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# Separation of Concerns in Extended Epidemiological Compartmental Models

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**Keywords:** Separation of Concerns, Compartmental Models, Contact Network, Epidemiology Modeling Tool.

**Abstract:** Epidemiological models become more and more complex as new concerns are taken into account (age, sex, spatial heterogeneity, containment or vaccination policies, etc.). This is problematic because these aspects are typically intertwined which makes models difficult to extend, change or reuse. The Kendrick approach has shown promising results to separate epidemiological concerns but is restricted to homogeneous compartmental models. In this paper, we report on an attempt to generalize the Kendrick approach to support some aspects of contact networks, thereby improving the predictive quality of models with significant heterogeneity in the structure of contacts, while keeping the simplicity of compartmental models. This approach has been validated on two different techniques to generalize compartmental models.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

Modeling and simulation have been heavily used in epidemiology, for instance to inform control strategies (Levin and Durrett, 1996). Epidemiological models largely rely on the compartmental framework where the individuals of a population are grouped by their epidemiological status (Keeling and Rohani, 2011). Those Susceptible to the pathogen (state S) can be infected with rate  $\lambda$ , the Infectious ones (state I) can transmit the disease or become immune a.k.a Recovered (state R) with rate  $\gamma$  (See Figure 1).

Compartmental models are typically first defined as ordinary differential equations (ODEs), such as Equation 1 below, which can be studied analytically and/or simulated using algorithms such as Runge-Kutta. It is however considered more realistic to adopt






Figure 1: Flow diagram of the SIR (Susceptible, Infected, Recovered) mathematical model.


a stochastic viewpoint on these models, typically considering them as Continuous-Time Markov Chains (CTMCs), that can be derived from the ODEs modulo some widely-accepted, albeit simplifying, probabilistic assumptions.

$$\begin{cases} \frac{dS}{dt} = -\lambda S \\ \frac{dI}{dt} = \lambda S - \gamma I \\ \frac{dR}{dt} = \gamma I \\ N = S + I + R \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

Aside from this core epidemiological concern, other concerns may have to be taken into account such as the age structure, the social or sexual mix-

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ing and the spatial heterogeneity of the transmission that may be caused by various considerations. Each of these additional aspects may lead to further partitioning the population. Unfortunately, concerns are typically intertwined in epidemiological models in both executable code and mathematical equations.

At first sight at least, it seems difficult to separate these concerns since, when a concern is added to a model, it is precisely because it interferes with the core epidemiological concern to introduce some kind of heterogeneity. For example, in a spatial SIR model, the spatial concern impacts the epidemic concern at each region which assigns a specific value to an epidemic parameter. If the epidemic parameters had the same value on the whole space, there would be little point in introducing a spatial concern in the first place.

The Kendrick approach(Bui et al., 2016) consists in defining concerns (age, sex, spatial heterogeneity, ...) as independent, possibly incomplete, models that are then combined into Stochastic Automata Networks (SANs) (Plateau and Stewart, 2000) using a tensor-sum operator. The stochastic dependencies between concerns are then introduced in a second phase so that the independent concerns can be reused and combined in other models much more easily.

A typical assumption of compartmental models is that individuals mix (meet others individual with potential disease transmission) uniformly, at least in the same compartments, i.e. with the same probability. This assumption is getting more and more criticized as unrealistic as it has been observed that, in many outbreaks, a few super-spreaders initially infect other individuals more quickly than homogeneous models predict. Later in an epidemic, on the contrary, when a lot of individuals are infected, the reverse has been observed: homogeneous models predict more infections than what happens, because the remaining susceptible individuals are typically the most isolated ones.

It has thus been proposed to define, study or simulate contact-network models in which nodes denote individuals or groups of individuals and edges denote potential contacts. These models, however, are more involved to define and study than compartmental models. It is thus natural to try and extend compartmental models to include some contact heterogeneity.

Several adaptations have been published to improve the homogeneous compartmental approach for at least some classes of contact networks. Bansal et al. (Bansal et al., 2007) have then proposed a general framework to capture such adaptations as changes to the parameters that define the force of infection, and

have redefined two of these adaptations, that they deemed typical enough, using their proposal: the Stroud (Stroud et al., 2006) and the Aparicio (Aparicio and Pascual, 2007) adaptations.

