The United Nations system: The policies of member states

Edited by Chadwick F. Alger,
Gene M. Lyons, and John E. Trent

United Nations
University Press

TOKYO · NEW YORK · PARIS

Contents

Preface

This volume of essays has been a number of years in the making. The project originated in discussions in the secretariat of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) in the mid-1980s about ongoing controversies over the role of the United Nations that threatened to weaken the system of international cooperation constructed after World War II. There were strong calls for reforming the UN system and it was thought that the international social science community might make a scholarly contribution to the reform movement by mobilizing an international research team to examine the crisis in multilateralism.

The IPSA initiative was joined by the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), the International Studies Association (ISA), and the newly formed Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS), and exploratory sessions were held at the IPSA world congress in Washington, D.C., in 1988 and at the ISA annual convention, organized in cooperation with the British International Studies Association (BISA) in London in 1989.

It was agreed during those meetings that a series of studies of national policies on the UN system should be commissioned. More than 30 years had passed since the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace had sponsored a similar comparative study of national policies on the United Nations. While there were some such studies available

since then, they were scattered and generally lacked comparison. A comparative study would not only make a positive contribution to the literature in the international organization field but also, it was hoped, stimulate continuing research on the issue.

When undertaking the eight studies of state policies in the UN system that appear in this volume, authors were asked to cover five main topics. First, a general review of the historic position of the state on international organizations and the expectations of the country about the role of the United Nations. Second, an analysis of the main UN issues in which the government has had a special interest. Third, the impact of societal factors (e.g. public opinion and interest groups) on UN policies. Fourth, how the state actually participates in international organizations (e.g. governmental organization at home and in UN missions, delegate selection, and consultation with regional groups). Fifth, the position of the state on proposals for UN reform.

With support from the Ford Foundation and the former Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, a series of draft studies were presented at a conference held in Ottawa, Canada, in early 1990. The eight national studies in this volume were originally discussed at the Ottawa meeting and were revised in late 1993 to take into account the dramatic changes in the United Nations – and in international relations, more generally – that have come about with the end of the Cold War.

At the same time, a second series of national UN studies were prepared in connection with a broad-ranging project on multilateralism (MUNS, Multilateralism and the United Nations System) sponsored by the United Nations University (UNU). The second series, like this volume, has just been published by the UNU Press under the title *State, Society, and the UN System: Changing Perspectives on Multilateralism* (ed. Keith Krause and W. Andy Knight). Together the two volumes provide a significant body of research and a base for continuing investigation as scholars and statesmen prepare to re-examine the role of the United Nations in 1995, 50 years after the signing of the UN Charter.

Transnational research cooperation can be as arduous as it is imperative. We are grateful for the perseverance and patience of the authors of the eight national studies in this book. We were faced not only with the problems of communicating over far distances but also with trying to keep up with fast-moving events in the early 1990s. Like any scholarly enterprise, we were more interested in long-term persistent trends than in current affairs. But the events that followed

the end of the Cold War have so fundamentally changed the arena of international affairs that they could not be ignored as they took shape.

Change continues, as it always does – and will. But, by the end of 1993, it was none the less possible to identify some of the main transformations that were taking place. It was time to make these studies available to a broader scholarly community and we are thankful that the UNU Press agreed to publication at a time when the 50th anniversary of the United Nations leads to serious reflection on the future of international organizations.

We also want to thank the Ford Foundation and the former Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security for their support of the Ottawa conference, our universities for the facilities that they have made available to us – the Ohio State University, Dartmouth College, and the University of Ottawa – and the colleagues who participated in the Ottawa conference. In the end, of course, each of the authors remains responsible for her/his work even while we have all shared in this common enterprise.

Chadwick F. Alger
Gene M. Lyons
John E. Trent

Part I
Perspective on the United Nations

1

The United Nations in historical perspective

Chadwick F. Alger

The purpose of this introductory essay is to provide the long view – a historical perspective against which to examine the studies of national policies on the United Nations that constitute the major part of this book. The country studies describe the policies that individual member states have followed in the United Nations over the years and the ways in which these policies have been shaped by domestic politics as well as developments in international relations. They reveal areas of convergence and divergence among member states and give us a basis for understanding the opportunities and problems in strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to enhance multilateral co-operation at a time of fundamental change in the inter-state system. But any assessment of the United Nations requires a longer and wider frame of reference to be meaningful. First, the present United Nations must be approached from a historical perspective. From the vantage point of 1994, for example, the League of Nations was founded only 74 years ago, on 10 January 1920, and the United Nations only 49 years ago, on 24 October 1945. Most of what we know about multilateral cooperation for solving common problems has come out of relatively brief experience in these two great laboratories, where we have learned from our failures as well as from our successes. Second, thinking about the role of the United Nations in the future requires a UN system perspective, including all of the or-

ganizations of the UN system – and, indeed, going beyond to regional and other limited membership organizations that are part of the total network of international institutions through which states cooperate.

The United Nations in historical perspective

The stage on which the drafters of the UN Charter performed was built during a long historical process through which human inquisitiveness, restlessness, and acquisitiveness produced ever-increasing contacts among human settlements, across ever-longer distances. The results of this historical process presented opportunities at the San Francisco Conference that had evolved out of growing experience in peaceful cooperation among peoples. But there were also constraints produced by tendencies toward wars of increasing geographic scope with weapons of rapidly increasing destructive power.

If we look back in time from San Francisco, we readily see that the United Nations is a child of the League of Nations. It incorporates important institutional developments of the League, such as an international secretariat and the growth in importance of economic and social activities during the relatively brief history of the League. The United Nations Charter also reflects efforts to gain from League failures, as in procedures for deployment of military forces by the Security Council in response to aggression. While the requirement that no permanent member of the Security Council vote against such deployment has, until recently at least, been an overwhelming restraint on the use of this power, nevertheless the unanimity required in the League was more stringent than the 9 votes out of 15 required in the United Nations.

The League too was not wholly a product of its founding conference, the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Inis L. Claude considers the century bounded by the Congress of Vienna (1815) and the outbreak of World War I (1914) as the "era of preparation for international organization."[1] He discerns three prime sources of the League of Nations. First, the League Council evolved out of the Concert of Europe created by the Congress of Vienna, convoked to create a new Europe out of the ruins of the Napoleonic Wars. Through the Concert of Europe the great powers made themselves the self-appointed guardians of the European system of states. The Concert of Europe met sporadically, some 30 times, before World War I to deal with pressing political issues. While smaller states were sometimes present at Concert meetings, the Concert was dominated by

the powerful. The League Covenant provided for a Council with explicit authority, with the continuity of regular meetings and with membership of both large and small states.

Second, the League also evolved out of the Hague System, instituted by conferences in 1899 and 1907. The League borrowed extensively from procedures for the peaceful settlement of conflicts codified by the Hague System. And the League reflected the Hague System's response to growing demands for universality, i.e. that all states take part in international conferences. In the words of the president of the 1907 Hague Conference, ''This is the first time that the representatives of all constituted States have been gathered together to discuss interests which they have in common and which contemplate the good of mankind.''[2] The notion of universality meant not only the inclusion of smaller states but also participation by states outside Europe.

Third, the League also evolved out of international bodies founded in the nineteenth century, often referred to as public international unions, to deal with common problems that transcend national boundaries. These include the Rhine Commission, established by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and the Danube Commission, established in 1848. Other examples are the International Telegraphic Union (1865), the Universal Postal Union (1874), and similar organizations dealing with health, agriculture, tariffs, railroads, standards of weight and measurement, patents and copyrights, narcotic drugs, and prison conditions. Through these organizations states acknowledged that problems were emerging that required periodic conferences where collaborative decisions would be made, to be implemented by secretariats on a day-to-day basis. The League borrowed extensively from this practice.

If we probe deeper into the past we find, of course, that the forces that fostered the antecedents of the League also had more distant beginnings. It is important to take note of these because we sometimes forget them when we emphasize more recent forms of ''interdependence.'' The industrial revolution in the eighteenth century dramatically changed the technology of transportation, communication, and manufacturing. This in turn fostered the need for international organizations to deal with problems created by more rapid transportation and communication and by growth in international marketing, in importing of raw materials, and in the international interdependence of labour.

Some might say that humanity was placed on an irreversible path

toward the League and the United Nations even earlier, in the late fifteenth century, when Europeans began a pattern of worldwide exploration that eventually led to extensive empires in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and to Western domination of the world. William McNeill dates the "closure of global ecumene" as 1500–1650. The result was to link the Atlantic face of Europe with the shores of most of the earth. "What had always before been the extreme fringe of Eurasia became, within little more than a generation, a focus of the world's sea lanes, influencing and being influenced by every human society within easy reach of the sea."[3] European-based empires eventually led to the creation of a worldwide system of states. In its early years the United Nations was deeply involved in the creation of independent states out of former colonial empires. Much present activity in the United Nations is concerned with the efforts of these new states to transcend their economic dependence on the West. In a fundamental sense the conditions that fomented demands for a New International Economic Order in the 1970s, and for a New World Information and Communications Order in the 1980s, have their roots in the "closure of global ecumene" in 1500–1650.

Of course, the creators of "global ecumene" were not the first builders of empires; they were preceded by the Roman, Greek, Persian, Mongol, Inca, Han, and many others. And the "global ecumene" was preceded by the closure of the "Eurasian ecumene" in the "first century (or perhaps earlier), [when] the consolidation of a Kushan empire forged a link between Parthia and China, completing a chain of civilized empires that extended all across Eurasia, from the Atlantic to the Pacific."[4] Across this vast ecumene McNeill describes exchange in art and religion, migration of useful plants and animals, the spread of disease, some technological exchange, and trade. For example, "cotton, sugar cane and chickens, all first domesticated in India, spread to both China and Western Eurasia during this period, while China contributed apricots and peaches, perhaps also citrus fruits, cherries, and almonds to Western Eurasia. In exchange, the Chinese imported alfalfa and a number of vegetable crops, as well as the Iranian great horses."

Thus we see that humankind has long had tendencies to travel, migrate, exchange, borrow, and dominate, and to invent ever new technologies to broaden the geographic scope of these activities. This has produced a growing number of international organizations, some 286 international governmental organizations (IGOs) and 4,696 international non-governmental (non-profit) organizations (INGOs) by

6

1992.[5] At least 34 of the IGOs and 426 of the INGOs are global in scope. The autonomous organizations that comprise the United Nations system alone account for 18 of the global IGOs. Although the UN system was not a necessary descendant of the "first ecumene," it can be viewed as a natural outcome of human tendencies to extend contacts and activities to the greatest distance possible, thus creating the need for permanent international organizations that facilitate co-operation and problem-solving.

In developing a historical perspective, it is worth remembering Claude's depiction of the century between 1815 and 1914 as the "era of *preparation* for international organization." How should we characterize the period between the founding of the League of Nations (1920) and 1990? Very apt would be the "era of *preparation* for global governance." What have the pioneers in this first era of global organizations left as their heritage?
– they have achieved universality;
– they have created a network of global organizations responsive to a growing agenda of global problems;
– they have established a continuous, worldwide presence of this system of organizations, in some 134 cities in all continents;
– they have made multilateral decision-making commonplace and have developed new procedures for achieving consensus;
– they have greatly increased the number of tools available for peace-building;
– they have identified and have made substantial progress in multilateral definition of a set of fundamental global values, such as peace, human rights, development, and ecological balance;
– they have made some progress in breaking down barriers between the people of the world and global governmental organizations;
– they have made limited progress in linking scholars to the UN system.

Imagine, if you will, how surprised the founders of the League, or the United Nations, would be to learn what has emerged from their initiatives. Imagine, too, how much easier their task would have been had they been able to approach the future with these achievements already in place. This imagination will set the stage on which we will now consider each element in the heritage that we have received from the "era of *preparation* for global governance." The "era of competent global governance" is still in the future, but we have come much further than most people realize. The greatest danger we face in the near future is that we may become so incapacitated

by dwelling on how far we have to go that we will fail to move forward on the solid stepping stones that have been laid by those who have gone before.

The achievement of universality

The universality of United Nations membership now seems so ordinary that its significance is often overlooked. At its founding the League had only 29 members, including 10 from Europe, 10 from Latin America, and only 9 from all the rest of the world.[6] The hope of League founders that League membership would be universal was never realized. Although 63 states were eventually members of the League, there were never more than 58 members at one time.[7] The United Nations has grown from 51 members to 184 members since its founding. The only state that has not ratified the UN Charter, other than a handful of very small ones that choose to remain outside, is Switzerland. Nevertheless, Switzerland is a member of many agencies of the UN system.

In achieving universality the United Nations first overcame the earlier exclusion of states that opposed the United Nations coalition in World War II. Later it admitted many states that were carved out of former colonial empires in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Oceania. Not only were these new states admitted to the United Nations simultaneously with the acquisition of independence, but the United Nations played a significant role in their relatively peaceful independence process. Even before independence, future leaders of new states, such as Julius Nyerere, testified before the Fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly and spent many months politicking for independence in the lounges and corridors of UN Headquarters. Still later the United Nations quickly accepted the membership of states created out of the former Soviet Union and several former Yugoslav republics.

Now that virtual universal membership of states has been achieved, there is a tendency of some to emphasize its drawbacks, particularly the fact that all states, despite great disparities in size, have one vote in UN bodies. These disparities are very great. UN members range in population from China, with 1 billion people, to over 30 members with under 1 million people. They range in per capita GNP from those with a few hundred US$ to some with over US$20,000. They range from the worldwide reach of missiles, ships, and aircraft of the United States and Russia to numerous states with little more than

local police forces. On the other hand, despite the fact that all states have one vote, there are countervailing factors: China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia have a veto in the Security Council; the wealthy benefit from weighted voting in the World Bank and the IMF; and consensual voting procedures have become more frequent, recognizing that majorities that do not take into account the wishes of the wealthy and militarily powerful may not be able to implement their decisions. Also, it cannot be denied that states with military and financial power use their influence to win the votes of others. Moreover, countries with great wealth and many trained people have far greater capacity to represent their interests in UN politics through the assignment of large numbers of people to UN bodies.

Whatever the difficulties of universality under conditions of one vote for each state, general acceptance that all states have a right to sit at the conference tables of humankind is a significant achievement for the United Nations. Those who worked for universality in the late nineteenth century would be stunned were they to wander into the UN General Assembly (or the plenary of any UN agency) and see an Assembly of 184 members. The same would be true of founders of the League and the United Nations. If we very arbitrarily assign these states to five customary regions, there are now 53 from Africa, 42 from Asia, 44 from Europe, 35 from the Americas, and 10 from Oceania. Of course, elements of the old Concert notion of rule by the powerful still remain – in the Security Council, in superpower negotiations outside the United Nations, and in a variety of economic and financial bodies within and outside the United Nations. Nevertheless, significant progress toward universal participation has been made.

Appreciation of the significance of universality is enhanced by recognizing that only a few states have embassies in virtually all other states. Most states have embassies only in the big states, in states in their region, and in a few others. It is common practice for a single embassy to be accredited to a number of states. Thus the achievement of UN universality has had a fundamental impact on possibilities for bilateral, as well as multilateral, contact. And it is an indispensable prerequisite for global problem-solving. States that would erode the principle of universality, either by withdrawing from UN organizations or by denying membership to others, are threatening one of the most precious achievements over the last 74 years. The opportunity for all states to speak to all others, and the obligation of

all others to listen, is now widely accepted as a fundamental principle of the common law of humanity.

A growing system of organizations

Largely as a result of the impact of new technology on all human activities, the central governments of states have greatly expanded the domains of their activity, resulting in a great increase in the number of governmental bureaux. As these same human activities have spilled across state borders, states have found it necessary to create international governmental organizations (IGOs) whose responsibilities mirror the departments of the governments of states. As a result, the number of IGOs grew from 37 in 1909 to 286 in 1992.[8]

In addition to the United Nations itself and the International Court of Justice, in 1945 there were six specialized agencies (established by separate treaty). By 1992, there were 15 organizations created by and reporting to the General Assembly, 16 autonomous organizations (specialized agencies), related to the United Nations by special agreement, and 2 other autonomous affiliated organizations, making a total of 33 (table 1.1).

Table 1.2 offers a brief snapshot of the scope of UN system functions by alphabetically listing key words in the name of each agency. This simple list portrays the remarkable functional scope of the UN system, ranging from atomic energy, to health, labour, meteorology, telecommunications, and women. Included in this table are a number of commissions of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) through which certain functions that involve a number of agencies are coordinated, such as narcotic drugs and natural resources. As would be the case with a similar listing of bureaux of any national government, this table offers only a partial view. The actual array of functions and problems covered is much more numerous. For example, communications is a significant concern of UNESCO but does not appear in the organization's name. Numerous agencies are involved in most of the functions listed, as reflected by the fact that aspects of health are not only on the agenda of WHO, but also a concern of the ILO, UNIDO, the FAO, UNESCO, the IAEA, and other agencies.

Thus the United Nations, through the actions of its members, has been remarkably responsive to the accelerating need for institutions for human governance. For example, there has been significant responsiveness to the need for global organizations for control of the

Table 1.1 **Agencies in UN system**

Organizations created by and reporting to the General Assembly

Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO)
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat)
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
United Nations Conference on Trade & Development (UNCTAD)
United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
  (UNRWA)
United Nations University (UNU)
United Nations International Research & Training Institute for the Advancement of
  Women (INSTRAW)
World Food Council (WFC)
World Food Programme (WFP)

Specialized agencies

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
International Development Association (IDA)
International Finance Corporation (IFC)
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
International Labour Organization (ILO)
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
Universal Postal Union (UPU)
World Health Organization (WHO)
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
World Meteorological Organization (WMO)

Other autonomous affiliated organizations

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

---

spread of nuclear weapons (IAEA) and for protection of the environment (UNEP) and also in drafting plans for comprehensive governance for the oceans, in the still not implemented Law of the Sea Treaty. At the same time, growth in the number of organizations in

11

Table 1.2 **Primary functions of UN agencies**

Function	Agency[a]
Atomic energy	IAEA
Children	UNICEF
Civil aviation	ICAO
Crime prevention and criminal justice	ECOSOC commission
Development	IBRD, IDA, IFC, UNDP
Disaster relief	UNDRO
Education/science/culture	UNESCO
Environment	UNEP
Food/agriculture	FAO, IFAD, WFC, WFP
Health	WHO
Human rights	ECOSOC commission
Human settlements	UNCHS
Industrial development	UNIDO
Intellectual property	WIPO
International standards of accounting and reporting	ECOSOC commission
Labour	ILO
Maritime	IMO
Meteorology	WMO
Monetary	IMF
Narcotic drugs	ECOSOC commission
Natural resources	ECOSOC commission
Peace-keeping/observation	UNFICYP, UNDOF, UNIFIL, etc.
Population	UNFPA
Postal	UPU
Refugees	UNHCR, UNRWA
Research/training	UNITAR, UNU
Telecommunications	ITU
Trade/development	UNCTAD
Trade/tariffs	GATT
Transnational corporations	ECOSOC commission
Transport of dangerous goods	ECOSOC commission
Women	UNIFEM, INSTRAW

a. See appendix for full names of organizations.

the UN system has been responsive to the interests and needs of new members, particularly those arising out of the self-determination movement in the third world. In this case, third world countries have believed that existing organizations have not served their needs and have used their voting majority to create new agencies. Examples are the creation of UNCTAD as a response to dissatisfaction with the Bretton Woods ideology of GATT and the creation of UNIDO as a

result of dissatisfaction with the attention given to third world industrialization by the International Labour Organization and other UN agencies.

There is a tendency in some quarters to dwell on the financial costs of new agencies and the difficulties of coordination that they create for the UN system. On the other hand, when our concern is to identify potential for the enhancement of global cooperation in the future, we must look upon growth in the UN system with considerable appreciation. Since no global problem respects state borders, the difficulties confronted in coping with these problems would be much greater were the UN system not already struggling to develop organizations whose geographic reach is as broad as the geographic scope of problems to be confronted.

A broadening geographic presence

The fact that governmental activity seems to require one central headquarters while at the same time it must appear to belong to all whom it serves has frequently been a problem for all levels of government. In some states, such as the United States and Brazil, new capital cities have even been created in response to this problem. For a system of global governance, the problem is even more difficult. It would seem that legitimacy for the system requires that headquarters be scattered. Multiple headquarters also offer options for transferring activities in times when specific headquarters may not offer a hospitable site for dealing with certain issues. One example would be the rapid movement of the UN General Assembly to the UN headquarters in Geneva in 1990 when the United States government prevented the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Yasser Arafat, from addressing the General Assembly in New York.

When New York became the headquarters for the newly founded United Nations, the old League headquarters in Geneva became a second headquarters city for the UN system, with special significance for economic and social activities. At the same time the new International Court of Justice took over the headquarters of its predecessor, the World Court, in the Hague. But there are now UN agencies in 14 other cities, as indicated in table 1.3. Specialized agencies now also have headquarters in Berne (UPU), London (IMO), Montreal (ICAO), Paris (UNESCO), Rome (FAO, IFAD), Vienna (UNIDO), and Washington (IFC, IMF, IDA, IBRD). Headquarters of other agencies are located in Nairobi (UNCHS, UNEP), Rome (WFC,

Table 1.3 **Headquarters in the UN system**

Addis Ababa ECA[b]	*The Hague* ICJ	*Rome* FAO[a] IFAD[a]
Baghdad ESCWA[b]	*London* IMO[a]	WFC WFP
Bangkok ESCAP[b]	*Montreal* ICAO[a]	*Santiago* ECLAC[b]
Berne UNP[a]	*Nairobi* UNCHS[a] UNEP	*Santo Domingo* INSTRAW
Geneva GATT[a] ILO[a] ITU[a] WHO[a] WIPO[a] WMO[a] UNCTAD UNDRO UNHCR UNCHS UNEP ECE[b]	*New York* United Nations UNDP UNFPA UNICEF UNITAR *Paris* UNESCO[a]	*Tokyo* UNU *Vienna* IAEA[a] UNIDO[a] UNRWA[a] *Washington* IFC[a] IMF[a] IDA[a] IBRD[a]

a. Specialized agencies and other autonomous organizations (created by separate treaties) within the system. All other agencies created under the authority of the General Assembly.
b. Regional commissions.

WFP), Santo Domingo (INSTRAW), Tokyo (UNU), and Vienna (UNRWA). The presence of UN headquarters in these 13 cities enhances the global legitimacy of the UN system and extends its potential for direct contact with different societies and regions. But the potential gained from the geographic spread of headquarters is still limited by the fact that most headquarters are located in North America and Europe. Few are located outside these two areas: the UN Environment Programme and UN Centre for Human Settlements (Nairobi), the UN Women's Organization (Santo Domingo), and the United Nations University (Tokyo). But the United Nations has established a presence in four additional cities through the headquarters of regional economic commissions in Baghdad, Bangkok, Addis

14

Ababa, and Santiago. (The fifth regional headquarters is located in Geneva.)

The global reach of the UN system is extended beyond these 17 cities by offices in 117 others, making a total of 134 cities. Included in this presence in many cities are 17 peace-keeping and observer missions, UNDP offices, UN Information Centres, and field offices of UNICEF, UNRWA, UNHCR, and other organizations. This presence of the UN system in 134 cities reflects a significant evolution of the role and activities of global organizations since the founding of the League. These organizations were initially created as places where representatives of states came together to debate matters of common interest. But as they developed an array of field operations, these organizations have found it necessary to dispatch representatives, and a diversity of technical experts, to their member states.

Procedures for multilateral decision-making

Joint decision-making by states with sovereignty (at least in legal terms) has always presented problems in international organizations. Deferring to the reality of state sovereignty, the League Covenant required unanimous decisions. The UN Charter departed from this tradition by requiring a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly on "important questions" and a simple majority on others, including matters of procedure. The Security Council requires 9 of 15, or three-fifths. Of course, on substantive questions the Charter requires "the concurring votes of the [five] permanent members" of the Security Council. The work of the Security Council has been greatly facilitated by an interpretation of this clause to mean that abstention or absence of a permanent member does not prevent passage of a resolution.

One of the most significant contributions of the United Nations has been to make multilateral decision-making an ordinary occurrence. This has been accompanied by the development of written and un-written procedures for calling meetings, for electing officers, for public debate, for private negotiations, and for relations with press, IGOs, and INGOs.[9] Much of this activity is carried out by permanent missions of states located at headquarters of UN agencies; in Dag Hammarskjöld's judgement, they "may well come to be regarded as the most important 'common law' development ... within the constitutional framework of the Charter."[10] Thus, the participants at headquarters of UN agencies have evolved new procedures

15

and permanent institutions for exchanging views, debating, and reaching agreement. It is a shortcoming of most works on international relations and international organizations that they barely mention these developments.

Much attention has been given by the media in the West to so-called "automatic voting majorities" through which third world majorities can pass resolutions that sometimes cannot be implemented because these majorities do not include the states with the power and resources required for carrying out the resolutions. Certainly this is sometimes a problem in UN bodies. On the other hand, approaches have been developed to deal with this problem that merit more attention than they receive. In fact, voting in most UN bodies is the exception rather than the rule. A high percentage of decisions are taken by consensus. Often a consensus reflects the fact that a resolution is non-controversial. On the other hand, elaborate procedures have been developed, through UN practice, for bringing consensus out of deeply conflictual situations.[11] For example, a study of voting in the UN General Assembly reveals that 52 per cent of the 320 resolutions adopted in 1986 were accepted without a vote, and 12 per cent of those voted upon received no negative votes. Thus, 64 per cent of the resolutions adopted (a total of 204) were adopted without a negative vote.[12]

Increasing success in the attainment of consensus in General Assembly resolutions is reflected in the fact that in 1986 an average of 80 member states voted in favour of adopted resolutions, the highest in the history of the United Nations, with an average of only five negative votes.[13] On the other hand, resistance of a few states to the general move toward consensual decision-making is reflected in the fact that "resolutions with a single negative vote went from a low of 12% in 1979 and 1980 to 27% in 1986." The willingness of the United States to stand alone is revealed by the fact that it cast the lone negative vote 98 times in the 1980s, twice as many as all the other UN members combined. "That averages out to 16.3 times a year since 1981, as opposed to 2.7 times in the late 1970s."[14]

It is important to recognize that UN decision-making is a multi-layered process in which public debate is only the tip of the iceberg.[15] Certainly public debate is indispensable. Here public declarations are made that are targeted to a variety of audiences – perhaps the press, the public at home, the opposition at home, or even the home government, which must be assured that instructions were explicitly carried out. The public debate is also useful in highlighting

different viewpoints and in revealing which states share these views. But a consensus, or even two-thirds of the votes, often cannot be achieved by public debate alone. This usually requires negotiations, carried out by a few representatives of significant points of view, in a more intimate setting outside the public arena. Here mediators schooled through vast experience in UN decision-making often make a consensus possible.

Skilled chairpersons of public meetings know how to orchestrate a dialogue between the public and private arena – prodding the private negotiations when useful, playing for time when it is needed by allowing seemingly useless public statements to go on and on. Often the whole process is monitored and creatively helped by members of the Secretariat, who not only have a vast background in the subject matter but also have acquired a feel for where an eventual consensus might be pulled out of a seemingly impossible array of conflicting viewpoints.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS), completed in 1983 after a decade of negotiations, can be examined for insight on what has been learned about decision-making in the UN system since the drafting of the Charter. In the assembly of the International Sea Bed Authority (ISBA), as in the UN General Assembly, each member has one vote and decisions on issues of substance require a two-thirds vote. The council also requires a two-thirds vote but has a more stringent requirement of three-quarters for nominations to the governing board of the Enterprise, the seabed mining arm of the Authority.

The attainment of consensus in the ISBA assembly is facilitated by provisions for a five-day delay on issues of substance, which can be required by one-fifth of those voting. The council has more elaborate procedures. A consensus is required (1) for actions that would protect less developed countries that are land-based mineral producers, (2) for rules for seabed mining, (3) for rules for sharing profits from mining by the Enterprise, and (4) for amendments to the treaty. A consensus is defined as the absence of formal objection. If a consensus is lacking, a Conciliation Committee is created that is required to report to the council within 14 days. If no consensus has been achieved, the Conciliation Committee must report the reasons.

The treaty also provides for the representation of specific interests on the council. This reflects further development of provisions in the UN Charter for the representation of both big powers (permanent members) and smaller powers on the Security Council and of govern-

17

ing powers and non-governing powers on the Trusteeship Council. Half of the 36-member council of the ISBA is to be composed of representatives from states having specific interests: four from states with the largest investment in the seabed, four from states that consume over 2 per cent or import over 2 per cent of minerals mined in the seabed, four from states exporting minerals mined in the seabed, and six from less developed countries with these special interests – landlocked, large population, major importers or potential producers of minerals mined in the seabed, or least developed. The other 18 members are to be apportioned so as to ensure equitable geographic distribution of council membership.

The point we are trying to make is not that these provisions of the LOS Treaty will necessarily improve on UN Charter procedures for representation for attainment of consensus. Rather, the significance is to underline the value of the UN as a laboratory for development of new procedures for decision-making and dispute settlement. It is to be regretted that there are states that are inhibiting the rapid establishment of the new institutions called for by the treaty. These would permit significant new experiments in the UN laboratory for the improvement of multilateral governance.

Creation of new tools for peace-building

During the last 70 years the League of Nations and the United Nations have demonstrated remarkable creativity in expanding the array of available tools for peace-building and in experimenting with these tools (fig. 1.1).[16] The League of Nations Covenant was essentially an effort to strengthen *Diplomacy* (1) by adding *Peaceful Settlement* (4) of disputes (through mediation, conciliation, and the World Court), to replace *Balance of Power* (2) with *Collective Security* (3), and to create procedures for *Disarmament and Arms Control* (5). These approaches emphasize the use of, and control of, violence in the pursuit of peace, sometimes referred to as "negative peace."

Practice under the League, and some of the lessons of World War II, contributed to the drafting of the UN Charter in 1945. Significantly, these three approaches were again incorporated into the United Nations Charter in 1945, although with some changes, particularly strengthening of collective security. But by far the greatest difference between the Covenant and the Charter is the fact that those assembled at San Francisco added three peace strategies: *"Functional" Cooperation* (6) on economic and social issues, *Self-Determi-*

18

19th century	1919	1945	1950–

NEGATIVE

I — Diplomacy (1), Balance of Power (2)

League Covenant — Collective Security (3), Peaceful Settlement (4), Disarmament/Arms Control (5) — II

UN Charter — Collective Security, Peaceful Settlement, Disarmament/Arms Control

UN Practice — Collective Security, Peace-keeping (9), Peaceful Settlement, Disarmament/Arms Control

POSITIVE

Functionalism (6), Self-Determinism (7), Human Rights (8) — III

Functionalism, Self-Determinism, Human Rights

Economic Development (10), Economic Equity (NIEO) (11), Communications Equity (12), Ecological Balance (13), Governance for Commons (14) — IV

Fig. 1.1 **The emergence of peace tools** (Source: ref. 16)

19

nation (7), and *Human Rights* (8). These approaches, in contrast to the earlier three, emphasize the creation of peaceful economic, social, and political relationships, sometimes referred to as "positive peace." The new Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was based on the experience of the ILO and the growth in functional activities of the League during its brief history. The Trusteeship Council continued League supervision over the treatment of colonies seized by the victors in war, but it was the Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories (Chapter XI) that opened the way for future self-determination advances under the Charter. And the mention of human rights seven times in the Charter, including the second sentence of the preamble, was a dramatic departure from the League Covenant.

The United Nations has now existed more than twice as long as the League. As our most significant peace laboratory, the present UN system of organizations reflects very significant learning since its founding. We have learned that collective security, actually a form of deterrence, is as dangerous as any other deterrence strategy if it fails. The application of collective security in the Korean War, in which we tottered on the edge of World War III, taught us this. On the other hand, *Peace-keeping* (7) forces are a useful new invention. With the UN Emergency Forces positioned between Egypt and Israel as prototypes (UNEF I, 1956–1967; UNEF II, 1973–1979), peace-keeping forces have usually patrolled a neutral zone along a cease-fire line, employing only small arms in self-defence.

UN forces dispatched in 1992 have been plunged into much more complicated situations involving civil war and ethnic strife. In order to cope with these kinds of challenges the Secretary-General has urged the creation of *peace-enforcement* units. These would "be more heavily armed than peacekeeping forces and would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national forces. Deployment and operation of such forces would be under the authorization of the Security Council and would, as in the case of peace-keeping forces, be under the command of the Secretary-General. [The Secretary-General considers] such peace-enforcement units to be warranted as a provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter."[17] Thus, as the United Nations faces new challenges, it is groping toward the development of a new peace tool that lies somewhere between peace-keeping and collective security.

Table 1.4 lists the 17 peace-keeping and observer missions in place in late 1993. Remarkable is the rapid creation of four operations in 1991,

20

Table 1.4 **UN peace-keeping forces and observer missions, November 1993**

MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, 1991–
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique, 1992–
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, 1991–
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, 1993–
UNAVEM II	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II, 1991–
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (Golan Heights), 1974–
UNFICYP	United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, 1964–
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 1978–
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission, 1991–
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti, 1993–
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, 1949–
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, 1993–
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, 1993–
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda–Rwanda, 1993–
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia II, 1993–
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force (Yugoslavia), 1992–
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (Palestine), 1948–

two in 1992, and six in 1993, with geographic reach from Cambodia, to Iraq–Kuwait, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Angola, Western Sahara, and El Salvador. But the long duration of the UN presence in India/Pakistan, Cyprus, and the Middle East none the less signifies that we still have not mastered blending peace-keeping activity and peaceful settlement of the disputes that produced the need for peace-keeping.

Functional collaboration has flowered as the UN system has developed agencies that cope with a broad array of global issues, such as health, refugees, labour, education, clean water, communications, balance of payments, and housing. Self-determination has been one of the United Nations' greatest success stories, as it has assisted a multitude of states in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean to independence and immediate UN membership.

With respect to human rights, under UN auspices the states assembled have drafted standards for human life on the planet through the Declaration of Human Rights, Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and an array of other treaties on genocide, women's rights, elimination of racial discrimination, rights of children, rights of labour, environment, hunger and malnutrition, religious discrimination, and many others.

Table 1.5 **Selected documents providing global standards for human relations**

1948	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
1949	Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention
1951	United Nations Convention of Refugees
1952	Convention on the Political Rights of Women
1960	Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples
1965	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
1966	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and Optional Protocol
1970	Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
1972	Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment
1974	Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order
	Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of the General Assembly
	Universal Declaration on Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition
1978	Draft Declaration on Fundamental Principles Governing the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding and to Combating War Propaganda, Racialism and Apartheid
1979	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
1981	Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief
1987	Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
1989	Convention on the Rights of the Child

Table 1.5 provides a selected list of declarations and treaties that now provide global standards for human relations. Fortunately, the existence of these standards has now raised our expectations for fulfilment; unfortunately, progress in implementation of these standards has been very slow. But this should not prevent us from celebrating the tremendous achievements of the drafters of these new norms for human aspiration.

With the attainment of self-determination by states created by colonialism, the number of third world states in the United Nations grew to over 100. The difficulties in achieving successful functional cooperation in a United Nations in which wealth and resources are so unequally distributed soon became apparent. Thus began the effort to narrow the gap through *Development* (10) programmes in the

third world. Despite significant successes in some locations, the gap between the rich and the poor of the world continued to grow, at the same time that the world economy became increasingly inter-dependent.

