers

The United States has gradually expanded from a shaky confederation of former English colonies first internationally recognized in 1783 into a strong and widespread federation of 50 states and several other territories, districts and possessions, mainly in the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean. Although the federal government in Washington D.C. greatly increased its powers in the twentieth century, a territorial balance is aimed at as Congress is elected on the basis of states' populations, while each state sends two persons to the Senate. Meanwhile, several hundred native Indian reservations are now overseen by both the federal government and tribal councils that have slowly regained some powers. Moreover, many states autonomously advance positions in a number of issues, in particular the promotion of international trade and investment. Many competitive cities and localized economic clusters on the west and northeast coasts dynamize both the rest of the United States and much of the world, to the point that a few cities like New York and Los Angeles have an even stronger global reach (often especially linking to other global economic and cultural cities) than the states in which they are located.

Chilly and autocratic Russia conquered many of the territories first unified by the Mongol hordes in Northern Asia, and at one point even controlled Alaska – soon sold for a pittance to the expanding United States. The former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, dysfunctionally controlled from Moscow, gave way to several independent countries soon after 1989. The main one is the Russian Federation, which for several years struggled with its internal constituents until it concluded in 1994 a treaty with all of them except Chechnya. As the Caucasus remained very conflictual and several ethnic republics demanded more autonomy, the Kremlin under Putin appointed seven regional governors to head large federal districts (four in Europe and three in Asia) on top of the 89 Russian member subjects. Meanwhile, a nationalistic Russia uses its energy resources as a tool of global power projection and has tensions with several of its neighbours that are strengthening links with more democratic countries, but this situation does not yet seem to be heating up to a cold confrontation reminiscent of earlier times.

Decentralization in European states

The global city of London is the capital of the United Kingdom, currently a complex political union of four “home nations”, each having separate football teams and a different set of political prerogatives. England remains the core of the union, but Scotland has a powerful parliament, in-
spiring the weaker Welsh national assembly, and Northern Ireland has
after decades of sectarian fighting become a unique condominium of
both the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic. The home nations are
then subdivided into a variety of smaller units that have been reorgan-
ized more often than their counterparts in other European countries.
Under its Crown there are also several overseas territories and depend-
cencies, but 15 other Commonwealth realms, formerly part of the mighty
British Empire, pay diminishing formal respects to the English monarchy,
and some even debate fully pulling out of the loose association. The
Crown does not seem to mind too much, as versions of English form the
lingua franca of world diplomacy, business and knowledge, linking even
the rainiest British town to some global place or event.

The remnants of another awesome empire, the French Republic, are
now divided into five territorial levels whose gradual reconfiguration indicates they are less centralized in the city-region of Paris than many people believe. France’s 22 metropolitan and 4 overseas administrative régions are subdivided into 100 départements and then further subdivided into 342 arrondissements, which in turn are composed of 4,035 cantons and 36,682 communes. The régions, départements and communes are known as “territorial collectivities”, possessing local assemblies as well as an executive, while the arrondissements and cantons are only administrative divisions but are in search of regaining legislative prerogatives within the context of a slow territorial decentralization that began in the early 1980s. Although France sustains some island enclaves and struggles to maintain cultural links with scores of partially francophone countries, France’s regions bordering Germany, Switzerland and Italy are now particularly dynamic as they help stitch together formerly antagonistic Euro-
pean nation-states.

While several European countries were largely unified with the treaties forming the Peace of Westphalia in the seventeenth century, proto-
Germany was actually an array of small and distinct sovereign nations only unified during the Franco-Prussian War ending in 1871, but not re-
strained in its visions to catch up and surpass the other global powers.
After two global wars largely initiated by a rising Germany, the federal republic of Germany is now composed of 16 peaceful states (Bundes-
länder) which are much more autonomous than government subunits in most other European states, perhaps with the exception of federal Bel-
gium and confederal Switzerland, and more dynamic than much of Eu-
rope if one excludes the poles of economic innovation around the largest
cities in Northern Europe. Further, new federalizing pressure has also be-
come prominent in other European countries. For example, Spain has
transformed from a unitary military regime into a federation of 15 auton-
omous communities, some of which are peacefully arguing for nearly confederate status, and dynamic Catalonia even successfully bargaining new prerogatives every so often. Italy's recurring political pressures occasionally induce a referendum to ask the country whether to transfer prerogatives to the northern regions. In these and new European member states risks of national fracture are not really strong and the rare exceptions may peacefully lead to a new friendly arrangement, like Czechoslovakia in the 1990s when it broke into Czechia and Slovakia, both new countries becoming member states of the European Union in 2004. Europe's substate regions also reach internationally for economic and socio-cultural purposes, and in federal states the substate regions sometimes press for broader external prerogatives. For instance, a few years ago the Belgium region of Flanders commissioned UNU-CRIS in Bruges to advise on various foreign policy elements relating to Eastern European countries.

Dynamism in East Asian countries and beyond

Not only the United States, Russia and Western European states are now reorganizing their political, economic and socio-cultural structures as substate units link more globally; some East Asian countries are experiencing similar decentralization pressures.

The People's Republic of China, tracing its history to a near succession of centralizing empires and in some periods ruled by dynasties originating in Northern Asia, is today composed of 23 provinces with a long tradition of Han control, 5 autonomous regions with complex histories (Tibet, Xingjian, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi and Ningxia), 4 centrally administrative municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing) and 2 special administrative regions (Hong Kong since 1997, and Macao since 1999). The legal status of a de facto economically independent Taiwan within China remains a difficult problem for the whole region, and Beijing tries to rein in demands for greater autonomy from Tibet and Xingjian. The Chinese ruling party periodically focuses on the need to manage governance challenges better at various levels (provinces, counties, municipalities and towns) and has even allowed some competition in village elections. Moreover, China's current leadership tries to spread inland the economic progress of the special economic zones created since the 1980s in coastal areas, and border provinces may form part of broad regional development plans that promote links with neighbouring countries.

Even relatively centralized Japan is in the process of a new large-scale internal reorganization. Historically a collection of warring feudal dai-
myos that finally held their peace under the dynastic Tokugawa military shoguns, and later with cultural emperors no longer living in Kyoto but in the former Tokugawa castle in Tokyo, Japan is in the twenty-first century undergoing its third administrative reorganization in modern times by merging many of the cities, towns and villages into more efficient units with some elements of autonomy. The economic and socio-cultural autonomy and global projection of the Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe Kansai region remain a source of inspiration for other economic poles that try to soften links from the Tokyo/Yokohama-centred Kanto region. Meanwhile, Japan’s local communities have had since the late 1980s a country-wide council that promotes their internationalization in quite a few issues. In addition, the Japanese government seems to be seriously considering a plan by which several groups of the current 47 prefectures would merge into a small number of relatively powerful regions or states. As in the past, some unexpected external event or earthquake may be the only trigger required to consolidate a new multi-level reorganization.

Other countries in East Asia are also beginning to address the issue of political federalism as they realize that innovative regions, government sponsored (the Multimedia Supercorridor in Malaysia, Media Valley in South Korea, etc.) or otherwise, need to have more degrees of freedom to compete successfully in today’s hyperlinked world.

The current boundaries and administrative divisions of most countries in other parts of the world often reflect histories of colonial or imperial administrations, bargains or wars. Yet many of these countries have also began to evolve in relative peace. For instance, the independence and partition of British Indian provinces and princely states were bloody and are still causing problems, especially between India and Pakistan. Yet the 28 states and 7 union territories currently composing the Indian federation are the result of several, mostly peaceful, reorganizations to manage linguistic diversity and population growth. All states and two union territories (Delhi and Pondicherry) now have elected governments, and the central government is allowing some economic decentralization to promote economic growth through international trade and investment.

The dis-United Nations system

Not only is there a great variability within states; there is also a surprising variability of states’ external projections. The uniqueness of each country’s foreign policy is reflected in its geographical scope, functional goals and means, timing and domestic inputs. While public and private actors in the countries presented in the previous section reach to much of the world by military, diplomatic, economic and socio-cultural means, many
other countries lack the resources to staff anything but a few embassies abroad.

The world must continue to cope with the variegated nature and projection of its states. Six decades ago, after various European and East Asian nation-states and imperial systems fought each other to the ground, the federated United States “reluctantly” took up the role of global Westphalian architect. After having helped Europe and much of the world out of Soviet communism the United States is now the main global superpower, but struggling by “hard” military and “soft” non-military means to incorporate much of the rest of the world in its governance vision. “Friendly” countries have accepted or bargained most US rules to build more open nation-states, alone or in shifting patterns of international cooperation. Less friendly countries may also build their nation-states in peace, but “rogue” ones going all the way to defy the US-sanctioned world view may get punished. The United States still has enough military power to implement international law all around the world, but it does so selectively, clumsily for some, and with numerous reservations, as it is not sure how much it can trust or understand friends and foes around the world who are finding new ways to deal with it (Walt, 2005). Meanwhile, many other countries simply cannot manage to function by the rules even if they had the will to do so; one-third of the world population still lives in sorrowful states that have failed or are near failing to provide basic human security, including peace and health (Foreign Policy, 2005). Given this panorama, many wonder if all capable may together keep building a prosperous and happier community.

The promotion of international issue clubs is one way, but powerful countries are having difficulties in jointly sustaining and expanding their ruling agendas. The United States is the prominent member in the exclusive club of countries holding UN Security Council veto power or effective nuclear capacity that is under strong pressure to reform, and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty that the United States helped advance in the 1970s is nowadays in question as the United States makes exceptions to its allies or friends and others threaten to pull out. Meanwhile, the real global influence beyond stock-taking exercises and cooperation pledges of the Group of Seven most industrialized, market-oriented democracies has long been questioned (www.G7.utoronto.ca). Moreover, although the G7 selectively relaxed its membership criteria in the 1990s to engage Russia, a debate rose about whether the original G7 countries should even be attending the G8 meetings held in 2006 in a still non-democratic Russia with renewed power aspirations. The Canadian government proposed having a G20 in order to account better for developing powers, but there is not yet a consensus in Washington about how far to advance such a proposal from Ottawa.
Reforming and decentralizing the United Nations

The gradual and rational reform of the UN system (www.un.org; www.unsystem.org) of organizations and linked regimes is a very difficult but necessary step to achieve sustainable peace and prosperity around the world (Kennedy, 2006).

Despite some remarkable successes, the United Nations has been a rather ineffective and complex structure through which the nowadays 191 member countries (some special states and territories are not formal members) have struggled to promote elements of peace and security, develop friendly relations and cooperate in solving international problems and promoting respect for human rights. Partiality and overlapping of institutional remits, mismanagement of limited financial assets and much political discord over development paths render the UN’s visionary objectives even more difficult to achieve.

The United Nations is nevertheless embarked on an unprecedented multiple reform process that promises to deliver benefits to a world disappointed with the evolution of global governance. This and many other issues were discussed in the world summit convened in New York just before the 2005 General Assembly. The outcomes of the 2005 assembly’s final agreement were naturally mixed, but better than anything coming from such high-level gatherings in a long time. It agreed on a Global Partnership for Development, not too far astray from the Millennium Declaration’s set of basic social development goals and targets. It also agreed on better peace building, peacekeeping and peacemaking measures, on a general responsibility to protect populations from gross abuses and on condemnation of terrorism. And it decided to reform its management so as to assess priorities and allocate budgets, human resources and oversight capacity better.

Yet the UN Charter was not substantially reformed, and the reform of the Security Council was delayed. The final arrangement for the Security Council might include a formula with a three-tier membership, with regional powers being directly involved. One option under discussion was that the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom and France would continue their oligopolistic position of holding a veto, but they would be joined by seven or eight semi-permanent members elected on a regional basis for a renewable four-year period, and by a group of rotating members elected on a regional basis, as now, for a non-renewable two-year term. Another discussed option, based on proposals first put forward in 1997 by a UN committee, calls for an expansion from 15 to 24 members, including 6 new permanent members (possibly Japan, India, Germany and Brazil plus two African countries, perhaps Egypt and South Africa), and 3 more regionally elected non-permanent members.
The key to an effective UN reform may not be to accommodate more countries with rising regional power; rather, it may be how better to recognize and effectively decentralize to regional processes in which groups of countries first prove they can gradually interconnect and find their own regional solutions while raising broader global admiration.

Global and regional visions have for decades remained in constant and fruitless tension. The project for a League of Nations envisioned by US President Wilson was to be based on world regions, but it did not succeed and, for a variety of reasons, the League proved ineffective in preventing another major war. The United States and its allies during the Second World War long debated the conflict between global and regional arrangements. In the end, US-centred universalistic principles based on the nation-state system won in the 1945 San Francisco conference, where the UN Charter was approved by 51 government representatives. Although autonomous regional arrangements are in principle also allowed by the Charter's articles 52–54, they have rarely been invoked, and the UN system's regional commissions have much less weight than the small administrative functional commissions, specialized agencies and various programmes and funds linked through the UN Economic and Social Council.

The road to transform the United Nations into a multi-level platform that selectively decentralizes to good regional processes is very winding and full of potholes, but given the limited capacity of the current nation-state system it may well be the safest one to take. The United Nations began soon after the end of the Cold War to explore regional security cooperation through two types of complementary meetings. Following a 1992 Russian proposal and a 1994 UN General Assembly declaration, the UN Secretary-General began convening in 1994 a series of high-level meetings with regional organizations aiming at a vision of a regional-global security mechanism, having already resulted in several modalities for conflict prevention and peace building. More importantly, in the wake of the 2002 Iraq crisis the UN Security Council began looking for partners in peace and security, and convened an exploratory meeting with regional security organizations in April 2003, which led to a second one in July 2004 to find ways to increase collaboration between the United Nations and regional organizations in stabilization processes, particularly by exchanging information and sharing experience and best practices. In a third meeting that took place in October 2005 members unanimously signed a resolution urging regional and subregional organizations that have a capacity for conflict prevention or peacekeeping to work within the framework of the UN standby arrangements system that allows countries to commit resources for UN peacekeeping operations. This meeting was jointly organized by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, be-
beginning a fruitful series of multi-level gatherings that should continue under the new Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and the goodwill of members of the Security Council. The window of opportunity is still open, as most regional processes are still looking for model roles to help multi-level countries successfully link across the world.

The rise of the macro-regional level

In the late 1970s European studies began to flourish, in particular with the creation in Florence of the European University Institute (www.EUI.eu), the first intergovernmental European postgraduate research and training centre in the social sciences. Its rich and rather anarchic academic debates have been reflecting the full variety of European and North American approaches to law, economics, history and political and social sciences (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006). They do not stop at analysing particular intra-European aspects, but they often focus on the evolving nature and role of Europe in the world. Social constructivist approaches are relatively advanced, but many resident and visiting academics are known for their scepticism about the future of Europe. Participants discuss whether Europe will become a super-federal state with soft or hard global ambitions, an intergovernmental alliance with a minor external projection, a macro-protectorate of the United States in which reaffirmed nation-states keep bickering, or simply an increasingly less relevant part of the world, possibly collapsing into a new medieval rivalry of smaller levels of governance in which hordes of migrants would radically transform an ageing European culture.

During the Cold War the European Economic Community was carefully watched for its implications for the GATT agreements in trade liberalization, but it was not really considered a serious multidimensional regional space. Meanwhile, the Non-Aligned Movement (www.E-NAM.org.my) and many other groupings of developing countries could not substantially advance their grand declarations of peaceful cooperation. Thus the study of a peaceful macro-region was left to a minority of thinkers who basically focused on how much and how Europe would regionalize. Mitrany (1943) began arguing even before the war was over that Europe should advance one step at a time, as the regionalization of functional sectors would give impetus to other sectors. This approach led to various neo-functionalist refinements, sometimes less normative and just based on empirical analysis, but sometimes arguing about the need to adapt various public and private actors. Meanwhile, interstate or intergovernmental theories argued that states’ governmental actors are still the key to regional cooperation, which was by no means crystallized to the point
of not being able to revert to the previous set of competing European states. Russet (1967) exceptionally took a global view when he analysed countries’ voting in the United Nations, their trade patterns and their membership in international governmental organizations. He concluded that there was not a world system made of regions, although he noticed that besides European economic cooperation there were developments suggesting an incipient Asian subsystem.

After the Cold War a vision of the world divided between first (US-led), second (Soviet-led) and third worlds is basically gone (although some leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement meet every three years and present strong declarations, but leave it others to consider implementing them), and we are all now living in fluid and flexibly interconnected multi-level spaces. New world regional dynamics are particularly competing for recognition and influence, which, as in the case of countries and international organizations, may be analysed and reanalysed in many dimensions as they evolve. But before theorizing and judging their internal and external merits and demerits it is necessary to have good knowledge of their present form and nature.

A more plural generation in the academic study of other macro-regional processes has began to develop as regional groupings around the world become more substantial. The growing plurality of approaches from around the world jointly contributes to theorizing a variety of multi-dimensional forms of integration, including economic, political, military, social and cultural aspects advanced by both governmental and non-governmental actors, thus going far beyond the goal of creating region-based free trade regimes or security alliances of earlier regionalisms usually advanced by governmental actors. In this complex and competitive field there is not yet even a clear consensus on the necessary conditions to recognize a macro-region as sufficiently homogeneous and distinct. That is natural, as many post–Cold War macro-regional spaces still have somewhat unfocused goals and limited resources, and frequently contain smaller and variable groups of countries, often overlapping, thus in effect creating still very fluid multi-level dynamics above the level of the nation-state. There is nevertheless some academic vocabulary in English denoting different possible paths to develop macro-regional spaces. The term “regionalism” refers to the driving role of political institutions in establishing a regional governance coherence and identity; the term “regionalization” implies a more fluid process driven by a plurality of actors, often profit-oriented businesses. And the terms “regionness” and “regionhood” have been advanced to argue that structural regions may be socially constructed, as if mimicking the development of Westphalian political territories into modern nation-state models. Yet a crucial caveat is here necessary. While world powers have sanctioned a system of sovereign
nation-states, the world is not giving way to a new system of similarly sovereign regions, as we will now see. The rise of macro-regions, coupled with intrastate dynamics, is instead giving way to a new multi-level paradigm that goes beyond the study of European or global macro-regionalism.

The world’s main regional projects

The EU (http://Europa.EU) regional process, originating in selected functional cooperation in the 1950s among 6 countries, rose over alternative regional projects and kept growing; in May 2004 it enlarged from 15 to 25 member states nowadays preoccupied with rationalizing their institutions to manage their many and peaceful multi-level interactions better. The European Union is often seen as the paradigm of a new regionalism wave that widens to embrace new members, deepens to address more issues and reaches out to the world for a variety of purposes. But other macro-regional processes are developing around the world in different ways.

Regionalism in East Asia is nowadays arguably the most interesting after that in Europe for the increasing strength of its many internal and external links. The Association of South-East Asian Nations (www.ASEANsec.org) was created in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand to diffuse security tensions; nowadays its 10 member countries deal with a broad range of issues, and it hopes to crystallize its achievements in a semi-constitutional charter by 2007 to commemorate its four decades of evolution. Although highly networked with important partners from around the world, ASEAN is particularly linking with its receptive North-East Asian neighbours through the ASEAN+3 process that began in 1997. Japan, China and South Korea (the “3”), although traditionally proud powers with a recent history of confrontation, used the 2003 ASEAN+3 summit to launch a process of tripartite cooperation that is regaining momentum after Japan’s Koizumi stepped down in the autumn of 2006. Understanding their need to transcend their differences and solve some pending problems, ASEAN+3 countries are now advancing a broad-based East Asian Community gradually reaching to neighbouring and distant powers. The first East Asian summit held in 2005 after the traditional ASEAN-centred summits welcomed Australia, New Zealand and India to begin a discussion on strategic issues. Further, ASEAN and North-East Asian countries are at the centre of a growing set of interregional relations that reach America, Europe, Africa and other parts of Asia. In other words, although the United States has allowed some regional self-government in non-communist Europe and East Asia through its alliances with Germany and Japan (Kat-
zenstein, 2005), in the twenty-first century not only the European Union has been advancing a global projection, but also East Asian countries have successfully begun to develop external functional dialogues and cooperation linkages.

In the Americas, the United States is still the driving force behind an open economic regionalism model focusing on trade and investment liberalization rather than European or East Asian multidimensional cooperation, which it believes would come naturally after the economy is liberalized. Its business firms have led the active North American Free Trade (and Investment) Agreement (www.NAFTA-sec- alena.org) since its inception in 1992, and it hopes to advance similar development ideas through the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (www.FTAA-alca.org) and triennial Summits of the Americas (www.Summit-Americas.org). The FTAA’s eighth ministerial meeting in November 2003 tried to maintain political commitment to conclude negotiations by January 2005 against the background of the failed WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun the previous September. However, an earlier comprehensive free trade agreement was then scaled down in terms of timing, participation, rights and obligations. Meanwhile, the US Monroe Doctrine is still the key to the fate of the broader Organization of American States (www.OAS.org), the institutional leader of the Summits of the Americas – far from a regional process as its Charter, signed in 1948, hopes “to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their territorial integrity and their independence”. In short, these are largely contradictory goals which, coupled with very limited resources and the potential erection of a great wall along the US-Mexican border, render the OAS quite ineffective.

South of the Rio Grande, Latin American countries are trying once again to cooperate regionally and develop in more areas, hoping to avoid the failures of previous waves. Efforts during the 1960s–1980s were driven by the dominant role of the state in the economy and a development model relying on import substitution. At the end of Cold War many countries were mired in debt crises, forcing them to rely on a US-backed neo-liberal model of structural adjustments including economic deregulation and various types of trade liberalization, substantially lowering tariffs. In the race to compete there are nowadays over 30 new regional integration initiatives, forming a mesh hard to disentangle, but what is important here is that some are moving beyond narrow trade issues to deal with a larger array of economic issues and even aiming at political and socio-cultural ones. The most prominent is the Southern Cone Common Market (www.Mercosur.org.uy), dating back to 1991 and institutionalizing broad relations in 1995 between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. Chile, Bolivia and Peru are associate members, and it has
actively pursued closer relations with other countries (like Mexico) and regions. It signed a free trade agreement with the five countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) of the Andean Community (www.ComunidadAndina.org), entering into force in July 2004, which is a key step towards closer South American economic integration with broader community aspirations, a process formally launched a year later. Meanwhile, the Central American Integration System (www.SGSICA.org) that started in 1991 faces many challenges but has progressed in trade issues as it links with North America, although it maintains distance from the Caribbean Community and Common Market (www.CARICOM.org) of mainly English former colonies aiming to re-enact a common political space. Trying to create a coherent layer over these and other Latin American regional cooperation processes is the Rio (de Janeiro) Group. This is an intergovernmental mechanism (yet without a fixed secretariat or website) for permanent political consultation and coordination of many issues beyond trade created in 1986 by the Contadora and Support groups concerned with the political crises of Central America; it has grown so far to 19 members. In the meantime, Latin American countries have not only participated in interregional dialogues with Europe and East Asia, but have also begun to explore links to other parts of the world. The fate of these top-down regional and interregional efforts is still uncertain as non-governmental actors have not yet deeply regionally integrated and governments have not fully tuned to a common long-term strategy. For instance, Venezuela, resisting US pressures to liberalize trade, recently tried to lead a different set of alliances and linkages with Cuba and other Latin American countries while jumping from the Andean Community into Mercosur.

**Struggling regional processes**

Regionalism in South Asia partly hopes to revive a range of relations similar to those of previous Indian empires. Mogul India (including present-day Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka) later became the core hub of Britain’s trading empire in Asia, but its decolonization process almost closed the country as it focused on breaking the traditional social hierarchies. Many socio-economic problems left unresolved are now addressed in a more liberal fashion, moving away from earlier loose links to the former Soviet Union and the Non-Aligned Movement orbit, by increasing cooperation with the economically dynamic world. Yet India’s relations with its neighbours have not been very good and the long South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (www.SAARC-sec.org) process remained stalled. SAARC, officially born in 1985 to advance jointly in economic, social and cultural development, was hampered by
the rule of unanimity, by its slow and non-binding procedures, by a lack of trade promotion progress (a preferential trading arrangement entered into force in 1995 but discussions for a freer trade area are dragging) and by the geopolitical tension between Pakistan and India. Dialogue on politically contentious matters was officially not allowed under the SAARC Charter. However, regular meetings of ministers did provide opportunities for informal talks, which have finally paid off. While at the beginning of 2003 India and Pakistan were on the edge of war over the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, a year later they agreed to a negotiated solution, now well on track. This took place on the margins of the twelfth SAARC summit, where participants approved a free trade agreement entering into force by 2006 and decided to advance a social chapter hoping to improve the dismal indicators of human development. SAARC’s path remains quite steep and bumpy. The February 2005 summit meeting was postponed due to India’s posture on the internal political developments of Nepal, but in November in Dhaka SAARC members welcomed China and Japan as observers while considering giving some sort of observer status to accommodate the increasing interest of neighbouring and distant powers, including Iran, South Korea, the United States and the European Union.

The post-Soviet space has given rise to many competing, broad-based regional processes of still unclear potential for good global governance. Not only is Russia fearful of further territorial losses and conflicts, but during the 1990s it tried to maintain its grip on its neighbourhood through the Commonwealth of Independent States (www.CIS.minsk.by) that holds regular summits and has a secretariat in secluded Belarus. But the CIS has been ineffective in maintaining peace or promoting economic and social development, and Central Asia became again in the 1990s a cauldron of geopolitical hostilities. Under President Putin, a Russia concerned with European enlargement, US takeovers and encircling alliances, facilitated by recently more pro-Western Ukraine and Georgia and North-East Asian growth and instability, is nevertheless reviving its external projection through shifting regional agreements. A 1991 Collective Security Treaty of dwindling membership was upgraded in 2002 into a Collective Security Treaty Organization. A project for a Eurasian Economic Community appeared in 2000, ambiguously superseding a planned CIS Customs Union and hoping to merge with the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO), itself the successor of earlier attempts (the Central Asian Commonwealth, Central Asian Economic Union and Central Asian Economic Cooperation). Meanwhile, the Community of Democratic Choice advanced in 2005 by Ukraine and Georgia catalyses Baltic, Caspian and Black Sea countries in conjunction with Europe and the United States.
South of Europe there is another rather fragmented area of precarious stability and uneven development. Formal, interstate efforts at regional cooperation based on ethnic and linguistic affinities are not strong. The League of Arab States (www.ArabLeagueOnline.org), created in 1945 among many of the new states formed in the wake of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the retreat of European colonial powers, nowadays has 22 members that usually prioritize nation-building and self-sufficiency over long-lasting regional cooperation. For these and many other reasons it has become a large area of still generally limited social, political and economic dynamism. Meanwhile, on the eastern side of the League, six rich oil- and gas-producing countries formed in 1981 the multidimensional Gulf Cooperation Council (www.GCC-sg.org), which is lowering and standardizing tariffs and even exploring monetary cooperation. But on the western side of the League, five quarrelling countries defer real convergence through the Arab Maghreb Union (www.MaghrebArabe.org) they created in 1987. The evolution of the League of Arab States is particularly dependent on global geopolitics. Each military action led by the United States in the area divides it but prompts new efforts for smaller groups to explore more fruitful ways of cooperation. And as the mantra of freer trade slowly percolates, there are greater chances of success for a Greater Arab Free Trade Area to be gradually implemented this decade among the 14 main traders of the League – that is if the Bush administration’s current chief vision for the region does not strain the process too much. The hawkish plan for a greater Middle East partnership, stretching all the way to Pakistan and giving priority to imposing formal democracies and opening markets while attacking informal transnational links, has not yet convinced the world. Meanwhile there are other regional linkages not based on ethnicity that could promote peaceful development. One could argue that the Organization of the Islamic Conference (www.OIC-OCI.org), established in Rabat in 1969 at the height of confrontations with Israel, is not a substantial organization despite its 57 member states and its many agencies in all kinds of fields given the great diversity within the Islamic world. Yet the Economic Cooperation Organization (www.ECOsecretariat.org), established in 1985 by Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, three ethnically and politically very different Islamic countries, for the purpose of promoting economic, technical and cultural cooperation, has been expanding with some success (it works in English) to seven other Central Asian republics.

In the large and diverse area south of the Sahara, several regional processes, often based on European colonial legacies, are not only suffering problems of competition and coordination but also a generalized lack of resources and, in and around Congo-Zaire, a horrific war to appropriate
natural resources. The Economic Community of West African States (www.ECOWAS.int) was created in 1975 by 16 countries (Mauritania withdrew in 2000) to advance a free trade area, and later upgraded to broader economic and political cooperation. ECOWAS now wants to launch a monetary zone based on the extension of the geographically smaller area in the French-speaking Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa (www.UEMOA.int) using the West African franc, and perhaps joining the Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (www.CEMAC.cf) to the east. In the meantime the rest of sub-Saharan Africa is advancing a series of multidimensional regional groupings whose success is still uncertain. The Southern Africa Development Community (www.SADC.int) was created in 1992 to advance economic, political and social issues and in its 2003 summit approved a long-term regional indicative strategic development plan and a charter of fundamental social rights. The SADC may now have some chances to achieve a free trade area with the recent joining of South Africa, the leader of a more successful and non-overlapping Southern African Customs Union. Yet the SADC overlaps the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (www.COMESA.int), established in 1994 among countries all the way up to Egypt, which looks for a customs union – COMESA’s formal institutions have even started to consider cooperation in peace, security and foreign policy given the troubles in some of its members. In addition, Kenya and Uganda have been reaching to Tanzania and smaller neighbours to promote still another regional project, the East African Community (www.EAC.int). Meanwhile, the continent created in 2002 the African Union (www.Africa-Union.org), in the wake of the ineffective Organization of African States, hoping to accelerate social, economic and political integration and partly catalysing and coordinating the existing smaller regional mechanisms. It links with the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (www.NEPAD.org), a proposal emanating from South Africa, the richest and politically most dynamic country in the continent.

There are other interesting regional projects linking large areas of the world that until recently one would hardly think could be functional. The Pacific Islands Forum (www.ForumSec.org.fj) is an intergovernmental consultative organization founded in 1971 as the South Pacific Forum gravitating around Australia and New Zealand, but the name changed in 2000 to reflect better the wider geographic locations of its more resolute 16 member states. Its secretariat, which grew out of the South Pacific Economic Cooperation bureau, now centralizes broader political issues and chairs the Council of Regional Organizations in the Pacific, a consultative process to coordinate the activities of its autonomous members. Meanwhile the Arctic Council (www.Arctic-Council.org) brings together
North America, Northern Europe and Russia to discuss social, economic and environmental issues through a combination of national governments and indigenous peoples increasingly well organized in international and substate multi-level platforms. The Antarctic Treaty (www.ATS.aq) that has been developing since 1961 does not focus on territorial claims but on ways to maintain a sanctuary for global scientific cooperation. The third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (www.un.org/Depts/los) that entered into force in 1982–1994 has established the International Seabed Authority in Jamaica (www.ISA.org.jm). Finally, for dreamers whose limit is the sky, the International Space Station (www.esa.int/esaHS/iss) is just a springboard.

In sum, the many regional projects nowadays arising around the world (see summary in table 1.1) do not seem either a passing fad of political elites who like to travel abroad to forget their domestic concerns or a geostrategic positioning for some ominous clash. Rather, a variety of countries aware of the perils of isolation want to lead or link to their neighbours for a broad range of political, economic and socio-cultural purposes to be accomplished in the long term under functional and competitive principles.

The spread of knowledge-based transnational actors

How is it possible that the world’s shaky system of nation-states holds despite being challenged by a variegated set of emerging micro-regions and macro-regions? My argument is that new types of less territorially bound private and mixed actors have risen thanks to the accelerating information and communications revolutions and have gradually woven strong meshes of functional interests that irreversibly link various levels of governance.

The broad concept of governance, promoted in transatlantic academic circles over past decades, refers to modes governments have of coordinating, often through shifting networks, with many other actors. A political territory is still governed “top down” by institutionalized government actors, but they selectively allow domestic and external private and mixed actors to reach “bottom up” into functional governance areas. In the European Union there are so many types of government agencies linking with, and decentralizing to, private actors that the European Commission helped start in 2005 a large-scale pan-European Integrated Project on New Modes of Governance (www.eu-newgov.org) to examine thoroughly their nature, structure, goals, resources, interrelationships and outcomes. In East Asia the growing interaction among domestic and international public actors may soon require a similar exercise. In the
meantime the Govern Asia project (www.governasia.com) launched in Barcelona provides a first platform for a comparative governance approach in China, India, the Philippines and Viet Nam. To contribute to these efforts, this section will now overview the main actors linking across multi-level areas of global governance.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Geographical location</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year of establishment</th>
<th>Number of countries (2006)</th>
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<td>Pacific Islands Forum</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td><strong>Arctic</strong></td>
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<td>Arctic Council</td>
<td>1996</td>
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<td><strong>Antarctic</strong></td>
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<td>Antarctic Treaty</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td><strong>Oceans</strong></td>
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<td>Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>149</td>
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</table>
Business actors

A world system assumed to be composed of Westphalian nation-states logically required one to assume the overriding primacy of states’ governmental apparatus in international relations. Public government actors have in the past decades indeed become very active, as they have agreed many treaties and codified customs for states to recognize each other’s territories and generally and functionally engage in economic, social, political and military activities. Yet although the final interpretation and adjudication of the existing laws and rights rest with contracting states, they are often not needed, nor capable of or interested in being the prime actors.

The spread of profit-seeking business firms in the past decades does not require much argument to convince observers of their power as key actors in globalizing capitalist systems. Firms now come in all sizes and shapes, from small investment and consulting partnerships to state-owned enterprises and large conglomerates, or focused firms no longer chartered by governments of nation-states but incorporated and taxed in whichever country or locality makes more economic sense. Many firms in liberalized economies link in more or less shifting networks to advance minor functional issues as well as broad political economy interests, all adding up to the bottom lines of accounted and unaccounted financial statements. Yet the territorial bases of the bigger global corporations still maintain much value. Ruigrok and van Tulder (1995) analysed governmental assistance to Fortune 100 companies (mostly based in North America, Western Europe and North-East Asia), finding that the main non-tariff measures were government procurement (often defence related), licensing arrangements, promotion of selected international strategic alliances and advantageous approaches to intellectual property rights protection (that is, lengthening the duration and scope of government-sanctioned monopolies to reward innovation). According to the triangular diplomacy model of Strange (1996), traditional state-state diplomacy has irreversibly been joined by state-firm and firm-firm diplomacy in the transnational political economy.

The tertiary or service sector based on human activities accounts for about three-quarters of economic added-value among developed countries, and over half in the rest of the world. Access to useful information and applying knowledge are crucial to raise the productivity of globally competing actors. Financial markets were the quickest to globalize, thanks to telegraph, telephone and computing. New transport and info-communication technologies have allowed more service activities to raise their profits. Indeed, the largest business firms have appeared in service sectors like info-communications and banking (Financial Times, 2000). And the world’s richest businessmen are often at the head of these firms.
Microsoft’s Bill Gates, the world’s first centibillionaire (despite his charity activities he could claim ownership of a noticeable slice of the world’s annual economic output), leads a long list of globally networked billionaires hoping to catch up with him through the increasing shares of profits of not necessarily computer-based but always knowledge-driven firms operating among the many competing multi-level political, economic and socio-cultural standards.

**Weaving more social actors**

As global movements of people increase in numbers and types, the governance of nation-states becomes an even more challenging multi-level priority (Global Commission on International Migration, www.GCIM.org). According to the International Organization for Migration (www.IOM.int), in 2005 the global stocks of migrants exceeded 3 per cent of the total world population. North America is still the main destination of the world’s migrants, but recently Europe’s migrant population has risen to over 6 per cent and there are fast-increasing exchanges of people within East Asia. Models to welcome and accommodate migrants in functioning nation-states, ranging from optimistic melting-pots able to transcend parochial cultures to more multicultural mosaics, are under strong global pressures to adapt (Parekh, 2006). Yet localizing pressures remain strong. The United States, once one of the key magnets for many people who wanted to progress politically and economically, is, according to Putnam (2000), becoming socially fragmented and less politically participatory, while Huntington (2004) warns that the mainly Protestant basis of the United States may be undermined by immigrants from other civilizational spaces – ideas that seem to have percolated into the 2006 immigration law hoping to reaffirm an Anglo-Saxon national identity over the many ethnic minorities that compose the country, especially the southern states that hold many millions of Hispanics. Fortunately, other parts of the world keep tearing down walls.

The nearly 500 million citizens and residents of the European Union should be able to move and find work without much trouble from controls. Tourist visas are no longer needed for citizens who have similar passports, and no longer needed in the Schengen area when flocking on to affordable trains and airplanes. There are exceptions for Eastern Europeans, and many other enthusiastic migrants still face various discriminations, but they do not substantially diminish the great mobility that most people may enjoy. Most European member states, although now in the middle of a grand debate on how to accommodate the rapid growth of European and global migrants, remain committed to both a full-fledged internal market and an “ever closer union of peoples”.
Like the European Union, the East Asian community is gradually realizing its hopes of a closer interaction of peoples. ASEAN countries are lifting tourist visa requirements and promoting many people-centred initiatives as part of an ASEAN socio-cultural community concept launched in 2003. Meanwhile, short-term people’s exchanges among North-East Asian countries have flourished in the past few years in a new climate of gradual political opening. The World Tourism Organization (www.World-Tourism.org) indicates that East Asia is the world’s fastest-growing tourist market, with the majority of tourists coming from within the region. Skilled workers employed in high-tech multinationals enjoy relatively good mobility among the well-linked economic hubs of coastal East Asia. And cheap labour from poorer countries is employed in more developed economies in low-tech sectors like construction, agriculture and food distribution, domestic service and “adult entertainment” – relatively worrying situations that are now addressed by multi-level trade unions and pro-worker NGOs like the Migrant Forum in Asia (www.MFasia.org) and the Asian Migrant Center (www.Asian-Migrants.org). Meanwhile, the governments of Japan, mainland China and South Korea are weaving many more types of their bilateral people’s exchanges into a more tripartite or trilateral regional space, softening their traditionally restrictive policies to accommodate an increasing number of workers and other migrants (Van Arsdol et al., 2005).

As distinct cultures communicate and interact in fluid environments with little recourse to segregation, younger generations eventually realize they have to manage creatively and competitively, like complex financial portfolios, a multiplicity of globally interlinked layers of social and political identities. As reflected in the public opinion surveys of the European Eurobarometer (http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/), a majority of people in most EU member states are increasingly considering themselves as having some European identity on top of their national identity. Meanwhile, responses from the newly established (East) Asia Barometer (www.AsiaBarometer.org) show that most urban people in East Asia are not opposed to the idea.

The Union of International Associations (www.UIA.org) indicates that the tens of thousands of international and transnational organizations not directly under the control of governments or businesses operate not only from America and Europe, but increasingly from parts of Asia and beyond. Given the restraints on civil society in many countries, few independent organizations may claim to be very influential in global multi-level governance, but the rise of info-communication sectors is changing the panorama. For instance, increasingly vocal groups of a variegated international “civil society” coordinated through e-mail and internet largely contributed to the failure of the controversial World Trade Orga-
nization “Millennium Round” of negotiations to expand the scope of liberalization which would have been launched in November 1999 in Seattle, setting the tune for later confrontations at high-profile international gatherings. Moreover, e-mail and websites have been instrumental in forming a multi-level World Social Forum (www.ForumSocialMundial.org.br). After a first meeting of hundreds of thousands of activists in Porto Alegre (Brazil) in 2001, their leaders decided that from 2002 onwards there would be regional, continental and thematic forums to extend their influence. Regular European forums attract many activists, and in parts of Asia and elsewhere civil society keeps growing in numbers and organizational strength.

Adaptive public actors

To manage the activities of these active transnational actors, many countries and regions are accordingly adapting their public diplomacy in a multi-level fashion. The US government announced in early 2006 a reconfiguration of its diplomatic corps to move diplomats stationed in Europe to many large cities in areas around the world lacking US embassies and consulates so as to understand and link better with a greater variety of actors. The EU countries may soon create a European External Action Service converging the functions of member states’ embassies and the representatives of the European Commission. There are already agreed elements in the formation of a European diplomatic academy to help staff European diplomatic offices with both federal and intergovernmental personnel. And in 2006 the first Asia-Europe diplomatic academy gathering took place in Poland, as many countries in East Asia are also creating or enhancing international studies and training centres that increasingly link with each other and the world.

International lawyers are also joining forces. For decades there were few courts or arbitration mechanisms capable of swiftly giving injunctions in complex interstate conflicts or reining powerful countries into acknowledging their value. For instance, the US government under the Bush junior administration led a group of powers suspicious of giving away some sovereignty to the International Criminal Court (www.ICC-CPI.int), rendering many people fearful that they preferred to create, interpret and enforce their own laws and morality in such a way as to undermine the work and will of the broader international community. But the Bush administration began slowly to realize that secret and special gaols like the one in Guantanamo are detrimental to its foreign policy objectives.

While the world slowly finds minimum international agreements on how to define and judge the international crimes of state and non-state
actors, regional and international organizations develop a legal personality. International organizations linked to the UN system and others have one for many functional purposes. The European Union defends its legal prerogatives in national, European and international courts of justice. Africa and other parts of the world are also developing regional legal institutions to advance the processes overviewed in the previous section. ASEAN plans to conclude at the end of 2007 a charter to give it a strong legal personality. As it promotes its linkages between parliaments and legalizes its institutions it will doubtless try to develop broader regional legal mechanisms reaching to China and beyond. Moreover, recourse to private international law, once a very rare option for most small enterprises and individuals as it required much time, skill and money just selecting the applicability of conflicting civil laws in different countries, is gradually giving way to a multiplicity of soft legal mechanisms and courts around the world for businesses to solve their differences and individuals and social groups to plead for their basic human rights.

Slaughter (2004) argued that more effective and just intergovernmental cooperation is possible if one agrees on better ways to create accountable synergies among the growing number of transnational informal networks of government officials in legislative, executive and even judicial branches capable advancing functional aspects of global governance (table 1.2). For global public networks to function it is also imperative that virtual public spaces mobilize knowledge-based transnational actors that help consensuate basic operating principles of the evolving world order in which nation-states have de facto already softened the principle of sovereignty.

**Knowledge mediators**

In a budding number of liberal democracies the interplay among political parties reflects the resolution of conflicts of basic interests among many
institutionalized public and private actors. Although political parties are still far from becoming the key instrument of global civil society linkages with multi-level governance institutions (Chase-Dunn et al., 2006), progress has recently been manifest in Europe, East Asia and beyond. International working-class and communist political associations now command only a fraction of their past power as more centrist global political platforms consolidate. The Socialist International movement (www.SocialistInternational.org) is nowadays a low-key platform for many democratic centre-left parties, while the International Democrat Union (www.IDU.org), created in 1983, has already accommodated centre-right parties in about 60 countries. The Liberal International movement (www.Liberal-International.org), dating from 1947, remains a weaker coalition of small centrist or similar parties, but the green parties, which emphasize local autonomy and democracy, started in the 1990s a global coordination with an incipient multi-level structure (www.GlobalGreens.info). Overall, regional political platforms have a growing presence in the European Parliament, an institution that has slowly increased its relevance to the point of having dismissed the Santer Commission for a minor corruption scandal, and with the prospects of increased powers in future constitutional upgrades of the European project. Meanwhile, the biennial International Conference of Asian Political Parties (ICAPP) that began in 2000 with the help of German political foundations to link political parties of Asian-Oceanian countries is attracting increasing interest. Delegates from 82 political parties in 32 countries gathered for the third ICAPP in Beijing, showing China’s ruling party that contested regional political platforms can advance progress without undermining basic stability, and Chinese and other delegates from 90 parties attending the fourth ICAPP in Seoul in 2006 agreed on a declaration to consolidate regional peace and prosperity (Xinhua News, 2006). As these and other regional networks of parliamentarians grow, the vision that drove the Inter-Parliamentary Union (www.IPU.org), dating from 1889 efforts in France and the United Kingdom and now including 143 national parliaments and 7 associated regional parliamentary assemblies, may soon attract more global attention.

Religious institutions and state philosophies with encompassing views of human development have long been very influential in mediating between terrestrial powers and ordinary people. After the collapse of the ideological Cold War, religious institutions are still influential in Europe, America and beyond, but limited when it comes to the management of ever stronger and more complex global multi-level networks overflowing with information and knowledge (Hanson, 2006). The Catholic Church and its hub state, the Holy See, do not command the strength of previous centuries even in Rome; other Christian denominations move independ-
ently; detrimental Islamic fundamentalism is now under attack by Bush and his allies; and most other widespread religions (Buddhism, Hinduism, animism, etc.) are even less capable of global transformations. It is thus difficult for the world to promote a religious dialogue and compromise on fundamental values. Perhaps more and more structured councils and ecumenical and interfaith dialogues, humbled by irrefutable human progress, will provide more hope and wisdom to the world. In the meantime, pressure to advance global multi-level governance in the information age has required nervously praying governments to link in novel ways with business firms and independently rising socially concerned organizations.

When intergovernmental relations are tense and transnational political parties and other strong civil society mechanisms are lacking, governments have often used informal (sometimes called Track-2) diplomacy that flexibly brings together academic scholars, retired government officials, social activists, public figures and other mediators. Track-2 processes with a research base and mechanisms to link broadly are nowadays quite numerous around the world. In two successive Christmas specials in the early 1990s *The Economist* (1991, 1992) weekly magazine presented two lists of reclusive but influential think-tanks and networks around the world, with relatively few outside the United States and Europe. While that may have made interesting holiday reading, there are now more comprehensive and systematic directories of the growing think-tank activity around the world that require much patience to digest. Europa Publications (1995) released a large-scale survey that cannot realistically be properly updated given the explosion of think-tanks around the world. Similarly, Japan’s National Institute for Research Advancement (www.NIRA.go.jp/ice) has long been producing a *Think Tank Directory* that can nowadays no longer catch up with all global organizations or regional developments in East Asia. Many of these think-tank networks and transnationally linked policy communities were instrumental in catalysing regional progress, but in a competitive environment for policy ideas, like firms venturing into profitable markets, think-tank networks increasingly become differentiated into competitive multi-level epistemic policy actors trying to advance their proprietary visions to link governments with a more complex set of private actors.

The more independent lobbies of international civil society actors reaching the ears of government officials are sometimes labelled as Track-3. While few countries’ governments promote truly independent civil society organizations, basically all countries around the world use relatively autonomous universities to advance their governance goals. According to the International Association of Universities (www.Unesco.org/iau), there are over 100 million students attending some 16,500
higher education institutions in over 180 countries. While some governments still try to turn these institutions into tools of antagonistic nation-building, universities have become bases for globalizing economic and social linkages, forcing countries and regions around the world to regulate them in a more open, multi-level fashion. The triple helix concept (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 1997) is becoming increasingly useful to conceptualize the flexible and competitive connections between universities, governments and businesses in North America, Europe and other places. Moreover, university-based academics and students have also often galvanized major social revolutions (like Paris in 1968, or Beijing in 1989) and nowadays are often behind global multi-level social movements like the Porto Alegre World Social Forum. In between these tensions to globalize universities for business or revolutionary purposes, countries in Europe and East Asia are leading regional cooperation projects in higher education that will merit a full chapter of this book.

The framework: Governing more levels of networked actors

The knowledge revolution facilitated by information and communication technologies is rendering obsolete the traditional realist paradigm in which military power was used to conquer sovereign territories and their material and human resources. Nowadays, as states link, business firms compete for economic power based on the standardization of production bases and consumer markets in more liberalizing economies, while new transnational forms of civil society get formed and become engaged to check the excesses and make up for the deficiencies of markets. To manage this situation, public governments need to reinvent themselves to maintain their usefulness. They increasingly link with evolving networks of profit-oriented businesses as well as more socially conscious civil society actors. Thus they form new governance levels that force a gradual adaptation in the size and shape of traditional nation-states and other areas of governance below and above them. The great complexity of political interactions within and across my four main analytical levels of political interaction is summarized with examples in table 1.3.

Applied transdisciplinary research (combining their main insights into useful syntheses), rather than just theoretical interdisciplinarity (selectively adding partial insights of detached and entrenched academic disciplines), now allows us to build on the increasing understanding of the plural rise of regions and the rise of peaceful transnational actors so as to advance a framework of global order based on multi-level governance.

A historical synthesis could render four main generations in the study and understanding of world politics increasingly informed by the peaceful
Table 1.3 Global interactions within and across levels of public government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Global</th>
<th>Macro-regions</th>
<th>States</th>
<th>Substate regions</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Interplay among UN and related organizations and treaties – WTO vs UNCTAD</td>
<td>Key to global multi-level governance – UN’s increasing recognition of EU and other regional processes</td>
<td>Classical international relations – UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
<td>UN Security Council Commission of Inquiry on Darfur</td>
<td>Weak but rising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macro-regional</td>
<td>EU’s negotiating power in the WTO</td>
<td>Macro-interregionalism – Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM); EU and East Asia’s projections towards other world regions</td>
<td>EU promoting change in accession and candidate states</td>
<td>EU efforts to develop Russian Karelia</td>
<td>Medium but rising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States</td>
<td>International regimes – US reforming the UN through Bolton; EU promoting the ICC</td>
<td>Macro-regionalism – France and Germany, traditional engines of the EU New external projections – Spain’s projection towards Latin America</td>
<td>Classical international relations – ratified through exchange of ambassadors, etc.</td>
<td>Classical federalist tensions – Germany negotiating with its states New external projections – Finland’s aid to Aceh</td>
<td>Strong but declining</td>
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<tr>
<td>Substate regions</td>
<td>Catalonia’s creation of cat. regional top-level internet domain</td>
<td>Catalonia leading creation of EU Committee of the Regions</td>
<td>New federalist tensions – Flanders’ own foreign policy towards Eastern European countries</td>
<td>Micro-interregionalism – Oresund economic region between eastern Denmark and south-western Sweden Global cities – New York, London, Tokyo in capital markets</td>
<td>Weak but rising</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
rise of regional processes, all paving the way to a new global multi-level governance paradigm (table 1.4). The first generation was the times of forceful politics, when even “enlightened” countries and empires expanded largely through military strategy. International relations scholars would clearly argue that those were times of crude “realism”, in which warring states constantly competed for territorial, material and human resources. The second generation started at the end of the Second World War, and concentrated on peaceful, functional and intergovernmental economic cooperation in Western Europe. But while some global economic regimes helped engage more countries into the Western economic system, much of the global architecture was still largely explained by realists focusing on Cold War rivalries. The third generation, often based on “new regionalism”, has developed since the end of the Cold War by arguing that in addition to increasing economic exchanges, political institutions and socio-economic interactions are constructing more complex regions not only in Europe but also around the world, as overviewed above. As many regional processes advance, regionalism theory comes of age but sometimes competes with new forms of liberal institutionalism, constructivism and, especially since 9/11, a neo-realism that argues that world politics is defined by both multipolarity competition and more diffuse, non-state challenges of terrorism and illegal trade. Hänggi, Roloff and Rüland (2005) distinguished between five levels of international policy-making: global, inter- and transregional, macro-regional, transborder institutions at a subregional level and bilateral state to state, and then analysed how some world regions are indeed becoming more relevant ac-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Type of regional process</th>
<th>Associated theoretical paradigm in world politics</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1940s–1950s</td>
<td>Expansion through security projection</td>
<td>Realism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1960s–1980s</td>
<td>Increasing importance of trade</td>
<td>Neo-realism with concessions to liberal institutionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1990s–</td>
<td>Formation of broad preferences in economic, social and political aspects</td>
<td>Mix of realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2000s–</td>
<td>Regions enhance their external projection to various levels</td>
<td>Global multi-level governance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
tors as they engage in autonomous bilateral relations that naturally vary in form, function, intensity and regularity.

A new generation of understanding of multi-level world order is possible when focusing on the plural interactions of public and private actors between and across many countries, regions and global regimes. Despite their variety and adaptation, states remain the main units of analysis to understand global governance, and state-to-state or international relations led by public actors are a natural consequence of the state system. Yet global cities and incipient micro-regional diplomacy have risen from the federal flexibility of nation-states to advance economic and socio-cultural issues functionally. But much more important for global governance is the competitive rise of macro-regional processes in economic, socio-cultural and even some political and military issues. Functional overlapping inter- and transregional relations are a consequence of increasing external projection of the formation of a macro-regional level. Meanwhile, on top of it all are the patchy global regimes not totally dependent on states’ actors, as they are starting to adapt to the rise of other levels of governance. With this flexible and functional framework classical international relations, as well as new regional studies, become subsets of the complex dynamics of multi-level governance. The traditional concept of international foreign policy becomes increasingly less relevant as a region’s intentions become embedded in multi-level interrelationships. Each area of governance now reconfigures the external projection of its domestic interests in a multi-level fashion. The size and shape of a governance area functionally change and evolve beyond the contours of traditional nation-states. Using a metaphor for the internet age, a multi-level governance region thus becomes a political node dynamically linking to other nodes through a variable geometry and mix of optimizing actors that nurture flexible economic spaces and social identities.

The structure of the book’s case studies

The book will argue the validity of the above theoretical framework by focusing on how Europe and East Asia are leading the transformation of global governance into a multi-level system with flexible states and regional processes collaborating with dynamic knowledge actors.

The European project revolving around a union since the early 1990s is doubtless the main case of new world regionalism with an increasing global, multi-level projection. It often serves as a benchmark to multidimensional regional processes in Latin America and Africa due to the institutional density and relatively strong cultural or colonial links, and gives inspiration or raises interest elsewhere. But the interrelated processes in North-East and South-East Asia are much more interesting
and important, as no natural or historical community informs current regional developments. Japan, South Korea, China and South-East Asian countries are a unique mix of regimes with little similarity to those found in other regional processes around the world. But the increasingly linked economies of East Asia are roughly of equal density and size as Europe’s or North America’s, and a Confucian legacy leads many of their people to prize education for progress. More crucially, despite their still frequent political tensions, they have not fought for decades and are not likely to do so as their interests become embedded with the whole world’s. In sum, regional developments in East Asia suggest an alternative working regional model worthy of very close study to understand the future of global multi-level governance.