In this paper, we report on our attempt to integrate Bansal's framework in the Kendrick approach to separation of concerns(Bui et al., 2016). The challenge consists in expressing Bansal's framework as well as any specialization of it such as Stroud's or Aparicio's adaptation as separate Kendrick concerns. The benefit of our proposal is that adaptations to the homogeneous compartmental model may now take advantage of separation of concerns and be combined with other kind of concerns that are not directly related to the contact network.

## 2 INTEGRATING BANSAL'S FRAMEWORK IN THE KENDRICK APPROACH

Seen from a software engineer's viewpoint, our idea is somehow similar to applying the Template Method design pattern (Gamma et al., 1995) to epidemic model equations<sup>1</sup>: it consists in expressing  $\lambda$  as a function of 3 parameters,  $\alpha$ ,  $i_i$  and  $\tau$ .

$\alpha$  is the average number of individuals with which a susceptible individual has contact or the average degree of nodes in a contact network,  $i_i$  is the proportion of contacts that are infectious<sup>2</sup> and  $\tau$  is the per-contact rate at which the disease is transmitted between an infectious and a susceptible individual.

Following Bansal et al. we have renamed these 3 usual parameters to  $\alpha_{gen}$ ,  $i_{gen}$  and  $\tau_{gen}$  to insist on their special meaning when applied to a model based on a contact-network and to signal that they are generic hot-spots, i.e. varying points. The generic definition for the force of infection  $\lambda$  is given by Equation 2. We have, however, for the sake of simplicity and of readability, often kept the original simple names without the "gen" subscript, especially when they have their usual homogeneous meaning, typically before a model is made generic using the Kendrick approach. We have used names with "gen" in final generic definitions of models and in Kendrick code.

$$\lambda = \alpha_{gen}\tau_{gen}i_{gen} \quad (2)$$

<sup>1</sup>The most obvious difference with the Template pattern is that there is no object-oriented inheritance involved here but there was of course no such inheritance either in the original patterns from Alexander.

<sup>2</sup>Caveat: this means the proportion of infectious individuals among the individuals a susceptible individual meets.

In traditional (homogeneous-compartmental) models  $i_t$  is typically defined this way:

$$i_t = \frac{I}{N} \tag{3}$$

(Bansal et al., 2007) reports on two proposals, Stroud et al. (Stroud et al., 2006) and Aparicio et al. (Aparicio and Pascual, 2007), to generalize compartmental models to capture some aspects of contact-network models. Both proposals were captured by giving  $(\alpha_{gen}, it_{gen}$  and  $\tau_{gen})$  specific values. In order to explain these approaches in the limited allowed space for this paper, we have chosen to simplify the rational and hypotheses behind them and more generally the epidemiological questions in this paper. The interested reader will need to refer to the original papers to get the full explanations of these models.

Consider Figures 5, 6 and 7. The curves are the daily incidence<sup>3</sup> predicted by different models assuming a Poisson, exponential and scale-free contact network respectively. The red line denotes a traditional (homogeneous) compartmental model. By definition, it does not depend on the network but then, in some cases, it suffers from two problems: the height of the peak is wrong and it happens too late.

The blue and green curves are run using our Kendrick compartmental tool but using the approach from Stroud et al. and from Aparicio et al., respectively, to approximate some aspects of contact networks. The former approach improves (lowers) the height of the peak on some classes of networks. The latter approach improves the timing of the peak on some classes of networks although sometimes exaggerating its height. Ideally, it should be easy to try one or several of these approaches to decide which approach best matches the observed data.

In this paper, we thus want to check if both these approaches can be captured as Kendrick concerns to keep the benefits of separation of concerns. This way these approaches can be changed more easily than in monolithic models where all concerns are mixed together (Bui et al., 2016).

In case of success, our middle-term objective, outside of the scope of this paper, would be to investigate what class of extensions can be defined as Kendrick concerns so that compartmental models can more easily be enriched with some of the properties of contact networks.

<sup>3</sup>Incidence is the number of new infections per day, sometimes normalized by dividing by some value. (Bansal et al., 2007) do not give which value they chose for the denominator we thus did not normalize incidence.

## 2.1 Stroud et al.’s Extension

In traditional homogeneous-mixing compartmental modeling, the expected number of new infections per day per infectious person is assumed to be proportional to the fraction of the population that is susceptible. In real social structures, however, some susceptible individuals have a greater chance to receive and transmit the disease than others. (Stroud et al., 2006) claim that "epidemic models can practically incorporate inhomogeneous mixing by taking the number of new infections per day per infectious person to scale as a power (greater than one) of the fraction of the population that is susceptible".