As worldwide systems for exploitation of resources, production, marketing, and communications reached ever more intrusively into the most distant human settlements and rural areas, the peacelessness of population explosion in urban shantytowns in third world cities provoked a searching dialogue on the meaning of development. This debate shifted the focus from development projects in third world countries to the inequities in the international economic system. A debate that began in the General Assembly grew into a UN Confer-ence on Trade and Development, to an UNCTAD organization, to a demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). In 1974 this campaign for *International Economic Equity* (11) produced a Declaration for an NIEO, A Plan of Action for an NIEO, and a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.

Third world frustration over the unwillingness of the industrialized countries to conduct global negotiations over an NIEO contributed to demands for *International Communications Equity* (12) and emer-gence in the 1980s of the third world demand, centred in UNESCO, for a New World Information and Communications Order (NWICO). The domination and control of worldwide communications by media corporations based in cities in the industrialized countries mirror those of transnational corporations for resource exploitation, produc-tion, and marketing. As a consequence, third world leaders complain that control of worldwide communications by corporations in Europe and North America prevents the people in the industrialized coun-tries from learning about the actual condition of third world peoples and the reasonableness of demands for an NIEO.

One could say that demands for an NIEO and an NWICO not only offered fuller understanding of the meaning of development, but in turn illuminated the full meaning of self-determination. Without changes in an international economic and communication system whose roots reach back into the days of colonial empires, the self-determination process will not be completed.

At the same time, the global dialogue on the meaning of develop-ment has challenged assumptions about the conditions under which functional cooperation could contribute to peace. It had been as-sumed that functional organizations such as UNESCO could provide arenas for collaboration among technical experts who would be iso-

lated from political controversy. Bringing issues such as the NWICO into UNESCO has been viewed by some industrialized countries as ''politicization'' of agencies that should remain apolitical. But, to many in the third world, continued collaboration among technicians was intolerable so long as worldwide economic and communications structures were inequitable. From their perspective, this structure, and its impact on the outcome of functional cooperation, is an appropriate concern for agencies such as UNESCO. This dialogue has caused us to think in a more penetrating way about the relevance of equitable economic and communications relationships to fruitful functional collaboration in dealing with global problems.

Questions of *Ecological Balance* (13) too can be seen as evolving out of global debate on the meaning of development. Ecological problems became a prominent issue on the agenda of the UN system, beginning with the UN Environment Conference in Stockholm in 1972. The initiative came from the industrialized countries, and at first the environment was perceived to be their issue. Initially the third world even suspected that environmental initiatives from the industrialized countries were a covert strategy for preventing third world development. But by the time of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, environmental issues were perceived to be a concern of people from all parts of the world. A new UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) is now leading the search for meanings of development that can include ecological balance. At the same time, the squalor, disease, and death that result from destruction of the human habitat are increasingly judged to have the moral equivalence of similar peacelessness produced by weapons of war.

As new technology has enabled humankind to exploit more extensively the depth and the breadth of the commons (atmosphere, space, oceans, and the two polar regions), this activity becomes an ever greater threat to peace – threatening war, environmental disaster, inequitable sharing of resources of the commons, and inequitable access to the transportation and communications potential of the commons. Thus *Governance for the Global Commons* (14) has emerged as a significant dimension of peace. The most significant event in the struggle to develop peaceful governance for the commons has been the drafting of the UN Law of the Sea Convention (1982). The convention sets territorial limits, and provides regulations for ocean transit, for sharing of resources in and under the oceans, for control of pollution, and for scientific research. The convention also applies les-

24

sons that have been learned in the UN laboratory since the Charter was drafted. These include new approaches to representing interests on international decision-making bodies, procedures for developing a consensus before voting on controversial issues, and new approaches for the settlement of disputes.

Our brief overview has revealed remarkable progress in fashioning tools that are now available for enhancing peace and well-being in the twenty-first century. Not only have Functionalism, Self-determination, and Human Rights been supplemented by Economic Development, Economic and Communications Equity, Ecological Balance, and Governance for the Commons, but these new themes have deepened our insight on neglected dimensions of earlier approaches. We now understand better the full meaning of self-determination, as we have learned about its economic and communications dimensions. We now have insights on the ecological aspect of human rights. At the same time, the Law of the Sea Treaty has provided creative new kinds of conflict-resolution procedures.

Multilateral definition of values

It is very important that the tools that have been enumerated have largely been created in UN laboratories in which representatives from virtually all states have participated – rich and poor, large and small, powerful and vulnerable. This great diversity of perspectives has often produced acrimonious debates. But the product has been deeper understanding of values such as peace, development, human rights, and ecological balance. Now it is widely agreed that peace must encompass both negative peace (i.e. stopping killing by bombs and guns) and positive peace (i.e. preventing loss of life and human capacity through social structures that are responsible for death and incapacity brought on by poverty, lack of health care, and malnutrition). Thus it is now widely accepted that war is but one kind of *peacelessness*. In most years, poverty causes more death, suffering, and human incapacity than does war.

At the same time, a global dialectic has challenged earlier tendencies to assume that development necessarily means acceptance of Western development models, by raising concern for equity, self-reliance, and basic needs for involved people. This dialectic has diminished the earlier gap between economic development and politics as a result of an increasing belief that the people themselves must decide what their basic needs are.

The placing of civil and political rights first in the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights signified the fact that these rights tended to be given priority immediately after World War II. But an increase in the number of third world states was accompanied by greater emphasis on economic, social, and cultural rights such that increasingly it is understood that progress in the two domains of human rights must move together. At the same time one now frequently hears that international peace and a life-supporting environment are human rights because without them all other rights would be meaningless.

Thus, as we approach the twenty-first century, we can apply what we have learned in global dialogue about the meaning of peace (and peacelessness), development (and maldevelopment), human rights (and inhumaneness), and ecological balance (and pollution).[18] We have learned that in different circumstances people are inclined to emphasize different aspects of these basic human values and that those involved in efforts to advance them globally must be responsive to different viewpoints. We have also learned that all four values are interdependent. When one pursues each to its wider implications one soon intersects the others. For example, the pursuit of non-violence eventually leads to human rights, and the pursuit of human rights eventually leads to development. From this I conclude that the pursuit of peace and human fulfilment in the twenty-first century will require a continuing global dialogue on the meaning of basic values. For purposes of explicitness and simplicity, we might say that we have learned that peace in its broadest sense includes non-violence, economic well-being, social justice, and ecological balance. Sometimes these four values complement each other and sometimes they seem to be contradictory. A global political process with wide participation is required in order to decide how all of these basic values can be maximized at any point in time.

Non-governmental organizations

The ideology of the state system tends to wall people off from the United Nations. This ideology asserts that a small politico-military élite in each state will take care of "foreign affairs," including relations with the United Nations. This ideology assumes that "foreign affairs" requires very special competence and experience not possessed, or attainable, by "ordinary people" – only a small élite can define the "national interest." This ideology, widely accepted by the

people themselves, even in the democracies, inhibits participation and thus prevents most people from learning about "foreign affairs." As a result, most people in the world know little about the UN system and its vast array of activities. And, cut off from the people, it is difficult for the United Nations to be responsive to peoples' needs worldwide.

As the United Nations attempts to deal with global problems, there are contradictions between its basic structure and the tasks it is called upon to perform. It is fundamentally a union of states founded to preserve the system of states. Its relationships with the peoples of the world are normally carried out through state officials, who naturally wish to preserve the prerogatives of states, including their own positions in the state system. Compounding the difficulty is the fact that UN officials have often received their training and early experience in the foreign affairs establishments of states, and often look forward to returning to these establishments. The élitist traditions of these institutions inhibit the development of long-term dialogue with people for assessing needs, defining solutions, and acquiring the widespread legitimacy that permits implementation of programmes.

The point here certainly is not that state officials are necessarily less concerned about serving peoples' needs than are UN officials. Rather the point is that state officials tend to be trapped in "foreign affairs" establishments with traditions that inhibit their responsiveness to these needs, particularly when international cooperation is required. The consequences of these traditions are dramatically revealed by the fact that these state politico-military bureaucracies devote 100 times more to military expenditures than they contribute to the UN system.

Of course, the state system has not been impervious to changes that permit wider participation. Obvious is the great growth in international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), from 176 in 1909, to 832 in 1951, to 4,696 in 1992.[19] These figures include only permanent organizations, with rotating headquarters and officers and with membership and financial support from at least three countries. In this century the involvement of non-governmental organizations, both national and international, with international governmental organizations (IGOs) has been increasing. The International Labour Organization (ILO), founded in 1919, was a trailblazer in its tripartite form of representation, including labour and management, as well as national governments, in its deliberations. The League Charter charged members "to encourage and promote the establishment and

cooperation of duly authorized voluntary national Red Cross organizations" (Article 25). Responsive to pressure from representatives of non-governmental organizations present at the San Francisco Conference, the United Nations Charter provides that "The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence" (Article 71). In pursuit of this clause, some non-governmental organizations may speak before the Council and many others have observer status. UNESCO has a similar arrangement under Article XI of the UNESCO Constitution, and other UN agencies have similar provisions.

In the early years of the United Nations there was a tendency for many INGO observers at the United Nations to perceive their role as limited to communicating information about the United Nations to their members, and to developing support for the United Nations within their countries. But, through the years, INGOs, and some of their national counterparts (NGOs) present at the United Nations, have taken a more assertive role in UN politics. INGO and NGO representatives attending UN meetings increasingly lobby with state representatives for specific proposals and also propose to them resolutions for UN bodies. And through their national organizations they coordinate this effort with pressure on national governments. It is widely recognized that constant prodding by INGOs and NGOs has been a significant factor in UN human rights achievements.[20] The significance of these efforts was recognized when Amnesty International was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Another example is the successful transnational campaign against infant formula marketing practices in the third world that led to the creation by the World Health Assembly of standards for marketing infant formula.[21] INGOs and NGOs have also played important roles in the United Nations' response to the needs of refugees.[22] Media attention to INGOs and NGOs reached its zenith with their participation in the UNCED conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. More than 1,400 were accredited to the official conference and many more participated in the parallel Global Forum.

Important in the increasingly active role of INGOs in the UN system has been the creation, and growing activity, of coalitions of INGOs and NGOs represented at headquarters of UN organizations. A prominent example is the Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations in Consultative Status with the UN Economic and Social Council (CONGO), active in Geneva and New York. Dramatic evi-

dence of the growing importance of non-governmental organizations has been their participation in special UN conferences on global issues. On these occasions they have published their own newspapers, and have run their own conferences concurrently with the inter-state UN conference. In a major departure from tradition, representatives of INGOs were permitted to address the plenary of the Second UN Disarmament Conference. Also reflective of a new style of non-governmental participation was the successful activity of Canadian organizations at the World Food Conference in Rome. Through a telephone network in Canada they brought pressure on the Canadian government in Ottawa to authorize Canadian government representatives in Rome to increase the Canadian pledge for food aid. At the same time, some third world NGOs are developing strategies for preserving local self-reliance while simultaneously collaborating with their own national government and external INGOs and NGOs.[23]

Despite the remarkable transformation that has taken place in the political style of some non-governmental organizations active in the UN system, their influence is still very limited. A limiting factor is the fact that INGOs tend to be federations of national organizations and national organizations involved in UN issues often do not have strong grass-roots participation in their activities. This is because the ideology of the state system has tended to inhibit grass-roots involvement in global issues. There is a tendency for the ''foreign'' policies of national NGOs to be made by a small élite in the national headquarters of the organization. In turn, it is this small élite that represents the organization at the United Nations and in an INGO. Thus, to some degree the ideology of the state system is reflected in non-governmental participation in that system. For the most part there are not organized avenues through which the grass roots can have access to the UN system. This access tends to be centred on national governments and on a small cosmopolitan sector of each society that has developed interest and competence in world affairs and is pioneering in developing new avenues for non-governmental involvement.

Despite deeply ingrained traditions of the state system that inhibit ''ordinary people'' from participating in global issues, there are growing signs of transformation. Amnesty International has local chapters in a multitude of cities working for the release of specific political prisoners in other countries. Anti-apartheid legislation, calling for disinvestment in corporations doing business in South Africa, was passed by provinces, cities, and towns, and also by universities. In-

creasingly people from many cities and towns are visiting other countries in order to see for themselves the actual conditions contributing to international conflict, tension, and arms races. In effect, there has emerged, although in small scale, a "people's foreign service." In the Western industrialized countries a "development education" movement is producing growing insight on the relationship between lifestyles in these countries and quality of life in the third world. Cities, towns, and provinces are declaring themselves nuclear-free zones. Churches are challenging the policy of states by offering sanctuary for those who are faced with deportation, although they fear their lives may be in danger if they return to their country of origin.

Much of this activity is centred in the industrialized countries but there are parallel tendencies in the third world.[24] Fishermen from countries of South-East Asia have joined together to prevent destruction of their fishing grounds by polluting industries. No longer do people accept as inevitable the sale to transnational corporations of land vitally needed for food production. Increasingly it is understood that the acquisition of local self-reliance requires comprehension of the involvement of the local community in the global political economy. There is even a growing awareness of common interests between consumer groups and the "Greens" in the industrialized countries and self-reliance movements in the third world.

Some scholars in both industrialized countries and the third world perceive transformation potential in these developments. Two Swedish economists, Mats Friberg and Bjorn Hettne, see a worldwide "Green" movement emerging that rejects "mainstream development thinking" in which "the state is always seen as the social subject of the development process." Instead, from the Green perspective, they see that "the human being or small communities of human beings are the ultimate actors. The state can at most be an instrument of this ultimate actor."[25] They believe that the "Green project" necessitates "stronger institutions on the global and local level," and de-emphasis of the state.

Writing out of experience with the grass-roots Lokayan movement in India, D. L. Sheth perceives a "new mode of politics arising across regional, linguistic, cultural and national boundaries. It is inclusive of peace and anti-nuclear movements, environmental movements, women's movements, movements for self-determination of cultural groups, minorities and tribes, and a movement for reassertion of non-Western cultures, techno-sciences and languages."[26] He discerns that this new politics is "not constricted by the narrow logic of

30

capturing state power.'' Rather, Sheth discerns the need for new insight on micro–macro linkage. He concludes: ''It is the dialectic between micro-practice and macro-thinking that will actualize a new politics of the future.''[27]

At this point it would be very difficult to prophesy where growing transformation in micro–macro linkage will lead us. One reason is that the idea that informed, purposeful action at the grass roots could shape global politics is so new to us. Indeed, the prevailing ideology of the state system has long made this possibility *unthinkable*. Yet transformations in the technology for human contact worldwide are producing new possibilities. Up to now these technologies have largely been under the control of states and corporations, but new visions for grass-roots participation are suggesting ways in which many local places can become dynamic nodes in global affairs.

Growing transformation in the participation of the grass roots in world affairs is offering significant new potential for state officials and UN system officials grappling with global problems. But this potential can be utilized only if these officials take a more open-ended view of the global system in which states and the UN system are actors. States and the United Nations deserve much credit for providing the world with new standards for human relations on the planet. Now they must permit the state system and the UN system to adapt in ways that are necessary for the fulfilment of these standards. A new world system, with far greater participation from the grass roots, could be emerging. The effective engagement of the grass roots is vitally necessary if an array of global problems is to be solved.

By underlining the significance of grass-roots participation for a future world system competent to handle global problems we do not wish to imply that grass-roots movements necessarily have better solutions, or that local leaders are more dedicated to the fulfilment of human development than are state or UN officials. All have an indispensable contribution to make from their territorial perspective. But it is necessary for all to permit a world system more responsive to human needs to grow out of a dialectic between representatives of local, state, and global organizations.

Scientists, scholars, and the UN system

The United Nations has always been inhibited from fulfilling its programmes and goals because the scientific talent of the world is largely at the service of large corporations and powerful states. Much of this

31

talent is engaged in the development of military technology and in the development of products for corporations. Even research that is focused on "foreign affairs" and global problems tends to concentrate on state interests and contributes little to knowledge needs of the UN system. In particular, in research on global problems there is a glaring neglect of the actual programmes and potential contributions of UN organizations.

At the same time, scholars in the mainstream of international relations research and teaching have been inhibited from contributing to the development of global institutions by their acceptance of the ideology of the state system. This power politics view of the world, parading as "realism," has tended to label *real* progress in global human cooperation as "idealism."

The United Nations system has, nevertheless, made important contributions to the development of worldwide scientific communities. Vital has been the support of UNESCO for the activities of world organizations for individual scientific disciplines, and in some cases for their establishment. A union of worldwide associations in the physical and natural sciences, the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), was formed in 1912. There is a similar union of international social science organizations, the International Social Science Council (ISSC), formed in 1952. ICSU has fomented a number of worldwide collaborative efforts, such as the International Geophysical Year and International Years of the Quiet Sun. The ISSC has developed multidisciplinary issue groups on peace and on technological change, youth, and employment. In all of these activities, UNESCO has been particularly helpful in supporting participation by third world scholars.

Because of limited resources, the United Nations lags far behind states and corporations in its ability to acquire the services of scientists. Nevertheless, through small contracts, consultations, and conferences, organizations such as the WHO, FAO, ILO, and others have attempted to bring relevant knowledge to bear on UN problems. A shortcoming, of course, is that these scientists spend most of their time working on problems defined by states, corporations, and foundations. Sometimes these problems are defined in ways useful to the United Nations, but often they are not.

The creation of UNITAR and of the United Nations University (UNU) are significant efforts through which the United Nations has attempted to establish separate research institutions, parallel to those created by many states. Among the contributions of UNITAR

have been efforts to improve evaluation of UN development projects, future studies, and studies of the role of non-governmental organizations in the UN system. An important programme has been training for new delegates to United Nations bodies. Most have been trained in the practice of diplomacy in the traditional diplomatic system and require training in multilateral diplomacy, particularly in the customary practice and rules of procedure for specific UN bodies.

The United Nations University has given the UN system additional capacity to bring relevant knowledge to bear on UN problems and to make scholars cognizant of these problems from a global perspective. The UNU has been particularly creative in developing sustained worldwide working groups and networks of scholars who work together in defining problems and proposing solutions appropriate to the UN context. As with all UN knowledge acquisition activities we have been describing, the UNU is severely constrained by its limited financial resources. For the most part scholars involved in UNU projects are making available to the UNU knowledge generated out of projects sponsored by other institutions. Nevertheless, the sustained work together by scholars coming from different traditions is pointing the way towards common solutions that take into account different cultural and ideological perspectives. And involvement in the UNU is broadening the global perspective of participating scholars.

Whether working in the context of the UN system or outside, the greatest challenge for scholars is to help IGOs, INGOs, states, aspirant states, and more local communities to develop visions that illuminate ways in which a diversity of actors can collaborate in the development of a world system more responsive to human needs. These visions would draw heavily on the potential already revealed in transformation taking place – in local movements, in the style of INGO activity, and in the UN system. But this will require that more scholars overcome the constraints that the ideology of the state system imposes on their perception of contemporary world politics and their visions of the future.

Conclusion

We have argued that "the era of *preparation* for global governance" (1920–1990) has provided us with significant potential that can now be employed in creating "the era of competent global governance." The four foundation supports of this potential for global governance are (1) the participation of virtually all states (universality), (2) in a

network of organizations that are attempting to cope with many of the increasing functions of governance, (3) that have a global geographic presence, and (4) that are involving a growing number of INGOs and NGOs. From this widely dispersed laboratory for global governance, four additional prerequisites for global governance have emerged: (5) new tools for peace-building have been invented, (6) basic values for global governance are being defined, (7) acceptable standards for multilateral decision-making have been evolved, and (8) limited progress has been made in linking the UN system to a global network of scholars.

It is now vital that what has been achieved be widely recognized and valued and that this potential for global governance be strengthened. First, very challenging is the need to ensure that the meaning of universality employed in the UN context be responsive to changing world conditions. Although the United Nations has indeed achieved universality from one perspective, the states that are currently members of the United Nations do not represent all the nations of the world. Despite its great successes as a facilitator of independence for "trust and non-self-governing territories," the United Nations has not yet come to grips with the inevitable continuing fulfilment of self-determination. This difficulty was foretold in paragraph 6 of the 1960 General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples:

Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

While recognizing the political necessity of this statement in 1960, there is deep irony in the acceptance of states created by colonial powers by a Declaration of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Of course, one could argue that peaceful change requires one step at a time and that any effort to redraw state lines might have indefinitely delayed any representation of colonial peoples in the United Nations. But it would seem that the time has now come for the United Nations to begin to deal more creatively with a new generation of self-determination aspirations. This will certainly be difficult because the United Nations is a trade union of existing states that tend to band together to preserve the status quo. But this is nothing new. The same conservatism that put the prerogatives of states above the aspirations of peoples held back self-determination movements in the past. Yet, in the end, the pursuit of peace, wide-

34

spread belief in the right of self-determination, and world opinion overcame the tendencies of states to preserve the status quo.

Lee C. Bucheit urges the world community to endeavour "to maintain the underlying force of the self-determination principle and yet minimize the dangers to international peace and security by concentrating upon a method of ascertaining *legitimate* claims of this kind."[28] The calculation of legitimacy would require "balancing of the internal merits of the claimants' case against the justifiable concerns of the international community expressed in its calculation of the disruptive consequences of the situation."[29] Obviously the development and implementation of a legitimation standard would be exceedingly difficult. On the other hand, Bucheit persuasively concludes that "it is wiser, and in the end safer, to raise secessionist claims above the present 'force of arms' test and into a sphere in which rational discussion can illuminate the legitimate interests of all concerned."[30] The tragic consequences of the disintegration of the Yugoslav state underline the need for a UN system for evaluating self-determination claims and for imposing responsibilities on new states. Might the Trusteeship Council be replaced with a Self-Determination Council, toward the broader fulfilment of Chapter XI of the Charter? Might this body even be a council of experts serving in their individual expert capacity? Such a body would monitor *all* situations where it is deemed possible that self-determination claims (for either greater autonomy or independence) are likely to emerge.

Perhaps a more hospitable environment for the next era of self-determination fulfilment will come as the people of the world, and even leaders of states, assess more critically the meaning of sovereignty in the present world. Sovereignty, in the sense of independence from external influence, has declining significance in the world. Sovereignty of states in this sense is now largely a myth – a myth shared by both those who wish to hold existing states together against unwilling self-determination movements and those who are fighting to create new "sovereign" states. The kind of "sovereignty" people need in today's world is control over factors that influence their daily lives, such as unemployment, poverty, pollution, and the threat of nuclear annihilation. This requires not independence, in the sense of separation from the rest of the world, but widespread opportunity for participation in decisions that affect the daily lives of people everywhere. These include decisions made in a diversity of UN agencies that deal with a panoply of global issues.

Perhaps the next breakthrough in self-determination will reflect the

fact that a single kind of entity, the territorial state, is not able adequately to represent all interests in world assemblies. It will be recognized that different kinds of territorial groups require different kinds of access to world bodies, and that it is not necessary for all to be present everywhere. For example, Alaska and Siberia might in the future be represented in a new UN Economic Commission for the Pacific, and perhaps even in the Second Committee of the General Assembly. But they might continue to be represented by the United States and Russia in the Disarmament Commission and in the First Committee of the General Assembly.

Second, we need more creative visions of the characteristics of a global system of organizations that would be responsive to the needs of global governance. There is still a tendency to employ the centralized state model in evaluating the performance of the UN system, although this model is obviously not appropriate. It is particularly important that visions of a competent system of organizations include concern for the geographic location of global headquarters, regional headquarters, and country activities. We need to know more about the impact of headquarters locations on legitimacy and about the impact of headquarters locations on the competence of a system of organizations to be responsive to global needs. Does new communications technology present new opportunities for effectively operating widely scattered agencies?

It is also important that visions of a competent system of global organizations include sustained relationships between IGOs, INGOs, and NGOs. Both the legitimacy and the competence of global governance requires sustained dialogue between global interests and activities (both governmental and non-governmental) and those of states, provinces, cities, and towns. Under the banner of ''Think Globally and Act Locally,'' local groups in many communities throughout the world are attempting to cope with global issues through local initiatives for disinvestment in corporations doing business in South Africa, for nuclear-free cities, and for the freeing of political prisoners in distant countries. The emergence of these local initiatives in support of global visions offers striking evidence that people in many parts of the world are beginning to sense that they have an inevitable part to play in global governance. This makes it necessary to reconceptualize the roles of the farflung UN information, development, and even peace-keeping and observational activities. They must also be viewed as means for permitting a diversity of kinds of representation in the UN system. No doubt this kind of thinking will

36

be seen as a challenge to the sovereignty of states. On the other hand, the realities of global problems such as environment and poverty indicate that strategies created by IGOs cannot succeed without widespread local support and participation. Therefore, a diversity of local governmental and non-governmental interests is a necessary element of global governance.[31]

Third, probing inquiry is needed to ascertain the financial needs of this system of organizations. It is obvious that the financial resources available to the UN system are woefully inadequate. But what criteria should be used in estimating what is adequate? Certainly the tendency of large contributors to keep budgets from growing simply because they reject the notion of paying more is undermining the utilization and development of potential for global governance. It is obvious too that an effective system of world governance is not possible when over one-half of the payments by members come from voluntary contributions. At the same time, the tendency of a few illegally to withhold contributions to activities that do not have their approval must give way to the practice of most members who accept assessments as obligatory.

Fourth, it is vital that the fundamentals for global governance that have emerged out of the League and UN laboratories, consisting of an interlocking set of tools for peace-building, basic values for global governance, and standards for multilateral decision-making, be more widely disseminated and applied. They are in a certain sense the emerging common law for global governance. Fundamentally, they recognize that peace, in the now widely accepted broad usage of that term, is multidimensional, embodying non-violence, human rights, economic well-being, and ecological balance. The lack of knowledge about and/or acceptance of this common law is retarding the fulfilment of potential for global governance.

Fifth, if the ``era of competent global governance'' is to become a reality, scholars have an indispensable role to play. Their task is especially challenging because the percentage of international relations scholars specializing in international organizations is rather small. Perhaps this is why we have tended to be less energetic than we could be in challenging the ideology of the power politics mainstream by illuminating the real achievements of global cooperation in the UN system. Because many of us tend to focus on specific issue areas, such as human rights, peace-keeping, and economic development, we have neglected to present a holistic view of emerging UN potential. At the same time, too few of us have made INGOs and

NGOs an integral part of our work. And we have neglected to give attention to the significance of the gap between the people of the world and UN institutions. It is hoped that the publication of this book is a sign that a more dynamic transnational community for United Nations scholarship is emerging. For scholars to produce research that is truly useful for an "era of competent global governance" their community of exchange and debate must be as broad and diverse as that of the United Nations itself.

Appendix: United Nations acronyms

ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECE	Economic Commission for Europe
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
EP	Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance (merged into UNDP)
ESCAP	Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
ESCWA	Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDA	International Development Association
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC	International Finance Corporation
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMO	International Maritime Organization
INSTRAW	International Research & Training Institute for the Advancement of Women
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
ONUCA	UN Observer Group in Central America
ONUVEN	UN Mission for Verification of the Electoral Process in Nicaragua
SF	Special Fund (merged into UNDP)
UNAVEM	UN Angola Verification Mission
UNCDF	UN Capital Development Fund
UNCHS	UN Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat)
UNCTAD	UN Conference on Trade and Development
UNDOF	UN Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNDRO	Office of the UN Disaster Relief Coordinator
UNEP	UN Environment Programme
UNESCO	UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFICYP	UN Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus

UNFPA	UN Population Fund
UNGOMAP	UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan & Pakistan
UNHCR	Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNIDO	UN Industrial Development Organization
UNIFEM	UN Development Fund for Women
UNIFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIIMOG	UN Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group
UNITAR	UN Institute for Training and Research
UNMOGIP	UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNRWA	UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNTAG	UN Transition Advisory Group for Namibia
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine
UNU	United Nations University
UPU	Universal Postal Union
WFC	World Food Council
WFP	Joint UN/FAO World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

Notes and references

1. Inis Claude, Jr., *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organizations*, 4th ed. (New York: Random House, 1971), 41.
2. J. S. Scott., ed., *The Reports to the Hague Conference of 1899 and 1907* (Oxford: Humphrey Milford, 1917), 201; cited by Claude, *Swords into Plowshares*, 29.
3. William McNeill, *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 565.
4. Ibid., 316.
5. *Yearbook of International Organizations* (Brussels: Union of International Associations, 1992).
6. Thirty-two states signed the League of Nations treaty but the United States of America and Hedjar (now part of Saudi Arabia) never accepted membership by ratification and Ecuador was not admitted until 1934. Leland Goodrich, *The United Nations* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1959), 347.
7. Ibid., 11.
8. *Yearbook of International Organizations*, 1992.
9. Johan Kaufmann, *Conference Diplomacy*, rev. ed. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988).
10. Dag Hammarskjöld, "Introduction to the Annual Report, 1958–59." Reprinted in Wilder Foote, *Dag Hammarskjold, Servant of Peace* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 224.
11. Kaufmann, *Conference Diplomacy*, 24–30.
12. Miguel Marin Bosch, "How Nations Vote in the General Assembly of the United Nations," *International Organization* 41 (Autumn 1987), no. 4: 709.
13. Ibid., 708.
14. Ibid., 718.
15. Chadwick F. Alger, "Negotiating a Consensus on Peacekeeping Finances: The United Nations Special Assembly Session of 1963," in Johan Kaufmann, *Effective Negotiation: Case Studies in Conference Diplomacy* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989), 1–44.

16. Adapted from Chadwick F. Alger, ''Peace Studies at the Crossroads: Where Else?'' *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 504 (Jul. 1989), 120.
17. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (New York: United Nations, 1992), 26.
18. Chadwick F. Alger, ''Values in Global Issues: The Global Dialectic in Value Clarification,'' in Kinhide Mushakoji and Hisakazu Usui, *Theoretical Frameworks of the Contemporary World in Transition*, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Yushindo Kobunsha Publishing Co., 1987), 3–51 (in Japanese).
19. *Yearbook of International Organizations*, 1992.
20. David Forsythe, ''The Politics of Efficacy: The United Nations and Human Rights,'' in L. Finkelstein, ed., *Politics in the United Nations System* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988), 246–273.
21. Kathyrn Sikkink, ''Codes of Conduct for Transnational Corporations: The Case of the WHO/UNICEF Code,'' *International Organization* 40 (1986), no. 4: 815–840.
22. Leon Gordenker, ''The United Nations and Refugees,'' in Finkelstein, *Politics*, 274–302.
23. Chadwick F. Alger, ''Grassroots Perspectives on Global Policies for Development,'' *Journal of Peace Research* 27 (May 1990), no. 2: 155–168.
24. Chadwick F. Alger, ''A Grassroots Approach to Life in Peace: Self-Determination in Overcoming Peacelessness,'' *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 18 (1987), no. 3: 375–392.
25. Mats Friberg and Bjorn Hettne, ''The Greening of the World: Towards a Non-Deterministic Model of Global Processes,'' University of Gothenberg, Sweden, Xerox, 1982.
26. D. L. Sheth, ''Grass-roots Stirrings and the Future of Politics,'' *Alternatives* IX (1983), 3.
27. Ibid., 23.
28. Lee C. Bucheit, *Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978), 217.
29. Ibid., 239.
30. Ibid., 245.
31. Alger, ''Grassroots Perspectives.''

2

Competing visions: Proposals for UN reform

Gene M. Lyons

In his opening essay, Chadwick Alger has provided an historical perspective – the long view – on the evolution of international organizations.[1] We have (to borrow a phrase) come a long way, however disorganized and chaotic world politics may seem at any particular moment in time. Projected over the long term, Alger's essay illuminates signs of an international consciousness and a set of international norms that influence the behaviour of governments. There is, as he suggests, a ''potential'' for global governance in which the United Nations plays a central role. It is a potential, moreover, that has been given momentum by the dramatic events that brought about the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s. While the years of fierce East–West antagonism had in effect undermined the UN Charter provisions for a collective security system, the collapse of communism and the breakdown of the Soviet Union now released the Security Council from the limits imposed by the constant threat of great power veto. Other international issues had also often been framed in the context of superpower rivalry, which distorted their reality and weakened the possibility of agreement on how to tackle them. North–South differences, based on economic disparities and the distrust that comes from relations of dominance and dependency, remain severe obstacles to cooperation on a range of international issues, but they have at least become unburdened of the influ-

ence of the Cold War. In the long run, there may be grounds for optimism in anticipating an increasing role for the United Nations in meeting the requirements of global governance.

Over the short term, the prognosis is nevertheless mixed. On the one hand, the Security Council has been unusually active in the last few years, authorizing as many peace-keeping missions since 1986 as it had in the previous 40 years. Now operating with the unanimity of the five permanent members, the Council brought the two sides in the Iran–Iraq war to the negotiating table, monitored the transition of Namibia to full independence, coaxed the antagonistic factions in Cambodia into an agreement to accept UN administration of the country during a period of national consolidation, provided a framework for organizing a broad-based coalition to respond to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and entered into a whole new complex of humanitarian and military operations in response to the collapse of civil society in Somalia and the dismemberment of what had been Yugoslavia.

In many respects, these operations have extended the United Nations "beyond the Charter" into new areas of peace and security. For that matter, international peace-keeping was an innovation under the Charter, emerging from what came to be called "Chapter $6\frac{1}{2}$," a series of operations that were not specified in the Charter but lay between methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes in Chapter VI and provisions for collective enforcement in Chapter VII. As it evolved during the first 40 years of UN experience, however, peace-keeping was generally limited to the agreed-upon stationing of UN forces between two sides to a conflict to enhance their negotiating a settlement to their quarrel. The more recent military operations have widened UN responsibilities. They now extend along a spectrum from monitoring danger spots before the outbreak of violence and providing police protection for the conduct of democratic elections and the distribution of humanitarian assistance to the actual enforcement of cease-fire agreements not only between states but also between warring factions within states.

The expansion of Security Council activity is enhanced by a growing consensus that the United Nations is the major instrumentality that the international community has to respond collectively to threats to international peace and security. This is the good news in terms of the future of global governance. But the expansion has equally provoked a series of questions. Are member states willing to provide the kind of support that is required, including the commit-

ment of their military forces under UN command? Is the composition of the Council – and particularly the five permanent members – sufficiently representative of the international community that its actions will be seen as the legitimate expression of the common will? How far can the Council interpret what constitutes threats to international peace and security before intervening into matters that are (in terms of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter) essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of member states? Questions like these are not easily answered and yet have great significance for the capacity of the United Nations to act effectively.

At the same time, relations between North and South remain strained, with the 1980s now seen as a "lost" decade for development. There are also persistent questions about the relevance of the United Nations to the problems of growth and stability in the world economy. The unity and the ardour of the South in calling for a restructuring of international economic relations in the 1970s have collapsed. Concessions dragged out of the North to open export markets and increase development assistance have been only weakly implemented, and the countries of Eastern Europe now compete with the South for investment from the major donors in the North. Some developing countries, especially those in East Asia, have been drawn into the world economy through their incorporation into the major trading blocs centred in the United States, the European Union, and Japan. But others continue to be burdened by huge debts that eat up a major part of their export earnings. Most tragically, the least developed countries remain mired in struggling economies that are often further weakened by internal rivalries, political corruption, burgeoning population growth, and overwhelming misery among many of their people. At the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, the North seemed to make their problems even worse by refusing to agree to any major financing facility to help developing countries meet the costs of complying with new environmental standards.