For each chapter, I focus first on regional developments in Europe and their increasing external dimension. Then I elaborate on the converging regional developments in East Asia and their increasing global projection. Afterwards, I compare the European and East Asian cases and see where they may be creating global multi-level synergies. Europe and East Asia in particular share commonalities when reaching inter- and transregionally, not only among themselves but also to other parts of the world. The process of reforming multilateral organizations and processes would be facilitated through gradual decentralization to a layer of innovative regions that better address the interplay between local and global concerns. Naturally, this multi-level approach requires a new engagement of the United States with its dynamic multi-level friends and allies.

Chapter 2 analyses the activities of Track-1 public government actors advancing supranational political interaction and institution-building. Chapter 3 studies the role of policy think-tanks and similar advisory Track-2 actors helping policy-makers to mediate regionally and globally with other public and private actors. The following two chapters argue that increasingly Track-3 business and social actors are helping consolidate knowledge-based regional and global governance. Chapter 4 studies how governments are promoting regional economic cooperation than allows the competitive interplay of public and private profit-oriented business firms in new sectors. The chapter pays particular attention to the multi-level development of converging information and communication sectors at the centre of new economic globalization. Chapter 5 focuses on how global social change is sought through a transformation of the higher education institutions that link regionally. The concluding chapter will first present a summary of my argued framework, then transdisciplinary theoretical implications and, finally, some basic policy recommendations to advance knowledge-based global multi-level governance with more engaged and clear-sighted actors.
2

Advancing multi-level intergovernamentalism

Chapter 1 introduced the theoretical and empirical elements to understand global multi-level governance. The following four chapters are complementary case studies to prove it as a worthwhile paradigm. This chapter focuses on the main public actors with the overall political power to lead the advancement of such a paradigm. The following three chapters focus on key types of actors that complement public ones from different angles.

We will start with the political developments behind the construction and increasing global projection of the European regional space before proceeding with the ever more interesting East Asian regional process. Afterwards, both processes will be studied for their potential to effect global change in other parts of the world and in international organizations like those of the UN system.

Overview of the European projects

The reconstruction of Western Europe that began six decades ago has led to an unprecedented durable peace and prosperity in a growing number of European countries. Under a Pax Americana, many people in Western Europe worked hard to lift their countries from rubble and some thought even harder on ways to consolidate a durable peace by advancing in steps until reaching a political union. The pooling of scarce resources soon led to the gradual creation of a larger space for businesses

and workers, all while maintaining social safety nets and renouncing military competition, hoping eventually to consolidate a political union. Complementary developments have been uneven, but remarkable nonetheless.

During the 1940s there were some interesting regional projects that still exist. At the end of the war, five Northern European countries (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Iceland) created the Nordic Council (www.Norden.org) to advance closer cooperation in political (basically parliamentary) and social (education, culture) issues. Meanwhile, the governments in exile of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg had also started during the war to explore economic cooperation, which became in 1948 the Benelux Treaty (www.benelux.be), transformed in 1960 into an economic union to last for at least 50 more years.

Seeing good prospects in such early regional experiments, British politician Winston Churchill gathered in 1948 in the The Hague (Netherlands) Congress all kinds of pro-European groupings to declare a common desire to work supranationally in all possible areas. The first institution coming out of this broad vision of peaceful coexistence was the Council of Europe (www.COE.int), aiming to form a Western union. It was set up in 1949 by 10 countries in the symbolic city of Strasbourg, now in France but formerly in Germany. The Council of Europe eventually did not agree on pooling much functional sovereignty, but its current 46 member states work jointly to advance aspects of broad and difficult areas like human rights, culture and education. It also has a Congress of Local and Regional Authorities that promotes self-government within signatory states. Moreover, successful membership in the Council of Europe has always been a prerequisite for any European country wishing to join the more demanding and functional European Communities (now the European Union).

An appeal made by Robert Schumann, the French foreign minister, in May 1950 is considered the starting point for the three European Communities, the institutional precursors of what four decades later became the European Union (http://Europa.EU). Following his appeal, the Treaty of the European Coal and Steel Community, or Treaty of Paris, was signed in April 1951 and came into force in July 1952. For the first time, a group of very diverse states (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) that had many times fought each other agreed to render European history obsolete by working towards peaceful integration in tangible strategic sectors. The treaty made it possible to lay the foundations of the community by setting up a high authority, a parliamentary assembly, a council of ministers, a court of justice and a consultative committee. Following the successful implementation of the Treaty of Paris, although France was opposed to the reconstitution
of a German national military force, the Frenchman René Pleven envisaged the formation of a European army. The European Defence Community negotiated in 1952 was to have been accompanied by a political community, but both plans were shelved following the French National Assembly’s refusal to ratify the treaty in August 1954. So efforts to get the process of European integration going were discussed at the Messina (Italy) Conference in June 1955 and took the form of specific proposals on customs union and atomic energy cooperation. They culminated in the signing of the treaties of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (also known as Euratom) in Rome in March 1957, coming into force in January 1958. The aim of the European Economic Community was to establish a common market based on the four freedoms of movement of goods, persons, capital and services and the gradual convergence of economic policies. The aim of Euratom was to coordinate research programmes on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, a promising technology already being advanced by member states. Although the Euratom treaty was concluded for 50 years, the two other community treaties ran for an unlimited period, which gave them an almost constitutional character.

From the European Communities to the European Union

The European Economic Community treaty set guiding principles and a legislative framework to manage mainly the elimination of customs duties between member states, the establishment of an external common customs tariff, the introduction of a common policy for agriculture and transport and the creation of a European social fund. The common market implied not only the free movement of goods through the scrapping of tariffs and related trade barriers, but also the mobility of factors of production (workers, services and capital) that required addressing many structural economic conditions. It was envisaged that a common market would be achieved in three stages from 1957 to 1969. By then a customs union was legally completed and member states had adopted a common external tariff for trade with third countries, but there were still major obstacles to internal mobility of goods, people and capital. Yet the European Court of Justice interpreted the regulations in the transitional period in such a way that, when it ended, a number of provisions took direct effect. Meanwhile, the Euratom treaty had laid down highly ambitious objectives, including the rapid establishment and growth of nuclear industries, although these had to be scaled down since they touched directly on national security interests. A parallel agreement stipulated that a parliamentary assembly and a court of justice would be common institutions to the three communities. It only remained to merge the execu-
tive institutions, which happened with another agreement signed in 1965. From that time onwards the European Economic Community became more prominent than the two sectoral communities, representing a victory for the general purpose over narrow functional goals.

The European Communities project could not sit in complacency as it was open to healthy competition. The United States, the manager of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (www.NATO.int) since its inception in 1949, also helped most of non-communist Europe to enter a path of joint economic reconstruction through the Marshall Plan, which was coordinated by the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) set up in Paris in 1948. The member countries of the OEEC proposed setting a broad free trade area to which countries not willing to enter the European Economic Community could belong, and in which the European Economic Community would function as one unit. As these negotiations failed, in 1958 the seven countries outside the community (Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) decided to form the European Free Trade Association (www.EFTA.int) to enhance their future bargaining power in establishing the envisioned wider free trade area. EFTA is based on the Stockholm Convention signed in November 1959, and became operative six months later with a small secretariat in Geneva (this was then superseded by today’s Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in Paris – www.OECD.org – to provide comparative research and policy recommendations to a growing number of industrial countries around the world). Finland, Iceland and Liechtenstein later joined EFTA, but Finland and most of the original seven eventually withdrew as they gradually joined the European Communities/Union. EFTA still exists with four countries, although Norway, Iceland and tiny Liechtenstein basically move along with the European Union under a scheme called the European Economic Area that came into effect in 1994–1995. The Swiss confederated cantons, always circumspect of strong governance systems, nevertheless maintain many privileged relations with the European Union as they have basically accepted the four economic freedoms (for goods, services, capital and people) and other economic regulations which are at the foundations of the European Economic Community of the European Union.

The European Communities/Union were enlarged every few years as they were joined by European countries satisfying ever stricter democratic and economic criteria. After a French veto during the 1960s, the United Kingdom finally joined in 1973, together with Denmark and Ireland, but Norway voted against accession in a referendum. Greece became the tenth member in 1981, Portugal and Spain joined in 1986, Austria, Sweden and Finland joined in 1994 and 10 former communist...
countries joined in 2004, enlarging the European Union from 15 to 25 member states. They were deemed to have met the Copenhagen Criteria agreed by EU leaders in July 1993: they had stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. They already had a functioning market economy with capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces, and their institutions were able to administer the obligations of membership. This was the fourth and most complex wave of enlargement, and possibly the last large-scale one. Romania and Bulgaria acceded in 2007, but Turkey, the Balkans and perhaps others will most likely be kept waiting for full membership while they are engaged in various functional ways.

Encouraged by the initial successes of the economic community, the aim of also creating political unity for the member states resurfaced in the early 1960s and several proposals were advanced. Yet the negotiations failed on three points: uncertainty as to the place of the “outsider” United Kingdom with its special transatlantic relationship, disagreement on the issue of a European defence system aiming to be independent of the US-led NATO, and the excessively intergovernmental nature of the institutions proposed, which was likely to undermine the supranational aspect of the existing community institutions. Yet an incipient foreign policy coordination, the European Political Cooperation, was set up in 1969 at the summit conference in The Hague. Moreover, rotating conferences of heads of state and government (called European Councils, formally unrelated to the Strasbourg-based Council of Europe) were introduced to provide some political impetus and settle the problems that ministerial council meetings could not handle. For instance, to help tackle the worsening economic crisis of the late 1970s, a European monetary system was established on a voluntary and differentiated basis, eventually leading to the creation of the euro. Another example began at the London European Council of 1981, when the foreign ministers of Germany and Italy put forward a proposal for a “European Act” covering a range of subjects: political cooperation, culture, fundamental rights, harmonization of the law outside the fields covered by the community treaties, and ways of dealing with violence, terrorism and crime. It was not adopted in its original form, but some parts of it resurfaced in the “Solemn Declaration on European Union” adopted by state heads meeting in Stuttgart in June 1983. This text forms an important base for the Single European Act of 1986, the first substantial change to the Treaty of Rome. Its main objectives included creating a large internal market by 1 January 1993; increasing the role of the European Parliament; and improving the decision-making capacity of the Council of Ministers. The Act strengthened the European Community’s powers by creating new responsibilities: a monetary capability, social policy, economic and social
cohesion, research, technological development and the environment. It also institutionalized the European Political Cooperation on foreign policy.

Several treaties in rapid succession added substance and structure to the European project. The Treaty on European Union was signed in Maastricht in February 1992 and came into force in November 1993. The Union was based on the three existing European Communities, but supported by new policies and forms of cooperation all commonly categorized into three pillars. Pillar one comprised the existing supranational or federalist European Communities. The other two pillars were based on more cautious intergovernmental cooperation in which ministers, aided by lower-level committees of civil servants, acted unanimously. Pillar two was the evolving common foreign and security policy; pillar three was cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs, which included issues like visas, asylum and immigration. The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in October 1997 and came into force in May 1999. Its objective was to amend and amplify the content of the Maastricht Treaty in five main areas: freedom, security and justice; citizenship; external policy; institutions; and closer cooperation. It advanced some issues like democratization, but it did not include all the institutional reforms which were necessary for enlargement. But contrasting with the European Political Cooperation, the Treaty of Amsterdam, hoping to create a new “area of freedom, security and justice”, moved much of the Maastricht third-pillar provisions into the first pillar or Economic Community machinery. Only policy and judicial cooperation on criminal matters remained rather intergovernmental, but, spurred by 9/11 and similar events, the European Union is nowadays particularly enhancing its cooperation in justice and home affairs.

The Treaty of Nice (France) was signed at the European Council of December 2000 to address some of the shortcomings of the previous treaties. Yet political compromises made it an extremely complex and opaque system of voting and institutional allocation. Thus Germany prompted in Nice for a serious process of reform and clarity. The European Convention on the Future of Europe (http://European-Convention.eu.int) was set up in 2002 to draft a constitutional treaty that would transform the Union’s institutions and enhance their prerogatives to accommodate the largest intake of new members. The draft treaty was presented to the Council meeting at Thessalonika (Greece) in June 2003, which agreed to use it as a base for further intergovernmental work that run from October 2003 to June 2004. All 25 EU member states signed in Rome in November 2004 the “Treaty for European Union”, but the process of unanimous ratification required for the treaty to enter into force was temporarily frozen in mid-2005 after a majority of French and Dutch
voters rejected it in successive referenda. Actually, as the construction of Europe was seen by many citizens concerned with globalization pressures as too remote and driven by technocratic élites, these referenda on Europe served as an admonition to national politicians. Since then, the élites of the European institutions and member states advance elements of the treaty that do not require full ratification and search for compromises and visibility to break the deadlock. It is possible that later in this decade France and the Netherlands will carefully stage new referenda for somewhat revised constitutional compromises.

A flexible, multi-level Europe

Despite the problems in strengthening and applying the various EU treaties, European collaboration advances through complementary multi-level regional mechanisms. Within the European Union there is the possibility of general closer cooperation in key issues with selected opt-outs or exceptions for one or more member states (Kolliker, 2005). Differentiated integration is a long-standing practice necessary to accommodate the great diversity of European political systems, even more so now that 12 ex-communist countries are basically playing by the rules they once formally despised. Differentiated intergovernmental cooperation has also long been a common practice in the functional areas that largely remain outside the European Communities/Union remit.

Usually France, Germany and a few continental European countries join EU agreements without reservations, and the United Kingdom and others opt to wait and see if and when they would like to join fully. This is the case in monetary union, used so far only in 13 countries as the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden decided not to join for the time being, and the last batch of EU member states may decide to convince the euro-land group that they meet the membership criteria. The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1999 actually contained general provisions allowing some member states to take advantage of common institutions to organize closer cooperation between themselves. Given these flexible arrangements, there are now many calls by politicians in Europe to proceed with European integration through greater use of the reinforced cooperation of willing leading countries which others may eventually join.

Sometimes a limited intergovernmental agreement grows and becomes part of the European Union. That is what happened with the Schengen Agreement that allows citizens and residents to move freely without showing their passports when crossing internal borders. Signed in the 1980s by a few continental countries, the Schengen Agreement was incorporated into the European Union in the 1990s for most countries to follow with the exception of the United Kingdom and Ireland. This type of
differentiated arrangement may also happen in the energy sector. In February 2006, in the middle of escalating difficulties in securing oil and gas from the Middle East and Russia, France, Germany and the Benelux countries announced plans to create among themselves an energy market that is now spurring the rest of the EU countries to speed common liberalization.

But many other regional intergovernmental mechanisms exist and evolve in unique ways. This has been happening in big science projects (CERN, Eureka), transport (the European Space Agency, Airbus, Eurocontrol), communication (GSM for mobile, the Galileo positioning system), sports (football, athletics), education (higher) and other functional knowledge areas. Of particular interest are the ongoing developments in communications and higher education, sectors which will be analysed later in this book.

Finally, the flexibility of the multi-level nature of the European Union shows in the collaboration of substate regions called Euro regions. Complementing the work to promote local governance by the Council of Europe, the European Union has an advisory Committee of the Regions (www.COR.europa.eu), set up in 1993 after being prompted by the Spanish autonomous community of Catalonia. This committee has been seeking the right to refer to the Court of Justice cases where the principle of subsidiarity is infringed. This principle says that European governance should take place at the lowest level possible as long as joint goals are not compromised. It is expected that the new Treaty for Europe will eventually confer this fundamental right which would clarify the degrees of flexibility among existing multi-level governance developments in Europe (summarized in table 2.1).

Europe’s growing external dimension

The European project is now at a crucial juncture to adapt nimbly to new, sometimes local but often global, challenges. European institutions have been since the beginning designed to help handle not only internal but also external policies and relations regarding the issues over which member states decided to pool sovereignty. But reflecting the differentiated nature of overlapping European projects, Europe’s joint external dimension also advances through functional differentiation.

Institutional development

The three European Communities, created in the 1950s by the Treaties of Paris and Rome, have at their institutional core the Commission of
the European Communities. Also simply called the European Commission, it is in full charge of external trade in goods but has only a secondary role in external trade of services, capital and human resources –
issues that the Commission has to devolve to member states. Moreover, during the 1980s and 1990s the Commission became increasingly charged with cooperation mechanisms, as well as with humanitarian and emergency aid. To handle all that external activity, the Commission has developed six full directorate-generals employing hundreds of people involved in external relations, divided according to geographical and functional objectives. While the European Parliament is still rather secondary in the whole process, the secretariat of the EU Councils has taken a stronger role in advancing a common foreign policy, albeit in an intergovernmental fashion in more difficult issues, even military cooperation.

Soon after creating the intergovernmental European Political Cooperation in 1969, the foreign ministers of the then six member states and a few Commission officials began meeting in a rotating fashion in some of the nicest restaurants of their countries. Long and good meals and wine were supposed to induce finding compromises, which were later reported in Brussels to the ambassadors of the member states to work on. In between meals, ministries exchanged confidential information through a system of telegrams, telexes and faxes named COREU. For several years they worked like that, following the principles of non-interference and equality. Their only policy instruments were mutual information and consultation in their efforts, with rather limited success, to harmonize views and concert diplomacy, especially towards the United States. The European Political Cooperation was enhanced when heads of state and government began meeting in European Councils. The first European Council of 1975, chaired by the then French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, dealt mainly with economic issues, but a few international political issues were raised (Palestine, South Africa). Throughout the following decades, heads of state focused more on security and defence issues.

The main actor in Europe’s overall external dimension has been the General Affairs and External Relations Council, a meeting of foreign ministers regularized by the Single European Act signed in 1986. Ministers discuss and coordinate to the extent possible both political (intergovernmental) and economic (federal) issues (pillars one and two), with pillar three increasingly part of the other two. There is a debate about creating a regular defence council, which has not yet happened formally although there have been informal meetings of defence ministers since the late 1990s alongside foreign ministers. Below the meetings of heads of state and ministers, the diplomats making up the Political and Security Committee prepare the general ministerial meetings and the Military Committee of top generals provides advice and recommendations.

The high representative is a position created in 1999 by the Treaty of Amsterdam to link politicians and bureaucrats better. S/he is also
secretary-general of the Council Secretariat (www.Consilium.Europa.eu) where s/he is located. In international meetings the European Union is usually represented by the “troika”, originally meaning the heads of government of the countries that just held, hold and will next hold the six-month-long rotating EU presidency, but nowadays meaning the head of government of the country holding the presidency alongside the president of the European Commission and the high representative.

Towards a fuller foreign and security policy

The European Union has grown since the 1950s mainly on economic bases, so the external projection of its economic policies is much more homogeneous and influential than in other areas. The European Union has become a trade power with about 20 per cent of world trade, mainly with industrialized countries in Europe, North America and East Asia, although it is also substantial in many developing countries. External trade and related economic policy decisions are taken mainly in the so-called “(Article) 133 Committee” of ministers and the Directorate-General for Trade (until recently headed by Commissioner Pascal Lamy, current head of the WTO). Since the adoption of the euro, monetary policies are handled by a combination of economic and finance ministers of the 27 member states, a smaller ministerial of the countries which have adopted the euro and the Frankfurt-based European Central Bank, one of the most independent agencies of the European Union.

General development aid policy aims to help poor peoples with financial, technical, trade (tariff) and humanitarian measures. The European Commission’s Directorate-General for Development manages special partnership arrangements for the 70 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries which are former colonies of France and Britain. Originating in the Yaoundé and Lome Conventions from the 1960s until the 1990s, and updated in the Cotonou Agreement of 2001 for the next decade, the ACP arrangements promote cooperation in many areas and use special instruments to encourage trade and stabilize export prices, but these arrangements will in a few years be phased into special free trade agreements. Meanwhile, with a large group of least developed countries the European Commission has recently taken the initiative to open its markets fully to everything but arms.

The European Union has other types of broad cooperation and association agreements with much of the rest of the world, depending on how close the relationship is. They tend to include clauses on a broad range of issues, including political dialogue; respect for human rights and democracy; establishment of WTO-compatible free trade over a transitional period; provisions relating to intellectual property, services, public pro-
curement, competition rules, state aids and monopolies; economic cooperation in a wide range of sectors; cooperation relating to social affairs and migration (including readmission of illegal immigrants); and cultural cooperation. Regarding human rights, the European Union may publicly condemn abuses, make representations and adopt various measures to correct them. The strongest arrangements have been with former communist countries in Eastern Europe to prepare many of them for eventually joining or otherwise linking with the Union.

The European Union also leads the world in the amount of humanitarian and food aid given to countries suffering from human crises or natural catastrophes, like in former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Sudan, Iraq and Indonesia.

EU member states increasingly have a joint global presence in issues handled outside the European Community, but a European foreign policy in security and defence remains a rather fragmented intergovernmental process with less tangible results than in the issues presented above. Since the beginning of the European Political Cooperation ministers have broadly informed and consulted each other on matters of foreign and security policy of general interest, but this “systematic cooperation” usually led only to joint declarations.

The Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam in the 1990s added new foreign policy instruments and improved the structure and hierarchy among them. On top of systematic cooperation are “common positions” adopted by the Council to define the approach of the Union to a particular matter. Member states must ensure that their national policies conform to common positions. There have been many common positions, especially relating to international forums such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (www.OSCE.org) that links transatlantic partners with much of the post-Soviet space, and towards the United Nations.

A common foreign policy is considered full-fledged when it can handle military defence. Europe is still under US military oversight through NATO and bilateral arrangements, although it has argued for more autonomy while it upgrades its military institutions. The Western European Union (www.WEU.org), a low-key military organization created in the 1950s, is since the creation of the post of high representative for the EU’s common foreign policy supposed to be able to contribute to the so-called Petersberg missions approved in 1992 for European troops to engage in humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and crisis management, including peacemaking, that may require actual use of force.

Yet since earlier capacities proved of little value to help resolve the Balkans conflict in the mid-1990s, in 1997 the European Council adopted “joint actions”, a slightly more ambitious tool to be used to address spe-
specific situations where operational action by the Union is deemed necessary. Joint actions must lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available by the European Union, the conditions for their implementation and, if necessary, their time duration. The next level of joint cooperation regards common strategies applying in selected areas. They are decided by the European Council upon the recommendation of the Council of Ministers. Common strategies are also required to specify their objectives, duration and the means to be made available by the Union and member states. On top of it all are the principles and general guidelines defined by the European Council, including matters with defence implications.

With these initiatives a European security and defence identity has slowly appeared alongside an evolving NATO. The current agenda in European foreign and security policy is being determined by the European Security Strategy, designed after the lack of a common response regarding the US-led regime change in Iraq. Like the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, it focuses on international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional threats, failing states and organized crime. Approved in the European Council of December 2003, it involves all the three pillars of the Union and was welcomed by the United States and multilateral organizations as it highlights the need to use human and social policies to solve largely global threats.

The European Union has already co-led some semi-military operations with NATO in Macedonia, and arranged police operations there and in Bosnia. More importantly, it has led UN forces in Congo-Zaire, and is nowadays becoming, again under the United Nations, the main pacifying force on the southern Lebanon border. While there is not yet a European army to help realize its purposes, a number of complementary forces are being set up. Nowadays most European countries contribute to a non-standing European rapid reaction force of more than 60,000 troops deployable anywhere in the world within 60 days for a period of 12 months, and to smaller battle groups deployable within two weeks. And there are also some experimental complementary military assets led by smaller groups of countries, like Eurocorps in continental Europe and Eurofor and Euromarfor in Southern Europe, which are at the disposal of European, NATO, OSCE or UN leaders.

The salience of interregionalism

The European Union maintains a strong multi-level set of external relations that include basically all of the world’s states, as well as regional and international processes and organizations. Relations with the United States face many difficulties but are generally strong and mutually bene-
ficial. The Transatlantic Declaration adopted in 1990 set the new principles of cooperation and consultation, and the New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995 laid a more detailed framework across many activities, with economic issues further addressed in 1998 in the special Transatlantic Economic Partnership. The “full and equal partnership” also aims to stabilize and develop other regions of the world. Disagreement in the wake of the US takeover of Iraq and complex commercial matters make that task very difficult, but the historic visit of President Bush to Brussels’ European institutions in February 2005 promised to mend the rift.

Particularly relevant for global multi-level governance, the Union has actively developed interregional dialogue and cooperation processes that go beyond the core trade and aid competencies of the European Commission and aim at comprehensiveness by raising a growing number of political, economic and social issues.

EU relations with Latin America have since the 1990s progressed partly through interregional agreements with political, economic and social objectives that also foster regional integration. The San José Dialogue, which forms since 1984 the cornerstone of EU-Central American relations, hopes to solve armed conflicts by means of dialogue and negotiation and includes a cooperation programme to address the socio-economic causes of the crisis. The meeting in 2004 took place alongside the third EU-Latin America and Caribbean summit, the highlight of a process which since 1999 has tried to catalyse relations with Latin America as a whole, as well as with its various subregional processes, through a strategic association touching political, economic and cooperation aspects. For that a bi-regional group of public administrators manage over 50 priority actions. The European Union concluded in 1983 a first cooperation agreement with the Andean Community, followed by a new one in 1993 which provided for economic and trade cooperation and development cooperation and included a most-favoured-nation clause. The last joint meeting was held in parallel with the Rio Summit in June 1999. The European Union has since 1999 had a framework agreement with Mercosur to achieve a partnership for political and security issues, closer cooperation on economic and institutional matters and the establishment of a free trade area for goods and services under WTO rules. EU and Mercosur officials also meet on the margins of interregional summits. Meanwhile, there are almost non-existent interregional arrangements between the European Union and the US-led NAFTA process, which Europe sees as too focused on trade and investment liberalization without enough concern for social and political issues.

The comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has since 1995 governed EU policy towards the strategic southern and eastern Mediterranean; that is, the Maghreb, the Mashrek and Turkey. The partnership, also called the Barcelona Process, overarches bilateral and multilateral
relations and seeks peace and stability based on fundamental principles, the creation of a free trade area and broader social, cultural and human relations. The European Union gives some financial and much political support to the process, but it seems it is never enough. Part of the reason is the recent problems of the Middle East, which the European Union craves to resolve faster with a complementary multidimensional Middle East peace process. As the issue converges with others, the European Union is advancing a proposal for a “wider Middle East” to reach to Iraq and Iran. Meanwhile, the European Union would like to have another free trade zone with the relatively peaceful and developed Gulf Cooperation Council countries to upgrade the cooperation agreement it signed in 1989 with the group.

The enlarging European Union has always put a special effort in its neighbouring areas and advances a number of overlapping initiatives to reinforce each other. In March 2003 the European Commission adopted a communication setting out a new framework for relations over the coming decade with the almost 400 million people of what it calls “wider Europe” – the southern and eastern Mediterranean, Russia and the western newly independent states. The strategy aims to create a “ring of friends” by offering them greater aid, cooperation and access to its internal market in exchange for concrete political, economic and institutional reforms.

The European Union’s relations with Russia have much improved in the last decade. A partnership and cooperation agreement addresses in the decade 1997–2007 trade and economy, science and technology, energy, environment, transport, space and a range of other civil sectors, as well as more complex dialogues on broad political issues and justice and home affairs. It pays special attention to the long-term procurement of oil and gas, and hopes that an energy charter treaty setting clear rules eventually gets ratified by the Russian Duma. Meanwhile, the joint summit of 2003 went further and agreed to structure in the long term all relations into four spaces consonant with Europe’s structure (the three EU pillars and other issues outside them): economy; freedom, security and justice; external security; and research, education and culture. An upgraded agreement starting in 2007 would like to focus more on regional issues, which might lead to some cooperation between the European Union and a still somewhat relevant Commonwealth of Independent States that tries to keep the allegiances of former Soviet republics locked in by other powers. Yet tensions remain, as the enlargement of both the European Union and NATO make many Russians feel threatened, which leads the Kremlin to use energy and military tools for strategic purposes.

Agreement, signed in 2000 for 20 years to supersede earlier agreements, mainly affects 48 sub-Saharan countries located south of those involved in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and “wider Europe” initiative. While differentiated to take account of the levels of development and the specific concerns of the countries concerned, the agreement embodies a comprehensive partnership based on three pillars: political dialogue, preferential trade relations and significant resources devoted to development and economic cooperation. Since October 2003 ACP negotiations have advanced at the subregional level, first with Western (ECOWAS) and Central (CEMAC) and then with Eastern and Southern African countries. Furthermore, the European Union has been increasingly engaged in conflict-prevention activities in Africa and in the financing of post-conflict demobilization and reconstruction programmes. In most cases this has been in support of Africa’s own mediation efforts entrusted to regional or pan-African bodies. At the continental level the first EU-Africa summit was held in Cairo in April 2000, a joint, comprehensive EU-Africa Strategy is being drafted with the collaboration of civil society for the second summit planned for late 2007 in Lisbon, and the European Union is prepared to use the NEPAD scheme for any activity that may be led by (South) Africans themselves.

Europe’s relations with developing South Asian countries could further improve. Europe used to be the South Asian countries’ most important trading partner and a major export market, but the overall degree of trade is very low while India’s trading relations with East Asia have recently been growing fast. Meanwhile, development cooperation between the European Union and the countries of South Asia covers financial and technical aid as well as economic issues. Europe has in this way been trying to support the institutions and activities of SAARC (including exchange of information, technical aid and training), but internal problems of SAARC have traditionally prevented any effective advancement.

The European Commission pushed in 1994 for a broad-based process of increasing dialogue and cooperation towards Asia (East, South-East and South) with its “New Asia Strategy”. A Singaporean initiative reacting to the original EU Asia Strategy led in 1996 to the interregional Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process that helped pave the way for closer independent collaboration first between East and South-East Asia. ASEM was designed as an intergovernmental, flexible dialogue and action on broad political, economic and social issues involving the member states of the European Union on one side and the Asian countries of ASEAN and North-East Asia on the other. The relatively slow but tectonic transformations catalysed by the ASEM progress during its first decade are now giving way to a rising and better-structured East Asia that is defining some of the main changes of global multi-level governance.
The increasing coherence of East Asian links

The last dynastic Chinese empire gradually decayed in the nineteenth century due to a complex mix of internal and external factors. Towards the end of that century, Japan came out of its secular near-isolation and entered a new world being divided or influenced by Western powers. In the twentieth century the Japanese military led the Japanese empire to defeat or conquer some of its neighbours, including parts of once-mighty China and mainly European colonies in South-East Asia, arguing it would paternalistically lead an East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere—a discourse that ended with the US victory in 1945.

In the following decades East Asian countries underwent bewildering transformations. Mao took over China, aided by Stalin; the country later tried to isolate itself, and finally began to promote links with non-communist countries that paved the way towards modernization for Deng’s China. Chiang’s Taiwan relied on the US security umbrella and eventually became democratic, a situation that allows a plurality of voices on its possible status vis-à-vis mainland China. Japan became a military protectorate of the United States but with much independence to profit from global markets. Russia’s grip on Mongolia softened and the newly democratic country gradually participates in a variety of regional processes. The United States remains the key security balancer in the split Korean peninsula and the region. South-East Asian countries became independent, often after struggles, and began forming nation-states under communist, military, monarchic or populist regimes. But an unwise move that mishandles one of the animosities which still plague the region could well turn into a large-scale regional, or even global, confrontation.

Nevertheless, most countries of East Asia have realized that cooperation is better than conflict to solve their differences and prosper in peace. Some countries in South-East Asia took in the 1960s a first intergovernmental step in regional cooperation. Since the mid-1990s, North-East Asia has entered a path of closer cooperation that builds on links to more advanced regional developments, especially in South-East Asia but also in other parts of the world. How much South-East and North-East Asian countries are really willing to weave a dynamic, multi-level East Asian community is still open to debate, but among the many mixed signals the developments in political institutional processes sound exceptionally promising.

The institutional harbingers: The ASEAN subregional core

After minor development plans to help large parts of Asia, and unsuccessful efforts to create alliances between several young countries in the
region, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (www.ASEANsec.org) was quietly launched in Bangkok in 1967 (Severino, 2006). Under a *Pax Americana* underpinned by bilateral security arrangements (Acharya, 2001), foreign ministers from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand signed a short, simply worded ASEAN (or Bangkok) Declaration, hoping to create an atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation to help maintain a precarious peace in the region and counter the fear of Soviet- and Chinese-backed communism as well as limit the desires for intervention of the United States and its allies. The cautious ASEAN intergovernmental path has remained flexible but communicative, stressing process over quick results. It has grown to 10 countries and attracted the interest of many more country and regional partners. It has not yet advanced as much as the European Union, but it has recently picked up speed in terms of the number and depth of policy issues it addresses.

The first five ASEAN member countries successfully focused on regional peace and stability. In 1971 they signed a “zone of peace, freedom and neutrality”. The Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation were adopted in Bali in 1976, the same year that a small secretariat was set up in Jakarta to prepare the rotating meetings taking place in hosting countries. During the following years the mood was hopeful, but ASEAN economic and social cooperation remained low.

After the Cold War against Soviet-backed communism basically ended in the early 1990s, ASEAN began a new phase of growth. It explored broader regional coordination in a substantial number of economic issues, as well as so-called functional areas that addressed particular microeconomic and social issues. And, spurred by the financially sparked crisis of 1997, ASEAN leaders declared even more and grander goals. At its sixth summit meeting that took place in Hanoi in December 1998, it drew up the six-year-long “Hanoi Plan of Action”, the first in a series of plans to achieve the much broader “ASEAN Vision 2020” adopted at the second ASEAN informal summit held in Kuala Lumpur a year earlier, aimed at a regional “concert of Southeast Asian Nations, outward looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded in partnership in dynamic development and in community of caring societies”.

An independent Brunei Darussalam joined ASEAN in 1984, and four former antagonists joined during the next decade: Viet Nam in 1995, Laos and Burma/Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia was finally admitted in 1999 after being temporarily given observer status only due to its internal political struggles. The independence of East Timor, achieved in 2000–2002, forced the ASEAN club to consider further expansion. But to decrease the pressure for substate regional fragmentation, East Timor was only accepted as a candidate observer.

In the new century ASEAN is rapidly transforming itself into a coher-
ent community, hoping not to lose momentum in the new global turmoil. In October 2003 in Bali, leaders agreed in a solemn declaration to advance the ASEAN Concord II Community project in which three broad communities for cooperation (political and security, economic, socio-cultural), somewhat resembling the EU pillar concept, would help achieve the ASEAN vision to live in peace and prosperity by 2020. For that, the current Vientiane Action Programme, being implemented over the period 2004–2010, is advancing its more concrete plans of action, taskforce recommendations and many detailed programmes and measures.

ASEAN’s political goals include soft democratic elements, an enhanced institutional framework, strengthening legal and governance mechanisms and the promotion of human rights. The ASEAN secretariat, which has become the hub for 25 regular ministerials and many hundreds of annual lower-level intra-ASEAN and external gatherings and follow-ups, may soon become more effective with plans for decentralization to ASEAN members so as to achieve greater coordination with national bureaucracies. If such a move were successful ASEAN may then increase the number of technical functional agencies to be based in different countries; so far there are only small, low-profile bodies like the ASEAN management agency in Brunei and an ASEAN agency for biodiversity in the Philippines.

An ASEAN programme for shaping and sharing norms is highlighted by the efforts to have a legally binding ASEAN charter by the end of 2007, when ASEAN members meet in Singapore to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the association. An eminent persons’ group comprising 10 distinguished and respected citizens from ASEAN member countries in 2006 examined and provided bold recommendations on the direction of ASEAN and the nature of the charter, to legalize ASEAN going beyond the so-called “ASEAN way” of non-interference in other members’ internal matters and consensus-driven intergovernmental processes. In its June 2003 ministerial meetings ASEAN started to discuss the internal problems of Burma/Myanmar, and at its July 2005 summit Burma/Myanmar bowed to pressure and skipped its 2006 turn in the group’s rotating chairmanship, all while its ruling junta retreated to a jungle post built with Chinese help after the United States invaded Iraq.

The ASEAN Security Community encourages further accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation by non-ASEAN countries after India, China, Japan and Australia recently acceded and committed themselves to promoting good relations with ASEAN and not using force to solve disputes. It will further encourage good conduct in the oil-rich South China Sea, the securing of a nuclear-free ASEAN, mutual legal assistance, a convention on counterterrorism, suspect extradition, maritime
security cooperation and many measures to address conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding. The inaugural ASEAN defence ministers’ meeting held in Kuala Lumpur in May 2006 reaffirmed the general interest “to bring ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment”, adopting a concept paper for enhanced, frank and transparent dialogue and cooperation in all aspects of defence and security involving various political and military actors.

The other two ASEAN communities are also advancing towards a broad range of goals, hoping to achieve a fine balance between economic and social progress. The ASEAN Economic Community addresses trade in goods and services, finance and direct investment and sectors like transport, info-communications, science and technology, energy and food. And the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community plan of action aims to tackle the full range of development concerns in the region to build a community of caring societies, to manage the social impact of economic integration especially through skill upgrades, to enhance environmental sustainability and to strengthen the broader cultural foundations of regional social cohesion.

Flexibility within ASEAN

Many of the detailed programmes of the ASEAN communities are, as in Europe, advancing through the functional differentiation that brings together only the capable, willing or concerned countries or subregions.

The original ASEAN-5 countries are still the core of ASEAN. Their long history of interaction gives them an advantage over the newcomers. In particular, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore often take the lead in many issues, later welcomed by the rest of the members lacking experience or funding capacity.

Singapore has also pioneered links with neighbouring subregions and countries. The Singapore-Johor-Riau Growth Triangle became the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle. Its success led to a much larger and comprehensive Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle, and the East ASEAN Growth Area (EAGA) comprising Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines (BIMP).

Meanwhile, the Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution was signed in 2002 by all ASEAN members, hoping to solve the environmental crisis caused by land clearing by open burning on the Indonesian island of Sumatra. It entered into force a year later as six countries ratified it (Brunei, Laos, Malaysia, Burma/Myanmar, Singapore, Viet Nam); Cambodia later ratified the treaty, but Indonesia has yet to do so.

These ASEAN–X arrangements (in which X number of countries are
given opt-outs in order to facilitate advancing a particular issue) are used not only for intra-ASEAN but also for external issues. For instance, ASEAN countries in the fertile Mekong River basin (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Viet Nam) are engaging south China to solve common problems raised by China’s construction of dams (Dosch, Duerkop and Thang, 2005). The Greater Mekong Sub-region Program, launched in 1992 and drawing on the experiences of the UN-sponsored Mekong Committee dating back to 1957, has the strategic support of the Japan-led Asian Development Bank in nine broad sectors, including a transport programme with three “economic corridors”. After years of engagement, China has become proactive by presenting its southern neighbours with a general development plan for the river basin that includes capital assistance. The leaders of the six countries even meet in summits, the first one held in 2002 in Cambodia to promote economic cooperation, and the second one in Kunming (China) in July 2005 to deal with social issues such as human-trafficking and drug-trafficking as well as transportation linkages, tourism and telecommunications.

**ASEAN’s multi-level external relations**

To hold a broadening and deepening ASEAN together better, its members have always relied on a mesh of external multi-level links with both important neighbours and distant powers. The United States saw the genesis of ASEAN in the late 1960s as a useful tool to complement its network strategy to contain communism in South-East Asia, and after a period of neglect is nowadays paying more attention to a renewed ASEAN that positions itself to balance China and other regional powers. ASEAN has one observer (Papua New Guinea) and one candidate observer country (East Timor), but it has particularly reached first to Japan and later to nine other dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia and the United States) with which it has formalized regular high-level meetings and a variety of dialogue and cooperation processes. They all meet in post-ministerial conferences, which take place after the regular ASEAN summits, to address all kinds of issues.

The key concern of ASEAN’s external partners has remained the promotion of security. When the Cold War ended, Canada and Australia suggested establishing a conference for security and cooperation in Asia that included human rights issues, following the model of the conference leading to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Eventually, a less intrusive ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) proposed by Japan was agreed in 1991, based on a memorandum to establish the Asia-Pacific Political Dialogue, which has become the main intergovernmental venue advancing a dialogue in security issues in and around the
region. The ARF had its first meeting in 1994 and now brings together 23 participants: the 10 ASEAN members, the 10 dialogue partners, North Korea, Mongolia and Papua New Guinea as an observer. The ARF’s broad range of activities in confidence-building and preventive diplomacy among both friends and potential military antagonists follow an incremental approach to complement the various bilateral alliances and dialogues underpinning the region’s security architecture. Politically complicated subjects like human and political rights, nuclear weapons and terrorism are not excluded from the agenda, although the provision of information by participants is voluntary. And the ARF’s role to engage regional powers has so far advanced well. Following a proposal by China at the tenth ARF in 2003, the first ARF Security Policy Conference was held in Beijing in November 2004 with the participation of defence officials. Stakes are high regarding regional leadership, but they seem far from reaching breaking point. The United States sent a low-level delegation to the June 2005 post-ministerial conference and ARF to put pressure on the group regarding the role of Burma/Myanmar, while the Chinese premier decided to fly to Rangoon instead. At the same meeting the ARF website (www.AseanRegionalForum.org), created with US funding, was officially launched in Jakarta giving for the first time a comprehensive picture of its evolution.

ASEAN is now spearheading a new wave of external relations with the whole world in order to advance its community objectives further. It has in particular reached to its powerful neighbours, but has profited from links with America and Europe, often in an interregional fashion – a model that ASEAN is now developing with Asia and Africa. The ASEAN secretariat has a partnership work plan with the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation, and has been involved in an Asian-African subregional organization conference. ASEAN foreign ministers had an informal gathering with counterparts in the Gulf Cooperation Council in 2004, and signed a memorandum of understanding with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2005 and another one with the Economic Cooperation Organization of Central Asia in 2006.

Finally, ASEAN is gradually making its presence felt in the multilateral world. It has long coordinated basic positions in international organizations like the WTO, and its presence is becoming increasingly felt in the UN system after it became an active observer in the work of the UN General Assembly in October 2006.

**Functional cooperation among ASEAN+3 countries**

The ASEAN group started reaching with much greater impetus to the whole of North-East Asia in the late 1990s to discuss collaboration in
economic issues. Just after the financial crisis hit many Asian countries in 1997, and building on several years of strengthening links, Malaysia convened the first informal ASEAN+3 summit meeting. This timing was a coincidence. Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto had proposed in January 1997 to regularize the Japan-ASEAN summits, and ASEAN countries accepted in May with the condition of including China and South Korea. On the afternoon of 15 December, after the regular ASEAN summit, the then nine ASEAN leaders (Cambodia had not yet joined) were invited to meet in the Palace of the Golden Horses in Kuala Lumpur with counterparts from Japan, South Korea and the People’s Republic of China. Although Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia’s former leader, was excited to host such a meeting, the heads of Indonesia and South Korea did not attend for personal reasons, and several countries were sceptical of Mahathir’s proposal to regularize such meetings despite the financial crises. Leaders did not actually discuss measures to address these growing crises, but generally focused on coordination and cooperation in macro-economic and high-technology sectors, and discussed the links East Asian countries had with the European model. The following day ASEAN leaders met in three separate meetings with leaders from the North-East Asian countries, and delivered three friendly joint statements respectively.

The second informal summit, convened by Viet Nam and held in December 1998 in Hanoi, was much more important as it started to set some bases. For this meeting the aftermath of the crisis of the previous year was indeed an important catalyst. China’s Premier Hu Jintao proposed a dialogue at the level of vice-financial ministers and vice-presidents of central banks among ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea, “and to form an Expert Group at a proper time if necessary, which is devoted to the in-depth research of the concrete means to regulate and control the international flowing capital”. He gave assurances that China’s currency, the renminbi, would remain stable, and announced a donation of US$200,000 to a new ASEAN fund to help South-East Asian countries jointly develop regional projects. Meanwhile, Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi pledged US$5 billion in preferential loans. The following day China and ASEAN leaders discussed the need to resolve the conflict in the South China Sea. More importantly, in the Hanoi summit the South Korean president successfully proposed launching an East Asia Vision Group of policy intellectuals that would propose a quasi-constitutional path aiming to construct an East Asian community. ASEAN+3 (jointly with Japan, China and South Korea) and ASEAN+1 (with single countries) summits have continued as regular gatherings of foreign affairs ministers and heads of state, increasingly galvanizing a growing number of ASEAN+3 ministerial meetings. Economic matters
have been a priority, but social and even security issues were soon added to the leaders’ agendas.

Then, leaders meeting in the third informal summit in November 1999 in Manila politically agreed on the need to strengthen their mutual understanding, trust and cooperation. They declared that the pivot of the East Asia cooperation shall be placed in economic, financial and scientific and technological areas, but also agreed that they should work to maintain peace in the South China Sea and to discourage independentist pressures within Indonesia.

With the new century, bolder advancements came from the commitment of all sides. Alongside the fourth informal summit in November 2000 in Singapore, the first financial ministers’ meeting, the first economic ministers’ meeting and the first foreign ministers’ meeting of ASEAN+3 countries were convened respectively. Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji stressed that cooperation in East Asia should aim at “development”, that the “10+3” mechanism should turn into the main channel for regional cooperation in East Asia and that financial, trade and investment cooperation frameworks should be gradually established so as to realize the more extensive integration of the regional economy. The Japanese prime minister in turn upheld the ASEAN principles of strictly intergovernmental regional cooperation. And the South Korean president successfully proposed creating an East Asian study group of government officials to digest and polish the recommendations of the East Asian Vision Group to present a final report to political leaders. In this expansive climate, the leaders from the three North-East Asian countries held their second informal breakfast meeting and reached a common understanding about holding a meeting at regular intervals to explore greater cooperation in trade and investment among themselves and with ASEAN countries.

At the seventh ASEAN summit meeting in November 2001 in Brunei (informal summits were discontinued in 2000 and regular summits became annual) leaders exchanged extensive views on strengthening exchanges and cooperation in all sorts of fields, including people exchanges and even non-traditional security. China and ASEAN agreed to establish a free trade zone within 10 years and reached a consensus on several priority cooperation areas which have further advanced ever since. At the eighth summit, convened in Phnom Penh in October 2002, China successfully proposed holding a 10+3 ministerial meeting on combating transnational crimes, and also advocated that East Asian cooperation required going to a level of governance below the state by holding an East Asia mayors’ forum. The ninth summit that met in October 2003 in Bali could be called truly historic, as not only an ASEAN Concord II declaration was signed, but the Chinese, South Korean and Japanese leaders
also signed a comprehensive joint declaration on tripartite collaboration (elaborated below). Also important was the eighth ASEAN+3 summit held in November 2004 in Vientiane, in which participants agreed to establish in the long term an East Asian community broadly but flexibly defined and pursued.

All the above activity may not be dismissed as irrelevant for regional construction, as a growing number of ASEAN+3 mechanisms, from ministerials down to meetings of senior officials and directors-general and sometimes working groups, do advance the political agreements declared in the summits. Table 2.2 summarizes those mechanisms. Regular diplomatic, economic and financial ministerials lead a wide range of issues; but there are ministerials for agriculture, fisheries and forestry, for energy, environment, tourism, transnational crimes, health, labour, culture and arts, science and technology, info-communication technologies and social welfare. Finance cooperation is a great concern that requires eight working groups. And the fear of energy scarcity has led to the formation of five working groups hoping to secure resources of traditional and new energy sources. In the foreign ministerial meeting of July 2006 four new sectors were added for high-level cooperation: rural development and poverty eradication; women’s issues; disaster risk management and emergency response; and minerals. Moreover, the first East Asian Cultural Week was planned for 2007, to be jointly prepared by Thailand and South Korea. An overdue stock-taking exercise will soon clarify progress and facilitate a more rational work plan in a growing number of fields according to the various inputs received from Track-1 and officially sanctioned Track-2 gatherings.

The East Asian overall regional political project has long followed the cautious ASEAN intergovernmental formula. Progress is at first gradual, informal and voluntary, and countries refrain from interfering on delicate issues considered internal by other countries. In that way, ASEAN+3 states form their preferences before bargaining and committing to longer-term institutions – a stage that seems to be quite close. To help consolidate the many high-level meetings and agreements, ASEAN+3 governments have been arguing more than ever the need to create more permanent administrative and political institutions. In the past few years Malaysia has stepped up its lobbying to establish an ASEAN+3 secretariat in Kuala Lumpur and has repeatedly offered to pay the set-up costs. Although it did not receive unanimous support, leading to its rejection in the ASEAN ministerial meeting of July 2002, just days before the eighth ASEAN summit in October, Malaysia presented a reformed proposal to have only a bureau on ASEAN+3 affairs that would be “organically linked” to the ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta and led by a deputy secretary-general. And South Korea also wanted to be considered a re-

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gional hub, and its government proposed in early 2005 creating an inte-
grated ASEAN+3 e-government centre in Seoul as of 2006 to facilitate
exchanges in such fields as human resources, technical support, education
and training (Xinhua News, 2005). Interestingly for global multi-level
governance, the proposal was raised on the occasion of the ASEAN+3
senior officials' meeting on Creative Management for Government held
on the sidelines of the UN-sponsored Sixth Global Forum on Reinvent-

Table 2.2 ASEAN+3 institutional cooperation mechanisms

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<th>Leaders</th>
<th>Ministers</th>
<th>Senior officials</th>
<th>Directors-general</th>
<th>Working groups</th>
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<td>Political and security</td>
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<td>Rural development</td>
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<td>and poverty eradication</td>
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<td>Women's issues</td>
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<td>Disaster risk</td>
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<td>Minerals</td>
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<td>Total bodies by level:</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
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Source: Based on ASEAN (2006).
ing Government. Nevertheless, it was decided that the best option was to enhance the ASEAN secretariat with various external, multi-level functions. Besides the virtual secretariat for the ARF mentioned above, it is developing a virtual secretariat to manage relations with Europe through the ASEM process (elaborated below), and thus facilitate the consolidation of an ASEAN+3 institutional platform.

**Flexible East Asian regionalisms**

Just like in Europe and within ASEAN, the concept of East Asian regionalism implies a flexible, multi-level approach towards collaboration where sometimes not all countries participate and at other times outside partners are involved (table 2.3). ASEAN+1 meetings taking place alongside those of ASEAN+3 are helping ASEAN to maintain a central role in East Asia.

Since 2001 China-ASEAN cooperation has advanced on many fronts, steered by annual meetings of foreign ministers, all leading to a joint declaration on strengthening strategic partnerships for peace and prosperity to guide their relations in the 2005–2009 period – the first time that China

<table>
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<th>Table 2.3 East Asia’s complementary regional projects</th>
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<td>ASEAN subgroups</td>
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<td>Tumen River area</td>
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<td>North-East Asia</td>
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<td>tripartite cooperation</td>
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<td>Mekong River basin</td>
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has set up a strategic partnership relationship with a regional organization. China has promised to behave in the South China Sea disputes, and was the first power to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia. China and ASEAN also agreed to create a free trade zone progressively from 2006 to 2013, a process overseen by institutional mechanisms like a senior economic officials’ meeting, a China-ASEAN free trade negotiation committee and a China-ASEAN business consultation meeting. Moreover, they are implementing a framework agreement on comprehensive economic cooperation with specific agreements on trade in goods, settlement of disputes and, possibly soon, services and investment. They have agreed to cooperate in agricultural and health sectors still under government control. China has even pledged some aid through its Debt Reduction Program for Asia scheme, and is helping to develop the Greater Mekong subregion through agreements to facilitate the movement of goods and infrastructure.

In the face of a re-emerging China, Japan is also attaching more importance to reinforcing its already strong relations with ASEAN. In December 2003 Tokyo hosted a special Japan-ASEAN commemorative summit meeting, in which the Tokyo Declaration and a dense action plan backed with several billion yen were presented, aiming to strengthen economic, political and security relations, with the stress laid on striving to establish a community based on Asian traditions and values. At the meeting the development of an “East Asian community” was first defined formally as the goal of regional cooperation in Eastern Asia, reaching even to Australia and New Zealand. Japan is also in favour of the development of the Greater Mekong subregion and the ASEAN growth areas. It has also signed the first-ever bilateral free trade agreement with Singapore, and soon began negotiations with South Korea, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and others beyond the region. In 2006 it began to stitch it all together by funding a Japan-ASEAN integration fund with over 7 billion yen to advance political, military, economic and social projects.

ASEAN relations with South Korea were enhanced in 2004 when they signed a joint declaration on a comprehensive cooperation partnership and South Korea acceded to the ASEAN Treaty on Amity and Cooperation. Soon afterwards both sides began negotiations on establishing a free trade area, and expanded an ongoing set of functional cooperation issues.

*Incipient functional linkages in North-East Asia*

The prospects of East Asian cooperation may be formally driven by ASEAN with Japanese yen, Chinese market access and growing links to South Korea, but substantially they depend more on building friendlier developments in North-East Asia, where proud and structurally diverse
powers still seem preoccupied with realpolitik (Togo, 2005; Shambaugh, 2005). Recent animosities in the region include Japan’s island conflicts with its maritime neighbours, the stance of Japan’s leaders on the memory of wars and colonization in the first half of the twentieth century, the North Korean military build-up and the ongoing conflict between the Chinese governments in Beijing and Taipei. Tensions between Japan and China nowadays seem the main obstacle towards community-building, especially given China’s reaction to the visits of Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi to the Yasukuni shrine where the souls of Class A war criminals are honoured, and to the issue of Japan not fully accounting for its past in history textbooks.