Introducing this power law can be done in two steps. First, combining Equations 1, 2 and 3 leads to:

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = -\alpha\tau I \frac{S}{N} \tag{4}$$

Then, this equation is generalized by introducing a constant,  $v$ , greater than 1, that is postulated to be a power of  $S/N$ . This constant must be "fitted" from real data i.e. estimated to minimize errors. Intuitively, a higher value for  $v$  represents a higher degree of heterogeneity, especially (although not necessarily) in the number of contacts among individuals or similarly in the degree of nodes in a contact network.

The generalized equation becomes:

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = -\alpha_{gen}\tau_{gen}I\left(\frac{S}{N}\right)^v \tag{5}$$

which leads to:

$$it_{gen} = \frac{I}{S} \left(\frac{S}{N}\right)^v \tag{6}$$

The parameters  $\alpha_{gen}$  and  $\tau_{gen}$  are constants whose values are best set outside of models themselves, in so-called simulation scenarios. Capturing this idea in Kendrick is quite simple and merely consists in assigning the above value to  $it_{gen}$  which will implicitly declare an additional parameter  $v$  to be assigned in simulation scenarios. The Kendrick code of this concern is given in Section 3. Remember that the point was to try and keep the implementation of this idea separate from the rest of the model, here from the SIR concern.

## 2.2 Aparicio et al.’s Extension

Homogeneous models often fail to predict when the peak of an epidemic will occur. Early in epidemics, the most likely individuals to be infected are typically "hubs" that have a lot contacts and thus are also likely to *secondary* infect more individuals than an average individual would. Late in epidemics, on the contrary,

the new infected individuals are typically more isolated and induce less secondary infections. On Figures 5, 6 and 7, the peak of the red curve comes too late.

In (Aparicio and Pascual, 2007), the authors propose an SIYR model to better account for secondary infections. Their idea is to split the usual I compartment into I and Y, where their I is individuals that are infected and infectious and Y individuals that are infected but not infectious, meaning that they do not produce secondary infections.

Their model is given by 7 where  $\gamma_e = \tau + \gamma$ , is the constant rate at which infectious nodes become inactive while  $\gamma$  is the constant rate at which infected nodes become recovered,  $g$  is the constant rate at which inactive nodes recover, and  $R_0$ , the basic reproduction rate, depends on the network.

$$\begin{cases} \frac{dS}{dt} = -\gamma_e R_0 \frac{S}{N} I \\ \frac{dI}{dt} = \gamma_e R_0 \frac{S}{N} I - \gamma_e I \\ \frac{dY}{dt} = \gamma_e I - gY \\ \frac{dR}{dt} = gY \\ N = S + I + Y + R \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

Note that there is here a potential confusion between the usual  $\tau$  parameter and the generic  $\tau_{gen}$  which in this specific model is not equal to  $\tau$ . From the above formulas we deduce:  $\alpha_{gen} = \gamma_e$ ;  $i_{gen} = \frac{1}{N}$  and  $\tau_{gen} = R_0$ . (Bansal et al., 2007) (supplementary material) gives  $R_0 = T \frac{\langle k^2 \rangle - \langle k \rangle}{\langle k \rangle}$  where  $\langle k \rangle$  is the mean degree of the network (set to 10 in our examples), while  $\langle k^2 \rangle$  is the mean square degree and  $T = \frac{\tau}{\gamma_e}$  is the probability of transmission of the pathogen.

For a Poisson random network  $\langle k^2 \rangle = \langle k \rangle (\langle k \rangle + 1)$  (Barabási et al., 2016) but for more general networks it is an issue to estimate  $\langle k^2 \rangle$  without an actual network. (Bansal et al., 2007) relies on computations on the random networks they used.

For the exponential network, we have generated a sequence of degrees with an exponential distribution and have computed  $\langle k^2 \rangle$ .

For the scale-free network, in order to calculate the mean square degree, we proceed in a similar way as in the exponential case, but we use the (Barabási and Albert, 1999) algorithm to generate the graph.

### 3 VALIDATION AND DISCUSSION

To validate our approach, we have replicated the experiments of (Bansal et al., 2007) comparing the simulation results from homogeneous compartmental models with the models of Stroud et al. and of Aparicio et al. with those obtained by (Bansal et al., 2007) for Poisson, exponential and scale-free networks.<sup>4</sup> The homogeneous model is a special case of Stroud et al.'s model with  $v = 1$ .

