The Environmental Porter Hypothesis as a Technology Adoption Problem?

Kriechel, Ben and Ziesemer, Thomas (2005). The Environmental Porter Hypothesis as a Technology Adoption Problem?. UNU-MERIT Research Memoranda. UNU-MERIT.

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  • Sub-type Working paper
    Author Kriechel, Ben
    Ziesemer, Thomas
    Title The Environmental Porter Hypothesis as a Technology Adoption Problem?
    Series Title UNU-MERIT Research Memoranda
    Volume/Issue No. 9
    Publication Date 2005
    Publisher UNU-MERIT
    Language eng
    Abstract The Porter Hypothesis postulates that the costs of compliance with environmental standards may be offset by adoption of innovations they trigger. We model this hypothesis using a game of timing of technology adoption. We show that times of adoption are earlier the higher the non-adoption tax. The environmental tax turns the preemption game with low profits into a game with credible precommitment yielding high profits (pro-Porter). If there is a precommitment game without environmental taxes, the introduction of a tax leads to lower profits (anti-Porter).
    Keyword Environmental policy
    Strategic trade theory
    Technology adoption
    Porter hypothesis
    JEL Q2
    F1
    H7
    O3
    Copyright Year 2005
    Copyright type All rights reserved
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    Created: Fri, 13 Dec 2013, 12:39:30 JST