In the eyes of many developing countries, the world has not changed. The unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council is perceived not necessarily as a return to the principles of the Charter but rather as evidence that the great powers are determined to dominate the international system and use the United Nations as an instrument of their own national interests. By the same token, the annual session of the General Assembly – where the developing countries carry a majority under the formula of one nation–one

vote – has been reduced to meaningless and repetitive debate as the industrialized countries concentrate decisions on economic growth and stability in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund where they retain effective control, in meetings of the exclusive Group of 7 industrialized countries and the ''Paris clubs,'' and in the negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, where their commercial power permits them to establish the terms of trade for the whole world. If East–West tensions have abated, North–South relations in the United Nations have become more complex and more tendentious.

The extent to which the United Nations can play an increasingly important role in the evolution of ''global governance'' is thus a matter of some conjecture. The end of the Cold War only further dramatized questions about the capacity of the United Nations that had been raised in the mid-1980s. Hampered, at the time, by the convergence of both East–West and North–South antagonisms, the organization had become stalemated and seemed increasingly incapable of mobilizing any collective response to important world problems. The dilemma was recognized by the Secretary-General in his report to the General Assembly in 1986, when he wrote that ''[r]egrettably ... the United Nations [is] subjected to a crisis challenging its solvency and viability.'' The immediate crisis had been precipitated by the failure of member states, and especially the United States, to pay their obligated contributions; the organization was strapped for funds (and, several years later, continues to operate in a state of impending financial distress). But, more than just the financial shortfall, the Secretary-General recognized a deeper need for ''the strengthening and revitalization of the present structure of multilateral institutions ...'' and went on to explain:

Various factors have contributed to the present difficulties of many multilateral organizations. We are still adjusting to the new and uneasy distribution of forces in the world resulting from the Second World War, from the revolution of decolonization, from demographic and technological changes, from the mixed patterns of development and, of course, from the advent of nuclear weapons.[2]

The end of the Cold War has essentially added to the dilemma posited by the Secretary-General; it has not solved it. If anything, it has raised the stakes. The United Nations still has to deal with disparities in development, the legacies of imperialism, threats of environmental deterioration, and human rights violations while taking on the added

44

burdens of an expanded role in maintaining international peace and security. More than ever, the United Nations needs strengthening to serve effectively in an international system in which governments increasingly organize their political and economic relations through a highly decentralized complex of multilateral arrangements. Over the years, the Charter has proved to be a flexible document, permitting the United Nations, however limited, to respond to new problems as they developed. When the original provisions for collective security were weakened by superpower rivalry, for example, the United Nations developed a peace-keeping role that was widely supported. When the European-dominated colonial systems began to fall apart, the United Nations provided considerable stability to the process of decolonization by the support the vast majority of its members gave to political independence and by the place that the organization itself offered to new states to pursue their interests in international relations. The question now remains whether the Charter can accommodate the added problems that have come with the end of the Cold War and whether member states will support changes to strengthen the organization to take on new security responsibilities as well as reform the economic and social programmes that were the principal target of criticism in the mid-1980s. The major purpose of this chapter is twofold: to review proposals that have been made since the mid-1980s for reforming the United Nations; and to develop guidelines for UN reform that can then be assessed against the policies of member states that constitute the major portion of this book. Will member states support strengthening the United Nations?

The United States' challenge to the United Nations

When the General Assembly met in September of 1986, it had the usual long agenda with issues (many hardy perennials) ranging from conflict in the Middle East and apartheid in South Africa to strategies for economic development and the codification of international law. But major attention focused on a more mundane issue entitled: ''Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations.'' The issue had long been hovering over the organization. It was now forced on the agenda by the threat of the United States to reduce its contribution unless voting procedures could be changed to give greater weight to major contributors. Over the years, other members had been delinquent in paying their assessed contributions and some had held back payments from specific

programmes that they did not support. But the US action was particularly significant both because the United States, assessed at 25 per cent of the regular budget, is the largest contributor to the United Nations and because any change in the method of voting threatened the principle of the sovereign equality of all member states, embedded in the one state–one vote formula.

The financial crisis brought on by the United States' action was more than a challenge to the financial status of the United Nations, however. It was also part of an ideological attack on multilateral organizations by the Reagan administration, which had taken office in 1981 and was driven by deep resentment against the loss of control that the United States had suffered all during the 1970s when the developing countries, backed by the Soviet Union, had rammed the New International Economic Order (NIEO) through the General Assembly. The NIEO was viewed by American neo-conservatives, who dominated the administration, as international sanctioning of state control of economies and a raid on first world treasuries.[3] The third world saw the NIEO redressing a balance in global economic relations that had become historically biased in favour of the industrialized countries. Other industrialized countries did not go quite as far as the United States in resisting demands. For one thing, most were less uncomfortable with a state role in the economy and, in the case of former colonial powers, more understanding of the problems of developing countries. Nevertheless, all major contributors to the UN budget had been pressing for reductions in the UN budget and the consolidation and rationalization of new economic and social programmes that had grown up, project by project, without careful planning, many swept in by the third world majority over the objections of the industrialized states.

Throughout the fall months, debate focused on the report of a group of 18 experts that had been set up a year earlier at the insistence of major donors, and particularly the United States, to present recommendations for "improving the ... functioning of the Organization."[4] The Assembly had no difficulty in unanimously supporting a series of recommendations by the Group of 18 for severely cutting back UN staffing at the top levels and simplifying what had become very cumbersome procedures for dealing with the organization's business. There was less success in finding a procedure that would satisfy the United States' demand for weighted voting in the UN budgetary process. The expert group itself had been split on the issue, finally presenting three options, which had been discussed with none gain-

ing their full support. The ball was thrown back onto the main playing field.

The compromise that was worked out was to provide for consensus voting when the projected programme for the next financial period is reviewed for programme content by the Committee for Programme and Coordination (CPC). Proposed programmes move from the CPC to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) for financial and administrative review. During the Assembly itself, the programme and budget are then reviewed by the Fifth (Financial) Committee on their way to the General Assembly for approval. Consensus voting at the CPC stage gave the United States (which, as a major power, always has a seat on the 21-member CPC) a virtual veto without forcing a revision to the principle of one state–one vote in the Charter. The problem was that it also gave a veto to every other member of the CPC. The Iraqi Ambassador emphasized the risks of consensus if it was applied too broadly:

If every Member of the Assembly or of any group has to vote positively for everything, consensus means something worse than weighted voting; it means transferring the veto of the five permanent members of the Security Council to others – going back to the League of Nations where every member of the Council … had a veto.[5]

In the end, the formula stood. Whatever may have been the views of the members of even the United States' delegation about the potential dangers of consensus, they were faced with a mandate to which they had to find an answer if the assessed contribution of the United States was to be appropriated by the Congress. At the same time, the practice of consensus voting had become widely prevalent in the United Nations as a practical way of avoiding North–South divisions on many issues. Indeed, the chief United States' representative reminded the Assembly that both the CPC and the ACABQ ''have traditionally taken their decisions by consensus.''[6] The difference was that the requirement for consensus was now made explicit under what some members considered to be conditions of duress.

The limits of reform

The mandate of the Group of 18 (G18) was deliberately limited. It was called upon to recommend immediate measures to meet the financial crisis that had been accelerated by the United States' threat to withhold a substantial part of its contribution. The Group was created

at the end of the 40th General Assembly and worked during the early part of 1986 to try to develop a series of recommendations. The Secretary-General had already had to begin to cut back expenditures by freezing appointments and taking emergency measures to curtail administrative activities. A major purpose of the Group's report was thus to support the actions that the Secretary-General had taken. But it also specified further cuts at the higher levels of the Secretariat, which it found to be "too top-heavy," "too complex," and "too fragmented," and recommended a sharp reduction in meetings and conferences and in service costs and new facilities.[7]

Beyond its mandate, the Group of 18 was limited by other factors. Its time was short and it was caught up in the controversial issue of voting procedures, on which there were deep differences. The Group was chosen to represent broad constituencies among UN members and many of the 18 were members of national delegations. They could not therefore completely play the part of disinterested "experts." Their major contribution was, in effect, political: to demonstrate, especially to the United States, a willingness to undertake drastic cuts in the short term and a genuine determination to begin a process of reform. Thus, their report left major issues largely unresolved. They could recommend, for example, only that a longer-range study of "the inter-governmental structure in the economic and social fields" be carried out and urged that the Secretary-General assume "greater leadership in personnel matters," especially to ensure that "the selection of staff is done strictly in accordance with principles of the Charter." Major reform was left unanswered.[8]

Besides the Group of 18, the UN financial crisis led to a private initiative on reform by Sadruddin Aga Khan and Maurice Strong, both of whom had served in high-ranking UN positions: Prince Sadruddin as UN High Commissioner for Refugees and Strong as director-general of the UN Environment Programme and, more recently, as UN Coordinator for relief operations in Africa. What they had in mind was the convening of a group that included experts who were knowledgeable and experienced but not restricted by holding official positions. They accordingly commissioned a separate study of UN financial problems by George Davidson, a former Under Secretary-General for Administration, and convened a consultative meeting to review his findings.[9] Not only did several members of the Group of 18 attend the final review, but the Davidson study was made available to them before they completed their report. It thus served as

additional material in the deliberations of the Group of 18, as well as a set of separate proposals that were subsequently more broadly circulated in order to contribute to the longer process of reform.

In dealing with the immediate need to find cuts in the budget, Davidson, like the Group of 18, emphasized over-staffing at the top echelons, excessive and repetitive meetings, and the need to combine functions and staff services. But, more broadly, he suggested that the regular budget, to which UN members contribute in accordance with their obligations under the Charter, could not be examined without also looking at the budgets of closely related economic and social programmes to which governments contribute on a voluntary basis. These principally include the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), UNICEF, the World Food Programme, and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). For the year 1986, these so-called extra-budgetary programmes amounted to $1.25 billion, as compared with the regular assessed budget of some $700 million.

Davidson argued that the UN Secretariat continued to carry a number of functions under the regular budget that could reasonably be charged to extra-budgetary programmes or, in some instances, to specialized agencies that have independent budgets of their own. There was, in effect, a broader base within which to absorb current costs and, where functions could not be cut, their costs might be transferred to operating programmes to which they are related. Taking this wider perspective means more than shifting charges for convenient budgetary purposes, however. It reflects the changes in the United Nations over the years, the increase in programme activities, the decentralization of operations, and the general unwillingness of governments to apply fixed assessments to funding operational programmes. What Davidson recognized was that "governments prefer to direct their contributions to … programmes which they themselves select as deserving of their support."[10] The principle of voluntary contributions could, of course, be carried too far and deprive the United Nations of an assured base of financial support as an obligation of membership. But taking a broader view of the organization and its budget provided a more comprehensive basis for coping with the immediate shortfall and projecting more long-range changes in how the United Nations functions. The scope of UN activities had dramatically expanded since 1945 and certainly justified an increase in the UN programme and budget. But the expansion often led to tasks that Davidson called "marginal activities" and "incremental

tasks [added] … without full consideration of whether they are susceptible to meaningful international action.''[11]

The Davidson study also took a bolder approach to the question of contributions. Davidson pointed out that the choice was not only between the principle of one state–one vote and weighted voting. There were other alternatives. The most significant was to reduce the maximum percentage that any member could pay from 25 per cent to 15 per cent or 10 per cent of the budget. A reduction to 15 per cent would affect only the US contribution, while a reduction to 10 per cent would also affect the contribution of Japan, which is slightly above that figure. Making up the difference, moreover, would not require heavy increases if it were distributed over a number of middle-sized states and there were limitations on the growth of the UN budget. The proposal to limit any single contribution to 10 per cent had actually been advocated by Sadruddin Aga Khan and Maurice Strong almost a year earlier.[12] The immediate effect would be to free the United Nations from the very substantial reliance on the contribution of a single member. But Prince Sadruddin and Strong also argued that, by assuming more of the financial responsibility, middle-sized states might also be encouraged to play a bigger role in the United Nations. ''The United Nations,'' they explained, ''is often their principal diplomatic outlet.'' They therefore have an incentive, which would now be backed by their more important financial role, in rationalizing the structure of the organization and actively supporting long-term changes to make it more effective.

The Nordic UN project

''Middle-sized states'' have always played a special role in the United Nations, which has given them a platform to exert a greater influence in international relations than might otherwise be the case. For one thing, they carry a good deal of credibility in the United Nations: they do not pose a threat to the weaker states, they can run interference for stronger countries whose policies are suspected to be self-serving, and, perhaps most importantly, they can provide material and human resources required to implement programmes. The contribution of the so-called ''middle powers'' has been notable over the years in manning UN peace-keeping forces, but has been no less significant in economic and social programmes, to which they have been consistent contributors. It was not therefore surprising that,

among the "middle powers," the Nordic countries – Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland – decided to take a direct part in reforming the United Nations by establishing the Nordic UN Project in 1988. The Project, in many ways, filled the gap when a special commission appointed by the Economic and Social Council to follow up on the recommendation of the report of the Group of 18 for "a careful and in-depth study of the intergovernmental structure in the economic and social field" failed to come to agreement and the matter wilted in committee. Carried out over a period of three years, the Nordic Project produced a series of analytical studies and final set of recommendations for reforming UN development programmes that followed the lines of the G18 report and some of Davidson's conclusions.[13]

Although the Nordic Project was particularly focused on the operational role of the United Nations, it was also concerned with the failure of broad policy guidance within the organization, a failure that stemmed in large measure from the weakness of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The creation of ECOSOC had been one of the innovations of the UN Charter, signalling a priority for economic and social affairs that had not been emphasized in the League Covenant. From the very beginning, however, the ECOSOC proved to be an empty vessel. Major economic and social programmes were developed through the specialized agencies, which operated autonomously even though they were obliged to submit annual reports to the ECOSOC. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank especially operated independently and, by the 1960s, became central agencies in international economic relations, following policies generally opposed to those expressed by the third world majority in the Council. Within the United Nations itself, UNICEF, the UNDP, the UNEP, and the UNFPA all operated under separate governing arrangements with little effective guidance from ECOSOC. At the same time, the Council, first set up as an 18-member group to facilitate negotiation, was twice increased in order to represent the expanding UN membership. Yet, even when the ECOSOC grew to 54 members, the developing countries still opted to bring economic questions to the General Assembly and its committees in which all member states were represented and they had an overwhelming majority. Not only were the same issues argued over again and again, but both ECOSOC and the Assembly's committees were too large and diverse to be effective policy-making bodies.

Two earlier efforts had been made to tighten up management and operations of the widening system of UN economic and social programmes. First, in the late 1960s, the UNDP governing council commissioned Sir Robert Jackson to study coordination in the expanded programme of technical assistance. Several years later, in the mid-1970s, the General Assembly established a group of experts to bring greater rationalization among UN programmes. In both cases, the thrust of the recommendations was for tighter controls, in the case of the UNDP at the field level and, in the case of the United Nations, at the top level of the UN Secretariat. The so-called Jackson Report in 1969, for example, gave the UNDP leverage to play a more central role in development activities in two ways: to require governments to project coordinated development programmes over a period of five to ten years in order to qualify for UNDP grants; and to provide UNDP resident representatives with authority to coordinate the activities of the specialized agencies in the field.[14] In 1978, in response to the recommendations of the expert group, the post of Director General for Development and International Economic Cooperation was established directly under the Secretary-General in order to provide greater central control and integration throughout the UN system, including the specialized agencies.[15] New central offices were created but the director general had few resources through which to assert his authority and made little or no dent on the system. The UNDP, on the other hand, had an annual budget, financed through voluntary contributions, with which to fund technical assistance and pre-investment projects; it thus had the means to force governments to present a comprehensive rather than sectoral request for assistance and to force the specialized agencies to report to its resident representative when acting as executive agents for UNDP-financed projects.

The Nordic UN Project was completed in 1991 and reported that the situation had, nevertheless, not appreciably changed since these earlier recommendations had been implemented. It echoed the reports of the G18 and Davidson about duplication, inefficiency, and cumbersome management, concluding that while "[o]perational activities have grown in importance ... [they] have evolved in an ad hoc and piecemeal fashion in response to emerging needs and concerns, without a coherent organization for effective and efficient implementation."[16] But the report attributed the persistent weakness of UN programmes not only to the absence of policy guidance and

52

deficiencies in management, but also to the inconsistent and often conflicting policies of member states. Traditionally, the report noted, donor countries contribute to development programmes because of their own national interests or in response to humanitarian need, leaving programme managers with uncertainty about what kind of long-term commitments could be made. But the Nordic group urged governments to consider a third motive: "the interest and concern of all states for a stable global system ... economically, socially and ecologically."[17] The report, moreover, related development assistance to the new demands on the United Nations with the end of the Cold War, particularly involvement in regional and internal conflicts in developing countries. "Development assistance," it was stated, "has a preventive role that is crucial to global security ... plays an important role while conflicts are in progress, primarily by providing humanitarian assistance ... [and] has an active role under the auspices of the UN, during the transition from conflict to an active peace process and in furthering the peace process by facilitating reconstruction and the repatriation of refugees."[18]

The Nordic study viewed the whole field of development assistance from a "systems" viewpoint, that is, it focused on the UN programmes within the context of the totality of the work of all of the organizations in the UN system, including the specialized agencies and the financial institutions, as well as regional organizations, like the regional development banks, and bilateral aid programmes conducted by major industrialized states. Within this "system," the report argued for the importance of a multilateral as opposed to a bilateral approach on several grounds: "the absence of commercial and political strings, the broad resource base, the multisectoral and multidisciplinary character of operation."[19] At the same time, it emphasized that the United Nations itself should complement and not duplicate the programmes of other multilateral organizations, referring to examples of effective inter-agency collaboration. The UNDP, in one case, has responsibility for funding technical assistance and pre-investment studies, while the World Bank provides longer-range, larger loans for implementing development projects. Another example is the creation of the Global Environment Facility through which the World Bank offers loans to countries, in consultation with the UN Environment Programme, to enable them to assess the environmental impact of development projects, and the UNDP provides technical assistance that may be required.

The report of the Nordic Project also recognized the weakness of the ECOSOC and recommended that, unless ECOSOC could be substantially reconstituted, a new International Development Council be created to provide overall policy guidance. It left open, however, the precise structure of the Council, suggesting several options from a body including all member states to more limited membership, but urged that any such Council be developed so as to bring "high-level ministerial participation in its deliberations," in the fashion, for example, of "the World Bank's Development Committee." At the same time, the report recommended that oversight of the UN operating programmes (e.g. UNICEF, the UNDP, and UNFPA) be entrusted to small executive bodies with expert representation from those countries with major involvement and that, at both headquarters and the field level, they "should be fully integrated and ... in essence become one organization." The thrust of the recommendations was to create a consolidated group of activities within the United Nations that complemented the operations of the financial institutions and the specialized agencies and was given guidance through a governing board to which governments sent principal officers responsible for development policies and not delegates with little authority or expertise, as has become the case with representation in ECOSOC.[20]

On the funding issue, the Nordic Project took a different position from the Davidson study, whose recommendations had been to shift expenditures from the regular budget for which member states are assessed to the programmes funded through voluntary contributions and to consider a top limit to assessed contributions. But the Davidson study, remember, came at a time when a main intent was to get the United States back on board and to meet American concerns by reducing the central headquarters budget without necessarily eliminating important operational activities. The Nordic Project began from a different set of objectives, mainly to provide greater financial stability and consistency for UN operations that were plagued with continual uncertainties about whether programmes would be funded. It therefore recommended that these programmes be financed through a three-tier system: assessed contributions from all member states to ensure that the essential infrastructure of the programme would be maintained; negotiated multi-year pledges from states in the same way as loan funds of the development banks are "replenished"; and, finally, voluntary contributions, especially from the major industrialized states.[21]

A "successor vision"

The primary aim of the report of the Group of 18 and the Davidson study had been to find a short-term solution to the predicament created by the American threat to reduce its contribution. The Nordic UN Project then filled a gap when the commission set up by the ECOSOC to examine the longer-range reform of economic and social programmes bogged down under North–South differences. In the meanwhile, a long-term and more comprehensive review was carried out by the United Nations Association of the USA to examine "United Nations management and decision-making." The recommendations of the UNA study, published in 1988, were available as background for the Nordic UN Project. But the UNA study was broader in scope, especially in examining the UN capacity to deal with threats to international peace and security. Here, however, the study panel was shooting at a moving target. Within a year after the report was published the Berlin Wall fell and, with the collapse of Soviet control in Eastern Europe, the bipolar system that had characterized international relations for most of the United Nations' history ended. Nevertheless, the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev to leadership in the Soviet Union in 1985 had already given the panel some signs of the promise of greater cooperation among the permanent members of the Security Council, especially when Gorbachev pronounced that class struggle no longer guided Soviet foreign policy and began to withdraw Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Still there was no way of predicting the full extent of change that was in train, especially the disintegration of the Soviet Union into a fragile Commonwealth of Independent States and the transfer of its seat on the Security Council to the struggling Russian Federation.

The UNA study was under the direction of a 23-member panel of eminent persons, nine of whom were from the United States, five from other industrialized countries, and nine from the third world. Although the panel was ostensibly directed toward the managerial problems of the United Nations, it was clear from the opening words of its report that its purposes were as political as they were managerial. "Future historians," the report began, "may come to view the 1980s as an age of paradox, in which international politics was dominated by two contradictory facts: increasing nationalism, and decreasing national power."[22] States were asserting their sovereign rights as vigorously as ever, even though their governments, increasingly, could not carry out their essential functions without cooperating with others.

The title of the report also characterized its political intent – *A Successor Vision: The United Nations of Tomorrow* – as did its premise that "the UN's [malaise] derives from two ... basic problems: the ambiguity of its specific world role, and the failure to change that role as the world has changed."[23] Principal among the changes that the panel underscored were the structure of world power, the number of independent countries, the nature of conflict in which "distinctions between domestic and international wars are difficult to establish," the "globalization of economic activity," the "emergence of environmental risks," and disruptive social and political conditions in many parts of the world, illustrated by the "semipermanent presence of massive numbers of stateless persons."[24]

While calling for a "successor vision" of the United Nations, the report of the UNA panel made it clear that, during the first four decades of its existence, the organization had not been completely frozen in its capacity to meet new requirements. Indeed, the Charter had proved to be particularly flexible when (and here was the key) member states could agree on taking collective action. The panel pointed to the innovation of UN peace-keeping activities and the role of the United Nations in providing a framework to deal with decolonization and to absorb the newly independent states into an organized system of diplomatic relations. The United Nations had also served as the forum for mobilizing international efforts to identify and deal with common problems like human rights, population growth, and environmental degradation. None the less, the organization had been stalemated throughout the 1980s, just at a time when dramatic changes were beginning to emerge that required effective international machinery through which governments could cooperate, in effect requiring a "successor vision" of what member states wanted the United Nations to do.

The problem was not only that there was no agreement on a "successor vision," but also that there were competing "visions" of what the United Nations should be doing. The report spoke of a "Western vision" that saw the United Nations as a "means for reinforcing and extending the post-war status quo" and a "Third World vision" that envisaged the United Nations as "a tool for accelerating the pace of systemic change."[25] Both positions persist in the sense of there being a fundamental difference between industrialized and developing countries about how rapidly change should take place and the role of the United Nations in that transformation. The UNA panel, in calling for a "successor vision," however, runs up against the problem that Robert Cox underscored some years earlier:

56

it would be unrealistic to search for a new "vision" for international institutions that could serve as a foundation for a new consensus. Such a vision was possible in the environment in which the UN Charter was written because it could be ideologically based on a power structure of stable dominance. Since there is no such power structure today, visions can only be particularistic... There are rival visions of a future world order today.[26]

In one respect, Cox suggests that there was more of a consensus in 1945 than truly existed. Certainly there was more than one "vision" of the world. There were the American and the Soviet visions, the special vision of middle states like Australia, Canada, and the Nordic countries, which tried to limit great power control at the San Francisco Conference, and the aspirations of countries like India and the Philippines for self-government for all peoples. But it was the circumstances of 1945, especially the critical domination of international politics by the United States, that permitted political support to be consolidated for creating the United Nations. The question today is whether, despite competing visions of the future, there is either a pragmatic convergence of interests among member states to get behind specific recommendations or a political centre through which broad support can be mobilized for the general aim of strengthening the United Nations.

The "successor vision" that the UNA panel advocated would have several characteristics. The role of the United Nations would be one that "(a) attracts the support of a balanced majority of its members, (b) utilizes the features which make the UN unique, (c) reflects the current and foreseeable conditions of the world ... and (d) offers a clear set of directions and goals to guide the desire for institutional change widely expressed in the international community today."[27] In looking back at UN experience, the panel concluded that success had come when there had been a convergence of interests among countries centrally involved in any issue, and when this convergence could be converted, first, into a common view of the problem and, then, into cooperative action through the United Nations.[28] The central task – and, in many respects, the central thrust of the panel's recommendations – was to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to carry out this three-part process:

global watch – to identify the issues on which convergence of interests exists; *consensus building* – to bring about common views with regard to those interests; and *consensus conversion* – to translate, usually by some form of collective action, common views and communities of interest into outcomes useful to the affected countries.[29]

57

In applying these criteria to economic and social programmes, the UNA panel, as had others, emphasized how they had grown far beyond what was contemplated when the Charter was written, focusing not only on problems of development, but also on global problems like the state of the environment and chronic issues like the plight of millions of refugees. Just like the Nordic Project, the UNA study discussed the complex connections between the central UN organs and the specialized agencies, as well as programmes and activities of international organizations outside the UN system in what is now a diverse network of multilateral arrangements through which governments are increasingly engaged. At the same time, it especially focused on the policy-making level, spelling out more specific recommendations than did the Nordic Project in its proposal for a new International Development Council.

First, the panel recommended that the Economic and Social Council, as a principal organ of the United Nations, be expanded to include all members, while the Second and Third Committees of the General Assembly (which deal with economic and social issues and already include all members) be abolished. The effect would be to have one rather than three settings for the broad policy discussion of economic and social issues prior to their being taken up by the General Assembly in plenary session. The expansion of the ECOSOC would require an amendment to the Charter, but similar amendments have already been approved in the past to increase the Council when UN membership had increased in the 1960s. Like other proposals for reform, the UNA panel stopped short of recommending changes that would require substantive Charter amendments, anticipating that anything more could open a Pandora's box; the aim was to push the flexibility of the Charter as far as possible. Focusing attention in one main forum, however, doesn't help reduce what has become a long, complicated agenda under the best of conditions. The panel thus also recommended that the debate in the ECOSOC be managed through a smaller Reports and Agenda Committee that would screen all reports and proposals and guide the work of the Council by establishing priorities and a timetable for debate.

An expanded ECOSOC, in some respects, changes the original concept of a small professionally oriented council that the founders had in mind. But the Council has, in fact, changed in practice, already expanding to 54 and coming to be not the main forum for debate on economic and social policies, but only one of several and not necessarily the most important. The expansion of the ECOSOC and

58

the elimination of the Second and Third Committees of the General Assembly have the merit of restoring the Council as a central organ of the United Nations under the Charter. But this does not, by itself, serve the purposes of consensus-building and concentrated action that the panel emphasized throughout its report. For this, the panel made three additional recommendations: to create a Ministerial Board of some 25 governments under ECOSOC, an Advisory Commission of five persons to assist the Secretary-General to coordinate programmes throughout the UN system, and a single Development Assistance Board, merging, in effect, the several governing councils that now supervise operational programmes run through the central United Nations (rather than the specialized agencies), like the UN Development Programme, the UN Population Fund, UNICEF, and the World Food Programme.[30]

Taken as a package, the several recommendations try to deal with what has happened to ECOSOC over the years, "neither fish nor fowl," as the report puts it, "too large for high-level consultations and ... flexible decision-making" and "not large enough to perform credibly as a plenary body."[31] So, ECOSOC becomes a plenary body through expansion and the Ministerial Board becomes what ECOSOC was supposed to be, a smaller body to serve the functions (in the panel's terms) of "global watch" and "consensus-building." This intergovernmental machinery, moreover, would be backstopped by a Secretary-General now equipped with an Advisory Commission to provide the "central brain" for the UN system of specialized agencies that the Jackson Report called for over 20 years ago and a single governing body for the UN programmes that focus on problems of development and have grown up one by one.

All of the study groups that had grown out of the United Nations crisis in the mid-1980s had concentrated on the economic and social programmes because these had been the source of the greatest budgetary growth and the greatest resentment between North and South. But the UNA panel expanded the reform process by taking on the problems of peace and security as well. Already the panel saw the possibility of a "renaissance" in the role of the United Nations in matters of international security as a result of a new rapprochement among the major powers, largely with the advent of Gorbachev and the change in Soviet policies. In doing so, the UNA anticipated the growth of security operations in the 1990s, which replaced economic and social issues at the centre of UN attention and financial problems. Its analysis, nevertheless, was still cautious, based on the kind

of good offices and mediation the United Nations was beginning to undertake in Afghanistan and the Iran–Iraq war rather than on the wider range of security issues that would soon emerge in Cambodia, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia.

This caution was reflected in the somewhat guarded position of the panel that the United Nations – and the Security Council, in particular – should not try to extend its involvement too far but be used "for what it is relatively good at – behind-the-scenes negotiations, consensus-building, providing a face-saving way out when the parties are ready to terminate hostilities, and posing alternatives to the parties for their consideration – rather than for what it does less well – conferring legitimacy, passing resolutions with teeth, and enforcing its judgements."[32] Much of the emphasis in the panel's report was on regional conflicts and on the need for the United Nations to work closely with regional groups that have a special stake in resolving conflicts in their areas and, in many instances, considerable influence over the competing parties. The panel took into account the general weakness of formal regional organizations like the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of American States, but recognized the significant role that an ad hoc arrangement like the Arias plan had had in reducing conflict in Central America. The panel also took a broad view of the UN role in redirecting arms control and disarmament attention to conventional arms, in establishing procedures for reviewing adhesion to arms control agreements, and in developing multilateral teams for the verification of compliance with arms control treaties. Here too it anticipated an area of growth that is only beginning to open up, especially with the experience of monitoring Iraqi compliance with arms control provisions in the agreements that ended the Gulf War.

Finally, throughout its report, the UNA panel underscored the need to strengthen the Office of the Secretary-General in all aspects of UN operations, but especially in the field of international security. It is the Secretary-General, the report pointed out, who will have to direct the "global watch" to identify incipient conflicts, use his authority under Article 99 to bring disputes to the attention of the Security Council when he believes they threaten international peace, create the opportunities and environment for negotiations, and ensure that the United Nations does not become so identified "with one side" that it becomes "part of the problem rather than part of its solution."[33] These are not functions that the Security Council or individual member states can perform, though they may be drawn

60

into the processes of negotiation by the Secretary-General and have to support his efforts if they are to have any hope for success. Security Council action would still depend on strong consensus among its members and the concurrence of the permanent members. But preventive diplomacy and negotiations primarily have to be carried out by the Secretary-General or his special representatives who serve as a link between disputing parties and the Council.

The model that the panel advocated was the Secretary-General as "initiative-taker" rather than "caretaker," and the mechanism they recommended to encourage him to take initiatives was a single term of office not to exceed seven years. Rather than the current practice of electing the Secretary-General for a renewable five-year term, a single seven-year term, it was argued, would accomplish two purposes: it would provide the incumbent with a maximum of independence since he would not have to be concerned about being re-elected; and it would encourage governments to select a person of strong will and imagination.[34] Although there was no immediate response to the panel's recommendations by governments, the need for strong leadership in the Secretariat became even more pressing as security operations expanded and the Office of the Secretary-General became increasingly stretched in the years that followed the publication of the UNA report. By 1991, questions of selection and tenure in office also swept on to the international agenda when it came time to select a new Secretary-General.

The Office of the Secretary-General

The UN Charter says very little about the Secretary-General. Nevertheless, there was every indication that the founders of the world organization had an "administrative" rather than "political" model in mind when they approved Chapter XV, which outlines the functions of the Office. Goodrich and Hambro, in their classic book on the Charter, observed that the wording in Article 97 that the Secretary-General should be "appointed" rather than "elected" emphasized the "administrative" character of the duties of the Office.[35] This was consistent with a "vision" of the United Nations as an organization of sovereign states that the Secretary-General was to serve and not, in any way, lead. For that matter, the only description of the position was in the statement that the Secretary-General "shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization," even though the functions were somewhat extended by the responsibility in Article 99 to

"bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security." The position was still deemed sufficiently important that the permanent members of the Security Council insisted that the veto apply to the recommendation of the Council, which is the first step in passing the nomination of a candidate on to the General Assembly for final approval. There were, however, no provisions for bringing candidates to the attention of the Security Council in the first place and no prescription for the review process that the Council should follow.

During the first 40 or more years of the United Nations' existence, two trends developed. In the first place, increasing responsibilities were delegated to the Secretary-General and the Office grew in size and scope. In almost every case of a threat to peace and security, for example, it was the Secretary-General to whom the Security Council turned to implement its resolutions: to investigate the circumstances of disputes, to offer good offices to conflicting parties or serve as mediator, to organize a peace-keeping force and provide for its deployment and maintenance, or to monitor the provisions of agreements to settle disputes. The new offices and economic and social programmes created with the growth of development, human rights, and environmental activities in the 1960s and 1970s also all reported to the Secretary-General, who was also expected to serve as a vital centre for coordinating the operations of the specialized agencies within the expanding United Nations system. By 1990, more than 30 high-ranking officers served under the Secretary-General and the job had become overwhelming.[36]

At the same time, the decision on who should be the Secretary-General was essentially left in the hands of the permanent members of the Security Council. Once they could agree, the rest of the process was little more than rubber-stamping. Their agreement, however, until the early 1990s, was caught in the bind of East–West antagonism, and the final choice was more likely to be someone about whom they did not disagree rather than someone who possessed the qualities required to take on increasing and complex responsibilities. Reviewing the selection process since 1945, Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers concluded that:

The process of appointing the Secretary-General has, hitherto, been a curiously haphazard and disorganized affair. The actual selection would appear,

in all cases, to have been the product more of chance than foresight, consultation, or planning at the highest levels of government. It might be said to be remarkable, with such a method of selection, that the results have been, on the whole, as good as they have. However, the importance and changing nature of the task raise the question whether such an important appointment should, in future, be so left to chance.[37]

Urquhart and Childers, from some vantage points, may have been generous in their evaluation that "the results have been, on the whole, as good as they have." Their purpose, however, was not to dwell on the past but rather to argue that the emerging international agenda, together with the end of the Cold War, provided the incentive and the opportunity to begin a more serious and rational process of selection, as the incumbent, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, planned to step down in late 1991 and a new Secretary-General had to be appointed. But before making any suggestions on how to go about choosing a new Secretary-General and how the United Nations might be restructured so that the job might become more manageable, they asked a central question: "What do governments, which make the key decisions in this matter, really want from the Secretary-General?"[38] The position had certainly become more than just "administrative," though the increasing complexity and scope of UN programmes required a high degree of management experience. But how much of a "political leader" did governments, and particularly major governments, want to see in a new Secretary-General? Major governments undoubtedly did not want the Secretary-General to get out ahead of them. At the same time, smaller states might want a Secretary-General who could be their advocate in the inner councils where they might not have full access, but where important decisions are made. Whatever the answer, the post had grown beyond the modest terms of the Charter, but how far was not entirely clear. As a veteran American diplomat put it: what governments require in a Secretary-General is "excellence within the parameters of political reality."[39]

In their report, Urquhart and Childers urged that the appointment of the Secretary-General come only after an extended search with rules developed for nominations and a timetable for discussion in the Security Council, all based on serious consideration of the qualifications needed to carry out the post. In the final analysis, they came down on the same side as the UNA panel in concluding that "a seven-year, single term of office is the key to improving the whole

process and should be established as soon as possible.'' The Charter is silent on the term of office and renewability, the practice of five-year terms having come about with the appointment of the first incumbent and continued through tradition. There is no question, therefore, of invoking the unsettling prospect of amending the Charter, though there is always the concern that proposing a procedural change in such an important issue could raise considerable questions and controversy. Like the UNA panel, however, Urquhart and Childers were convinced that relying on chance had gone on too long and a unique opportunity was taking place with the end of the Cold War and a trend toward cooperation among the permanent members of the Security Council.

