Bargaining Power in Cooperative Resource Allocations Games.

Madani, Kaveh, Farhidi, Faraz and Gholizadeh, Sona, (2022). Bargaining Power in Cooperative Resource Allocations Games.. Algorithms, 15(445), 445-n/a

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  • Sub-type Journal article
    Author Madani, Kaveh
    Farhidi, Faraz
    Gholizadeh, Sona
    Title Bargaining Power in Cooperative Resource Allocations Games.
    Appearing in Algorithms
    Volume 15
    Issue No. 445
    Publication Date 2022-11-25
    Place of Publication Switzerland
    Publisher MDPI
    Start page 445
    End page n/a
    Language eng
    Abstract Cooperative game theory provides an appropriate framework to assess the likelihood of conflict resolution, encourage cooperation among parties, and determine each party’s share in resource sharing conflicts. In calculating the fair and efficient allocation of the incremental benefits of cooperation, cooperative game theory methods often do not consider the exogenous bargaining powers of the players based on factors, that are external to the game, such as their political, economic, and military powers. This study reformulates three well-known cooperative game theory methods, namely, Nash-Harsanyi, Shapley, and Nucleolus, to account for the exogenous bargaining powers of the players in cooperative games. Using the Caspian Sea international conflict as an example, this paper shows how the negotiators’ exogenous bargaining power can change the outcome of resource sharing games. The proposed weighted cooperative game theory approach can help determine practical resolutions for real-world conflicts in which the exogenous powers of players can have a significant influence on the outcome of negotiations.
    UNBIS Thesaurus GAME THEORY
    Keyword bargaining power
    conflict resolution
    resource allocation
    Caspian Sea
    Copyright Holder The Authors
    Copyright Year 2022
    Copyright type All rights reserved
    ISSN 1999-4893
    DOI https://doi.org/10.3390/a15120445
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    Created: Sat, 30 Sep 2023, 06:12:48 JST by Věra Greschner Farkavcová on behalf of UNU FLORES