The whole show may be understood as a proxy clash to see who (and how) leads – peacefully – in East Asia. Japan acts as if it wants to get itself cheaply out of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, in which it was seen as a loser and communist China a winner, a strategy disliked by China’s ruling party. But political exchanges among North-East Asian countries have considerably grown in the past few years in a new climate of gradual political opening. The 1998 joint declaration on “Building a Partnership for Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development” remains the base for cooperation despite the high-level posturing between nationalistic Japanese and the Chinese ruling party. A similar long-term cooperation trend is discernible between Japan and South Korea as the 1998 joint declaration for “A new Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century” is crafting a future-oriented relationship. And vindicating Kim Dae-Jung’s “sunshine” policy to link the Korean peninsula gradually, China’s links with North Korea are relaxing while new ones are being built with South Korea. China is now tending to acquiesce in participating in alternative institutional mechanisms to the point that Wada (2004) believes there are possibilities to create a new “Greater East Asian Community” that brings together regional communities in South-East and North-East Asia.

There are signs that economic cooperation in the Tumen River area is more than just a watered-down possibility. The area is the only direct link from the North-East Asian inland to the Sea of Japan, spanning the Yanbian Korean autonomous prefecture in Jilin, China, the central and southern part of the Primorsky territory in the far east of the Russian Federation and the Rajin-Sonbong area in North Korea. The development of the Tumen River area was viewed with widespread hope by the international community after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The UN Development Programme formally presented the Tumen River Area Development Programme (www.TumenProgramme.org) and convened a conference in Pyongyang that began a process of mild institutionalization and a call for investment. In the following years various
gatherings included committees and commissions, and even a secretariat in Beijing, through which China, the Koreas, Mongolia, Russia and sometimes even Japan met. North-East Asian regional cooperation through this mechanism has not been as substantive as that of ASEAN, mainly due to North Korean intransigence, but the effort has promoted some hopeful unilateral and bilateral responses. China has signed agreements on harbour-sharing with Russia and North Korea, reached agreements on opening sea-, air- and land-coordinated transport routes for goods and passengers and launched the Hunchun Border Economic Cooperation Zone. South Korea and Japan have shifted their overseas investment to the Tumen River area. North Korea has established a free trade zone in the Rajin-Sonbong area, opened harbours to the outside world, planned to attract foreign trade and investment and increased its own infrastructure. Russia has also opened some harbours, drawn up a Great Vladivostok plan and a development plan for its Primorsky territory and established the Nakhodka and Vladivostok free economic zones. And even Mongolia has begun improving its eastern railway network. All these efforts are now paying off, as a more strategic action plan was adopted in 2005 for the following 10 years.

Some success has also taken place in environmental matters. The North-East Asian Conference on Environmental Cooperation began in 1992, attended by representatives from China, Japan, South Korea, Mongolia and Russia. In 1993 the North-East Asian Subregional Programme on Environmental Cooperation was created, assisted by the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. And since 1999 Japan, China and South Korea have begun holding annual meetings of environment ministers.

And there is hope that high-level political summits facilitated by external partners will help resolve the lingering animosities in North-East Asia. An East Asian regionalism is emerging, starting with a process of “ASEAN+3” cooperation and moving towards a substantive East Asian community in which China and Japan may reconcile while enhancing functional links if not yet full shared interests. Informal meetings started in 1999 and soon activated lower levels, from ministers to senior officials and working groups. To consolidate the progress they held the first tripartite leaders’ meeting during the ASEAN+3 summit held in October 2003 in Bali. Their first joint declaration had very high hopes for peaceful development to sustain open coordination and cooperation in regional and international affairs in collaboration with other actors, as seen in the five shared fundamental views that are fully compatible with global multi-level governance:

- The tripartite cooperation will be pursued in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and other universally recognized norms governing international relations.
On the basis of mutual trust and respect, equality and mutual benefit and with a view to securing a win-win result for all, the three countries will seek ways to strengthen their across-the-board and future-oriented cooperation in a variety of areas, including economic relations and trade, investment, finance, transport, tourism, politics, security, culture, information and communication technology (ICT), science and technology and environmental protection.

With the governments of the three countries being the main players in the tripartite cooperation, they will encourage business and academic communities and various non-governmental organizations to play their parts.

The tripartite cooperation is an essential part of East Asian cooperation. The three countries will, through regional cooperation in diversified forms such as ASEAN+3, continue to strengthen coordination and support the process of ASEAN integration. The three countries will promote economic cooperation and peace dialogue in North-East Asia for stability and prosperity in the region.

The tripartite cooperation will be carried out in a transparent, open, non-exclusive and non-discriminatory manner. The three countries will maintain their respective mechanisms for cooperation with other countries so as to benefit from one another’s experience in the interests of their mutual development.

The declaration included an agreement to promote a wide range of cooperation areas broadly divided into three governance fields similar to ASEAN’s communities. Economic cooperation would address trade, finance, foreign direct investment, settling economic disputes and improvement of business governance, and agreed on advancing in some sectors, especially info-communications. Cultural and people-related cooperation would promote tourism and broader people-to-people contacts, including education and media. Political cooperation would include both hard security (including disarmament, the Korean peninsula issue, terrorism) and soft security (environmental protection, disaster prevention and management, energy, fishery resource conservation, disease, crime) issues. In a functional approach, tripartite North-East Asian cooperation may well advance through projects in areas of common interest, both subregionally and externally, reaching first to ASEAN but also to the global level through the United Nations.

Some institutionalization would be required for the three countries to consolidate their list of good intentions. There are not yet formal discussions to set up a North-East Asian secretariat like that of ASEAN, but the incipient ASEM-Asia virtual secretariat may prompt institutional commitments among the three. Moreover, the collaboration between politicians and technocrats at various levels has been substantial. A growing number of annual tripartite ministerials in economic (economy and trade,
finance) and functional (environmental protection, information and telecommunications, patents) cooperation are steered by a three-party committee of foreign ministers who study, plan, coordinate, monitor and report cooperation activities. In their first meeting, held in June 2004 in Qingdao, the three foreign ministers agreed to meet annually and decided to formulate the Action Strategy for Tripartite Cooperation (ASTC). The second tripartite summit held alongside the November 2004 ASEAN+3 summit approved the ASTC and a progress report of the past year, then discussed in more details how to develop further in investment, trade, energy as a security concern, tourism and human exchanges, environment, financial and exchange rate issues. The declaration specifically encouraged Asian regional cooperation in a multi-level environment, mentioning the ASEAN+3 mechanisms and the need to help consolidate ASEAN’s key role in this process. It also mentioned the usefulness of the ARF discussed above, as well as broader processes discussed later: the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). This broader interregional dimension may be the key to maintain momentum in the faltering North-East Asian cooperation, since China decided to cancel the seventh trilateral summit in December 2005 due to “the current atmosphere” of political posturing over historical issues. Despite the political troubles, the three North-East Asian leaders gleefully appeared next to each other for the colourful picture of the first East Asian summit held in Kuala Lumpur after the other, more consolidated, ASEAN-centred gatherings that exclude “Westerners”. To diffuse the tension and cooperate with a smile, North-East Asian governments must still use a multi-level political strategy that reaches other key partners and parts of the world.

East Asia’s multi-level external dimension

East Asian linkages are not very strong when compared to the EU institutions, but they are consolidating as they reach out to the whole world. We have seen how the EU institutions reach to much of the world for a multiplicity of goals, originally trade-related, but increasingly comprehensive to the point of the European Union being viewed as an important security player in some places. The European dimension is increasingly multi-level, as interregional processes complement relations with countries. Similarly, there is an incipient East Asian multi-level external projection, usually formally led by ASEAN, to reach not only to external powers but also interregionally to all parts of the world, hoping to be reciprocated and thus mutually help construct a more regional political infrastructure. The ASEAN secretariat Directorate for External Relations
has recently become the Directorate for Plus Three and External Relations. It hosts the ARF secretariat and an ASEM virtual secretariat to coordinate relations better with both Europe and North-East Asia. While the European Union rotates its presidency every semester, both ASEAN and the three rotate every semester to engage with external partners.

**ASEAN-centred East Asian neighbourhood policy:**

*The East Asian summit*

Japan’s former premier Koizumi presented in February 2001 its East Asian community concept, which although based on ASEAN+3 would also welcome Australia and New Zealand, two other allies of the United States. Ever since then, Japan’s basic positions in community-building are summarized in three broad principles: reliance on a step-by-step functional approach; striving for an open regionalism or opening to selected partners; and respect for universal values and conformity to global rules, which is another way to say that unilateralism is not welcomed. Singapore and Indonesia shared that concept for an East Asian community, although China and Malaysia usually take a more critical stand – but not hardened enough to prevent middle-of-the road compromise solutions as in the end they do not want to antagonize the United States unduly.

The East Asia Vision and Study Groups (elaborated in chap. 3) recommended having an East Asian summit as an upgrade of the ASEAN+3 summits. Originally envisioned as a way to institutionalize ASEAN+3 to give more formal weight to North-East Asian countries, the idea of an East Asian summit evolved for ASEAN+3 countries to discuss strategic issues of common concern with other key dialogue partners that have signed ASEAN’s Treaty on Amity and Cooperation, in effect becoming a unique type of regional neighbourhood policy (in EU terminology) that balances the interests of both Japan and China.

The eighth ASEAN+3 summit held in November 2004 in Vientiane invited Australia and New Zealand, and also agreed to hold a first East Asian summit immediately after its ASEAN+3 summit in late 2005 in Malaysia, the country that then held the rotating ASEAN chair. For the first East Asian summit, not only Australia and New Zealand but also India attended, as a way to balance a rising China with another rising, and somewhat more democratic, power that may be coming closer to the US-led world. Moreover, this mechanism for ASEAN+3 to advance a neighbourhood policy will soon be consolidated, as it was agreed in Kuala Lumpur that future East Asian summits will convene annually after the smaller ASEAN-centred summits. Admitting new members must be decided by consensus of existing members. Thus, although the original criteria were set by ASEAN in accordance to Japan’s proposal
for an East Asian community, not only ASEAN+3 but also India, Australia and New Zealand have to agree jointly to welcome energy-rich Russia, whose insistent President Putin was invited to come to Malaysia at the time of the first East Asian summit and give a short speech before leaving the gathering. At the end, two complementary declarations were issued. The declaration by the ASEAN+3 process focused on maintaining momentum in a variety of areas, while that of the East Asian summit hoped to continue discussing more strategic issues that would help advance the East Asian community. The declarations of the ASEAN-centred summits held in Cebu (the Philippines) in January 2007 indicate the increasing intention of raising the scope and profile of the East Asian summit, but it is still very far from what the ASEAN+3 process has already achieved.

The East Asian summit seems a compromise which is only slowly decreasing the large role of the United States in East Asia. In trying to decrease attachments with the superpower, East Asian countries have reached first to Europe and soon afterwards to much of the rest of the world. Yet much of what is happening in East Asia may also be seen as paving the way for the superpower to remain engaged in the region more easily and acknowledge that East Asia can work together as a group that resolves its own problems.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)

During the 1990s the Clinton administration took a friendly stand towards East Asia in both political and economic terms. It joined the security discussions in the ARF and engaged, under the broad rhetoric of economic cooperation for growth and development within an idea of open regionalism, an increasing number of “economic” partners from East Asia, Oceania and America through the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Ravenhill, 2001; Feinberg, 2003). APEC (www.APECsec.org.sg) was formed by most of East Asia plus Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States; China, Taiwan and Hong Kong were welcomed as distinct member economies in 1991; and Mexico, Chile, Papua New Guinea, Russia and Viet Nam were also allowed in later in the decade.

The Clinton administration saw APEC as a particularly interesting venue not only for greater market access in difficult Asian markets but, especially, to reach an earlier conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. The World Trade Organization got going, but APEC did not advance as much as originally envisioned. Through its yearly summits, and served by a small secretariat in Singapore, APEC presented a series of declarations and resolutions, agendas and plans, always aiming at broader and deeper trade and investment liberalization as
well as economic cooperation. It even expressed in 1994 its aim to achieve a free trade area in many areas by the year 2020, a vision detailed further in APEC’s 1995 Osaka Action Agenda and subsequent collective action plans. That vision soon proved unrealistic given the many developments moving in opposite directions. For one, the two largest APEC economies, the United States and Japan, kept engaging in strong economic competition epitomized by recurrent trade disputes. Furthermore, in the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the overall APEC process entered a declining path. Moreover, APEC liberalization accomplishments are still shallow and frail, as the members take decisions only by consensus and there is no legal mechanism to assure compliance with the agreements.

The late Clinton administration lost interest in APEC and focused instead on helping bilaterally to finalize China’s accession to the WTO. After all, APEC had reverted to being a relatively quiet venue for gradual economic dialogue and cooperation. Given the limited effectiveness of APEC, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and other countries are creating free trade agreements with various American countries. But the United States is now exploring using APEC to tackle security issues. The first Bush administration began to confront China, to the point of risking its successful entry into the WTO, but it changed course when hoping to involve China in its global coalition against terrorism in all possible ways. At the fifteenth APEC summit in October 2003 the economic leaders agreed to pursue some security aspects of business transactions, although they showed only mixed support for the resumption of trade liberalization in the WTO.

APEC is not an interregional structure as it does not rely on relations between different organizations – ASEAN being at best an informal subgroup – but it has helped catalyse an interregional projection of the East Asian countries. In other words, APEC may unnoticeably have paved the way for more effective multi-level governance. In 1990 Malaysia formally requested to create an East Asia Economic Group outside APEC, but it was turned down by the United States and some other countries fearing US reactions. The whole idea was then scaled down to an East Asian Economic Caucus within APEC that never really took off. Thus, in an open and partially competitive global multi-level system, it was obvious that East Asia would look for partners elsewhere.

The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)

Despite the US veto to formal East Asian institutionalization in the APEC process, closer independent collaboration between North-East and South-East Asia started to come about with the help of the Euro-
pean Union. This has taken place through the interregional Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process that began in 1996 as an effort to enhance and rationalize the increasing ties between Europe and East Asia; it has gradually deepened and broadened to become an important new diplomatic tool for comprehensive global multi-level governance (Reiterer, 2006).

Despite the inclusion of Myanmar in ASEAN, EU-ASEAN relations that began in the late 1970s have managed to increase relevance beyond economic cooperation and development issues (Robles, 2004). The European Union and North-East Asian countries began in the early 1990s promoting mutually closer bilateral relations in a broader range of issues (Maul, Segal and Wanandi, 1998; Preston and Gilson, 2001; Wiessala, 2002). The tune was already set by improving EU-Japan relations, which led in 1991 to the Hague Declaration full of good intentions in many fields, some of which became substantiated during the 1990s in bilateral and multilateral venues (Gilson, 2000). EU-China relations entered into a temporary decline in 1989 after the Tiananmen student crackdown but recovered soon afterwards (Edmonds, 2002) and in the new century rapidly thickened with all kinds of exchanges, often catalysed on the margins of ASEM meetings.

The European Commission pushed in 1994 for a broad-based process of increasing dialogue and cooperation towards Asia with its “New Asia Strategy”. An economic factor behind the strategy was that the European Union was not allowed to participate even as an observer in the APEC process, at a time when it seemed to be rising in relevance – it became clear in 1993 that the United States was going to be more active in APEC to accelerate the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, partially stalled by the French-led EU position not to liberalize the agricultural sector. But through the strategy the European Union went further, as the overall goal was to accord a higher priority to relations in economic, political and social terms to complement and enhance the existing variety of improving Europe-Asia relations. The strategy was well received, and was first updated in 2001 with a new communication expecting to strengthen the EU presence in Asia by focusing on six broad dimensions: political and security; trade and investment; poverty reduction; promotion of democracy, good governance and the rule of law; building partnerships and alliances on global issues; and promotion of mutual awareness and knowledge.

A Singaporean initiative reacting to the original EU Asia Strategy quickly led to the interregional ASEM process that helped pave the way for closer independent collaboration between North-East and South-East Asia (Lay-Hwee, 2003). After a brainstorming discussion in the 1994 World Economic Forum’s East Asia Economic Summit with the then French prime minister, former Singaporean premier Goh Chok Tong formally proposed in 1995 institutionalizing collaboration between Europe
and Asia during his visit to France, where he found warm political support for the idea. As much of EU foreign policy is still intergovernmental, and also will be in East Asia for the foreseeable future, ASEM was designed as an intergovernmental flexible dialogue and action on broad political, economic and social issues involving the then 15 EU member states (coordinated by the European Commission) and originally 10 Asian countries (coordinated by two rotating countries, one from South-East Asia, the other from Japan, China and South Korea in North-East Asia).

Heads of state have met biennially since the first summit (ASEM-1) took place in Bangkok in March 1996, and an increasing number of ministers and senior officials meet in between to substantiate the broad range of economic, political and cultural proposals agreed in the summits and elaborate new ideas to be presented for future gatherings. In ASEM’s first decade gradual progress was real despite the lack of public awareness that APEC commanded. ASEM-2 in London, in the wake of the 1997 financial crises, concentrated on addressing economic and financial problems, but it kept addressing issues in all pillars. ASEM-3 in Seoul (the Korean government hosted it in the newly built ASEM tower) was again broad-based, and even started to pay attention to security issues, especially on the Korean peninsula. And, in the wake of the US reaction to 9/11, ASEM-4 in Copenhagen enhanced leaders’ attention to a broader range of security matters and launched a dialogue on cultures and civilizations. ASEM-5 of October 2004 in Hanoi enlarged to accept the new EU member states as well as Laos, Cambodia and Burma/Myanmar, the three latest ASEAN members. ASEM-6 of September 2006 in Helsinki reviewed the first decade of the process and agreed on strengthening the partnership while gradually admitting Bulgaria and Romania on the European side and the ASEAN secretariat, India, Pakistan and Mongolia in the Asian group, a situation to be formalized by ASEM-7 in Beijing. The achievements of all the ASEM summits are summarized in table 2.4.

ASEM has quickly become an instrument in the creation of an East Asian identity and community. ASEM preparatory meetings have been particularly useful for East Asian government representatives to get used to multi-level meetings on their own. Before ASEAN+3 formally took off, there were ASEM-Asia preparatory contacts at the levels of country, subregion (South-East and North-East Asia independently) and region (South-East plus North-East Asia together) before meeting with European counterparts. The Asian side of the ASEM process first included the seven members of ASEAN at the time, plus China, South Korea and Japan. In ASEM-5 the 10 new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe were allowed to join on the European side, while Laos, Cambodia and even Burma/Myanmar, after a long row,
joined in the Asian side, in effect equating ASEM-Asia with ASEAN+3. The membership of Burma/Myanmar was difficult because its human rights record prevented the European Union from agreeing to hold meetings with a full ASEAN at the highest possible level, but in the end the European side considered it more important to give the country a chance in the hope that belonging to the grouping would socialize the military junta and move it towards democratic openness. ASEM-6 coupled the welcoming of the ASEAN secretariat as a key coordinating partner with the launch of an ASEM virtual secretariat (www.ASEMvs.org), funded by the Japanese government but managed from the ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta, which will encourage the Asian countries to institutionalize their own regional and subregional coordination.

Across the Pacific to reach developing America: Forum on East Asia-Latin America Cooperation

Given the relative, but growing, success of ASEM and the diminishing importance of APEC, the government of Singapore proposed in September 1998 to the government of Chile a multi-issue interregional linkage with Latin American countries that soon led to the process called the Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC) or, in Spanish, the Foro (de Cooperación) América Latina y Asia-Pacífico (www.FOCALAE.org). Singapore hosted in 1999 the first senior officials’ meeting of FEALAC/FOCALAE, bringing together the East Asian countries, Australia, New Zealand and 17 Latin American countries, almost the Rio Group, for informal dialogue and cooperation based on

Table 2.4 Overview of ASEM summits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASEM</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Highlights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>Setting of three pillars: political, economic, socio-cultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Trust fund to help address financial crises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>Rise of political collaboration (Korean peninsula)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>General advancement; operational rationalizing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Hanoi</td>
<td>Parallel enlargements to match the EU and ASEAN+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Helsinki</td>
<td>Deepening, strengthening, rationalizing and planned enlargements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>Finalized enlargement to Bulgaria, Romania, the ASEAN secretariat, India, Pakistan and Mongolia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
principles of consensus, equality and mutual benefit. In March 2001 the Rio Group held three complementary ministerial summits in Santiago de Chile: first they met among themselves, then with EU representatives and later with the East Asian representatives within FEALAC/FOCALAE. The second ministerial in Manila in January 2004 enlarged to Guatemala and Nicaragua, and presented a comprehensive plan of action to advance chiefly through economic and cultural issues. To prepare for the third ministerial in Brazil in 2006, Japan hosted a core group meeting of senior officials representing both regions, as well as meetings of the three working groups with overall attendance of all member countries. Of course FEALAC/FOCALAE cannot be a threat to APEC, but it has the potential to consolidate another interregional mechanism that helps global multi-level governance to become more dynamic.

While East Asia reaches to South America, Japan and China try to plant some political seeds in the Pacific islands. As they hold not only fish but for China also the potential of broader political recognition at the expense of Taiwan, China began in 2006 substantially to reach towards the Pacific Islands Forum, three years after Japan had promoted a first summit.

_The Asian Cooperation Dialogue and the Asia-Middle East Dialogue_

Despite the many difficulties, East Asian countries are also finding ways to reach to South, Central and West Asia in a broad interregional fashion to promote a balance between political, economic and social issues. In this landscape, Singapore and Thailand have been active promoters of multilateral processes that engage large countries like India, as well as countries further west that have had little experience in multilateral cooperation outside the Arab League or the Organization for Islamic Cooperation. India now sees itself very much as a peaceful non-aligned regional and world power, so it deals directly with other world powers when it sees fit, especially those in East Asia. India warmed up to its rival China, and both premiers met for the first time in June 2003; and India’s relations with Japan, in the past friendly but weak, are slowly being enhanced since the first high-level visits in the 1990s. Meanwhile, India signed a free trade agreement with ASEAN in November 2002, and hopes to become a privileged partner of the East Asian community through its participation in the East Asian summits that began in 2005.

A preliminary effort by South-East Asia to engage India was the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (www.iornet.com). Tracing its origins to a 1997 meeting in Mauritius that brought together Australia, India, Kenya, Mauritius, Oman, Singapore and South
Africa (countries with Indian diasporas), it nowadays has 18 members (China, Japan, the United Kingdom, France and Egypt are dialogue partners) discussing trade and investment facilitation. But it has very few resources to tackle development or pressing problems; for instance, it did not play a role in aiding the areas affected by the tsunami of December 2004. Thus, alternative venues are being sought. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (www.BIMSTEC.org) can help pick up the pieces of the IORARC as Pakistan is not there to argue with India. Started in Bangkok in 1997, it tries to promote transport and energy links; but like the limited ASEAN–X relations with Guangxi (south China) in the Mekong River basin, these activities are complemented by geographically broader dialogue and cooperation mechanisms.

The first East Asian comprehensive multi-level effort to reach South Asia and beyond started in Thailand in June 2002. The ruling Thai Rak Thai party suggested during the first international conference of Asian political parties held in Manila in September 2000 that Asia as a continent should have its own forum to discuss Asia-wide cooperation. The idea received support from ASEAN leaders and many others. In June 2002 the Thai government hosted in Cha-Am, the royal town near Bangkok, the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (www.ACDdialogue.com), which brought together ministers from 17 countries in East, South-East and South Asia, and even some Arab state members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, informally to discuss the diffusion of tensions and possibilities of economic (finance, energy, etc.) and cultural and scientific cooperation. Moreover, the ACD hopes “to become a viable partner for other regions” and “ultimately transform the Asian continent into an Asian community, capable of interacting with the rest of the world on a more equal footing and contributing more positively towards mutual peace and prosperity”. For that, Thailand strives “to ensure that the inclusion of the new countries will increase a certain level of equal representation of each sub-region of the Asian continent”. The number of countries has grown with each ACD ministerial, to a total of 28 by 2005, while others may apply for the category of “partner for development”. In the end, the success of these processes will depend on the level of commitment of the participating countries. At first the ACD conducted 19 activities in 12 areas, including agriculture, tourism and poverty alleviation. The flexible but top-down ACD process managed to bring Japan and China together, as well as Thailand, in most of the activities generally agreed. But that was not the case for other ACD countries. For instance, Singapore at first only showed an interest in being involved in one area of cooperation that focuses on small and medium-sized enterprises.

Singapore reacted to the ACD by trying to lead East Asian countries
in a new Asia-Middle East Dialogue (www.AMED.sg) process of understanding that largely overlaps with the ACD. Singapore’s former premier, mega-interregionalist Goh Chok Tong, travelled in February 2004 to the region, raising hopes of activating exchanges within a year. In June 2005 a broad spectrum of representatives of more than 50 countries met in Singapore to discuss, following ASEAN’s intergovernmental principles of non-interference on internal matters, possible consensual collaboration on all kinds of political, economic and social issues. Singapore invited almost all of the Middle East countries, including Egypt, which hosted the second AMED meeting in 2007. The AMED process was open to all kind of issues: political, security, economic and social, the latter encompassing education, science, culture and media. It plans to be “inclusive in spirit and focus on positive outcomes for greater cooperation between Asia and the Middle East”, according to the concept paper drafted by Singapore. Working principles will be “voluntary, informal and flexible”. As in all of East Asia’s interregional processes, AMED will also adopt the ASEAN code of conduct of non-interference in other members’ internal affairs and respect for each member’s unique culture and social values. Contrasting with the ACD’s intergovernmental approach, AMED’s participants included policy-makers, business people, scholars and other opinion-formers, all encouraged to engage in frank discussion acting in a private capacity.

The complementarities between AMED and the ACD may become obvious in the near future. The timing for East Asia to reach west is good given the lack of historical animosities between the participants in these processes and the current balance in the Middle East raising mild prospects for durable peace. For decades the ASEAN position on the region has continued to support the peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict and the self-determination of the Palestinian people, not only to maintain good relations with oil-rich countries but also because many Filipinos, Thais, Vietnamese and Indonesians have found jobs in the Middle East. And nowadays the economic strength of China, the economic revival of Japan and the emergence of India have made these countries attractive partners for cooperation to Middle Eastern developing economies.

Competing for the Eurasian heartland: Transforming the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

It is also worth watching the evolution of competitive East Asian relations towards the former Soviet space for the potential to bring Russia closer to the global multi-level governance system in selected non-security issues.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (www.sco.org) is a China-led multi-issue process that reaches to Russia and beyond. The Shanghai Five group began in 1996 when China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan began to discuss regional security and development threatened by endemic instability. This group of five broadened in 2001 into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with the inclusion of Uzbekistan. The SCO seems to be progressing well when one realizes that China and Russia have had very cold relations for many years. The original five countries started in 1996 to deal with some security issues; in May 2003 the six agreed to establish a secretariat in Beijing towards the end of the year and to promote an anti-terrorism initiative managed by Kazakhstan; and in the summer of 2005, when the United States and Japan were reaffirming their security alliance, Russia and China led joint military exercises off the coast of eastern China. But since 2001 the SCO has dealt with globally promising economic and social issues, which drew the attention of the 2005 summit. Given the diversity of its members, the SCO is still less a regional or interregional project than another try at entente between two key powers, but it is also trying to expand geographically into very different governance areas. In 2004 it admitted Mongolia as an observer and at the 2005 summit India, Pakistan and Iran were also invited, while there were talks of reaching to other regional processes in the post-Soviet space as well as to ASEAN, with which it signed a memorandum of understanding to cooperate in five areas.

Japan has long been the largest donor for several Central Asian countries, and has often used the Asian Development Bank to promote infrastructure cooperation. Moreover, in 2004 Japan started the “Central Asia plus Japan” dialogue with foreign ministers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, a process that gradually broadened into areas such as terrorism, drug-trafficking, landmines, poverty reduction, health and welfare, thus hoping to help turn the volatile republics into a grouping more independent from power games. At the 2006 meeting in Tokyo foreign ministers agreed to an action plan for future cooperation in know-how, and a working committee will discuss advancing infrastructure projects, possibly with countries and international organizations from outside the region.

To help link Central and East Asia, ASEAN signed in January 2006 in Tehran a memorandum of understanding with the Economic Cooperation Organization to share information, practices and experiences in the areas of trade and investment, narcotics control, development of small and medium-sized enterprises and tourism.

In the meantime, Russia has recently been mending its problematic relations with East Asia as it would like to increase energy and industrial exports and develop transport links while expecting to receive foreign di-
rect investment to develop Russian Siberia and the Far Eastern regions. For that, a multi-level strategy seems welcome. Russia’s relations with Japan improved in 2003 as the Kurile Islands problem became decoupled from economic cooperation. Russia joined both the ARF and APEC in the late 1990s, and it has shown an interest in joining ASEM as an Asian member. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect that CIS or Central Asian regional economic projects would be additional vehicles for Russia’s new global multi-level economic strategy towards East Asia.

The Tokyo International Conference on African Development and the new Bandung spirit

The intensity of interregional relations of East Asian countries grows as an increasing number of countries competitively try to lead their neighbours to reach other parts of the world. In particular, Japan and the ASEAN countries are also working to enmesh China’s increasing projection towards Africa into their own.

China’s multi-level strategy towards Africa began in 2000 when it hosted the first ministerial meeting of the China-Africa Forum on Cooperation (www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/) to complement its increasing interest in procuring natural resources from various African countries despite their sometimes very questionable political situations. The second forum held in 2003 in Ethiopia (where the African Union has its secretariat) advanced a programme for cooperation in economic and social development.

Japan then upgraded its Tokyo International Conference on African Development (www.TICAD.net) process. Started in 1993 by the Japanese government, TICAD now tries to catalyse a broader East Asian interest as Japan promotes “Asian modes of development and governance”. TICAD-I led to the first Asia-Africa Forum organized in 1994, which subsequently led to the Bandung Framework for Asia-Africa Cooperation; in TICAD-III held in 2003 the Asian mode of development was more assertively advertised.

In 1955 Sukarno hosted heads of 29 countries in Bandung (Indonesia) at a first conference trying to create global anti-colonial, non-aligned solidarity. The final declaration mentioned human rights, but ignored the danger that foreign colonialists might be replaced with indigenous dictators. Half a century later, in April 2005 in Bali, some 87 delegations, including 40 heads of state or government and more than 100 ministers, engaged in a series of summit, ministerial and other meetings seeking to reinvigorate the Bandung spirit and forge a new Asian-African strategic partnership for the twenty-first century. The proclamations of Bandung were quite diverse, from anger at American unilateralism to gentle urges...
(by Indonesian and Singaporean premiers) to promote good governance. The next Asian-African meeting will take place in 2008 in South Africa, a country trying to lead the African Union. If the Bandung spirit remains open and flexible, honestly giving more prominence to good governance and cultural moderation, it could become an ASEAN-led useful inter-regional forum to complement the more pragmatic Japan-led TICAD process and China’s overtures to the continent.

**Summary**

In sum, East Asian countries have been advancing interregional relations with most of the world as a way to consolidate a regional identity (see table 2.5). Sometimes competing processes are advanced by Japan and China, but increasingly a convergence is noticed as ASEAN is allowed to take the formal leadership.

**Europe and East Asia: Soft global multi-level powers**

This chapter has so far analysed how Europe and East Asia have been developing multi-level political and institutional frameworks. It started with the construction of the European Union and its increasing external projection. The legally sanctioned institutionalization that developed in Europe in past decades was unique and is not being overall replicated in East Asia, although it seems to be gradually moving in that direction. The chapter then analysed in greater detail the intergovernmental developments centred in East Asia to show their flexible characteristics, so far quite compatible with Europe and the rest of the peacefully developing world. It paid particular attention to the external dimension of East Asia, which has been a much more important tool than in the case of the European Union to construct a regional identity.

The previous section argued that the countries forming East Asia centred in the ASEAN+3 processes have started to create the basis of a common external dimension. If one compares its basic elements with those of the European Union (see table 2.6), one notices some striking similarities. East Asia has some regional institutional actors with broad goals and an increasing number of instruments to reach to a broad geographical range. In particular, East Asian countries have been developing their external dimension towards key partner countries and world regional bodies through intergovernmental processes where leaders and bureaucrats discuss, consult and try to reach a consensus. The “East Asian” way does not radically differ from the early, informal, “European” way during the 1969–1986 period of European political coopera-
tion. But what is remarkable is that so far it seems to be working despite the great diversity found among East Asian countries.

**ASEM’s second decade**

The evolution of the ASEM partnership reflects the growing weight and interdependence between Europe and East Asia in political, economic

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name and acronym</th>
<th>Year established</th>
<th>Regions/countries involved (2006)</th>
<th>Issues tackled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>North America, much of Latin America, Oceania, Russia</td>
<td>Trade liberalization and economic cooperation; venturing into security aspects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>ASEAN, North-East Asia, EU members; planned India and Pakistan (almost SAARC)</td>
<td>Political, economic, socio-cultural, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC/FOCALAE)</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>ASEAN+3, Oceania, Latin America</td>
<td>Mainly economics, some politics, socio-cultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD)</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>ASEAN+3, SAARC, GCC, reaching to Central Asia</td>
<td>Mainly economic development, some social/intellectual input</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Middle East Dialogue (AMED)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>ASEAN+3, SAARC, Arab League</td>
<td>Politics, economics, intellectual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD)</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Japan, East Asia, African Union</td>
<td>Export of Japan/Asia’s economic governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Africa Dialogue</td>
<td>2005 Follow-up of 1955 Bandung Conference</td>
<td>Most regions in both continents</td>
<td>Politics, economics, social</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and socio-cultural pillars, quite compatible with both the European pillar structure and the ASEAN community’s vision.

In its first decade there have been over 100 collaborative initiatives. Many of them were simply explorative, but quite a few catalysed closer multi-level governance, especially in East Asia. ASEM-6 leaders meeting in 2006 in Helsinki reaffirmed their interest in a comprehensive partnership broadening political dialogue and strengthening economic relations and socio-cultural exchanges. ASEM is now rationalizing, building on its strengths and accomplishments, improving its working methods and developing institutional mechanisms to steer the process. ASEM has begun its second decade by reaffirming its commitment to deepening economic and financial cooperation, as well as by better focusing on a broad array of policy areas of global interest: multilateralism and global threats; globalization, competitiveness and structural changes in the global economy, including labour issues, education and human resource development; health; science and technology, including information and communication technology; sustainable development with a special focus on the Millennium Development Goals; climate change, environment and energy; and intercultural and interfaith dialogue as a means to promote mutual understanding.

Table 2.6 Comparison of basic elements in European and East Asian external dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Europe (EU)</th>
<th>East Asia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional actors</strong></td>
<td>Intergovernmental councils (heads of state, ministers) in charge; supranational (federal) commissions assist; <strong>ad hoc</strong> groups of countries in some issues</td>
<td>Intergovernmental summits and ministerials; inspired by federalizing Track-2 networks of experts linking globally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Issues</strong></td>
<td>Quite comprehensive; noticeable in trade, cooperation and aid, and increasingly in security</td>
<td>Exploring comprehensiveness and institution-building; keen on finance, energy and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Instruments</strong></td>
<td>Information, consultation, positions, actions; wide array of agreements</td>
<td>Information, consolation, common positions; simple agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geographical reach</strong></td>
<td>States (neighbours; US; other important powers); world regional processes; international regimes (especially the UN system)</td>
<td>ASEAN-centred dialogue partners (key and selected countries, the EU); prominence of interregional processes; some presence in international regimes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Under more flexible guiding principles ASEM partners now allow functional leadership in setting priorities and advancing clusters of issues and initiatives that can link public and private actors in the three main pillars. The whole process now has a more rational hierarchy of steering and coordination: overall sanctioning through biennial summits of heads of state and government, steering through annual foreign ministerials, coordination by more and more regular meetings of senior officials (usually vice-ministers and functional deputies), ASEM coordinators and the hosts of scheduled meetings, a supporting virtual secretariat and regular contacts between ASEM embassies. Moreover, multi-level governance is assured by a combination of informality, networking and functional flexibility, with selected welcoming to relevant stakeholders, including social partners and civil society gatherings of business people, parliamentarians and many others catalysed by the Asia-Europe Foundation. For that purpose, ASEM is enhancing its public visibility awareness through a public communication strategy.

ASEM’s deepening, rationalization and expansion provides the Asia-Europe partnership with the means to address global multi-level challenges better. In ASEM-6 Bulgaria and Romania were admitted as new European members, while four partners were welcomed on the Asian side, an enlargement to be formally celebrated at the ASEM-7 summit in Beijing in October 2008. The ASEAN secretariat thus consolidates its key multi-level hub position as it manages the ASEM virtual secretariat and, indirectly, ASEAN+3 relations. Moreover, while the East Asian summit reaches to selected ASEAN dialogue partners, ASEM prepares the way for East Asia to reach to neighbouring regional processes. India and Pakistan are the key to a sustainable peace in South Asia and the development of SAARC. And Mongolia, celebrating the 800th anniversary of its foundation by Temujin, is now once again a proud country whose transition out of communism renders it in a unique role-model position for the troubles in North Korea and Taiwan, thus giving more hopes of North-East Asian community-building, as well as bridging to a Russia that is eager to develop its Asian policy as a way to renew its global status. A growing number of ASEM partners will advance in global multi-level governance as they have committed to multilateralism and synchronization with other relevant regional, subregional and bilateral processes.

The final section of this chapter focuses on how Europe and East Asia are, and could even better be, converging their external projections, under the benevolent oversight of the United States, to spur change in other parts of the world and, at the same time, reform the UN system and related multilateral organizations into a dynamic global multi-level functional platform.
The potential of ASEM extraregionalism: Converging interregionalisms

If Europe and East Asia share a similar world vision in which regions have a useful role to play in dynamic global multi-level governance, one may see a window of opportunity to create a dynamic layer of regional processes for East Asia’s interregionalism, increasingly matching Europe’s interregional projection (see table 2.7).

The flexibility and enhanced scope of the multidimensional ASEM process might hold the key to catalyse the above vision. Many activities advanced within or across ASEM’s political, economic and social pillars often touch the concern of the broader world. Moreover, political declarations often highlight the potential synergies of regional and inter-regional processes with multilateral ones. For instance, the chairman’s statement of the sixth ASEM foreign ministers’ meeting in April 2004 stated a thought amplified ever since:

ASEM Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to multilateralism and to a fair and just rules-based international order, with a strong United Nations at its heart, to resolve international disputes, to promote positive aspects of globalization, and to advance democratization of international relations . . . Ministers also stressed the role regional organizations and dialogue mechanisms such as ASEM can play in enhancing multilateralism.

The potential for extraregional synergies varies according to the degree of overlapping in geographic terms and in the themes addressed. Good ASEM relations with the US-led processes of regional cooperation in America could be explored, as the potential of joint action nowadays seems to be increasing as the final years of the Bush administration are taking a less unilateral approach to address global concerns. The Transatlantic Dialogue and APEC do not overlap geographically or thematically with NAFTA or the Organization of American States, although that could change in the future. In contrast, the European Union-Latin America and Caribbean Summit and the Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation overlap very much with the Rio Group, not only in geographic terms but also in the broad range of issues addressed. Similarly, both Europe and East Asia now have mechanisms to reach the whole of the African continent and its New Partnership for Africa’s Development, respectively through the EU-Africa and Asia-Africa and TICAD processes. Meanwhile, Europe and East Asia could try to reach to SAARC in complementary ways. Europe’s multidimensional relations with SAARC are even weaker than those with India, but the external relations of ASEAN, the Asia Cooperation Dialogue and Asia-Middle East
Dialogue allow East Asia to engage with India and SAARC countries in many issues in a wider geographical context. Moreover, as both these processes also reach to some countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, they could evolve and allow bi-regional dialogue and cooperation, which would then permit synergies with the EU-GCC agreement. In time there could even be room for cooperation with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the new Wider Middle East initiative. Finally, developments in Russia and Central Asia merit all the attention possible. So perhaps ASEM partners may want to suggest the SCO should link better with East Asia, Europe and the rest of the world through, for example, a diversified development of energy and transport infrastructures.

Given the rapidly evolving global multi-level dynamics, the potential expansion of the ASEM process to other partners with which both the European Union and ASEAN+3 countries have strong relations would need a thorough discussion on the pros and cons in the light of so many overlapping regional and interregional processes. In particular, regional community-building efforts on the Asian side and EU enlargement on the European side represent considerable change at the interregional level. The Asian membership of ASEM will remain until 2008 the ASEAN+3 group of 13 countries. Yet alongside the ASEAN+3 summit of December 2005 the first East Asian summit was held with India, Australia and New Zealand. One could have thought of enlarging the Asian side of ASEM to these three countries, but instead it enlarged to Mongolia, India and Pakistan (the core and key of SAARC), as well as the ASEAN secretariat. That way, an East Asia centred on ASEAN+3 gradually socializes neighbouring countries and institutionalizes its interregional projection. Once East Asia organizes its external projection more coherently there could also be potential for ASEM to enlarge through extraregionalisms. Thus SAARC and the Pacific Islands Forum, and perhaps the SCO and the CIS, could somehow be allowed to join ASEM in functional stages if they follow the criteria of both Europe and East Asia when reaching to the world following globally acceptable goals.

Europe and East Asia may also show leadership by focusing on dynamic sectors that could construct a safer and more prosperous global multi-level order in which not only states' governmental actors but broader civil society can play useful roles. By doing so they would encourage other interregional processes among developing countries not to make the mistakes of previous decades of reducing useful links with the global community. This includes, for instance, through the first Arab-Latin America summit held in May 2005 in Brasilia (proposed by President Lula in December 2003 while touring the Middle East), where free trade agreements were signed between Egypt and Mercosur, and Latin America and Gulf States; and the courting of many other countries.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic region</th>
<th>Regional process</th>
<th>EU interregionalism</th>
<th>East Asian interregionalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
<td>None, but indirect links through the transatlantic partnership</td>
<td>None, but indirectly through Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement of the Americas</td>
<td>EU-Rio Group</td>
<td>Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC/FOCALAE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>EU-Latin America and Caribbean Summit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Andean Pact</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mercosur</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>EU-Rio Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>African Union (and NEPAD)</td>
<td>EU-African Union summits</td>
<td>Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD); Asia-Africa Summit (Bandung)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
<td>EU-ACP (subgroups)</td>
<td>None yet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab world</td>
<td>League of Arab States</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
<td>Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
<td>Wider Middle East initiative</td>
<td>Asia-Middle East Dialogue (AMED)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU-GCC gatherings/agreement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>European Union</td>
<td></td>
<td>Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td>EU-ASEAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None yet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Initiatives/Summits</td>
<td>Dialogue/Initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)</td>
<td>EU-ASEAN&lt;br&gt;Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)</td>
<td>EU-ASEAN&lt;br&gt;Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)</td>
<td>EU-SAARC gatherings&lt;br&gt;Possibly ASEM</td>
<td>Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD)&lt;br&gt;Asia-Middle East Dialogue (AMED)&lt;br&gt;Possibly ASEM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and other regional and international organizations to cooperate with SAARC.

Eventually not only countries and macro-regional processes but also other levels of governance may occasionally be catalysed and welcomed in ASEM. One could envision having substate regions in especially large countries (Chinese provinces, Indian states, etc.) somehow participating in selected issues of the ASEM process. This is still a difficult predicament as some countries feel insecure about decentralizing to smaller, more agile levels. Meanwhile, ASEM could help speed the reforms of the ailing multilateral world by better linking with the UN system of organizations and related regimes. And with the gradual, functional welcoming of other regions and interregional processes, Europe and East Asia may help engage the United States to lead the world into a dynamic global multi-level system.

Reforming the United Nations into a flexible multi-level platform

While global norms and rules are plentiful, they are often not well coordinated by the diplomacy of world powers or their intergovernmental institutions. But there is now a good chance that the UN system and the converging Bretton Woods economic organizations could further reform themselves to coordinate better with countries and world regional processes. The impulse of a rising East Asia teaming with Europe could be crucial for the United Nations to realize the potential of functional multi-level decentralization. The slow-moving UN bureaucracy has only recently started to realize the capacity of the European Union. The United Nations recognized the European Community in 1974, but placed it in a special category on its list of observers far removed from the list of members. The European Union, on the contrary, has for long had great emphasis on the United Nations in its entire range of external relations. The Amsterdam Treaty declared that to advance a common foreign and security policy the European Union would follow the principles of the UN Charter, a position maintained all the way to the EU security strategy paper of December 2003 and beyond. Moreover, the main areas in which the United Nations is active today – such as international peace and security, human rights, environment, health, economic development and poverty – are also priorities for the European Union. The European Union also launched in 2003 a more specific strategy to coordinate better with the United Nations in a way that helps, through financial support and policy dialogue and participation, the UN functional organizations coordinate better among themselves.

It should take little time for the United Nations to realize the changing environment and potential of other effective regional actors, as in the
past few years a growing number of regional processes and organizations have joined the list of observers allowed in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly.

The rise of East Asia may well catalyse a restructuring of the United Nations. As Allied victors of the Second World War designed the structure, Asia’s leadership was largely limited to China (originally Taiwan, but since 1973 the People’s Republic). Japan joined in 1956 and by the 1980s had become the largest regular financial contributor (the United States has often refused to pay its dues on time). Thus Japan became more assertive in influencing the United Nations, often taking a regional leadership role, although both China and ASEAN are linking to the United Nations through a variety of conferences. South Korea’s former foreign minister Ban Ki-moon succeeded Kofi Annan in 2007 as Secretary-General of the United Nations. More East Asian bureaucrats are becoming heads of UN organizations and increasingly speaking of regional solutions to address regional concerns. The rise of East Asians in specialized agencies focusing on information, communication, education and culture is especially noticeable. And the World Health Organization was headed from mid-2003 by a South Korean medical technocrat, who has now been superseded by the Hong Kong expert who effectively tackled SARS. But the rise of some form of ASEAN-centred East Asian community may hold the key to a new type of multilateral, multi-level system in which regions and states coordinate and play an effective role if something akin to the EU actions could be advanced. The signing of an ASEAN charter in 2007 will allow the 10 South-East Asian countries to be considered as a group when addressing many issues of the United Nations, a precedent that surely North-East Asian countries would like to exploit.

The United Nations could then more easily enhance its vision and capacity by coordinating with effective regional processes to help solve regional problems. It could also exert change in many issues in countries through regional organizations and processes. And if a regional or local problem is not well solved through a region and its member countries, the United Nations could call on other regions and countries to discuss ways to help solve it. As a good start, the UN General Assembly adopted in September 2006 by consensus a global counterterrorism strategy (www.un.org/terrorism/strategy) with concrete measures to “encourage Member States, the United Nations and other appropriate international, regional and sub-regional organizations to support the implementation of the Strategy, including through mobilizing resources and expertise”. As the United Nations presumably becomes more efficient by partly delegating to regional processes, the European Union and the East Asian community should make clear to the United States that it can better lead such a global, multi-level, flexible governance system by engaging with it.
Further engaging the United States

The US geopolitical maxim in the past century has been to avoid large geopolitical regions hostile to the projection of its governance model. The “reluctant” superpower fought in the Second World War to prevent Germany and Japan becoming regional hegemons. And during the Cold War the role of the United States was crucial to maintain stability and progress in both Europe, through allies like Britain and Germany, NATO and many other transatlantic mechanisms, and East Asia, especially through its military presence in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. During the early post–Cold War years the US global set of multi-level hub-and-spoke geopolitical policies was only partially relaxed, but not reformed, to focus relatively more on geo-economics. Since 9/11 the United States has concocted a new unilateral mission, enshrined in a worrisome theory of “preventive war” that has the potential to antagonize even many of its closest allies, in accelerating the instalment of pro-Western institutional democracies in Central and Western Asia to avoid a convergence of anti-US regimes. But given the problems of taking over Iraq, Bush inaugurated his second mandate with a more enlightened speech that sounded as if he was trying to find a middle way towards global peace. The idea is to prioritize liberal views around the world through intelligence and diplomacy, albeit not renouncing military options. Regional processes close to the United States can surely play a role, as the country hopes to influence more open regional cooperation around the world in a fashion that would not hurt its global leadership vision. According to its national security strategy of September 2002, the United States would enhance the spread of its world vision and swiftly take action to prevent the formation of enemies, be they countries, groups of countries, transnational networks or combinations thereof. Nevertheless, the United States acknowledged then, and stated more explicitly in its national security strategy upgrade of March 2006 (www.Whitehouse.gov/NSC/), that to build a safer, more prosperous world it needs to engage better with allies, friends and even appropriate regional and global multilateral organizations.

The United States has long helped maintain momentum for an open European Union, and often acquiesces to a growing European external projection as it still has a very small military component. Thus a renewed transatlantic partnership could help convey to the United States a better sense of what happens in parts of the world where it is not well engaged. Naturally, Europe should continue to learn about US concerns. When the European Union was considering the possible lifting of the advanced arms embargo to China, the United States clearly indicated its concerns and so the European Union is not lifting the embargo until China makes irreversible improvements in its governance system. And Europe now
welcomes NATO reaching to Central Asia with the increasing input of several European countries.

Moreover, the United States does not seem to worry that much about how East Asia is developing an internal identity. Indeed, James Kelly (2004), US-East Asia policy assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs, declared at the end of the first Bush Jr presidency that Asian regionalism may be beneficial for the United States:

Our Asian partners have begun forging more regional organizations among themselves, reflecting their growing cooperation. We welcome this trend, understanding that strengthened ties and cooperation between nations of the region contribute to regional prosperity and stability, two of our highest priorities. I have seen suggestions that the growth of regional organizations reflects a loss of U.S. influence in the region. I disagree. The trend toward regional cooperation offers the United States the opportunity to engage on a multilateral level to address issues we were unable to resolve through bilateral approaches.

The oversight of multi-level governance may be the only reasonable option left for the United States wanting to pacify Asia. The renewal of the US-Japan hub-and-spoke alliance calls for Japan to play a more active regional security role (Ikenberry, 2002; Cossa, 2005), and Washington continues to support institutionalized multilateral mechanisms (including subregional efforts that do not include the United States) as useful means to promote regional security and coordinate counterterrorism efforts, while relying on ad hoc coalitions (or unilateral actions if necessary) to address specific threats to its own security or the security of its allies. Although it has stepped up its presence in South-East Asia to deal with groups labelled as evil, the United States is also promoting a stronger ASEAN in selected security aspects. On top of it all, perhaps the United States may want to take the lead in reforming APEC into a platform in which several regional groups and subgroups deal not only with economic development and security aspects but also with a broader set of political and social issues. Thus it could welcome both the Plus Three process bringing in China, South Korea and Japan and the intermittent six-party talks. Both Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the United States have met several times since 2003 to find a solution to the desperate North Korean nuclear programme that threatens the peace of the region, especially since North Korea successfully launched a test rocket over Japan in 1998 and apparently detonated a primitive nuclear device in October 2006. But such a dialogue process has not advanced very much in its prime goal (Snyder, Cossa and Glosserman, 2006), thus the additional, soft influence of other parties might be welcome to build confidence and promote functional cooperation.

The United States could then link with Europe and East Asia to the
rest of the world in other ways. The G7/8 and the OECD could become platforms of responsible countries and regional processes. The G7/8 has for some years welcomed the leaders of the European Union and sometimes the heads of UN and Bretton Woods organizations, intergovernmental institutions that remain weak at best and are under strain to adapt to new world realities. Moreover, the June 2003 meeting held in France included for the first time China’s premier, as well as representatives from other developing countries, in what has been labelled the G21, and started a broadening of G7/8 concerns to help developing countries while integrating them in the global economy. Meanwhile, a number of the G7/8 economic development declarations are delegated to the OECD. Through publication of statistics and a process of consensual dialogue and peer review and pressure, it advances internationally agreed instruments, decisions and recommendations to promote global governance rules. It has been broadening to highly developing countries, often in East Asia. Japan joined in the 1960s and South Korea in the 1990s, and the OECD’s Centre for Cooperation with Non-Members has an Asia and China unit which launched in 1995 a China programme that has dealt with many dialogue and cooperation activities. The OECD nowadays groups 30 member countries sharing a commitment to democratic government and the market economy, but it is in the middle of a discussion process of overall reform and modernization to position itself more effectively in the circuit of multilateral institutions. The debates revolve around how to set priorities and streamline its many activities, how to change its consensual decision-making to allow weighted-majority voting for some issues and how to enlarge to new members so as to make the OECD more geographically balanced and globally relevant. In other words, the OECD reform process seems to be converging with that of other international organizations.

For all those reasons and more, a legitimate United Nations and regional organizations may have a more substantial role to play, thus helping the hyperstretched United States to achieve a more just and prosperous peace. The United States is still the key to the United Nations and its potential to enhance global multi-level governance. It is a founding member, host of many of its organizations and should be the largest and most exemplary funder and manager. Although the United States uses the United Nations only as another tool in its foreign policy, it does not want to discard it; rather, even the Bush administration reckons it is time to make the United Nations more effective, and thus managed in 2005 to get the tough but controversial John Bolton temporarily appointed as US permanent representative. A more effective United Nations would profit from the assets of the most committed states and regional processes.
3

The crucial influence of Track-2 advisory processes

Chapter 1 introduced the theoretical and empirical elements to understand global multi-level governance, and chapter 2 analysed on the main public actors with the overall political power to lead the advancement of such a paradigm. This chapter focuses on the relatively understudied but increasingly important set of Track-2 advisory actors that are facilitating global multi-level governance processes by connecting public actors with an increasing plurality of civil society actors. Here again we will focus on both Europe and East Asia before looking into their potential to effect broader global change. But first let us recall some facts about the role of the United States, once the main source of advisory mechanisms for international relations.