The appointment of Boutros Boutros-Ghali as the new Secretary-General in the fall of 1991 nevertheless gave no real evidence that the process had been changed. He emerged as the nominee from a period of negotiation over several months in which the African states insisted that it was their turn to have a Secretary-General from Africa and the permanent members of the Security Council did not come up with an alternative on whom they could agree, let alone any strong statement on the qualities that they were looking for in the new incumbent. Nevertheless, Boutros-Ghali, on his appointment, announced that he would not be a candidate for reappointment at the end of his five-year term. Whether he was motivated by knowledge of the recommendation of the UNA panel or the Urquhart–Childers report or, more probably, by considerations of age (he was 69 years old at the time), there was no doubt that, as a strong-minded person, he wanted to establish his independence as he moved into the position. At the same time, he promised that, soon after taking office, he intended to restructure the organization in order to increase the effectiveness of the Office.[40]

The UNA panel and the Urquhart–Childers report had both emphasized the need for reorganizing the Office of the Secretary-General but were short on specific suggestions. In early 1991, a group of ambassadors, permanent representatives of their countries at the United Nations, asked Urquhart and Childers to develop ''detailed suggestions for the reorganization of the UN Secretariat'' that might be discussed and made available when the new incumbent was about to take office.[41] A preliminary version of their subsequent report then became a major contribution to the discussion on reorganization that the ambassadors held with Boutros-Ghali, who, several weeks after taking office, announced a reordering of positions that

followed the general directions that they had recommended. He con-
solidated the activities of the headquarters into eight departments,
eliminating a large number of high-ranking positions at the level of
under-secretary-general and assistant secretary-general in the pro-
cess. Moreover, the new priority of the United Nations was evident
when four of the departments were created to deal with the prob-
lems of international peace and security and the increasingly related
activities of humanitarian assistance: two Departments of Political
Affairs (divided by regional responsibilities), an Office of Peace-
keeping Operations, and a Department of Humanitarian Assistance
(which actually responded to a resolution passed by the General As-
sembly in December 1991 to consolidate all humanitarian assistance
programmes under a single under secretary-general). The sprawling
set of economic and social units that had been severely criticized in
earlier reform studies were brought together under a single Depart-
ment of Economic Development, and three house-keeping depart-
ments were set up in legal affairs, public information, and administra-
tion.[42]

The new Secretary-General also announced that this was the first
stage in a long-term process of reorganization that he intended to
carry out during his term in office. In the meanwhile, the Security
Council had met at the level of heads of state and government for
the first time in its history in January 1992 and invited him to prepare
an "analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and
making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the
Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplo-
macy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping."[43] On one level, the
resolution was an acknowledgement by the major powers, however
symbolically, that, with the end of the Cold War, the United Nations
was now a major instrument of their foreign policies in maintaining
peace and security. But, important as was the commitment to multi-
lateralism, there were still questions to be answered: What kinds of
conflict could be expected in the future? What were the require-
ments of collective intervention? What would be the political implica-
tions? the financial implications? What could be done to anticipate
conflicts and prevent them from erupting to a point of violence that
threatened international peace? How far were governments pre-
pared to go in providing the United Nations with the political support
and resources that the new responsibilities required? The Coun-
cil resolution provided an opportunity for the Secretary-General to
go beyond bureaucratic reordering and develop the political and con-

ceptual bases for reorganization that might begin to answer questions such as these and test the commitment of member states.

An Agenda for Peace

The UN Charter had addressed the classic problems of inter-state conflicts, providing the United Nations with a series of options, under Chapter VI, to try to get the parties to a conflict to settle their differences peacefully. Only then, if efforts for peaceful settlement failed and the dispute was deemed to be a threat to international peace, could the Council, with the concurrence of the permanent members, apply enforcement measures under Chapter VII, escalating from diplomatic and economic sanctions to the use of military force. Chapter VII was actually invoked only twice. The first time was in the Korean War, when the United States served as executive agent of the United Nations in mobilizing opposition to the North Korean attack on South Korea. Thirty years later, member states were authorized to take ''whatever action is necessary'' to turn back Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, sanctioning, in effect, American leadership in organizing a military coalition to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. In the years between, the practice of peace-keeping had evolved to fill a gap by placing UN-sponsored military forces between disputing parties after a cease-fire in order to provide stability while they negotiated the terms of a more lasting settlement of their differences. Peace-keeping forces, however, operated under strict limitations, maintained only with the agreement of the government on whose territory they were based and permitted to use force only in self-defence. Only in the Congo crisis in the early 1960s had UN forces exceeded these limitations, engaging in open combat against rebellious local troops in the effort to preserve a unified state in the transition from colonial status to what came to be the independent state of Zaire.

   With the end of the Cold War, the United Nations quickly began to encounter a series of conflicts that went beyond the preconceptions of the Charter, even as extended by the practice of peace-keeping. In the months between the high-level special session in January 1992 and the publication of the Secretary-General's report in June, the Security Council either authorized or extended the deployment of multilateral forces that would vastly outnumber the forces put into the field since the Congo crisis, with responsibilities more difficult and complex than the traditional task of passive peace-keeping. In

66

many ways, the report of the Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace*, was an attempt to codify what was, in fact, fast becoming practice and to identify the implications and the requirements of this escalation of UN involvement. He defined the three functions that the Security Council resolution had asked him to address: *preventive diplomacy* to prevent disputes from exploding into violence; *peace-making* to encourage disputing parties to come to agreement by exercising the means for peaceful settlement of disputes under Chapter VI; and *peace-keeping* to deploy UN forces between disputing parties with their consent. But his report made clear that this was not the complete range of responsibilities that the United Nations was actually being called upon to perform and they did not emerge as separate series of activities.

He emphasized, for example, that the lines between peace-keeping and peace-making could not always be kept clear and, indeed, that peace-keeping forces might also have to be mobilized in connection with efforts at preventive diplomacy, to be deployed before violence breaks out in response to "early warnings" of impending danger. He also added to the range of responsibilities a fourth function, the need for the United Nations to be heavily involved in "post-conflict peace-building," to help create the foundations for political and economic development after conflicts were resolved in order to prevent a resurgence of instability. It was that thinking, moreover, that enabled him to establish a connection between international security and the United Nations' economic and social programmes by insisting that "the deepest causes of conflict" are "economic despair, social injustice and political oppression."[44] In the avalanche of immediate security emergencies, the reform of the economic and social programmes of the United Nations, which had previously been so much the focus of attention, had been put on a back burner. The Secretary-General clearly did not want them forgotten. In an interview shortly after he released his report, he warned that "[t]he real problem of the next 10 years will be mainly in the countries of the third world ... and the problems of the third world [are] not only in military confrontations, but the problems of refugees, hunger, drought. So many problems!"[45]

It is perhaps instructive that *An Agenda for Peace*, although dutifully circulated through appropriate channels in foreign offices throughout the world, was never subjected to serious review in either the Security Council or the General Assembly. The questions raised by the report, however, could not be ignored. For one thing,

they were being raised almost every day in the issues that came on to the Security Council agenda as UN forces became increasingly engaged in the turmoil in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Cambodia, especially. Law, in the sense of establishing rules to govern the behaviour of states and legitimating the authority and responsibility of the Security Council, was being made, not by formal processes of amending the Charter or asking for authoritative "advisory opinions" from the International Court of Justice, but, as has often been the case, by practice.

For example, the line between international and domestic affairs became increasingly blurred, forcing new interpretations of the venerable principle of sovereignty. The Secretary-General had insisted in his report on respect for national sovereignty as a principle of the Charter, but equally observed that "the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty ... was passed."[46] In doing so, he reflected the ambiguity that had existed from the beginning in the Charter where the United Nations was entrusted with a series of objectives that invited intervention into domestic matters while, at the same time, under paragraph 7 of Article 2, was forbidden to do so (except in the extreme case of implementing Chapter VII). If at all, the balance between national sovereignty and the requirements of international security was being slowly worked out in the pragmatic responses of the Security Council and UN forces in the field to particular cases of violence. One example was in Somalia where UN forces were deployed to protect humanitarian aid shipments and disarm warring factions when civil authority broke down; no governmental authority existed to carry out the essential function of sovereignty to provide security for its citizens. The United Nations thus operated on Somalian territory without explicit recognition from a duly constituted government.[47]

These new and more complex operations also tested the rules of engagement under which UN forces operated when, for instance, peace-making and peace-keeping have to be carried on simultaneously. In the Cambodian case, for example, the preparations for democratic elections were increasingly disrupted by the Khmer Rouge, one of the major factions that had agreed to UN administration of civil affairs until the return of stable government. When the United Nations was criticized for not taking more aggressive action against the Khmer Rouge for openly defying the agreement, the UN troop commander responded that he had no authority for "internal security" and that "when you move into enforcement ... your neutrality is

gone. You have no one to talk to.''[48] His reasoning was certainly consistent with early peace-keeping experience. To take military action against the Khmer Rouge for violating its agreement would mean taking sides in a dispute in which the United Nations is seeking to reconcile all parties involved, including the Khmer Rouge, and to bring them around to supporting a democratically elected regime. On the other hand, the civilian head of the UN operation, faced with large-scale killing by the Khmer Rouge, responded: ''I have had to shake our police and military colleagues to adopt a more activist viewpoint in that regard.''[49]

A not dissimilar situation evolved in the former Yugoslavia. Here the United Nations was engaged in trying to get all sides to the conflict to agree on a new regime for Bosnia–Hercegovina under which Serb, Croat, and Muslim interests would be recognized by a high degree of local automony. UN forces, primarily employed to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance, were governed by traditional peace-keeping conditions. They could not take ''enforcement'' action against Serbian militia that were disrupting aid shipments and driving Muslim populations from their homes in order to establish wholly Serbian enclaves. In immediate terms, to counter the Serbian assault with armed force would have meant supporting the Muslim side and provided the Serbs with excuses to disrupt the negotiating exercise even further. The United Nations had actually moved into an enforcement phase by applying economic sanctions against Serbia and forbidding Serbian military planes from flying over Bosnia. But the Bosnian Serbs, with aid from the Serbian government in Belgrade, were able to consolidate their position through the brutal use of military power while UN troops on the ground were restrained by what were essentially ''peace-keeping'' rather than ''enforcement'' rules of engagement. As negotiations painfully dragged on, the United Nations, in cooperation with NATO, was preparing a military force of up to 50,000 troops to compel compliance with whatever agreement could be finally reached on the future of Bosnia. The atrocities committed by the Serbs, however, raised serious questions – not unlike those raised in the Cambodian case – about whether to provide UN forces with authority to maintain civil order while negotiations were going on even if it involved action against one of the negotiating parties.

An Agenda for Peace raised serious questions about how far the United Nations could be extended in dealing with problems of peace and security and explored the alternatives to UN involvement in so

many diverse operations in so many parts of the world. The Charter had emphasized the complementary role of regional organizations under Chapter VIII. Except in the case of NATO, however, no truly viable regional arrangements had developed. Even in the former Yugoslavia, an initial West European effort to resolve the conflict had faltered and the engagement of NATO troops to help enforce a negotiated settlement could only follow the sustained effort of UN peace-keeping and peace-making. In other parts of the world, ad hoc groups (e.g. the Contadora group in Central America) had, on occasion, been effective in helping to resolve conflicts, as had what are essentially associations of economic cooperation such as the participation of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the effort at Cambodian reconciliation. For the most part, however, experience thus far had shown that regional arrangements, formal and ad hoc, could contribute only within a broader framework of operations organized under UN auspices. For some time, the United Nations would remain the principal instrument through which the international community could become collectively engaged in responding to threats to international peace and security.

The United Nations, of course, has no way of raising a military force of its own; it depends on member states to provide the troops and the financial resources that security operations require. The original intent in the Charter was that member states would sign agreements with the Security Council under Article 43 to provide the armed forces and *matériel* needed to carry out its collective security responsibilities. But no agreements were ever signed and the military contingents mobilized to carry out peace-keeping missions were usually arranged by the Secretary-General on a case-by-case basis in consultation with governments, most especially the governments of middle powers, such as Canada and the Nordic countries, and developing countries, such as Senegal and India. The Secretary-General now called for new negotiations to be sure that armed forces would be ready to serve "not only on an ad hoc basis but on a permanent basis." "The ready availability of armed forces on call could serve," he argued, "as a means of deterring breaches of the peace since a potential aggressor would know that the Council had at its disposal a means of response."[50] The problem, moreover, was not only the commitment to provide military forces, but also the capacity to deploy them without delay in case of emergency and to back them up with the logistics, equipment, and civilian support personnel that

might be needed. It all added up to a greater financial, as well as political, commitment than member states had yet accepted.

It was thus not surprising that the Secretary-General ended his report with the warning that "a chasm has developed between the tasks entrusted to this Organization and the financial means provided to it."[51] His immediate concern was the mounting costs of the numerous and extended military operations in which the United Nations was now engaged, adding to the long-time costs of maintaining peace-keepers in still unresolved conflicts in regions like the Middle East. But he also had in mind the continual struggle of long-term financing of economic and social programmes that were aimed at what he called the "poverty, disease, famine, oppression and despair" that were the breeding grounds of conflict. There was also, on the horizon, the expectation of increasing obligations in implementing norms and rules for controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and for monitoring compliance with human rights treaties and the expanding series of environmental agreements given new momentum with the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development. All of this, aggravated by the chronic problems of countries in arrears or late in paying their obligated assessments and the increasing uncertainties of meeting funding targets for programmes financed through voluntary contributions, led to a vulnerable financial state. He therefore made an appeal for a reliable financial base and announced that he had "asked a select group of qualified persons of high international repute to examine [the] entire subject" of UN financing and report back to him.

Headed by Shijuro Ogata, former high official in the Bank of Japan, and Paul Volker, former chairman of the US Federal Reserve Bank, the group made recommendations early in 1993, not only on the peace-keeping budget but also on the regular assessed budget of the United Nations and on affiliated operational programmes, including UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNEP, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.[52] Whereas the regular budget had been kept in steady state (except for inflation) since the report of the Group of 18 in 1986, the operational programmes, funded through voluntary contributions, had grown to almost US$3 billion by 1993 and the peace-keeping budget had soared from US$439 million in 1983 to US$3,627 million a decade later. With regard to the regular budget, the group mainly addressed the cash-flow problem and suggested that each member's annual assessment be paid in four equal instalments a

year with penalties charged for late payment and that the Working Capital Fund, which offered a cushion, be increased from US$100 million to US$200 million. It made no major suggestions on the scale of assessments except that it be based on a three-year rather than ten-year average of GDP in order to take into account changes in the economies of member states (as were, for example, occurring in the republics of the former Soviet Union). In the case of the operational programmes, largely devoted to development and humanitarian assistance, the group followed the lead of the Nordic UN Project, recommending that the administrative costs of all of the programmes be charged to the assessed budget and that voluntary contributions be negotiated on a multi-year basis in order to provide the bases for long-term planning of operations.

The most immediate financial problems, however, stemmed from the rising costs of peace-keeping, for which states were charged according to a modified scale of assessment that placed the major burden on the industrialized countries, especially the permanent members of the Security Council. Under this formula, for example, the United States, assessed at 25 per cent of the regular budget, was assessed at 30 per cent for peace-keeping operations. Over the years, moreover, a separate budget had been set up for each peace-keeping operation as it was authorized by the Security Council, and there was an inevitable delay in approving expenditures since the budget then had to be approved through the General Assembly. The advisory group thus recommended that a single peace-keeping budget be established, that a revolving fund of US$400 million be set up to permit the Secretary-General to meet immediate start-up costs for new operations, and that he also be authorized to obligate up to 20 per cent of the estimated budget on the decision of the Security Council without waiting for final General Assembly approval.

The advisory group acknowledged that its review was limited in several ways. First, it had addressed the financial problems of the central United Nations, together with affiliated programmes, and had not taken into account the finances of the specialized agencies and Bretton Woods institutions of the wider UN ''system,'' all of which, taken together, represented a web of interrelated global programmes. Second, it had also focused on the most immediate financing problems of the United Nations, particularly peace-keeping, and had not projected into the future to take account, for example, of the possible costs of implementing the recommendations of the UN Conference on Environment and Development, which, on some estimates,

"could approach \$125 billion a year."[53] Third, the group had assumed that the major source of financing UN activities still had to be member state contributions and had not explored other means of financing, such as "levies on airline traffic and shipping ... as well as taxes on arms sales and on the production of hydrocarbon fuels."[54] At the same time, the report recognized that the "UN's current operations are still in many ways limited" and that "there may come a time when the UN will face exceptional needs that can only be met by exceptional means."[55] Finally it emphasized that, however they might have increased in recent years, UN peace-keeping expenditures were only a small fraction of the military expenditures of member states and urged that UN security operations be viewed as part and parcel of defence requirements; in these terms, UN peace-keeping was a bargain.[56] Echoing the Secretary-General's report, the advisory group concluded that "[t]he United Nations remains the only existing framework for building the institutions of global society."[57]

Reform by adaptation

Peter Wilenski, who served as Australian permanent representative to the United Nations, has observed that "radical reform of the United Nations is unlikely." "[B]road-ranging ... recommendations come to nothing," he continued; "incremental or step-by-step reform is more likely as the path ahead."[58] The experience of UN reform from the mid-1980s substantiates Wilenski's views to a very great extent. The report of the Group of 18 and the Davidson study had both been exercises at "damage limitation" to respond to the American threat to reduce its contribution unless expenditures were held steady, if not markedly reduced, and major contributors given greater control over the UN budget. Their immediate effect was to formalize consensus procedures in the budget process. The Nordic UN Project and the UNA panel proposed more far-reaching changes: the Nordic Project examined the operations of development programmes that, until then, had been the area of greatest growth, and the UNA panel expanded the review to cover the full range of UN activities, attempting, in the process, to provide a strategic approach to UN reform through the concepts of *global watch*, *consensus building*, and *consensus conversion*.

The recommendations of the Nordic or UNA studies were not directly implemented but, together with the G18 and Davidson reports,

formed a cumulative package of ideas that contributed to a growing consensus for change. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, an increasingly positive political environment developed for strengthening the United Nations, especially in the field of international peace and security. When Boutros-Ghali took office as Secretary-General, he immediately announced a restructuring of the United Nations that followed the principle of consolidation that had been urged in all of the earlier reports on reform. His *Agenda for Peace*, moreover, reflected the thrust of many of the recommendations in the UNA panel report, especially in developing a capacity for "global watch" to serve the goals of preventive diplomacy. At the same time, he went further in exploring the requirements for UN enforcement in order to respond to the complexities of the UN military role in operations like those in Somalia and Bosnia–Hercegovina. The recommendations on rationalizing economic and social programmes were partially realized in the headquarters restructuring, and field operations are increasingly consolidated, especially as they involve humanitarian assistance in regions of conflict and violence. Any wider adaptation, especially in changing the role and organization of ECOSOC, awaits a greater sense of immediacy and greater convergence of the interests of both the North and the South.

The "incrementalism" and adaptation that characterize change in the United Nations can be seen more clearly, however, if one takes a broader perspective and examines the evolution not only of the United Nations but of the process of international organization as a whole since World War II.[59] "Particular international organizations may come and go," Inis Claude said in an early text, but "international organization" as a characteristic of international relations "is here to stay."[60] Tracking the evolution of the United Nations with this understanding of what we mean by international organization, a "vision" of the United Nations emerges that is quite different from the ideas that drove the writing of the Charter. It involves the United Nations in three essential functions of global governance: (a) as the major instrument for collective action in confronting threats to international peace and security from both inter-state and internal conflicts; (b) as a forum for rule-making in connection with global problems, like environmental degradation, that states cannot deal with alone and global values, like human rights, on which there is growing consensus; and (c) in mounting large-scale operations to provide a "safety net" for the least developed parts of the world, for refugees

74

from violence and tyranny, and for people deprived of their rights by their own governments.

Almost from the beginning, instead of being centred in the United Nations, matters of international peace and security became diffused through three sets of complex networks: East–West relations; regional arrangements; and the United Nations. The first and most important network was based in relations between the superpowers as the centres of antagonistic military alliances. This network was governed by what might be called a ''nuclear regime.'' Within the framework of their otherwise hostile relations, the behaviour of the superpowers became guided by rules and procedures to further their common interest in preventing the outbreak of a nuclear conflict. The rules were broadly three: to maintain a balance of power between the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances; to limit their competition outside of Europe by largely operating through proxies and avoiding direct confrontation; and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons not only among their allies but also outside the European theatre.[61] These rules largely shaped the policies of deterrence followed by the United States and the Soviet Union, the conduct of arms control talks between them, and their political relations with their allies.

The superpower alliances have been completely transformed with the end of the Cold War. The Warsaw Pact has disintegrated and NATO is revising its mandate so that, among other new functions, it can complement UN peace-keeping and assist in providing the capacity for enforcing security agreements in situations such as that in the former Yugoslavia. A new European security system will have to take into account a united Germany, a more autonomous European component in NATO, a series of cooperative relations between NATO and the states of the former Warsaw Pact, and the often tense relations between Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), created under the Helsinki Accords of 1975, provides one existing vehicle for a broader European organization. But exactly what new institutional arrangements will emerge in the transformation of both NATO and the CSCE is still a matter of conjecture.

Outside of Europe, regional security organizations have generally been weak, despite the priority in Article 52 of the Charter for regional intervention in cases of threats to international peace and security. The Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organi-

zation of African Unity (OAU) are both relatively ineffective, the first because the overwhelming presence of the United States has often made it less of an alliance and more an instrument of American policy, and the second because the African members have lacked the unity to take action against even the most flagrant act of aggression. The League of Arab States has also lacked the unity to play an effective role in regional security, and no regional defence organization has been established in Asia, vast and expansive as it is, where agreements would have to overcome the rivalry between India and Pakistan, the lingering hostility between Viet Nam and its neighbours, and the large presence of China. In some regions, more ad hoc subregional arrangements have emerged to mediate conflicts. Such efforts, like the Contadora group in Central America, may prove to be more efficient than permanent region-wide organizations, involving as they do fewer governments, which, by their self-selection, have a common interest in resolving the conflict and a readiness to contribute to the solution, if necessary.

The United Nations now constitutes an increasingly active centre of international cooperation, not only because regional organizations are generally weak but also because the end of the Cold War has left only one power with global reach and created a new basis for cooperation among the permanent members of the Security Council. Although the collective security provisions of the Charter were stillborn, peace-keeping operations were successful when they served the purpose of hastening the process of decolonization, for which there was broad support. Those peace-keeping forces that have dragged on over the years, in Cyprus and between Arabs and Israelis, are sitting on persistent and bitter political conflicts. Pressures from the international community to resolve disputes have been strengthened, however, as the Cold War receded. The five permanent members of the Security Council started to meet regularly during the Iran–Iraq conflict and extended their consultations, first in the negotiations on Cambodia and the Gulf War and then as violence spread in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. Increasing activity by the Security Council, in turn, expanded the role of the Office of the Secretary-General, who bears responsibility for implementing the Council's resolutions.

The end of the Cold War has widened the role of the United Nations not only in terms of the peaceful settlement provisions under Chapter VI of the Charter but also, as the Secretary-General's report emphasizes, under the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII.

The allied coalition that fought the Gulf War was sanctioned under Chapter VII, and the military operations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia increasingly provoked questions about the relation of enforcement to peace-keeping and peace-making. The ending of the Gulf War also involved the United Nations in new problems of monitoring and enforcing disarmament provisions. The task of eliminating the Iraqi capacity to produce and deploy weapons of mass destruction graphically illustrated how the objective of the major powers to stop the spread of nuclear weapons requires the negotiating forum of the United Nations to legitimate collective action and the services of UN agencies like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor compliance. Devising rules and inspection systems to prohibit the production and use of chemical and biological weapons has also been put high on the agenda by their dangerous proliferation and the drafting of new treaties. Although the Charter gives only limited attention to arms control and disarmament, there is a new urgency not only to rid the world of weapons of mass destruction but also to control the widespread trade in conventional arms that fuels regional conflicts throughout the world. There is no alternative to strengthening the United Nations as the only global agency through which to build instruments of control.

A second area of UN reform, in addition to peace and security, is usefully illuminated by Oran Young's notion of "free-standing" organizations.[62] Young's formulation is an important step in clarifying the links between organizations and regimes, with regimes defined as "principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area."[63] The concept of regimes has provided a way of examining international organizations without getting trapped between "realism" and "idealism," as was the case for many years. The task is to relate organizations to regimes. The clearest connection is the role of organization as a forum for the negotiation of rules and, subsequently, for the implementation and monitoring of regimes. But Young points out that regimes may also operate without organizations when states actually follow rules that have been agreed upon and are, in one way or another, self-regulating. An example is the regime for Antarctica, where activities are carried on under an international treaty without any large administrative apparatus. By the same token, there are organizations that function independently of regimes, that is, international organizations may be set up not to contribute to the functioning of a specified series of rules and procedures but rather to provide

services that facilitate the practice of diplomacy and help governments solve problems that they cannot otherwise contend with on their own. "Free-standing" organizations may also provide the arena within which governments negotiate regimes that may then "spin off" and become quite separate in how they are administered.

The idea of "free-standing" organizations is extremely useful in capturing an essential role for the United Nations in an increasingly interdependent world. On the one hand, the United Nations provides a forum for the growth and adaptation of traditional diplomacy to a world of more numerous and more divergent states. Not only do governments confront those issues that are on the formal agenda, but they have facilities to deal with other states in multilateral sessions rather than through numerous and time-consuming bilateral communications. The United Nations also provides facilities for the creation of political coalitions and for integrating new members into the business of international affairs. Coalitions may, on the one hand, lead to greater confrontation, but they also contribute to the organization of international politics in much the same way that political parties contribute to stabilization in national politics. It is difficult to think how states that became independent after World War II could have become effectively engaged in international relations as broadly and widely as they have without the facilities of the UN system. The UN system also provides an infrastructure for developing a worldwide system of information and communication and for codifying international law, equally essential to bringing the minimum of order to a decentralized system of politics in which there is no government.

In the broadest sense, the UN system is also a principal channel for opening up the international agenda so that governments can be confronted with problems whose transnational implications might not emerge from more narrowly oriented policy processes, something of the "global watch" function developed in the UNA report. The whole issue of the global environment is a prime example of how a "free-standing" organization operates to serve just such a purpose. Environmental concerns were growing in almost all industrialized countries in the 1960s. The huge increase in industrialization after the post-war recovery and the application of new scientific and technological advances to industrial production were beginning to threaten the quality of air and water and disturb the rhythm of many natural processes. The transnational effects of environmental change also began to show up in international programmes like those of UNESCO and the Food and Agriculture Organization, and,

on the initiative of the Swedish government, the General Assembly voted to convene a global conference on the human environment in Stockholm in 1972. The Stockholm Conference spawned not only a new UN Environment Programme but also a series of regional projects and the development of environmental standards to serve as a guide and target for national environmental programmes. The process was then consolidated and set on a new trajectory 20 years later with the signing of new agreements at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992.

The expanding international agenda is related to a third area of UN activity, economic and social affairs, which had seen the greatest growth and was the subject of much of the criticism in the early reports on UN reform. The UN programmes were almost all established to respond to the particular needs of developing countries as they became politically independent. The North and the South nevertheless increasingly clashed over what issues should be on the agenda, what the priorities should be, and even where in the system of international organizations they should be taken up. The countries of the North have given priority to the requirements for economic growth and liberal economic policies, maintained the centrality of the Bretton Woods agencies, which they can control through weighted voting, and urged the countries of the South to base development programmes on their effective integration into the dominant world trading system. The South, beginning with the establishment of UNCTAD in 1964 and working through its overwhelming majority in the United Nations, drew up an alternative strategy for economic co-operation and development. Under the rubric of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), developing countries called for substantial increases in development assistance through multilateral agencies, a system of trade preferences to give Southern manufactured goods a leg up in Northern markets, and international price supports for commodities.

What, in essence, happened is that the countries of the South tried to use the organs of the United Nations to influence the international monetary and trade regimes that the highly industrialized countries control through the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT. They pushed the NIEO proposals through UNCTAD and the General Assembly by completely outvoting the United States and its allies. At the same time, the developing countries were continually frustrated, since votes in the United Nations constitute only recommendations and have no binding force. They have also been dissatisfied with the ex-

tent of response to the NIEO proposals outside the United Nations. Multilateral lending to developing countries more than doubled between 1975 and 1985, and trading preferences, extended by schemes like those of the European Communities under the Lomé Accords and agreements between producers and consumers to stabilize prices, were drawn up to cover a number of commodities. But development assistance from the OECD countries still failed to reach the 0.7 per cent of GNP voted in the International Development Strategy, and the economies of developing countries were hard hit by recession in the North, first in the early 1980s and 10 years later in the 1990s. They found it impossible, despite their voting strength, to get the industrialized states engaged in UN-sponsored ''global negotiations'' to revise the regimes that govern economic relations. The stand-off was typically summarized in a preview of the 40th session of the General Assembly in 1985:

Smarting from dependence in a system where external markets, terms of trade and interest rates greatly influence their economic fate and yet remain outside their control, Southern governments ... will renew their efforts to improve their individual and collective bargaining power. Northern governments will resist.[64]

Controversy over economic regimes came to dominate the broad policy debate in ECOSOC and the General Assembly. In practice, however, the ''action,'' so to speak, had become more centred in the financial agencies as development issues were increasingly related to the problems of economic growth and stability in world markets. Developing countries have, in fact, been drawn into the dominant world economy as they increasingly pursue export-oriented economic policies and as the largest and most important rely on private sources of capital investment. What has become concentrated in the United Nations has been those problems that cannot be left to market forces but require concerted community effort. Thus, at the operational level, the cluster of economic and social programmes in the United Nations – including the UNDP, UNFPA, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), technical assistance activities, emergency relief operations, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees – have taken on a distinct identity; broadly viewed, they all focus on the least developed countries and on humanitarian activities to respond to the basic needs of the poorest and the homeless in the world. There is, in effect, a division of responsibility in economic and social affairs, which had been obscured by the controversy over the NIEO. At the same

time, it has been given greater visibility by the growing programmes of humanitarian and refugee assistance in regions of instability, want, and violence. By adaptation, the increasingly distinct role of the United Nations in economic and social activities is focused on programmes that offer a "safety net" to those peoples most in need of international assistance.

From adaptation to managing interdependence

Ernst Haas has developed three models of change in international organizations: incremental growth; turbulent non-growth; and managed interdependence. In recent years, the United Nations has changed through incremental growth, adapting to shifts in world politics and a convergence of interests, especially in matters of peace and security and particularly among the major states that are permanent members of the Security Council. Much of the 1970s and early 1980s, in contrast, was generally a period of "turbulent non-growth." The organization was stalemated, split by ideological differences, both East–West and North–South, with a demoralized Secretariat unable to mediate in reconciling differences. None the less, over the same years, there was a trend toward incremental growth in the field of environmental protection. Beginning with the Stockholm Conference in 1972, member states were confronted by specialists, in the Secretariat and in professional and scientific associations, who projected impending ecological disaster unless corrective action was taken. Despite ideological disputes about who was to blame and how costs were to be carried, the member states were forced to begin to develop an international environmental regime, the first steps in managing interdependence. Periods of managed interdependence have been rare, however, evident only when the United Nations has been bolstered by a broad and strong agreement among its members about a common problem that requires concerted action, such as setting up the International Atomic Energy Agency in the 1950s.[65]

The way that the United Nations changes, the way that it is strengthened or weakened in contributing to global governance – whether it develops through incremental growth or managed interdependence or is stalemated by turbulent non-growth – will be the result of (a) the interplay of substantive forces of social transformation, especially science and technology, (b) decision-making processes within the organization, and (c) the foreign policies of member states.[66] Chadwick Alger has established the long-term impact

of science and technology on the "preparation" for global governance in his introductory chapter. In the shorter time-span of UN history, the development of nuclear energy led not only to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency but more broadly, with the end of the Cold War, to a new impulse to create viable systems of inspection and enforcement in order to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. And certainly the movement for an international environment regime gained momentum during a period of otherwise fierce ideological differences, because of the authority and forcefulness of scientific studies of the implications of unbridled industrialization on climate change, the ozone layer, and the carrying capacity of the earth. Member states have not been able to avoid transnational issues, emerging from the impact of science and technology, from coming up on the international agenda. Still, how effectively they deal with them depends on UN governing processes and their own perception of their interests. "States," concludes Haas, "acting on their perceived interests ... are the architects that will design the international organizations of the future."[67]

A major purpose of all of the proposals for reform, as well as the Secretary-General's "agenda for peace," has been to strengthen the United Nations' decision-making process and its capacity for taking on new responsibilities. The UN panel report, emphasizing the processes of global watch and consensus-building, the Nordic Project, in recommending greater efficiency and coordination in development programmes, the Urquhart–Childers studies on the selection of the Secretary-General and the consolidation of UN headquarters, the Secretary-General's own elaboration of the realistic requirements of the United Nations' widened role in international peace and security, and the report of the Independent Advisory Group on stabilizing the financing of UN programmes – all are directed to making the United Nations more capable of "managing interdependence." But the response of the organization, however reformed, still depends, when all is said and done, on how its member states decide to act. Rosenau has suggested that the world is now in a state of "turbulence," in the middle of what could be a historic transformation from a world of states to a global system of more diverse units of human loyalty and attachment.[68] In his introductory chapter, Alger describes the quest for global governance in quite similar terms. For some time, however, states will remain in the centre, their governments torn between their obligations to provide security within territorial boundaries and the compelling pull of global forces for change.

The studies of national policies on the United Nations that follow have been commissioned so that we might have a better basis for understanding how member states perceive their interests as they pursue foreign policies through the United Nations. What are the opportunities for a merging agreement on the United Nations? To what extent, if at all, has the experience of participating in the United Nations changed the way governments perceive their interests? Has being engaged in multilateral organizations broadened perspectives on national interests? What essential differences continue to exist, not only between North and South but also among states within the two groups? The United Nations – like other international organizations – has a Janus-like quality: it remains an instrument of national policies as much as the expression of the world community, but a world community still in the process of finding its form and shape. If we are to understand the future of global governance, we have to probe deeply into national policies.