All models were defined using the Kendrick tool (Bui et al., 2019) even though we used the low-level Kendrick language rather than its domain-specific language which is currently under revision.

The parameters  $\alpha_{gen}$ ,  $i_{gen}$  and  $\tau_{gen}$  are noted in Kendrick as `alpha_gen`, `it_gen` and `tau_gen`.

Our implementation of Stroud et al. is shown Figure 2. The code is divided into three parts: defining the concerns (SIR and Stroud), initializing the parameters, running the simulation. The code for the Aparicio et al. case is divided in a similar way (See Figure 4).

The results of the simulations can be seen on Figures 5, 6 and 7 are similar to those of Figures 6 (b), 6 (d) and 6 (f) in (Bansal et al., 2007), taking into account that used random networks and that different scale-free or exponential networks may have different values for  $\langle k^2 \rangle$ . This suggests that integrating Bansal's idea was successful.

Both adaptations alter the homogeneous case in very different ways. As heterogeneity in the degree of nodes grows from the Poisson to the exponential to the scale-free case the Stroud adaptation further shrinks the peak of daily incidence but does not fix its dynamics: it still comes too late. On the contrary, the Aparicio adaptation shifts this peak to the left (earlier in the outbreak) but outside of the case of their publication (Poisson networks) the height of the peak is deemed exaggerated by (Bansal et al., 2007).

The challenge was to check if the Kendrick approach to separation of concerns could capture approaches such as those from Stroud et al. or Aparicio et al. while keeping the familiar compartmental framework.

We first defined a classical SIR model (line 1-14) in a usual way except for the definition of lambda (lines 9-10). Note however that this definition of lambda is general and not, by any means, restricted to trying and capture some aspects of contact networks. The SIR model defined this way can thus be

<sup>4</sup>Python and Kendrick code of our experiments are available online: <https://github.com/KendrickOrg/BIOINFORMATICS22-code>



```

1 sirConcern := KEModelPart new.
2 sirConcern attributes:
3   {#status->#(#S #I #R)}.
4 sirConcern addParameters: {#lambda. #gamma}.
5 sirConcern
6   addTransitionFrom: {(#status -> #S)}
7   to: {(#status -> #I)}
8   probability: 'lambda'.
9 sirConcern changeParameter: #lambda
10  value: 'it_gen*tau_gen*alpha_gen'.
11 sirConcern
12  addTransitionFrom: {(#status -> #I)}
13  to: {(#status -> #R)}
14  probability: 'gamma'.
15
16 stroudConcern := KEModelPart new.
17 stroudConcern addParameter: #it_gen
18  value: '(I*(S/N)^nu)/S'.
19
20 model := sirConcern + stroudConcern.

```

Figure 2: Definition of SIR and Stroud concerns.

```

22 model atCompartment: {(#status -> #S)}
23   put: 9999.
24 model atCompartment: {(#status -> #I)}
25   put: 1.
26 model atParameter: #tau_gen
27   assignValue: 0.025.
28 model atParameter:
29   #nu assignValue: 1.4.
30 model atParameter: #gamma
31   assignValue: 0.1.
32 model atParameter: #alpha_gen
33   assignValue: 10.

```

Figure 3: Definition of the scenario's parameters.

used quite generally.

The Stroud concern is then quite simple: it merely gives a value to the  $it_{gen}$  parameter (lines 16-18). This concern is separate from the SIR in the sense that it is a distinct syntactic structure. The SIR concern can be reused without the Stroud concern.

One issue is the fact that the SIR concern was not reused in the SIYR one for the implementation of Aparicio et al's approach. Factoring out commonalities between the core epidemic concerns (SIR, SEIR, SIYR...) that define the epidemic status is a bit involved and does not always simplify models.

It might be tempting to introduce some kind of inheritance between models (using the Kendrick DSL) but the benefits are not impressive as far as core concerns are considered. In low-level Kendrick it is possible to copy SIR into SIYR, add a Y status, redefine the transitions and so on, but this is not clearly simpler than redefining SYIR from scratch as we did. There are only a few kinds of core concerns so that redefin-

```

1 siyrConcern := KEModelPart new.
2 siyrConcern attributes:
3   {#status->#(#S #I #Y #R)}.
4 siyrConcern addParameters:
5   {#lambda. #gamma. #sigma}.
6
7 siyrConcern
8   addTransitionFrom: {(#status -> #S)}
9   to: {(#status -> #I)}
10  probability: 'lambda'.
11 siyrConcern changeParameter: #lambda
12  value: 'it_gen*tau_gen*alpha_gen'.
13 siyrConcern
14  addTransitionFrom: {(#status -> #I)}
15  to: {(#status -> #Y)}
16  probability: 'gamma'.
17 siyrConcern
18  addTransitionFrom: {(#status -> #Y)}
19  to: {(#status -> #R)}
20  probability: 'sigma'.
21
22 aparicioConcern := KEModelPart new.
23 aparicioConcern addParameter: #alpha_gen
24  value: 'tau+gamma'.
25 aparicioConcern addParameter: #it_gen
26  value: 'I/N'.
27 aparicioConcern addParameter: #tau_gen
28  value: 'R0'.
29
30 model := siyrConcern + aparicioConcern.