Advising the US foreign policy

The United States is still considered a respectable democracy by many people around the world, noticing how the federal and state governments, political parties, large and small enterprises, single-issue associations and other manifestations of civil society all try to have a say in many kinds of domestic policy concerns. Yet many would argue the United States still needs to democratize its foreign policy process to account for the needs of all those affected by its actions.

The US government élites have during the past few decades been leading the opening of the world through military, political, economic and
socio-cultural means in a bipartisan consensus that only very rarely showed substantial differences in the occasional public debate (Bacevich, 2002). A small but fluid intellectual hierarchy of foreign policy advisers has been consolidated, while the average citizen, generally incapable of visualizing a realistic world map, remains largely unaware. Congress relies on many expert committees for particular issues that interest its constituencies, where global issues may occasionally be important but generally have not been (let us just recall how few members of Congress hold passports). So the executive presidency has had much more weight in generalist foreign policy-making. The most prominent executive body in foreign policy is the National Security Council (www.Whitehouse.gov/NSC), created by Truman in 1947 at the start of the Cold War and particularly strengthened during the Nixon administration, although now it is in the middle of a soul-searching process as the Vice President’s Office and the Defense Department have taken up leading roles (Rothkopf, 2005) and all intelligence agencies have military heads. There is also the National Economic Council (NEC) created by the Clinton administration to advance a global economic vision after the Cold War, but its influence is much smaller than the NSC in our times of global turbulence. The councils’ policy experts are drawn from academia, think-tanks and intelligence organizations to try to synthesize the best available intellectual input and present basic foreign policy recommendations. Ideas from civil society that are not first analysed by “respected” academics and selectively synthesized by connected think-tanks and advisers are usually left out of the foreign policy loop.

The elitist Council on Foreign Relations (www.CFR.org) has a long history of successful intermediation in sustaining debate between a broader world of policy ideas and the federal government, thus serving as a useful indicator of the rationalization of the cacophony of policy proposals trying to influence the federal government. Although the CFR’s idealistic beginnings, dating from the inter-war period, were very much in favour of international institutions, after the Second World War it began leaning towards a confrontational or realist perspective to forge shifting alliances that helped contain communism at the expense of longer-term multilateral commitments through international agreements and organizations. Actually, the US global projection after the Second World War, largely determined by the 1947 Truman Doctrine to contain Soviet-backed communism, was intellectually inspired by George Kennan’s long telegram from the US embassy in Moscow and later summarized in his anonymous article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” in the journal Foreign Affairs (www.ForeignAffairs.org), the flagship publication of the CFR.

Perhaps the most notable international stretching of the CFR at the height of the Cold War was the Trilateral Commission. Inaugurated in
Tokyo in 1973, it was designed as a Track-2 facilitator to the G7 intergovernmental process created in 1975. Not much real analysis can easily be done on the inner workings of this restricted club of mega-networkers (see the exception in Gill, 1990) launched from the United States by the CFR, then chaired by David Rockefeller, and prominent practitioners and thinkers like national security advisers Kissinger and Brzezinski (then still a professor). Its public website (www.Trilateral.org) nowadays indicates that the Trilateral Commission remains an organization of private citizens with links to governments and businesses at the highest level, often through commanding positions in think-tanks and advisory networks. While most of its members still come from North America, Western Europe and Japan, its somewhat renewed membership has expanded, particularly to other East Asian countries. The Trilateral Commission regularly requests independent expert reports on global and regional issues, and has published four specifically on East Asia, the most dynamic of the three regions: one published in 1985 dealing with security problems in the region, another in 1988 focusing on transition aspects, a third dated 1997 focusing on community-building and a fourth, released in 2001, on how Asia can fit in the international system. An overall analysis of the evolution of the four reports indicates a trend away from security concerns and towards finding ways to integrate the region in the largely Western-led international system of norms, which can bring absolute benefits to both East Asian and trilateral countries provided that adjustments are carried out smoothly. The trilateral accommodation became reflected in the Trilateral Commission’s membership, which in November 2000 extended its Japan group to form a Pacific Asian one that stretches to other East Asian countries as well as to Australia and New Zealand. It nowadays has about 100 regular members, many of them from Japan, but a growing number from other neighbouring countries with relevant positions in the think-tanks mentioned later in this chapter.

Even though China is not a democratic country in terms of party contestation, the Pacific Asia group of the Trilateral Commission is making special efforts to engage its more open leaders. So in 2003 there were also nine members from China, Hong Kong and Taiwan in a special, preliminary category labelled “Triennium Participants”. That year the Trilateral Commission held its plenary meeting in Seoul, and in late 2005 Beijing hosted a regional trilateral event.

But after its takeover of Iraq, the United States, its vocal allies and the international organizations it leads have lost much trust around the world and have further disrupted the transatlantic partnership, both politically and intellectually. Naturally, much of the world now tries not only to adjust but, in a globally competitive market for ideas, influence a new global policy intellectual transformation. Following the structure of the
previous chapter, this chapter looks at the new global multi-level plurality of Track-2 policy intellectual drivers increasingly catalysed from Europe and East Asia.

A distinct European policy intellectual world

The early history of European cooperation was driven by a small élite of bureaucrats, politicians and intellectuals from various religious and secular humanist backgrounds meeting in congresses, conferences and committees, hoping to advance long-term broad federalist visions (Winstead, 2001).

In May 1948 the Hague Congress attracted 800 delegates from Europe and observers from North America. Organized by the International Committee of the Movements for European Unity and presided over by Winston Churchill, the congress brought together representatives from across a broad political spectrum (including later political figures like Konrad Adenauer from Germany, François Mitterrand and Albert Coppé from France, Paul-Henry Spaak from Belgium and Altiero Spinei from Italy) to discuss European cooperation and unity.

This landmark conference influenced the shape of the European Movement (www.EuropeanMovement.org), which was created soon afterwards in October 1948 out of an earlier cross-country platform for the coordination of political and civil society organizations. The movement’s stated objective remains to “contribute to the establishment of a united, federal Europe founded on the respect for basic human rights, peace principles, democratic principles of liberty and solidarity and citizens’ participation”. Its various councils and associations, under the coordination of the European Movement International, work to influence major decision-makers across European civil society – its multitudinous associations, governments, politicians, political parties, enterprises, trade unions and individual lobbyists – to achieve these ends. The movement focuses on seeking further integration in political, social and cultural arenas, using its network of lobbyists to achieve those ends, and since 1948 has lobbied on various subjects. Its efforts were important or decisive in soon setting up the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, the College of Europe in Bruges and the European Centre of Culture in Geneva. From the 1950s through to the 1990s the movement helped set up think-tanks and a network of discussion groups across Europe to maintain the momentum of practical intellectual engagement and synthesize the most valuable options. More recently it has lobbied for the direct election of the European Parliament, the Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) and the European constitution. The association reaches to both right and left
in the political spectrum in all the countries where it operates, its main division being between the “unionists”, supporters of simple intergovernmental cooperation along the lines of the pre-Maastricht European Union, and the “federalists”, supporters of a federalized Europe governed along similar lines to the United States at which the constitutional treaty is aiming.

The European Commission has traditionally dominated the advisory function to European policy-makers. But thanks to the highly networked and focused efforts of the European Movement and the like, the many existing EU institutions have nowadays a complex array of mechanisms to reach to broader civil society for their input. There are over 1,000 standing and parliamentary committees, more than the roughly 950 federal advisory committees with 62,000 members found in the United States (Financial Times, 2005). Moreover, European institutions consult tens of thousands of experts; it had in 2004 about 1,700 advisory groups composed of a broad array of people, including government officials, lobbyists, consumer groups and charity workers.

To upgrade the institutions and procedure of an enlarging European Union, the Nice Council entrusted the drafting of the constitutional treaty to a European Convention of just over 100 members of member states’ governments, about 4 per country, mostly taken from political élites. One of the key outcomes was to design a more coherent institutional setting that would gradually enhance a more representative European Parliament and, therefore, the growing number of European political party platforms. While a number of activities run in parallel to the convention’s work to get citizens’ input, they remain too complex and distant for most people to understand or appreciate, and eventually led to the consecutive rejections of the treaty in France and the Netherlands. The current freezing of the ratification process of the constitutional treaty requires political élites to find better ways to communicate with civil society and synthesize their inputs.

The role of more independent think-tanks and trusted advisers in EU decision-making and construction processes is seen as potentially crucial to get out of the current European impasse by making more coherent the irreversible democratization of the European regional process. A 2004 in-depth analysis by Notre Europe (www.Notre-Europe.asso.fr), a think-tank set up in Paris by former Commission President Delors and later staffed by his chef du cabinet and former Commissioner Lamy, analysed most think-tanks in Europe and concluded that they have not yet “fully found their place in European policy-making; the value they add is not perceived clearly, they are seen as moderately useful, and even sometimes elitist. Overall, they are believed to have a limited impact on policies and public opinion” (Notre Europe, 2004). So EU political élites are
further promoting policy advisory venues that better link the plurality of citizens’ concerns.

Germany has a large variety of relatively independent strategic and economic think-tanks funded by federal or regional governments, as well as seven political foundations with a strong global projection, a number of business foundations and many academic and cultural institutes. Overall they have become more visible among the public than the traditional wise-looking academics. France also has a large community of well-known advisory mechanisms. But, following its Gaullist tradition, they are less independent than in the case of Germany, as they tend to be tied to government agencies, academic centres or political clubs. In contrast, there is an ever-growing number of privately funded and internationally networked think-tanks in England.

Much growth and diversity is also noticeable in Northern Europe. The Swedish government has financed new bodies focusing solely on European topics, although the current Danish conservative government has greatly cut funding to its think-tanks, forcing their merger and leaving advice to the detached academic community. Meanwhile, Finland keeps punching above its weight with an interesting plurality of think-tanks that often honestly broker difficult issues.

There is a growth of more independent intellectual diplomats in Southern Europe, especially in Spain, with international relations research centres and regional casas (houses) that explore European and global multi-level issues. Despite Italy’s centrality to the European construction, the few Italian policy clubs tend to revolve around charismatic personalities who help produce much public debate but less conspicuous written research. The European University Institute, mentioned in the introductory chapter, is a postgraduate research and training institute for the social sciences created in Florence in the mid-1970s as a counterpart to the College of Europe created in Bruges for masters studies. The EUI has had a policy advisory role since the beginning, and it was the place where allegedly the euro was first coherently proposed by a British diplomat! It now continues its think-tank activities through the Robert Schuman Centre, superseding the earlier European Policy Centre.

Eastern European think-tanks have quickly been shifting from their former roles as beacons of Soviet propaganda to compete in the public space thanks to growing ties with Western Europe and North America.

Naturally, Brussels has recently become a magnet for new think-tanks and regional networks. The Trans European Policy Studies Association (www.TEPSA.be) was created in 1974 as a pan-European discussion and research network by several national institutes at a time of relative slow momentum of European integration. A few years afterwards the Centre for European Policy Studies (www.CEPS.be) became the first Brussels-
based generalist European think-tank, originally staffed with professors from the EUI. Since the 1990s other names also becoming familiar in the circuit include the European Policy Institutes Network (www.EPIN.org), the European Policy Centre (www.EPC.eu) in Brussels and the mega-networking Friends of Europe (www.FriendsOfEurope.org), physically located in between all the key European institutions. A more recent addition in the rush to think the future of Europe is the Brussels European and Global Economic Laboratory (www.Bruegel.org), a think-tank proposed by France and Germany and presided over by Mario Monti – former EC commissioner for competition policy – with financial backing from many member states and corporations.

**Europe’s soft intellectual power**

What is particularly important for global multi-level governance is the growth and competitive external projection of European intellectual diplomats organized in think-tanks and networks. Contrasting with the earlier European expansion underpinned by religious and business fundamentalism, Europe now conspicuously exports a much more enlightened humanism.

European political cooperation, the forerunner of a European foreign policy, at first advanced in the 1970s through the “Davignon” and other high-level reports largely drafted by politicians and technocrats, sometimes in collaboration with a few researchers in think-tanks and networks in Europe and beyond.

Policy intellectual transatlantic links were particularly helpful for Europeans to be more pluralistic. The Salzburg Seminars (www.SalzburgSeminar.org), a series of yearly seminars given by prominent US and global faculties, were one of the main ways to mend European rifts after the Second World War. Prominent intellectuals and business leaders of the Mont Pelerin Society (www.Pelerin.org), first gathering in 1948 in the Swiss resort of Mont Pelerin, created think-tanks and foundations around the world to promote economic liberalism. The Atlantic Council of the United States spread the values of NATO in European countries, while the International Institute of Strategic Studies (www.IISS.org) did much quoted analysis. Since the beginning of the European project, European élites have been particularly active in reciprocating North American bridging efforts. The Wilton Park (www.WiltonPark.org.uk) and, later, Ditchley (www.Ditchley.co.uk) conferences in the United Kingdom are just a case in point. But the number of links went further. For instance, the Bilderberg group/conference is an unofficial annual invitation-only conference of influential businesspersons, academics and politicians to discuss, off the record, common policies against
firstly Soviet communism and, nowadays, global issues. Key political promoters include Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands and Belgian Prime Minister Paul Van Zeeland. The guest list of about 130 brings a plurality of political representatives to discussions at five-star resorts, the first official meeting in 1954 being in the Hotel de Bilderberg in the Netherlands. Even more than the US-promoted Trilateral Commission, the annual Bilderberg meetings are covered by a veil, but anybody who cares to read the occasional news about them realizes they have been for decades a key gathering of influential policy-makers and thinkers from both sides of the Atlantic. Martin Wolf, columnist on the Financial Times, left the 2003 transatlantic Bilderberg meeting in Versailles thinking that a divorce between the United States and Europe “could easily become unstoppable” (Financial Times, 2003). The mood of subsequent Bilderberg and other high-level transatlantic meetings has not been that sombre, as the intellectual guidance emanating from the United States has been adjusting to a more balanced exchange.

The World Economic Forum (www.WEF.org) is much more open and visible than the Trilateral Commission, somewhat broader in scope and membership (Track-1.5 rather than Track-2 as many political leaders converse with other people), more European-led and more decentralized in a global multi-level way. The WEF grew out of the conferences organized in the 1970s by Klaus Schwab, a professor of business policy at the University of Geneva. It now attracts funding from about 1,000 member global companies to allow many relevant personalities from government, business and beyond to discuss pressing world problems. This takes place in a variety of gatherings. The global Davos summits attract media attention, but there are also many other gatherings more focused on particular issues, key countries or world regions. For instance, the WEF has also been very attentive to, and perhaps instrumental in, the rise of East Asia during the 1990s. In the WEF East Asia economic summit of 1994, Singapore’s Goh Chok Tong and Lee Kuan Yew spoke forcefully of a dynamic and economically growing East Asia and the importance of strengthening links with Europe in a global triangular context, an idea agreed with French Prime Minister Balladur who was also present at the meeting. Soon after, Goh Chok Tong went off to Europe, where he first formally proposed to the French government what soon became the ASEM process. Overall, the future vision of the WEF for the Asian region is optimistic: China is on the move, ASEAN has awoken and Japan seems ready to move again (Richter and Mar, 2002). So in June 2006 the WEF inaugurated in Beijing the Center for Global Growth Companies, around the time when Japan hosted the first-ever East Asian WEF gathering. Meanwhile the WEF increases the frequency of its regional and country gatherings all over the world, not shunning even the most diffi-
cult places like the Middle East or Africa. Moreover, after the financial and economic crises and the increasing uproar of transnational civil society movements since the late 1990s, the WEF has broadened its scope to invite social leaders from around the world, and its Schwab Foundation for Social Entrepreneurship (www.SchwabFound.org) started its activities in the late 1990s with African and Indian summits.

Since the 1990s many more networked foreign policy think-tanks have emerged in member states aiming to enrich and add coherence to Europe’s external projection. This may happen bilaterally, but some are setting up branches in Brussels, like the Institut Français des Relations Internationales (www.IFRI.org). Many are joining forces, for example through the earlier mentioned TEPSA that created Europe’s Foreign Policy Network (www.FORNET.info), partly financed by the European Commission in one of the many ways it uses to promote research and advisory institutes dealing with various aspects of Europe’s complex external relations.

Friends of Europe is nowadays perhaps the most active large-scale catalyser of European domestic and foreign policy ideas and debate. It is backed by a large number of engaged experts, often with highest-level political experience, as well as by many business contributions. Its flagship publication, *Europe’s World* (www.EuropesWorld.org), is an independent policy journal launched with some 45 leading European think-tanks in October 2005, when it claimed to be the only pan-European publication that offers policymakers and opinion-formers across Europe a platform for presenting ideas and forging consensus on key issues. It also reflects the diversity of national policy debates in EU states, with particular attention being paid to newcomer and candidate countries. A hard copy of *Europe’s World* is received by 20,000 selected people all over Europe while over 180,000 more people are invited by email to consult *Europe’s World* online.

Well, as the first article of the first issue is titled “How China could divide the West”, it seems that Europe’s key concern is really finding a fitting role in a new global multi-level governance system being catalysed by the rise of China in East Asia and beyond.

It is now the United States which seems to be adapting to the soft intellectual power of European advisory mechanisms. US-based think-tanks are rushing to establish European branches, like the Rand Corporation (www.rand.org) in Leiden and the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution, which have recently opened a European version of their joint Centre for Regulatory Studies in Paris (www.AEI.Brookings.org). The Salzburg Seminars now aim to reach much of the world to dis-
cuss all kinds of critical regional and global issues. The Atlantic Council of the United States and its many European chapters have similarly broadened their remit to argue the need of a transatlantic partnership to promote a better global system. And the International Institute of Strategic Studies opened a branch in Singapore in 2003. In sum, although transatlantic links may be of crucial value, they must now reach to plural regions to advance a functioning global multi-level world.

The multi-level rise of East Asian policy intellectuals

As in the case of Europe before, a small group of East Asian advisory elites are more recently trying to find an intellectual compromise which in essence broadly accepts a powerful globalization framework as long as it can locally steer it in beneficial ways. The Asian values academic debate aired in the early 1990s by a diverse group of politicians (Lee Kwan Yew, Shintaro Ishihara, Mahathir Mohamad) soon began catalysing indigenous thinking to influence the power of globalization discourses. Although many in the West argued that Asian governance values were the cause of the real crises in the late 1990s, many in East Asia claimed that the prompt recovery of many of the affected countries that did not reform as much as the globalizing West wanted was due to the same values. Whatever the rest of the world may wish, (East) Asian arguments are here to stay as they grow and evolve.

These formerly grandiose debates are now less conspicuous and more functional and hard-working – as seen, for instance, in the 1995 Foreign Affairs article “The Pacific Way” by former diplomat Mahbubani, the only South-East Asian to make it to the “Top 100 Public Intellectuals” list of the Foreign Policy online journal (www.ForeignPolicy.com) and currently head of the Lee Kwan Yew School of Government. This moderated advisory trend particularly fits the informal networks that advance policy in many Asian countries (Dittmer, Fukui and Lee, 2000). But the numbers of East Asia’s policy experts outside government are not only growing (Evans, 2004) but, given the scarcity of formal intergovernmental institutions, their interrelationships and influence are relatively greater than those in legalized Europe (Morrison, 2004). It is conceivable that the growth of regional think-tank networks heralds the birth of a new type of governance institution that mixes the best of the European legal approach with a still recondite Asian way of informal consultation and organization.

This section first analyses the early policy intellectual developments promoting regionalization among ASEAN states. Then it argues that East Asia has been enmeshed by both Pacific American and European advisory cultures. Next it focuses on the recent developments being led
from North-East Asia to engage East Asia further. Finally, it argues that East Asian regionalism is being further promoted by interregionalism with other emerging world regions.

The harbinger role of ASEAN

The ASEAN process has managed to remain afloat and expand its intentions as a function of the increasing intellectual input it has received from a growing number and diversity of foreign policy experts (Nesadurai and Stone, 2000). Some are close to government, but others are more independent.

The first and arguably still most relevant regional think-tank network focusing on a broad range of strategic studies is the ASEAN Institute of International Studies (ISIS). Its beginnings are traced to individuals familiar with each other through transpacific conferences discussing peace and security issues (Soesastro, Joewono and Hernandez, 2006). ISIS held its first informal meeting in September 1984 in Bali, initiated and organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (www.CSIS.or.id), a leading think-tank in Indonesia that brings together business liberals and government élitesthe secretariat of ASEAN-ISIS, and is located not far from the ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta. It formally launched the ISIS group at its fourth conference in June 1988 in Singapore. At first members of ASEAN-ISIS worked individually through their respective governments, but formalization of an institutional relationship began in April 1993 when they were invited to feed ideas to the ASEAN senior officials’ meeting, thereby consolidating their claim to be the key epistemic community in the region. In parallel to the ASEAN process of enlargement, the ISIS group has since then been broadening its membership, even to Burma/Myanmar, with the hope of helping intellectually to open the country after they had unsuccessfully discouraged other ASEAN leaders from accepting it as a full-fledged ASEAN member.

ASEAN-ISIS has also enlarged its intellectual remit in the overall promotion of institutional regionalization – albeit with links to key external partners – in a growing number of areas merged in the concept of cooperative and comprehensive security. It was first successful in prompting governments in 1990 to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Later it promoted the realization of a South-East Asian nuclear-weapons-free zone at the 1995 fifth ASEAN summit (although no nuclear powers outside it have signed up). But more significant was the launching of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, which has managed to create measures of confidence-building and preventive diplomacy, made moves to establish an Asian arms register and has led some governments, including China, to publish Defence White Books. Moreover, ASEAN-
ISIS became a model for the Council Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (www.CSCAP.org), which since June 1993 is the main Track-2 counterpart for the ARF (Ball, 1999; Simon, 2002). CSCAP is, like ASEAN-ISIS, quite close to government officials. Some of its now 20 member committees are actually located in foreign ministries or related research centres, while a few are located in more academic centres and think-tanks, as in the case of the European, Australian and North American committees. They are all served by a secretariat currently located in Malaysia’s ISIS. But CSCAP’s input is naturally not enough to handle all possible conflicts in the region.

According to Rüland (2002), all this had relatively limited value. Earlier in the decade a code of conduct on the South China Sea had not yet been signed to prevent crises in that area, financial risks were still a strong possibility, the non-interference principle in domestic issues was still paramount and NGOs from civil society kept being marginalized. Nevertheless, much has changed in the past few years. CSCAP’s definition of preventive diplomacy was adopted by the ARF; at the ASEAN+3 summit of November 2002 China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties to prevent crisis; and ASEAN members started criticizing Burma/Myanmar for its internal actions.

Moreover, ASEAN-ISIS has also influenced economic and social cooperation matters. It argued for ASEAN to join APEC, endorsed the East Asia Economic Caucus and proposed the creation of an ASEAN free trade area that more or less became a reality in 2003. It catalysed the ASEAN People’s Assembly, which held its first meeting of society actors in 2001. Subsequent meetings are taking place next to ASEAN+3 summits, with the hope that an ASEAN socio-cultural community may be more quickly advanced and also to help China find ways to listen better to the concerns of more actors.

ASEAN-ISIS is a reflection of how ASEAN institutions increasingly rely on policy experts. The ASEAN secretariat is increasing both its in-house research capacity and external consultancy procurement. It plans to enhance its ASEAN Foundation created in 1998. To promote AFTA it commissioned the McKinsey consultancy to produce a report full of detailed recommendations that went all the way to the ASEAN summit of 2003.

While the above regional efforts coalesce, a more competitive plurality of ideas and networks is coming from public and private advisers in leading ASEAN countries. Particularly relevant are Singapore’s intellectual leaders, who as a group epitomize the concept of a large and well-coordinated policy research milieu as they often rotate positions in government, academia, business and think-tanks. Much of that movement takes place on the eastern outskirts of the National University of Singa-
pore, where a growing number of domestic and multi-level policy, research and education institutions are consolidating into a think-tank hub. The key node seems to be the Institute of Policy Studies (www.IPS.org.sg), long directed and now chaired by Ambassador-at-Large Tommy Koh, the relentless promoter of much of Singapore’s multi-level policy. Physically connected to the Institute of Policy Studies is the National University of Singapore’s Lee Kwan Yew School of Government (www.spp.nus.edu.sg), soon to move to a bigger and more central location as its large endowment is now attracting a growing number of potential Asianists. Across the street are the Institute for South-East Asian Studies (www.ISEAS.edu.sg), the APEC secretariat, the Asia-Europe Foundation and, until recently, the Civil Service College. Nearby there are several more Asia-related academic research centres, and closer to the city centre is the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (www.SIIAonline.org), an ASEAN-ISIS member to which the former ISEAS director recently moved. Moreover, the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (www.IDSS.edu.sg) became in 1996 Singapore’s latest foreign policy research centre. It is based at the Nanyang Technological University, which the government tries to enhance so as to compete with the National University of Singapore to decrease the risks of stifling innovation in multi-level foreign policy.

Malaysian leaders, always in competition with their Singaporean neighbours, have also long promoted research think-tanks paying more attention to East Asia. Soon after coming to power in the early 1980s Mahathir wanted to bypass the inefficient bureaucracy, so he created the Institute of Strategic & International Studies (www.ISIS.org.my) as a somewhat independent but de facto policy planning department for the Foreign Ministry. Malaysia ISIS is not only a key founding member of ASEAN-ISIS, but also articulated the East Asian Economic Grouping concept in the early 1990s. It convened in 1992 the Commission for a New Asia, an élite group of 16 eminent persons from the region’s countries – including Australia and India – that presented a year later a manifesto entitled “Towards a New Asia”. Since the beginning it has been the secretariat for CSCAP, and since 1987 (since 1991 on behalf of ASEAN-ISIS) it has hosted the annual Asia-Pacific Roundtable, the main networking gathering on regional issues that traces its origins to the transpacific conferences from where ASEAN-ISIS sprung.

As Mahathir, Malaysia’s prime minister, declared his intention to step down in late 2003, some members of ASEAN-ISIS thought he could then devote more time to the East Asia Economic Grouping vision he originally promoted in APEC. Thus they held the first East Asian Congress in Kuala Lumpur in August 2003, just before the seventeenth Asia-Pacific Roundtable. Mahathir’s inaugural statement called on East Asian
leaders to acknowledge that ASEAN+3 was really the East Asian Economic Grouping he had long advocated. Afterwards, the substantive sessions broadly discussed building an East Asian community with regular summits, promoting an Asia Monetary Fund (the noted former Japanese official of the Treasury Ministry, Sakakibara, argued that trade, investment and finance should move in tandem, with the overall goal of avoiding foreign intrusion) and free trade agreements and enhancing sectors like health, tourism, education and labour. The second East Asian Congress, held in June 2004 in conjunction with the eighteenth ASEAN-ISIS Roundtable, broadened the discussions to include the role of the media, as well as the environment and political and security cooperation. Nowadays, yearly evolving congresses are one important way for ASEAN to show it can intellectually lead more broadly in East Asia.

Meanwhile, other developing countries within the ASEAN region have relatively few foreign policy research centres due to histories of strict hierarchical command by royalty, the military or communist parties. Yet a small number, not necessarily constrained by their governments’ leaderships, are appearing and joining ASEAN counterparts and beyond. Jakarta’s CSIS not only acts as the secretariat of ASEAN-ISIS but also coordinates a broader range of regional issues with the creation of the ASEAN Economic Forum and the Europe East Asia (Economic) Forum. Particularly active is the Philippines, whose relatively closeness to the “West” is reflected in the range of intellectual policy debates coming out of its public and private universities. The University of the Philippines in Manila (www.UPM.edu.ph) hosts the Institute of Strategic and Development Studies, which is a key founding member of ASEAN-ISIS. It also hosts the Asian Center, the base of Professor Aileen Baviera, a member of the East Asia Vision Group discussed later. But Catholic universities have also increased their interest in regional issues. For instance, Wilfrido Villacorta, director of De La Salle University’s Yuchengco Center (www.dlsu.edu.ph/research/centers/yc/), which came about with the help of Japanese funding, became the first vice secretary-general of the ASEAN secretariat in charge of some ASEAN+3 issues. And the historic Ateneo de Manila University (www.admu.edu.ph) Centre for Asian Studies is enlarging its growing number of Japan- and China-related centres and programmes.

All these efforts to promote new thinking seem to be paying off, as ASEAN political leaders decided to entrust their future vision to an external eminent persons’ group. Comprising 10 distinguished ASEAN citizens, in 2006 it provided bold recommendations on the overall direction of ASEAN and the nature of the ASEAN charter – which, if all goes according to plan, will be ready by the end of 2007 when political
leaders meet in Singapore to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the association.

**Enmeshing East Asia in the world**

As argued in the previous chapter, functional interregionalism has become a prominent feature in the construction of the East Asian process. This phenomenon is also reflected in high-level advisory venues and processes. A policy intellectual interregionalism was first tried with North America. But a regional advisory identity was first successfully outlined in East Asia’s relations with the European Union, and it has later been enhanced with additional dialogue and cooperation processes with the rest of the developing world. Here again, Japan is still often leading, a re-emerging China feels it can benefit from being engaged and active ASEAN countries are often allowed to take much of the credit for the overall formal balancing process.

“All the major initiatives for the institutionalization of Asia-Pacific cooperation from the mid-1960s onwards came mainly from Japanese academics, who acted in close association with the Japanese government, and in collaboration with counterparts in Australia” (Ravenhill, 2001: 50). Shaped by the flying-geese theory of Kaname Akamatsu, Japanese economist Kiyoshi Kojima proposed in 1965 to create a Pacific [Advanced Countries] Free Trade Area (PAFTA), which proved unsuccessful but led to a long series – first meeting in 1968 – of Pacific Trade and Development (PAFTAD) conferences of self-selected economists from academia and government promoting economic liberalization. Meanwhile, Japan proposed to enlarge the Australia-Japan Business Cooperation Conference, and hosted in 1967 the first conference of the Pacific Basin Economic Council (www.PBEC.org), an association of prominent business representatives from the same five industrialized economies originally envisioned by Kojima and serviced by a small secretariat in Honolulu. The lack of governmental interest in PAFTA led Kojima to reformulate the proposal into the more functional (less institutionalized) Organization for Pacific Trade and Development (OPTAD), aided by the writings of Peter Drysdale and John Crawford, two Australian students of Kojima. OPTAD was also unsuccessful, but it generated momentum to create in 1980 another Australian-Japanese initiative, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (www.PECC.org), a still-active tripartite gathering of prominent and rather liberally minded government representatives, academics and business people.

All that intellectual activity greatly helped the creation of APEC in 1989, timely proposed by the Australian government with the thawing of
the Cold War, and well received by developing Pacific Asia economies (mainly ASEAN) as it was not formally coming from either Japan or the United States. Although eventually institutionalized with working groups, regular high-level meetings and a secretariat in Singapore, APEC advanced slowly during the 1990s in the direction towards freer trade that the United States wanted. There had long been a smallish Pacific Business Forum meeting in parallel to APEC ministerial meetings, but under the leadership of Fred Bergsten, formerly on the staff of the National Security Council and now head of the Institute of International Economics (www.IIE.com) in Washington, D.C., leaders from members’ research centres gathered in an eminent persons’ group to propose trade liberalization successfully; this ran only from 1992 until 1994, when their mandate was stopped for being increasingly vocal and specific in their recommendations. Nevertheless, diehards of the eminent persons’ group formed in 1995 the APEC Business Advisory Council (www.ABAConline.org), with three experts per country and a secretariat in Manila, but overall it cannot provide the leadership that the eminent persons’ group tried to sustain. Meanwhile, APEC’s own small secretariat engages in only very limited research, sometimes in cooperation with the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, whose members are very close to governments and therefore restrained in providing ground-breaking ideas. Given APEC’s role of advancing economic cooperation, it is undergoing a long and crucial period of self-reflection. In Feinberg (2003) scholars from APEC study centres thoroughly assessed APEC’s status quo, giving ideas to invigorate it for the new economy. None of that intellectual input seemed to make APEC advance very much in economic cooperation.

While APEC tries to reinvent itself, ASEM is promoting both bilateral and bi-regional cooperation, epitomized by high-level intellectual interaction. A clear indication that ASEM, and therefore an ASEAN+3 with interregional projection, is here to stay in some form or another is the growing number of non-governmental policy groups that have risen in and around it, advancing ideas to keep the whole process going forward.

On top of it all was the ASEM Vision Group, proposed by South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung in ASEM-1, which from February 1998 to March 1999 gathered personalities who had moved between academia, business, government and civil society to produce a comprehensive report with 29 recommendations that still remain very relevant to improving cooperation generally in political, economic and social fields (see table 3.1).

Meanwhile, somewhat outside the margins of ASEM, the leaders of about a dozen research centres in Europe, East Asia and even Australia strengthened their informal links and formed the Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation (www.CAEC-asiaeurope.org) to provide additional,
but more independent and constant, input to the ASEM process. The European side is partially an outgrowth of CSCAP Europe; while the European secretariat has moved from London to Paris, the (East) Asian secretariat has always remained at the Japan Center for International Exchange, a think-tank that benefited from some funding from Japan’s Foreign Ministry to help launch the whole exercise. The CAEC taskforces produced a variety of non-controversial reports for each ASEM summit that included issues like finance, population and earth resources. It was

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<th>Clusters</th>
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<td>Trade</td>
<td>Advancing WTO trade talks</td>
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<td>Free trade in goods and services by 2025</td>
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<td>Macro-economy,</td>
<td>Closer macro-economic policy coordination and reform of</td>
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<td>Global rules for enhancing transparency and prudent financial supervision</td>
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<td>Cooperation in economic assistance</td>
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<td>Aviation agreements and aerospace development</td>
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<td>Improved infrastructure framework</td>
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<td>Information technology council</td>
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<td>Virtual technology transfer centre and cooperation between technology</td>
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<td>“Non-marketable” technologies – solutions in health care</td>
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<td>Environment centre</td>
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<td>Education</td>
<td>Forum of education ministers and heads of universities</td>
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<td>Dual degrees, targeted language teaching, simplification of national</td>
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<td>academic regulations and survey of curricula</td>
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<td>Scholarship programme</td>
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<td>Visiting professorships</td>
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<td>Social</td>
<td>Forum for societal exchanges – strengthening ASEF</td>
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<td>governance</td>
<td>Managing social imbalances</td>
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<td>Culture</td>
<td>Biennial cultural festival</td>
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<td>Strengthened dialogue</td>
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<td>security</td>
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<td>General</td>
<td>Affirmation of the principles of good governance</td>
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<td>governance</td>
<td>Twinning of cities</td>
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<td>Institutions</td>
<td>ASEM secretariat</td>
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particularly active until ASEM-3, but it still produced reports on social policies, migration and peace creation to feed into the ASEM-4 summit. As having Australia on board precluded fully acknowledging the value of the CAEC for the ASEM process, some of its members became active in EU-ASEAN (ISIS) think-tank dialogues that began in the late 1990s and since 2004 have been transformed into EU-East Asian think-tank dialogues with funding from German political and business foundations. These types of open intellectual exercises are now further enhanced as ASEM governments endorsed Finland and Japan’s proposal for the University of Helsinki Network for European Studies and the Japan Center for International Exchange to lead a large-scale critical review of the first decade of ASEM, presented to leaders attending the ASEM-6 summit in 2006 (Japan Center for International Exchange and University of Helsinki Centre for European Studies, 2006).

The second pillar, focusing on economic and financial matters, has also been progressing with the help of external policy advice. As ASEM is largely intergovernmental, business actors are relatively less active than in APEC. Yet the Singaporean government keeps trying to promote them, through the Asia-Europe Business Forum that has agreed on a low-key ASEM Connect initiative, and the convincing of INSEAD, Europe’s most global and reputed business school, to set up a regional Asia campus in Singapore in 2000. Rather than from business groups, the evolution of ASEM’s second pillar has received the input of a “Taskforce for a Closer Economic Partnership”, first meeting in May 2003 at the Real Instituto Elcano (www.RealInstitutoElcano.org), a bipartisan Spanish think-tank that served as the taskforce co-secretariat while it prepared a report for ASEM economic leaders. This taskforce called for the creation of not only strong economic links but also permanent institutions like an ASEM secretariat.

More important for long-term Europe-Asian exchanges is the engagement of civil society. As the input of Track-3 actors risked not being heard at the start of the ASEM process, the European Commission convened the first large-scale Forum on Culture, Values & Technology in January 1996 in Venice. Since then, Asia-Europe People’s Forums (www.AEPF.net) meet on the side of ASEM summits and their input is increasingly recognized by more ASEM partners. Also under ASEM’s third, cultural/intellectual, pillar is the much more structured intergovernmental Asia-Europe Foundation (www.ASEF.org). It was successfully proposed by the government of Singapore in ASEM-1, and first directed from 1997 to 2001 by Singaporean Ambassador Tommy Koh, who largely designed its multi pillar platform; by 2006 it had reached to over 15,000 intellectuals, students, media experts, culture-related and other opinion-makers to discuss and cooperate in a regional and interregional fashion.
Since mid-2004 ASEF has also hosted a website on the ASEM process (www.ASEMInfoboard.org) as a pilot project to help disseminate relevant news.

The leadership of North-East Asia

The ASEAN tradition of researching and consulting with a broader range of actors is nowadays particularly widespread in Japan, South Korea and, increasingly, China, the key countries now still peacefully competing to shape the East Asian community.

South Korea’s East Asia Vision and Study Groups

The East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) was formed in December 1998, again under the initiative of the South Korean government under President Kim Dae-Jung, to become so far the closest to a preliminary constitutional effort to help turn the ASEAN+3 regional process into a substantial East Asian community. A total of 26 intellectuals (2 per country) gathered several times before submitting in 2001 a landmark prospective report full of recommendations (East Asia Vision Group, 2001). The EAVG’s chairman was Professor Sung-Joo Han, who personally established the Ilmin International Relations Institute (www.korea.ac.kr/~ilmin/) at the elite Korea University in Seoul. Professor Han hosted in May 1984 a transpacific conference that spurred the events that led to ASEAN-ISIS. Then, again under Korean leadership, ASEAN+3 leaders agreed in November 2000 to convene the East Asia Study Group (EASG) of governmental officials to assess the EAVG recommendations and the implications of an East Asian summit. The EASG, established in March 2001, submitted its own report to the ASEAN+3 leaders meeting in Cambodia in November 2002, arguing that an East Asian summit was both inevitable and necessary and presenting, as if suggesting intellectual democracy, 26 recommendations generally ratifying the input of the EAVG (East Asia Study Group, 2002). Naturally, the ASEAN+3 leaders warmly endorsed the outcome of the EASG.

Table 3.2 summarizes the plurality of outputs of the groups. Overall, the joint goal of both reports is to promote more political and business interactions while enhancing knowledge dissemination, all steered by networks of think-tanks while more permanent but lean and effective institutions are constructed. In other words, the construction of an East Asian community remains largely, but not completely, a top-down design. There were 17 short-term measures ready for implementation, often focusing on helping businesses, and 9 medium- to long-term measures more concerned with difficult political and social concerns requiring further study.
Table 3.2 EASG recommendations and types of actor mainly addressed

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Business</th>
<th>Think-tanks</th>
<th>Academia</th>
<th>Civil society</th>
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<td><strong>Short term</strong></td>
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<td>Form an East Asia business council</td>
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<td>Establish GSP status and preferential treatment for the least developed</td>
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<td>countries</td>
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<td>Foster an attractive investment environment for increased foreign</td>
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<td>direct investment</td>
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<td>Establish an East Asian investment information network</td>
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<td>Develop resources and infrastructure jointly for growth areas and</td>
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<td>expand financial resources for development with the active</td>
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<td>participation of the private sector</td>
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<td>Provide assistance and cooperation in four priority areas:</td>
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<td>infrastructure, information technology, human resources development</td>
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<td>and ASEAN regional economic integration</td>
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<td>Cooperate through technology transfers and joint technology</td>
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<td>development</td>
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<td>Develop information technology jointly to build telecommunications</td>
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<td>infrastructure and provide greater access to the internet</td>
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<tr>
<td>Build a network of East Asian think-tanks</td>
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<td>Establish East Asia Forum of the region’s governmental and non-</td>
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<td>governmental representatives from various sectors</td>
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<td>Implement a comprehensive human resources development programme</td>
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<td>for East Asia</td>
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Establish poverty alleviation programmes
Take concerted steps to provide access to primary health care for the people
Strengthen mechanisms for cooperation on non-traditional security issues
Work together with cultural and educational institutions to promote a strong sense of identity and an East Asian consciousness
Promote networking and exchanges of experts in the conservation of the arts, artefacts and cultural heritage of East Asian countries
Promote East Asian studies in the region

Medium and long term
Form an East Asian free trade area
Promote investment by small and medium-sized enterprises
Establish an East Asia investment area by expanding the ASEAN Investment Area
Establish a regional financing facility
Pursue a more closely coordinated regional exchange rate mechanism
Pursue the evolution of the ASEAN+3 summit into an East Asian summit
Promote closer regional marine environmental cooperation for the entire region
Build a framework for energy policies, strategies and action plans
Work closely with NGOs in policy consultation and coordination to encourage civic participation and state-civil society partnerships in tackling social problems
A key short-term measure was to “build a network of East Asian think-tanks”, as they can bridge between the academic community and political decision-makers. Think-tanks can give early warning to governments and civic social groups before the problems become serious. Focusing on analysis of important issues, they can concentrate on new political, economic, and societal trends that will be potential problems in the near future, and they are able to detect new problems in advance. In addition, think-tanks can come up with measures and policy alternatives to solve new problems to help decision-makers find appropriate solutions. Furthermore, think-tanks can function as opinion leaders by fostering favourable environments for decision-makers to adopt new policies to address problems because they are able to provide the public with in-depth studies on new policies and benefits to be produced by implementing such policies. Expanding globalization and deepening interdependence among East Asian countries have necessitated think-tanks in the region to establish a network to carry out their tasks more effectively because it becomes more and more difficult for a country to solve new problems without cooperation from other countries.

It will be relatively easy to establish a network of East Asian think-tanks because ASEAN has experience in building the ASEAN ISIS and extending it through its network of institutions in Northeast Asian countries. Once a network of East Asian think-tanks is established, the network will make a great contribution to promoting political cooperation and deepening cooperative relationships among East Asian countries.

The masses, as seen from the limited references to civil society, were at first largely left out from the elite intergovernmental process, although the elites hoped eventually to be able to reach to them and incorporate them into the process. Many medium- to long-term measures are also geared towards government-business collaboration. The rest of civil society would later be brought into the process, as seen in the last of the medium- to long-term recommendations: “work closely with NGOs in policy consultation and coordination to encourage civic participation and state-civil society partnerships in tackling social problems”.

Another of the 17 concrete short-term measures advanced by the EAVG and taken up by the EASG was to establish the East Asian Forum (EAF). Exactly, the proposal was to “Establish an EAF consisting of the region’s governmental and non-governmental representatives from various sectors, with the aim to serve as an institutional mechanism for broad-based social exchanges and, ultimately, regional cooperation.” The EAF would consist of “representatives from government, business, and academic circles”, and “will be modelled as a Track II process with a view to encouraging dialogue and interaction, developing networking,
and promoting an exchange of views and generation of ideas in the region”.

The outputs of the EAVG reflected the short biographies of its members, available at the end of the report. Most had been working in the main policy research centres in their own countries. Direct business input was relatively limited, although it is possible that some of the members had stronger business affiliations than those declared. And broader civil society seemed to be underrepresented, for only the Malaysian representative declared having been involved in a non-governmental organization.

The rising competition between think-tanks is particularly noticeable in South Korea. Fifty-nine government research institutes with 18,000 researchers were to be rationalized into five at the end of 1998, and placed under the control of the prime minister (Korea Times, 1998). In the end the plan was only partially implemented and nowadays about a score of governmental research institutes remain active, but a few more independent ones have appeared around business conglomerates and in academic institutions.

As South Korea has for long felt pressured to be a balancer between its larger neighbours, it took from the recommendations of the East Asia Vision and Study Groups the responsibility of managing the East Asian Forum. Seoul’s Yonsei University, one of the promoters of the forum, has also created the North-East Asian Network (www.NEAN.org) for young people to explore common solutions to common problems more freely. Moreover, current President Roh Moo-Hyun has established the Presidential Committee on a Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative (www.nabh.go.kr) to set up strategic directions (Geung, 2005). If better coordinated with the policy intellectuals of China and Japan, NACI could eventually grow alongside young think-tanks and Track-2 initiatives to catalyse a subregional coordination office for the earlier East Asia Vision and Study Groups.

Japan still in the leading role

In the late nineteenth century the Kyoto school of Eastern philosophy argued that Japan should not fully embrace Western liberalism but should aim to be a leader in Asia by helping develop it. Japan’s military found inspiration in such ideas, but twisted them, as military conquest is very different from the concept of leadership by example commonly accepted in other parts of the world.

Current East Asian regionalism is intellectually driven by a different kind of policy experts who, at least in Japan, link to a more democratic and stable policy process. Much of Japan’s consensus towards a multi-level policy that accommodates a rising East Asia is first reached in the
growing number of research centres and discussion committees of various kinds formed at all levels. Japan’s ministerial bureaucracy has led that process, and in the 1990s became somewhat more fluid (Tanaka, 2000). The prime minister is chosen by the leaders of the dominant factions in the ruling LDP party, which also oversee the creation of his cabinet. The prime minister’s cabinet, collectively answerable to the Diet, signs what has been agreed by vice-ministers, who in turn sign what has already been worked out in the relevant ministries. In an effort to secure wide acceptance for their policies, ministries have often used all kinds of expert councils and think-tanks to get ideas and disseminate the final bureaucratic output. But Koizumi’s cabinet, operating in a context of bureaucratic reform, tried in the new century to increase its influence in a similar way. The prime minister’s cabinet research section has started to promote more efficient policy-oriented consultative research groups bringing officials and external experts in contact. Its best example so far may have been the taskforce for Japan’s foreign policy, which comprised mainly Japanese, US and Asian experts although also including experts on Europe.

Japan still uses the multilateral route to advance regional ideas. It pays almost 20 per cent of the UN budget, and has hosted since the mid-1970s the publisher of this book, the United Nations University (www.UNU.edu), which coordinates over a dozen centres and programmes around the world. The UNU’s overall output is not comparable to the large universities in most economically advanced countries, but it tries to catalyse them to collaborate in novel ways. For instance, the UNU Asia Pacific Initiative has recently been created to support the development of a new-media studio to promote online multimedia broadcasting at the UNU, expecting to function as a regional node in a networked virtual organization composed of partner universities, research institutions, NGOs and businesses. Within the World Bank the Japanese government keeps arguing in favour of Asian modes of development. In 1991 Japan financed the World Bank’s East Asian Miracle report, which caused much controversy and was generally dismissed later in the decade in the wake of the financial crisis (World Bank, 1993). Nevertheless, since 2001 the government of Japan has sponsored a new round of reports similarly arguing the inherent good potential of a mixed public-private system of economic governance for growth, albeit in need of some revisions in the financial, corporate, judicial and social areas to become more innovative (Yusuf and Evenett, 2002). In other words, the East Asian model has been adapted to the European continental model of balancing economic liberalization with social concerns.

Meanwhile, Japan’s private-led intellectual centres specializing in foreign policy have begun promoting a vision of a stronger East Asia within
a multi-level context. For instance, the Japan Center for International Exchange (www.JCIE.or.jp), created in the late 1960s to promote exchanges with the United States, has grown to incorporate a variety of multi-level intellectual and civil society activities that increasingly focus on the Asian region. This centre is familiar with the key Asian intellectual resources as it has surveyed all major research institutes, NGOs and foundations in the region (Yamamoto, 1995), and tries to keep track of the recently exponentially growing number of dialogue and research activities helping advance the idea of an East Asian community. Moreover, the JCIE is also the secretariat for the Pacific Asia group of the Trilateral Commission, and advances Track-2 research initiatives with North America, Western Europe and beyond.

Catering more to the increasing domestic supply of policy-oriented think-tanks is the Japan Forum on International Relations (www.JFIR.or.jp). Created in 1987 by former diplomat Saburo Okita and known for its interest in regional issues, the forum is rather small but has developed a unique élite-democratic system of producing policy recommendations (PRs) that require approval by a majority of its about 100 Policy Council members. Since the first PR in 1988, largely focused on Asia’s newly industrialized countries, several others have increasingly focused on the promotion of regionalism: PR11 of 1994 titled “The Future of Regionalism and Japan”; PR19 of May 2000 titled “Economic Globalization and Options for Asia”; PR22 of December 2002 titled “Building a System of Security and Cooperation in East Asia”, which exhorted in 15 points for Japan to aim to lead in the long term an open regional core within a broader, multi-level environment dealing with multiple issues (it was approved basically unanimously); and PR23 of May 2003 titled “Japan’s Initiative for Economic Community in East Asia”, which specified 15 recommendations that included the creation in the short term of an economic community, in the medium term a customs union and, in the longer term, a common currency (it was approved by 72 non-drafting members of the council). Complementing the PRs are occasional project reports, like the one titled “Japan in Asia: What Should We Do? – Asia as a Political System”, and outreach activities like the Global Forum of Japan; since its start in 1996 this has been shifting its focus from quadrangular partners (Europe and North America) to neighbouring countries in Asia-Pacific, sometimes in collaboration with the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies.

The forum has also taken the lead in creating a platform to coordinate the many rather small but competitive think-tanks, mostly linked to factions within ministries or companies, generally paying increasing attention to Japan’s role in the East Asia region. The Council on East Asian Community (www.CEAC.jp) was inaugurated in Japan in May 2004, trig-
gered by the launching the previous year of the Network of East Asian Think-tanks in Beijing and the East Asia Forum in Seoul. It is an intellectual platform balancing business, government and academic inputs. The membership of CEAC consists of think-tank members (usually retired bureaucrats), individual members and corporate members under the chairmanship of former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and the presidency of Ken’ichi Ito, former bureaucrat in the Foreign Ministry. The basic management policy of the council is directed by a caucus comprising its president and vice-presidents. The plenary meeting, which is attended by the members of CEAC, conducts policy debate among its members and produces policy recommendations as occasion demands. And in an effort to lead a transparent East Asian intellectual community the council maintains links with the rest of the world in various ways, the litmus test being China.

**China’s search for valuable advice**

As the People’s Republic was born in 1949, the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (www.CPIFA.org) was founded to promote elite people-to-people diplomacy, but most international contacts and much intellectual capability were obliterated during the Cultural Revolution. Only since the late 1970s have party leaders allowed a slow rebirth of policy research centres (for a general description of the research centres feeding policy analysis to the party élite, see the first five articles in the September 2002 issue of *China Quarterly* devoted to think-tanks). In the newest, post-Tiananmen, generation of research sections and affiliated institutes of party organs analysing international issues there is even competition. The influence of the Central Committee’s China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (www.CICIR.ac.cn) is decreasing relative to the Foreign Ministry’s China Institute of International Studies (www.CIIS.org.cn). Meanwhile, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (www.CASS.net.cn), the main semi-independent establishment specializing in longer-term views for the party, has been particularly influential in promoting the enthusiastic participation of China in the East Asia process. But the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (www.SASS.org.cn) and the Shanghai Institute of International Studies (www.SIIS.org.cn) are also following similar wavelengths (they helped intellectually to concoct the Shanghai Cooperation Organization), especially since they were highly considered by Jiang Zemin, a former Chinese premier with strong ties to that booming East Asian city. Moreover, Jiang used think-tanks to develop a complex intellectual doctrine to broaden the party’s policy process to the “Three Represents” – business people and bankers (both competitively and globally minded), and large owners, often party
members at the regional level; China’s Renmin University hosts a research centre which advances that line of thinking.

China gradually continued to open up intellectually and politically, creating its own competitive model (but partially drawing from its regional neighbours), as the fourth generation of party leaders appointed in 2002 had unprecedented academic credentials (Brodsgaard, 2002).

Nowadays the rapidly growing China Foreign Affairs University (www.CFAU.edu.cn), funded by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wants to be the key hub of East Asian intellectual diplomacy. It coordinates the Network of East Asian Think-tanks, one of the recommendations of the EAVG and EASG originally proposed by South Korea.

Building networks of East Asian think-tanks

Following the ninth near-term recommendation of the EASG, the Network of East Asian Think-tanks (www.NEAT.org.cn) was set up. The network has been handled by the Chinese government: it held its first annual meeting in September 2003 hosted by the Asia-Pacific Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, but later the China Foreign Affairs University took over its general coordination. Professor Zhang Yunling, the host of the first NEAT conference, summarized the consensus among many recommendations, all posted on the website.

Concerning the formation and work of Network of East Asian Think-tanks, some consensus was reached among country coordinators through the working meeting: Formal name, website, annual periodicity, openness to all think-tanks and their scholars as institutional members and individual members in 10+3 countries. By a think-tank, it should be real policy oriented research institution and to be a member of NEAT, scholars should do their research mainly on policy issues relating to East Asian cooperation. Each country designates, with the support from the respective government, one leading institution as a country coordinator responsible for developing the country think-tanks network, developing NEAT members, coordinating and organizing research projects, meetings independently or projected by NEAT relating to East Asian cooperation issues. NEAT will be a track 2 of East Asian cooperation process. It will assign its representative to participate track 1 meeting and make recommendations to senior officials meeting (SOM), ministers meeting and leaders meeting directly. It is requested that NEAT recommendation should be included into the agenda of above meetings. NEAT is led by the General Coordinator in cooperation with the country coordinators. The general coordinator is the representative of NEAT and is responsible for coordinating the work of country network through country coordinator and developing the relations with outside think-tanks, as well as international organizations. The coordinating office of NEAT is allocated in Beijing, China. NEAT should get full support from East Asian
governments. While it receives financial support from the government, it also welcomes the support and contribution from private sector, foundations and individuals. A website for NEAT (www.neat.org.cn) is going to be set up and registered in China.

