Independent Monitoring Mechanism for the Pandemic Accord
Layth Hanbali, Elliot Hannon, Susanna Lehtimaki, Christine McNab and Nina Schwalbe (2022). Independent Monitoring Mechanism for the Pandemic Accord. UNU International Institute for Global Health.
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Subtitle Accountability for a safer world Sub-type Research report Author Layth Hanbali
Elliot Hannon
Susanna Lehtimaki
Christine McNab
Nina SchwalbeEditor Sparks Street Advisors Title Independent Monitoring Mechanism for the Pandemic Accord Publication Date 2022-11 Place of Publication Kuala Lumpur Publisher UNU International Institute for Global Health Pages 42 Language eng Abstract To address the challenges in pandemic preparedness and response (PPR), the World Health Assembly, at a special session in November 2021, established an Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB) and tasked it with drafting a new legal instrument for PPR. In July 2022, the INB decided to develop the accord under Article 19 of the WHO Constitution, which grants the WHO the authority to negotiate a legally-binding Convention or Agreement and requires ratification by countries according to their local laws to enter into force. The aim is to complete negotiations and adopt a new pandemic instrument at the WHA in May 2024. The new legally binding agreement aims to address many of the failures exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, negotiations on the instrument must establish a mechanism to monitor countries' compliance with the accord, particularly on the legally binding elements.In this paper, we recommend creating such a mechanism as part of the accord: an independent committee of experts that monitors state parties' compliance with the pandemic accord and the timeliness, completeness, and robustness of states’ reports on their obligations. Its primary purpose would be to verify state self-reports by triangulating them with a range of publicly available information, making direct inquiries, and accepting confidential submissions. It would report its findings to a body consisting of or that is directly accountable to heads of state, with a particular focus on elevating instances of non-compliance or inadequate reporting. Copyright Holder UNU-IIGH Copyright Year 2022 Copyright type All rights reserved ISBN 9789280881158 DOI https://doi.org/10.37941/RR/2022/1 -
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