A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games - An Experimental Study

Decker, Torsten, Stiehler, Andreas and Strobel, Martin (2002). A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games - An Experimental Study. UNU-MERIT Research Memoranda. UNU-MERIT.

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  • Sub-type Working paper
    Author Decker, Torsten
    Stiehler, Andreas
    Strobel, Martin
    Title A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games - An Experimental Study
    Series Title UNU-MERIT Research Memoranda
    Volume/Issue No. 18
    Publication Date 2002
    Place of Publication Maastricht, NL
    Publisher UNU-MERIT
    Pages 32
    Language eng
    Abstract In this experimental study we analyse three collective and one individual punishment rule in a public good setting. We show that under all punishment rules cooperation is stronger and more sustainable than reported from settings without punishment. Moreover, we present evidence and explanations for differences between the rules concerning punishment intensity, contribution and profit levels, as well as justice. Finally, we investigate influences crucial to participants' support for a collective rule when the individual rule is the status quo. We show that beside profit differences the degree of consent required by the collective rule is essential for the degree of support by the participants.
    Copyright Holder UNU-MERIT
    Copyright Year 2002
    Copyright type All rights reserved
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    Created: Fri, 13 Dec 2013, 12:42:21 JST