Political Budget Cycles: Conditioning Factors and New Evidence
Veiga, Linda, Efthyvoulou, Georgios and Morozumi, Atsuyoshi, "Political Budget Cycles: Conditioning Factors and New Evidence" in The Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics ed. Klaus H. Goetz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), n/a-n/a.
Document type:
Book Chapter
Collection:
-
Author Veiga, Linda
Efthyvoulou, Georgios
Morozumi, AtsuyoshiBook Editor Klaus H. Goetz Chapter Title Political Budget Cycles: Conditioning Factors and New Evidence Book Title The Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics Publication Date 2019-05 Place of Publication Oxford Publisher Oxford University Press Start page n/a End page n/a Language eng Abstract This chapter reviews the literature on political budget cycles (PBCs), focusing on studies that analyze the conditionality of opportunistic effects. First, factors that affect incentives of politicians to embark on pre-electoral policy manipulations are highlighted, and then factors that influence the capability of those manipulations to generate additional votes are discussed. Finally, the effects of personal characteristics of leaders on PBCs are explored. To complement the review, an empirical investigation of electoral effects on central governments’ deficit, expenditure, and revenue series, under various political arrangements, is implemented on a large panel covering seventy-eight countries and forty-two years of data (1975–2016). Empirical results confirm that PBCs are more likely to occur under certain politico-institutional circumstances, including predetermined elections, disputed elections, majoritarian electoral rules, larger private benefits from holding office, weak constraints on executives, a high proportion of uninformed voters, and new democracies. Keyword Political budget cycles
Political business cycles
Fiscal policy
Conditionality
RhythmCopyright Holder Oxford University Press Copyright Year 2019 Copyright type All rights reserved DOI 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190862084.013.8 -
Citation counts Search Google Scholar
Access Statistics: 651 Abstract Views - Detailed Statistics Created: Tue, 14 Jan 2020, 02:00:53 JST by Mario Peixoto on behalf of UNU EGOV