NEAT’s yearly meetings, which are held alternatively in North-East and South-East Asia, have become increasingly structured and productive. In the second meeting that took place in August 2004 in Bangkok’s Thammasat University, six working groups were established and sponsored by various countries:

- overall architecture of community-building in East Asia (sponsored by Japan)
- concepts, ideas and empowering guidelines for East Asia (sponsored by Malaysia)
- East Asian investment cooperation (sponsored by China)
- East Asian financial cooperation (sponsored by China)
- energy security cooperation (sponsored by Singapore)
- promoting economic integration in East Asia through resolving new global imbalances (sponsored by Japan).

At the third meeting, hosted in August 2005 by the Japan Institute of International Relations, the first set of proposals were presented and discussed, hoping eventually to be accepted by forthcoming political summits. Just before that meeting, Japan’s Council on East Asian Community forcefully presented a summary report with many revolutionary ideas to help lead the process (CEAC, 2005). Without ambiguity, Japan should aim to achieve peace, prosperity and progress through openness, transparency and inclusion. Japan would promote a broad range of useful functional cooperations to help develop soft East Asian identities among people. It hoped to promote through a mixture of bilateral and regional mechanisms more open trade (including agriculture) and investment, and would show a concern for monetary and financial stability, which would require a strengthening and opening of its own financial sector, all to accomplish in steps a true East Asian economic community. But Japan would not forget social concerns and would foster regional trust through functional cooperation in energy and environment, maritime security and infectious diseases. It would also promote longer-term cultural, research and education issues that include accepting more human resources from the region. To manage the whole process, Japan would continue arguing that ASEAN should remain at the driving seat of yearly ASEAN+3 summits, as well as more infrequent East Asia summits including other countries, but the ASEAN secretariat should be enhanced and a flexible framework established to allow observers and associate countries to participate, case by case, in functional meetings. At the same time, the re-
port requests the Japanese cabinet to create regular East Asian policy meetings with all concerned ministries jointly to sustain Japan’s regional vision. Many of those recommendations would be very difficult to achieve for a long time, but they overall signal that the time for decisive action in a global environment has come.

The fourth NEAT country coordinators’ meeting, held in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 in preparation for the fourth annual conference in August 2006, proposed a new working group structure, in which “concepts, ideas and empowering guidelines” disappeared and the five working groups on economic and energy issues basically remained unchanged but complemented by a new one on “intraregional exchange rate stability and prevention of financial crisis in EAST Asia”, to be steered by Japan, and two new groups to be managed by new countries: “IT cooperation in East Asia” by Korea, and an “international conference between NEAT and other regional groupings” by Thailand. During the fourth annual conference, the fifth NEAT country coordinators’ meeting approved reports from most of the working groups.

NEAT is possibly the Track-2 closest to the ASEAN+3 process, but certainly not the only one, as Japan and ASEAN want to make sure that their input is heard. Thus a new wave of research think-tank networks has been developing to advance towards a more plural policy intellectual space in East Asia.

After the financial crisis of 1997, Tokyo campaigned for an Asia Monetary Fund to complement the role of the IMF. The United States and other countries did not accept the proposal, but Japan now hosts the IMF’s regional office for Asia and the Pacific to monitor regional developments and assess progress and issues in regional integration and cooperation.

Japan then created the Global Development Network Japan as part of the World Bank’s Global Development Network. It is composed of 16 research centres close to the most relevant ministries and coordinated by a common publications database (www.GDN-japan.jbic.go.jp). The network complements the East Asian Development Network (www.EADN.org), which brings together nowadays 32 members from the rest of the East Asian community (plus Fiji and Hong Kong), with Singapore’s Institute of South-East Asian Studies serving as the first regional coordinator before it moved in 2004 to Thailand’s Development Research Institute.

Moreover, Japan is following the example of the World Bank and established in December 1997 the Asian Development Bank Institute (www.ADBI.org) to help turn the ADB into a knowledge bank. The institute is located in Tokyo and was first headed by one of Japan’s two members of the East Asia Vision Group. Among the institute’s strategic
initiatives is the design of intermediate financial market structures in post-crisis Asia. One actual way was through the Asian Policy Forum, whose third set of policy proposals focused on the sequencing of China’s financial market liberalization. Its seven points recommended a series of domestic reforms as well as the promotion of a managed, semi-open exchange rate system. Moreover, the ASEAN secretariat and the ADB increasingly call on ASEAN+3 research think-tank groups to provide analysis and ideas on economic cooperation.

Meanwhile, ASEAN think-tanks have become even more active. For instance, the Singapore Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies presented in November 2005 a report with 30 recommendations for the East Asian summit (See and Emmers, 2005): It should aim to build confidence and comfort in addressing broad strategic themes, including security, in frank and constructive dialogue. It should aim at having useful management practices (a flexible chair for the East Asia summit, a lean secretariat, senior officials' meetings and intersessional support groups and meetings and stronger links with Track-2 and Track-3 actors). It should be based in functional cooperation; in the short term addressing terrorism, piracy and maritime security and health security, but in the longer term focusing on economics, energy, human security, transnational crimes and weapons of mass destruction issues. More importantly for global multi-level governance, the East Asian summit should be complementary to existing mechanisms like ASEAN+3, the ARF and APEC.

*Weaving tripartite cooperation*

One may also notice thickening Track-2 developments in North-East Asia to deal with a growing number of issues. After the Canadian government funded some conferences in 1991–1992, the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation of the University of California, San Diego, started in 1993 the North-East Asia Cooperation Dialogue between China, Japan, both Koreas, Russia and the United States, which has been peacefully wiring (www.WiredForPeace.org) the participants in the yearly conferences to discuss many delicate issues of bilateral and regional concern, and paving the way to the current multilateral six-party talks to tackle the desperate North Korean attitude.

But one of the first tripartite agreements among the leaders of North-East Asia was to create a new batch of North-East Asian young intellectuals who would focus on the potential of future collaboration, implicitly giving the message that they realize they need to get out of their current political impasse but are not sure of the best way to proceed. Young leaders from government, business, academia, media and people’s organizations, building on the experience of the first ASEAN+3 Young
Leaders Forum in 2000 in Brunei, have been meeting in the Japan-China-Republic of Korea Future Leaders Forum, designed since 2002 as an annual forum for the exchange of opinions in seminars and symposia, as well as field trips and visits to schools and government offices in all three countries. This forum is co-organized by the Japan Foundation, the Korea Foundation and the All-China Youth Federation, key government organizations in promoting international cultural exchange.

Towards a global multi-level policy intellectual space

The end of the Cold War has allowed much of the world to explore new collaborative dynamics in which extreme left–right cleavages are giving way to a constructive plurality of cleavages tempered in a multi-level fashion. As this chapter has argued, distorted visions of clashing civilizations are not shared by a majority of global policy advisers in Europe and East Asia – who, on the contrary, see that civilizations are complex human constructions capable of bridging their diversities. The tradition of private-led supranational policy advisers sustaining ideas of economic liberalization and democratic governance has been broadening beyond earlier transatlantic links into a rising multi-level Asia aiming to form an East Asian community based on functional competition, somewhat resembling the European project that was sanctioned by many politicians and advisers in the United States during the Cold War years. Europe and East Asia are now in a position to link further their relevant advisers able to catalyse a broader, responsible, global multi-level civil society.

Strengthening the enlarged ASEM process

As a start, the revitalized ASEM process offers an excellent platform for a multiplicity of relevant advisers to cooperate. The Council of Asia-Europe Cooperation, having included Australia, is not in a position to be recognized as a preferred Track-2 platform in an ASEM process that has not enlarged to Oceania. Yet its last taskforce reports, dating from 2004, offered valuable advice for the plethora of international think-tanks and cooperative networks in European and East Asian countries and regions. They should further help Asia and Europe enhance global governance, reform multilateralism, raise awareness in the United States of the increasing role of Europe and East Asia and address global issues relating to security, energy and environment. The enhanced financial structure of the Asia-Europe Foundation will soon allow it to further more elements of civil society and make politicians and business and people’s
leaders from more countries able to learn from each other. But perhaps what is needed is an ASEM multi-level vision group to reassess the evolution of its recommendations according to multi-level developments.

*Catalysing practical intellectuals in developing areas around the world*

To increase global safety and prosperity, Europe and East Asia could best engage the rest of the world in a multi-level fashion, through inter-regional dialogues and reaching to multilateral organizations so they become more effective multi-level dynamic platforms for the growth of public and private intellectual groups around the world.

The EU’s soft external relations with other regional processes usually include policy dialogues as complements to the growing advisory links that its member states are constructing with much of the world. Given the relative successes in APEC and ASEM, East Asian countries are increasingly active in using this type of semi-public diplomacy in their broader set of interregional processes. The fourth NEAT country coordinators’ meeting proposed a working group to advance an “international conference between NEAT and other regional groupings”. Although the results of that intellectual convergence may take some time to produce visible results, East Asia is already exploring intellectual links with developing parts of the world.

In the Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC/FOCALAE), experts on both sides of the Pacific soon began providing policy advice not only to promote trade openness but also to look for closer, broader types of interregional collaboration. And so the Chilean Pacific Foundation (www.FunPacifico.cl) and its main patron, the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hosted in October 2000 a first academic seminar. Moreover, the first ministerial agreed to have increasing inputs from think-tanks, and a first symposium for intellectuals from East Asia and Latin America was held in Tokyo in February 2002.

Meanwhile, the Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) began as a top-down intergovernmental process with very little input from independent intellectuals, and those few who aired an opinion in Thailand were critical of the whole exercise (Matichon in *Thai*, 23 June 2002). At first there was only “a preliminary study on potential areas of Asia-wide cooperation”, produced entirely by the International Studies Centre of the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, raising issues of physical linkages, people/human linkages and cooperation and economic linkages and cooperation, but it did not elaborate much on how to achieve these successfully. Yet the ACD also soon began to rely on policy intellectuals to grow. Thailand compiled a list of academic institutions, development networks and
research groups in ACD countries to serve as an academic arm of the ACD. In June 2004, the day before the third ACD foreign ministers' meeting, the Saranrom Institute of Foreign Affairs, in cooperation with the Boao Forum for Asia and NEAT, co-organized the first ACD high-level seminar on Asian cooperation and development. China had been promoting the business-oriented Boao Forum for Asia (www.BoaoForum.org), that has met since 2001 on the Chinese island of Hainan, as a Track-2 business exercise that has become intertwined with both the ACD and the East Asia community. Its 2004 annual conference included an informal meeting for heads of Asia's regional and subregional organizations. And in December 2004 Thailand hosted the first ACD think-tanks symposium, under the theme of “Towards Asian Dynamism: The Potentials of the Asia Cooperation Dialogue”. The event was attended by 36 participants, including those from the ACD listed think-tanks. Exchanges of views were made on various issues, such as energy cooperation, biotechnology, economic and financial cooperation in Asia and human resource development. The symposium proposed action in two areas, namely the creation of an “energy security community” to promote cooperation between energy-supplying and energy-consuming countries in the region, and the establishment of an ACD human resource development centre.

Another potentially useful advisory venue to reach into the “Great Balkans” is the first Asia-Middle East Dialogue (www.AMED.sg), which more than a political summit was actually a mega-epistemic exercise, as all kinds of political actors and experts came in 2005 to Singapore from about 50 countries to discuss in a private capacity how to create synergies and solve common problems.

Meanwhile, the generally forgotten African development pleas need much more attention than is coming now even from East Asian policy intellectuals. To enhance the New Partnership for Africa's Development through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development process, the African diplomatic corps based in Tokyo and the United Nations University decided to launch the Africa-Japan-Asia Centre for Economic, Trade and Cultural Exchanges in Tokyo to “contribute to furthering African awareness within Japan and the Asian community, particularly within the business community” (United Nations University, 2003). The many sorrows of Africa demand all the help the world can provide to help Africans develop their great potential.

*Fresh ideas to transform international organizations*

The UN system of international organizations in particular should improve its global multi-level reach to synthesize the useful advice of global
civil society. Policy advice coming from special *ad hoc* advisory commissions and panels has produced so far uneven results because of, *inter alia*, the variegated nature of issues they deal with, the political bargains deciding their expert composition, the sometimes unfocused output presented and the changing mood of receiving countries (Thakur, Cooper and English, 2005). But among the 100 recommendations for change the United Nations presented in the 2004 report by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change was the proposal to increase cooperation with regional organizations and processes for soft security issues like conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding (Graham and Felicio, 2006). In addition, the Alliance of Civilizations (www.unAOC.org) initiative launched by the United Nations in 2005 reflects a potentially useful multi-level consultative precedent, as it is being led by a high-level group of about 20 eminent persons chosen from 11 regions (West Europe, East Europe, North Africa, West Africa, Southern Africa, Middle East, South Asia, South-East Asia, North-East Asia, Latin America, North America) who will be cooperating with similar initiatives and draw on work accomplished or under way in other forums.

But much more could be done to transform the United Nations away from being a travelling circus with a report-churning malaise into a flexible, global multi-level advisory platform. It could better coordinate with the World Bank’s Global Development Network (www.GND.org), already based on regions and countries, to help refocus the Bank into a knowledge-brokering institution. Further, it could try to have regional advisers in the G7/8. And instead of following the repeated suggestions of creating an East Asian version of the OECD to monitor its functional regional developments, ECOSOC could decentralize much of its work to a transformed OECD in which regional processes are accommodated in stages while their country members are assessed for full membership.

In addition, the United Nations could envison better multi-level fashion coordination with relevant global civil society. Although thousands of NGOs have UN consultative status, their input has in the past been very limited for a number of reasons, including the lack of rigour of some of them. But in the future some global Track-2 and Track-3 processes could be better incorporated into the UN system as a consultative platform on which their voices are transparently presented to Track-1 political leaders. This could start with the most prominent Track 1.5 gatherings, such as the Trilateral Commission, which is now divided into three largely autonomous regional groups (North America, Europe and Pacific Asia), and the World Economic Forum, which is increasingly gravitating away from the Atlantic and into East Asia, where it is often cited as a
model for business-led advisory processes like China’s Boao Forum for Asia or South Korea’s World Knowledge Forum (www.wkforum.org).

But, like countries’ parliaments, the United Nations cannot forget to accommodate the more critical global multi-level platforms that are backed by many millions of people. Thus the United Nations should better explore profiting from the ideas coming from the increasingly structured World Social Forum (www.ForumSocialMundial.org.br). The international committee of the yearly World Social Forum and the Brazil organizing committee (2001 founding host) decided that from 2002 onwards there would be regional, continental and thematic forums across the globe to catalyse social energies better where most needed. Thus the World Social Forum poly-nodal decentralization notably started with the Asian Social Forum that took place in Hyderabad (India), which helped prepare for the 2004 World Social Forum held in Mumbai, India’s economic capital. Since then a growing list of activities are taking place in more places around the world where critical NGOs are allowed, including in many parts of East Asia.

Europe and East Asia can help clear the US world vision

Finally, the US “intelligentsia” should now be further engaged by having the correct picture of friendly regional developments in Europe and East Asia as well as the possibilities of dynamic global multi-level governance. Since the end of the Cold War, not many policy intellectuals in the United States have been trying coolly to understand and accommodate a new world order in which regions have a greater role to play. One could even argue that within the foreign policy élite some had long been preparing the intellectual basis for longer-term multi-level geo-strategic containment. Indeed, the Council of Foreign Affairs journal Foreign Affairs published the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis by Samuel Huntington (1993), which in essence proposed a very creative interpretation of the recent evolution of world politics in which the transatlantic (mainly) Christian West is united (many critics read he meant under US leadership) to face potential conflicts with other world civilizations based on religion, thus separating Shinto Japan from Confucian China, Korea and Viet Nam, Buddhist South-East Asia, Tibet and Mongolia, the Islamic group from West Africa to Indonesia, the Hindu subcontinent, Catholic Latin America, Orthodox Eastern Europe and Russia and sub-Saharan African mixed animism. With what could be considered an unusually blatant lack of impartiality, online visitors to the Foreign Affairs website were for years constantly reminded that new online subscribers would get for free this so-called “prescient essay”, “the X article of the post-
Cold War World''. Somewhat departing from those ideas, Brzezinski (1997) proposed a global strategy for the United States to maintain its dominant security position over a Eurasian chessboard of cultural regions. He argued in favour of the United States managing the mainly ethnic conflicts and relationships in Europe, Asia (where the rise of China is just a potential regional issue) and the Middle East so that no rival superpower could arise to threaten US interests and well-being. Despite this ominous argument, he also claimed that the United States is the first and last comprehensive superpower of the world system, and hoped that, like Europe and much of East Asia, eventually other parts of the world would be brought in line with the US system to help achieve global governance.

During the first Bush administration there were strong intellectual pressures to consolidate a new type of unilateral global foreign policy in favour of intervention and pre-emptive military attacks against selected states (first seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, but the pressure keeps mounting in the region), and general containment of any possible alliance of external and internal factors that may be evily working against the US self-declared benevolent designs. Thus the National Security Council was reinvigorated and complemented by the Homeland Security Council, while the National Economic Council fell into disarray as its prominent economists resigned in protest against Bush’s ways of handling the country’s mounting economic problems. Much of that recent unilateral pre-emptive geopolitical doctrine was credited to a few “neo-conservative” officials and advisers allying with supremacists in the Department of Defense (Drew, 2003). These ideas were forged in previous Republican administrations and in Republican think-tanks and ideological platforms like the New American Century (www.NewAmericanCentury.org), and sometimes aired in the supposedly still impartial Council on Foreign Relations. Once in power, these ideas were crystallized through the Department of Defense’s Policy Board, composed of respected former government officials, retired military officers and academics all “conspiring” to expand its original strategic defence scope to influence shorter-term overall US policy.

But the wonder of the US foreign policy process is that it can become once more pluralistic and self-critical despite short-term political manoeuvres to monopolize influential advice. Huntington (1999), criticized from many quarters, began after a few years to acknowledge a long-term trend towards multipolarity. Later, Brzezinski (2004) also argued that the United States needed a better master-plan for world advancement that brings in its friends to exact change in the fragmented Central Asia and Middle East, the only really worrying areas for world peace. Even some of the strongest critics of US foreign policy, like Chalmers Johnson, Noam Chomsky and others gathering in the American Empire
Project (www.AmericanEmpireProject.com), who were at first muffled, nowadays have an increasing domestic resonance as more people ponder in awe how developments in elitist US foreign policy may seriously “blow back” and irremediably lose its valued leadership around the world, all while negatively affecting the less fortunate people everywhere.

The accommodating actions towards Europe and East Asia of the second Bush administration indicate that overall it is paying less attention to civilizational cleavages and pre-emptive supremacist arguments, and greater attention to alternative, middle-of-the road grand strategies closer to the soft ones coming from, *inter alia*, Joseph Nye and Charles Kupchan, influential academics with close relations to a more democratic US government and a record of influential writing in, for instance, *Foreign Affairs*. Nye (2002) argues that the United States should continue promoting a more encompassing (with multilateral institutions), peaceful and prosperous world system without unilaterally abusing on the military front, as in the current global information age the United States is the only superpower in military terms, but in economic terms faces strong competition from Europe and Asia and in other issues faces many threats from a number of transnational sources. Meanwhile, Kupchan (2002) argues for the need for the United States to start constructing without arrogance a prosperous multipolar world bound by open institutions and norms; now it can do this relatively easily, in a way it may like, but it may be harder and conflictual in the longer term. Regarding China, Kupchan argued that it may require some constraining, “But to assume that China is already an adversary requiring rigid containment would be equally unfounded – and likely would become a self-fulfilling prophecy.” It is too early to tell, and the United States can afford to adopt a wait-and-see attitude. Moreover, Washington should welcome regional integration that promotes reconciliation and rapprochement, as the region will ultimately need a self-sustaining order.

Even “neocons” and new “realists” acknowledge the need for the United States to be more accommodating. For example, Kagan (2002) contrasts the militarist US (so powerful that it should be less arrogant and pay more attention to the concerns of the rest of the world) and idealist European (possible thanks to the United States) world views. And Roy (2004), the first Eurasian to hold the Kissinger Chair of the Library of Congress, argues that as all big powers (with the exception of US-China relations) now maintain rather good terms with each other, the most promising global scenario would arise if China should base its long-term strategy on a McKinderian scenario of Eurasian strategic coordination, rather than follow the footsteps of the British Empire to hold on to its acquired great-power position.

While transatlantic relations between North America and Europe are
somewhat improving as high-level intellectual exchanges advise political leaders (Council on Foreign Relations, 2004), the rise of the East Asia community is not yet fully understood by the policy intellectual communities in the United States. Exceptionally, the influential US “futurologist” Rifkin (2004) argued that the communitarian but flexible European socio-economic and political model is eclipsing the American dream of unbridled individual capitalism, and that model is best being advanced in East Asia. But others in the United States may not want to see such a picture as they worry about the potential military capability of China and its allies.

Nevertheless, the policy advisory community in the United States has not yet reached a clear consensus on basic parameters in East Asia. The Foreign Affairs journal did not prioritize East Asia after the Cold War, and James Baker’s (1991) article calling for a US blueprint for a broader Asia-Pacific architecture was the exception. During the Clinton years there was not an overall policy, but patchwork policies. For instance, when relations with Japan were loosening in the early 1990s, Joseph Nye, prominent Harvard academic and former Democrat assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, teamed with Republican Richard Armitage to lead a group that produced the bipartisan “Armitage-Nye Report” to reaffirm the bilateral security alliance (National Defense University, 2000). A leading group of Stanford-based scholars proposed in 1996 to give the United States a coherent strategy and a clear-cut set of policy priorities that would reverse the erosion in power and prestige of the United States in East Asia, arguing in favour of engaging China while adjusting security treaties with Japan and Korea (Okimoto et al., 1996), but this never made it to the headlines. Meanwhile, single academic voices presented a variety of scenarios. For instance, Hall (2002) argued that a more nationalistic Japan has easily been able to delude the US policy intellectuals about its intentions to lead Asia, first economically, which is happening in a de facto fashion, and later more broadly. But Dittmer (2004) argued in favour of cautious optimism in North-East Asian countries in their long march toward institutionalized regionalization, where it would be wise not to upset the tensions of the regional balance of power, which perhaps may even be resolved by informal production networks and economic integration.

The Council on Foreign Relations has nevertheless recently begun printing bipartisan debates to help understand the prospects of regional cooperation in East Asia. Abramowitz and Bosworth (2003) painted a picture of a diminishing role of the United States in a rising Asia led by China, although a war centred in the Korean peninsula could change everything. Meanwhile Gordon (2003) was more critical of current US policy that allows world trade regionalization at the expense of the WTO.
And according to the former head of policy planning in the State Department, and now head of the Council on Foreign Relations (Haass, 2004), the United States must tackle the rise of China as the most important medium- to long-term concern. Nevertheless, the editor of *Foreign Affairs* (Hoge, 2004) highlighted the need to understand coolly and adjust to the rise of Asia.

There are actually strong encouraging signs from policy advisers that Washington may see the East Asian community developments as an opportunity to advance a global multi-level vision that does not seriously affect its core values. As already mentioned, ASEAN-ISIS was catalysed in the 1980s by transpacific conferences on security matters in which US intellectuals hoped to help bring peace to the region, and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation of the University of California, San Diego, started in 1993 the North-East Asia Cooperation Dialogue between China, Japan, both Koreas, Russia and the United States, which has paved the wave to the current multilateral six-party talks to tackle the North Korean problem. Fukuyama (2005), a repented “neocon”, has even suggested that it may become a US-led organization, implicitly acknowledging the need for regional solutions in North-East Asia. Moreover, one may think that APEC might be transformed into a new platform for multi-issue cooperation in which the United States tried to maintain some leadership role among the rise of East Asian cooperation mechanisms. Key US policy intellectuals concerned with the region reorganized in April 2003 into a higher-profile US Asia Pacific Council (www.USAPC.org) with the support of the Department of State. This council consolidated the US representation in the Pacific Basin Economic Council and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council. It is hosted by and administered through the East West Center (www.EastWestCenter.org) in Honolulu and Washington. And its honorary chairman is George Shultz, former secretary of state and now fellow at Stanford’s most influential Hoover Institution, while its chairman is Stapleton Roy, Clinton’s first ambassador to China and currently managing director of Kissinger Associates, the main geopolitical consulting firm through which the former national security adviser under Nixon and Ford maintains an active role in the world’s political and governance advice, framed by his slightly softened version of realist geo-strategy that admonishes the United States to be “implacable” if any power aims to take over the Asian continent (Kissinger, 2001).

To maintain the momentum towards a global multi-level governance that engages the United States, an increasing advisory coordination between the European and East Asian intellectual projections will prove crucial. Yet it should aim to promote healthy, competitive development in other parts of the world. As the ASEM process was formed without
becoming a counterbalancing force to the global military policies of the United States, policy intellectuals from that country were not particularly concerned with the details of the whole process (Bobrow, 1999). Although Millot (2005) admonishes that nowadays the United States “is watching”, Europe and East Asia should make sure that more people in the US policy advisory world are clearly seeing the very soft fluidity of the ASEM process. As Brzezinski (2005) put it at Stanford University:

A European-Far Eastern connection or a European-China connection, which some people are talking about, is likely to remedy a situation in which both Asia and Europe conclude that the United States policies are disruptive, that the United States in effect is isolating itself, and that they have to protect themselves against the likelihood of the ensuing chaos as a consequence of the failure of American leadership by collaborating more closely. However, that is essentially a fail-safe policy, to be undertaken only in the face of a significant failure by the United States.
Uncertain economic globalization

The two previous chapters have analysed how global multi-level political and advisory regimes are being formed largely through European and East Asian leadership and the oversight of the United States. This chapter focuses on "lower-level" or "bottom-up" governance concerned about the large diversity of goods and services beyond war machinery that public and private firms produce, trade, consume and invest under globalizing economic laws.

The current wave of economic globalization has also relied on the external projection of the United States. It used its unique position in the wake of the Second World War to enact a new blueprint in much of the non-communist world. It had for a time largely been successful in ensuring the primacy of economics over politics or, in other words, it shifted the development focus from redistribution to output growth in risky environments. The United States did this in its own multi-level way. Through bilateral pressure it exacted economic change in Germany and Japan, and influenced many of its allies and friends. Through the Marshall Plan (the European Recovery Programme managed by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation), the United States induced European countries to lift barriers to goods and capital to recover together as a group. Globally, the United States used the Bretton Woods economic multilateral organizations to liberalize economies increasingly so US-based multinationals in all kinds of economic sectors could enter into new markets.
Yet the US model had limits, so the mantra of an ever-more-liberal economic order for capital, goods and services could not always convincingly be recited. While the International Monetary Fund (www.IMF.org) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (www.WorldBank.org) proceeded as planned and gradually added prerogatives, the plan for an International Trade Organization was scaled down to a General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) due to the opposition of the US Senate. As the United States relatively decreased its mighty economic power while Germany, other European countries and Japan recovered, its domestic lobbies demanded protection against foreign imports. Thus US policy began in the mid-1960s to show an incoherence that led to occasional international instability (Katzenstein, 1978).

Yet the somewhat incoherent model survived and grew, with even more explicit managed trade practices as part of a set of goals to ensure that the United States remained an engaged but dominant actor in the international system. Federal procurement encouraged technological upgrades, and tax benefits encouraged exports. World trade continued liberalizing through bilateral pressure from the OECD (www.OECD.org), the successor of the organization managing the Marshall Plan, and through several rounds of trade liberalization within GATT.

In the early 1990s, when the Cold War was basically over, the United States temporarily shifted from geopolitics to geo-economics (let us recall the fate of the National Economic Council) as it came into increasing competition with European and Japanese economies first, and gradually with some Asia tigers and China more confident of their new development. After a transatlantic entente over agricultural products, the Uruguay Round concluded seven years of intergovernmental negotiations when over 100 countries signed a series of international (finalized and ongoing) trade agreements in goods, services and intellectual property rights and agreed to the creation of the World Trade Organization (www.WTO.org) to supersede the GATT regime. Since 1995 the WTO has acted as administrator, supervisor, arbitrator, consultant and negotiation forum for the issues under its many agreements broadly affecting countries’ economic governance. It operates under the basic trade liberalization principles of most-favoured nation (same preferences to all members) and national treatment (no discrimination between foreign and domestic services) in all existing and future sectors and subsectors that signatories may agree to liberalize. A key novelty has been the setting up of a sophisticated legal redress mechanism for the sanctioning of retaliatory measures in the case of uncorrected wrongdoing, an authority that goes beyond the prerogatives of any other international economic agency.

One of the WTO’s most important mechanisms for economic liberal-
ization for the post-industrial world is the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). It divides services into 11 main sectors: business (including professional services); communications (including telecommunications and audio visual); construction and related engineering; distribution; education; environment; financial; health and social; recreational, cultural and sports; tourism and travel; and transport. There is a twelfth category for “other” sectors. GATS explicitly excludes services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority (article 1), which explains the initially low overall commitments. But WTO members concluded within GATS two more specific liberalization agreements: on communications (mainly basic telephony, as many related value-added services had already been agreed upon; but not audio visual services), and financial services, which would open more types of financial instruments to greater world competition. GATS indirectly pressures liberalizing investment regimes by dividing schedules into four modes of supply. Modes 1 and 2 refer to cross-border supply and consumption abroad (easy to liberalize as they are hard for governments to control), while modes 3 and 4 refer to commercial presence (closely related to foreign direct investment) and the temporary presence of natural persons.

According to the data provided in the 2000 World Investment Report of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (www.UNCTAD.org/WIR), the surge of global cross-border foreign direct investment (FDI) in the late 1990s was largely due to friendly mergers and, more often, less friendly acquisitions of large firms in a small number of consolidating manufacturing industries or liberalizing service industries within the developed world (UNCTAD, 2000). Annual FDI flows represented about 6 per cent of the world’s GDP, although total FDI stock was around 25 per cent of global GDP. Developed countries received almost 90 per cent of FDI in 1995 (mainly the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom and Germany). Meanwhile, China was already taking about a third of the share of developing countries, among which there is strong competition for relatively scarce and mobile financial capital, as other dynamic Asian economies experienced during the years 1997–1999.

Automobiles, pharmaceuticals and chemicals, and food, beverages and tobacco were the leading industries in the manufacturing sector in terms of worldwide cross-border M&A activity in 1999. Most M&A in those industries were horizontal, aiming at economies of scale, technological synergies, increasing market power, eliminating excess capacity, or consolidating and streamlining innovation strategies and R&D budgets. In most of the industries in which horizontal M&A activity is strong, concentration ratios have intensified... Telecommunications, energy and financial services were the leading industries in M&A activity in the services sector, largely as a result of recent deregulation and liber-
alization in these industries. In financial services, competitive pressures and mounting information technology costs have given an added impetus to M&As. (UNCTAD, 2000: xxi–xxii)

From the beginning of the WTO the United States and other trading economies pushed for further investment liberalization. As it did not find a consensus in the first WTO ministerial meeting in 1996 in Singapore to advance the ambitious Multilateral Agreement on Investment, the United States shifted to the OECD for preliminary negotiations (Henderson, 1999). In essence, early proposals wanted a fully fledged, binding international treaty encompassing a comprehensive, open-ended definition of investment that included direct and portfolio investment, real estate, intellectual property rights, rights under contract and rights conferred by authorizations or permits. All phases of existing and future investment would receive national treatment and most-favoured-nation status. Reservations would be subject to “standstill”, “rollback” and “ratchet” provisions; and a “top-down” principle would be applied to a general list. It would have a formal dispute settlement mechanism, applicable to state-state and state-firms relations; and would tie all official actions of governments at all levels (federal and state in the United States, regions in Europe, etc.), committing public actors to “upfront” liberalization. More specifically, it would include privatization measures subject to national treatment and most-favoured-nation provisions on the behaviour of public monopolies and state enterprises; disciplines on incentives; and performance requirements more limited than trade-related investment measures. Further, it would give right of access and residence to key foreign personnel. On top of all this it would address the questions of extra-territoriality, regional economic integration organizations and cultural industries. Later, environmental and labour standards were added to the agenda.

Such a bold economic liberalization agenda naturally encountered many obstacles, even among advanced economies. It did not lead to substantial convergence of minds within the OECD, as recurring transatlantic disputes (including banana trade regimes, export tax credits and subsidies to steel) were accentuated during the Bush administration. And the lack of attention to labour and social issues catalysed international networks of activists, which at the WTO ministerial in Seattle in 1999 set the tune for later confrontations at times of high-profile international gatherings that forced economic leaders to become more reclusive and reflective.

But the United States seems reluctant to lead a new world order, and perhaps was trapped as it did not want to risk endangering its declared multilateral goals. Noland (2000) summarized the three main themes and
significant challenges in the US and world economies for the first half of
the new century. According to him, these were disputes over substantive
agendas, haggling over filling top leadership posts, and Asia’s possible
desire to go its own way and expand regional organizations in parallel
with, or in opposition to, the existing global order. These issues would
develop in the context of a probable slowing of the US economy, which
could contribute to a more conflictual trade environment than has existed
in the recent past.

Thus global economic governance has become the informal preroga-
tive of North America, Europe and East Asia, each group of countries
producing about 20 per cent of the world’s total economic production of
about 50 trillion euros in 2006. While some European colonies and US
allies had easily taken up capitalist economic systems, growing develop-
ing countries (Brazil, India, Mexico, Indonesia, Russia, Turkey) and
especially small African, Asian and Pacific countries are still very far be-
hind in global economic production except for natural resources or a few
agricultural or industrial niches. Many of these countries would like to
benefit from economic globalization, but they feel aggrieved and there-
fore resist the pressure from advanced economies and increasingly form
alliances to indicate this.

The WTO only came close to meriting the name “world” in its name at
the fourth ministerial conference that met in secluded Doha (Qatar) in
2001. After 15 years of negotiations China and Taiwan were admitted as
members numbers 142 and 143, a score of candidates increased the pace
of entry negotiations, many developing members successfully began to be
increasingly vocal in presenting alternative views to those coming from
developed countries and selected NGOs were allowed to offer ideas to
bridge diverging economic and social objectives.

Although the WTO allows regional trade agreements if they open mar-
kets beyond the general WTO agreements, quarrelling member econo-
 mies do not seem clear on how to tackle this growing issue. The 27 EU
member states, now much more than a regional trade agreement and
customs union, are represented by the European Commission. But the
WTO has received notification of hundreds of regional (actually, many
are bilateral) trade agreements under GATT article XXIV (Territorial
Application – Frontier Traffic – Customs Unions and Free-trade Areas),
and is aware of scores of additional ones not yet notified. Meanwhile
there is little understanding of the regionalization of services under
GATS article V (Economic Integration) and article V-bis (Labour Mar-
kets Integration Agreements). Indeed, the WTO Regional Trade Agree-
ments Committee, operational since 1995, has failed to complete its as-
sessments of whether trade agreements conform to controversial WTO
provisions. So the Doha Declaration of 2001 was aiming at “clarifying
and improving disciplines and procedures under the existing WTO provi-
sions applying to regional trade agreements. The negotiations shall take
into account the developmental aspects of regional trade agreements.”
As the wide disagreements on farming subsidies and other issues be-
tween transatlantic partners and many developing countries led in the
summer of 2006 to the suspension of the Doha Round negotiations, the
world now looks at economic alternatives to develop jointly.

The chapter will argue that Europe and East Asia are not advancing
regional solutions in opposition to the existing global economic order.
On the contrary, Europe and East Asia are showing much leadership
in promoting a global multi-level economic order that keeps the United
States engaged and increasingly attracts the attention of much of the
rest of the world. The chapter will focus in particular in the new economy
based on the information and communication sectors, which are among
the most liberalized of all in the WTO.

Effective global governance of info-communications

Scientists funded by public or private organizations in the United States,
Europe and Japan were behind most of the information and communi-
cation (info-communication) technologies of the past two centuries. As
they converge increasingly through the internet, these technologies have
been driving some of the most dramatic changes in global multi-level eco-


cable or wireless, anything that can be transformed into digital binary codes, including voice and sound, pictures and images and multimedia combinations thereof. Consequently, distinct technologies still command different economic activities distinctly governed.

*Traditional communications regimes*

Since almost the beginning of telegraphy in the mid-nineteenth century, international communications were handled in a multilateral framework where state governments have had the controlling hand (Headrick, 1991). The ancestor of the International Telecommunications Union (www.ITU.int) was established by European countries in 1865 to ensure common standards for the interconnectivity and interoperability of telegraph traffic. Through subsequent decades the ITU has broadened its membership to most of the world’s countries, and has taken responsibility for the various new communications transport technologies that have been developing, including not only fixed-wire telephony but an increasing number of technologies depending on the electromagnetic spectrum, mainly radio, television, satellite communications and mobile telephony.

Soon after the commercial development of radio broadcasting, an informal international conference of 10 countries led in 1925 to the creation of the Union Internationale de Radiophonie (UIR), originally to address programme exchanges and copyrights but eventually also to discuss the allocation of frequencies. The UIR disbanded during the Cold War, giving rise to regional groupings, while the ITU, which became a member of the UN system in 1947, took over the coordination of frequencies.

In the early days of limited wireless communications new spectrum segments were usually allocated in an ITU-topped multi-level intergovernmental fashion without much attention being paid to the first to demand them for their new technologies. The process of spectrum allocation is still largely controlled by national governments, whose national representatives attend, usually every two years, the ITU’s World Radiocommunication conferences to allocate between the three established world regions the very broad range of frequencies under the supervision of the ITU (technically, from 9 kHz to 400 GHz), leaving to members in each region the subsequent final negotiations for more specific allocations and overall rationalization.

The increasing political-commercial competition for the allocation of the scarce spectrum for mobile communications is handled through the three world regions. The whole multi-level process has become a dynamic negotiation for primary interregional and secondary intraregional allocations, reallocations and management to avoid interferences be-
tween users of the same frequency in adjacent countries, or users of adja-
cent frequencies in the same geographical area. Within the Americas
there is little problem of coordination, as US firms dominate over the
rest. In Europe coordination has successfully taken place through the
Conférence Européenne des Administrations des Postes et des Télécom-
munications (www.CEPT.org), and earlier regional fragmentation has
given way to recent pan-European allocation of radio frequency for the
new generation of corresponding pan-European mobile technologies,
thus in effect creating a full European advanced wireless roaming environ-
ment. Its Asian counterpart is the Bangkok-based Asia-Pacific Telecom-
community (www.APTsec.org), a body attached to the United Nations, which
started to show in the late 1990s some signs of a will to coordinate region-
ally a number of communications issues under the leadership of Japan.

The ITU-centred intergovernmental telecommunications regime was
particularly pressured to change by the WTO (Bronckers and Larouche,
1997). Discussions started in 1989 during GATT’s Uruguay Round and
still continue in the WTO over a number of issues not fully resolved in
the agreements signed during the 1990s. In essence, there has always
been a tension between the choice of regulatory venues and their associ-
ated prerogatives. The WTO is usually favoured by the United States and
many developed nations, while the ITU is preferred by developing coun-
tries as commitments there are less stringent and enforcement more diffi-
cult. Developing countries unsuccessfully resisted the inclusion of com-
munications services in the Uruguay Round, yet managed to put them
on a separate track. GATS-Communications distinguishes many subsec-
tors (voice; packet-switched data; circuit-switched data; telex; telegraph;
faximile; private leased circuit; digital; paging; PCS – personal communica-
tions services; TRS – trunked radio system; mobile data; audiovisual;
and postal, courier and express mail services) for local, long-distance and
international service provision of sound, data, images or any combination
thereof, regardless of the technology of the underlying infrastructure
(cable, radio, satellite). While an agreement on “value-added” services,
which were then seen as relatively unimportant, had been reached in
1994 within GATS-Communications (tables 4.1 and 4.2), there was no
agreement on the then much more valuable basic telecommunications
subsectors and the issue was entrusted to an ad hoc negotiating group
on basic telecommunications.

From the beginning, negotiations were dominated by the US insistence
on a critical mass of commitments that would grant reciprocal access to
firms of signatory member states for both value-added and basic telecommu-
nication services. The US position was somewhat balanced by the role
of the European Union in finding a compromise with the political difficul-
ties many countries were experiencing to meet such strong demands.
### Table 4.1 Summary of first specific commitments on telecommunications services in GATS

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**Source:** WTO (1998a).

**Key:** a. Voice telephone services; b. Packet-switched data transmission services; c. Circuit-switched data transmission services; d. Telex services; e. Telegraph services; f. Facsimile services; g. Private leased circuit services; h. Electronic mail; i. Voice mail; j. Online information and database retrieval; k. Electronic data interchange (EDI); l. Enhanced/value-added facsimile services; m. Code and protocol conversion; n. Online information and/or data-processing; 01. Terrestrial-based mobile; 02. Satellite-based mobile; 03. Other.

### Table 4.2 Summary of specific commitments on GATS audiovisual

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</table>

**Source:** WTO (1998a).

**Key:** 02.D.A Motion picture and videotape production and distribution; 02.D.B Motion picture projection services; 02.D.C Radio and television services; 02.D.D Radio and television transmission services; 02.D.E Sound recording; 02.D.F Other – the United States and Japan originally presented some commitments.
Progress was arduous, and after a second postponement, the “quad” (the United States, Canada, the European Union and Japan) listed by February 1997 a critical mass of market liberalization commitments to open their markets substantially to international competition early in 1998. Eventually ratified by 69 governments representing more than 90 per cent of the global telecommunications market, the agreement entered into force in February 1998.

The globalizing agreement in the WTO has several limitations that still give some controlling power to member economies (Tuthill, 1997). Overall commitments were high in OECD countries but lower in developing ones. Moreover, the agreement allowed various moratoria for many developing countries, and some “quad” countries took important exceptions: the United States took some exceptions for certain radio and TV broadcasting techniques, Canada limited foreign ownership to 46.7 per cent and Mexico to 49 per cent, while Japan and other countries took exceptions to limit foreign ownership of their large incumbent operators.

Meanwhile, audio visual broadcasting services are not globally regulated. They are not even part of the active WTO-GATS-Communications agreement, since negligible offers by a French-led European position prompted the United States, which had scheduled more substantial commitments, not to accept the inclusion of audio visual in the agreement at all. Nor has the United Nations been able to regulate them substantially. The shock provoked by new global audio visual flows during the late 1960s led many newly independent and developing countries in the 1970s to react strongly against information and values from the United States and other Western countries, and many called for a new world information and communications order that would respect local traditions. This took place within the Paris-based UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (www.UNESCO.org), since 1946 a proper UN organization with a very broad remit, including communication, which at the time was headed by a Senegalese director-general (Spaulding and Lin, 1997; Taylor, 1997). Arguing that UNESCO was leaning excessively to communist and third world ways that suppressed a free press and perpetuated mismanagement, the US Republican administration left the organization in 1984 (in its wake the United Kingdom and Singapore did likewise a year later), and during the next two decades UNESCO had a limited projection.

This anarchic situation was also reflected in the lack of coordination among broadcasters and technological standards. Canada formed in the early 1990s the World Broadcasting Union (www.WorldBroadcastingUnions.org) with the vision of coordinating activities among eight regional members: the Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union, the International Association of Broadcasting, the Arab States Broad-
casting Union, the Caribbean Broadcasting Union, the European Broadcasting Union, the North American Broadcasting Association based in Canada and acting as the WBU’s secretariat, the Organización de Televisiónes Iberoamericanas and the Union of Radio and Television Organizations of Africa. When the International Organization of Radio and Television formed by the former Soviet bloc disbanded in the early 1990s, its European members quickly joined the European Broadcasting Union and the Asian members later began to join the Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union. Despite its hopes, the scope of the WBU is limited to the more or less regular exchange of opinions (its scheduled world conferences have been postponed), and its technical arm, the WBU Technical Committee, is powerless beyond occasionally and vaguely exhorting the world to find common standards after the global competitive upgrade from black-and-white to colour television technologies during the 1950s and 1960s rendered a global geography of competing standards fragmented along state lines. The first family of standards for technical production, transmission and reception appeared in the United States (NTSC), with two alternatives appearing in Europe, Germany’s PAL and France’s SECAM. While all became compatible with existing monochrome standards to allow smooth processes of local upgrades, they were not mutually compatible. Since the 1990s digital TV technologies have been emerging to compete for local and world markets: the US Grand Alliance, Europe’s Digital Video Broadcasting and Japan’s ISDB-T (Integrated System Digital Broadcast for Terrestrial) are the most important, but China and India are also developing indigenous technologies.

The computing revolution

Information technology (mainly computer hardware and software) remains one of the most international and globalized industries, largely thanks to the leadership of US firms. Borrus (2000) described how the United States regained world competitiveness in the newer generations of computing hardware and software. This was epitomized by the relatively liberal (as compared to the Japanese strategy) outsourcing of proprietary, Intel and Windows technologies to dynamic firms in Asia outside Japan. So while Asian firms followed US standards and were able to sell globally, Japan’s restricted technologies never reached large enough economies of scale. Although the complex production networks expanded into Asia and Europe, all this new IT hardware still relies on a myriad of semiconductor chips largely standardized by US-based private-led venues like the Semiconductor Assembly Council that ended in 2004.

A global computing environment does not mean that governments play
no substantial role. The US government intervened in the early 1990s, as it was worried to the point of thinking that its national security and global leadership position could be at risk by Japan’s increasing world market share in memory semiconductors (microprocessors were still dominated by US manufacturers). Domestically, the US government organized the main domestic firms in a research and development consortium to regain supremacy: the Sematech International 300 mm Initiative grouping 13 members. Internationally, semiconductors became one of the most prominent trade rows between the United States and Japan. The Department of Commerce worked to reach an agreement that partially secured an open Japanese market to American producers, even demanding specific minimum levels of US market share in the Japanese market. Eventually the rest of the semiconductor-producing world also demanded a say, creating a great deal of activity, but not of a technological standardization nature, in various multilateral and transregional venues. As a start, in the 1994 EU-Japan ministerial meeting agreement was obtained from Japan for the European Commission to have parallel monitoring meetings with Japan on all subjects covered by the then adopted US-Japan agreements. Then the industrial federations of the United States and Japan created in 1996 the Semiconductor Council, which soon became the World Semiconductor Council when the EU and Korean industries joined. It was launched in the follow-up to the US-Japan Semiconductor Agreement (Vancouver Agreement), signed for three years in 1996 and then renewed on a truly multilateral basis. It is not a regulatory organization at all, just a mechanism for industry representatives to engage in dialogue and coordinate common positions on free market doctrines and present recommendations to governments participating in the government consultative mechanism, which involves joint government-industry meetings.

Other global venues provide additional governance mechanisms to tackle the many technical issues that computing gives rise to. Technical matters arising from the evolution of electricity and mechanical devices became much contested in the twentieth century when private entrepreneurs in Europe, the United States and other countries participated in the race to promote their technologies (Loya and Boli, 1999). This eventually led in the early twentieth century to the creation of more permanent (technically non-governmental) bodies to organize regular congresses of technical societies to deal better with increasingly large-scale capitalist enterprise and rapid technological innovation. The International Electro-technical Commission (www.IEC.ch) became in 1906 the first international coordination effort for researchers from several countries to get together permanently to solve technical and commercial problems due to the variety of electricity-related standards. In the field of
mechanical engineering the International Federation of National Standardizing Associations was created in 1926, although dissolved in 1942 because of the ongoing war, and the International Organization for Standardization (www.ISO.ch, ISO meaning “equal” in Greek) took over the process in 1947.

Actually, the ISO is not a full-fledged international organization of the UN system like the ITU, but an independent worldwide federation of some 150 representative national standards bodies (the majority linked to governments and regional groupings, although nearly a third are private) in which some 30,000 “voluntary” experts from various backgrounds work in almost 3,000 technical bodies aiming to promote the development of standards and related activities to facilitate international exchange of goods and services and develop cooperation in the spheres of intellectual, scientific, technological and economic activity. After a series of drafts are voted in specialized committees, the “final draft international standards” are voted in more general meetings. If they get at least 75 per cent of the votes, they become international standards for members and non-members to implement at their leisure. Although the ISO has no mandate or resources to oblige compliance, technical experts in both global firms and national and regional regulatory venues tend to find value in maintaining some global connectivity.

Internet-based regimes

Like computing technologies, the internet has flourished through a multiple global governance environment that allows both public and private actors to give their inputs. Early internet standardization initiatives were self-organized by computer experts, usually based in the United States but open to the rest of the world. The dynamic behind the standardization of the core internet protocol suite has been the groups converging into the Internet Society (www.ISOC.org), a non-governmental organization based near Washington, D.C., that sprung from pioneering internet coordination efforts among many thousands of technicians in academia, government and firms from all over the world. ISOC was created in 1990 from the secretariat of earlier technical management bodies: the Boston-based Internet Architecture Board (www.IAB.org), which since 1983 has been responsible for defining the overall architecture of the internet and its standards and providing guidance and broad direction to the Internet Engineering Task Force (www.IETF.org), in charge of technical issues, formally established by the IAB in 1986, although informally much earlier.

Although ISOC’s coordination work was crucial to the early growth of the internet, it is far from being the global regulator or even coordinator
of the increasing number of info-communications service and infrastruc-
ture layers affected by the internet revolution. Its original role is dimin-
ishing in relative importance as other (global and regional, public and
private) standardization venues arise, hoping to set technological stan-
dards. Nowadays ISOC is just a largely US-based professional member-
ship organization of internet experts (many sponsored by big computing
companies) that comments on policies and practices and oversees a num-er of other boards and taskforces dealing with network policy issues.
Beyond its education and lobbying activities against “excessive regula-
tion”, it basically coordinated the decentralized upgrade to new versions
of internet protocols (IPs), having started in 1996 a very long process
to replace the previous congested version 4 (IPv4) with version 6
(www.IPv6Forum.com) that can accommodate many billions of info-
communication devices.

Perhaps the key indicator of the global multi-level evolution of the in-
ternet is its Domain Name System (DNS). Hosts are the computer sys-
tems connected to the internet and registered with associated unique IP
records, the internet equivalent to telephone numbers. The US govern-
ment, via its National Science Foundation, contracted the business
of number registration to a private firm called Network Solutions Inc
(www.NS1.com), while it delegated the technical coordination of all
unique internet numbering and naming parameters to the Internet As-
signed Numbers Authority (www.IANA.net), based at the University of
Southern California’s Information Sciences Institute. The IANA worked
with the Internet Registry (IR), which had the root database for the
DNS, and three supranational “voluntary” organizations (called regist-
ries) in charge of allocating their assigned blocks of numbers in their
world regions: the American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN),
Asia-Pacific Network Information Center (APNIC) and RIPE NCC (Ré-
seaux IP Européens Network Coordination Centre). These agencies sub-
sequently reallocate or assign IP addresses to individual organizations,
such as internet service providers (ISPs) or national bodies coordinating
IP address space for a certain country, from which most end-users would
normally request assignments.

Each IP numeric record has an associated domain name or address,
easier to remember, usually with two parts divided by a period, while ad-
titional labels (www, telnet, etc.) may be added to the name to indicate
the type of service and way of accessing it. Two main types of top-level
domain (TLD) names were introduced in the 1980s, when the number of
hosts was around 1,000 and growing exponentially in the United States
and beyond: “Symbolics.com” was the first registered domain for a ge-
neric top-level domain (gTLD), and “.uk” the first country code top-level
domain (ccTLD). While ccTLDs were decided within the ISO in the
1980s, they are now managed by state and regional agencies. Meanwhile, gTLDs are decided and managed by an increasingly complex mix of actors. Of the original available set, three are managed by the agencies under the US Department of Commerce and are demanded mainly by private actors: `.com` (commercial), `.net` (network) and `.org` (organization). Three others are mainly reserved for, and managed by, US public institutions: `.gov` (government), `.mil` (military) and `.edu` (post-secondary education). The seventh one, `.int`, prompted by a request from NATO, is reserved exclusively for treaty-based international organizations and managed by the ITU.

The problem of how to expand and restructure the DNS detonated as the demand for easy-to-remember, thus valuable, short letter names available under the generic .com TLD increased so rapidly in the late 1990s that contentions arose in the United States and abroad. While start-up firms wanted more new TLDs (some have even proposed having hundreds of them, which is technically easy to do in the new IPv6 version mentioned above), objections came mainly from the owners of existing trademarks (and their accompanying goodwill, sometimes very highly valued by the stock markets at the turn of the century), which raised various claims regarding the investments behind their names and requested safeguards against the dilution of their trademarks’ value were new TLDs to be created. The global internet community tried for some time to find a globally comprehensive solution. After years of technical discussions, an international group of internet veterans produced a plan of reform in 1997, the same year the European Commission called for a more comprehensive global charter for international communications. These old-timers set up the Internet Ad-Hoc Committee (www.IAHC.org), a large coalition of participants from the broad internet community (grouped in consortia with more or less known acronyms: ISOC, IANA, IAB, FNC, ITU, INTA, WIPO) that lasted until May 1997. The IACH produced a generic TLD memorandum of understanding in which it was agreed to set up the Internet Council of Registrars (CORE), registered under Swiss law, to manage a gTLD system with seven new, competing TLDs (store, nom, firm, web, info, rec and arts) in addition to the seven existing ones. While the proposal was signed by 88 bodies around the world involved in registering domain names, the US government and part of the private industry sector were against it.

