The Environmental Porter Hypothesis as a Technology Adoption Problem?
Kriechel, Ben and Ziesemer, Thomas (2005). The Environmental Porter Hypothesis as a Technology Adoption Problem?. UNU-MERIT Research Memoranda. UNU-MERIT.
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Sub-type Working paper Author Kriechel, Ben
Ziesemer, ThomasTitle The Environmental Porter Hypothesis as a Technology Adoption Problem? Series Title UNU-MERIT Research Memoranda Volume/Issue No. 9 Publication Date 2005 Publisher UNU-MERIT Language eng Abstract The Porter Hypothesis postulates that the costs of compliance with environmental standards may be offset by adoption of innovations they trigger. We model this hypothesis using a game of timing of technology adoption. We show that times of adoption are earlier the higher the non-adoption tax. The environmental tax turns the preemption game with low profits into a game with credible precommitment yielding high profits (pro-Porter). If there is a precommitment game without environmental taxes, the introduction of a tax leads to lower profits (anti-Porter). Keyword Environmental policy
Strategic trade theory
Technology adoption
Porter hypothesisJEL Q2
F1
H7
O3Copyright Year 2005 Copyright type All rights reserved -
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