Notes and references

1. An earlier version of this chapter was published in the *International Social Science Journal* XLI (Spring 1989), no. 2, under the title ''Reforming the United Nations.''
2. *Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization* (New York: United Nations, 1986), 4.
3. See Burton Yale Pines, ed., *A World Without a UN* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1984).
4. *General Assembly, Official Records*, 41st session, Supplement No. 49 (A/41/49) (New York, 1986; hereafter G18 report).
5. A/41/PV.38, 16 Oct. 1986, 56.
6. Ibid., 42.
7. G18 report, 12.
8. Ibid., 8.
9. George Davidson, ''United Nations Financial Emergency: Crisis and Opportunity,'' New York, Aug. 1986, mimeo.
10. Ibid., 8.
11. Ibid., 27.
12. Sadruddin Aga Khan and Maurice F. Strong, ''Proposals to Reform the UN,'' *New York Times*, Op-Ed Page, 8 Oct. 1985.
13. *The United Nations in Development: Reform Issues in the Economic and Social Fields*, Final Report of the Nordic UN Project (Stockholm, 1991; hereafter Nordic UN Report).
14. See *A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System* (Geneva: United Nations, 1969), DP/5.
15. See the Report of the Group of Experts on the Structure of the United Nations System, *A New United Nations Structure for Global Economic Cooperation* (New York: United Nations, 1975), E/AC.62/9.
16. Nordic UN Report, 55.
17. Ibid., 81.
18. Ibid., 81–82.

19. Ibid., 33.
20. Ibid., 19–20.
21. Ibid., 85–86.
22. *A Successor Vision: The United Nations of Tomorrow*, Final Panel Report, United Nations Management and Decision-Making Project (New York: United Nations Association of the USA, Sep. 1987), 1 (hereafter UNA-USA Report).
23. Ibid., 4.
24. Ibid., 6–10.
25. Ibid., 5.
26. Robert W. Cox, "Problems of Global Management," in Toby Trister Gati, ed., *The US, the UN and the Management of Global Change* (New York: NYU Press, 1983), 238–262.
27. UNA-USA Report, 11.
28. Ibid., 33.
29. Ibid., 71.
30. Ibid., 80–94.
31. Ibid., 82.
32. Ibid., 79.
33. Ibid., 78.
34. Ibid., 101–102.
35. Leland Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, *Charter of the United Nations*; *Commentary and Documents* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1946), 269.
36. See Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers, *A World in Need of Leadership: Tomorrow's United Nations* (New York: The Ford Foundation, 1990). For a recent series of essays analysing the evolution and problems of the Office of the Secretary-General, see Benjamin Rivlin and Leon Gordenker, eds., *The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary General* (New York: Praeger, 1993).
37. Urquhart and Childers, *A World*, 23.
38. Ibid., 17.
39. Seymour Maxwell Finger, quoted in ibid., 18.
40. See Gene M. Lyons, "Introduction," *The State of the United Nations: 1992* (Providence, R.I.: The Academic Council on the United Nations System, Brown University, 1992).
41. Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers, *Towards a More Effective United Nations* (Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, 1992), 6.
42. The Department of Economic Development was divided into three departments a year later.
43. Security Council resolution of 31 Jan. 1992, quoted in Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992), 1.
44. *An Agenda for Peace.* For a critical analysis of the report, see Thomas G. Weiss, "New Challenges for UN Military Operations: Implementing an Agenda for Peace," *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 1993), 51ff.
45. *New York Times*, 1 Aug. 1992.
46. *An Agenda for Peace*, 9.
47. For a discussion of the problems of sovereignty in an interdependent world, see Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, *Beyond Westphalia: International Intervention, State Sovereignty and the Future of International Society* (Hanover, N.H.: The Rockefeller Center, Dartmouth College, 1992).
48. Quoted in *New York Times*, 18 Mar. 1993.
49. Quoted in ibid.
50. *An Agenda for Peace*, 25.
51. Ibid., 41.
52. *Financing an Effective United Nations*, A report of the Independent Advisory group (New York: The Ford Foundation, 1993). It should be noted that, under the system that had grown up, the administrative costs of the UNDP, UNICEF, and the UNFPA were funded,

like the costs of operations, from voluntary contributions, whereas the administrative costs of the UNEP and the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees came from the assessed UN budget, with operations funded through voluntary contributions.

53. *Financing an Effective United Nations*, 3.
54. Ibid., 23.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., 31–33, has a table indicating the relationship of national military expenditures to assessments for UN peace-keeping.
57. Ibid., 24.
58. Peter Wilenski, ''Reforming the United Nations for the Post-Cold War Era,'' in M. R. Bustelo and P. Alston, eds., *Whose New World Order*? (Sydney: The Federation Press, 1991), 125.
59. ''Incremental growth'' is one of the three models of change in international organizations developed by Ernst Haas in *When Knowledge Is Power* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1990).
60. Inis Claude, *Swords into Plowshares* (New York: Random House, 1956; 4th edition published in 1971 and reprinted in 1984).
61. See Michael Mandelbaum, ''International Stability and Nuclear Order: The First Nuclear Regime,'' in David C. Gompert et al., *Nuclear Weapons and World Politics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1977), 15–80.
62. Oran Young, ''Patterns of International Development: Institutions and Organizations,'' prepared for delivery at the 1986 meeting of the American Political Science Association, mimeo.
63. Stephan Krasner, ''Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,'' *International Organization* 36 (1982), no. 2: 185.
64. *Issues before the 40th General Assembly of the United Nations* (New York: UNA-USA, 1985), 69.
65. Haas, *When Knowledge Is Power*; see table 6 on p. 156 for a summary of organizational change in the UN.
66. For a discussion of these forces for change, see ibid., especially chaps. 5, 6, and 7. See also James Rosenau, *The United Nations in a Turbulent World*, Occasional Paper Series, International Peace Academy (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992).
67. Haas, *When Knowledge Is Power*, 6.
68. Rosenau, *The United Nations*. See also his *Turbulence in Global Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990).

Part II
National policies on the United
Nations

3

Algeria and reform of the international order

Slimane Cheikh

Introduction

The participation of Algeria in international affairs, as for any country that has recently become independent, necessarily affects the existing structure of the international system. From the vantage point of Algeria, the reform of the United Nations system cannot take place outside of reforming the overall international system. This connection between the United Nations and the international system within which it operates is essential to understanding Algeria's globalist approach to the issue of UN reform.

At the same time, it is an approach that emerges from the theoretical bases of ''dependency'' theory, which seems best to explain the relations between the hegemonic centre and the dependent peripheries. It is a diachronic approach responding to the need to link Algerian history with the evolution of centre–periphery relations, and marked principally by changes that are simultaneously taking place within the Algerian national environment and in the world in which it finds itself. But change has different meanings for different international actors. For some, such as Algeria, it means establishing more equitable relations among states and, for others, restoring stability on the basis of a balance of power among the major states that control the international system.

As a less developed country, Algeria, having come to independence after a long armed struggle, aspires to exercise its sovereignty fully in a world setting where the rules of the game were developed in its absence. It thus finds itself in a dilemma: whether to accept an order shaped by these rules and be content with a marginal role or to claim a more active role in seeking to modify the system and, by doing so, to become "destabilizing." Certainly reality is not so simple, nor should the rules be rejected outright, especially those that are consistent with the kind of reform that Algeria seeks. These include "the sovereign equality of all states" and "the right of peoples to their own resources." None the less, the claim to the exercise of its sovereignty and the will to participate actively in decisions that affect the international community lead Algeria to question the existing order.

This "*remise en cause*" is necessarily undertaken collectively by all those countries facing the same situation. Hence their interest in multilateralism and international organizations, and their engagement and political mobilization in the UN system, offer these newly independent states a visible platform from which their voices can be heard. It is the reason, moreover, for their propensity to "externalize" the terms of conflict emerging from the framework of bilateral relations into more general conflicts in the context of multilateral relations. This "externalizing" generalizes particular issues and is a powerful lever permitting the developing countries to raise questions important to them to a greater level of attention than might otherwise be the case. It permits them to enhance their political capability by taking the lead in setting the agenda and mobilizing wide support to exert an influence on the international scene that is beyond their real power.

Scope and bases of the foreign policy of Algeria

In order to present a brief sketch of the scope of Algerian foreign policy it is necessary to recall the main stages in its development. Its foundations emerge from both historical experience and a set of ideas that can be found in fundamental texts and official documents representing explicit positions.

From a historical perspective, there are important benchmarks in the progress of Algerian foreign policy. Any attempt to divide history into specific periods is necessarily arbitrary, but nevertheless puts these benchmarks into context and provides a basis for under-

scoring their significance in terms of the evolution of policies. Two main periods can be emphasized: one covers the armed struggle for national liberation in which the foundations of Algerian foreign policy were built; and the second is the period of independence in which policies, grounded in these foundations, evolved in terms of the needs of national construction and the shifts in international developments. For the sake of convenience, the period of independence is described in three parts, each spanning ten years of experience. The first, covering the 1960s, is dominated by a concern with the liberation of the African continent from colonization. The second, covering essentially the 1970s, follows the effort to gain economic independence and establish the New International Economic Order (NIEO). Finally, the third period, stretching through the 1980s, is characterized by a diplomacy of mediation. It is clear that these periods cannot be sharply divided and that the sequences overlap with one another. Still, the dominant characteristics of each provide a clear sense of the evolution of Algerian foreign policy until the 1990s. Then the government was forced to concentrate on problems of internal stability, at the very moment when the Cold War ended and a new phase of international relations began.

The period of armed struggle

It was during the period of its armed struggle for independence that Algeria first emerged on the international scene and began to forge the bases of a foreign policy, one that was constantly reinforced by the struggles going on within the country. Internal and external actions have been inextricably linked.[1] M'Hamed Yazid described this connection when he wrote: "One should speak not of the diplomacy of the National Liberation Front (NLF) but of its international action because the movement and the revolutionary organization embody the struggle, the sacrifices and the policies of a people in arms. We did not conceive of international activities in terms of the diplomacy of states. Even when the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (PGAR) was created, we thought of our international activities, in their style, their methods and their objectives, as those of a revolutionary movement."[2] What was intended, in effect, was to extend the lessons of fighting in the countryside and in the urban centres in the conquest of national "space" to the conquest of international "space."

The NLF's proclamation of 1 November 1954 established the inter-

91

national aim of the armed struggle as "the internationalization of the Algerian question," which became an integral part of internal policies and actions and the basis for "external activities to make the Algerian problem a reality for the entire world with the support of our natural allies." This internationalization, moreover, was to be carried out by a policy of confrontation. In essence, a struggle for national liberation involves a quest for autonomy. From the view of the liberation movement, the conflict between colonizers and colonized is a struggle between two separate entities, that is to say, it is an international conflict.[3] Thus the NLF characterized the conflict against the colonial power as a "state of belligerency" and the Provisional Government, through the government of Libya, on 11 April 1960 presented its adhesion to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the laws of war.[4]

France, while arguing that the Algerian issue was a matter of "domestic jurisdiction," was nevertheless driven by the NLF policy of confrontation to take measures that ironically emphasized the internationalization of the conflict. Measures taken by the French in the name of "maintaining internal order" went well beyond the borders of Algeria and drew them into acts with serious international implications. Examples include: the diversion in October 1956 of a plane carrying the foreign delegation of the NLF; the inspection on the high seas of foreign-flagged ships like the *Athos* and the *Slovenia*; and even the Suez expedition, which, on the part of the French, was largely motivated by a wish to end the troubles in Algeria by punishing Cairo, considered to be the main centre of subversion.[5] Tunisia, moreover, was not spared when the village of Sakiet Sidi Youcef was bombed by French planes on 8 February 1958.

All of these acts could only add fuel to the NLF efforts to internationalize the conflict with the French and reinforce its position that the Algerian issue was a threat to the peace of the region. Its position was then further strengthened by the prolongation of the war. Internationalization was also manifest in representing the fight led by the NLF as a struggle for liberty, embedding it in a universal theme that gained worldwide support and inspired works of art such as poems, plays, novels, and songs. Every effort at informing, explaining, and sensitizing world public opinion to its cause progressively developed the capacity of the NLF to represent its position on the international scene.

From the beginning of the armed struggle, the movement for national liberation was represented abroad by the foreign delegation

of the Algerian revolution in Cairo.[6] After the Congress of Soumman in 1956, the central committee entrusted Lamine Debaghine with responsibility for coordinating revolutionary foreign policy. International activity progressively increased, especially after the creation of the Provisional Government in 1958. The Minister for Foreign Affairs oversaw the activities of PGAR missions in countries in which it was recognized and of NLF delegations elsewhere. But external affairs were not the exclusive domain of the Foreign Ministry. The President of the Provisional Government and the Minister for Information were equally involved, as were mass organizations dependent on the NLF, in sum all those who could contribute to the cause of national liberation on the international scene, including many inside Algeria. For example, the regular sessions of the UN General Assembly were the occasion for organized demonstrations in the country.[7]

What we have here, once again, is the close link between actions inside and outside the country projecting a global dimension to the national struggle. But if it can be said that international "space" was conquered in the course of conquering the national "space," it was more directly achieved by a policy of "presence," that is, by direct participation in international meetings and events. From the outbreak of the armed struggle, a deliberate policy was to make the voice of the Algerian revolution heard in the world. The role of information was given major importance in raising international public awareness by focusing broad press coverage and other means of mass communication on the battle in Algeria. Representatives of the NLF fanned out through the major capitals, explaining the course of the struggle and gathering increasing support for the cause.

The striking participation of Ait Ahmed and Yazid in the Bandung Conference in 1955 led to a denunciation of French colonialism and the invocation of the Algerian situation.[8] The NLF there marked its entrance into the Afro-Asian family and, from that time on, continually participated in meetings held under its auspices.[9] The Front also began to make its presence felt in conferences of the independent states of Africa, as well as conferences of African peoples, which adopted positions in support of Algerian independence.[10] Indeed, the Algerian cause became an issue that mobilized support in Afro-Asian and African conferences and provided an opportunity for the NLF to assume a position of leadership that became increasingly strengthened as the process of decolonization accelerated.

The NLF was accordingly represented in the permanent secretariat of the executive committee of the Organization of Solidarity for the

Peoples of Africa and Asia (OSPAA), held the vice-presidency at the second conference of the OSPAA in Conakry in April 1960, and chaired a committee of the Conference of African Peoples held the same year in Tunis. At the same time, the Provisional Government was a fully accredited participant in the Second and Third Conferences of the Independent States of Africa held successively in Monrovia (4–8 April 1959) and in Addis Ababa (14–24 June 1960), as well as the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned States in Belgrade (1–6 September 1961). Throughout, the NLF was also active in marshalling unanimous support for the Algerian cause at Arab and Maghreb meetings.[11]

At the United Nations, the NLF brought the case for its struggle before the international community in its broadest forum. Here the Front took special efforts to internationalize the conflict in which it opposed the colonial power. In 1955, at the 10th session of the General Assembly, the Algerian question was for the first time placed on the agenda at the insistence of the Afro-Asian group. The question was then regularly debated every year until Algeria became independent.[12] In order to maintain contact with various parts of the UN machinery, the NLF appointed Abdeldader Chanderli as head of a New York-based information office that published an English-language bulletin called "Free Algeria." This effort at both providing information and promoting public relations contributed to the success in developing sympathetic support for the NLF and the cause it fought for. The United Nations, from 1955, was the platform that permitted the furthest extension of the voice of the fight for national liberation going on in Algeria. The scheduled debates and the publicity given to their acts of repression drove the French, branded as the accused, to take an often aggressive and angry defensive position, which, in turn, furthered the internationalization of the Algerian conflict.

As a forum, the United Nations was also a special field for the advancement of NLF diplomacy. The Front was able to become familiar with the practices of world politics, to take the measure of its international audience, and, progressively, to elaborate the main lines of a foreign policy, including a policy of alliances. By following a policy of "presence," of direct participation, the NLF was able to emerge onto the international scene and extend its contacts and network of relations into different corners of the world. This also permitted the Front to define a policy of alliances and to use its conflict with France as a litmus test for establishing ties with others. If we think

of three sets of interests in international politics[13] – identical, complementary, and conflictual interests – the range of third world countries could be placed in the first category, the socialist camp in the second, and the West in the third. The attitude adopted in each of the categories corresponds globally to the logic of relationships dictated by the position taken with regard to the antagonists. None the less, differences in situations introduce nuances to this strict linear logic.

If the NLF tended to denounce and accuse the Western bloc as a whole, it nevertheless took care to moderate its position in dealing with individual countries. Thus, NATO was the object of the harshest criticism as the principal ally of the French in the war being waged in Algeria.[14] The United States, for its part, was not spared as a principal representative of imperialism and as a faithful supporter of France. But the Front, at the same time, sought to gain the support of the American people through the activities of its information bureau in New York, through close relations between labour groups and the American AFL-CIO, and between student groups and the American National Students Association, which took a stand in favour of Algerian independence. The report presented to Congress by Senator John Kennedy on 2 June 1957 and the Mansfield report of February 1958 to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations both contributed to sensitizing American public opinion to the Algerian problem. Without discussing all the countries of the Western bloc, mention should be made of the particular attention that the NLF paid to Spain and Italy,[15] whose geographic positions permitted travel to Morocco and Tunisia, and to the Nordic countries and Switzerland by virtue of their relatively neutral stances on the Algerian conflict. In effect, the objective of the NLF was to pierce the cohesion of the Western bloc and to seek, if not the support, at least the neutrality of its members by playing on East–West rivalry.

As for the socialist bloc, the NLF appreciated its support in the United Nations and through the general activities of the World Peace Council and the international workers' movement. Its material assistance was not negligible,[16] but was nevertheless handled discreetly since the Soviet Union dealt carefully with France, which it considered a potential ally in detaching Western Europe from American domination. The central organ of the Front put the issue thus: "The USSR prefers a solution in the framework of French–Algerian relations; this preference is notably explained by the apprehensions that it has about American influence supplanting the French in

North Africa."[17] This explains why the USSR did not recognize the Provisional Government until October 1960 and agreed only to de facto recognition.

On the margins of the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia and China had the warmest relations with the NLF. China was among the first countries to give the Provisional Government *de jure* recognition (from 22 September 1958) and was not meagre in its military and financial assistance, which was particularly appreciated because it came from a country with limited resources. Its condition as an underdeveloped country also made China an attractive example for the NLF.[18] The example of Yugoslavia was equally important because of its own struggle for national liberation and for non-alignment. Without going into all the details of Yugoslav assistance, the military, financial, and medical aid was especially significant as was the political support, including the personal intervention of President Tito at Brioni,[19] at the United Nations,[20] during his African tour (of 14 February–26 April 1961), and in Belgrade at the time of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned States. In sum, Yugoslavia's policy of non-alignment was unique in Europe and was included in the "principle of identity" that formed a major guideline in the foreign policy of the NLF.

It was the "principle of identity" that placed Algeria, while still struggling for independence, in the vast community of the third world, politically characterized by the rejection of both colonial domination and alignment with one of the two major blocs. In this domain the NLF identified its struggle with those of all third world countries and considered it valid to extend information and understanding about its own battle throughout Asia, Africa, and even Latin America.[21] If, according to the NLF, the struggle for national liberation being fought in Algeria was part a wider struggle throughout the third world, it was more concretely and specifically part of the struggle by Africans, Arabs, and the peoples of the Maghreb, thus creating concentric circles of solidarity with which to be identified.

In Africa, the NLF concentrated on denouncing colonialism in general and French colonialism in particular. It called on Africans to cut themselves off from France by rejecting every kind of Franco-African alliance. It reminded them of their obligation to support the Algerian cause both at the United Nations and in inter-African conferences. In effect, the struggle for liberation in Algeria was part of the African political scene and undoubtedly accelerated the process of decolonization throughout the French possessions in Africa. It also tended to

96

accentuate the split between the moderate Monrovia group of African states and the more radical Casablanca group, added liberation to the aims of African unity, and enlarged the concept of solidarity to encompass all of Africa. In this way, pan-Africanism, based on common identity among black Africans, was replaced by African unity, based on the common struggle against colonialism and the spirit of liberation and embracing all of Africa north and south of the Sahara.

In the Arab world, the call of the NLF for solidarity was presented, from the beginning, as a natural appeal for support to "brothers" in an hour of need. For "in addition to links that unite the people of Bandung as a whole, the Algerian people are united with the Arab Middle East by close ties of culture and civilization, by the same history and by a future to be built together."[22] For that matter, Arab solidarity existed throughout the Algerian war in very concrete terms without wavering. The Algerian cause was a rare case of unanimity among the Arab states, motivating them to transcend their differences, while the NLF scrupulously avoided getting trapped in inter-Arab rivalries. The Front, here too, added liberation to the aims of Arab unity, going so far as to call for the use of petroleum as a weapon against imperialism.[23] But, except for advocating liberation, the NLF adopted a prudent attitude in approaching other questions of Arab unity, taking a gradualist approach and giving priority to unity among the states of the Maghreb.

Maghreb unity was rooted in the emergence of the nationalist movements in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, from the African North Star in 1926 through successive waves of student militancy to the programme in 1954 to coordinate the armed struggle throughout the region.[24] The Algerian war nevertheless exposed the strengths and weaknesses of unity. It was the occasion for political support, for welcoming Algerian refugees in Morocco and Tunisia, and for periodic meetings of cooperation. On the other hand, it also exacerbated differences among the political leadership in the three countries. The separate accession to independence undoubtedly intensified nationalist feelings to the detriment of dynamic unity. The crux of the difference between Algeria and the other countries lay in the latter having achieved independence through negotiation rather than armed struggle.

The many manifestations of support for the Algerian cause tended to create tensions with France, as had military actions like the bombing of the Tunisian village of Sakiet Sidi Youcef in February 1958.

But, more deeply, the concern on the part of Tunisia and Morocco to maintain good relations with France often led them to seek a solution in a French–North African framework that would require concessions from the NLF. The Front always opposed such moves, reminding its neighbours of the need to respect its autonomy and the strategy of its struggle. The purpose of the Conference of Tangiers in April 1958 of the nationalist parties of the three countries,[25] according to the NLF, was "to agree on a common line of conduct to bring about the independence of Algeria."[26] That important meeting institutionalized Maghreb unity by creating a consultative assembly and a permanent secretariat, but it did not fundamentally change the relations among the three countries or settle the territorial controversies between the NLF and its neighbours. The impulse toward unity, for the moment, permitted them to express solidarity during the armed struggle. It permitted Algeria to confront France with a relatively united Maghreb but postponed any real union to a post-independence scenario.

By the time of independence, Algeria had developed both experience and a series of guiding principles in foreign policy as well as strong alliances and a diplomatic corps that had been matured in the international activity of the Algerian struggle.[27] Algeria emerged from its battle for liberation with international prestige that stimulated it to take an active role in politics, choosing a leading theme during each period and achieving a more important position in the international system than was warranted by its material capability. People are an important element in making foreign policy choices and successive presidents had a great influence on Algerian diplomacy. It was a diplomacy, moreover, that, owing to both its intensity and its wide range of action, was neither linear nor univocal since constraints in the internal and the external environments often led to hesitation, setbacks, and contradictions. But it is still possible to analyse the main lines of Algerian foreign policy by following the leading themes chosen at each stage of its development.

The liberation of Africa

The leading theme in Algerian foreign policy in the years immediately after independence and throughout the 1960s was the liberation of Africa. Other themes were less evident in a young diplomacy anxious to establish itself on the international scene. Engulfed in territorial disputes, the idea of Maghreb unity became secondary to

98

Africa in the hierarchy of interests pursued in Algerian foreign policy.[28] It was the same for the Arab world, where Algeria found no common objective except the Palestinian question, which took centre stage from the time of the Six Day War in 1967. For the rest, Algeria sought to keep its distance from inter-Arab rivalries. Relations with France, at the same time, were limited to bilateral discussions, involving questions of state succession and the application of the Evian Accords that had granted Algerian independence.[29] Finally, with regard to the two superpower blocs, Algerian policy was defined as non-aligned and anti-imperialist. Algeria also stood back from taking sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute that arose at the time and dominated the preparations for the second Bandung conference, which was to be held in Algiers in June 1965.[30]

In contrast, Africa offered Algeria the possibility of pursuing a foreign policy that continued the direction that had been adopted during the struggle for liberation. Throughout the continent, the independence of Algeria had been hailed as an African victory. On its side, the NLF considered that, by its armed struggle, it had contributed to accelerating the process of decolonization in Africa, particularly in the part of Africa dominated by the French.[31] Algeria was thus obliged to support those movements that were fighting the same battle elsewhere in Africa. It was a total obligation, moreover, aimed at the complete liberation of the continent from colonial domination and from the oppression of regimes of racial minorities in southern Africa. Continuity in policy was maintained by the first two presidents of independent Algeria. Whereas, under the first president, Ben Bella, Algeria opened its doors to liberation movements fighting against colonialism and racism and to opposition parties to independent African regimes, under President Boumediene it pursued a more selective policy to separate the wheat from the chaff. In both cases, however, actively engaged liberation movements were granted political as well as military and financial assistance.

Faced with a multiplicity of liberation movements, sometimes in conflict with one another, Algeria selected those it would support by applying certain criteria: how representative the movement was, the intensity of its effort, and support of the population. Those thus chosen were movements that led in the struggle for independence, among them the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau,[32] FRELIMO in Mozambique,[33] the MPLA in Angola,[34] SWAPO in Namibia,[35] the ANC in South Africa,[36] and ZAPU in Southern Rhodesia.[37] Each of these organizations had a permanent representative in Algiers, could train

part of their forces in Algerian military camps, and was granted political and financial support. Algeria also championed their cause within international organizations, notably in the Organization of African Unity (OAU), where it advocated freedom for the whole continent and where it served as one of nine original members of a Committee on Liberation responsible for coordinating military and financial assistance to African liberation movements.[38] Algeria's presence on the committee strengthened support for the most representative of the movements and for the continuance of the committee itself against detractors who wished to suppress it.[39]

The anti-colonialist and anti-racist solidarity championed in the multilateral setting of the OAU and the United Nations system had the same purpose that Algeria had pursued while struggling for its own independence: to internationalize the problems of decolonization and enlarge the scope of the anti-colonialist fight. Thus the experience gained in the national struggle was extended, after independence, to the African continent. It was the same thrust that would be followed in advocating a New International Economic Order in the 1970s, seeking to guarantee the best conditions for economic development and the strengthening of sovereignty.[40]

The New International Economic Order

The progressive exercise of national sovereignty after independence led to different measures of nationalization, beginning with the property belonging to the French minority, who left Algeria in huge numbers after the cease-fire of March 1962. The decrees of 22 March 1963, establishing the nationalization of colonized lands, instituted self-administration; this was to be a characteristic of Algerian socialism during the early years of independence. The exploitation of oil and gas was also an issue that brought on long and difficult discussions with the French.[41] After the framework of the Evian Accords and the Petroleum Code, which guaranteed France's preponderant right to exploit oil and gas reserves in Algeria, the agreements of 29 July 1965 established parity between the two countries for a period of five years. Algeria took advantage of this period to develop the human and technical resources to take over complete control. And it was only after having nationalized the Anglo-Saxon-owned oil companies, following the Six Day War, and having sought in vain to gain a 51 per cent share in the French companies that the Algerian government nationalized the latter on 24 February 1971. In reply to the

cry of the French companies that the Algerian petroleum products on the international market were "red oil," Algeria launched a major diplomatic campaign to build support for the "right of people to manage their own natural resources," the first expression of the call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO).

It was in the African setting that Algeria first launched this principle, gaining the adoption at the Ninth OAU Summit (15–23 June 1971) of a resolution affirming "the inalienable right of all countries and of African countries in particular to exercise their permanent sovereignty over their natural resources in the interest of their national development in accordance with the spirit and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the OAU." The Algerian spokesman of the delegation commented: "this resolution should be put in the framework of the dispute over petroleum between Algeria and France. It is thus very important that the OAU support Algeria under these circumstances."[42] Algeria continued to take similar action at the level of the non-aligned states as well as in the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) and in the United Nations in developing support for the NIEO.

For that matter, the direction had already been set at the meeting of the Group of 77 in Algiers in November 1967 with the adoption of the Charter of Algiers, which prescribed the strategy that developing countries followed at the second session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) held in New Delhi (1 February–19 March 1968) and further pursued at the third session held in Santiago (13 April–29 May 1972).[43] But it was at the Fourth Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned States in Algiers (5–9 September 1973) that the programme of action that became the NIEO was fully developed, in no small part inspired by Algerian documentation. The programme aimed at reducing the inequalities between the developed and developing countries and at achieving greater coordination and exchange among the latter in order to achieve their "collective autonomy."[44]

In moving to realize its goal, Algeria first sought to consolidate the "petroleum front" and to draw on the efforts of petroleum-producing countries to assert their authority over the world price of oil. It was a favourable time for such a move in the wake of the Six Day War and the oil embargo imposed by the Arab producing countries. The steep rise in the price of oil that followed gave OPEC a significant role and enabled its members to take the initiative in world markets. This development gave further impetus to the idea of an NIEO that Algeria,

as president of the non-aligned movement, then proposed in the United Nations.

It was on the initiative of Algeria[45] that the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly was convened on 9 April 1974. Over a period of nearly three weeks, the delegates debated the conditions for reforming international economic relations and adopted two fundamental texts as the legal basis for the NIEO – Resolutions 3201 (S VI) and 3202 (S VI), the first a declaration of general principles for establishing the NIEO and the second a proposed programme of action, including a statement of objectives and the means and modalities for achieving them. A number of rights favouring developing countries were also affirmed, including permanent sovereignty over natural resources, the free and unimpeded right of nationalization, and access to modern technologies. Several months later, the 29th regular session of the General Assembly met, with the Algerian Foreign Minister, Bouteflika, as president, and passed a third fundamental text, Resolution 3281 (XXIX), which encompassed a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, originally proposed by the Mexican head of state, Luis Echevería.

These meetings gave Algeria the opportunity to influence the international scene and to press its objectives[46] through the texts of resolutions that received international approbation and became the reference points for the NIEO. It was an ambitious undertaking that had substantial implications for international economic relations, touching different sectors (financial, commercial, industrial, and technological), and bringing into question the well-established interests of developed countries. Realizing the aims required, at minimum, consent by those that had voted for the resolution and unfailing cohesion on the part of the countries of the third world.

Nevertheless, the subsequent experience in North–South dialogue, reactivated by the Conference on International Economic Cooperation in Paris from late 1975 to mid-1977 between 19 third world and 8 industrialized countries,[47] did not respond fully to the expectations of the South. The few concessions that were extracted, such as the pledge to devote 0.7 per cent of GNP to development assistance and the creation of a stabilization fund for primary products, only partially satisfied the needs of developing countries and did not begin to meet the level of declared intentions and promises. The cohesion of the third world also gave signs of weakening and Algeria found its radical positions gaining less and less favour, especially in

OPEC meetings. At the same time, the Western Saharan situation began to demand its attention and, as President Boumediene's administration gave way to that of President Bendjedid, Algerian foreign policy began a slow evolution toward the easing of tensions and the practice of mediation.

The policy of mediation

Several factors help explain the evolution toward a new policy direction:
– the anti-colonialist movement weakened after the Portuguese colonies were granted independence and the Rhodesian problem was settled;
– the call for an NIEO gave signs of losing steam in the face of the intransigence of the developed countries; at the same time, the New World Information and Communications Order was shaken by the fierce opposition of the United States, which quit UNESCO in 1984, followed by the United Kingdom;
– last, but not least, the economic crisis that Algeria suffered from the diminishing of its petroleum resources and the aggravation of its external debt took away its freedom to manoeuvre and focused its attention on internal problems.

All of these factors influenced the conduct of Algerian foreign policy, which became increasingly directed at ''calming the waters'' and reducing the causes of conflict or tensions. It was demonstrated in relations with the other Maghreb states by the application of the principle of ''positive good neighbours'' set down by President Bendjedid in a speech on the state of the nation on 20 December 1981[48] and involved the elimination of territorial disputes and the establishment of regional cooperation across clearly limited and incontestable frontiers.[49] The resources of Algerian diplomacy were fully deployed and negotiations carried out with neighbouring states in order to defuse, as President Bendjedid put it, the ''sleeping bombs'' that the boundary disputes represented. A series of conventions demarcating boundaries were signed with Niger, Mali, and Mauritania.[50] The contested territories that Algeria had with Tunisia and Morocco were dealt with through a general *détente* that progressively developed from 1982[51] and led to the creation of the Union of Arab Maghreb in February 1989 in Marrakesh. This move was possible only by the common accord of Algeria and Morocco to pass over their disagreements over

the Western Sahara and the efforts of Algeria to ease the tensions between Tunis and Tripoli and overcome Moroccan–Libyan differences.

The policy of mediation was demonstrated in a very special way in 1981 in the case of the American hostages in Iran and provided a new dimension to Algerian foreign policy. Algeria, in effect, fulfilled all of the conditions of an effective mediator in having been chosen by common accord between the two parties and, having their full confidence, was seen to possess certain necessary qualities:

– *neutrality*: Algeria had abstained from taking the part of either side in the hostage crisis[52] and, from the beginning, had shown a humanitarian concern through the visits of its diplomats to the hostages;[53]
– independence: Algeria had constantly affirmed and demonstrated its autonomy in matters of foreign policy;
– *disinterest*: the controversy between the two parties did not affect the national interests of Algeria.

To these attributes were added availability, discretion, and the competence of Algerian diplomats, whose role, in the long negotiations in which they served as intermediaries, eventually contributed to a solution.[54]

The success of its mediation permitted Algeria to gain prestige in the international arena and encouraged it to renew the experience on several occasions, but with only mixed results. For example, Algerian mediation in the Iran–Iraq conflict was short-lived and cost the tragic disappearance of its Minister for Foreign Affairs and the team that had accompanied him. In addition, Algeria's neutrality was seen by Iraq as a grave lack of duty on behalf of Arab solidarity. In contrast, Algeria, paralleling action taken by several states engaged in a West African non-aggression agreement,[55] was able to assist in ending an armed conflict between Mali and Burkina Faso and, again, by its contacts in Tripoli and Njamena, helped settle a Chad–Libyan dispute. Finally, Algeria participated with Morocco and Saudi Arabia in a tripartite committee[56] to try to find a solution to the Lebanese crisis, an example of the policy of mediation that, nevertheless, broke the tradition of not taking sides in inter-Arab conflicts in the Middle East.

The period of mediation policy contrasts with earlier periods by directing Algerian foreign policy towards the stabilization of the international system and the resolution of conflicts rather than contesting and advocating changes in the established order. It reflected

Algerian national interests less openly than it did humanitarian considerations and a will to reconcile brothers who had become enemies. It relied more on qualities of discretion, dialogue, and conciliation than on a combative spirit and widespread mobilization of support. At the same time, the debt problem, which bled the economies of a number of developing countries, including Algeria, hardly inspired energetic action in international affairs. Nevertheless, these changes should not obscure the constants that assured Algerian foreign policy of a certain continuity based on foundations and principles that persisted over the phases of its evolution.

Foundations and principles

The basic texts of the NLF and successive constitutions adopted after independence constitute the doctrinal framework of Algerian policies, including its foreign policy. Together they constitute the expression of official discourse and define the programme of action.

It was the proclamation of 1 November 1954 by the NLF that first fixed "the internationalization of the Algerian problem" as one of the objectives of the armed struggle and gave priority to action in the context of North Africa. It also referred to the Charter of the United Nations and assigned "two essential tasks to be carried out simultaneously: to take political and direct action within the organization; and to go beyond to make the Algerian problem a reality for the whole world with the support of all our natural allies." The Soumman Platform, adopted in August 1956, reaffirmed the Maghrebian framework of the Algerian revolution and called for solidarity with neighbouring countries, while favouring the creation of a federation of the three North African states after independence. The call for solidarity went further, however, extending to all countries while emphasizing, in two places, the autonomy of the Algerian revolution, which was dependent on no outside power. Finally, the importance of the United Nations was underscored in referring to the first debates on the Algerian question at the 10th session of the General Conference and mapping out a strategy of action in the world organization.