Three months after the proposal to form CORE, the US government released a paper titled “A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce” arguing in favour of a not-for-profit private corporation under US law and without governmental involvement. And six months later the White House, working with the Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (www.NTIA.doc.gov), pro-
posed in a green paper released in January 1998 to reorganize the structure and management of the DNS in a very US-centric way, although open to the whole world. The crucial point was the creation, out of the IANA, of a new, eventually (emphasis added) private-led, standard-setting body in the United States and under US law, and the creation, out of the current system of allocation of gTLD names, of a new system under the temporary (emphasis added) overview of the US Department of Commerce. It would coordinate the activities of registries independently managing a small number of gTLDs around the world and (emphasis added) other issues of standardization as required by the evolution of the internet. Concretely, the green paper proposed the creation of five TLDs, each to be handled by a cartel of non-competing registries (private companies), although competing registrars (also private firms but at a lower level in the hierarchy) would deal with the end customers. The whole system would be coordinated by what eventually became the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (www.ICANN.org), a non-profit entity incorporated in California in October 1998 with an initial two-year mandate to take over responsibility for many core issues still then performed under US government contract by the IANA and NSI. This implicitly meant that the new agency would be above the functions of the ITU and other international organizations increasingly concerned with various regulatory needs of global communications, although the US government said representatives of such organizations could be present through the IANA’s board of directors. After a several-months-long dispute in 1998 between US and EU administrations, the European Union agreed with the proposal as long as European actors were largely involved and it took into account the rest of the world.

Well, it seemed that from the year 2000 almost everybody could be happily represented in one way or another as ICANN organized as a complex “hierarchical network”, partly top down and partly bottom up (Kleinwaechter, 2000). Its main body is the 19-member board of directors; besides the CEO, 9 are selected by three main types of supporting organizations and 9 by the broad internet users’ community (referred to as “at-large membership”) from the industrial world, which jointly decides on an external chief executive officer. The supporting organizations are responsible for policy-making in the field of internet domain names (composed by seven constituencies: business domain name holders, ISPs, trademark owners, registrars, gTLDs, ccTLDs and non-commercial domain name holders); internet addresses (constituted initially by three regional internet registries, RIPE NCC for Europe, APNIC for Asia and ARIN for North America; and later two more, AFRINIC for Africa and LACNIC for Latin America); and internet protocols (ISOC’s IETF, the W3C, Europe’s ETSI and the ITU-T). The at-large membership of inter-
net users is open to anyone older than 16 owning an e-mail and a postal
address. As a trial to replace members of the ICANN board “democrati-
cally”, in October 2000 a low turnout of savvy netizens from all over the
“e-world” directly selected five directors (one each for ICANN’s five re-

gions, North America, Latin America, Europe, Asia-Pacific and Africa),
while the other four in line should have later been elected in the way
originally agreed in May 2001, although the issue lingered with various
proposals to improve the electoral process. Meanwhile, several advisory
committees were set up alongside the broader Government Advisory
Committee (GAC), whose recommendations regarding the relation of
ICANN with ccTLDs and other issues lack direct applicability. Carl Bilt,
a former prime minister of Sweden, became the new chairman of the
board, epitomizing the rise of governments’ interest in having a greater
say in the internet’s structural development.

In the new century ICANN began adding new gTLDs whose registry
functions would be managed by specialized, new or existing, organi-
zations. Seven were approved in 2000: .aero (Société Internationale
de Télécommunications Aéronautiques SC), .biz (JVTeam, LLC),
.coop (National Cooperative Business Association), .info (Afilias, LLC),
museum (Museum Domain Management Association), .name (Global
Name Registry, LTD) and .pro (RegistryPro, LTD). Seven more were
approved in 2005: .mobi, .post and .tel are going ahead to promote info-
communication activities; .jobs and .travel will probably soon follow suit;
but .xxx is on hold as the Bush administration blocked it for moral rea-
sons. The seventh one, .cat, sponsored by the Associació puntCAT, is in-
tended to be used to promote Catalan regional culture (not cats), which
has spurred Scotland to propose a .sco and many other substate regions
to consider a similar move. Macro-regional TLD names are also appear-
ing. The Hong Kong-based Dot Asia Organization (www.DotAsia.org)
has been proposing the .asia gTLD, which in 2006 was approved by
ICANN. And prompted by the US government’s creation and control
of ICANN, Europe launched in 2006 its “.eu” country/regional TLD, a
move that may trigger other macro-regional organizations and processes
to follow suit and force a multi-level restructuring of the whole DNS in a
way that brings ICANN closer to other public and private standards
bodies around the world co-led by Europe and East Asia.

The standardization of web parameters is an example of how ICANN
may evolve into a global multi-level governance platform for internet-
based info-communication services. The World Wide Web Consortium
(www.W3C.org) was created in 1994 by the inventor of the html language
used in web pages as he went back to Boston’s MIT, where he helped
organize the W3C in collaboration with Geneva’s nuclear research labo-

ratory CERN, with support from the US DARPA (the defence agency
from where the internet appeared) and the European Commission. Soon it settled into a triadic structure, jointly hosted by the MIT’s Laboratory for Computer Science (www.LCS.mit.edu), the French Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (www.INRIA.fr) for coordination in Europe and Keio University (www.Keio.ac.jp) in Tokyo for coordination in the Asian region. These three main global nodes link with subregional and local nodes to reach to all public and private actors interested in contributing to the process.

The knowledge-based European economic space

There are a variety of European forms of capitalism evolving with pressures for economic globalization. The United Kingdom has experienced a process of reform and economic liberalization with ideas coming from the United States, which parallels their special military partnership. Meanwhile, France and Germany may collaborate with such partnerships to some degree, but both countries tend to resist economic liberalization pressures and continue to pay more attention to state-industry relations while providing “safety nets” in their own ways, France being more centralized than federal Germany. Latin and Nordic countries present an array of unique models that try to balance economic globalization with social and institutional safety nets.

Linking macro-economies

But despite those differences, economic development debates have been largely moved to the European level. The European Economic Community started with the specific economic objective of creating a free trade area. The increasing trade liberalization for goods soon led to a new phase of economic integration: building a customs union. Member states agreed that goods originating inside the community or elsewhere would be free to move without customs duties, quotas or equivalent measures, and they established a common external tariff whose revenues were used by European institutions to regulate the incipient common economic space (led by Germany), although much of it went to subsidize the agricultural sector (led by France). As quotas were basically lifted in the 1960s, the emphasis turned later to eliminating domestic obstacles to trade. Cross-country harmonization has been a long and arduous case. It is not fully accomplished, but a series of political, legal and regulatory arrangements have made the European Union a fairly clear single market for goods.

In the 1970s the European Court of Justice laid down the principle of mutual recognition, by which any product legally manufactured and mar-
keted in a member state in accordance with the fair and traditional rules and manufacturing processes of that country must be allowed on to the market of any other member state. To help develop European standards two bodies had already been created: CEN, a general-purpose organization, was set up in 1961, and CENELEC in 1962 for the electrotechnical field. These were at first relatively inactive, but production of European standards has considerably grown since the 1980s when new and global regulatory approaches superimposed the European standards on to national ones except when there were risks to health. The process is slow and sometimes runs into difficulties, but the large majority of standards are now European.

The goal of a single market also required freer movements of financial capital. The first measures permitted direct investment, short- or medium-term lending for commercial transactions and purchases of securities traded in stock exchanges. Further liberalization came in 1986 with long-term lending for commercial transactions and purchases of securities traded outside stock exchanges. Liberalization was later extended to monetary or quasi-monetary transactions, such as loans, foreign currency deposits and security transactions.

It took a few more years to consolidate a monetary union that would remove the costs in exchange transactions and fluctuation risks (high since the 1970s when the dollar ended its convertibility into gold and the oil supply became unstable) and allow greater comparability of costs and prices. As early as 1969, when the international monetary system was threatening to collapse, the heads of state and government decided at the Hague Summit that the European Community should progressively be transformed into an economic and monetary union. A first attempt did not succeed in the 1970s, but in 1979 a European monetary system was established to create a zone of monetary stability in Europe. The system established fixed but adjustable rates of exchange between the currencies of the participating countries, and a European currency unit was established. For many years monetary discipline led to some economic convergence with a reduction of inflation rates and an approximation of interest rates. The European currency unit was used by both central banks and private financial houses. But the system was seriously disrupted by the violent upheaval in the European exchange markets in the autumn of 1992 following the difficulties in ratifying the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark and France.

Nevertheless, the establishment of the internal market in 1986 had committed the European Community to a path to monetary union. Informed by the advice of a committee chaired by Commission President Delors, member states decided to advance in stages from 1990 until 2002, the year in which euro banknotes and coins finally became publicly
available. The first stage required a completion of the internal market and strengthening of economic coordination. The second stage saw the creation of the European Monetary Institute to oversee newly required financial and monetary discipline, which included five convergence criteria regarding inflation, budget and government deficits, and interest and exchange rates. The third stage began in 1999 when a European system of central banks and the European Central Bank came into operation and the euro became the sole official currency as the currencies of the 12 participating countries were irrevocably fixed, although it only started to circulate in the form of banknotes and coins in 2002. Since then, member countries engage in closer coordination of economic policies and aim to ensure budgetary and fiscal discipline to maintain stability in the system. Moreover, there are provisions to regulate the relationship between the single currency and the currencies of candidates to join the euro and other neighbouring countries. In May 2006 the European Commission announced that Slovenia could soon take up the euro as it had met all the criteria to join the Eurozone, but rejected the Lithuanian case because of its persistent high inflation.

Full economic Europeanization would require a liberalization of all economic service sectors, which is a most difficult task as it usually directly affects other factors of production, like technology and human resources. After many years of discussion, the EU legislation (called a "directive") on services was approved in 2006, showing a traditional European compromise between liberalizing and regulatory tendencies. To face the global challenges posed by Europe's ageing population, slow economic growth and agriculture-based environmental model, heads of state met in Lisbon in 2000 to launch a series of ambitious reforms aiming to make the European Union "the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world" by 2010. Mid-term review of this Lisbon Strategy (http://ec.europa.eu/lisbon_strategy/index_en.html) showed unsatisfactory results, but the European Commission proposed to establish a new kind of partnership with member states and decided to focus on productivity and employment, with knowledge, research and education as key tools. Many of these issues are actually handled primarily outside the European Union. EU leaders still disagree on the best mix of economic and social policies, as the United Kingdom and others are questioning the benefit to economic growth of existing generous unemployment, social security and pension benefits in most continental European countries. The United Kingdom tends to lead groups in favour of transatlantic economic liberalization, and France and Germany lead others who prefer to harmonize tax laws to create a more common European economic space. The United Kingdom likes a plan from the European Commission to help workers retrain, and France prefers to promote
investment in research and development. To compound the problems, the EU budget was under pressure as the United Kingdom was also fighting France and others to maintain a special rebate on its financial contributions because its small agricultural sector does not benefit much from Europe’s common agricultural policy. Meanwhile, to find a converging path between Anglo-Saxon and Franco-German forms of capitalism, the European Commission is advancing the new concept of an “open method of coordination”, which would allow firms more self-regulation, although governments would still set the basic performance benchmarks.

Although the European Union keeps fighting verbally, it is flexible enough to use other mechanisms to advance a variable geometry of knowledge-based economic development. Often with France and Germany at the core, groups of European countries have been nurturing European business champions. While the overall value of this European industrial policy is open to debate in today’s hyperlinked world, it has sometimes helped some European sectors to become globally competitive. The air transport industry is a success story as the many Airbus airplanes developed through the collaboration between French, German, British and Spanish firms are flying high around the world (despite the delays in delivering the revolutionary A380). Meanwhile, mobile telecommunications are another thriving sector as the GSM mobile standard is widely accepted not only in Europe but globally. In the year 2000 the European institutions launched an e-Europe vision to promote the growth of Europe based on converging info-communications technologies, mainly building on the European successes in mobile technologies. And in 2006 the European Parliament debated taxing SMS and e-mails to complement the EU financing system based on a mix of taxes and member contributions.

**Telecommunications and audio visual**

Until the 1980s, state telecommunications monopolies in Europe were overseen by national regulatory agencies, coordinated through the intergovernmental Conférence Européenne des Administrations des Postes et des Télécommunications (Conference of European Post and Telecommunications Administrations, www.CEPT.org). While the United States was liberalizing domestically and promoting similar ideas abroad, the European Commission successfully took a leadership role in the 1980s and 1990s to Europeanize the telecommunications markets partially while opening up to more global competition (Sauter, 1997; Pelkmans and Young, 1998).

Ideas of economic liberalism coming from the United States were first taken up by the UK’s Thatcher government in the late 1970s, leading to
the partial liberalization of domestic telecommunications in 1981. While the Netherlands soon followed suit, most other countries were only pressured to liberalize partially and converge by the European Commission. From 1957 to 1984 there was no European telecommunications policy as such. The issue was first raised in the Council of Ministers only in December 1977, when an agreement was reached to pursue limited pilot projects, as in data communications. The first telecommunications action programmes were launched in 1984, implying a coordination in the development of new technologies and the first steps towards standardization and opening up public procurement. While a 1985 white paper did not contemplate telecommunications liberalization in the general liberalization of 1992, the change came with a 1987 Commission green paper on the development of the common market for telecommunications. It led to the formation a year later of the European Telecommunications Standardization Institute (www.ETSI.fr) out of the earlier mentioned CEPT that links with the ITU, and to a number of directives tackling four broad policy objectives: the liberalization of telecommunications equipment trade and mutual recognition of equipment testing; the selective liberalization of telecommunications services (not yet voice); the separation of national telecommunications regulation from the operation of networks and services; and the harmonization of a range of public telecommunications offerings required for the provision of liberalized services (open network provision). Preparing for full liberalization, the European Commission reviewed telecommunications services in October 1992, leading the Council of Ministers to agree in mid-1993 to liberalize all services and infrastructure at the beginning of 1998. Before that, it forced a gradual liberalization for mobile and alternative infrastructures during 1995–1996. Fuller liberalization came in 1998, although allowing various moratoria to Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Yet the word liberalization needs important qualifications, as new European-wide regulations represent a compromise between the goal desired by many firms for open and contested networks and the reticence of incumbent national operators to loosen their position, often claiming that they have invested large sums to reach a unique position allowing for the provision of affordable universal communications services. Thus, preparing newer but competing arguments for the aftermath of a major policy and legislation review at the end of 1999, the European Commission was in 1998 closely overseeing the legal implementation in member states, as well as market privatization, cable and wireless infrastructure investment and alliance developments, often catching the media headlines. But the regulatory tension between the state and community levels is exemplified in the lack of an EU-wide regulator, for the European Commission has to share many prerogatives with member states’ regulators.
Yet the rise of ETSI in telephony and audio visual standards production and promotion has proven a de facto technological promotion venue. Although legally a voluntary, open, market-led consensus standards body, ETSI has become the preferred venue to balance the interests of all interested parties, both private and public, and reach a common denominator to enter the European markets in telecommunications and, increasingly, in converging sectors (information technology and broadcasting). ETSI plans, develops, establishes and coordinates voluntary consensus standards using agreed-upon procedures. And it has formed a growing web of loose alliances with the growing number of private actors. As ETSI has achieved successes teaming with firms in a flexible manner, since 1995 CENELEC has been trying to develop into a relevant body in the standardization of info-communications technologies by becoming faster, more open and more relevant to market needs.

The second generation of mobile phones became fully digital and largely cellular, which meant that it was now possible to manufacture smaller, lighter, higher-quality and more secure phones that could be used everywhere, rendering international service competition much stronger than before. The main standard during the second generation was the European group special mobile (GSM) cellular family of technologies. The GSM technologies largely came out of the European Commission's co-funded research programmes (mainly RACE) by firms that grouped in the GSM Association (www.GSMworld.com) and standardized at ETSI. Although the final deal was struck in the early 1990s by national governments, when mobile telephony services were fully liberalized in Europe in 1995–1996 private firms were ready to compete in Europe and beyond, which eventually led them to achieve a global leadership. And so the GSM family of technologies kept growing, and came in the new century to be used by hundreds of operators, manufacturers and suppliers in most countries around the world.

But a third generation of converging mobile communications is not yet that regionalized. Upgrading from GSM, competing European firms and standards bodies advanced the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (www.UMTS.com) to provide a wide range of broadband services from any terminal equipment. After delays and facing worrisome prospects of repaying the high debts incurred in acquiring 3G licences, some of the largest EU telecommunications firms finally started in the year 2001 launching in some areas full-fledged 3G services; Japanese and North American operators have also been able to launch 3G services in Europe based on somewhat competing technologies. The limits to full Europeanization of mobile info-communications are now pushed high in the sky as it globally leads a multipurpose space-based radio navigation system, the Galileo Joint Undertaking (www.GalileoJU.com).
Public institutions are promoting more European audio visual content, the most difficult aspect in communication sectors. After several years of discussions, in 1988 the European Council adopted the “Television without Frontiers” directive, setting up general rules for TV broadcasting in several fields, including the promotion of the distribution and production of European television programmes (MEDIA I and II), television advertising, sponsorship and teleshopping, protection of minors, the right of reply and the accessibility of events of major importance for society on free-to-air television. Member states could nevertheless still restrict retransmission in other matters not harmonized by the directive, provided that general European treaty provisions to achieve the internal market were not breached. To help promote a European cultural space and lessen Europe’s noticeable dependence on some types of American media content which supplies much of the television and cinema demanded in the European markets, the directive declared the obligation for channels to broadcast a majority of European production “where practicable”. Its vague wording regarding content quotas was due to the pressures of Belgium (concerned about its language policy) and Denmark (disputing the competence of the European Commission), plus the threats of the US Department of Commerce to take the issue to GATT if it was found to be restrictive to US interests. Although the European Commission tried to delete the “where practicable” clause, the Council of Ministers rejected that proposal and a partially connected but rather fragmented panorama is still visible.

Public institutions are also promoting more European audio visual technological platforms. Europe’s analogue television market has since the 1960s been divided by two incompatible standards developed by French (SECAM) and German (PAL) industry. The ongoing upgrade from analogue to high-definition digital televisions, to be completed in the next few years, envisions a Europeanized market. Mainly European broadcasters, but also consumer electronics manufacturers and regulatory bodies, formed in the early 1990s the Digital Video Broadcasting (www.DVB.org) group project, which defined an open market-led approach to digital TV technologies and services at the European level. Since its beginning the DVB group has worked to allow the simultaneous serving of several different consumer markets. Although it started with satellite and cable means of transmission, which were easier to address from both a technical and a regulatory angle, it has been growing to cover all means of transmission (cable, satellite and terrestrial, by far the most valuable segment) and many service options (standard and high definition, wide-screen, free to air, mobile, encrypted for pay-TV, internet, etc.). Nevertheless, these actions were not enough to replace existing PAL and SECAM systems with full pan-European TV standards and services as the digital TV market gave rise to rival, proprietary and often
incompatible, conditional access systems on top of the common digital platforms. DVB was supposed to work on every digital TV set independently of its internal software and operating system. But when digital TV started in Europe (the first terrestrial service was broadcast in November 1998 in the UK) some companies put a proprietary software layer on top of the open DVB standards. Recalling the tale of the 1960s, the first set-top boxes on the market were therefore incompatible: electronic programme guides produced for the German market could not be used with French set-top boxes and vice versa. And no one manufacturer is big enough to impose a proprietary standard on a European or worldwide market. Thus, here again, a European content market is in principle facilitated through the adoption of common standards for new television technologies, but countries and firms may ally to create barriers that may be surmounted by paying a price.

European DVB is also expanding globally, albeit not as rapidly as in the case of mobile telephony. In the new century, the DVB standards consortia included over 200 well-known organizations (broadcasters, manufacturers, network operators, regulatory bodies) in more than 30 countries worldwide (many in Europe, but also in Japan and even a few in the United States) committed to designing a global family of standards for the delivery of digital television (broadcasting and reception equipment for professional, commercial and consumer applications) in any media. The DVB family has started to be widely accepted internationally in the cable and satellite television segments that have to work on existing analogue terrestrial infrastructures. DVB-S standards for satellite digital television have already been used all over the world, including in the European Union, United States, Japan and China, while the relatively minor DVB-C standard for cable digital television systems has been adopted in Europe, the United States, China, Australia and New Zealand. Expectations that it will be equally successful in the more valuable fully digital terrestrial television segment will be more difficult to realize: DVB competes not only with the incompatible ATSC standard and receiving set-top boxes of the United States, but also with other standards being produced by East Asian companies largely building on DVB, but differentiated enough to create a fragmenting barrier to trade in television goods and services.

Information technology and internet

The information technology and internet revolutions have further caused European regulators to coordinate to link globally. Due to the strong global reach of useful US-based standards, European regulators and firms decided not to promote alternative technologies.

As European IT firms were generally behind US and East Asian com-
petitors in terms of market share, European public institutions teamed with them to help recover some ground while presenting a more supranational and coordinated front. At the broadest policy level, since the early 1980s the European Commission has promoted the European Information Technology Industry Round Table grouping the main firms, including Alcatel, Siemens, Philips, Ericsson and Nokia. The European Commission and member states also targeted much applied research into IT. The member states let the European Commission become the main actor in the maintenance of some European presence in IT, giving special emphasis to research in telecommunications equipment, whose relatively strong market position would stimulate the weak IT and electronic industries. This took place within the EU Framework Programmes, as well as the broader and more applied intergovernmental Eureka 127 or the Joint European Submicron Silicon Initiative (JESSI), superseded in the mid-1990s by the Micro-Electronics Development for European Applications (www.MEDEAplus.org) Eureka 1535 and 2365 projects. In the end, while the European communities were consolidating the internal market for goods with a series of actions to Europeanize standards, including the promotion of pan-European standardization venues in CEN, CENELEC and ETSI, Europe had to accept Wintel and other IT standards from the United States, as despite efforts the European Union has not been able to lead in the setting of standards in key PC operating systems or semiconductors. More recently, Europe is labouring to promote Linux (www.Linux.org), a globally open operating system first developed by a Finnish student that has attracted many people around the world to nibble at Microsoft’s market.

While the delivery of broad political declarations may easily fall short of expectations, an important drive behind the e-Europe vision could be the creation of a multi-level and multilingual regional space for electronic commerce and society under an “.eu” country code (actually world regional) TLD name. Upon receiving in 1998 the US green paper with the proposal to create what eventually became the earlier analysed ICANN, the European Commission reacted right away by requesting a greater internationally coordinated approach, and soon developed a much more detailed strategy to proceed with the creation of the .eu. The European Commission actually coordinated all public and private interests at the European level through meetings and online discussions within the framework of the European Commission’s panel of participants. Its recommendations led in 2006 to the adoption of the “.eu” TLD name, commercialized under the oversight of the European Commission and the multi-level European Registry of Internet Domain Names (www.EURID.eu). Naturally, these developments do not preclude the continuation of internet developments under country and generic TLD names.
On the contrary, they increase the choices for European public and private actors.

Summary

In short, the variability of Europe’s info-communications economic governance renders a complex multi-level panorama in constant flux. Mobile telephony became largely regionalized, but is now competing more globally in newer multimedia generations. Television has for long been segmented on state lines, but European efforts are slowly regionalizing the market. Regional computing efforts have yet to create a distinct European market as useful global standards are the most accepted. Finally, the internet, a global technology, only becomes partly regulated at the European level as the “.eu” regional TLD name gets going alongside country code and global TLD names. Similar developments are beginning to be taking place as East Asian countries are setting hyperconnected regional nodes.

The knowledge-based East Asian economic space

There is a much greater variety of industrial capitalisms in East Asia than in Europe, but they are overall compatible with global economic regimes. Japan’s competitive but nationalistic model, largely sanctioned by the United States during the Cold War, has traditionally been steered by the designs of bureaucrats in Tokyo. Administrative guidance requires firms to follow ministerial decisions, which in principle aim to be consensual although in practice are quite competitive, thus avoiding monopolistic sclerosis. At the top of the hierarchy of firms are a few large and diversified indigenous industrial groups (Keiretsu) centred around a main bank and making flexible use, as semi-independent contractors, of a very large number of local small and medium-sized enterprises. The Keiretsu system has since the 1990s been under pressure to rationalize, as many sectors that the government considered strategic have not developed as envisioned, leaving many banks without prospects of recovering many loans. In this system only a token number of foreign firms were traditionally allowed, although the mounting foreign pressure and need for foreign markets, capital and technology led the Ministry of Treasury (formerly of Finance) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI, formerly MITI) to start a cautious guided process of joint ventures between domestic and foreign firms while the Keiretsu entered a process of rationalization and consolidation. In 2005, as the country’s economic outlook appeared shinier than in a long time, inward foreign direct invest-
ment surpassed outward foreign direct investment for the first time in recent Japanese economic history.

Other smaller East Asian countries are similarly reforming their economies. South Korean Chaebol groups have undergone a rationalization and opening up particularly spurred by the financial crisis of the late 1990s. South-East Asian government enterprises, as well as most private enterprises, often owned by ethnic Chinese families, have similarly felt the pressure to reform and link more globally. And China's historic economic transformation, rubber-stamped by WTO accession in 2001, suggests an irreversible opening up to trade and investment in many manufacturing sectors, although its need for energy and food is prompting Chinese firms to roam the world to secure long-term deals. The worrying state of China's banking and financial sector may harm economic growth figures, but even if these key sectors collapsed China would probably have to link even more globally.

Weaving a regional macro-economy

In the 1980s the Japanese economy increased its trade with an opening China, with the booming economic tigers and with the inducement of the Plaza Accord of 1984 to revalue the yen. Over a decade ago Gipoloux (1995) argued that North-East and South-East Asia should be conceptualized together when analysed from a non-institutional (bottom-up) economic approach. In East Asia there are several specialized clusters of dynamic localities that have been formed by the subregional networking, trading and investing activities of dynamic enterprises. These regions, such as the South-East Asia of Japan, the Yellow South-East Asia Rimland and the South China Sea, are part of a still larger East Asian network which only recently began a long-term path towards institutionalization.

Japan has been trying to lead its neighbours through selective networks that cut a middle course between the quite comprehensive and deep regional economic integration model advanced in Europe and the free trade area model preferred by the United States in North America. Japan's international economic governance plans centred on East Asia particularly grew after the economic crises triggered by the financial meltdown of 1997. In its 1999 white paper on international economy and trade, METI began to show concerns about Japan's isolation from the regional trend. Ever since, METI's white papers have featured regional developments in East Asia prominently, to the point of titling a 2005 paper “Towards a new dimension of economic prosperity in Japan and East Asia”. Similarly, Japan's official development assistance increasingly focuses on East Asian regional cooperation.
While visions for an East Asian economic community based on the four European economic liberties (goods, services, workers and capital) may not be fully realized in our lifetimes, East Asian countries have nevertheless entered on a multi-level path of political economic collaboration to allow regional collaboration in a global economic context that suggests windows of opportunities to overcome the still-great diversities in economic governance and go far beyond the NAFTA model. A still-developing China seems to accept this course, while ASEAN becomes the formal broker between the two economic giants and other important economies to which they all link in multi-level ways.

The first noticeable political effort to create a regional trading space was the APEC forum established in 1989. But, as briefly discussed in chapter 2, APEC is too large and diverse to be effective in fulfilling its vision, thus it is trying to retune it and possibly reinvent itself. APEC has been subregionally enhanced since 1992 by the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) that began operating in 2003. Common progress remains slow, as most countries’ development hopes rely on similar sectors (agriculture, tourism), rendering it difficult to find complementarities, and one finds many exceptions and moratoria in the general agreements. But ASEAN maintains the political goal of consolidating a free trade area and many of its bilateral agreements find synergies among complementary economies, as Japan and, to some extent, South Korea have substantial stocks of technology and capital, while China and South-East Asia can offer cheaper labour and natural resources.

In the year 2000 East Asian economic ministers began to explore the possibility of starting to weave an East Asian free trade zone as part of a long-term strategy towards a broader economic space. According to the Manila-based but Japan-led Asian Development Bank (www.ADB.org), in mid-2006 there were about 180 bilateral and regional trading initiatives centred in or involving Asia, all paving the way for greater trade cooperation and integration, mainly among South-East and North-East Asian countries. A few merit especial attention. A China-ASEAN free trade area, which when fully operative possibly in a few years would form the world’s biggest free trade area encompassing 1.7 billion people, can easily advance as China is eager to import ASEAN agricultural products not finding their way to the protected Japanese market in exchange for selling manufactured goods. Meanwhile, Japan has begun to advance bilateral comprehensive economic partnership agreements that go beyond trade and somewhat in the direction of the EU’s four economic liberties as they also deal with foreign direct investment, human resources and technology transfer. And Japan, South Korea and China have begun discussions about trade cooperation and have even started some dialogue regarding more open foreign direct investment regimes.
In the wake of the financial crises, East Asian countries have also advanced proposals towards greater monetary and financial cooperation for East Asia. These included macro-economic policy coordination, exchange rate coordination, the need to develop a regional long-term capital market, the setting up of an Asian Monetary Fund partially independent from the IMF and even a monetary union in the long term along the lines of the European model. These initiatives may not easily be fully realized, but they reflect an increasing common understanding among diverse parties within the region that East Asia needs to develop new approaches and mechanisms to protect itself better from the risks and volatilities that led to the crises and to ensure a more stable economic development environment for the region in the future. They are also a reaction to the feeling that the IMF imposed a liberalizing rescue programme that was far from optimal. Moreover, unilateral measures adopted by some countries, such as the imposition of controls on capital outflow in Malaysia and direct interventions by the government in the stock market in Hong Kong, also indicate that alternative approaches could have served better.

Regional progress in the financial sectors is slow but steady. An Asian Monetary Fund proposal in late 1997 by the Bank of Japan was swiftly turned down by the US government and discouraged by lack of interest by China. Yet officials of finance ministries and central banks began in November 1999 a peer review information exchange and surveillance mechanism in exchange rates, macro-economic development and social policies. The ASEAN surveillance and early-warning mechanism, which may eventually be expanded to cover North-East Asia, is guided by the Manila Framework group of 14 Asia-Pacific economies and supported by the ADB. Since 2000 a regional financing facility has also been established through the Chiang Mai Initiative, aiming to create a network of bilateral swap arrangements to address short-term problems among ASEAN+3 countries by mobilizing a growing portion of the very large reserve holdings of its members. It involved an expansion of the ASEAN swap and repurchase arrangement and a series of stronger bilateral arrangements with Japan, South Korea and China, complemented by bilateral agreements within North-East Asia: China has had exchange agreements with Japan since 2002 and Korea since 2003. Further, in 2003 East Asian countries agreed on an Asian bond fund as a starting point for the Asian Bonds Market (www.AsianBondsOnline.adb.org), supported by the ADB and largely funded by Japan. With these economic governance initiatives, governments hope to develop capital markets attractive enough to bring back some of the local savings that have long been financing high US consumption.

In the short term the domestic behaviour of Japan is crucial to back the
still-fragile scheme, so in 2005 Japan increased its contribution to maintain the system to about US$60 billion. But in the longer term China is the key. It “escaped” financial trouble as its currency, the renminbi/yuan, has been since the early 1990s strongly pegged to the US dollar with an exchange rate relatively favourable to growing Chinese exports to the US market. There has been much pressure by the US government and affected economic sectors to float the renminbi, but China argues that such a move is premature as it would destabilize its very weak banking system, which the government is very cautiously liberalizing as it tries to shed its many non-performing loans. China began only in July 2005 very carefully to revalue and partially float its currency for the first time in 13 years, while pegging it against a basket of currencies selected by the criterion of trade importance. Thus it first included, besides the US dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen and the Korean won. As China wants to become a regional financial and trading leader, that basket will surely increase its weight of Japanese yen and other East Asian currencies. To prepare for joint coordination an Asian currency unit began to function in mid-2006 as an indicator of the stability of participating currencies. In other words, East Asia seems to be moving in stages to create a common exchange rate mechanism that could be compared to the scheme that the European Union has advanced since the late 1980s.

During the decades when Europe was advancing from a customs union towards a closer economic union, East Asia lacked any formal or intergovernmental arrangement for regional economic cooperation. Yet industrial Asia is finding a solution through its links with the rest of the world. Japan had been arguing since the 1950s for a regional bank to channel its development aid, but the ADB was only allowed to start because the US Johnson administration saw it as a good vehicle for regional peace. Headed by officials from Japan’s Ministry of Finance (now Treasury) since its inception in 1966, the ADB has long been peacefully promoting different types of broader or narrower regional cooperation within Asia and the Pacific islands. After the 1997 crisis, affected economies lost some interest in the ADB, but it soon enhanced its regional outlook. For several years the ADB has been developing infrastructure and commerce projects in the Greater Mekong, Central and South Asia and the Pacific. The ADB reorganized in early 2002 and created a Regional and Sustainable Development Department headed by a Japanese. Moreover, the Regional Economic Monitoring Unit, created in March 1999, was superseded under President Kuroda in April 2005 by the Office of Regional Economic Integration to give both technical support and increasing leadership to trade and financial initiatives, as well as to the broader economic issues not only within the ASEAN+3 framework but also within APEC and ASEM. The website of its Asia Regional Integration
Center (www.ARIC.adb.org) provides so much in-depth information about economic cooperation and integration that one wonders if there is a need for a separate physical institution. If the mesh of bilateral, subregional and regional economic activity in East Asia progresses in a fashion compatible with the global economic order it may be an easy political choice to strengthen the ADB instead of creating other regional economic cooperation organizations like an Asian OECD or some version of an Asian IMF.

In the meantime, East Asia continues to cooperate on a functional, case-by-case basis, as exemplified by its adaptation to the global, multi-level and dynamic economic interdependence of rising knowledge sectors. In the ninth ASEAN+3 economic ministers’ meeting in Kuala Lumpur in August 2006, the ASEAN ministers reiterated that to advance towards an East Asia free trade area they would need first to conclude ASEAN+1 free trade areas and more comprehensive economic partnerships. ASEAN+3 ministers took note of two high-level Track-2 proposals by Japan. The first is to establish an economic research institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA); they requested Japan to discuss this proposal further with the ASEAN secretariat. The second is to launch a study on a possible comprehensive economic partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) comprising ASEAN members, Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand, all established or rapidly growing economies with global projections. At a more practical level, ministers noted progress in the implementation of economic cooperation projects covering areas like information technology, small and medium-sized enterprises, standards and quality conformance, environment and logistics management. They also approved five new cooperations on information and communication technology, customs information exchange via a website, logistics, comparable statistics and an agricultural technology and management training programme for ASEAN countries.

**Telecommunications and audio visual**

The telecommunications sector lagged behind in ASEAN public sector cooperation despite being one of the seven priority sectors covered for negotiation under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services concluded during the fifth ASEAN summit in Bangkok in 1995, expecting to reach beyond the limited package of commitments undertaken earlier in the WTO-GATS. Within its Directorate for Economic Cooperation section for transport and communications, the ASEAN secretariat has increased coordination with the ASEAN telecommunications regulators to advance cooperation programmes and activities, including the harmonization of type approval standards and processes for telecommunication
equipment, and the development of a common vision and framework for ASEAN broadband interconnectivity and interoperability of national information infrastructures. Meanwhile, ACASIA.net Communications became the first business unit established in 1996 under the ASEAN Telecommunications Alliance of the then six major long-distance telecommunications carriers in the region to achieve better coordination of advanced telecommunications services, to provide necessary impetus to further the growth and expansion of the various existing regional collaborative ventures towards a seamless broadband ASEAN internet backbone.

East Asian telecommunications links have been helping regional developments in ASEAN. In 1997 Japan’s former Ministry of Post and Telecommunications lobbied for a plan to create within the Bangkok-based Asia Pacific Telecommunity (www.APTsec.org) an Asian telecommunications standardization institute (ATSI), a regional body promoting the technologies of the region’s companies and sounding as if it wanted to emulate the European Telecommunications Standardization Institute that successfully promoted the GSM set of wireless telecommunications technologies (*Mobile Communications International*, 1997). Although original plans to have ATSI fully operative by 1999 were scaled down due to coordination problems within the many and diverse members of the APT reaching from Iran to the Pacific, an *ad hoc* group on standardization chaired by Japan eventually led to an APT standardization programme to harmonize standards coming downstream from the ITU with local needs.

Leading Japanese firms are also trying to promote converging info-communications standardization regionally in alternative venues. For instance, the Tokyo-based and NTT-sponsored Asian ISDN Council was established in 1988, reflecting Japan’s interest in regionalizing high-speed cable-based technologies. Original members from Korea, Singapore and the Philippines were joined by others from Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Viet Nam and China. Nowadays, the key public and private actors in the region gather to exchange opinions and information on technologies and their international standardization. Furthermore, the name changed to the Asian Info-Communications Council (www.AIC.or.jp) in 1999 to accommodate converging technological changes.

In 1997 17 telecom operators of East Asian countries, led by Japan’s giant NTT, reached an agreement to begin an Asian multimedia forum to secure interoperability of infrastructures and speed up the development of new multimedia technologies, applications and services in the five most relevant ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), Korea and also Hong Kong, now the main entry point to mainland China’s partially liberalizing market. For
Japan’s NTT, multimedia is broadly defined in terms of open computer networks so as to encompass the key technological developments of the information revolution centred on the internet. The multimedia platform under construction includes platforms for market segments for consumers, government and schools, and also for business consumers.

The early generations of wireless phones similarly present a fragmented panorama in Asia that is gradually being resolved. At first Japan used indigenous systems while other East Asian countries adopted various foreign systems, mainly the European GSM. The litmus test for East Asian regionalization is happening this decade, as 3G standards for mobile broadband communications are being adopted in countries that are liberalizing their infrastructures according to their GATS-Communications commitments. Japan’s NTT DoCoMo had been positioning itself for years to promote its 3G Freedom of Mobile Advanced (FOMA) technologies around East Asia, although China, since 2001 the largest mobile telecommunications market in the world, has so far preferred to allow in various foreign standards to compete among themselves while Chinese firms upgrade their technologies.

The key to a common regional info-communications space is the audio-visual sector (Chang, 2003). One could think the prospects of broadcasting cooperation in East Asia are dim, given the generalized protection of all forms of media communication in the two main countries. While Japan’s government indirectly controls a media cartel (Hall, 1998), the Politburo of China’s Communist Party, through the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT), strongly controls the main TV firm, China Central Television, regulates the connection and standardization content of local cable networks and is trying to establish a national radio and cable transmission network to merge cable, wireless and satellite TV as well as internet systems (Li, 2002).

Yet Japan has here again also long been trying to regionalize TV technology and content in East Asia in a multi-level fashion. The Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union (www.ABU.org.my) is a professional association of terrestrial broadcasting carriers and producers in the fields of radio and television established in 1964 after several Asian broadcasters’ conferences were held between 1957 and 1963 under the initiative of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation. While the ABU was not ready to work on common colour TV standards, it has found avenues to cooperate in exchanging limited amounts of TV content and has recently been declaring its readiness to coordinate its activities with other standardization venues, including the earlier mentioned Asia-Pacific Telecommunity.

For decades the main standards adopted in East Asia were versions of Germany’s PAL, although NTSC has been used by three of the key US military allies in the region: Japan, South Korea and the Philippines.
pan’s public broadcaster NHK unsuccessfully tried in the 1980s to promote its multiple sub-nyquist encoding (MUSE) high-definition broadcasting technology, to be commercialized in the world under the market name HiVision. Although NHK led to the world’s first commercial trials of HDTV in around 1990 with its MUSE technology, it was basically abandoned when digital technologies were actually beginning to show a potentially much greater future for everyone. During the 1990s NHK led a digital broadcasting experts’ group (www.DiBEG.org) to develop an indigenous digital TV technology named ISDB-T (integrated system digital broadcast for terrestrial), which is an improved variant of Europe’s DVB for terrestrial broadcasting. Slowly being introduced in the new century, ISDB-T will dynamically compete with the indigenous types of high-definition television that the Chinese government is nowadays considering (Abi Research, 2006). According to the tripartite Bali declaration of October 2004 between Japan, China and Korea, “The three countries will encourage communication and cooperation among their media organizations through joint seminars or in other forms with close communication among the three governments.” If Chinese competing standards find ways to collaborate with Japan’s NHK there is good reason to think that Asia could be a harbinger in the partial regionalization of TV technologies, leading to easier exchanges of services.

All these and other activities are being promoted at the ministerial level, increasingly within an ASEAN+3 framework. A first conference of the ministers of information and broadcasting in the Asia-Pacific region that met in May 2003 in Bangkok recognized that “media professionals can play an important role in informing, educating and entertaining the public, fostering peace and mutual respect” (Asia Institute of Broadcasting Development, 2003). And to sustain the recent expansion of distribution of films and television programmes in East Asia, under the proposal of Japan’s METI at the ASEAN+3 economic ministerial held in Jakarta in September 2004, ministers and experts responsible for content industries gathered at the Asian Content Seminar in the following month at the Tokyo International Film Festival. They agreed jointly to study establishing an “Asian Content Promotion Center”, develop and exchange human resources, support Asian film festivals and enhance the trade and investment environment – actions to be followed through an “Asian Content Information Network” and future annual meetings. The ASEAN functional Committee for Culture and Information has advanced quite a few projects for regional promotion in radio, television, film, video, printed media and, increasingly, new internet-enabled media. It has gradually induced countries to broadcast ASEAN television news, and a recent ASEAN digital broadcasting initiative is looking, *inter alia*, to the formulation of common standards for set-top boxes. Moreover, the
eight conference of the ASEAN ministers responsible for information meeting in 2004 agreed to invite the Plus 3 countries to their conferences starting from 2006 to address international and regional issues.

*Information technology and internet regionalization*

At the same time that Japan and other East Asian countries begin to explore regional links in their traditionally closed telecommunications and media policies, one can see regional collaboration in more global computing and internet technologies. As in the case of Europe, the liberal US policy to outsource information technologies eventually led East Asian countries to choose and compete with globalizing standards. For instance, through the Very Large-Scale Integration consortium running from 1975 to 1979 the Japanese semiconductor industry adopted and improved US standards. Eventually, Japanese producers forced Intel to leave behind memory chips and, since 1986, concentrate on top-of-the-range, more valuable processors. Since then, competition in random access memory chips has intensified with the arrival of Korean manufacturers, forcing Japanese firms to quicken their pace to upgrade to more powerful devices required by multimedia software. Similarly, Japan started in 1984 the TRON (The Realtime Operating-system Nucleus) project to set computing standards and architectures alternative to those emerging from IBM’s PC, but it hardly developed beyond its domestic niche position, so Japanese IT firms basically build on Microsoft’s Windows operating systems.

Since Japanese academic researchers first linked to the internet in 1984 and China in 1987, global internet technologies also spread very quickly in East Asia. The provision of an internet backbone in Asia was started in the mid-1990s by both private and public consortia in the telecommunications sector, mainly led by Japan, but with the relative prominence of Singapore to maintain and promote its secondary hub position in East Asia. For instance, the Asia-Pacific Advanced Network (www.APAN.net), formed in 1997 hoping to create a high-performance ATM network for advanced research in many fields, is a volunteer consortium in which Japan’s second telecommunications firm KDDI provides the main hub, while Korea Telecom and Singapore Telecom manage the other two regional hubs.

But Japan’s efforts in the face of a rising e-China strongly require increasing coordination with ASEAN. A key node is Singapore, with which it agreed on significant joint IT development cooperation in Asia as Japanese officials toured South-East Asia in January 2001 to exchange views on Japan’s support programme for IT development, under which the
prime minister had pledged at the G8 summit the previous July to provide US$15bn in the next five years.

As information technologies converged with other knowledge sectors, ASEAN countries began in the 1990s to advance national information promotion plans (Goonasekera and Ang, 1999). For instance, Singapore developed an IT2000 master plan to consolidate the island-state as a regional and global e-conomic hub, Malaysia built its 40-km-long Multimedia Super Corridor and Indonesia’s Nusantara-21 project connected by cable and satellite the 27 provincial capitals. The ASEAN Hanoi Plan of Action launched in late 1998 expected to reach in stages a more common free trade and investment area by the year 2010, which included achieving the interoperability and interconnectivity of national information infrastructures. The third ASEAN informal summit of 1999 launched an e-ASEAN initiative to establish a free trade area for goods, services and investments for the info-communications industries, with the help of a public-private advisory taskforce and, later, the ASEAN Business Council (www.eABC.biz). Ministers and senior officials of telecommunications and IT nowadays advance a broad action agenda and detailed work programmes to develop, strengthen and enhance the competitiveness of the ICT sector, reduce the region’s digital divides, promote cooperation between the public and private sectors and develop regional infrastructure through the gradual promotion of interoperability, interconnectivity, security and integrity. A database of national information infrastructure profiles and a digital divide database have been created, national computer emergency response teams began in 2005, a virtual forum for ASEAN cyber-security is being formed, intra-ASEAN trade and investment in ICT is being enhanced, an ICT products’ list and the tariff reduction schedule have been updated, the creation of a database of trade and investment policy and regulatory practices is under consideration, some countries have begun to implement bilateral and plurilateral mutual recognition agreements in telecommunications (electric and electronic products were in the 1990s the first to be promoted by the ASEAN Consultative Committee on Standards and Quality), legal infrastructure is being promoted and a network of ICT skills competency centres is in place.

In the fourth ASEAN informal summit, participating leaders from China, Japan and South Korea showed their support for the Initiative for ASEAN Integration, proposed creating a study group to study the feasibility of an expanded free trade zone and agreed to work towards an “Asian IT Belt” to link up cities of IT excellence. A more important macro-regional link was established as an ASEAN-China memorandum of understanding on cooperation in information and communications
technology was signed in October 2003. Among the areas agreed are China’s commitment to utilize its domestic training bases to provide training for personnel from ASEAN member countries. ASEAN and China have agreed to cooperate in developing mutual recognition agreements for ICT skills certification. Furthermore, China will assist ASEAN countries in the construction and development of information infrastructure such as fixed/mobile communications networks, multimedia applications and the internet.

Strong political backing is raising expectations that the current East Asian fragmentation will give way in a few years to more regional common converging info-communications platforms. Japan hosted in September 2001 the first East Asia ICT Cooperation Conference, and a year later it promoted the first China-Japan-Korea IT ministerial meeting in Morocco alongside an ITU meeting. The second ministerial meeting, held in September 2003, released a joint declaration for trilateral info-communications cooperation in six areas: the next generation, telecommunication service policies, 3G and next-generation mobile communications, digital TV and broadcasting (including the 2008 Beijing Olympics), open source software, network and information security and next-generation internet (IPv6). More broadly the governments of Japan, South Korea and China

will enhance, as a priority, exchange and cooperation in broadband communications, mobile communications and e-business. They will continue to advance high-tech communication R&D and promote exchanges in such areas as new generation communications network and the third generation mobile communications. They will also expand the application of ICT in all sectors of society while ensuring its security. Meanwhile the three countries will seek to play a positive role in building a broadband network throughout Asia, accelerate the development of internet industry and facilitate the flow of information within Asia.

Working groups and forums first met in the spring of 2004, and the next ministerial held in July 2004 in Sapporo added an international cooperation working group to promote efficient cooperation, as well as an ad hoc study group on the idea of a grand convergence idea called “Ubiquitous Network”, and decided to rename the regional cooperation framework as the “East Asia (CJK) ICT Summit”.

Nowadays most East Asian countries are part of competitive multi-level info-com links. Japanese firms have managed to get large global market shares in some computing niches like notebook displays or special ceramic semiconductors, while South Korea and Taiwan are strong in other types of semiconductors. North-East Asian countries are nowa-
days trying regional collaboration in operating systems, but instead of developing something totally new they are building upon the globally available Linux-based software and operating systems. Asia Open Source Software (www.Asia-OSS.org) holds biannual conferences in East and South Asia, the first held in 2003 in Thailand and co-sponsored by Japan’s Center of International Cooperation for Computerization, that focus on the upgrading of software program skills and the creation of regionally mutual recognition standards, although this has to be done taking into account the current environment where Silicon Valley still leads a large global network of computing hubs.

On top of US global operating systems, Japan and other East Asian countries have been able to promote local forms of written communication. When computers became increasingly used for text-based applications, US-based computing firms had to code the language scripts of the countries where computers were going to sell. The text that computers handle was originally limited to a character set named ASCII (American Standard Code for Information Interchange), large enough to code the simple Roman alphabet in which English is based, but not at all suited to code the over 100,000 ideograms (including homonyms and other mappings to the meanings) found in the scripts of China, Korea and Japan. Nevertheless, a working group of the multilateral ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee JTC-1, which had been studying the issue for some years, circulated a first draft of a standard in the late 1980s. In 1991 a group of US software firms (Microsoft, Xerox and Apple) set up the Unicode Consortium (www.Unicode.org) and, as it at first deliberately restricted what it would encode to the most common Asian characters, Japanese and other members of the JTC-1 working group and national standards bodies raised a dispute, thus forcing a compromise. ASCII then became a subset of a globally comprehensive Unicode standard that has been upgrading over the years to add more characters and languages.

The issue of language script encoding is what may eventually bring North-East Asian countries together in the internet-based multimedia age. Japan allowed commercial internet activities in the early 1990s, at the same time as the precursor of Japan’s Network Information Center (www.NIC.ad.jp) was formed. Since then the country has experienced an exponential growth in connections and applications, an increasing number of them suited for the Japanese language and culture. In 2000 the JPNIC transformed into a more agile corporation to take over the administration of the .jp domain name registration and management, the Japan Registry Service (www.JPRS.jp), which soon began its registration service for general-use .jp domain names and a better service for browsing Japanese .jp domain names through the internet. Internationally, the JPNIC first and JPRS later have been promoting their policies with inter-
national organizations at different levels. At the lowest, the JPRS was proposing its RACE encoding algorithm for international domain names developed in collaboration with US-based Real Names (www.RealNames.com) as a standard to be agreed at the IETF. At the visual level it has been active in W3C. And, at the broadest policy level, it entered an agreement in February 2002 with ICANN underscoring, in the words of its president, their “joint commitment to promote a stable Internet, both worldwide and locally in Japan . . . It continues the Japanese Internet community’s traditions of leadership in the global Internet, and their interest in participating fully in the ICANN process.” At the same time, the Japanese .jp stakeholders have been active with other countries and regional organizations in East Asia. This includes even China, whose Communist Party has certainly maintained strong controls over the internet to limit information considered harmful to basic political and social stability, but has generally welcomed wide use of the internet for economic purposes.

The Asia Pacific Networking Group (www.APNG.org), originating in the National University of Singapore, is the core for newly created regional internet organizations dedicated to the advancement of regional infrastructure. It is flexibly organized by part-time volunteers, mostly from advanced economies. The APNG has spawned several Asia-Pacific organizations, information, trade and policy discussion. One of the most relevant was the Asia-Pacific cross-country TLD body to try to coordinate and organize the region’s TLD name holders (www.APNG.org/ APeTLD), which initiated in July 1998 with other AP organizations a first, but short-lived, forum of general discussion. One of the key topics of interest for the APNG has been promoting a decentralized, multilingual internet environment. Researchers at the National University of Singapore’s Computing Faculty started in 1998 a pilot project with academics in Japan to create domain names in Chinese, which soon developed to incorporate more languages. The project quickly became operational with the launching of services in Taiwan in December 1999 by Internationalized Domain Names Server (www.i-DNS.net), a largely Singaporean firm that has quickly spread around Asia and the United States. It has also engendered other firms, like TimeNet (www.TimeNet.net), a Taiwanese firm that since late 1999 has registered names written in Chinese and many other languages; since 2000 it has been trying to spread and globally coordinate with the Multilingual Internet Names Consortium (www.MINC.org).

It may be just a matter of time before strong regional solutions appear in Asia. In November 2000 US-based VeriSign tested allowing the registration of second-level domain names in Chinese, Japanese and Korean, thus still forcing use of .com, .net, .org gTLDs under US oversight. But
the Chinese government blocked internal registrations, stating that registrations in Chinese are its sovereign right. Moreover, as the Bush Jr administration was worrying about the pressure that the Chinese government puts on search engine companies like Google to comply with its stringent media regulations, the US State Department set up in 2006 a global internet freedom taskforce composed of key government and non-government actors and advisers to consider, inter alia, restrictions and censorship on US companies, tracking and repression of dissidents and efforts to modify internet governance structures in order to restrict the free flow of information.

If the US pressure grows, it is probable that industrial Asia will soon create an organization to regulate a regional Domain Name System for Chinese characters under existing ccTLDs and gTLDs, or even create unique regional TLDs to be steered perhaps in some sort of e-East Asian community way. A key development is the “.asia” TLD name proposal launched in 2004 by the Hong Kong-based Dot Asia, originally backed by a consortium of mainly East Asian country and regional internet regulators, although the name has attracted the support of a growing number of countries, organizations and companies. Although .asia has not yet been approved by ICANN, China is apparently considering launching a system to use Chinese characters under “.cn”, “.com” and “.net” TLD names, thus allowing users to type Chinese characters instead of Roman alphabet letters for website and e-mail addresses (BBC Online, 2006). It seems this system would still be compatible with the global internet run by ICANN, but it could be decoupled, of course at some cost, and more easily if jointly agreed with other countries writing in ideograms.

Summary

In sum, like in Europe before, East Asian countries have begun to regionalize their macro-economies and knowledge sectors while increasing global linkages. The telecommunications and audio visual sectors, traditionally under state control in East Asia, are slowly becoming more open in a regional fashion. And on the other side of the global information communication coin, they are also beginning to work together to benefit from the global revolution in computing and internet technologies.

Towards a global multi-level economic knowledge governance

counterargued that trade and investment collaboration in East Asia has produced only modest results and that neither a preferential trade agreement nor an Asian Monetary Fund is likely to materialize. My position is still different and more optimistic. I claim that increasing regional economic cooperation in both Europe and East Asia is real and, at the same time, they are setting mechanisms for closer but selective global interdependence. Although industrial Europe and East Asia maintain distinct forms of regulated capitalisms, both their public and private actors have proven largely compatible with the North American sort, especially in knowledge-enhancing info-communications sectors. As countries converge regionally, they are at the same time opening globally to grow, although in a competitive environment where functional cooperation renders a constantly variable geometry of multi-level economic governance. Thus these joint developments have the chance to enhance further a dynamic global multi-level governance system, starting with the United States – which, although continuing to advocate the opening of economies, strongly protects sectors ranging from agriculture to computing, oil exploration and the management of ports.