```

Figure 4: Definition of an Aparicio concern.




Figure 5: Daily incidence for the homogeneous, Stroud and Aparicio approaches on a Poisson network of 10000 nodes with a mean degree of 10.

ing them from scratch is not a heavy burden.

Other concerns, on the contrary, are quite varied and are the focus of the Kendrick approach. Because it relies on a specific core concern (SIYR), implementing the Aparicio et al. extension is more involved than with the Stroud et al. one. It is however still possible to benefit from the Kendrick approach and com-




Figure 6: Daily incidence for the homogeneous, Stroud and Aparicio approaches on an exponential network of 10000 nodes with a mean degree of 10.




Figure 7: Daily incidence for the homogeneous, Stroud and Aparicio approaches on a scale-free network of 10000 nodes with a mean degree of 10.

bine the SIYR and the Aparicio concerns with other concerns such as the age or sex structure. For this reason we consider that this was also a success.

Another issue is the relationship between the Stroud concern and SIR and more generally of non-core concerns with the core concern of the model. Non-core concerns are expected not to structurally depend (use names introduced in other concerns) on each other even though this may possibly happen in huge models (e.g. a global pandemic model) that are quite beyond the scope of this paper. Non-core concerns may however depend on the core one. Indeed, the Stroud concern gives value to a parameter introduced in SIR and uses names that are defined in SIR. In low-level Kendrick there is little support, aside from the host system complaining at run time, to avoid pitfalls such as misspelling a name or avoiding name conflicts across concerns. This is obviously something the Kendrick DSL must address e.g. by prefixing names by that of their concern, importing the names of concern, ...

The reader may wonder if it would be possible to

combine the approaches of Stroud et al. and from Aparicio et al. The Kendrick approach would support it but the respective domains of validity, or at least of reasonable quality of prediction, of both approaches do not necessarily intersect so that neither (Bansal et al., 2007) nor we, have considered this possibility.

Finally, in (Bansal et al., 2007) the idea to adapt compartmental models, that was transposed to Kendrick in this paper, was further developed to distinguish the edges of Susceptible individuals from those of Infected individuals. Including other parameters to concerns is not difficult but Bansal et al. consider that obtaining values (by fitting on simulations run on a contact network) or formulas (by analytical methods) for these parameters may become more cumbersome than using network models. We think this suggests that it may be worth in future work to try and capture more aspects of contact networks in concerns and check if this helps combining or switching between the compartmental approach and the contact-network one in models.

## 4 RELATED WORK

Separation of concerns (Hürsch and Lopes, 1995) is a major goal of software engineering and more generally of any discipline where models or artifacts may be too complex to grasp, change or reuse easily when they are not decomposed into separate parts whose dependencies on each other are kept minimal.

The Kendrick approach, language and tool (Bui et al., 2016; Bui et al., 2019) achieve separation of concerns in compartmental epidemic models by defining each concern (age, sex, spatial heterogeneity, containment or vaccination policies, etc.), i.e. each potential source of heterogeneity, as a separate stochastic automaton and by deferring combining concerns until a composition phase where they are put together into a SAN using a tensor sum operator.

Process algebras and SANs have similar objectives and have both been used to define compartmental epidemic models, although not, as far as we know, to support a general approach to separation of concerns that introduce heterogeneity in epidemic models (Mccaig et al., 2009). Moreover, process algebras are not initially meant to model epidemic models which makes them awkward.

Bio-PEPA, for instance, is an extension of PEPA (Performance Evaluation Progress Algebra) (Gilmore and Hillston, 1994) with some features for biological system modeling. Some PEPA models however cannot be translated into ODEs which requires checking some conditions to do it (Benkirane, 2011). Also,

defining compartments is tedious and PEPA's syntax "might look daunting" (Benkirane, 2011). A subsequent adaptation of Bio-PEPA was thus introduced to better support compartmental epidemic models (Ciocchetta and Hillston, 2010). We are not aware of any extensions to Bio-PEPA to support contact networks.