The Tripoli Programme, adopted in June 1962 on the eve of independence, set down more explicitly the foreign policy choices of Algeria and defined its policy of alliances, with a hierarchy expressed in the concentric circles of its Maghrebian, Arab, and African interests.[57] The problems of unity were recognized in speaking of the concern to overcome narrow considerations and the will to support, in

concrete terms, "the liberation of the masses." Colonialism and imperialism were denounced and criticism of neo-colonialism was centred on the Evian Accords, which were labelled "a neo-colonialist platform from which France was ready to assert a new form of domination." The programme was optimistic in estimating that "Algeria is achieving sovereignty in an international context where the balance of forces is evolving in favour of the peoples of the world and to the detriment of imperialism." The Charter of Algiers,[58] elaborated at the NLF Congress of April 1964, took the same line and, on the whole, repeated the analysis, but added a more pronounced Marxist tone by referring to the "coexistence of states with different economic and social systems" and to the Treaty of Moscow on the limitation of nuclear weapons. The Charter of Algiers, however, progressively fell into the background and ceased to be used as an official document of reference with the coming of a new regime in June of 1965.

It was in 1976 that a new text, the National Charter, was adopted by referendum after a wide popular debate and determined the broad outline of the constitution developed several months later. The two texts together constituted a doctrinal and institutional basis for guiding the action of the state and the party.[59] Foreign policy had an important place in the National Charter and, if the analysis repeated the denunciation of colonialism, neo-colonialism, and imperialism, emphasized non-alignment, and identified the priority of Maghreb, Arab, and African interests in the policy of alliances, there were several new elements. Economic issues were given greater emphasis with the call for the New International Economic Order and affirmation of the right of people to manage their natural resources. Reference to OPEC expressed the prime importance that Algeria gave to that organization in the battle of the 1970s for control over petroleum prices. It gave Arab unity the same duty as liberation of the Palestinian people, but also underscored the objective of Algeria's controlling its economic potential. The crisis in relations with Morocco over the Western Sahara helps explain the large part devoted to the Maghreb and the insistence on the Maghreb of Peoples rather than the Maghreb of States: "recent history shows us that unity will not be achieved by action at the top, but will be forged by solidarity and common action by the masses around the same objectives."

A new text of the National Charter, amended and adopted by referendum in January 1986, contains new elements in the chapter devoted to foreign policy in comparison with the text of 1976. The

policy of "positive good neighbours" characterizes relations with others in the region and the notion of a "Maghreb of the Peoples" is only indirectly evoked when discussing Maghreb unity: "in effect, that unity, from the view of the Algerian revolution, must serve the people of the region and help them achieve prosperity." The Iran–Iraq war stimulated a call to the necessity "for all Arab and Islamic peoples to work to resolve the differences that divide them," while recognizing, at the same time, the difficulty of strengthening the ties among them. Without renouncing the New International Economic Order, the text nevertheless underscores the difficulties encountered and the impasse into which the North–South dialogue has fallen because of "the refusal of certain industrialized countries to become engaged in global negotiations that could lead to a New International Economic Order to bring about conditions of real recovery and balanced development for developing countries." It also emphasizes the need to enhance "South–South cooperation so that the countries of the Third World can consolidate their policies and reinforce their negotiating position vis-a-vis the industrialized countries." These different texts, only briefly presented, mark the successive steps in Algerian foreign policy. They reveal, at the same time, the lines of continuity that, through changes over time, have constituted the driving forces that have guided Algerian diplomatic action. These forces emerged through the continuities in the fundamental texts and actual practice in the course of the different stages and evolved less by elimination than by a deepening of established principles and the addition of new ones.

The first constant in Algerian foreign policy is the close connection between internal and external policies. It is explicitly stated in the doctrinal texts of the NLF and is the primary element motivating external actions, which gain force from their support in national politics. Thus, the fight for national liberation was naturally extended in the appeal for international solidarity against colonialism. In turn, anti-colonialism became one of the major themes in the foreign policy of independent Algeria. The experience of nationalizing its own economic sectors inspired international action in advocating a New International Economic Order. This connection served to amplify domestic action to an international level and permitted Algeria to play an international role that was otherwise beyond its material capabilities. It also gave Algeria's position an authenticity and force of persuasion drawn from its own experience: the best way of being heard being to instruct by example.

The second constant, which can flow from the first, is the principle of independence in decision-making, rejecting any outside allegiance as well as any meddling in Algerian domestic affairs. The Soumman Platform underscored this principle forcefully: "We must be systematically watchful to preserve intact the independence of the Algerian revolution." The Tripoli Programme, in its turn, underscored the need for an "independent foreign policy," and the National Charter recalls the determination of the Algerian revolution "to be free of any foreign constraint." This is not to deny the internal and external constraints to which any developing country is subject and which contribute to limiting its autonomy, but rather to take every possible precaution to avoid dependence and make this effort a permanent factor in its international relations. This principle, moreover, undergirds the Algerian concept of sovereignty and its approach of non-alignment, two other constants in its foreign policy. Sovereignty is conceived in its dynamic meaning. It is concretized, in the first place, by defence of territorial integrity and the immutability of national frontiers. These principles were invoked during the course of the battle for liberation and sustained the strong will of the NLF to liberate the national territory in its entirety and refuse any partition, even at the cost of prolonging the war. They were also defended after independence in the face of territorial claims by its neighbours and determined Algeria's adherence to the juridical rule of the immutability of frontiers inherited from the period of colonization (*uti possidetis juris*). Sovereignty takes shape, in the second place, by the continual consolidation of national independence, which is a never-ending struggle. Thus political independence must be extended by economic independence, and the right of people over their own destiny must be extended by their right to manage their own natural resources.

Non-alignment emerges from the same quest for liberation and the same affirmation of independence.[60] The National Charter of 1976 states it thus: "Non-alignment is a constant policy of Algeria, the expression on the international level of the policy of national independence." It is not limited to refusing to be drawn into any bloc dominated by a great power, but implies taking an active part in fighting against any form of domination, be it political, economic, or cultural. This militant concept of non-alignment is linked to Algeria's relations with different groups (Maghrebian, Arab, and African) in forming its "sphere of identity" and, in the liberating unity of combat, involves a dialectic between affirmation and negation. The "sphere of identity" is opposed to the "sphere of rejection," which, in turn, motivates the

108

continuing policy of denouncing colonialism, anti-colonialism, imperialism, Zionism, and apartheid.

The reform of the international order

Algeria pursues its foreign policy, based on these principles, within a broad movement that challenges the existing international order and demands its reform. One needs to remember that, like the rest of the third world, Algeria came onto the international scene in a structure that was already established and governed by the Yalta agreement, which had divided the world into two blocs under the leadership of the superpowers. The phenomenon of decolonization appeared in the mid-1950s and, in the course of the following 10 years, created new actors in international relations and raised the problem of reform of the international system. By the radical character of its struggle for national liberation, Algeria was led to play an active role in the forefront of the movement to reform the world order, in general, and the United Nations system, in particular.

Algerian participation in international conferences and in the work of international organizations had begun even before independence. It is sufficient to recall the part played by the NLF in conferences in the African context and the place of the Provisional Government in the Casablanca group, which, in contrast to the Monrovia group, was characterized by strong support for the Algerian cause, support that was also expressed at the Non-Aligned Summit in Belgrade in 1961. Before that date, moreover, Algeria, while still in the midst of battle, participated in Afro-Asian assemblies and had a special status in the League of Arab States, which assured it of support. But it was in the General Assembly of the United Nations that Algeria pursued a particularly active campaign for the ''internationalization of the Algerian problem'' in successive sessions from 1955.[61] General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 on granting independence to all colonial countries and peoples was an important step in the evolution of the world organization in favour of decolonization and reinforced the position of the NLF in the debates on the ''Algerian question.''

Upon independence, Algeria joined international organizations in two stages: the first was dominated by the essentially political preoccupations of the new state, and the second was marked by its growing interest in the economic problems of development.[62] Thus, during the early 1960s, Algeria joined the United Nations and its specialized

agencies as well as the OAU and the Arab League. Its activity in these organizations was principally directed toward the problems of decolonization and conflict resolution. Coming from the prestige of its successful struggle for liberation, Algeria presented itself as a champion of the anti-colonial struggle. The Palestinian cause was a particular focus for its activities in the Arab League and permitted Algeria to project its militant concept of Arab unity while avoiding inter-Arab ideological splits. The Arab–Israeli war of 1967 gave it the opportunity to confirm its commitment in this conflict despite the distance from the battlefield.

The Palestinian cause was also argued by Algeria at the OAU, of which it had been a founding member and in which it had participated actively in preparing the Charter.[63] Support for African independence movements was one of the major thrusts of Algerian activities in the pan-African organization and especially in its Committee on Liberation.[64] The engagement of Algeria was notably evident in the ''Rhodesian affair,'' unleashed by the unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith on 11 November 1965. Algeria was one of the few African countries to apply the sanctions set down by the OAU council of ministers and to break diplomatic relations with Great Britain.[65] The OAU, soon after its creation, was also the vehicle through which the border dispute between Morocco and Algeria was examined and settled in 1963. It was Algeria that favoured an African, rather than a Maghrebian, Arab League, or UN framework. It made the same choice for the settlement of the Western Saharan conflict, without excluding the United Nations, whose Secretary-General had already organized a referendum on self-determination in the region.

At the United Nations, the Palestinian issue and the African liberation movements were central themes in the diplomacy of Algeria, whose representatives participated regularly in the Committee on Decolonization created in 1961.[66] Its commitment also led Algeria to be designated (along with Senegal and Zambia) by the OAU to argue the African position on the Rhodesian case before the Security Council[67] and to represent Africa before the special committee of the Council on the application of economic sanctions against the Salisbury regime. In effect, sanctions against these denounced regimes paralleled support for the liberation movements. Thus Algeria participated in activities whose aim was to have the international community outlaw these regimes and exclude them from the organizations of the United Nations system. The results were gener-

ally mixed but still put these countries in an uncomfortable defensive position. The Republic of South Africa and Portugal were the special targets and were indeed excluded from the Economic Commission for Africa, the International Labour Organization, and UNESCO.

Although activities in international organizations in the 1960s were focused on the problems of decolonization, Algerian diplomats were also able to become familiar with the politics and working methods of the aforementioned organizations. It was a kind of apprenticeship, which prepared them for the following phase, which was dominated by economic issues. In order to consolidate the sovereignty it had gained with political independence, Algeria had to seek economic independence. The multiple problems posed by the development of the country and mobilization of its resources revealed the structural relationship between dependence and imperialism as well as the internationalization of economic processes. Thus Algeria began to direct its foreign policy toward economic issues and to take the lead in international arenas in the 1970s in advocating a New International Economic Order.

For this purpose, Algeria first addressed the countries of the third world through the non-aligned movement, it being necessary to gain the support of those who found themselves in the same situation and who, in certain cases, shared the same aspirations. Their numerical importance gave them a counterbalance to the power of the established countries, at the least to be able to shake their dominant position. Algeria was thus at the centre of the meetings that began to question the existing world order: e.g. the Fourth Conference of the Non-aligned States in Algiers (5–9 September 1973), the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly convened on the initiative of Algeria (April–May 1974), the 29th session of the General Assembly under the presidency of the Algerian Foreign Minister, and the Conference of Heads and Chiefs of State of OPEC countries in Algiers (4–6 March 1975).

These conferences permitted Algeria to formulate its concept of the NIEO[68] and to emphasize certain central ideas like "counting on yourself" or self-reliance, sovereignty over natural resources and the right of nationalization, the pricing of primary commodities, reform of the international monetary system, and development assistance. Ideas like these also had to be argued in the international financial agencies in which Algeria had a growing interest. Algeria had joined OPEC only in 1969 and the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting States (OAPES) a year later, having judged them

111

both too docile in dealing with the large Western oil companies. But these hesitations gave way to a desire to make these organizations a place for developing an agreed-upon petroleum strategy by third world producers and an instrument for mobilizing resources for development assistance in the framework of South–South cooperation, especially Arab–African cooperation.

Algeria participated in creating new organizations to respond to Arab–African cooperation, for example, the Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to Arab Countries, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the OPEC Fund for International Development, the Special Fund of the OAPES, and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa.[69] At the same time, Algeria worked to strengthen the role of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to counter the preponderant influence of the Western powers in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as the World Bank. All of these actions were part of the movement to reform the international system and, more precisely, the United Nations system. The terms of the debate placed in opposition the well-established powers that had originally created the system and the newcomers on the international scene and reflected the dialectic of "numbers and power."

The dialectic of numbers and power

Reform of the international order became an issue when the new states gained independence and their numbers gave them a majority in international organizations. So long as the powers that had established the rules could dominate the system, the question of reform was less acute and did not bring into question the very philosophy that had prevailed when the system was founded. In these circumstances, the majority and power were not contradictory. But they became so with the influx of new states and the creation of a new majority that emerged from the democratization of the organizations. In the debate that followed with the industrialized states, Algeria defended the positions of the third world, positions that were first discussed in the more limited African or Asian–African group.[70]

The first rule that was raised was (and remains) that of "one state, one vote." This rule brings into question the oligarchic character of certain of the operating principles in the organizations of the UN sys-

tem. The right of veto is one of these since it gives each permanent member of the Security Council the power to block action against the will of all of the other members. This power has been broadly used and has often paralysed the United Nations in taking action. The states of the third world have not hesitated to criticize this practice, which greatly weakens the principle of the sovereign equality of states that is granted in the UN Charter.

Another discriminatory practice is the weighted voting in the financial institutions of the UN system, which ensures that the principal contributors will monopolize the decision-making process. Several proposals have also been made by the developed countries to introduce weighted voting in the General Assembly in order to reduce the effects of what is called a third world "automatic majority" by its detractors. Among these proposals[71] are: taking abstentions into account in voting; the introduction of weighted voting in financing development programmes; and the concept of "associated states" as applied to "micro-states" of limited means that would not have to contribute to the United Nations but would, in turn, give up their right to vote. This last proposal would introduce a kind of discriminatory regime based on capacity to pay, which would be contrary to the principle of universality and, thus, unacceptable.

The democratization of the UN system implies, in effect, the application of the principle of universality, which assumes the participation of all states on an equal footing in the affairs of the international community.[72] The Fourth Conference of the Non-Aligned States at Algiers underscored this point in its policy declaration: "The non-aligned states must continue to work ... for the transformation of international relations in the direction of democracy and the equality of all states in order to be sure that decisions which could affect small and large countries are not taken without their full participation on the basis of equality." The general UN declaration concerning the establishment of the NIEO confirmed this principle[73] and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States gave it the status of law in Article 10, which states: "All states are equal under law and, as equal members of the international community, have the right to participate fully and effectively in the adoption, at the international level, of decisions taken to solve world economic, financial and monetary problems."[74] All of these texts only substantiate the tendency toward majority rule in the United Nations that favours such participation. It was the principle of universality that led Algeria to support

the admission of the People's Republic of China into the United Nations as well as the struggles for liberation in order to free dominated peoples and integrate them into the international community.

Democratization also implies the application of majority rule in the absence of unanimity and the acceptance by the minority of the decisions taken by majority vote as an expression of the will of the international community. The problem is in implementing such decisions and establishing their binding character for everyone. The legal debate about the value of resolutions passed in international organizations covers a political debate that arises from the problem of the dialectic of numbers and power. Like a great number of non-aligned countries, Algeria wants to confer a greater obligation on member states to comply with resolutions adopted in the United Nations system. Mohammed Bedjaoui, in this regard, developed an eloquent argument in favour of a "legal new deal" by giving resolutions the role "of instruments for the progressive development of international law."[75] But there are too many obstacles to accepting such a concept. The developed countries, now a minority in the global organizations, all have a tendency to abstain from implementing any majority decision that does not serve their interests – and there is no lack of them. They also have numerous opportunities to meet as a "closed club" to take decisions that preserve their interests.

The debate was accurately summarized by Virally when he said that "the power of numbers is less a weapon to force a decision than an instrument of pressure in multilateral negotiations where the objective is to come to a unanimous agreement."[76] The concept of consensus has been proposed as a way of reaching unanimity and avoiding a split between majorities with their numerical weight and strong minorities with their material power. But this formula of compromise,[77] while it has maintained a dialogue between the two groups and has been presented as an intermediate solution between the right of veto and majority vote, has strayed from that goal in practice. Consensus has had the effect of softening the propositions of the third world and preserving the interests of the developed countries.

Indeed the problems of reforming the United Nations system have been approached through compromise. The UN organizations have always been considered by Algeria as the appropriate framework through which to introduce new and more equitable rules in the relations between nations big and small. The National Charter makes this clear: "The United Nations constitutes for the non-aligned countries

114

an adequate framework in which they can participate in preserving security in the world and establishing a just balance in the system of international relations." The reference to the "non-aligned nations" serves to situate the position of Algeria in the international system, but also indirectly reveals the mediation through which it passes in acting on the world scene. The context of the non-aligned somehow fulfils the function of an "amplifier" for the actions of Algeria, as is specifically illustrated by the economic reforms that it has proposed.

Economic reforms

The elaboration of the Algerian concept of a New International Economic Order and its defence in UN organizations took the following course:

– The nationalization of petroleum and natural gas in 1971 was the point of departure for confrontation with the petroleum companies, which tried a number of intimidation tactics in response, notably by calling Algerian oil "red" on the world market.
– This confrontation was extended to the Arab level with the oil embargo that followed the Arab–Israeli War of 1973 and was agreed on at the Arab summit in Algiers in November.
– Shortly before that, the field was extended even further to the non-aligned movement, whose summit was also held in Algiers in September.
– The culminating point was the proposal for an NIEO, beginning with the Special Session of the General Assembly convened at the request of Algeria and ending with passage of the programme of action in May 1974 and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States in December of the same year.

This chronology brings out three principal stages in this process. The first takes the national setting as the anchor for Algeria's activity abroad and the second expands from that point by sensitizing others and mobilizing support through the "sphere of identity" and its central force, the non-aligned movement, in which close cooperation developed between Algeria and the "founding countries" of India, Yugoslavia, and Egypt. The third stage is collective intervention in the world organization in order to introduce modifications into the international system. The final result, however, was a compromise between the position of those defending the status quo, who hold power, and those advocating change, who hold the numbers. In truth, the gains that have been fought for bear the marks of compro-

mise. In the process, however, the initiative passed to the third world, with Algeria contributing its part. Algeria rarely acts alone in the international arena; rather it acts through the mediation of an ''amplifier'' that can add weight to its position.

Despite the compromises, one of the achievements was affirmation of the right of peoples to manage their own natural resources, including recognition of the power of nationalization. The controversy came over the question of compensation.[78] Algeria took a radical position on this issue, leaving it to the nationalizing state to judge whether indemnification is justified and to fix the level of payment unilaterally, with any dispute also subject to its jurisdiction. This position can be found in point 8 of the economic declaration adopted at the non-aligned summit in Algiers: ''Every state can fix the level of eventual compensation as well as the method for payment and all disputes must be resolved in accordance with the national laws of that state.''[79]

The compromise text in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States retreated from this radical position, however. The Charter recognized the right ''to nationalize, expropriate or transfer the property of foreigners,'' but added that ''it must pay reasonable compensation ... taking into account rules, laws and circumstances that are appropriate.'' On the one hand, the addition of the word ''must'' indicated an obligation, while the compensation is no longer ''eventual.'' Moreover, while recognizing the legal competence of the nationalizing state to settle any disputes arising from the question of compensation, other channels are open in cases where the states involved ''mutually agree to seek other peaceful means on the basis of the sovereign equality of states and the principle of free choice.''

With regard to protection against pressure or obstacles to the right to nationalize, the declaration on establishing the NIEO considers nationalization as an expression of the full sovereignty of a state and adds: ''No state can be subjected to economic, political or other coercion aimed at preventing the free and full exercise of this inalienable right.'' The Charter, in Article 32, approaches the question in more general and somewhat weaker terms: ''No state should resort or encourage resort to economic, political or other measures that would constrain another state in the exercise of its sovereign rights.'' Algeria and other third world countries sought to strengthen this protection during the debate on the definition of aggression by introducing the idea of economic aggression. But their efforts were in vain and the resolution adopted on 14 December 1974 did not include this no-

116

tion. In effect, the protection that a nationalizing state has is basically theoretical in the face of the numerous means of economic pressure at the disposal of the industrialized countries and the multinational corporations. For that matter, the sophistication of these means of pressure is such as to reduce the chance of giving the idea of economic aggression a legal and practical character.

But protecting the right of nationalization is not sufficient. What is necessary is to make it part of the economic development of the country. The connection between nationalization and development was emphasized by President Boumediene at the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly: "When [nationalization] breaks down the screen which foreign owners hold up between us as producers and our customers and suppliers, it permits us to participate fully in the business of international relations [and thus becomes] an act of development." It is this link between nationalization and development that justifies asking the United Nations to provide financial and technical support to the nationalizing state and anticipates two parts of the programme of action for the NIEO under the heading, "Assistance in the exercise of permanent sovereignty by states over their natural resources": "Every effort must be made (a) to neutralize any attempt to prevent states from freely and effectively exercising their rights of complete and permanent sovereignty over their natural resources;" and "(b) to insure that the competent organs of the United Nations provide assistance requested by developing countries in order to assure the full functioning of the means of nationalized production."[80]

In the thinking behind the NIEO, the problems of development are matters for the international community as a whole. What follows is an obligation for a coordinated effort by the industrialized countries to assist the developing countries, and particularly the least developed, in terms of transferring technology, financing development programmes, and providing preferential treatment in economic and commercial transactions. Article 18 of the Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States puts the matter thus: "the developed countries must grant, improve and widen the general system of preferences in favour of developing countries without reciprocity or discrimination." And Article 19 adds: "In order to accelerate the economic growth of developing countries and overcome their economic lag in comparison with developed countries, the latter must grant them, in the areas of international economic cooperation in which they are engaged, generalized preferential treatment without reciprocity or discrimination."

117

Although the principle of preferential treatment is strongly affirmed in the text, its realization still largely rests on the goodwill of the developed countries. The same is true with regard to the section on peace in the NIEO, calling on the great powers to end their build-up of arms and devote part of the savings from disarmament to development financing through the creation of an International Fund of Disarmament for Development. The same message can be found in Algeria's National Charter of 1986: "In the area of disarmament and collective security, Algeria has contributed to a better understanding at the United Nations of the problem of reversing the course of armaments by eradicating the reasons for their accumulation and enhancing the relation between the problems of peace and those of development." The opportunity that the United Nations provided to get this message across nevertheless had little effect on the strategies of the major powers or on the increasingly important resources devoted to military purposes.

The NIEO was thus severely limited in making an impact on international economic relations and translating its principles into action. The programme developed in the proposals encountered scepticism and disenchantment.[81] The idea of an International Law of Development that it stimulated was re-examined in the light of the problems of "double standards" and especially questions about the effectiveness of norms when applied.[82]

Along the same lines, the long negotiations on the Law of the Sea exposed the ambiguities in the notion of "the common heritage of humankind," first proposed by Malta and subsequently supported by the Group of 77 to apply to the open seas outside of national jurisdiction.[83] On this point, Algeria based its position on a perspective that tended to substitute solidarity and interdependence for domination and competition in international relations.[84] It also defended the interests of less developed land-locked countries in supporting the establishment of a supranational organization with exclusive authority over the exploitation of the open sea, including authority to restrain the activities of the great powers and multinational corporations. This provision was included in the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly in 1969 and 1970 and in the negotiating text adopted in Geneva in 1975.

The following year, however, the developed countries responded by weakening the principles defended by the Group of 77 and turning to their own advantage the idea of the "common heritage of hu-

mankind'' that Algeria wanted to raise to the level of an ''imperative law.''[85] In the end, the convention that was adopted in 1982 reintroduced the possibility of states and multinational corporations engaging in the exploitation of the open seas.[86] Despite the number of concessions to its position, the United States did not sign the convention, retaining the capacity for unregulated action that its advanced technology permits and ignoring the changes introduced by the supporters of the NIEO and the modest limitations imposed on freedom on the high seas. Nevertheless, the campaign that Algeria and the Group of 77 carried out under the banner of the NIEO did not upset the structure of classical international law, but nevertheless raised the possibility of change over the long term. Defeats, like victories, are never total and conquered lands are not held in perpetuity.

The American counter-offensive, apparent at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, became more violent at UNESCO in response to the New World Order on Information and Communications. It was rooted in a broadly based hostility to the UN system, which was accused of excessive politicization.[87] The United Nations itself was not spared and faced an American threat to cut back its resources at a time when it was facing severe financial difficulties. It was this crisis that placed the issue of UN reform on the agenda.

Institutional reforms

The problems of UN reform are discussed elsewhere in this book and need not be repeated here. What we want to concentrate on is the position of Algeria on reform of the UN Charter and on the several propositions that were advanced in the framework of ''the examination of the effectiveness of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations.''

One should remember that, like other developing countries, Algeria sees the United Nations as an especially important forum open to the international community. As evidence of the importance it attributes to the United Nations, Algerian representatives are, in general, chosen from among the most experienced members of the diplomatic service, who have proved their worth in other posts or in fulfilling government responsibilities. The basic texts of the NLF and the Algerian constitutions have always given significant attention to the United Nations, and Algerian diplomacy has worked to support the world organization, emphasizing that the strongest support

comes from its universality and its democratization. This is the angle from which Algeria approaches the issue of institutional reform of the United Nations.

Reform, however, goes back at least to 1974 when the Algerian Foreign Minister presided over the General Assembly. At that time, the Algerian delegate said that "the need to examine several propositions about the Charter has always been a concern of Algeria and the non-aligned countries and creating an ad hoc committee could only increase the efficiency of the UN. At the same time, if the Charter belongs to all, nothing prevents such issues being considered by a committee."[88] Resolution 3349 then created a committee that, a year later (under Resolution 3499 of the 1975 Assembly), was transformed into the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization, known as "the Committee on the Charter." Algeria, together with other third world countries, contemplated a general revision of the Charter, while the developed countries, and particularly the permanent members of the Security Council, defended the status quo and would agree only to a partial revision that did not disturb the general architecture of the system and, above all, their own domination. They considered it more important to guard the Charter than to revise it. These two divergent positions persisted throughout the discussion that went on over a number of years and became increasingly lost in interminable debates over procedure.[89]

At the level of general principles, Algeria took the initiative in introducing amendments to Article 2 of the Charter to include the principles of the right of self-determination and permanent sovereignty over natural resources. The firm opposition of the permanent members of the Security Council prevented their adoption. An indirect route was also taken in the form of a complementary text for Algeria and other partisans of reform to submit a declaration on the peaceful solution of international disputes. What they sought was the definition of a dispute and of aggression, having in mind the Western Saharan dispute[90] and the struggles for liberation.[91] Several meetings were necessary, interrupted by caucusing sessions,[92] in order for the General Assembly to adopt by consensus, on 15 November 1982, the Manila Declaration (Resolution 37/10) to serve as a standard in the peaceful solution of disputes.

The debates revolving around the maintenance of peace and collective security permitted Algeria and the non-aligned group to affirm their interest in democratizing the United Nations by proposing

the enlargement of the Security Council and limiting the right of veto. What Algeria has contended is that the maintenance of peace is a concern of the whole of the international community and cannot be limited to a dialogue among a few powers. The intervention of the Algerian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ahmmed Taleb-Ibrahimi, during the 43rd session of the General Assembly in 1988 repeated that position: "In the work on disarmament, which is essential to building a peaceful order, all of us have a contribution to make. My country has always considered that, while bilateral relations are necessary, they should neither be excluded nor serve as a substitute for multilateral action. The deplorable failure of the 3rd Special Session on Disarmament is a poor omen. We would like to think that it was a detour along the way and a perverse situation that we can redress in the future. When it comes to security for all and peace for all, universality in action and decision-making must be the rule."[93] A document prepared by a group in which Algeria participated[94] and serving as a basis for discussion[95] proposed that the competence of the General Assembly be expanded in matters of peace and security and those of the Security Council be limited. At the same time, it proposed enlarging the Council on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, permitting the third world to be better represented.

These proposals were rejected by the permanent members of the Security Council, hostile to any modification of the existing balance. They also rejected proposals to limit the use of the veto. Algeria, like other third world countries, has criticized the right of veto as an example of the inequality of states in fact and one of the causes of paralysis of the United Nations at times of crisis. This was the meaning of a statement by the Algerian Foreign Minister, Mohamed Seddik Benyahia, at the 37th session of the General Assembly: "Among the major reasons for the failure of the organization to act in the face of danger … is the abusive use of the veto, which is evidence of the enormous gap that exists between the rule of unanimity and its application."[96] This same point was made on a number of other occasions[97] and each time encountered the firm resolve of the permanent members to maintain the status quo, in effect imposing a closed system that prevented the introduction of reforms in the UN Charter. The work of the Committee on the Charter became engulfed in the sands of interminable discussion and dilatory manoeuvres that slowly dampened the will for reform. As the Algerian delegate remarked bitterly: "Instead of moving ahead in coherent fashion toward substantial improvement in the way the UN works, the Commit-

tee seems to have a pronounced preference for academic discussions that have no practical effect."[98]

The split between the third world and the great powers, attenuated by the presence of "groups of states," is none the less a fact of life and juxtaposes the partisans of reform with those who defend the status quo. The latter, by force of inertia, have been able to empty the work of the Special Committee of any really creative results, with the exception of the Manila Declaration, which may be considered a happy compromise. Outside of the Special Committee, Algeria's reform activities have centred on efforts such as strengthening the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) as a specialized agency in the UN system. President Boumediene raised this problem at an early stage at the second session of the Group of 77 in Algiers in 1975,[99] and the Lima Conference also adopted a recommendation on UNIDO.[100] While these efforts were successful, a move to strengthen the role of UNCTAD failed.[101] Another Algerian proposal that was supported by the non-aligned, but that could not be implemented, was to strengthen the Economic and Social Council by converting it to an Economic Security Council.

In face of the grave crisis looming over the United Nations in 1987, Algeria's interest was in saving the world organization. The Minister for Foreign Affairs set the tone in his address to the General Assembly that year: "The United Nations finds itself at an essential crossroads. It must take on problems that involve the very survival of humanity when its own existence is threatened." He then went on: "there is no alternative to the preservation and strengthening of our organization. If, to assure this, reforms are necessary to increase its efficiency and if, from this point of view, there is a need for structural changes, we must all encourage and contribute to this process. For the international situation bears witness that it is, in truth, the only instrument that humanity has to bring together the forces of all of us and to open a universal perspective on peace and progress."

It is true that the budget crisis that the United Nations faced in the mid-1980s relegated large plans for the global reform of the world organization to a secondary level. The dominant concern about reform focused on budgetary problems and the rationalization of UN administration. In this respect, Algeria adopted a defensive posture, whether in the Group of 18 where it was represented by Layachi Yaker (one of the group's four vice-presidents) or in the Committee for Programme and Coordination (CPC) where it had an observer. In responding to different recommendations,[102] Algeria's position was

dictated by an interest in defending the interests of the third world. If UN expenditures must be limited (by avoiding overlapping staffing, reducing the number of conferences and meetings, regrouping services, and reducing staff, for example), these measures should not reduce the essential activities of the organization, particularly its development programmes.

At the same time, reform in the sense of improving the efficiency of the organization need not involve financial reductions.[103] Algeria has specifically defended the construction of a new headquarters for the Economic Commission for Africa and opposed the reduction of its budget, recalling the priority that the United Nations has given to development in Africa. It has also reaffirmed the need for an equitable geographical distribution of positions in the United Nations and an enlargement of the CPC along the same lines. With regard to the scale of contributions toward meeting the UN budget[104] as set down by the Committee on Contributions, Algeria protested against any increase in the shares paid by the developing members of OPEC in order to emphasize the constraints under which all third world countries operate and to propose the application of a principle of "compensatory inequality."[105] But this principle does not have the same meaning for all: for some, it means a right that emerges from international solidarity; for others, a favour that depends on the goodwill of the creditor states. This is the same difference in perspective that was reflected in the NIEO debate, the difference between confrontation and solidarity.

Conclusion: The past as prologue

In terms of the discussion of this paper, it should be emphasized that reform of the United Nations has been an issue throughout the history of the organization as changes have taken place in international relations. But two periods have had a special impact on the issue of reform. The first, in the 1960s, was brought about by the vast process of decolonization, which set off an important transformation in the structure of international relations. This was followed in the 1970s by the development of the New International Economic Order. Algeria was at the heart of these two sets of events, which shook up the world and introduced a wind of change in the United Nations. The first but not the least of these changes heralded the massive arrival of new actors on the international scene and the appearance of a new majority in the United Nations that began to question the bal-

ance established in the aftermath of World War II. The dynamic of national liberation after accession to political independence then provoked the second change, manifested by the introduction of the debate on the NIEO in the institutions of the UN system.

Nevertheless, the force of "numbers," short of material means, could only end in a profound questioning and not a real change of the existing system. The limits of the reform proposals revealed the contradictions in the NIEO project, which sought to change the international system with the material assistance of the principal beneficiaries of the established order. Even if one provisionally agrees with an American commentator that "at the level of negotiations, the NIEO is, literally, a paper tiger,"[106] it is nevertheless true that the international system will never be the same. It is "condemned" to change and, this being the case, it will be impossible to ignore the fundamental aspirations and democratization contained in the NIEO. The signs of a new period of change are already knocking on the door of the last decade of the century with the upheavals in the regimes of Eastern Europe and the new balances and imbalances that follow in the wake of the end of the Cold War.

Upheavals of this magnitude have usually followed a great war. Without it being a certainty, the risk of war cannot be totally brushed aside and, this time, could follow these deep mutations that carry with them imbalances and instabilities in Eastern Europe: dismantling of the Soviet bloc, intensification of ethnic conflicts, brutal integration into the international capitalist markets, pluralist transition in a context of crisis . . . so many changes that are difficult to control. The ending of the East–West split is already accentuating the North–South split, which will establish the new dialectic in the international system. It is in this context that the international order established at the end of World War II is undergoing a profound revision. The negotiation of new rules of the game will be carried out in the presence of the third world, and the participation of developing countries will reflect the democratic hopes of the NIEO.

The dramatic changes in the international system are already manifest in the United Nations, especially in the dominating role of the United States, the withdrawal of any countervailing power with the dismantling of the Soviet Union, and, in the beginning, the marginalization of the countries of the South. In the case of Algeria, its role is muted by internal adjustments through which it has been going and by the weakening of the coalitions through which it had maximized the influence of "numbers" in earlier transformations. Nevertheless

the position that Algeria has taken on questions of UN reform remains unchanged. Consistent with the aims of the countries of the South, it is a position that calls for a democratization of the international system and thus of the main organs of the United Nations: the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Economic and Social Council.