Promoting flexible regional nodes

ASEM-6 called for the resumption of global trade talks in the WTO, but the real focus was to advance bilateral trade deals, starting with ASEAN and South Korea. An FTA with China first requires addressing several important issues (market economy status, counterfeit goods, high market access barriers, questionable human rights record, tense relations with Taiwan, arms embargo). During the ASEM gatherings leaders discussed ways to enhance cooperation in the interdisciplinary fields of innovation, science and technology, advanced various bilateral deals, supported an ICT ministerial meeting organized in Viet Nam in December 2006 and agreed that the possibility of a follow-up to the first science and technology ministerial conference should be studied. Furthermore, leaders acknowledged the important role of the Trans-Eurasia Information Network (www.TEIN2.net), largely funded by the European Commission, in extending connectivity between Asia and Europe in the fields of research and education and related sectors, directly connected to a highly advanced pan-European research and education network.

ASEM should reach to the many people in Europe and Asia who are still unaware of each other through more common info-communications infrastructure links that help sustain the slow but continuous growth of multimedia. ASEM's economic partnership could further facilitate competitive public and private enterprises' efforts for joint research, development, standardization and distribution of info-communications infra-
structures and services. This would include laying “cyber silk routes” of high-capacity cables (possibly along railroads), further upgrading and enlarging the Trans-Eurasia research information network, exploring the best uses of the Galileo Joint Undertaking radio navigation system and other space technologies, making sure that the new generations of multimedia mobile devices have even more compatible cores that nevertheless allow for competitive proprietary elements and promoting useful applications based on the Linux open software platforms.

Europe and East Asia could also further engage the United States not only through clubs like the G7/8, but also through their respective inter-regional relations with North America (transatlantic partnership, APEC, etc.). But as economic development is rather limited in much of the rest of the world, knowledge economies could competitively reach other countries in stages. Europe and East Asia can offer alternatives that balance the local needs of developing countries while making sure they remain economically linked in competitive multi-level patterns. This approach would offer some protection mechanisms but also promote more competition, thus causing less harm than the shock therapies of the 1990s that destroyed the political and social fabric and created long-lasting resentment.

Europe and East Asia have strong incentives to promote jointly the incorporation of Russia, the Middle East and the broader Eurasian space into a knowledge-driven world economy. Many of these countries rely heavily on energy resources, which become a tool in global political clashes. But silk roads in info-communication sectors could easily be laid alongside energy pipelines, highways and railroad systems. For that, the European Union’s relations with its neighbours could better link with the Asian Cooperation Dialogue, the Asia-Middle East Dialogue, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or an enhanced East Asia summit.

The Latin America development record is mixed. Some of its agricultural and industrial niches are globally competitive, but its service sectors are generally lagging behind. Here again, Europe and East Asia might consider the promotion of greater linkages to info-communication sectors through the EU-Latin America and the Forum of East Asia-Latin America Cooperation.

Meanwhile, much of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific are even less developed in service sectors. Most people in these parts of the world still have little access to telephony, plural audio visual channels, computing or internet connections. Like the US Marshall Plan after the Second World War, and now that the United States gives very little public economic aid for long-term development, Europe and East Asia could elaborate a multi-level development plan based on economic sectors that structurally link territories among themselves and the rest of the world,
and chiefly on knowledge sectors with broad spill-over effects on the rest of the economy as well as political and social development. European and East Asian initiatives could, for instance, promote the regional adoption of MIT MediaLab’s “one laptop per child” vision (www.Laptop.org) to sell US$100 computers in millions of batches, or similar plans by other US-based info-communications firms (Intel’s EduWise, AMD’s 50 × 15, etc.).

Transforming international e-economic organizations

European and East Asia could at the same time help transform international organizations into new platforms to promote balanced multi-level growth in the knowledge economy.

We have seen that key governance aspects of internet-based communications rely on public and private experts organized in a multi-level way based on three principal nodes in the United States, Europe and Japan: ISOC for electronic issues and W3C for web applications. And as ICANN struggles to find a solution to govern the Domain Name System, Europe’s “.eu” and a similarly effective version for East Asia may before long catalyse a world regional platform of TLD names on the side of country code and public and private global-generic ones.

An ever more decentralized and dynamic ITU would greatly help in the process. It has for decades managed the allocation of valuable spectrum bands for wireless and satellite communication and broadcasting through three large world regions, and has successfully collaborated with the ISO and IEC, organizations across the street in Geneva that help produce global standards out of basic info-communications technologies. In 1998, and headed since then by a former Japanese vice-minister of telecommunications, the ITU adopted a strategic plan with the overriding goal of becoming the international focal point for all technical, development and policy matters relating to telecommunications, and reaching to other info-communication sectors. To prepare for that, the ITU’s standardization process, which generally has been shortened from four years to a few months, is collaborating more closely with private firms and consortia. Its World Summits on Information Society advanced in 2003–2005, largely through regional conferences, and formed the Internet Governance Forum (www.IntGovForum.org), a democratic and transparent multistakeholder policy dialogue open to national governments, the private sector, civil society, intergovernmental organizations and international organizations. This may go beyond the high-level Information and Communication Technologies Task Force (www.UNICTtaskforce.org) of the UN Economic and Social Council active in 2001–2004, prompted by the Digital Opportunities Task Force established at the 2000 G8 summit.
Although it consulted a multiplicity of actors, studied national and regional e-strategies and decentralized to five regions, it did not truly reflect the regional processes that are shaping global multi-level governance. Its working group on internet governance, set up in the ITU’s first World Summit on the Information Society in 2003, was supposed to find a way to promote effective internet multi-level governance, but its three main proposals to reform the internet did not go far enough: maintain ICANN in the United States as the main organization controlling TLD names and addresses; create a new agency under UN control; and create three government agencies for policy, oversight and global coordination. Yet a possibly better solution is to acknowledge the multi-level nature of info-communications advanced by effective macro-regional processes and give them greater weight in catalysing further multi-level nodes around the world. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes that “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”. But as ASEAN reminded in its joint statement to the first World Summit on the Information Society, the global strategy to realize the information society must be based on concrete milestones rather than broad visions, and its action plans should be adapted to each region’s unique and diverse needs.

As info-communications sectors keep growing and transforming other global economic sectors like finance, energy, education, health and leisure, other economic governance regimes could take heed. Bretton Woods organizations and others around the UN Economic and Social Council might want to coordinate broadly but functionally with effective regional processes that have proven they can remain globally open through an interplay of both public and private actors. The International Monetary Fund, nowadays in an unusual period of reflective tranquillity, launched in 2005 a medium-term strategy hoping to make it more effective in tackling its many tasks, including not only global monetary stability and financing temporary balance of payments problems, but also creating standards and codes, promoting data transparency, assessing financial sectors, combating terror-linked finance and money-laundering and helping low-income countries. The new multi-level geographies of money and credit have thus prompted the IMF to propose, *inter alia*, consulting groups of countries on issues of systemic importance, formulating regional work plans that pay heed to the concerns facing the region and supporting regional and other reserve pooling arrangements. Meanwhile, the World Bank would have no particular problems in following suit. It even argued that regional agreements can prove beneficial to member countries, and if open can promote global growth (World Bank, 2005).
Although more funding and better management is hard to find, the Bank could coordinate with regional development banks and state banks on the one hand and the global private development banking system on the other.

The stalled WTO really needs to find a working compromise soon in defining functional regional trade agreements. So far, many regional organizations are admitted on its Committee on Trade and Development but only a few regional processes are allowed as observers in some of its other committees: on the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements only the Organization of American States is a regular observer, while the Latin America Integration Association is an \textit{ad hoc} one. Before the indefinite suspension of the Doha Round of negotiations, developed countries were pressuring developing ones in many ways, encircling them and asking for sectoral numerical and qualitative targets. But these pressures to change the political economy of protectionist countries would be better channelled through the many regional trade agreements that keep flourishing. A WTO possibly woken up by Europe and East Asia could well start decentralizing to effective regional nodes via functional, sectoral multi-level agreements in selected regions. Gradually, the WTO would then become a humbler multi-level platform that balances the irrefutable concerns of most economic actors.

Much more global thought is required to assess the general validity of the above recommendations, but the final case study of this book hopes to provide an even more concrete example of how a global multi-level governance system may gradually be advanced by attracting more and more educated people.
Towards higher levels of education

The three previous chapters have looked at how innovative global multi-level political, advisory and business-led regimes are being formed largely through European and East Asian leadership and the oversight of the United States. This chapter focuses on how both regional processes are promoting a more knowledgeable global civil society through the gradual transformation of their higher education systems.

Globalization of higher education

To promote a knowledge-based political economy, governments around the world are now trying to cope with the social fissures between those few with the skills to flourish in a liberalized world market and the many still lacking these assets. One of the necessary answers is lifelong education that induces people to design their own educational paths. International education has become crucial for both economic growth and social construction, thus perhaps discrediting the realist dictum that powerful states are locked in confrontational power games. The growing mobility in the higher education sector presents an opportunity for longer-term interaction as international university students usually spend several months or years in another country, which quite often leads to socializing, working and even marrying and otherwise living peacefully in the host country or in a third country.

At the end of the last century about 8 per cent of the total OECD adult

population had a university degree (tertiary) and only a small percentage studied abroad (Larsen, Martin and Morris, 2002). Globally, UNESCO’s Institute of Statistics (www.uis.unesco.org) annual global education digests showed that nearly 2 million university students, about 2 per cent of the world’s total, were then studying abroad (see table 5.1). Almost one-third of the world’s foreign students were during the 1990s attracted to the United States by its academic reputation and job opportunities afterwards. But many European and East Asian countries are also attractive destinations for international students.

With the demand for skills to adapt to the globalizing knowledge society, the trend to study abroad is expected to grow exponentially for many years. Private profit-seeking institutions are still a minority, but many state-controlled universities have begun to compete for talent and money wherever they can. “Western” universities are not just marketing their courses to prospective wealthy incoming foreign students; some academic institutions and business schools, as well as financial and computing multinationals, outsource specialized teaching internationally while controlling the curriculum, quality standards and qualifications. More universities are opening campuses abroad, not only in America and Europe but now often in China and other Asian countries, that teach a large variety of courses in all kinds of disciplines. And online education aided by multimedia technologies is further helping promote sectoral growth.

The governance of the higher education sector has also been undergoing rapid changes as governments of both developed and developing countries have begun a regulatory drive in response to the growing demand for more global lifelong learning opportunities (WTO, 1998b; World Bank, 2002; UNESCO, 2003b). That demand is leading to various degrees of autonomy from the long-established practice of top-down, structural government planning. Governments and private actors are reforming curricula, creating evaluation and accreditation mechanisms,

| Table 5.1 Leading exporters of education services (consumption abroad) |
|----------------------------------------|------|------|------|
|                                         | 1999 | 2004 | % change 1999–2004 |
| World total                             | 1,680,268 | 2,452,929 | 46.0 |
| United States                           | 490,933 | 572,509 | 16.6 |
| United Kingdom                          | 232,540 | 300,056 | 29.0 |
| Germany                                 | 178,195 | 260,314 | 46.1 |
| France                                  | 130,952 | 237,587 | 81.4 |
| Australia                               | 117,485 | 166,954 | 42.1 |
| Japan                                   | 56,552 | 117,903 | 108.5 |
| China                                   | 44,711 | (2005) 140,000 | 213.0 |

*Source: American Council on Education (2006).*
promoting institutional differentiation and using info-communication technologies. Progress is still not globally visible, but under the leadership of Europe and East Asia the world of higher education governance is advancing in a hyperlinked, multi-level manner.

The renaissance of European higher education

To further the goal of a full-fledged internal market and an “ever closer union of peoples”, a growing European project has particularly been weaving a more common human resource infrastructure.

In the past decades European governments have created two postgraduate institutions to study and research European integration. The College of Europe began in 1949, just after the Congress of Europe galvanized by Churchill, with a campus in Bruges (a new campus in Warsaw opened in the 1990s) to teach masters courses in law, economics, politics and administration. After decades of discussions the European University Institute was created in Florence in the 1970s to teach and research similar subjects, as well as history, at doctoral and post-doctoral levels. The European Institute of Public Administration (www.EIPA.eu) then opened in Maastricht in the early 1980s to train public administrators from European governments. Newer initiatives have appeared since then, co-financed by national governments and other actors. For instance, the Academy of European Law (www.ERA.int) was created in the early 1990s with the collaboration of Luxembourg and the German city of Trier. And a world-class European Institute of Technology may open by the end of this decade with the collaboration of industry.

The Lisbon Strategy set up by the European Council meeting in Lisbon in 2000 aimed at processes to reform the European Union into “the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world” by 2010. Such a grandiose vision will naturally not be achieved, but some aspects of it, like higher education, are advancing well as they allow institutional actors to link more freely in a multi-level way. Two complementary intergovernmental processes promote this new form of higher education collaboration: one centred in the European Union’s European Commission; and a more recent broader intergovernmental transformation closer to the Council of Europe’s long-term vision of an enlarged Europe.

*The Erasmus programme*

The European Commission has been for almost two decades managing an increasing number of projects agreed by EU ministers, originally fo-
cusing on the mobility of students and more recently paying greater attention to the Europeanization of content. The directorate for education and training within the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Education and Culture (http://ec.europa.eu/education/index_en.html) proposes and manages the growing number of programmes and strategic initiatives. The most relevant is the European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students (Erasmus). Established in 1987, the Erasmus programme was the first comprehensive action on interuniversity cooperation for student and, to a lesser extent, faculty mobility. Socrates, a broader education programme, continued and extended the Erasmus action in higher education in the years 1995–1999. Erasmus and other education actions were complemented through Socrates by various transversal actions like Lingua (for language learning) and Minerva (for open and distance learning and the use of information-communications technologies). The second phase of Socrates, running in the seven-year period 2000–2006, advanced in eight actions/areas that reflect the individual’s progression through the learning life, from preschool and school education (Comenius), then on through higher education (Erasmus) and finally even into adult education (Grundtvig).

While there were only 3,244 Erasmus students in the 1987/1988 academic year, the numbers grew exponentially to over 135,000 in 2003/2004, the year in which the number of Erasmus teachers reached 18,500 – numbers indicating that teachers are proportionally more mobile than students. The number of education establishments participating in the programme has similarly grown to nearly 2,000. Part of the growth is due to the enlargement of the European Union and the opening of the Erasmus programme to Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein (members of the European Economic Area) and Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey (candidate countries). But much of the success reflects a genuine interest among the participating students and faculty, assisted by enlightened administrators, to broaden their minds beyond the confines of the traditional nation-state.

The Erasmus programme at first strongly facilitated the growth in the number of intra-European university networks and association focusing on various, broader and narrower, aspects of higher education. Nowadays, several groups of universities stand out for their goals of collaboration in a broad range of issues of internationalization. There are also many other groupings focusing on European subregions. Moreover, there are university associations of teachers, students, managers, rectors, sectors (medicine, law, business, etc.), technical colleges and, more recently, institutions focusing on online delivery, all trying to give some input to the regionalization process.
In Socrates’ first phase Erasmus managed around 200 projects focusing beyond the earlier networking of single university departments and into promoting broader university mobility and curriculum innovation. In Socrates II, Erasmus provided large sums not only to support and catalyse physical exchanges of students and faculty but also to develop content broadly; thus it placed more emphasis on teaching-staff exchanges, on recognizing credits gained taking similar courses in different countries, on transnational curriculum development and on pan-European thematic networks. Moreover, Socrates promoted a thorough comparative analysis of education systems and policies, and the exchange of information and experience to help formulate and implement educational policies around the European Union. In other words, through the Socrates programme the European Union has been changing the national university systems to help Europeanize at home the majority of students who are not yet very mobile.

In a conference titled the Sound of Europe held under the Austrian presidency in Salzburg in January 2006 and attended by over 300 European opinion-formers, the EU’s high representative for common foreign and security policy pleaded that the best way Europe could get out of its current pessimistic impasse was to multiply the efforts of the Erasmus programme. The EU budget for the period 2007–2013 noticeably increased its allocation for education, and groups all the above programmes into a grand concept of lifelong learning that benefits national economies and societies. Yet these actions can only complement the transformation of higher education systems which are still under the prerogatives of national governments or, in federal countries, involve sub-state regions.

The structural “Bologna Process”

A newer pan-European intergovernmental “Bologna Process” expects to go beyond the Erasmus programme and achieve a broad European regional space in higher education towards the end of the current decade. Education ministers of the four largest European countries, commemorating in 1998 the 800th anniversary of the establishment of the University of Paris, raised a set of basic principles for common development of higher education, and decided to commit themselves “to encouraging a common frame of reference, aimed at improving external recognition and facilitating student mobility as well as employability”. Several other education ministers soon signed the Sorbonne Declaration, and a year later ministers of 29 European countries meeting in Bologna signed a detailed charter or magna carta aiming to establish a European Area of
Higher Education (EAHE) by 2010. This would imply the adoption of a range of measures addressing all key aspects of mobility of higher education:

- easily readable and comparable degrees (through an explanatory European degree supplement)
- two main cycles (undergraduate of at least three years, and postgraduate of masters and/or doctoral degrees)
- a system of credits based on students’ work (such as the European Credit Transfer System)
- promotion of mobility of students and teachers (through programmes and the removal of barriers)
- promotion of cooperation in quality assurance (including in curricular development)
- promotion of the European dimension (including inter-institutional cooperation).

The Bologna Process now advances through biennial summits of education ministers from a growing number of European countries. In 2001 ministers from 30 countries meeting in Prague refocused some topics and added three action lines:

- promotion of lifelong learning
- opening the policy process to higher education institutions and students
- further promoting the attractiveness of the EHEA.

In September 2003 ministers from 40 countries (the majority of the Council of Europe, but also including Russia) meeting in Berlin (www.Bologna-Berlin2003.de) agreed on measures to speed up the development of the EHEA at the bachelors and master levels by making their academic degrees comparable by 2005, and to focus on increasing the quality of higher education. They also added a new action line:

- doctoral studies to promote synergies between the EHEA and a European research area.

Although the ministerial agreements and recommendations of the Bologna Process are not legally binding, there is a generalized will and effort to transform Europe’s education systems so they may globally excel. The Norwegian city of Bergen hosted in May 2005 education ministers from 45 countries (Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were welcomed) who decided not to add new priorities but instead chose to reinforce the existing commitments (www.Bologna-Bergen2005.no). Ministers adopted the overarching framework for qualifications in the EHEA, comprising three cycles (including, within national contexts, the possibility of intermediate qualifications), generic descriptors (focusing on skills) for each cycle based on learning outcomes and competences and credit ranges in the first and second cycles. They urged universities to make sure that PhD programmes become more in tune with European
job market requirements (raising even the idea of a European doctorate label), and asked for core principles in PhD programmes. By the time of the next summit in 2007 in London (www.dfes.gov.uk/bologna/) education ministers will be looking for progress in the implementation of the standards and guidelines for quality assurance; in the implementation of the national frameworks for qualifications; in the awarding and recognition of joint degrees, including at the doctorate level; and in creating opportunities for flexible learning paths in higher education, including procedures for the recognition of formal and non-formal prior learning to make it easier for students to move from one cycle to the next. There is even a possibility that the intergovernmental Bologna Process may become partially supranational, as ministers meeting in Bergen welcomed the principle of a European register of quality assurance agencies based on national review; the issue of creating a new committee to oversee this register is being considered.

Europe’s higher education reaching to the world

European colonial expansion had a strong educational component. Catholic powers created university systems in Latin America and beyond. Oxford and Cambridge were the models for many new universities, including the first colleges created in the North American colonies, although the German concept of a research university also took root and eventually flourished there. For centuries many students from the colonies felt the need to sojourn in Europe to further their learning.

While European countries now jointly transform in various ways their higher education systems, they have to work hard to compete in the broader world. The Bologna Process has always stressed a global projection. In 1999 European education ministers declared that “the vitality and efficiency of any civilisation can be measured by the appeal that its culture has for other countries. We need to ensure that the European higher education system acquires a world-wide degree of attraction equal to our extraordinary cultural and scientific traditions.” In later meetings ministers have been further emphasizing the need to promote a greater European higher education that encourages international collaboration.

The European Union has been advancing a number of global and targeted initiatives to different parts of the world. The European Commission has helped create scores of European documentation centres and depository libraries in leading universities. And Jean Monnet Action promotes knowledge on European integration through teaching and research, grants, chairs, courses, centres of excellence, conferences and institutional support. About 800 universities in 60 countries offer Jean Monnet courses as part of their curricula, involving a network of 1,800
professors and reaching an audience of 250,000 students every year. Much of this recent global projection focuses on a rising Asia. The European Commission has also globally promoted the creation of EU study centres drawing on European faculties and documentation. In East Asia, ASEAN and China have created a dense network, two EU institutes have recently appeared in Japan and newer consortia are planned in South Korea and Australia. Although regional networks may be encouraged, they are free to evolve in their own way as these institutes become largely self-financed after a few years.

The European Union has also been complementing its Socrates-Erasmus schemes with initiatives connecting Europe with the rest of the world, be it countries or regions. Agreements on higher education and vocational training cooperation with the United States and Canada began in 1995, and a few years later pilot projects were started with Australia and Japan. The Tempus programme, which during the 1990s covered the countries of the former Soviet Union, the western Balkans and Mongolia, was extended in 2002 to the EU’s Mediterranean partners. And the ALFA and Alßan programmes similarly link the European Union to Latin America. In the new century the number of initiatives towards Asia is particularly increasing. The ASEAN-EU University Network Programme (www.deltha.cec.eu.int/aunp/) promoted in 2000–2005 university cooperation between the European Union and South-East Asia, especially through networks, applied research, curriculum development and development of human resources. Asia Link (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/europeaid/projects/asia-link) is a cooperation programme that since 2002 has promoted regional and interregional networks between the European Union and Asian developing countries (South and South-East Asia and China).

From 2004 the Erasmus Mundus programme (http://ec.europa.eu/education/programmes/mundus) promotes the European Union as a centre of excellence through cooperation and mobility between Europe and the rest of the world at the masters level. Its first phase, lasting until 2008, is independent of the Socrates-Erasmus programme, but a convergence if not a merge between the two programmes is expected afterwards. For the time being, Erasmus-Mundus finances quality European masters programmes involving at least three universities in three European countries, complemented by funding to attract students and academics to Europe, and European students to the rest of the world. As the majority of international students now come from China, India and other Asian countries, there are specific efforts to link with these countries and regions in a climate of increasing political and social dialogue.

All this activity does not decrease the relevance for European member
states of internationalizing their higher education systems. Actually, most countries have recently enhanced their own efforts. The United Kingdom has expanded the global projection of the British Council (www.BritishCouncil.org), hoping to maintain its leadership position in Europe’s international education, already facilitated by the widespread use of English in the world of learning and ties to former colonies through the Association of Commonwealth Universities (www.ACU.ac.uk). Similarly, France is nowadays complementing the ongoing actions of its Agence universitaire de la Francophonie (www.AUF.org) that promotes French-based language and education in its former colonies with a more global EduFrance agency. While German is not so popular around the world, its German Academic Exchange Service (www.DAAD.de) remains among the most active and successful cultural institutes that promote the internationalization of German universities. Spain plans a similar academic exchange agency, explores new ways to promote the Spanish language and is trying to connect the European Erasmus programme to Latin America while promoting broader exchanges through the Organización de Estados Iberoamericanos para la Educación, la Ciencia y la Cultural (www.OEI.org). Other Southern European and Northern European countries are similarly labouring with the governmental tools and traditional attractions (Portuguese communities, Italian high culture, Nordic affordability and efficiency) at their disposal.

The multi-level construction of an East Asia higher education space

During the second half of the twentieth century the higher education systems in East Asia developed in different directions. Japan allowed the creation of many private universities to complement those funded by national and local governments. Mao’s China basically closed its universities during the Cultural Revolution, and only in the 1980s did it begin a path of recovery and catching up with the industrial world. ASEAN countries also took different directions to promote their own paths of nation-building, but they generally have been adapting to pressures to internationalize higher education while keeping the door open to regional collaboration. Given the mixed historical record, it is thus understandable that the efforts to regionalize while globalizing aspects of higher education in East Asia are of a very different kind than in the case of Europe. While Europe is structurally adapting its higher education systems mainly through the Erasmus programme and the Bologna Process, the process in East Asia is more recent, complex and surprising. Building on
various overlapping regional networks and institutions, the ASEAN+3 countries have recently began to converge while generally transforming their higher education systems.

I argue the case in a chronological, multi-level way. I first analyse the initiatives originating in South-East Asia, then present the efforts of North America and Europe to help embed East Asia. Next I introduce the ASEAN+3 vision hoping to bring together the developments in South-East and North-East Asia. Finally, I highlight the recent and key efforts by North-East Asian countries to start a path of intellectual reconciliation that promises to consolidate a flexible multi-level East Asian regional space.

Initiatives from South-East Asia

The first regional initiative for higher education collaboration came from a small but open group. The Association of Southeast Asian Institutions of Higher Learning (www.ASAIHL.org) was founded in 1956 as a non-governmental organization at a meeting in Bangkok of the heads of eight state universities in the region. The association is still administered through a general conference, an administrative board and a secretariat. It is a clearing-house of information and assists member institutions in the recruitment and placement of faculty and staff, in exchanges of professors and students and in the development of cooperative arrangements on specific projects. And it grants a token number of fellowships, but, given its meagre resources, the ASAIHL has linked more globally to survive, and nowadays includes many Asian members as well as others from developed countries: Canada (two), Japan (four), Australia (six), New Zealand (five), the United States (six), Europe (one) and Hong Kong (one).

The next regional development came from UNESCO. It established in 1961 in Bangkok its Asian Regional Office for Primary and Compulsory Education; two decades later this extended to higher education and, in the late 1980s, became the UNESCO Asia and Pacific Regional Bureau for Education (www.unescobkk.org). Through the Regional Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Diplomas and Degrees in Higher Education in Asia and the Pacific, UNESCO-Bangkok provides limited financial and technical assistance and sustains an overall policy debate for reform. It sometimes assists developing countries in a subregional fashion, as in a plan to establish the Greater Mekong Virtual University, and by focusing on quality assurance and mutual recognition issues and promoting regional networks (the UNESCO, 2003c). There are many UNESCO chairs, over 40 university twinning and networking scheme networks and an Asia-Pacific regional group of the UNESCO-sponsored Global University Network for Innovation. More interestingly, it is now developing a
new regional education strategy to “interpret global priorities and goals in a regional context” and “adapt broad institutional strategies to achieve the regional goals”.

UNESCO works in tandem with the South-East Asia Ministers of Education Organization (www.SEAMEO.org), which was established in 1965 as a result of a meeting held in Bangkok between the education ministers of Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the then Republic of (South) Viet Nam, the chairperson of the UNESCO national commission of the Philippines and a special adviser to the US president. SEAMEO has a wide remit to promote cooperation in education, science and culture, but it has linked outside the region to prosper. It currently includes the 10 ASEAN countries and East Timor as regular members, while a few Western countries are associate members, the International Council for Open and Distance Education is an affiliate and Japan is a donor country. They all meet annually, and its headquarters in Bangkok is shared with the regional office of UNESCO. SEAMEO has grown into a network of regional centres to promote training of specialists, including the Regional Institute of Higher Education and Development (RIHED). Independently founded in 1970, it reconstituted under SEAMEO in 1985 after a period of inaction (Wongsothorn, 1997), and nowadays the RIHED “responds to needs related to policy and planning, administration and management of higher education”. With core funding from the Thai government, it deals with commissioned projects for training, conferences, research, information and consultancy, often in regional groupings (like the East Asian Growth Area, the Greater Mekong subregion, and the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle). Since 1997 it has been complemented by a regional open-learning centre based in Indonesia. According to SEAMEO, over 50,000 professionals from the region (and beyond) have participated in its training courses, and over 25,000 in professional technical conferences, seminars and workshops; but only some 3,000 people have participated in graduate degree programmes (Soekartawi, 2002).

ASEAN took three decades to go beyond irregular discussions and small pilot projects to find its formal leading role in multi-level higher education. A first ASEAN Committee on Education meeting took place in Manila in 1975, and at a second one in 1977 it decided on four “problem areas” to tackle (manpower development, teacher education and training of other education personnel, the education system and special education) and even proposed establishing an ASEAN university. A meeting of the ASEAN ministers of education held in Manila in 1977 advanced several issues in pre-university education but did not touch upon higher education. Nothing else happened until Malaysia successfully proposed in 1989 reactivating the Committee on Education to complement the
work of SEAMEO. Finally, the fourth ASEAN summit of 1992 reaffirmed ASEAN studies and the ASEAN University as priorities for education cooperation and also urged that student exchanges at secondary and tertiary levels be implemented as a strategy for promoting awareness of ASEAN. The Charter of the ASEAN University Network was later signed by the ASEAN ministers responsible for higher education, while the agreement on the establishment of the ASEAN University Network (www.AUN.chula.ac.th) was signed in November 1995 by the heads of 11 participating universities. The ASEAN University Network has since established a secretariat at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok and manages incipient collaborative programmes (masters studies, short-term exchanges of students and faculty, scholarships), information networking and even collaborative research. Moreover, it includes the ASEAN Virtual University (www.aunVirtualU.dlsu.edu.ph), managed from Ateneo University in Manila, that has compiled a first ASEAN studies course syllabus based on “Anglo-Saxon” bibliographical references. But given the relative slowness of progress towards a fuller-fledged regional university system, the ASEAN University Network also started to reach to other countries, especially China, Japan, South Korea and the European Union, as well as India and Russia.

The decisive moment took place in an informal retreat held in Bangkok in August 2005, when many issues were agreed before polishing and rubber-stamping them in the formal ASEAN summit of December. Education ministers accorded to promote seriously ASEAN exchanges of teachers, staff and students, as well as the creation of common content in traditional and info-communication platforms. The ASEAN University Network would be strengthened with a view ultimately to establishing the ASEAN University, and it would work to promote mutual recognition of academic degrees and qualifications. They agreed to establish an ASEAN ministerial meeting on education that would meet alongside the annual SEAMEO meeting. Finally, ministers in the Bangkok retreat “agreed that regional coordination mechanisms for education collaboration through the ASEAN and SEAMEO forums should be synergized to work with countries beyond the Southeast Asian region and with other regional and international organizations on education”.

Education ministers and senior education officials from South-East Asian countries, as well as partners and other representatives from the region and beyond, gathered in Singapore in March 2006 for the first ASEAN education ministers’ meeting (ASED) alongside the forty-first SEAMEO Council conference. ASED agreed to promote an ASEAN identity and socio-cultural community, building on the strengths of the region’s multiethnic societies arising from the many country experiences and reaffirming that education plays a key role in the promotion of re-
gional identity and the ASEAN socio-cultural community. They agreed to deepen, and expand to other countries, ASEAN’s many activities and programmes that enhance interactions and exchanges among students and educationists in the region on a bilateral or regional basis. ASEAN and other countries would strengthen ASEAN studies, produce resource books, enhance ICT technologies, bring students and teachers together and encourage other people-to-people interactions, study how education relates to multiethnicity, quality, find good combinations of language education that combine English with national and mother tongues, promote vocational technical education and select and train school leaders.

All these initiatives are bound to grow within the ASEAN socio-cultural community since they include a broad range of programme areas and concrete measures to promote more globally competitive human resources.

Country reforms

As basically all ASEAN countries face common global challenges, they have begun jointly to analyse the evolution of all the key elements of their higher education systems (UNESCO Asia and Pacific Regional Bureau of Education, 2006). To meet the increasing student demand, universities are training academic and institutional staff, developing new curricula and searching for funds as they are turning into corporations, fully privatized or at least entering various public-private strategic partnerships. ASEAN countries’ new competitive strategies increasingly involve regional and global transnational partners. Many countries in the region remain importers of cross-border education from Anglo-Saxon countries, or, in the case of the poorest countries, dependent on international development aid, but most are also now racing to develop and compete in multi-level education markets.

The city-state of Singapore has been radically transforming its higher education system, hoping to become a multi-level hub for higher education that benefits its overall economic development. The University of Singapore created in 1962 out of the earlier Raffles College became the National University of Singapore in 1980, and a year later it founded the Nanyang Technological Institute (a university since 1992) to help train high-tech workers to maintain rapid economic development. Singapore Management University became in 2000 the third government university inspired by the Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania. But to promote its global vision, Singapore’s government decided in the late 1990s to host 10 foreign universities by 2008. It has enticed several specialized graduate institutions and created educational alliances with reputed counterparts in the United States, Europe, Australia and China. Singapore’s Economic Review Committee described in 2003
more radical plans for the country to be “a thriving international education hub”, bringing together large, niche, public, private, foreign and domestic educational institutions. As an element of its overall strategy, Singapore is an active promoter of various intergovernmental partnerships to attract international students, including the ASEAN University Network (it provides ASEAN scholarships) and APEC’s and ASEM’s educational activities. While many Singaporean students have traditionally gone abroad (brighter ones often under government-sponsored schemes to train academic elites), Singapore now hopes within 10 years to triple the number of inward foreign students to 150,000, or roughly 20 per cent of the university capacity, and establish a system to retain most of them for several years after the completion of their studies.

Malaysia, once part of the Malay Federation with present-day Singapore, aimed at reaching around 50,000 foreign students in 2004, the same year in which it created a full Ministry of Higher Education to manage better the flourishing of private higher education: it has several foreign university campuses and numerous twinning arrangements with overseas institutions, including several in Europe as part of its vision of developing the Asia-Europe Institute at the University of Malaysia into a stronger biregional partnership.

The internationalization of Thai higher education has also evolved and nowadays it hopes to become a regional hub (Chang, 2004; Nakornthap and Wichit, 1997). Thailand began to internationalize in the 1950s through cooperative programmes with institutions in the United States and other countries, and through the increase of public and private efforts to send students abroad, especially during the economic growth of the 1980s. In the 1990s Thailand began a more comprehensive effort. In the wake of the “15-Year Higher Education Development Plan” completed in 1990 by the former Ministry of University Affairs, the Seventh National Higher Education Development Plan for 1992–1996 explicitly hoped to turn Thailand into a regional higher education hub: one of the five major dimensions was “internationalization and regionalization”, while the others were access and equity, efficiency and accountability, quality and excellence and privatization and corporatization. Thailand has increased the number of international education programmes (from 387 in 2001 to 520 in 2003) and collaborative relationships with foreign institutions. In addition, Thailand increasingly hosts major regional and international education organizations and networks of institutions. Besides the earlier mentioned ASAHL, UNESCO and SEAMEO (including RIHED) and the ASEAN University Network, it hosts the Association of Universities of Asia and the Pacific (AUAP, presented below). Moreover, Thailand’s small but growing number of foreign students now come from neighbouring countries: China sent 946, Viet Nam 619, Burma
340, Laos 131 and Cambodia 61; others come from India, Japan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Taiwan and the United States (Chang, 2004; Nakornthap and Wichit, 1997).

Other ASEAN countries are also taking measures to internationalize their higher education systems. Upon its independence in the middle of the twentieth century, Indonesia shifted from a link with the Netherlands to a US link to train its elite academics. Nowadays it is trying to enhance a more autonomous higher education system while realizing it has to compete in a multi-level fashion. Although Philippine academics still often get some training in the United States, newer international programmes aim at developing links with Japan, China and Europe. Meanwhile, most foreign students in the Philippines come from Korea and China. Viet Nam allowed in 2000 new forms of semi-private higher education provision supplied by social, professional and economic organizations (rather than individuals, companies or foreign universities). It is also giving more management freedom to the 35 state universities, aims at raising the national university to international standards by the end of the decade, has welcomed an Australian campus and is trying to increase funding to send more students abroad. Meanwhile, less developed countries often rely on external funding to help revitalize their universities or, as in the case of Cambodia, start almost anew.

Embedding East Asia in the West

East Asian countries are coming closer together through the growing links to external partners and regions in the world of knowledge. Trans-regional links with the United States are nowadays complemented by ideas coming from Europe and beyond.

APEC had its first education ministerial in 1992, when it created the APEC Education Forum (www.APECneted.org) within its Human Resources Working Group to advance various projects in different levels of education. In the year 2000 APEC held a second ministerial where it was decided to transform the Education Forum into the Education Network, which, based in Taiwan, helped little in regional cooperation. Complementary initiatives within or around APEC in the higher education sector have had a useful but limited projection.

Various Asia-Pacific academic networks have appeared to stimulate cooperation. A consortium of APEC study centres was launched in 1993 to promote studies and research on APEC issues. The Association of Pacific Rim Universities (www.APRU.org) was created in 1997 with a base in Singapore to link the chief executives of nowadays 36 leading universities in APEC, hoping to stimulate cooperation in teaching and research
on various issues. In addition, the geographically broader Association of Universities of Asia and the Pacific (www.sut.ac.th/auap) was formed in July 1995 at a conference at Suranaree University of Technology in Thailand. Its broad membership includes universities from Iran, India, Bangladesh, the United States, Australia, Japan and UNESCO, advancing an operational plan to develop management, teaching, research, internationalization, information dissemination and attracting new members.

Meanwhile, Australia promoted independently in 1991 the structurally more challenging University Mobility in Asia and the Pacific (www.UMAP.org) scheme to complement APEC’s intergovernmental activities. Since 1993 UMAP has been a voluntary association (with a secretariat in the Tokyo Academic Park) of governments and non-governmental representatives aiming to increase the mobility of university students and staff. Participating universities first recognize credits for one or two semesters abroad; since 1998, based on the Erasmus experience in Europe, a pilot project has been trying to achieve a broader credit transfer scheme and recognition of qualifications. But a report on the UMAP credit transfer scheme presented to its board in March 2003 highlighted difficulties with its use and generally limited understanding and knowledge across Asia-Pacific. Moreover, UMAP does not even have the resources to provide basic statistical information on student mobility. UMAP recently changed course and began advertising itself as “a vehicle for governments and regional organisations interested in supporting the UMAP vision”.

East Asian countries have increasingly been approaching Europe to internationalize their higher education further. Upon the creation of the ASEAN University Network, the ASEAN-EU University Network Programme was launched in 2000 to enhance cooperation between higher education institutions, promote regional integration within ASEAN countries and strengthen the mutual awareness of European and Asian cultural perspectives. It is complemented by the Asia-Link Programme, an initiative by the European Commission to promote regional and multilateral networking between higher education institutions in countries from the European Union, South Asia, South-East Asia and China.

To help form an East Asian higher education core, Singapore has been particularly active in the ASEM process, which it decisively helped set up in the mid-1990s. The Asia-Europe Foundation, now located in front of the APEC secretariat next to the National University of Singapore campus, has promoted several pilot activities in higher education, including university networks, short-term university courses and scholarship programmes. Moreover, ASEF has been developing policy colloquies to facilitate mobility of students and faculty, credit recognition and transfer, quality assessment, joint research and joint curriculum development and borderless education including e-learning. It has also begun creating
databases on academic systems, programmes, exchanges and scholarships. More importantly, leaders attending the ASEM-6 summit in Helsinki emphasized that qualified human resources constitute a key factor for economic and social development, stressed the value of continued dialogue and exchange of best practices on questions related to structured and lifelong education and training and welcomed the offer by Germany to host the first ASEM ministerial meeting on education in 2008, in effect helping East Asian countries to consolidate their efforts in regional cooperation.

_Envisioning East Asian higher education spaces_

Higher education developments in South-East Asian countries, spurred by global and interregional connections, are now particularly reaching to North-East Asia. Let us recall that the East Asia Vision Group included recommendations to favour educational cooperation, which were later fed into the East Asia Study Group which submitted similar recommendations in its own report welcomed by heads of state and government meeting in Cambodia in November 2002. The EAVG called countries to “Provide assistance and cooperation in ... human resources development” and to “work together with cultural and educational institutions to promote a strong sense of identity and an East Asian consciousness”, further elaborated in two points of section 5 on “Social, Cultural and Education Cooperation”:

**Point 100:** The promotion of East Asian studies in the region is necessary in order to achieve mutual trust and understanding lasting many generations. To this end, we recommend that: i) key universities in the region be encouraged to set up East Asian studies programs focusing on the study of history, languages, cultures and contemporary society of the region; ii) these East Asian studies programs be organized into an East Asian Studies Network that will undertake research, exchanges and other projects on subjects relevant to contemporary East Asian development; and iii) one university be designated and supported as the Network Secretariat, tasked to serve as an information resources center as well as to coordinate projects.

**Point 101:** A comprehensive “Human Resource Development Program for East Asia” may be drawn up on the basis of existing programs, focusing on the improvement of basic education, skills training and capacity building to help the workforce adapt to a changing environment. To promote educational advancement and scholarship, the Vision Group recommends that an East Asia Education Fund be established to support basic education, literacy programs and skills training. This Fund will also provide scholarships for students to pursue higher education in East Asian universities.
The bureaucrats behind the EASG followed upon these ideas, but in a careful way as regarding the financial considerations touching their governments’ pockets:

The EASG acknowledges that HRD is one of the key elements in combating poverty and ensuring economic and social development in East Asia. It recommends the elaboration of concrete measures towards comprehensive HRD.

The EASG believes that the concept of East Asian consciousness and identity needs to be strongly promoted among scholars and the young generation. As most of the cultural and educational activities are loosely organized and carried out by various organizations, it is important to encourage and support the networking among those organizations and experts. The EASG recognizes that more discussions should be done before establishing a fund with the purpose of promoting education, considering the financial implication of a new fund.

[The EASG asked to] Implement a comprehensive HRD program for East Asia, focusing on the improvement of basic education, skills-training, and capacity-building … Work together with cultural and educational institutions to promote a strong sense of identity and an East Asian consciousness.

The report later expanded these ideas in the section on “Identification of Implementable Concrete Measures with High Priority” short-term measures, which advocated promoting East Asian studies in the region through cooperative programmes, teaching of languages, establishment of networks, expanding the ASEAN University Network to the rest of East Asia and profiting by existing bilateral initiatives between ASEAN and China, Japan and Korea.

Japan then formed an “ASEAN+3 group on facilitation and promotion of exchange of people and human resource development” that advanced the earlier ideas in greater order and detail. The group held three meetings in 2003 to prepare its final report for the October 2003 summit. The first meeting suggested improving the institutional and regulatory environment at the multilateral, regional, bilateral and unilateral (country) levels, and specifically suggested promoting academic cooperation, a common university certificate for business studies, a network of academic institutions, the twinning of educational institutions (sister schools) and establishing an ASEAN+3 university. The second meeting drafted possible recommendations that included:

Free Trade Agreements/Economic Partnership Agreements, promotion of mutual recognition of the academic, skill and professional qualifications, facilitation of immigration procedures, improvement of existing trainee exchange programs, acceptance of unskilled workers, promotion of lifelong learning, co-
operation among educational institutions, strengthening student and youth exchange, promotion of R&D cooperation, improvement of “Centers of Excellence”, promotion of various cultural and sports events, cooperation among media organizations, cooperation among villages, municipalities and cities, implementation mechanisms of these recommendations as well as the financial resources for the implementation.

The final report of August 2003, accepted by the ASEAN+3 leaders meeting in Bali in October, presented 14 recommendations on economic, educational and social/cultural sectors which in some cases differ from the two interim reports. The final economic recommendations ranged from addressing free trade and economic partnership agreements to the promotion of mobility of skilled and unskilled workers. The social/cultural ones suggested promoting gender equality, youth skills, greater public appreciation of the regional cultural heritage, galvanizing public actors at local levels as well as other types of community actors and requesting advice and monitoring from Track-2 processes (the East Asia Forum, the East Asian Think-tanks Network and the ASEAN Foundation). The educational recommendations were to promote:
• lifelong learning programmes
• credit transfer systems
• scholarships and exchange programmes for students, faculty and staff
• research and development cooperation
• “centres of excellence”, including those based on e-learning
• curricular development as bases for common regional qualification standards among interested centres/institutions.

To prepare for a broader East Asian cooperation, Japan had launched in late 2001 a large-scale programme of cooperation with ASEAN countries in the field of human resources development and education. Moreover, in 2003 Japan pledged ASEAN assistance of over US$1.5 billion (through technical cooperation, grant aid and yen loans) over three years for human resource development via various human exchange programmes involving approximately 40,000 people: these include receiving trainees, students and youths and dispatching experts. These ideas are now part of the comprehensive economic partnership agreements Japan is crafting bilaterally with East Asian countries, with the aim of eventually creating and leading a regional agreement.

*Incipient North-East Asian cooperation*

The governments of Japan, mainland China and South Korea are softly weaving many types of their bilateral people’s exchanges into a more tri-
partite or trilateral regional space. At their meeting of November 2000 on the occasion of the ASEAN+3 summit the three North-East Asian leaders proposed measures to enhance human and cultural exchanges between capitals and young people, and designated the year 2002, anniversary of several diplomatic landmarks and the occasion of the football World Cup in Japan and South Korea, as the “Year of Japan-China-Republic of Korea National Exchange” to complement the “China Year” in Japan, the “Japan Year” in China and the “Year of Japan-ROK National Exchange”. More importantly, the 2003 Bali declaration included a large array of measures to promote civil society exchanges (section 10):

For the purpose of enhancing mutual understanding and trust and expanding diverse channels for exchanges for better trilateral cooperation in the future, the three countries will strengthen cooperation in a variety of areas, such as people-to-people contacts, culture, education and human resources development, news media, public health and sports. The three countries will continue to encourage and facilitate personnel exchanges to increase contacts among youth and young leaders. They will also vigorously develop cultural exchange and cooperation to enhance cooperation in such areas as the preservation and development of tangible and intangible cultural heritage, cultural diversity and dialogue among civilizations. The three countries will continue to support the tripartite cooperation in the field of education. They will enhance cooperation to expand student exchanges among their institutions of higher education, promote mutual institutions’ recognition of academic records, degrees and credits, and encourage language teaching and cultural exchange among the three countries. The three countries will encourage communication and cooperation among their media organizations through joint seminars or in other forms with close communication among the three governments. The three countries will expand exchange and cooperation among local governments by arranging sister cities among the three countries or by other means. For the enhancement of mutual understanding and friendship among their peoples, the three countries will encourage diversified forms of exchange and cooperation among the sports communities of the three countries such as organizing football and table tennis matches.

In the multi-level creation of an East Asian higher education space the key long-term component is the consolidation of cooperation among North-East Asian countries. The first yearly progress report of the tripartite cooperation adopted in November 2004 already indicated a growth in several cultural and people-to-people exchanges, including student exchanges and progress in mutual recognition of academic credits and records through agreements between universities. And the action strategy on trilateral cooperation concomitantly adopted included several broad measures to enhance education:
The three countries will further education cooperation through promoting high level consultations.

The three countries will continue to encourage cooperation on the training of highly qualified personnel.

The three countries will facilitate mutual recognition of academic degrees, credits and records.

The three countries will continue to promote student exchanges among higher education institutions in the three countries and the exchange programs for high school students.

Although the government leaders cancelled their summit planned for 2005, lower-level government officials keep advancing the education agenda. The inaugural Korea-China-Japan educational directors-general meeting, held in Seoul in March 2006 (Korean Ministry of Education, www.MOE.go.kr), presented each country’s educational priorities and government policy measures and discussed ways to develop diverse three-way collaboration models, expanding from current practice where cooperation tends to take place only in a bilateral format, and broadening dialogue and raising it to the level of ministers.

Moreover, countries’ reforms indicate increasing regional projection. The Confucian legacy of Japanese and South Korean schools has produced some of the highest literacy rates in the world and their well-trained human resources are key to rapid economic growth, a path that China hopes to follow. All three countries have to relax their traditional hierarchical knowledge provision somewhat to accommodate rapidly changing foreign technology. The Confucian appreciation of the value of education leads to high expectations for its youth to enter meritocracy systems regulated by state examinations, but as foreign students and faculty move in and out of their countries new ideas challenge their national systems. Nowadays, Japan wants to be a hub for Chinese and other East Asian students, but China has also entered international competition to attract foreign students and South Korea has finally realized its need to catch up by internationalizing.

**Japan’s leadership**

According to Japan’s Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (www.MEXT.go.jp), most Japanese studying abroad still choose the United States or Europe instead of Asian universities, but most of Japan’s inward foreign students come from China and other East Asian countries. In the academic year 2000/01 about 47,000 Japa-
nese studied in the United States, 14,711 in Asia and 11,000 in Europe. Meanwhile, the number of inward foreign students has considerably grown from 53,847 in 1995 to 117,302 in 2004, 65 per cent of whom came from China, 12.4 per cent from Korea and 14.4 per cent from other Asian countries. Japanese government programmes mainly target bright students from the region to attend the main national universities sponsored by the Ministry of Education.

The Ministry of Education has been speeding the reform of the universities so they gradually become more autonomous and internationally competitive. A key measure has been to set up a strategic fund for the creation of international headquarters (www.U-kokusen.jp), where one reads that the new international mission of the University of Tokyo (www.U-Tokyo.ac.jp), the zenith of Japan’s national university system, is to become the gateway between East and West. Tokyo University is already a key resource for teaching, research and advice on East Asian issues. Many of its researchers are involved in Asian issues, an increasing number galvanized by the Asian Studies Network (ASNET) created in 2005 and managed by the Institute of Oriental Culture. Researching here for two years this author strongly felt a gradual transformation as many teaching and research activities adapted to a multi-level Asia by increasingly adding the terms “Asia”, “North-East Asia”, “East Asia” or “Asia-Pacific” on any possible occasion.

The University of Tokyo leads the creation of an increasing number of regional networks. The BESETOHA network created in 1999 brings together the top national universities of Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo and Hanoi. The Association of East Asian Research Universities (www.AEARU.ntu.edu.tw), dating from 1996, even links Japan to South Korea and both to China. The undergraduate liberal arts college of the University of Tokyo, unique to Japan’s national universities, started in 2005 an East Asia liberal arts initiative to reach bidirectionally to China and other neighbouring countries over difficult issues like textbook translation and the public sphere. Since the rector of the Universities of Tokyo and Beijing first met in 2000, various bilateral gatherings are aiming at a tripartite educational leadership.

The Network of East Asian Studies (NEAS) is of particular importance as it focuses on catalysing contemporary East Asian regional knowledge, not on atomized issues as is often the case in classical Asia-related exchanges. It follows the successful proposal by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi in the December 2003 ASEAN+3 summit. Supported by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, the University of Tokyo’s Institute of Oriental Culture, then headed by a member of the East Asia Vision Group, became NEAS organizer. The inaugural meeting at the institute in January 2005 discussed broad strategy and actual projects among not
only leading national universities representing the ASEAN+3 countries but also the ASEAN University Network. NEAS annual meetings now alternate between North-East and South-East Asia. The February 2006 meeting in Putrajaya (Malaysia), prepared by the Universities of Tokyo and Singapore, reviewed current developments in most countries and drafted a series of recommendations to be raised in the ASEAN+3 political process.

Research academics at the Institute of Oriental Culture have helped advance several other complementary regional education and research activities (Inoguchi, 2005). These include academic journals (International Relations of the Asia Pacific Journal and the Journal of Asian Studies), and the Asia Barometer (www.AsiaBarometer.org), the first comprehensive yearly survey on the opinion of increasingly East Asian urban residents on a broad number of issues hoping to find clues to help advance an (East) Asian identity.

The institute has also influenced the creation of the (East) Asian Consortium of Political Research (www.ikps.or.kr), which in 2004 set up its secretariat in Seoul National University and held its first joint sessions of workshops in September 2005 in Tokyo with country coordinators from Korea, China and a few South-East Asian countries. The ACPR is actually modelled on the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) set up decades ago to promote research coordination among an increasing number of European countries. Moreover, the ACPR was formally created in Seoul in June 2004 on the margins of a conference organized by the Asia-Europe Foundation. The ACPR is complemented by the Asian Politics and International Studies Association (www.APISAnet.com), which held its first meeting in Singapore in 2003; it has a secretariat in the National University of Malaysia, but has set up its legal registration in Hong Kong. While the ACPR is based on institutional membership, APISA is based on individual membership. Here again, Europe’s help is noticeable, as much funding has so far come from the Swedish International Development Agency.

The Institute of Oriental Culture also hosts an online Gateway to Asian Studies in Japan where one can see scores of links to Japanese research centres touching on aspects of East Asia, and increasing numbers having a regional remit or interest. For instance, the Waseda University Asia Pacific Studies Centre of Excellence on Contemporary Asian Studies (www.Waseda-coe-cas.jp), created in 2002, has a number of interesting initiatives focused on the East Asian community. It held in December 2005 an East Asian studies forum with representatives from North-East and South-East Asia to brainstorm in detail about how to create networks that help internationalize higher education in East Asia with an East Asian dimension. As an interesting example, the participant from
China’s People’s University suggested constructing an association of research institutes for North-East Asian studies and a network of academic associations for regional cooperation in (North) East Asia. And the representative from Singapore’s National Technological University proposed joint curricula in historical studies of the region, creation of an East Asian research programme on globalization and regionalization, the creation of chairs in East Asian political and strategic studies and enhancement of non-traditional and human security issues, all to help the North-East Asian powers to continue coming together and find ways to resolve their lasting problems. The academic from Mongolia presented similarly interesting proposals but reminded Japan, the largest donor in the region, to be more proactive in helping everyone come together.

