Political Budget Cycles: Conditioning Factors and New Evidence

Veiga, Linda, Efthyvoulou, Georgios and Morozumi, Atsuyoshi, "Political Budget Cycles: Conditioning Factors and New Evidence" in The Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics ed. Klaus H. Goetz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), n/a-n/a.

Document type:
Book Chapter
Collection:
UNU-EGOV Book Chapters

Metadata
Links
Versions
Statistics
  • Author Veiga, Linda
    Efthyvoulou, Georgios
    Morozumi, Atsuyoshi
    Book Editor Klaus H. Goetz
    Chapter Title Political Budget Cycles: Conditioning Factors and New Evidence
    Book Title The Oxford Handbook of Time and Politics
    Publication Date 2019-05
    Place of Publication Oxford
    Publisher Oxford University Press
    Start page n/a
    End page n/a
    Language eng
    Abstract This chapter reviews the literature on political budget cycles (PBCs), focusing on studies that analyze the conditionality of opportunistic effects. First, factors that affect incentives of politicians to embark on pre-electoral policy manipulations are highlighted, and then factors that influence the capability of those manipulations to generate additional votes are discussed. Finally, the effects of personal characteristics of leaders on PBCs are explored. To complement the review, an empirical investigation of electoral effects on central governments’ deficit, expenditure, and revenue series, under various political arrangements, is implemented on a large panel covering seventy-eight countries and forty-two years of data (1975–2016). Empirical results confirm that PBCs are more likely to occur under certain politico-institutional circumstances, including predetermined elections, disputed elections, majoritarian electoral rules, larger private benefits from holding office, weak constraints on executives, a high proportion of uninformed voters, and new democracies.
    Keyword Political budget cycles
    Political business cycles
    Fiscal policy
    Conditionality
    Rhythm
    Copyright Holder Oxford University Press
    Copyright Year 2019
    Copyright type All rights reserved
    DOI 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190862084.013.8
  • Versions
    Version Filter Type
  • Citation counts
    Google Scholar Search Google Scholar
    Access Statistics: 629 Abstract Views  -  Detailed Statistics
    Created: Tue, 14 Jan 2020, 02:00:53 JST by Mario Peixoto on behalf of UNU EGOV