The increased power of the Western states has reinforced the concentration of decision-making in the Security Council with the larger General Assembly progressively weakened. What Algeria, together with other developing countries, wants is a renewal of the Assembly's role so that the problems that involve the future of the international community can be examined in a setting that permits the great number of states to participate. Debate on reform of the Security Council has already opened, with arguments ranging from the admission of Japan and Germany as permanent members to proposals for broad representation based on regions and the creation of a category of "semi-permanent members." Here Algeria has favoured the broader criteria that favour regional representation rather than economic and financial capacity. At the same time, Algeria has advocated the limited use of the veto to avoid its abuse and a realignment in the relations between the Security Council and the General Assembly in order to enhance the influence of the Assembly.

The Economic and Social Council also needs to be revitalized, as do the operational activities in the field of development throughout the UN system. The right of development has to remain a priority. In his *Agenda for Peace*, the Secretary-General emphasized the importance of development in eliminating the sources of conflict and violence as well as in creating the democratic structures of political systems. All of these positions require the democratization of the UN system and greater transparency in its organization. They serve, moreover, as something of a counterbalance to the increasing predominance of the Western powers in international arenas and the influence of "power" over "numbers."

The preoccupation of Algeria with internal problems of political and social instability leaves no room for ambitious international initiatives, which can emerge only once the domestic front is consolidated after widespread reforms. The transition toward pluralism, born in crisis, does not necessarily guarantee democracy and still less social progress. But it liberates forces engaged in defending and eventually achieving pluralism through unrelenting and persistent activity. The foreign policy of Algeria is necessarily affected by domes-

tic conditions and will have to be conducted in a relatively low key in maintaining constant pressures for the democratization of the United Nations. The reality remains that international and domestic politics are integrally connected, and thus developing countries such as Algeria must continue to be engaged in the United Nations and must ensure that the evolution of the world organization takes a direction that will enhance their interests.

Notes and references

1. For more information see *L'Algérie en armes* (Algiers: OPU; Paris: Economica, 1981).
2. See *Algérie actualité*, no. 994 (1–7 Nov. 1984): 20.
3. On this subject see Mohammed Bedjaoui, *La révolution algérienne et le droit* (Brussels: Éditions AIJDI, 1961), 141–183.
4. See PGAR memorandum in ibid., 191–201.
5. See General Beaufré, *L'expédition de Suez* (Paris: Grasset, 1967), 226ff.
6. Le Comité de Coordination et d'Exécution (CCE).
7. The following dates are important: 20 Sep. 1955, shopkeepers' strike in Algiers; Jan.–Feb. 1956, eight days' strike; 11 Dec. 1960, demonstrations in Algiers.
8. See Pierre Queuille, *Histoire de l'Afro-asiatisme* (Paris: Payot, 1960).
9. The First Solidarity Conference between the Peoples of Africa and Asia took place in Cairo (26 Dec. 1957 – 1 Jan. 1958) and the Second in Conakry (12–15 April 1960); the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non Aligned States was in Belgrade (1–6 Sept. 1961).
10. See Slimane Cheikh, "Algeria and Africa – 1954–1962," in *Revue algérienne des sciences juridiques, économiques et politiques* (Sept. 1968): 703–746.
11. Slimane Cheikh, "The Machreq and the Algerian War," in *Relations Maghreb–Machreq* (Aix-en-Provence: GIS, Université d'Aix-Marseille, 1981).
12. See Khalfa Mammeri, *Les Nations-Unies face à la question Algérienne (1954–1962)* (Algiers: SNED, 1969).
13. See Thomas W. Robinson, "Ends and Means of Foreign Policy," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961).
14. See the PGAR memorandum dated 19 Sep. 1960 in *El-Moudjahid*, no. 79 (25 Sep. 1960). The memorandum is also included in Bedjaoui, *La révolution algérienne*, 202–209.
15. Italy's oil policy, pursued by the ENI (under the leadership of Enrico Mattei), was favoured by the NLF.
16. Including weapons, food, and medical supplies, and scholarships allocated to Algerian students.
17. See "Les prises de position de l'U.R.S.S.," in *El-Moudjahid*, no. 20 (15 Mar. 1958).
18. See "Le G.P.R.A. à la fête de la Révolution chinoise," in *El-Moudjahid*, no. 51 (29 Sept. 1959).
19. Meeting between Nehru, Nasser, and Tito on 19 Jul. 1956. See *El-Moudjahid*, no. 2 (n.d.), "Derrière Briori."
20. 25th session of the UN General Assembly, Sept. 1960.
21. See Alfred Berenguer, *Un curé d'Algérie en Amérique Latine* (Algiers: SNED, 1966).
22. "La révolution arabe," in *El-Moudjahid*, no. 27 (22 Jul. 1958).
23. Along these lines, the NLF suggested the creation of "an Arab cartel for petroleum." See "La révolution arabe sur la voie de l'unité," in *El-Moudjahid*, no. 28 (22 Aug. 1958).
24. Association of Muslim Students of North Africa created in 1919 in Algiers, and Association of North African Muslim Students created in 1927 in Paris.

25. "Istiqlal marocain, le Néo-destour tunisien et le F.L.N."
26. According to the CCE, in *El-Moudjahid*, no. 11 (1 Nov. 1957).
27. See Nicole Grimaud, *La politique extérieure de l'Algérie* (Paris: Karthala, 1984), 10–20; Salah Mouhoubi, *La politique de coopération algéro-française* (Algiers: OPU; Paris: Publisud, 1983).
28. See Bruno Etienne, "L'unité maghrébine à l'épreuve des politiques étrangères," in *L'unité maghrébine* (Paris: CNRS, 1972), 91–106.
29. See Grimaud, *La politique extérieure*, 35–85.
30. See Diplomatic Section in *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord* (Paris: CNRS, 1965).
31. See in particular the Tripoli Programme, which stipulates: "The war of liberation contributed, by its intensity and its dynamism, to the acceleration of the process of decolonization – particularly in Africa."
32. African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde created in September 1956. It started the liberation struggle in 1962 under the command of Amilcar Cabral. Its rival movement, FLING (Liberation Front for the National Independence of Guinea), was less representative and was not recognized by Algeria.
33. The Mozambique Liberation Front created in June 1962. It started the independence struggle in September 1964. Its rival movement, COREMO (Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique), created in March 1965, was not recognized by Algeria either.
34. Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, created in December 1956. Its rival movement, the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola), created in March 1962 and successor to the UPA (Union of the Angolan People) headed by Roberto Holden, received some help from Algeria during the period 1962–1963; at the same time, Algeria seemed undecided which was the most representative movement of liberation in Angola. On this subject, see Slimane Cheikh, "La politique africaine de l'Algérie," *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, 1978* (Paris: CNRS, 1980), 1–54.
35. South West Africa People's Organization, created in April 1959. Its rival movement, SWANU (South West Africa National Union), also created in 1959, was not recognized by Algeria.
36. African National Congress, created in 1912. Its rival movement, the PAC (Pan African Congress), benefited from some help from Algeria, to a lesser degree.
37. Zimbabwe African People's Union, created in December 1961.
38. Including the following countries: Algeria, Congo (Leopoldville), Ethiopia, Guinea, Nigeria, Uganda.
39. Cheikh, "La politique africaine de l'Algérie," 15–16.
40. See O. Ferdiou. "L'Algérie en développement. Projet économique et stratégie internationale (1962–1982)," Thesis, political sciences, University of Paris 1, 1984.
41. Madjid Benchikh, *Les instruments juridiques de la politique algérienne des hydro-carbures* (Paris: LGDJ, 1973). See Grimaud, *La politique extérieure de l'Algérie*, 69–79, and Mouhoubi, *La politique de coopération algéro-française*, 105–109.
42. See *El-Moudjahid*, no. 1876 (24 Jun. 1971).
43. On these various meetings see A. Sid-Ahmed, *Nord–sud – Les enjeux* (Algiers: OPU, 1981).
44. See text of the studies of the Fourth Summit of the Non-Aligned States in Abderrahmane Remili, *Tiers monde et emergence d'un Nouvel Ordre Economique International* (Algiers: OPU, 1976), 124–174.
45. Explained in the Memorandum submitted by Algeria at the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations; see République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire (RADP), *Le pétrole, les matières de base et le développement* (Algiers: SONATRACH, April 1974).
46. Following the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly. It was convened by Algeria and presided over by Mr. Bouteflika.
47. Algeria was represented at that conference by Mr. Aft Chaalal, its ambassador to the CCE, and even held the vice-presidency to the Commission for Development.
48. See the text of the address in *El-Moudjahid*, no. 5127 (21 Dec. 1981).

49. See Nabil Bouaita, "Le concept de bon voisinage positif dans la politique étrangère algérienne," *Revue algérienne des sciences juridiques, economiques et politiques* (Mar. 1984): 193–214.
50. These conventions were signed by Nigeria on 15 January, by Mali on 8 May, and by Mauritania on 13 December.
51. Treaty of "amitié, fraternité et de concorde" signed by Algeria and Tunisia on 19 Mar. 1983. This treaty was considered by Algeria as the starting point of a United Maghreb that the various countries of this region would enter over a period of time. See Ahmed Taleb-Ibrahimi on this subject: "Traité de fraternité et de concorde ou le Magreb en mouvement," *Revue algérienne des relations internationales* 9 (1988): 7–12.
52. It is important to point out that the NLF never resorted to taking hostages during the war.
53. Mr. Abdelkrim Gheraieb, Algerian ambassador to Tehran, was the first diplomat to pay a visit to the American hostages. Cardinal Duval was a member of the religious delegation that visited the hostages at Christmas 1979. Mr. Mohamed Bedjaoui, Algerian representative to the United Nations, was a member of the UN delegation sent to Iran.
54. For further details on these negotiations see Boussetta Allouche, *Small States and International Mediation. The Case of Algeria* (Algiers: OPU, 1989); Warren Christopher et al., *American Hostages in Iran* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985); Patrick Juillard, "Le rôle joué par la République Populaire et Démocratique d'Algérie dans le réglement du contentieux entre les Etats-Unis d'Amérique et la République Islamique d'Iran," *Annuaire Français de Droit International* (*A.F.D.I.*) (Paris: CNRS, 1981): 19–44.
55. Agreement on non-aggression and mutual defence signed in 1977 by Togo and the member states of the Economic Community of West African States.
56. This committee was created on 26 May 1989 after the Arab summit in Casablanca.
57. See text in NLF, *Textes fondamentaux du Front de Libération Nationale 1954–1962*. (Algiers: Ministère de l'Information et de Culture, 1979).
58. See text in NLF, *La Chartre D'Alger* (Algiers: Commission Centrale d'Orientation, 1964).
59. See on that subject Mohammed Bedjaoui, "Les aspects internationaux de la constitution algérienne," *A.F.D.I.* (1977), 75–94; M. Benounich and N. Ghozali, "La politique extérieure de l'Algérie à travers la Chartre Nationale et la Constitution," *Revue algérienne des sciences juridiques, économiques et politiques* (1978). See also Mohhamed Abdeiwahab Bekhechi, *La constitution algérienne de 1976 et le droit international* (Algiers: OPU, 1989).
60. See Ahmed Taleb-Ibrahimi, "Le non-alignement. Pour une humanité unie dans un nouvel ordre de paix et de progrès," *Revue algérienne des relations internationales*, no. 3 (1986): 11–33.
61. See Sammam Boutros Farajallah, *Le groupe afro-asiatique dans le cadre des Nations-Unies* (Geneva: Droz, 1963), 231–284; Khalfa Mammeri, *Les Nations-Unies face à la question algérienne (1954–1962)* (Algiers: SNED, 1969).
62. See chart of the international organizations joined by Algeria in Ahmed Mahiou, "L'Algérie et les organisations internationales," *A.F.D.I.* (1962), 131.
63. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *L'organisation de l'unité africaine* (Paris: A. Colin, 1968).
64. See Abdelmajid, *Le comité de coordination pour la libération de l'Afrique*, Memorandum (Algiers: IEP, 1971).
65. The other African countries were: Congo-Brazzaville, Egypt, Ghana, Gunea, Mauritania, and Sudan.
66. See M. Barbier, *Le comité de décolonisation des Nations-Unies* (Paris: LGDS, 1974).
67. See Charles Cadoux, "L'organisation des Nations-Unies et le problème de l'Afrique Australe," *A.F.D.I.* (1977), 127–174.
68. Outlined in the following official documents:
    – Memorandum presented by Algeria at the Conference of Heads and Chiefs of State of the Member Countries of OPEC, Algiers, Mar. 1975.
    – Memorandum presented by Algeria at the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly entitled, *Le pétrole, les matières de base et le développement* (Algiers, Apr. 1974).

69. See E. C. Chibwe on these various institutions: *Afro–Arab Relations in the New World Order* (London: Julian Friedman Publishers, 1977); and A. Kerdoun, *La coopération arabo-africaine, dimensions et perspectives* (Algiers: OPU; Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1987).

70. See analyses of Mohammed Bedjaoui, *Pour un Nouvel Ordre Economique International* (Paris: UNESCO, 1979) and, by the same author, "Un point de vue du Tiers-Monde sur l'organisation internationale," in G. Abi-Saab et al., *Le concept d'organisation internationale* (Paris: UNESCO, 1980), 223–292.

71. See T. Bensalah, "Revendications des pays du Tiers-Monde et égalité souveraine," in *Annuaire du Tiers-Monde* (1975), 41 and 45.

72. Paragraphs 2 and 4; see Resolution 3201 55–VI.

73. See text of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 1974.

74. Ibid.

75. See Bedjaoui, *Pour un Nouvel Ordre Economique Internationale*, 181 et seq.

76. M. Virally, *L'organisation mondiale* (Paris: A. Colin, 1972), 293.

77. See G. de la Charriere, "Consensus et Nations-Unies," *A.F.D.I.* (1974).

78. See Abdelkader, "Problèmes actuels posés par l'indemnité de nationalisation," *Annuaire du Tiers-Monde* (1975).

79. See text of the Declaration in *IVème conférence des Chefs d'Etats ou de gouvernement des pays non-alignés*, Basic texts (Algiers, 1973).

80. See statement by Mr. Smaíl Hamdani, Secretary-General of the Algerian Foreign Affairs Ministry, at the International Conference on Relations between Disarmament and Development, New York, 25 Aug. 1987, in *Revue algérienne des relations internationales*, no. 8 (1987): 175–181. See also Noureddine Kerroum, "Désarmement et développement," *Revue algérienne des relations internationales*, no. 6 (1987): 71–78.

81. See, for instance, the articles published in collections dedicated to Charles Chaumont (Paris: Pedone, 1984) and collections dedicated to P. F. Gonidec (Paris: LGDJ, 1985); see also C. Nigoul and M. Torelli, *Les mystifications du Nouvel Ordre International* (Paris: PUF, 1964).

82. See, for instance, Ahmed Mahiou, "Une finalité entre le développement et la dépendance," in CRESM, *La formation des normes en droit international du développement* (Algiers: OPU; Paris: CNRS, 1983).

83. See Ahmed Laraba, "L'Algérie et le droit de la mer," doctoral dissertation, Institut de Droit et des Sciences Administratives, University of Algiers, 1985.

84. See also D. Djazairi, "La conception de solidarité internationale pour le développement," *Revue algérienne des sciences juridiques, économiques et politiques*, no. 1 (1979): 101–117.

85. Mr. Hocine Mesloub, member of the Algerian delegation at the Convention on the Law of the Sea, considers that this principle is included in "the development of the *jus cogens* concept of the law." See H. Mesloub, "La 3ème conférence sur le droit de la mer et le Nouvel Ordre Economique International," *Revue algérienne des sciences juridiques, économiques et politiques*, no. 2 (1978): 302. See also M. Benchikh, "L'intégration de la notion de patrimoine commun de l'humanité dans le système des relations dominant de notre époque," ibid., no. 4 (1978): 627–649.

86. For details on the negotiations during the third conference, see Laraba, "L'Algérie et le droit de la mer," 345–447.

87. A hostile campaign led by the American Heritage Foundation against the United Nations mobilized part of the American Right. See G. A. Astre, "L'offensive de la droite américaine contre les Nations Unies," *Le monde diplomatique* (Oct. 1985). Regarding the American position on the NIEO, see Robert K. Olson, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the New International Economic Order* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), 243.

88. Analytical overview of the Sixth Commission, A/C6/SR.1526, 296.

89. For details on these discussions see Hassina Oussedik, "Etude du comité de la révision de la Chartre de l'O.N.U. Aperçu sur la contribution de l'Algérie," doctoral dissertation (law and international relations), Institute of Law and Management, University of Algiers, 1987, 359.

129

90. See text of the declaration by the Algerian representative: *General Assembly Official Records* (GAOR), 33rd Session, 1978, report of the Special Committee, A/33/33, 80.
91. The Algerian representative declared on that subject: "The struggle for independence by people under colonial or racist regimes – including apartheid – or subject to any other form of foreign rule, is quite legitimate but it would be particularly detrimental, in this matter, to apply to the movements of national liberation the basic obligations derived from the principle of peaceful settlement, while at the same time depriving them of their right to fight for their independence by whatever means they deem fit including violent ones; history shows that it is the violence that forces the colonial power, the foreign invader, or any other racist regime, to negotiate." Noted by Oussedik, "Etude du comité," 145.
92. For instance, the African Group, which studied and lengthened the Algerian proposal, and the Group of Non-aligned Countries, which drafted a five-part document. See GAOR, 35th Session, 1980, report of the Special Committee, A/35/33, 34.
93. M. Taleb-Ibrahimi had already pointed this out in his declaration before the previous UN General Assembly (7 Oct. 1987): "We are now coming back to the basic truth that the problems of world security are interrelated and require therefore a global and integrated approach. The regional approach presents advantages but it will contribute to world peace only if it reflects a non-discriminatory respect for the right of security of all the states." See text of the declaration in *Revue algérienne des relations internationales*, no. 9 (1988): 157.
94. The following countries were included in the group: Algeria, Cyprus, Congo, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Iran, Kenya, Nigeria, Romania, Rwanda, Sierra-Leone, Tunisia, Yugoslavia, and Zambia.
95. See GAOR, 35th Session, 1980, report of the Special Committee, A/35/33, 52. AIACWG 46 Rev. I.
96. See *El-Moudjahid*, no. 5379 (14 Oct. 1982).
97. See GAOR, 37th Session, 1982, A/CG/37/SR; Oussedik, "Etude du comité," 172–178.
98. Mentioned by Oussedik, "Etude du comité," 207.
99. He outlined the Algerian position on this occasion: "Algeria considers that this conference should concentrate its efforts on deciding on the changes necessary to strengthen the role and the means of the UNIDO with a view to establishing, at the Lima Conference, under the authority of the UN, a real international institution for development." See text of opening speech of the second session of the Group of 77 of UNIDO in Memorandum presented by Algeria at the Conference of Heads and Chiefs of State of the Member Countries of OPEC, 397.
100. Item 69 of that plan specifies in particular: "To that effect, it is recommended to the General Assembly of the United Nations that UNIDO be transformed into a Specialized Agency."
101. On UNCTAD see, for instance, Benamar Boualia, *La C.N.U.C.E.D. et le Nouvel Ordre Economique International* (Algiers: OPU; ENAL, 1987).
102. See, for instance, the 71 recommendations included in the report of the Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts (Group of 18) in GAOR, 42nd Session, 1987, A/42/16.
103. The Algerian representative to the UN, Mr. Hocine Djoudi, in his address before the Fifth Committee of 5 Nov. 1987, emphasized "the utmost importance to have a common definition of the meaning and the scope of the current reform. If the goal is to increase effectiveness, reform is not necessarily synonymous with savings. As a matter of fact, when you consider an annual budget of $200 billion – not even half of the budget for the firemen of the City of New York, as our colleague from Sweden reminded us two years ago - it is not on that amount that the l59 Member States as a whole are hoping to make substantive savings."
104. See GAOR, 41st Session, 1986, A/40/11.
105. On that subject, this is what the Algerian delegate declared before the Fifth Committee: "The definition of a country's capacity to pay should take into account some parameters

addressing first of all the uneven development of developing countries, and also the efforts made and the difficulties encountered by the developing countries in their attempt to consolidate a certain level of development – which is more and more undermined not only by the economic situation but also by a deep structural crisis.'' He added: ''This is why the efforts made by the developing countries towards development should not be penalized in any way, but, rather, should help to reduce the apportionments of their contributions, after adequate scrutiny.''

106. See Olson, *US Foreign Policy*, 219.

4

Canada, the United Nations, and the reform of international institutions

Keith Krause, W. Andy Knight, and David Dewitt

Introduction: Canada and the UN system

Canada's active participation in the United Nations system has been a fundamental tenet of Canadian foreign policy since 1945 and reflects a deep-rooted commitment to the multilateral process. Although the bulk of Canadian foreign policy activity is bilateral, the pronounced emphasis on multilateralism is remarkable: as one recent government statement noted, "for Canadians, multilateralism is both an instinct and a vocation, and they expect their government to play an active and positive multilateral role."[1] This commitment to the multilateral process can be traced back to Canada's involvement in the League of Nations, as the nascent Canadian state tried to establish an independent foreign policy: League membership was "actively sought as an avenue for furthering Canadian autonomy in foreign affairs."[2]

As a founding member, Canada played a significant role in the drafting of the UN Charter, its unusually high level of influence being in part a product of its involvement in World War II. The influence of delegates such as Escott Reid, Charles Ritchie, Norman Robertson, and Hume Wrong was reflected in such things as: the provision for the election of non-permanent members to the Security Council; the right of non-members of the Security Council to have a

voice on the Council if their armed forces were being called on in any UN mission; the parallel and counterbalancing security function of the General Assembly; the role of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); and adherence to the functionalist principle.[3] Successive Canadian governments have prided themselves on Canada's engagement in most significant organizations and activities of the UN system.[4] This engagement is shaped by Canadian interests, but the characteristic view is still that Canada is a net ''contributor'' to the multilateral system. In financial terms, Canada is the fourth-largest contributor to the United Nations and seventh-highest per capita contributor. Canada has also held a seat on the Security Council as an elected non-permanent member at least once each decade (most recently in 1989–1990), served as the president or vice-president of the General Assembly five times, and demonstrated similar leadership on the main UN committees.

Canadian policy towards the United Nations in the 1980s, during a time when the organization underwent a serious crisis in commitment and resources, is of special significance. The Canadian commitment to the organization held firm at a time when this had become unfashionable for some major Western powers and close Canadian allies. But while Canadian representatives to the United Nations in the 1980s fought off criticisms of its performance and relevance by groups like the Heritage Foundation, they were not blind to the fact that changes to the UN system were urgently required. The crisis of multilateralism and the financial crisis in the United Nations during the 1980s created a sense of greater urgency, especially among member states wholly committed to the multilateral process, for reform and adaptation of the UN system.[5] Canada has been at the forefront of many of the reform proposals promoted in different forums.

Reform has remained high on the priority list of the Canadian government.[6] If ongoing reform efforts are seen as the means by which the system of international governance evolves, it is important to understand both the kinds of reforms that a country like Canada promotes and endorses, and the domestic and international roots of this reformist orientation. Various factors could explain the multilateralist impulse of Canadian foreign policy and Canada's consequent support for reform of the UN system (many of which will be examined below), and it is a truism that the foreign policy commitments of a state in some way reflect its domestic political culture. Since at least the early 1970s Canadian foreign policy has explicitly been described as ''an extension abroad of national policies.''[7] It should be noted, how-

ever, that support for multilateralism can also reflect the weakness of a state's position in the international system; as the Canadian Minister of State for External Affairs acknowledged, "Smaller and middle powers ... need effective global institutions to make each of our voices heard in the world."[8] And "lesser powers," as John Holmes pointed out, "always feel the need of international institutions more acutely than stronger powers ... [through international institutions] ... lesser powers can, by consolidating their interests with those of other countries, hope to have some impact on the great powers."[9] Thus an understanding of the role played by states like Canada (and the sources of its policies) can shed some light on the future possibilities for reform and adaptation of the UN system. The strongest supporters of multilateral institutions may not be the most powerful members, but they are crucial to the success of them, and their efforts provide a useful window on the process of institutional evolution itself.

This paper will approach these issues from two different, but related, perspectives. First, it will attempt to assess the direction and impact of recent Canadian proposals for reform of the UN system, within the overall context of UN reform efforts. Second, it will discuss the possible domestic and international sources of Canada's commitment to multilateralism that might help explain its particular preoccupation with reforming and adapting the institution that best embodies the multilateral ideal. These different perspectives will ultimately help one to create a composite picture of the impulses and pressures behind Canada's policy towards the United Nations and UN reform and, in a broader context, perhaps indicate some of the possible future outlines of the UN system.

"Reform" in the United Nations system

Reform, in one guise or another, has been on the UN agenda since the organization was founded: its drafters explicitly recognized that the UN Charter was not a perfect instrument and that it required mechanisms of adaptation.[10] It is essential, however, to clarify what "reform" means in the UN context, especially since there are many different ways in which to conceptualize "reform activity."[11] Only then can one situate Canadian policy within the panoply of different approaches to reform.

The term "reform" has been defined by John Renninger as "changes in structures, practices, policies, bureaucratic arrangements, etc., that

would lead to greater efficiency and effectiveness."[12] In the United Nations system, critics as well as supporters have advocated various changes that have been deemed essential if the organization is to remain relevant. In some instances, commentators speak of a gap between perceived needs and the UN system's inability to meet them, based on an underlying perception that UN agencies are not keeping pace with the rapid changes occurring in the world today.[13]

Reform remains, however, an elusive concept. Some member states, especially those from the North, use the term to refer to restructuring, streamlining, and reactivating organizations of the United Nations. For them, the major goal of any reform effort in the United Nations should be to make organizations within the UN system more accountable to members. Essentially, they see the UN organizations as needing a greater degree of management, control, and rationalization. For member states from the South, the issue is completely different. They are less interested in the control and management aspects and view reform as a means of making the UN system more responsive to the needs of the less developed countries (i.e. improvement of the delivery mechanisms of the organization).[14] This type of reform is much less incremental and may even be categorized as more revolutionary than reformist. Then there are still others, coming from both the North and the South, who view reform as the need to adapt the organization not simply in response to the needs of the less developed world but rather to the changing international climate.[15]

One potentially useful set of distinctions identifies three types of reform activity:

(a) *Process reform*: concerns the internal/administrative functioning of organizations and focuses on improvements to their efficiency and operations.

(b) *Adaptive reform*: concerns the responsiveness of existing institutions to a changing agenda of concerns, and focuses on structural changes (including growth or retraction) to these bodies.

(c) *Transformation reform*: concerns the creation of new institutions (or bodies within them) and the elimination or drastic reorganization of the activities and responsibilities of obsolete ones.

These three types of reformist activity range along a continuum from "incremental" to "revolutionary," with of course a grey area between each of them. For example, the reforms that led to the merger of various programmes into the UN Development Programme (UNDP) can be regarded as either adaptive or transformational re-

form. But these grey zones must not obscure the fundamental difference in approach signified by, for example, Canadian proposals for improving the handling of financial and budgetary matters versus the "successor vision" advocated by the UNA-USA report. Although states may share a common commitment to reform, this broad consensus may obscure significant differences on not only the exact content of reform but the modalities and possibilities for reform itself.

Canada and UN reform: The historical pedigree

Although Canadian policy in the UN system has concentrated on specific issue areas, such as disarmament, development assistance, or human rights, Canada has also pursued a general policy commitment to "reformist activity." The reformist pedigree reaches back to the League of Nations, when Canada participated in the work of the Committee of 28 (which met between 1936 and 1938) to study "the application of the principles of the Covenant." Canada's role was undistinguished and it "took no active part in developing reform proposals."[16] Canadian foreign policy during this time could also not be considered "internationalist" or "multilateralist," coloured as it was by the contradictory impulses of a strong isolationist sentiment coupled with a quest for the recognition of full Canadian sovereignty through membership and participation in international organizations.[17] It has been argued that the motive behind the Canadian government's involvement with the League lay in its desire to remain, as much as possible, disentangled from the vagaries of international affairs; a position that soon changed once Canadians assumed direct responsibility over their foreign policy.

Once full sovereignty was achieved, Canada's commitment to reform of international organizations changed. Under the United Nations system, one can identify several major and minor initiatives supported or spearheaded by Canada that attempted from the outset to make the UN system more responsive to the needs and wishes of its members and more likely to meet the lofty (and unfulfilled) goals set out for the organization by its founders. As early as 1945–1946, Canadian policy reflected the view that international institutions, in order to remain relevant, would have to undergo changes from time to time. Lester Pearson was one of the first to call for a revisionary conference to be held 10 years after the establishment of the organiza-

tion. Canada's Brock Chisholm, the first director of the World Health Organization, argued in 1946 that the United Nations Charter and the specialized agencies' constitutions should be regarded simply as "a minimum prescription, for this generation."[18] In 1950, Canada also proposed (with other states) changes to the means by which ECOSOC determined its priorities.[19]

In 1955 Canada and the Soviet Union led efforts that broke the deadlock regarding the membership of new states in the United Nations and permitted the admission of 16 new member states.[20] In the literature on reform, this is generally pointed to as one of the major successes for non-Charter reform. It was initiated by a speech by Lester Pearson, at the San Francisco commemorative meeting, and catalysed by a meeting between Canadian and Soviet representatives. The result was a co-sponsored resolution hammered out by Canada that passed in the General Assembly, which in turn placed pressure on the Security Council to break the deadlock.[21] When the initiative passed, the Canadian delegate received the bulk of the credit. There are several salient points to note about this effort. First, Canada directly opposed the United States and the United Kingdom on this issue (although the United Kingdom did not ultimately oppose the resolution), staking out some distinctive policy territory in the midst of the Cold War.[22] More importantly, Canada's position was dictated by a commitment to a particular kind of multilateralism and internationalism: its main interest was not in universal membership per se, but in the admission of states such as Austria, Japan, Ireland, Spain, Hungary, and Romania, most of which can be characterized as "middle powers" and most of which could be expected to share an activist middle-power perspective. Finally, this position reflected a willingness to promote change in response to a crisis in order to preserve the viability of the UN system, rather than an explicit reformist orientation (in the positive sense). There was no unanimity in the Canadian delegation, but those who won the day argued that "all these new countries were coming into being; you couldn't deny them admission to the United Nations. Article 4 of the Charter is so clear."[23] At no point was this an issue with a high salience, either domestically or in formal political decision-making circles. Thus one need not search deep into political culture to find the motivation behind this reformist policy.

Another Canadian initiative for reform was launched at the end of the 1978 General Assembly session, amidst the growing consensus

that in order to stem the tide of debate and streamline the work of the Assembly the rules of procedure had to be modified or significantly altered. The need for reform of the procedural rules was sharpened because of the poor performance of that year's General Assembly president, and several representatives expressed their frustration at the paralysis of the Assembly. As a result, the Secretary-General promised a review of the rules. According to then-Canadian ambassador, William Barton, "this move to review the rules of procedure would have resulted in nothing being done for at least six months, and once it fell into the hands of the bureaucrats it would have been quite a while for anything concrete to be implemented."[24] Barton thus convened a group of representatives from 18 countries (respecting the various geographical and political blocs) in an informal working group to revamp the rules of procedure. The report of that group was submitted to the Secretary-General and the new rules (which have come to be known as the "Barton rules") were implemented at the 1979 Assembly session. This highlights the significance of individual efforts if a window of opportunity for change presents itself and is grasped. Reform in such cases is pursued not as an end in itself or as a contribution to substantive change but as a means of improving the process in order to facilitate action on the substantive portions of the UN agenda. Again, this Canadian effort was not the direct product of a political commitment or formal policy decision, although it does reflect the Canadian "multilateralist impulse."

Canada's role in support of several recent reform attempts will be discussed below, with attention being focused on the following questions. How do Canadian representatives conceptualize reform and the reform process? What issues has Canada placed on its UN reform agenda and what success have Canadian delegates had in putting such issues on the UN agenda (and achieving results)? To what extent does the strong Canadian commitment to multilateralism translate into effective support for reform proposals? Is the Canadian position on reform similar to that of other middle powers, and is the Canadian position influenced by its close relationship to the United States? Has the Canadian position on UN reform been influenced by its sympathetic posture to the third world, or is Canada simply one of the status quo powers that utilize a particular kind of reform process to stave off changes that are considered revolutionary but necessary in the eyes of the anti-status quo powers within the United Nations?

Canada's support for UN reform efforts in the 1980s and early 1990s

Early efforts were conducted during a period of relative growth and stability in the UN system. Although an atmosphere of crisis was often present, and although the hopes of many supporters of the United Nations were repeatedly disillusioned as its scope of fruitful activity progressively narrowed, there were few coherent and direct threats to the survival of the UN system itself.[25] As frustration over the United Nations mounted in the 1960s and 1970s, the focus of reform initiatives shifted from proposals emerging from within the organization to proposals promoted primarily by member states. This frustration culminated in the most important period of activity, the post-1983 efforts at reform that were triggered by a perceived generalized threat (primarily from the United States) to the entire purpose and function of the UN system. Canada placed itself in the forefront of efforts for both ''process reform'' of the UN system in response to the perceived systemic crisis triggered by the American threat to cut funding (almost as a form of damage limitation) and ''adaptive reform'' of the UN system (including growth) to meet a new range of concerns advanced in the international system, such as the status of women. Even when more dramatic proposals were put on the agenda by other states (such as in the case of ECOSOC reform), Canada chose to take a path of incrementalist or minimalist reform.

For Canada, both of these broad thrusts of reform efforts are characterized primarily by a desire to work *within* the constraints and structures of the existing multilateral system, rather than from without. This makes the Canadian approach distinct from that of states that speak of ''reform'' in the context of transforming or changing the fundamental structures of the multilateral system.[26] Unlike these advocates, the perception among Canadian decision-makers and officials is that ''we should work from within the organization'' to achieve change. Canada has also been strongly committed to working with the existing Charter. As one formal statement of position makes clear:

The UN can be made more dynamic without rewriting the Charter; its effectiveness and vitality depend not so much upon changing the basic structure of the organization as upon the political resolve of the member states to fulfil the obligations and responsibilities each one has taken up in subscribing

to the provisions of the Charter ... No documentary revision in itself can be a substitution for that will; nor can it be shown that where the will exists the present form of the Charter frustrates it.[27]

One can find two main reasons for this Canadian approach, the first being a tactical disagreement with threatening methods and a desire to "show the Americans that the institution could work," the second being that "[we] don't matter as much," and hence would not be likely to make a difference were Canada to adopt the language of threats.[28] Whatever the motivation, Canada was quick to embrace explicitly the reformist mantle in 1984, in line with its traditionally self-appointed role of mediator or "helpful fixer." Stephen Lewis, the new ambassador, acknowledged that diplomats "are being encouraged [by the government] to take to the defence of the UN" and that the government "hope[s] to try to play a lead in the area of reforms for the institution."[29] This policy thrust has been reflected in six distinct initiatives.