Even new technologies in education are being tested for East Asian cooperation. At the ASEANþ3 economic ministers’ meeting in Cambodia in May 2001 the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry proposed the Asia e-Learning Network (www.Asia-elearning.net) initiative, which was approved in the ministerial in Viet Nam in August 2001. It began in 2002 with experimental projects among six countries, and in 2003 four working groups were established to promote technological interoperability, an open standards certification programme in a multilingual environment, a framework to train e-learning professionals and an e-learning quality assurance and management programme. Despite its name, the Asia e-Learning Network is restricted to the group of East Asian community countries, although they acknowledge the need to link with the rest of Asia, Europe and America. As the project promises to advance well in the China-led high-growth sector of distance education, the jump towards creating a fuller East Asian higher education space where students and faculty enjoy new mobility might be much eased.

China’s rapid internationalization

After the death of Chairman Mao in 1976, China’s new developers have been focusing on establishing a viable system of human resources, for which an overall strategy to reform its higher education system to face internationalization is key (Min, 1998; Yang, 2003; Zhang, 2003; Garrett, 2004). There has been a gradual opening to the world to acquire technology, and increasing numbers of students have been sent abroad. With the introduction of the market economy and the growing demand for qualified manpower, China is now in the middle of a revolution of its higher education system that is facilitating, and perhaps determining in the longer term, the creation of a regional higher education area in East Asia open to the world.

The Communist Party’s Central Committee reformed the higher education system, first in 1985 and again in 1993, to promote expansion and
diversification of institutions (100 were selected, hoping to achieve international standards), allow private establishments, send even more students abroad and further encourage international exchanges. In the early 1990s China consolidated the university system by merging most institutions and promoting selected universities to compete globally, thus the number of transnational programmes, physical and online, has increased to about 800.

The demand by potential students for domestic and international higher education keeps growing exponentially as the country develops. Gross enrolment ratios are still very low and many millions of potential students still cannot enter Chinese universities. And as radical reforms started in 2001 in primary schools, and in 2004 in secondary schools, the growing number of cohorts of students reaching universities later this decade will create additional pressure to overhaul the Chinese higher education system. Consequently China will for some time remain the most significant source of international students. Over 700,000 Chinese have studied abroad since the reforms of 1978. Many went to the United States (63,000 in 2002), but in increasing numbers they go to Japan and several thousand go to other East Asian countries, as indicated earlier.

The regional trend is particularly seen in the intake of foreign students (Chinese Ministry of Education, International Students in China, www.moe.edu.cn/english/international_3.htm; Xinhua News Agency, 2006). China took 33 foreign students from Eastern Europe in 1950, but the majority of the large and growing numbers now come from East Asia. In 2003 China had some 77,715 foreign students, mostly attracted to Beijing (40 per cent of the national total), Shanghai (18 per cent) and other dynamic coastal cities. South Korea provided more than 45 per cent of the total and Japan about 17 per cent. Presumably many more students will soon come from the region, as China started in 2004 to implement an unprecedented plan to attract 120,000 foreign students by 2007.

Not only public universities but private colleges may also accept foreign students as from July 2004 (China Daily, 2004). And the curriculum is being modernized accordingly. While in the past foreign students went to China to study the language or traditional medicine, many now go to study globalizing natural and social sciences, sometimes taught in English, a language increasingly required in Chinese universities. Not surprisingly, about 70 per cent of the joint programmes between Chinese and foreign higher education institutions focus on business and management, issues that link China increasingly to industrial countries (Zhang, 2003).

China now envisions being a global knowledge hub once more. In the meantime, the Chinese government first forged links with foreign education systems (with the United Kingdom in 2000, with Germany in 2002,
with the United States, Australia and New Zealand in 2003) before making the declaration to advance a tripartite education space in North-East Asia.

South Korea’s catch-up reforms

Given the developments in Japan and China, the South Korean government announced in 2005 a plan to reverse the relative failing of its higher education system based on five key policies (Park, 2005): university administration systems will be substantially improved; content will fit industrial demands; universities will especially enhance regional innovation; professional graduate schools will be created to enhance the quality of university education; and specialized universities will be supported with funding based on the principles of “selection and concentration”.

A number of supporting schemes will connect the new higher education vision to the outside world. The government wants to create world-class research-oriented universities. The Brain Korea 21 project will enter its second round (2006–2012) to help students study abroad, invite foreign faculty members, provide graduate students with personnel expenses and foster industry-academia collaboration. The government’s Study Korea Project hopes to attract 50,000 foreign students by 2010 to learn not only the Korean language, but mainly other subjects to be taught in English or other languages (read Chinese or Japanese). The number of partnership agreements between Korean and foreign universities will increase. Moreover, establishing branches of Korean universities abroad will be promoted. Given these developments, regional academic networks, like the Interuniversity Consortium of East Asian Studies (www.East-Asia.org) formed by Seoul National University and other universities, will probably soon grow domestically and through regional links.

Towards a multi-level world of higher education

The chapter has so far argued that Europe first, and East Asia more recently, are labouring to adapt their higher education systems through flexible multi-level frameworks to globalize these systems competitively (table 5.2). Programmes from the European Commission to promote mobility of students and faculty are being complemented by the greatest structural reforms in decades, if not centuries, as all university systems across Europe will be fully embedded in a globalizing education paradigm. The increasing numbers of intra-European linkages of students, faculty and institutions indicate a greater opening not only within Europe
but also with the rest of the world. Meanwhile, ASEAN and North-East Asian structural reforms are now coming together with the help of the ASEAN+3 process as well as through their links to North America and Europe. The East Asian case will probably take a long time to reach similar goals to those of the European Bologna Process. Nevertheless, the current multi-level supranationalization of higher education in ASEAN and North-East Asian countries suggests the potential for a very rapid qualitative leap. Both regional higher education processes now have a chance to link among themselves and beyond to promote better economic and social multi-level governance.

**Increasing linkages between Europe and East Asia**

Since ASEM-2 in London first explicitly mentioned the mutual interest in promoting higher education exchanges, interregional and transregional cooperation between Europe and East Asia has been maturing over a decade. The ASEM Vision Group report released in 1999 included many specific proposals to enhance educational exchanges at various levels, from students all the way up to heads of universities and ministers. During subsequent years an increasing number of references to education
were raised in ASEM declarations. And some countries, like France, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea, have been particularly active in promoting bilateral exchanges within ASEM. But only as both the Bologna Process and the ASEAN+3 vision of regional higher education cooperation advanced was it possible to think of the strong bi-regional ASEM cooperation to be institutionalized in the first ASEM ministerial meeting on education scheduled for 2008.

As a start, contemporary studies focusing on European and (East) Asian collaborations in social sciences and humanities merit much more attention. European studies, a standard fixture in European countries’ academic environments, are also developing in East Asia to the point that the Asia-Europe Foundation begun in 2006 to stimulate coordination among the growing density of European studies in Asia (www.ESiA.asef.org) by helping link with European counterparts. The mirror image is also beginning to become true. In many European countries there has long been a plurality of Asian or Asia-related studies. France, Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands have for long had strong programmes. Leiden University took the lead in the mid-1990s to promote regional and global links in Asian academic research through the activities of its International Institute of Asian Studies (www.IIAS.nl). It is one of the key promoters of the European Alliance for Asian Studies (www.Asia-Alliance.org) network that reaches to several national counterparts as well as the regional Nordic Institutes of Asian Studies (http://NIAS.ku.dk). To help link the growing number of Asia-related research and study centres in Southern Europe, MedAsia was catalysed in 2006 by a meeting in Barcelona’s Casa Asia (www.CasaAsia.es). These multi-level developments are complemented by the growth of (East) Asian studies in East Asia, including the regional networks mentioned earlier in this chapter, thus facilitating opportunities to link with European counterparts. The first steps would be to compare European and East Asian studies in an incipient ASEM educational space.

Reaching to other regional processes

As European and East Asian regional higher education processes develop and converge, they could serve as an example to other regional processes around the world which are also trying to participate successfully in global issues through developing their higher education sectors (see table 5.3). This proposal for joint action, which I would call “ASEM extraregionalism in higher education”, could easily begin as it regards Latin America. The recent EU gatherings with the Rio Group and the Latin American and Caribbean countries have emphasized education and technology. Similarly, the Forum for East Asia-Latin America Coop-
Table 5.3 World macro-regional processes in higher education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical region</th>
<th>Regional process</th>
<th>Attention to (higher) education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
<td>Interamerican Organization for Higher Education since 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>Unión de Universidades de América Latina, 1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Organización de Estados Iberoamericanos para la Educación, la Ciencia y la Cultura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Andean Pact</td>
<td>Convenio Andrés Bello since 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mercosur</td>
<td>Grupo Montevideo since 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Cooperation</td>
<td>Protocol of Education and Training since 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>African Union</td>
<td>Plan for 2006–2011 to develop peace through education, in connection with subregional processes and linking with many countries and international organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab world</td>
<td>League of Arab States</td>
<td>Not yet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
<td>Exchange of faculty members and students since 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>Facilitating education collaboration since 1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Union (and economic associates)</td>
<td>Ministerial councils supervise the Erasmus programme of the European Commission since 1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bologna Process (most of European continent)</td>
<td>Ministerial meetings since 1998 to create European Higher Education Area by 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations</td>
<td>South-East Asia Ministers of Education Organization since 1960s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ASEAN ministerial meeting in 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>First joint SEAMEO-ASEAN education ministerial, March 2006</td>
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</table>
operation (FEALAC/FOCALAE) tried a number of concrete projects in the first few years, leading to positive recognition for a further build-up during the second foreign ministers’ meeting at the end of January 2004. It agreed on the Manila plan of action to chart its direction for the next few years, which recognized the importance of education for broad-based sustainable development. It also agreed on strengthening contacts at all official and unofficial levels, and explicitly added that an “Academic Exchange Program could be considered an important means to strengthen partnerships between the two regions”. Moreover, it is creating interest in Latin America in East Asian research institutions, and catalysing the development of a Latin American and Caribbean network of study centres on the Asia-Pacific created in 1997 by the Latin-American Economic System as well as a link with Europe through the IberoAsia (www.lberoAsia.org) knowledge initiative.

It should not prove difficult for innovative ASEM extraregionalism to reduce higher educational divides in other parts of the world in even greater need. The EU relations with SAARC and the Gulf Cooperation Council could coordinate with the rising Asia Cooperation Dialogue that reaches to regional processes in South and West Asia to discuss the diffusion of tensions and possibilities of economic and cultural cooperation. The ACD includes e-education as an area of cooperation led by Ma-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical region</th>
<th>Regional process</th>
<th>Attention to (higher) education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North-East Asia (China, South Korea and Japan) ASEAN+3, basis for an East Asia community</td>
<td>First education directors-general meeting, March 2006 ASEAN+3 leaders’ political declaration (including education) in October 2003 and subsequent Japansponsored working group Global linkages through APEC-UMAP since 1993, ASEM 1996 and others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurasia</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
<td>Signs of recent Russian educational expansion into Central Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</td>
<td>Human Resource Development Centre in Islamabad since 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Pacific</td>
<td>Pacific Islands Forum</td>
<td>University of South Pacific since 1969</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
laysia, and a first ACD workshop on e-education took place in Kuala Lumpur in April 2004, when participants discussed policy, technology, human capacity-building and knowledge-sharing to develop various types of education, and recommended setting up the ACD Consultative e-Education Committee and a regional e-education centre. Thus, as India and Pakistan gradually join the ASEM process, European and East Asian partners could induce them to collaborate among themselves and with neighbours, for example through the excellent software and technological education services of the Indian Institutes of Technology, and, more broadly, to realize some of SAARC’s intentions to develop its science and technology potential.

Europe and East Asia could also help address the enormous challenge of raising education levels in much of Africa. The gap in enrolment ratios between sub-Saharan Africa and developed countries has continued to widen, and currently higher education in sub-Saharan Africa is the least developed of all the regions of the world. African governments and groups of universities (like the Association of African Universities and the Association for the Development of Education in Africa) receive contributions or otherwise have links with many multilateral organizations and private foundations like the Agence universitaire de la Francophonie and the Association of Commonwealth Universities. Thus the EU-Africa and related subregional dialogue and cooperation efforts to promote human resources might easily link with the Tokyo International Conference on African Development process and the Asia-Africa Dialogue to help the New Economic Partnership for African Development further realize its vision of generally providing basic education and breaching the digital divide, as well as the plan the African Union has launched to develop peace through education from 2006 to 2011, all in conjunction with the incipient initiatives of smaller regional groups.

In addition, more joint ASEM relations with the struggling Commonwealth of Independent States could better ensure that Russia’s excellent technical education systems promote more globally open Eurasian knowledge infrastructures. The EU efforts to create with Russia a space for science and technology could be taken into account in the improving Russian relations with its East Asian neighbours. ASEM partners may even better address the conflicts in Central and Western Asia in an extra-regional fashion, as China seems keen to forge an area of peace and economic cooperation that includes Central Asia through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other pan-Asian gatherings recently established with ASEAN leadership. As Professor Tommy Koh, chairman of the inaugural AMED on “Common Interests and Common Challenges”, mentioned in his closing summary regarding the importance of education:
The development experience of Asia shows that there is a positive correlation between investment in education and economic development. The right to education is indeed one of the most important human rights. We also live in a world in which knowledge and creativity are two of the most important assets of a country. We must therefore educate all of our people, not just some of our people. We must educate them well by reforming our education system and curriculum and our pedagogy. The emphasis must be, not on rote-learning, but on cultivating every child’s thinking skills. Education should also be a continuing process throughout one’s life. In view of the importance of education, at all levels, I hope that AMED countries would help each other in the field of education and training, both vocational and professional.

Keeping the United States engaged

After the First World War the Wilson government created the Institute of International Education (www.IIE.org) to help advance at first an idealistic intellectual and cultural diplomacy. Throughout the twentieth century the vision has been modified according to geopolitical circumstances, and is now in need of reaffirmation.

After winning the Second World War the US government realized it needed seriously to know more about the complex planet it was trying to steer. It launched area studies programmes to learn about the communist and so-called third worlds. It operated the US Information Agency to promote certain international educational, cultural and media exchanges. It enticed private foundations like Rockefeller, Carnegie and Ford to create American studies programmes abroad. And it laboured to lead higher education with allies and friends. Its Fulbright Scholar programme was at first aimed to create a transatlantic community of ideas at the postgraduate and advanced research levels (de Wit, 1998; Rupp, 1999).

After the end of the Cold War the United States became a more plural but unstructured global education hub. Higher education grew into the fifth largest service sector export in the United States as hundreds of thousands of not only Europeans but mainly Chinese, Indians and other Asians headed for a US education, as detailed in the yearly reports of the IIE’s Open Doors portal (www.OpenDoors.iienetwork.org). Moreover, many North American undergraduates and some graduates have been going around the world for short periods to study (160,920 in 2001–2002) in increasing numbers of overseas campuses or special programmes in Western Europe, the Americas and now many Asian countries. Many US universities have recently developed their own international exchange programmes or joined institutions like the Council on International Educational Exchange (www.CIEE.org) or the Institute for the International Education of Students (www.IESabroad.org). And while
GATS-Education negotiations were stalled in the 1990s, US universities and private businesses were lobbying for greater opportunities. Anecdotal examples include a league of world universities set up by New York University and a business consortium behind the ill-fated Global Alliance for Transnational Education to put pressure on liberalizing the higher education market. And to reach to the least mobile students abroad, many universities are now following the model of MIT’s OpenCourse Ware (www.OCW.mit.edu) to upload to the internet increasing amounts of course information. But Clinton’s geo-economics put pressure on the academic community against Asian and related area studies and only a relatively small number of area-based academics maintained limited funding, mainly thanks to intelligence organizations living on geopolitics (Cummins, 1999: 173–204).

After decades of steady growth, the number of international students attending colleges and universities in the United States began decreasing in the wake of the Bush reaction to the 9/11 attacks. After a peak of 586,323 in 2002–2003, numbers began to decline as the US Congress required more oversight and higher fees for foreign students. Due to visa and other restrictions, applications for the 2004–2005 academic year plunged even from semi-friendly countries – by 45 per cent in the case of graduate students from China, and 30 per cent for those from India. Luckily for the knowledge-seeking world, the United States soon began reversing that trend. Its big private foundations began redoubling their efforts to promote a more global higher education not only centred in the United States. For instance, the Ford Foundation and the IIE launched the International Fellowships Program to allow thousands of students to study anywhere in the world and to strengthen undergraduate institutions overseas. And the second Bush administration began to change course, as it had become a matter of “national security” to reverse the decline in bidirectional educational exchanges and address the lack of the language abilities needed to understand the complexity of the world more successfully. So the year 2006 started by President Bush and Secretary of State Rice giving worrisome addresses at the US University Presidents summit on international education (www.Exchanges.state.gov/universitysummit/).

The United States is now in a better position to study how world regionalism and broader multi-level governance are developing to pacify and develop the world. The European and East Asian models for a more open, global, multi-level higher education environment should be of great interest not only for thinkers in secluded ivory towers in Ivy League campuses, but also for the growing number of US citizens, residents and foreign students willing to learn more about the real world and how they can both benefit from it and help shape it.
Promoting multi-level adaptation in multilateral educational organizations

Finally, there are windows of opportunities for dysfunctional international organizations dealing with higher education to find synergies with regional processes. Nowadays, national university systems trying to find regional synergies can only advance in ways to promote greater global openness. To facilitate that process, Europe and East Asia could better present their models to help advance reforms in multilateral organizations trying to find a role in global multi-level governance of education and knowledge that goes beyond piecemeal efforts like the United Nations University and its Global Network for University Innovation (www.guni-rmies.net), created in 1999 with several regional subnetworks, or the regional programmes of its University for Peace aiming at promoting among all human beings a spirit of understanding, tolerance and peaceful coexistence.

Better coordination through UNESCO

The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (www.UNESCO.org), created in 1946 out of earlier efforts to promote international intellectual cooperation, is the only UN body with an explicit mandate to support national capacity-building in all forms of education. During its long and turbulent history, UNESCO’s capacity to promote the development of higher education has been relatively small within its overall education remit, whose limited budget and personnel were always prioritized to primary and secondary education. Yet not much money is needed just to coordinate change with other committed institutions around the world. And so, during the 1970s and 1980s, six “Conventions of a Standard-Setting Nature adopted under the auspices of UNESCO solely or jointly with other International Organizations” were created to promote the recognition of studies, diplomas and degrees of higher education. But these conventions assumed a grandiose macro-regional approach that usually became largely ineffective beyond promoting the occasional network, conference or report where regions were seen as a collection of countries (sometimes from outside the region) rather than a new mode of governance. The conventions now address only very general issues, are not binding in terms of political or financial actions and, more crucially, have not been widely ratified in most cases except for in Europe (see table 5.4).

Nevertheless, UNESCO’s new strategies for global higher education include a general decentralization and a thorough review of all regional conventions:
to respond to new needs and to represent international standards in the GATS framework. The specific focus of this revision will be issues of recognition of cross-border higher education provision, strengthening mechanisms to assure quality and emphasizing reliable, transparent and coherent criteria for the assessment of qualifications. In addition, the feasibility of establishing an international framework will be explored that will cover both the issues of the recognition of qualifications and quality assurance and accreditation. (UNESCO, 2003a: 25)

UNESCO could build on its recent efforts to develop new system-level and strategic indicators (Kaiser and Yonezawa, 2003) by creating basic regional indicators like stocks and flows of people (students, professors and researchers), institutions (universities, networks), content (degrees and credits) and political agreements (laws, regulations by ministries and government agencies). Moreover, profiting from its yearly meeting with all kinds of higher education actors, UNESCO could become an information platform where regional higher education actors meet to present their advances. If UNESCO found that autonomous and flexible regional processes in higher education are fruitful to provide more and better higher education services, it could then explore decentralizing and coordinating its regional conventions with these dynamic processes rather than trying to impose its static regional vision of the world.

**Greater help from the World Bank**

Much could also be done to help the World Bank improve its always too-limited capacity to promote global education schemes (World Bank, 2002). The Bank started in 1963 to support the growth and diversification

### Table 5.4 UNESCO’s regional conventions on recognition of qualifications: Participation of countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Year adopted</th>
<th>Participating in various stages of ratification process</th>
<th>Fully ratified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>18 (includes 4 from Europe)</td>
<td>12 (2 later renounced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab states</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European region</td>
<td>1979 (revised 1997)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African region</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>41 (including USA)</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia Pacific</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UNESCO.org website.*
of tertiary education systems in middle-income developing countries, and to promote essential policy reforms to make the sector “more efficient, relevant, equitable, transparent, and responsive”. But during the 1970s and 1980s much of the support for that broad vision was piecemeal, with a narrow focus on the establishment of new programmes or on discrete quality improvement measures for existing teaching and research activities. In other words, the Bank was rarely able to offer the type of long-term comprehensive support for tertiary education that is still required for successful reform and effective institution-building.

To its credit, the Bank’s instrumental approach to higher education began to change during the 1990s. A new policy framework included projects, research, sector studies, training and technical assistance (World Bank, 1994). Moreover, the Bank started addressing comprehensive reforms, paying attention to the broader political-economy aspects and relying on positive incentives to other actors. Furthermore, in cooperation with UNESCO, the Bank has also recently changed policy to focus on poorer countries and place higher education in a broader context of lifelong learning, using info-communication technologies when possible.

But the Bank may further cooperate with world regional banks and processes, which could supplement its higher education policy already paying increasing attention to the changing regional dimension. In the recent past the Bank has proposed that small states form subregional partnerships to establish university networks along the lines of the University of the West Indies, the University of the South Pacific and the University of the Indian Ocean. Moreover, the Portuguese-language economies of the African Atlantic region (São Tomé and Príncipe, Cape Verde and the Azores) recently began discussing a similar step. In addition, the Bank has a significant new pan-African initiative centred on the African Economic Research Consortium, a collaborative PhD programme in economics. And there is the recent African Virtual University initiative hoping to survive beyond its pilot phase. Finally, the Bank is even exploring helping to re-regulate higher education in a regional fashion as its East Asian Development Network, part of the Global Development Network, awarded in 2003 a small grant to the Korean Educational Development Institute (www.KEIDI.re.kr) to coordinate the Asia-Pacific Education Policy Research Initiative, which could be an interesting precedent to promote.

**Increasing liberalization in the WTO GATS-Education**

As countries feel tangible benefits from linking with regional and global organizations, there would be fewer objections to general liberalization of higher education services in the WTO. The WTO’s GATS has so far had very limited impact on promoting more open higher education markets.
One of the most restricted service sectors in GATS is education and its five subsectoral divisions (primary, secondary, tertiary/higher, adult and other), because education is considered a key tool for national identity-building. Even higher education, the most open subsector, is only slowly shifting its balance from social to economic progress, mainly as the United States is pressing other member economies to liberalize the sector. GATS addresses all the key elements of education through four modes of supply affecting different aspects of the service: cross-border supply regards mainly online and posted content (mode 1); consumption abroad regards the acceptance of foreign students (mode 2); commercial presence regards permitting foreign academic institutions (mode 3); and natural persons regards mainly the inflow of foreign faculty (mode 4). By early 2001 only 30 economies (the enlarging European Union counting as one) in the growing WTO club had presented market access commitments to liberalize any aspect of education services, among which only 21 focused on the various modes of supplying higher education. As the majority of the commitments were partial and referred only to the movement of content or students and not to free establishment of higher education institutions, countries remain quite free to regulate the sector overall. In the preparations for the failed WTO Cancun ministerial of September 2003, a “record” number of 39 members had presented requests and offers. The few that became publicly available overall indicated little liberalization. Even the United States, already committed to minor aspects of adult and “other” types of education but not to higher education liberalization, tabling a general request to liberalize the sector greatly, stated in its initial offer many limitations that could greatly discriminate against foreigners. Similarly, the European Union, which had in the 1990s liberalized minor aspects of higher education, did not table a substantial liberal proposal. And in East Asia only a few countries are part of the WTO, so general liberalization of higher education is also out of the question. Japan has liberalized some aspects in the past, but its new initial offer did not advance beyond suggesting constructing an information network to research the sector better. Meanwhile, developing China, in preparation for its entry to the WTO in 2002, made full commitments in mode 2 (students) but only partial commitments in mode 3 (commercial presence).

Summary

In conclusion, the transformation of higher education systems in most of Europe and East Asia is allowing a growing number of people to broaden their minds in a multi-level fashion, thus promoting greater movements of people to work and live in other countries – a develop-
ment that promises to find a balance between an exploding global market and static state governance.

Table 5.5 summarizes the concrete recommendations for international organizations, the main actors in global higher education governance that may further catalyse regional developments around the world. UNESCO could monitor the basic indicators of autonomous regional processes, become a multi-level meeting place and then review its regional conventions on the recognition of studies, diplomas and degrees in collaboration with the most capable to deliver more and better higher education services. Meanwhile, the WTO could advance liberalization of the sector through the accommodation of open regional agreements in higher education. Finally, the meagre resources for higher education development of the World Bank may prove more effective if teamed with innovative regional initiatives. This multiple and flexible approach would be in a position to balance and complement the many existing pressures to promote and govern a more dynamic global higher education in which more people could develop their portfolio of identities. All this would be compatible on the one hand with the open international education system that the United States and a few other countries would like to sustain and, on the other hand, the careful nurturing of plural human resources for national and regional identity formations for which much of the rest of the world is aiming.
Envisioning a better multi-level world

This book began by presenting the main contending transatlantic theories of international relations and argued that they are limited when trying to explain the post-Cold War knowledge-based hyperlinked multi-level system. The realist school ominously claim that the search for a bipolar balance of power often leads world states to engage in war. Liberal approaches nevertheless argue that international organizations and softer regimes allow international businesses and civil society to forge prosperous links peacefully. Social constructivists, the most optimistic theoretical approach, claim that a broad range of public and private links, profit and non-profit oriented, may restructure the world system by accommodating multiple identities.

The book argues that a gradual transformation towards a new world order should be theorized by a knowledge-based global multi-level governance paradigm. The knowledge revolution catalysed by information and communications technologies has given rise to many more transnational actors and regional processes that influence governance at various interrelated levels. Although the state system is still crucial in global governance, other levels below and, especially, above it are increasingly relevant, challenging and complementary. Westphalian states are in constant tension with substate levels (micro-regions, cities, etc.), but most functioning states manage to accommodate them without seriously considering partitions. Above states all kinds of world or macro-regions are emerging and many are vying for recognition and influence. And on

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top of it all there are global institutions and other regimes trying to strengthen or renew their role in global governance. All levels now interact, not only within levels but also across levels.

These multi-level processes go beyond traditional trade and security concerns to include now a wide range of converging political, economic and social issues analysed in four complementary chapters. Public governments are not the only relevant actors advancing the multiplicity of issues in the world’s multi-level system. Governments often use flexible Track-2 think-tanks and networks to link with selected non-governmental actors. Business firms, especially large multinational and transnational corporations, are key drivers in regional and global economy processes. And universities often become the preferred Track-3 platforms for knowledge workers and other independent civil society actors to connect all over the world.

The book argues that flexible macro-regional regimes are particularly crucial to current multi-level governance as they dynamically link states to a potentially more effective multilateral system. The chapters focus on the crucial European and East Asian regional processes that are largely driving this tectonic transformation. The European process is by far the most developed and the East Asian one is nowadays the most dynamic, and both are already linking with other parts of the world to help them develop their own paths towards effective global multi-level governance.

The reconstruction of Western Europe that began six decades ago led to lasting political, economic and social governance innovations. The pooling of scarce energy resources, the creation of a larger space for businesses and workers, the maintaining of social safety nets and the renunciation of military competition have created an unprecedented peace and prosperity with which many people increasingly identify. This regional governance system is largely based on the European Union, which broadened its original federalizing functional and economic communities with intergovernmental pillars addressing a fuller range of political and social issues internally and externally. The European Union is complemented by other European processes, sometimes institutionalized in the broad Council of Europe, but often driven by groups of willing countries in non-institutionalized ways. Moreover, the European Union is flexible enough to accommodate both exceptions to its agreements and the leadership of countries advancing the reinforced cooperation of core and willing member states. While the European Union is now in the middle of another cathartic process, it relentlessly increases its external projection. It is an ever more important transatlantic partner, and attracts growing interest from neighbouring countries and far-away partners, often organized in regional formations.
Regional collaboration in East Asia, globally less conspicuous as it lacks the type of permanent institutions found in Europe, nevertheless promises to lead to an innovative model of converging economic and, perhaps, social development that bridges over the region’s diversities and successfully engages a re-emergent China. In East Asia there are many geographical, demographic, political, economic and social disparities, and encounters in the twentieth century did not help much to reduce them. Gradual functional and intergovernmental cooperation with a long-term vision of an East Asian Community (with a capital “C”) that successfully engages a re-emerging China will not easily resolve all existing problems, but the evolving East Asian multi-level structure is overall flexible and open enough to raise hopes within and outside the region. The ASEAN+3 process formally builds on four decades of dense cooperation in South-East Asia that has recently picked up pace to the point of very probably agreeing on a substantial quasi-constitutional charter by the end of 2007. Through a mesh of links it has catalysed a tripartite cooperation between Japan, China and South Korea, three traditionally proud powers with limited common history that nevertheless seem to understand they have increasingly to work together – a position highlighted by many partners, even the United States.

The shape and depth of the regional and subregional processes within the envisioned East Asian community are clearly entangled with the external multi-level environment. Neighbours may participate in a good number of issues, including strategic ones in a nascent East Asian summit that first welcomed “Western” Australia and New Zealand and a newly active India (Russia’s Putin did not make it all the way in), while other neighbouring countries may join only some of the ASEAN-led functional processes. Meanwhile, the United States bilaterally and in multilateral forums like an evolving APEC, Europe through bilateral and interregional schemes like ASEM and the rest of the world in a variety of multi-level ways are all striving to remain actively involved to make sure the East Asian regional process is generally beneficial.

Chapter 3 focused on the crucial role of advisory Track-2 mechanisms that synthesize the input of many stakeholders. It argued that, like the European Community at the beginning of its historical formation and the European Union at the current cathartic junction, the evolution towards an ASEAN+3-centred East Asia community has, at least since the 1990s, been shaped by governmental actors listening to the advice of policy-influential intellectual actors, usually sitting in think-tanks and competitively networking in a multiplicity of ways, domestically and globally.

Chapter 4 focused on the new economic dimension of the multi-level governance processes largely pioneered by Europe and East Asia. The European Union has already advanced much in creating an economic
space with increasing liberties for goods, services, workers and capital. It has been particularly successful in some info-communication sectors that remain competitively linked to the rest of the world. And East Asian countries, again confident of their partially relaxed guided reforms, are thickening their already strong trade interactions with a mesh of economic agreements touching on investment and monetary issues, while info-communication services are representative of their new multi-level common cooperation.

The final case study that formed chapter 5 focused on innovations in higher education as a crucial case of incipient knowledge-based global multi-level social governance. The European Union and neighbouring countries are building a common space where people can freely move to travel, work and, especially, learn. The EU Erasmus programme and the intergovernmental aspirations to form a pan-continental higher education area by the end of this decade are possibly the most successful efforts to consolidate a common European identity in addition to existing national and local ones already under global stress. Meanwhile, East Asian countries are also jointly exploring to develop a more innovative social space. There are fewer restrictions to travel and work in the region. And there is a commitment to advance a more common higher education space by linking developments in ASEAN and North-East Asia through the ASEAN+3 process, aided by links with the rest of the world.

New theoretical journeys

The theoretical conclusion that can be drawn from the analyses of the book is that one must link and transcend mainstream approaches into useful syntheses. The increasing visibility of the EU and East Asian summits gives plenty of evidence in favour of balance-of-power realists desperately looking for conflicting multipolarity. Yet there is also much in favour of neo-liberal institutionalists as Europe opens more service sectors and intra-East Asian economic agreements are paired with external ones. Moreover, social constructivists would rejoice when looking at the great number of multi-level exchanges not only between government businesses, but increasingly also students, tourists, migrants and less profit-oriented civil society organizations.

The rise of functional and institutional regionalism in Europe, and the paced institutionalization of functional East Asian links and beyond, allow new theoretical paradigms for the internet age. Rather than conflicting poles, flexible world regional processes are giving rise to linking nodes that rapidly diffuse information and knowledge. Rather than strong institutions, regional processes are promoting flexible, lightly insti-
tutionalized, networked regimes that link countries to global processes. Rather than promoting conflictual visions of a global citizenship or human identity, multi-level social exchanges are allowing for a multiplicity of peaceful identities in need of constant educated reassessment of their secondary values. In sum, the world is now in a multi-level network governance paradigm in which bottom-up and top-down explanations of state and regional construction are converging into a series of nodes competitively interlinking at all levels in variable geographies.

The theoretical argument of this book could be further tested and refined with the help of basic global multi-level indicators that facilitate comparisons and partial explanatory theories. That requires experts to look down a bit more from the ivory towers where polysemic terms like peace, democracy, culture or development are more or less anarchically debated in a myriad of ways that only with synthetic filters may eventually have some usefulness for most people.

_Statistical indicators_

One way to transcend the detached anarchy of the social sciences is to focus on the growing number of homogenized statistical indicators available in bulging databases. The simplistic material production measures used in communist states have given way to richer ways to account for economic activity based on market activities. Despite its limitations as a measure of human and social capital and happiness, GDP per capita roughly correlates with many broader indicators of desirable living standards. The Human Development Reports provided by the UN Development Programme (http://HDR.undp.org) show that European countries tend to top global rankings, while North America, Australia and Japan are just behind and some industrial Asian countries not far behind. More complex composite indexes measuring human development, poverty (summarizing indicators of a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living) or inequality (Gini) are not yet in widespread use but also indicate a broad correlation between economic and social progress. A superabundance of market goods and services may not lead to people living much longer and more fulfilling lives, but their scarcity tends to be a sign of political and social despair.

Welfare and value in today’s global economy are less driven by access to food, raw materials (despite the recurring troubles in obtaining oil and gas) and industrial goods than by the harnessing of information into useful knowledge. Yet a global multi-level market for knowledge-based services is much more difficult to achieve, as their added value comes less from standardized products and more from processes embedded in human resources, which are by their nature much more bound to their
social contexts. The world has even begun to aim at having a socio-economic balance sheet where all assets and liabilities are better recorded. Spurred by the creative accounts of multinationals like Enron and WorldCom in the United States and Parmalat in Europe, recurring scandals in Japan and the transition towards open market economies in China and elsewhere, governments around the world have begun to request large firms to present ever more comprehensive financial statements. Their balance sheets should reflect all the businesses’ tangibles and intangibles, short-term and long-term assets and liabilities, all periodically updated with income statements resulting from recording all earnings and expenses. If those activities cannot be priced because there is not yet a widespread market, agreed proxies should be used to indicate their tentative value. A few sophisticated country accounts are even calculating and recording booming underground activities (legal and illegal), and others are exploring ways to measure in-site production (household production, often subsistence farming), barter in social networks, quality changes, often due to technology changes, or human and ecological assets and liabilities. Meanwhile, the UN Statistical Division (www.unstats.un.org) is helping to complement national accounts with more demographic, social, environmental, energy and development statistical systems. It also contributes, with the assistance of Bretton Woods international organizations and the OECD, to the construction of a Millennium Development Goal Indicators Database, based on a framework of eight developmental goals to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and develop a global partnership for development. These goals are all refined into 18 targets and 48 indicators. At the broadest level, the UN Global Compact (www.UNGlobalCompact.org) brings together a growing number of UN agencies, firms and international labour and civil society organizations to promote human rights, labour, the environment and anti-corruption through policy dialogues, learning, country and regional networks and projects.

Even the Buddhist kingdom of secluded Bhutan has joined the world race in producing new quantitative indicators; its mystical Gross National Happiness index is of course topped by its realm! Although it lacks much scientific rigour, it is surely sparking the imagination of some smiling human scientists and regulators to design better measures of human psychological states and processes. “Happiness indexes” are a reminder that although people’s values and identities are ultimately ineffable, more and more persons now have to manage competitively, like complex financial capital portfolios, a multiplicity of globally interlinked layers of social
and political identities. In such an incipient world community, North America, Europe and East Asia are quite close together, according to the analysis of Golden (2005) based on Ronald Inglehart’s World Values Survey (www.WorldValuesSurvey.org) value map based on two broad variables of modernity (self-realization beyond survival, and rational-secularity).

**Focusing on the basic questions**

Reassessing and moving beyond existing paradigms is a slow but tectonic process, as academic investments take many years to be recouped. While epistemic communities and networks of other experts are formed to agree on methodologies to operate homogenized datasets in governance (Arndt and Oman, 2006) and other issues, more qualitative transdisciplinary research may be developed by focusing on simpler parameters that most concerned people may easily understand – the sort of questions all journalists need to answer when reporting the news.

The first question is *where?* Many research questions need be explored to increase geographical understanding of the convergence, deepening and external projection of rising macro-regions around the world, and how other levels of governance are adapting. Which other areas of governance, clearly indicated on maps, promote a plurality of dynamic public and private actors? Are multi-level foreign policies consolidated? Besides country-to-country bilateral and multilateral foreign policies, are there solid country-to-region, region-to-country and region-to-region foreign policies? How is the relative influence of each level evolving? Will world regions rise over states in global governance? What will be the role of the United States in the rise of new world regions?

Next, *who?* Besides public executives, which other government representatives engage and advance functional aspects of global multi-level governance? Are networks of legislators and judges becoming crucial in new issues? Which non-government actors are important? Are profit-oriented business groups really always the key or are they sometimes against multi-level flexible regulation? Are the broader civil society and other transnational private actors with non-profit objectives the hidden key to a global multi-level transformation? Are perhaps platforms of political parties consolidating regionally and globally, or are there new networks of religious institutions helping bridge over distinct civilizations by creating synergies among the best values? Will Track-2 advisory actors consolidate, perhaps to the point of forming a new type of democratic mechanism between rulers and the world’s peoples? Will universities remain true to the goal of being universal in promoting the necessary knowledge to produce globally happy workers and citizens?
Then comes the question of what? Global multi-level governance processes allow discussion and cooperation in all kinds of issues broadly divided in three pillars: political, economic and socio-cultural. How is the mix evolving due to multi-level governance? Is the evolution of functional economic sectors that depend on knowledge, like energy, finance, transport or agriculture, similar to the cases analysed in this book? What are the actors’ particular goals and success rates? Are many people really adapting and adopting multiple identities, or are identities at particular levels much more important?

Next is how? What are the means and ways to advance the issues that various actors envision within a fluid global multi-level framework? Is discussion alone enough to catalyse change, or are funding for big cooperation projects or even legal institutions necessary to advance the prioritized goals?

And finally when? What is the timing for actors to advance their goals? Can one more generally distinguish a macro-regional and multi-level generational path from simple functional cooperation to broader international collaboration and then external collaboration? That path largely reflects Europe’s evolution, but East Asia is simultaneously promoting its internal and external multi-level dimensions.

Renewed European and East Asian leadership:
Visioning knowledge to empower civil societies

Higher education institutions form the primary arena to discuss and synthesize ideas that help develop better curricula and fulfil the desire of many people to balance their expansive individual creativity with the various governance layers reaching beyond their traditional localities and nation-states. To advance a transdisciplinarity that is useful not only to broaden entrenched academic views but also to clarify the vision of the many more people willing to be engaged in global multi-level governance, the results of previous research must be easily available to the public, private and mixed actors investing in it. The last section of the book will provide some ideas to use new communication and learning technologies to promote multi-level, democratic knowledge that transcends languages.

The European project is now at a crucial juncture to adapt to new, sometimes local but often global, challenges. An internal market for industrial goods is quite consolidated, but an expensive and very protectionist common agricultural policy has long fuelled global trade frictions. Meanwhile, many economic services are still only partially liberalized. European governments manage with difficulty, through a complex web
of agreements and institutions, collaboration in a range of issues hoping to address the social expectations challenged by global economic competition and security concerns. Excessive public deficits pose strains in tuning economic cycles and in the stability and acceptance of the euro. And while nearly 500 million citizens and residents of the 27 EU member states should be able to move without border controls, Eastern Europeans and many other enthusiastic migrants still face various discriminations, more difficult to address in the wake of 9/11 since global issues related to justice and security pose increasing challenges to the consolidation of the freedom of movement of people.

European collaboration has in the past half-century advanced by finding innovative compromises among politicians, academics and business leaders. But the key challenge for elites is now to dispel the scepticism of baffled electorates by showing that an enlarging and upgrading European Union can better address both their local and their global concerns. Lack of information on Europe is not the issue; on the contrary, http://Europa.eu is one of the largest and most multilingual government portals in the world. Nor is lack of educational opportunities a problem, as most European countries have compulsory basic education and ample opportunities to advance into a variety of higher education institutions. The problem is to synthesize and deliver useful knowledge from an overload of atomized information. While better websites help, much more needs to be done to reach the broader public that still passively relies on traditional communication means. The European Commission has downsized the large press corps accredited in Brussels with the hope that many journalists will go back to their countries and coordinate better with national and local media. And within the European Commission there are ideas of creating a truly European audio visual media market on the model of the BBC or the Franco-German Arte channel.

A well-designed convergence of info-communications and education sectors that combines timely investments with an open-software culture would further engage civil society into the European project. Visualizing synthetic information in mass-media and education channels should breach the gap between the Atlantic countries that communicate well in English texts (Nordic countries are world leaders in internet use, and their universities often teach technical issues in English) and the Mediterranean ones that prefer oral communication in Latin languages and through visual codes (Southern Europe leads in mobile communications, and has a world-class tradition of visual culture). Then not only may Eastern Europe rapidly converge through a common, open, tolerant, communicative vision, but the external dimension of the European Union would make a real contribution to reach to the rest of the world.

East Asia has many ingredients to advance in the visions of community-
building agreed by political leaders. Mutual interdependence in the new hyperlinked economy seems inevitable, as recent intergovernmental agreements in converging info-communications are promoting collaboration among the trade and investment networks of innovative firms. And regional economic and social benefits will surely multiply with the links made possible by the rapid developments and reforms in national university systems. A growing number of people are broadening their minds in a regional fashion, thus promoting greater movements of people to work and live in other East Asian countries, all while maintaining links with the rest of the world. Yet, despite a growing number of vision and study group reports, political leaders advancing the East Asian community lack a clear roadmap to convince the average person of the feasible paths of development in today’s world. As in the case of Europe, the key challenge in East Asia will be to convince the general public that having an additional, but semi-open and innovative, regional layer of governance can ease their local and global concerns.

Converging info-communication technologies provide some elements of the solution as they become localized to reach more people. The growing efforts of regional public websites, still inevitably in English (like www.ASEANsec.org), could be complemented by enhanced national ones, as well as those of think-tanks and academia, in local languages. And besides becoming multilingual (partly facilitated by Chinese ideograms and the simplicity of Bahasa), they could become more visually enticing as they profit from the increasing regional collaboration in films and video games. The East Asian countries aiming at regional cooperation are indeed beset by many challenges, including unresolved political conflicts, environmental degradation, weak governance institutions, great financial risks and terrible social disparities. Yet their dynamic, flexible and forward-looking elements give hope that they will manage to cope with the problems if well engaged with the rest of the developed world. Moreover, East Asia’s incremental multi-level development model is competitively being exported to other developing regional processes. For, despite all the troubles, East Asia now lives in hope of greater prosperity and long-lasting peace, while much of the rest of the developing world still lives in fear of not being able to adapt peacefully to economic, political and cultural globalization pressures. As humanity is bound by increasing knowledge to greater interdependence, a rising multi-level East Asia is well placed to help shape it.

The innovations of European and East Asian regional processes to disseminate knowledge and engage more people may further excel by connecting their similar innovation paths through interregional and multilateral platforms. A useful mechanism is the multipillar and flexible ASEM process. In the past decade ASEM political elites have become much
more aware of each other’s realities and advanced cooperation in all geographical formats. ASEAN countries usually see ASEM as a way to maintain cohesiveness and a privileged relation with the European Union as well as with North-East Asia, while North-East Asian relations with Europe as a whole have also improved dramatically. At the same time, the ASEM process has successfully promoted the fluid interconnection of a myriad of knowledge-based civil society actors.

ASEM countries and regional organizations could globally excel in global multi-level linkages by creating unique synergies between info-communications and education technologies and services. One could create a public news service that would distribute to existing media, and even broadcast on its own, public information presented through dynamic maps, like TV weather forecasts or Google Maps and Google Earth, with zooming capabilities and other visual tools that facilitate recognizing mutual synergies and the joint contribution of Europe and East Asia to the world. Public access to textual, visual and multimedia information on most supranational issues in the new age of global databases and search engines is no longer a technical problem. Public dissemination of synthetic maps with interconnected graphs and tables has become very affordable through new geographic information software. Synthesizing and delivering such broad knowledge could easily be done by a mix of think-tanks, media and academic experts developing media programmes and academic curricula that promote appreciation and cooperation among cultures and civilizations.

A first step for these knowledge services would be to present clear multi-level maps. Regional government portals in Europe (http://Europa.eu) East Asia (www.ASEANsec.org) and ASEM (www.ASEMvs.org, www.ASEMInfoBoard.org, etc.) should add depth by promoting general and functional visual links with relevant partners. As the visual maps become broadly useful dynamic atlases, Europe and East Asia could add interactivity and use them as the base of an online multi-level virtual lifelong university connecting all willing education institutions.

As ASEM partners successfully connect their info-communication and education innovations, other countries will want to link and enhance their own multi-level development paths. ASEM can catalyse dynamic regionalism through the growing set of flexible interregional dialogue and cooperation mechanisms that both Europe and East Asia have with other developing parts of the world. What is particularly promising is that most of Europe’s and East Asia’s interregional processes seek to promote economic and social development through knowledge acquisition. Thus, Europe-East Asia coordination of their own interregional processes would entice other world regions to innovate and participate successfully in global issues. This proposal for joint action could easily begin with
Latin America. The EU gatherings with the Rio Group and the Latin American and Caribbean countries have for some time emphasized education and technology. Similarly, the Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation highlights education and technology, especially in information communications sectors.

It should then not prove difficult for innovative ASEM extraregionalism to reduce the digital and educational divides of other parts of the world in even greater need. The EU relations with SAARC could coordinate with the rising Asia Cooperation Dialogue and the Asia-Middle East Dialogue, reaching to regional processes in South and West Asia to discuss the diffusion of tensions and possibilities of economic and cultural cooperation. For instance, there may be ways for India to collaborate with its neighbours in its excellent software and technological education services and, more broadly, realize some of SAARC’s intentions to develop its science and technology potential and its more concrete plans to have a useful information centre.

Moreover, the EU-Africa and related subregional dialogue and cooperation efforts to promote human resources might link with the Tokyo International Conference on African Development and with a renewed Asia-Africa Bandung process, and thus further help the New Economic Partnership for African Development realize its vision of generally providing basic education and breaching the digital divide. In addition, joint ASEM relations with the reviving Commonwealth of Independent States could better ensure that Russia’s excellent technical education systems can benefit the promotion of Eurasian communication infrastructures. The EU efforts to create with Russia a space for science and technology could be taken into account in improving Russia’s relations with East Asian neighbours. ASEM partners may even better help address the conflicts in Central and Western Asia in an extraregional fashion, as China seems keen to forge an area of peace and economic cooperation, despite occasional joint military exercises, through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Finally, the external projection of Europe and East Asia should take care to revitalize the information and education sectors in the United States.

Practical ASEM extraregional collaboration could happen through innovative functional projects where ASEM partners would invite dynamic representatives of other world regions to selected ASEM activities as a joint learning exercise. In addition, Europe and East Asia could speak about ASEM innovation in their parallel interregional processes. This functional approach could also be used to advance the global aspect of multi-level governance. As ASEM partners successfully connect their innovations, and through converging interregionalism broadly catalyse innovative regionalism around the world, they would also have a unique
chance to reform effectively in a multi-level fashion multilateral organizations and processes dealing with broad-based innovation. Europe and East Asia may jointly help the UN system in its challenge of reaching to the global public through new types of mass knowledge-enhancing multimedia. A successful visual knowledge platform catalysed through ASEM would surely attract the interest of other world regions and interregional processes, whose online portals could then be interconnected with an increasingly sophisticated UN system portal (www.unsystem.org) to advance a dynamic, multi-level, encyclopaedic atlas. This UN portal started with a simple alphabetic index of multilateral organizations, but is growing fast with an incipient thematic structure and links to UN news and other resources. It may be accessed through the six UN official languages, but it could become more visual and present global and regional maps based on multi-level information categorized through the families of statistics agreed in the United Nations. Moreover, it should aim to catalyse the world media to present in timely, dynamic maps the essence of a growing number of public global datasets and reports produced by multilateral organizations. Some sort of broad-based and forward-looking Economic and Social Council could become the steering hub of such a global, multi-level visual atlas that could well serve the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals.

ASEM partners may similarly address the great limitations of the Bretton Woods organizations to liberalize and promote education services by working with the promising UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Under the leadership of Japanese ambassador Matsuura and the return of the United States after a two-decade hiatus, UNESCO is reforming to help promote knowledge societies through its remit in education, science, culture and communications. In the new world regionalism, UNESCO could encourage advancing the vision of a global, multi-level, multimedia lifelong university specializing in sound education based on

| Table 6.1 Policy recommendations for knowledge-based global multi-level governance |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| **Level** | **General recommendations** | **Knowledge recommendations** |
| States | Promote dynamic overlapping regional processes to solve regional needs | Liberalize education in a multi-level fashion; link media to lifelong learning |
| Regions | Promote new regional nodes through interregionalism | Synthesize, link and visualize knowledge |
| Global | Decentralize international regimes to effective regional processes | Link state and regional knowledge platforms |
science, crafts and arts by connecting governments, universities and the media through innovative combinations of rapidly growing technologies (table 6.1). Perhaps the suggestion of some activists to tax speculative international info-communications to fund international organizations should be refocused to help effective global multi-level governance regimes through competitive pilot projects led by visionary leaders relying on knowledge and wisdom.
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This book draws on a personal mix of primary and secondary sources from governmental, business, academic and think-tank actors and experience, which makes it practically impossible to acknowledge them properly.

Information from governments and international organizations is plentiful on their own websites and in many academic analyses, etc. The websites of the world’s governmental ministries are available from the University of Michigan’s Library Documents Center (www.Lib.umich.edu/govdocs/). Many of them, including China’s, now provide information in English and links to their multi-level developments. The rising interest in this new regionalism is exemplified in Europe by the Global Governance, Regionalisation and Regulation (www.Garnet-eu.org) consortium of over 40 research institutions created in 2005, the same year that the University of Tokyo started its Comparative Regionalism Project (http://project.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/crep).

Japan’s National Institute for Research Advancement (www.NIRA.go.jp/ice) keeps updating its global Think Tank Directory and provides interesting analyses about their evolutions. I cannot recommend a single source on the economics of info-communications and its business actors (that knowledge would soon be copyrighted by a smart network), but I can recommend readers to familiarize themselves with the growing number and versatility of converging info-communications devices. For general sources on the global multi-level developments in higher education, the online reader may want to start navigating the International Higher Edu-
cation Clearinghouse at the Boston College for International Higher Education (http://BC.edu/bc_org/avp/soe/cihe/ihec).

There are many sources of information on the European Union and related European regional projects. The Gateway to the European Union (http://Europa.eu) is the main entry point to all things related to European institutions and policies. The yearly factsheets produced by the European Parliament’s Directorate-General for Research (www.europarl.europa.eu/facts_2004/default_en.htm) provide non-specialists with a general view in various European languages. Hundreds of European Documentation Centres in Europe and around the world, most in universities, research centres and national libraries, help anybody interested in finding out more about basically any European topic (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/relays/edc_en.htm). Euroactiv is a joint venture between think-tanks and consulting firms that provides a timeline (www.euractiv.com/en/). The European Commission portal (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/world) gives basically all the factual information and many useful links to understand the basics of the EU’s external projection. The Foreign Policy Network (www.FORNET.info) provides a useful academic bibliography.

There are increasing sources of information and analysis on East Asian-centred regional projects. The website of the ASEAN secretariat (www.aseansec.org) is growing and provides most factual information in English. One may find more information of particular relevance to the ASEAN+3 process through the portal of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/conference/asean3/index.html). In the recent past some East Asian think-tanks have become quite informative about government activities, especially those in the Network of East Asian Think-tanks (www.NEAT.org.cn). For factual information and chronologies, particularly useful is Comparative Connections; A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, produced by the Pacific Forum of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Hawaii (www.CSIS.org/pacfor/ccejournal). Meanwhile, the ASEAN Virtual University (http://aunVirtualU.dlsu.edu.ph), managed from Ateneo University in Manila, has so far only compiled an outdated ASEAN studies course syllabus based on “Anglo-Saxon” bibliographical references.

While the bulging bibliography on European topics is no longer fully manageable by a single academic, I would like to offer some bibliographic recommendations from the still-incipient literature on East Asian regionalism: Leifer (2000); Webber (2001); Lee (2002); Chalermpanupap (2002); Naber (2003); Terada (2003); Hund (2003); Okfen (2003); Liu and Regnier (2003); Suehiro (2004); Tanaka (2004); Pemple (2005); Boisseau and Fort (2005); Zhang (2005); Ito and Tanaka (2005); Katzenstein and Shiraishi (2006); Tanaka (2006).
At any rate, to get a good picture of the evolution of the actors mentioned in this book I recommend the reader to navigate their portals, which are mentioned within the text, usually functioning as acronyms, and in alphabetical order in the following section. They were all properly working in the spring of 2007, but some may change in the future, as, for instance, many European-based ones began changing in 2006 to end with the "eu" macro-regional top-level domain name, and the "asia" counterpart began to form in 2007.

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