Generally, traditional mathematical models (compartmental models) used in epidemiology, make simplifying assumptions about the interaction between hosts. This is because they implicitly define host-to-host contact and assume that hosts have identical contact rates, which does not always agree with real-world models. However, these models have the particularity of being manageable, easily implementable, robust and predictive (Anderson and May, 1992; Mollison et al., 1994). However, faced with their difficulties in reflecting certain real-world models, in recent years epidemiologists have largely focused on so-called contact network models, which have the characteristic of explicitly capturing the various models of interactions that underlie transmission of disease (Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani, 2001; Shirley and Rushton, 2005). These models also have the advantage of providing very good prediction but have the disadvantage of requiring more programming skills. In order to find an ideal compromise between compartment-based models and contact network models, at least from the point of view of implementation, the Kendrick (Bui et al., 2016; Bui et al., 2016; Bui et al., 2019) approach was thus generalized in order to take into account aspects of contact network models from models based on compartments that are known to be easily manipulated.

Many epidemiology modeling and simulation platforms take into account deterministic/stochastic models based on compartments or/and contact networks (Muellner et al., 2018; Bui et al., 2016; Bui et al., 2019; Picault et al., 2019; Miller and Ting, 2020; Hladish et al., 2012). Hladish et al. introduce EpiFire (Hladish et al., 2012) - an API<sup>5</sup> implemented in C++ for generating network models of epidemiology. EpiFire also provides a graphical user interface (GUI) which allows to fast configure the structure of different networks (i.e., random, small-world, scale-free etc.) for SIR models. Although the authors have achieved the separation between the network construction and the simulation of the disease spreading through networks, they have ignored other epidemiological concerns, only considered the SIR structure. The most recent work on the field of contact network modeling for epidemiology is EoN of Miller et al. (Miller and Ting, 2020). EoN provides

<sup>5</sup>Application Programming Interface

the same features as EpiFire with the aim of modeling the spread of SIR and SIS models over different networks. It is arguable that most of these tools do not formalize the principle of separations of concerns in epidemiology as the Kendrick (Bui et al., 2016; Bui et al., 2019) and Emulsion (Picault et al., 2019) tools do. Indeed, Emulsion is a platform that was built with the aim of helping modelers to focus on the design of models rather than on the programming aspect. It is a domain specific language which makes it possible to make explicit all the components of an epidemiological model (structure, process, parameters, ...) in the form of a structured text file. Even if the authors of Emulsion do not specifically specify how this principle of separation of concerns was formalized, they highlight the fact that it allows modelers to design processes (infection, demography, detection, control, etc.) and different scales (individuals, populations, meta-populations) independently, which would allow the management of multiple hosts, the diversity of pathogens, as well as realistic detection methods and control measures.

## 5 CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have proposed to generalize the Kendrick approach to separation of concerns in compartmental epidemic models (Bui et al., 2016) to easily capture some aspects of contact network models. To do this we have applied an idea from (Bansal et al., 2007) which consists in defining the usual  $\lambda$  parameter of epidemic models as a kind of template method with three extension points.

We have then applied this approach to 2 extensions of compartmental models, Stroud et al. (Aparicio and Pascual, 2007) and Aparicio et al. (Stroud et al., 2006) and we have been able to get results close to those of (Bansal et al., 2007). Stroud et al.'s extension was defined as a very simple concern that was separate from the core SIR model. Aparicio et al.'s extension was a bit more complex to implement because it relies on a specific core concern, namely SIYR, but the resulting concerns can still be combined with other epidemic concerns in Kendrick.

Building on these promising results we aim at generalizing our approach to express more general aspects of contact networks as separate concerns. (Bansal et al., 2007) pointed out that the approach we have reported on was probably not enough to cope with heavy heterogeneity in the contact network unless much more significant efforts are made to adapt compartmental models and suggested to abandon them in this case for a full-fledged contact-network



approach. It is thus interesting to see whether separation of concerns can be even further generalized to alleviate these additional efforts. This will probably lead to developing concerns that capture more information of contact networks to the point that the original compartmental framework may become a mere specific concern itself. Finally, we also plan to include this generalized approach in the Kendrick DSL to offer better support to avoid some caveats, especially those involving name clashes or ambiguities in the global model.

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