The immediate response to the financial crisis
The 1986–1989 financial crisis of the United Nations, triggered by the 1985 American Congress's Kassebaum amendment and the Gramm–Rudman–Hollings Act, and compounded by a practice of withholdings from the regular UN budget by several member states, was the major catalyst for the most recent round of ongoing UN reform efforts, although threats to the UN budget and the policy of "zero real growth" had been advocated from the early 1980s.[30] In the specific crisis of 1985–1986, however, the most direct implication of the American decision was a possible cut-back of 15 per cent of the UN Secretariat's operating budget by fiscal years 1987 and 1988.[31] The immediate response on the multilateral level was the Report of the Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts to Review the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Nations (Group of 18, or G18).[32] Canada did not have a representative in the G18, but it did make its view known to the group through informal consultation. Canada's absence from the G18 was surprising, given its history of reform efforts, and Canada may have been deliberately passed over because its commitment to reform would have made it bend too quickly to cope with the American threat. Others suggest that the reason was that there were simply too many Western members in the group to ensure balanced geographical and political representation.[33]

140

Although Canada was not on the G18 it did take major steps to help the United Nations deal with the crisis. The tone of Canada's future policy was set in 1983; as the then-ambassador noted, "[we] were instrumental in building a consensus around the idea that if all the governments were reducing their (national) budgets it was folly to believe that they would increase the UN budget without any limits. Zero growth should be the rule."[34] This was only a conditional policy, however, and when the Fifth Committee first reviewed the G18 report Canada was generally opposed to the main thrust of American policy for zero real growth because it meant, when combined with differential inflation and currency fluctuations, real cuts to personnel and programmes, affecting especially developing countries.[35]

Canada eventually accepted (at least temporarily) a zero real growth policy, but argued that it should be implemented with flexibility and with the reallocation of resources, which would reduce or eliminate possible real cut-backs.[36] This also catalysed a major Canadian policy initiative – which emerged in early 1987 as the "Blue Book" set of proposals on *Reform of the United Nations – Financial and Budgetary Questions*. These proposals were triggered by the lack of consensus within the G18 on the arrangements that should be made with respect to the budgetary process, which left room for member states on the Fifth Committee to make recommendations addressing this problem. The technical and detailed Canadian document set out a comprehensive reform for the administrative and financial decision-making process of the United Nations and specialized agencies, the goals of the proposal being:

(i)   to standardize the scope and contents of the financial and budgetary programme documentation so that it becomes possible to compare objectives, timetables, and programmes across the entire UN system;

(ii) to provide opportunities, at various points of the budgetary two-year cycle, for executive boards to examine and review programmes and priorities;

(iii) to provide to member states and the UN Charter bodies the possibility of giving priority and direction to particular tasks or fields.[37]

The Blue book presented several papers containing specific financial reform proposals, such as a proposed "envelope system" for budgets, the standardization of UN budget accounts, a mechanism for the establishment of short-term or self-financing "special programmes," and an exchange fluctuation and inflation facility. The

overall thrust was to increase the transparency of the budgeting system, create a better fit between the resources expended and the goals deemed important by member states, and provide the entire programme delivery system with the ability to adapt in the short and long term to changing conditions through the addition and cancellation of programmes. The Canadian proposals were presented formally and informally on many occasions (within, for example, the Consultative Level Meeting of the Geneva Group), and were the focus of a wide range of diplomatic contacts, at and below the ambassadorial level.[38] They were explicitly presented as not implying new or revolutionary directions or goals for the organization. There is little doubt that, on a practical level, the Blue Book was Canada's most important concrete contribution to the crisis management or damage limitation response of the Fifth Committee during this period. In addition, though, it was a far-reaching document designed to ensure that the reform process would result in durable changes to the operation of the UN system.

What came of all this? According to one Canadian official directly involved, "the Blue Book sank without a trace." This conclusion is probably somewhat overstated, as officials in New York claim that "bits and pieces of it have appeared elsewhere, although none of these can be attributed directly to a Canadian initiative."[39] In the General Assembly resolution from the 1987 Fifth Committee report, for example, one finds a recommendation for the establishment of a contingency fund for inflation and exchange adjustments, which may have been based on the earlier Canadian proposal.[40] The most likely reason offered for the general lack of acceptance of the Blue Book was that it was too technical and detailed to generate the *political* "energy" needed at a high level to promote such initiatives. At a practical level, it was likely too detailed for even well-intentioned UN officials to promote successfully within their organizations, except if one adopted a strong top–down Western management style and encountered few political obstacles. As the spotlight of Canadian policy shifted off financial reform (with the exception of the specific issue of funding for peace-keeping operations), the political push required for such specific proposals was not present. To put it in different terms, this type of process reform may have to be "internally driven" by parameters set within the various institutions themselves. Canada, or any member state, would have difficulty overseeing this type of reform process, but it can contribute rhetorically and diplomatically to supporting it. This is illustrated by current Canadian sup-

port for the efforts of the Secretary-General to implement financial and administrative reforms along the lines that have been advocated by many states.[41]

What sort of approach to reform does this demonstrate, what motivated the Canadian ''Blue Book'' effort, and why did it take the form it did? The Blue Book proposals were a classic example of ''process reform,'' and reflected an incremental response to a perceived immediate crisis. The policy was also *not* promoted from or at the highest political levels (in other words, as a response to domestic political considerations), but rather was the result of internal bureaucratic imperatives, including the dedication and interest of a few individuals who were essentially single-handedly responsible for the form the Blue Book finally took. This may be indicative of reform proposals in general, which do not necessarily implicate the high levels of the bureaucracy and do not come with strong political direction from above. As one diplomat argued: ''on big issues, we have tight guidelines, but on issues like reform, no one at a high level has really thought about it, beyond the reaction 'we're for it'.''[42] With respect to the *form* of the initiative, it owes much to the administrative and financial procedures of Canadian federal government bureaucracies, and in this sense reflected the domestic political culture.

ECOSOC

Another major proposal to emerge from the G18 report concerned the restructuring of the ''intergovernmental structure in the economic and social fields.''[43] Following this recommendation (number eight), ECOSOC established in 1987 a Special Commission to Study the United Nations Intergovernmental Structure. All member states were invited to participate equally and to send high-level delegations to aid in its work. The goal of the Commission was an in-depth study of the UN intergovernmental structure and functions in the economic and social fields and of the support structures of the Secretariat, as was recommended by the Group of 18.[44] Canada played an active role in this two-year effort, which was ultimately designed (in the minds of some supporters) to culminate in a drastic overhaul of ECOSOC activities.[45] At the most dramatic, the overhaul would have made ECOSOC the economic equivalent of the General Assembly, by rationalizing the activities of intergovernmental units operating within its mandate. The most radical formulation of this programme would qualify as a transformative reform that could imply major structural change to the functioning of the UN system (or even

changes to the Charter). Of course, not all participants in the exercise viewed it this way.

The two-year exercise ultimately failed to reach a consensus on a package of reform measures, although the chair did submit a final report to ECOSOC in May 1988 that highlighted the areas of agreement.[46] But, until the discussion reached an impasse, this Commission was a major focus for substantive reform proposals. Canada was one of the nine states or groups to present specific reform proposals in the form of "non-papers" for discussion (the others being Norway, the EC-12, Japan, China, the Eastern bloc, the G77, the United States, and Australia). One should note a clear pattern here, with middle powers (Canada, Norway, Australia) being disproportionately active in these efforts.

There were two Canadian "non-papers." The first set out six principles for the reorganized structure, including the need to "harmonize action" between different units, "reconfirm ECOSOC as a direction-setting and overview institution," "maintain the economic and social dichotomy," and, most prominently, "establish a system of sectors of responsibility and financial envelopes."[47] The paper tentatively sketched out a seven-sector division of responsibility that grouped the various ECOSOC functions together.[48] The second paper, put forward in response to other proposals (and in an attempt to integrate some of them), concentrated on more specific suggestions for the operation and coordination of a renewed ECOSOC. It included a six-year operating cycle and an agenda of annual meetings for various organizational and management committees. It also completely reworked the sector proposal, now divided into six areas of responsibility.[49] A final reworking of the Canadian proposal was annexed to the final report of the Special Commission.[50]

How do these proposals reflect on Canada's reform policy and the effectiveness of its role? First, the fact that the Canadian proposals were flexible and mutable suggests that the policy was not dogmatic and was governed more by pragmatic consensus-seeking considerations than by a clear commitment to specific reforms.[51] Second, the Canadian proposals were simultaneously far-reaching and incremental. The concentration on scenarios for cycles of meetings and on sectors of responsibility is easily understood as "process reform"; the willingness to consider universal membership for ECOSOC (via subsidiary bodies) and the elimination and drastic reorganization of some intergovernmental organizations qualifies as transformational reform. In fact, Canadian officials appear to have recognized the ulti-

144

mate choice this implied: when it came time to push for a final report, two distinct consensus "packages" emerged, one that merely eliminated a few intergovernmental structures and included cosmetic restructuring, the other that envisaged major changes. Canada favoured the second package, but would have settled for the first although it argued that accepting the first "is implicitly to recognize that the UN cannot be reformed in any meaningful way."[52]

With respect to Canada's role in the deliberations and negotiations, officials assessed Canada's role positively, claiming that Canada had:

been among the delegations providing substance and leadership to the Special Commission. [Our] proposals were instrumental in developing a structured format for the presentation of data ... We helped the Special Commission to focus on the role and make up of ECOSOC [and] we helped to move discussion towards examination of substantive sectors.[53]

This upbeat assessment should be put in perspective, however, given the ultimate failure of the effort. Canada was simply not in a position to engineer a consensus, and a certain amount of frustration was evident with the relative lack of effort by other delegations, or the failure of various proposals to address the question of reform directly. But, as one UN official put it, "very few concrete recommendations for reform can be expected to emerge from a Commission as large as the ECOSOC one. There were just too many people involved."[54] The Canadian delegation in its final statement to the Commission summed up the problem succinctly: "if we have fallen short of agreement, it is due to such facts as the essential conditions of timing, the complexity of the process itself and that sufficient understanding and mutual confidence were not yet adequately advanced."[55]

Internal brakes were also put on the advocacy of reform from within the Department of External Affairs. By March 1988, when discussions of reform within ECOSOC were well advanced and a major restructuring appeared conceivable, other actors in the policy-making apparatus began to express concern about the scope of reform, essentially revealing a desire to keep UN agencies less powerful. The specific issue was the desirability of enhancing the coordinating and supervisory role of ECOSOC. The main concern was that an increased role for ECOSOC could hamper the activities of other bodies in the international economic sphere. At this point, one official noted that "comments made by Canadian representatives in discussions of the different proposals should not imply that Canada could accept a greater degree of management by the UN of the basic

international economic system.''[56] What is most interesting is that enthusiasm for far-reaching reforms within the Canadian bureaucracy directly concerned with the United Nations took on a life of its own that could have had unanticipated consequences for other specific Canadian policy concerns.

Specialized agencies (FAO and UNESCO)
Canada also took prominent public stances on specific reform issues with respect to two UN agencies, the FAO and UNESCO. In the debate over reform in UNESCO, Canada publicly disagreed with the American and British decisions to withdraw from the organization, on the grounds that ''[we] believe that there can be a better possibility for setting it right from within than from outside.''[57] Although Canada supported reform from within (and sought election to UNESCO's executive board in 1983, as the United States was filing its notice of withdrawal), it did express its major concerns about the operation and policies of the organization by issuing a mild threat. The threat, in a 1984 letter from the Minister of State for External Affairs to UNESCO director-general M'Bow, warned that Canada's membership was ''under continuing review'' and that continued participation ''will be determined by the extent to which the organization is able to bring to a successful conclusion the movement towards reform which is now underway.''[58] It came after repeated unheeded urgings that UNESCO freeze its budget and implement reforms. By 1985 the Canadian position had become more tough, but it still retained its commitment ''to bring about reforms from within.''[59] UNESCO membership was also the most prominent issue on which major media attention in Canada was focused in 1985 (see table 4.4 below), and articles and letters both supportive and critical of Canada's decision to stay in UNESCO were published.

In the Food and Agriculture Organization, Canada essentially spearheaded a 1987 campaign to replace director-general Edouard Saouma. Canada's discontent with the organization was based on perceived weaknesses in programme review and evaluation, poor planning of priorities, and insufficient oversight and coordination.[60] The Canadian campaign for reform included a 10-page document (unofficial and unsigned) that was circulated among delegations and that described the upper management as secretive and inaccessible.[61] Despite what Canadian diplomats expected to be a close result, Saouma was re-elected 94–59, and the FAO took its revenge in early 1988, accusing Canada of withholding its 1988 assessed contribution

(US$10 million) and of threatening to withdraw from the organization. The Canadian government, which was at the time attempting to promote reforms from within the organization, was forced to reiterate its commitment to the FAO.

On both these issues one can detect the Canadian orientation towards "process reform," driven in part by an attempt to implement the Blue Book proposals. In UNESCO, Canada's approach was considered successful (Canada was a leader in the campaign to replace M'Bow) largely because sufficient agreement existed among member states on the need to replace him. But this could equally be considered a success for the tactics of the United Kingdom and the United States, which is suggested by the failure of the analogous campaign to unseat Saouma.[62] Precisely *what* kind of reform Canada wanted to see in either institution after a change of leadership was unclear, and Canada did not put forward concrete public proposals for adaptive or transformational change.

The Directorate of Public Information

The importance of reform efforts in the Department of Public Information (DPI) was threefold. First, the DPI was targeted by the United States and the G18 for special attention. Second, the need to improve the United Nations' capacity to provide information and communications, which had hitherto been delegated to member states, was an essential recommendation of the G18 reform exercise.[63] Third, the DPI was seen as a trial balloon or guinea pig for further adaptive reforms that involved retrenchment within the UN system. In defining the principles of the proposed reorganization of the DPI, the Secretary-General recognized that the second-tier global constituency of the United Nations below its member states had been largely ignored as far as UN information and communication was concerned.[64]

The Canadian contribution to reform in the DPI can be traced to a deal that was worked out between the Secretary-General's Office and the Department of External Affairs to ensure that a Canadian be brought into DPI as under-secretary-general in order to implement the recommendations of the G18. According to some sources, "the Secretary-General wanted a woman and that fit in nicely with the Mulroney government's stated objectives with regard to the promotion of Canadian women."[65] The appointee, Thérèse Pacquet-Sévigny, came from a background in advertising and public relations and had held a middle-management position with the Canadian

Broadcasting Corporation. She had no background or experience in international affairs and had never worked outside of Canada. Sévigny's appointment was seen as a chance to make a real contribution to the reform process, and, although she was an international civil servant, Canadian support included a large subsidy for her salary.[66] Her primary concern with managerial and administrative reforms was consistent with the overall objectives of the G18. Among her contributions, she insisted that the DPI be given no new mandates without a budget line, as a means of forcing responsibility and choice on decisions. This was consistent with the overall Canadian emphasis on holding the line on UN expenditures as a first step to maintaining the viability of the organization.

Her actions, however, only ruffled feathers in the Secretariat, in the DPI, and among some member states. Many of her reform measures in the DPI backfired, tarnishing not only the United Nations' image but also Canada's. To offer one example, an attempt to improve the "professionalism" of the DPI through joint ventures with corporate sponsors resulted in an agreement with Benetton to provide outfits for UN tour guides, in return for which a plaque would be placed within the United Nations honouring Benetton's contribution. But Benetton operations in South Africa made this venture a matter of embarrassment for the Secretary-General.[67] The Joint Inspection Unit's monitoring and evaluation of the reform efforts were critical of Sévigny's approach to reforming the DPI, especially of the attempt "to carry out a reorganization of DPI without paying adequate attention to the administrative environment and political context of the United Nations system." It concluded that "DPI's new administrative machinery seems no more efficient than the one it replaced. It satisfies no better than did the former one the acknowledged need for coordination and coherence, for rationalization and for simplification."[68] In so far as Canada must take some responsibility for this initiative (as it was consciously embarked upon as a reform initiative), it must be considered a policy failure. Sévigny herself was replaced on 1 March 1992 after another round of reorganization in the Secretariat under the new Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and the issue has vanished from Canadian policy concerns.[69]

The status of women
Few women have risen to the upper ranks of the UN system. Canadian efforts to promote the advancement of women within the UN system began with a focus on "process reform" that attempted to re-

148

form the bureaucratic and personnel structure of existing organizations to ensure an increase in the representation (and rank) of women in general and Canadian women in particular.[70] Canada also pushed for the creation or strengthening of the ''status of women'' machinery that could in any way support the Canadian vision of the advancement of women, in several intergovernmental organizations.[71] These initiatives met considerable resistance within the organization and among member states, and the 1988 report of the Steering Committee for the Improvement of the Status of Women in the Secretariat suggested that there were still several structural obstacles (such as lack of financial resources, the recruitment freeze, problems of human resource planning) to the advancement of women. The report stated that ''a considerable gap has emerged between the Organization's professed commitment to women's advancement and its success in achieving this goal.''[72] Since March 1985, only three women have been appointed to under-secretary-general positions (including Mme. Pacquet-Sévigny), and the only two remaining women at this level lost their posts in the 1992 administration reorganization. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has, however, publicly stated a commitment to increasing the number of women in UN posts to 50 per cent by 1995.[73] On a broader front, Canada pressed for reforms as a member of the UN Commission on the Status of Women, and in 1987 was elected to a third consecutive term. The Canadian delegation to the Nairobi Conference for Women in 1988 initiated a resolution that required the ''forward-looking strategies'' from that conference to be incorporated into the programmes of work and mandates of UN bodies.[74] In February 1989, a Canadian, Ms. Sharon Capeling-Alakija, became director of the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). According to Canadian officials, this was the result both of Canada's position as the second-largest contributor to UNIFEM and of the high Canadian profile on advancement of women issues.[75] Finally, in 1992 Canada appointed a woman (Louise Frechette) as its ambassador to the United Nations, highlighting its continued commitment to the issue in the multilateral forum.

Again, the Canadian position on this set of issues is characteristic. First, the advancement of women is a natural issue for a middle power because the high politics concerns characteristic of great powers are sufficiently absent to allow an issue such as this to climb up the Canadian foreign policy agenda, and because the inactivity of great powers in this realm also allows a certain comparative ad-

vantage in expertise and interest to develop within the UN system. Factors such as this must be at work, since neither the Canadian government nor the Canadian polity can claim a progressive status on women's issues that is not shared by at least some other states (especially the Nordic countries). Second, the Canadian position focuses on "adaptive reform" (incremental structural reform to meet changing concerns) rather than more potentially far-reaching proposals. As one critic has noted, such an approach "ignores both the structural causes of women's oppression and the concerns of women's groups working for social change" at the domestic as well as international levels.[76] These structural causes cannot be solved simply by increasing the number of women in prominent positions, whether that be within the government or within the UN Secretariat and agencies. Finally, Canadian influence on this issue has not been great, and its efforts have not been able to overcome resistance within the organization or member states. It appears that, without support from other major states, Canada will not be able to build a coalition strong enough to implement meaningful changes in this field. This issue highlights the weaknesses in the Canadian approach to reform on any set of issues where the problems are not simply bureaucratic or administrative but historical and systemic.

UN peace-keeping operations
As the reform agenda shifted in the early 1990s, and as the United Nations assumed a vast array of new tasks, the most prominent issue in Canada's UN policy became its participation in UN peace-keeping operations. Canada claims a certain patrimony over peace-keeping (with Lester Pearson having been awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for participating in its creation), and Canadian forces have served in all of the UN peace-keeping, and many of the observer, operations. The UN military adviser, Brig. Gen. Maurice Baril, is a Canadian. The total Canadian contribution to the end of 1992 reached about 100,000 personnel in more than 30 missions.[77] Canada had about 4,500 personnel active in peace-keeping operations as of December 1992, which was almost 10 per cent of the total UN deployment. These personnel were almost all drawn from the land forces, whose total numbers are only about 19,000! With this level of involvement, Canada has been active in the debate over the future of UN peace operations.

A full review of Canada's peace-keeping policy is beyond the scope of this paper.[78] Aside from its position on specific operations, Canada

has concentrated on three areas of more general concern: the financing arrangements for peace-keeping operations, the scope and mandate of UN peace and security operations suggested by the Secretary-General in the *Agenda for Peace*, and Canada's capacity to sustain a high level of involvement in a large number of UN operations. With respect to the financing issue, Canada is increasingly unhappy with existing arrangements (among other things, Canada has outstanding costs of about US$21 million that have not been recovered), has raised the issue repeatedly in the UN Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, and has formally supported the Secretary-General's proposals for peace-keeping financing.[79] This concern has its roots in the Canadian experience in the Cyprus operation (which is funded by voluntary contributions), and Canada expressed its disapproval as early as the 1990 mandate renewal resolution (on which it abstained) and its subsequent withdrawal of forces from the operation in 1993.[80] With respect to current UN activities and the proposals contained in the *Agenda for Peace*, Canada generally endorsed the Secretary-General's proposals, but placed an emphasis on:

- improving the "institutions and infrastructure of peacekeeping";
- "strengthen[ing] UN capacities in preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peacekeeping";
- committing "more resources which translate into better financial arrangements at the UN";
- "standardization of UN military operations" (including a revamped support system and a command and control centre).[81]

Canada did *not* support some of the more dramatic proposals for reform (including earmarking specific forces for UN operations), and generally concentrated (as the above points suggest) on incremental, managerial improvements and rationalization of existing mechanisms and procedures, rather than on the wholesale rethinking of UN peace operations.

Given this historically sustained commitment, it is not surprising that peace-keeping is a prominent issue within domestic politics. Indeed, it has almost become an ineffable part of the Canadian self-image. This has manifested itself concretely in several ways in recent years. First, when the behaviour of Canadian peace-keepers in Somalia came under great criticism as a result of allegations of racism and the torture and murder of Somali nationals, a full-scale investigation was conducted.[82] What is most significant, however, is *not* that some members of the Canadian forces violated the law but that there was a public outcry over this damage to Canadians' sense of what involve-

ment in peace-keeping meant. As one critical non-Canadian assessment of the UN operation in Somalia noted, "no other government contributing soldiers to UNITAF or UNOSOM has shown comparable concern for accountability ... this level of scrutiny of abuses puts the other UNOSOM forces to shame."[83] Second, the growing involvement of major powers in UN operations has in effect diminished Canada's claim to a unique understanding and experience in peace-keeping; which has triggered attempts to redefine the Canadian "niche" in peace-keeping through such possible initiatives as the establishment of an international peace-keeping training centre, or a focus on "pre-operational" efforts that would see Canadian troops withdraw after establishing the infrastructure and groundwork for major UN operations. Finally, the great expansion and mounting cost of UN operations have called into question Canada's ability to continue to participate in all operations or to sustain a long commitment to them. In all cases, a growing sense of unease about Canada's future role has been manifest.[84]

Observations on Canada's position on UN reform issues

Canada has been heavily engaged in most ongoing efforts to reform the UN system, and has made reform a public foreign policy commitment. Before exploring *why* Canada has advocated reforms to the UN system (and why the specific reforms discussed above were highlighted), it is worth noting *how* these reforms were pursued. First, Canada pursued its reform efforts in a loose (and shifting) coalition that usually included the Nordic states and New Zealand and Australia. Common cause is made whenever possible with the members of the Geneva Group, although the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany were often at odds with particular Canadian efforts. Canada also began quickly cooperating with the more "progressive" East Europeans on UN matters, and Canada "seldom finds common cause with the Americans (or Britain and West Germany) because their positions are largely 'zero real growth'" for the foreseeable future.[85] What is noteworthy about this loose coalition is that virtually all its members are, by one index or another, "middle powers," and the overall Canadian reform policy posture has been consistent with the thesis that argues that middle powers such as Canada have the most to gain from the successful functioning of international institutions.[86]

Second, the concept of reform articulated by Canadian representa-

tives at the United Nations and in the Department of External Affairs has meant a process to bring about changes within the UN system in incremental, evolutionary, and therefore non-transformational and non-dramatic ways. One official in External Affairs described "[our] reform efforts in the UN system … [as] fall[ing] into three categories:

Financial reform … to guarantee the viability of the UN …

Management reform … to improve the methods and performance of … the delivery of programmes …

Substantive reform … to improve the ability of UN institutions to carry out their mandates."[87]

These categories all fit into either "process" or "adaptive" reform, giving an incrementalist cast to Canadian policies. In addition, many Canadian efforts have concentrated on what John Holmes called "a 'damage limitation' role," based on "a dedication to the preservation and reform of the institutions, along with an ability to understand … if not share the American distemper."[88]

The focus of the Canadian approach to reform has been on attempts to improve the management structures and processes of the system, an approach that places the accent on "the managerial, administrative and structural measures aimed at static-reduction," or, to use an analogy, aims at oiling the machinery to get it to function as best it can.[89] This managerial view of reform hinges on several presuppositions: that a correct diagnosis of what is wrong with the organization has been performed; that there is sufficient consensus among member states and within the UN bureaucracy about the nature of the problem; and that changes within an organization can be planned, controlled, and channelled in the desired direction. However, when challenged on these presuppositions, Canadian representatives have been pessimistic about whether or not they have been fulfilled.

There has, however, been a progression in Canada's reform efforts since the mid-1980s, which may reflect a renewed commitment to multilateral diplomacy. This progression moves from the early advocacy of "process reform" (via institutional retrenchment and damage limitation, or organizational policy and procedural reform, such as in UNESCO and FAO) as a response to the financial crisis, to a broader focus on "adaptive reform," including structural changes to existing institutions (ECOSOC, peace-keeping, the advancement of women, the DPI). This has included a greater willingness openly to criticize the functioning and operation of the UN system (as well as the behaviour of member states) on issues ranging from human

rights to food aid.[90] Still, only rarely can one find Canadian support for "transformational reforms," such as new institutional responses (ECOSOC, the environmental initiative) that might address over the longer term some of the root causes of the crisis. As one official summarized it, "[Our] lack of resources makes it impossible for us to address individual UN initiatives in-depth. We have therefore sought to define 'general cases' and to formulate simple functional or structural models ... Reform is not a plot or a foolhardy plunge into supranationalism and world government."[91]

Overall, changes in the emphasis of Canadian policy have tracked the rise and fall of perceived crises in the institutions themselves (whether it be UNESCO, ECOSOC, or the workings of various committees), rather than a clear domestically driven reformist agenda. Programmes promoting institutional growth and development (adaptive reform), as a positive or progressive type of reform, are pursued when financial and institutional crises are least urgent (or non-existent) and are a response to external demand for services. On the other hand, policies of retrenchment and cut-backs to programmes and personnel are pursued whenever there is an institutional or financial crisis. Process reforms within existing bodies are less ambitious and usually respond to critical pressures on existing operations. These efforts to reform organizational policies and procedures have been most intense during times of major stress for the institutions and are the least far-reaching in their implications.

Although Canada may pursue a variety of reformist activities, its relative power position (both globally and within the UN system) and strong commitment to multilateralism discriminate in favour of such managerial or incrementalist policy activities. Canada does not have the resources to mobilize support for major programmes of growth and adaptation, and is among the first states to respond to perceived threats to the well-being of the institutions themselves. This "quasi-conservative" outlook creates a resistance to more radical proposals for change, given that one possible "cost" involved might be a decline in Canada's international influence or profile. One clear example of this was provided by Canada's recent experience on the Security Council. In the early 1980s, Canada promoted the expanding use of Article 99 by the Secretary-General, an increased "fact-finding" capability for his Office, and informal and off-the-record consultations with permanent members of the Security Council.[92] But when this began to occur in 1989 (as Canada joined the Security Council), the Canadian government was accused (do-

154

mestically) of having "given up" its reputation and influence by its inability to take strong and effective positions on the Security Council.[93] Then-ambassador Yves Fortier admitted that a great power "condominium" meant that "the role of power broker, in which we always saw ourselves, will not work in some situations."[94]

Finally, what is striking about this commitment and these Canadian efforts is their limited success, whether individual or collective. Although there is a consensus within the Department of External Affairs that Canada has had some influence around the Group of 18, and through informal efforts such as the "Friends of the UN," it is difficult to find areas in which Canada made a concrete difference to an outcome. Initiatives of limited success abound, including the Blue Book, the advancement of women, the UNESCO election, and the detailed proposals for ECOSOC reform. These difficulties serve to highlight some of the limitations associated with Canada's position as a "helpful fixer," especially since the domestic appeal of this image is not always shared internationally. Although Canada has attempted to distance itself from the United States, both in the tactics used to achieve change and in its public commitment to the organization, this stance has also involved an effort to explain the "American distemper" to more radical delegations (often from the third world). As John Holmes noted:

In close association with its traditional "middle power" friends, the Scandinavians, with Australia and other Commonwealth partners, with Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Ireland, Italy, and often West Germany, Canada has been trying to curb the anti-American sentiments provoked by the disdainful approach of the American delegates.[95]

This effort has not always won friends, and Canadian attempts to accommodate divergent demands on the UN system over the years have meant that Canada's contribution to the reform process has been seen by some delegations as dominated by process over substance, the depoliticization of issues, an absence of issue-linkage, and incremental reform rather than more radical approaches to change. In addition, the attention that has been given to maintain Canada's reputation as a "helpful fixer" within the UN system makes it less likely to support any proposals for change that may be construed as too radical, especially if such support would detract from this reputation internationally. These tendencies all suggest that Canadian policy on change and evolution within the UN system will be reformist rather than radical.

Factors affecting Canadian policy on the United Nations and UN reform

It is difficult to understand the roots of this reformist orientation, or how Canadian policy initiatives can be situated with respect to alternative visions of ''reform,'' without searching within the Canadian polity or the international system for the roots of the Canadian commitment to multilateralism and the UN system. But before examining the societal, political, and institutional inputs into Canadian policy, one must point out some analytic caveats. There are three related problems, one of frameworks, one of evidence, and one of analysis, in tracing a causal link between the domestic political environment and foreign policy outputs.

First, the framework selected to explain Canada's multilateralist commitment presumes that the conduct of Canadian foreign policy cannot be fully understood outside the context of the ''principles and practices of Canadian politics at home,'' a presumption that is reflected even in government thinking.[96] Analysts should not, however, exclude the possibility that the Canadian internationalist perspective reflects the ideas of key individuals in the post-1945 Canadian foreign policy establishment (such as Lester Pearson, Escott Reid, and John Holmes) ''more than it represents an organized model or framework.''[97] The tendency of scholars to assume a coherent policy framework may falsely project order onto essentially ad hoc policy responses shaped by individuals. With respect to the United Nations, the presence of strong figures such as Stephen Lewis or Doug Roche (or even individual bureaucrats within External Affairs) may have had more to do with forming specific policies than any other factor. Alternatively, Canadian policy may be determined by an ''organizational politics'' framework. In neither case would one have to refer to broad issues of political culture. Some of the evidence presented below with respect to media coverage and political discussion of UN issues confirms this, as it indicates that the amount of sustained interest in UN issues *outside* of the bureaucracy is low.

The second problem is with the evidence one uses for tracing the connection between domestic and foreign policy. With few exceptions, the background noise of public opinion, media coverage, and interest group activity does not connect with policies oriented around UN reform. Organizational and institutional matters make thin gruel for issue-based interest groups, and seldom grasp the atten-

tion of public discourse. Thus, although one can sketch the level of activity of interest groups and the range of public opinion on specific issues, it requires a leap of argument to claim that this is causally linked to policy outputs, especially in matters that broadly implicate "reform." But, as one analyst put it, "there is reason to suggest that our diplomatic praxis abroad meshes too well with our political praxis at home to admit of our dismissing out of hand the possibility of a connection between the two."[98] The most common resort is to focus attention on the diffuse notion of "political culture" and attempt to find more complex links between policy outputs, the attitudes of policy makers, and the social and political environment that shapes them. Thus one section below will explore the possible coincidence between Canadian political culture and the policy positions staked out by Canada with respect to UN reform, and the implications of this for future international organizations.

Finally, by explicitly focusing on domestic inputs to foreign policy, one excludes the important possibility that a state's position in the international system may be a more crucial determinant in foreign policy (and particularly in a policy commitment to multilateralism). As one former Canadian ambassador to the United Nations put it, "a country the size of Canada has a much bigger stake in multilateral diplomacy than a major power or a superpower."[99] This trail can lead all the way back to the domestic inputs themselves: Canada may have a particular set of public attitudes towards the United Nations, and a certain profile of NGO activity, *precisely because* of its position as a middle power with a Western/Northern orientation. These inputs could be a *consequence* of the commitment to multilateralism, rather than a cause of it. Thus this section includes a brief analysis of Canada's position in the international system, if for no other reason than that several officials explicitly present this sort of analysis as their explanation for Canada's active involvement in the reform agenda of the UN system.

Societal factors: Public opinion

Public opinion sampling on United Nations-related issues has been undertaken in Canada from the time of the San Francisco Conference.[100] Although it is difficult to draw direct links (except on highly specific issues) between domestic public opinion and foreign policy behaviour, public opinion can help assess the broader parameters

Table 4.1 **"How important do you think it is that we try to make the United Nations a success?" (%)**

	1985	1967	1961
Very or fairly important	83	90	89
Not important	7	3	7
No opinion	11	7	4

Source: Clare Delbridge, "Public Attitudes in Canada towards the United Nations," *Briefing paper no. 19*, United Nations Association of Canada, Dec. 1985. The Gallup results were disaggregated as follows: 1985 – Very important, 58 per cent; Fairly important, 25 per cent; 1961 – Very important, 77 per cent; Fairly important, 12 per cent (*The Gallup Report*, 21 Mar. 1985).

within which policy must operate, the rise and fall of support for the UN system itself, and Canadian support for change in the operations or direction of UN activities.

Unfortunately, most polls have concerned issues of the day and not been comparable across time. Nevertheless, on two significant issues – Canada's commitment to, and assessment of the performance of, the United Nations – some comparison is possible. When Canadians were questioned on their commitment to the United Nations, a strong underlying faith in the organization appears. Table 4.1 summarizes these results. In August 1985, a similar question was posed, but with the specific slant towards making the United Nations more successful in promoting "peace and security." This scored 94 per cent for "very or somewhat important" and 7 per cent for "not important."[101] In December 1989, 68 per cent of respondents somewhat or strongly disagreed that Canada should reduce its support for the United Nations.[102]

These results are noteworthy in two ways: the level of commitment has remained consistently high for more than two decades, but the level of "no opinion" (which could reflect a lack of awareness of, or interest in, the organization and its activities) has been steadily increasing. This trend is partly confirmed by other data from the 1985 poll that broke down the responses by age. In the 50 and older age group, support for the United Nations was significantly higher than in the under-30 age group, reflecting perhaps "lean years" in the 1970s and early 1980s for public awareness of the scope and significance of UN activities.[103] This is confirmed by the results of the 1989 poll, which revealed that only 6 per cent of respondents were "very familiar" with the United Nations, while 18 per cent were "not at all familiar."[104]

158

Table 4.2 **"In general, do you feel the UN is doing a good job or a poor job in trying to solve the problems it has had to face?" (%)**

	1989	1985	1976	1973	1967	1961
Good job	47	36	28 (42)	36 (53)	42 (57)	54 (79)
Fair job	—	—	33	32	26	32
Poor job	17	39	15 (22)	16 (24)	21 (28)	6 (9)
Can't say	36	26	24 (36)	16 (24)	11 (15)	8 (12)

Source: *The Gallup Report*, 24 Jan. 1976; Delbridge, "Public Attitudes," 3; *Globe and Mail*, Apr. 1990. Figures in brackets have been recalculated to exclude "fair job" responses. This allows at least a limited comparison of the more recent data with the earlier figures.

Table 4.3 **"Is your respect for the United Nations Organization increasing or decreasing as the years go by?" (%)**

	1990	1980	1972
Increasing	34	18	20
Decreasing	22	42	25
The same	33	28	36
Can't say	11	13	19

Source: *The Gallup Report*, 11 Jun. 1980; *Toronto Star*, 11 Oct. 1990.

When the performance of the United Nations itself was under scrutiny, however, Canadians were less satisfied. Table 4.2 summarizes the results of six polls of UN performance. Although the two most recent of these are not directly comparable with the first four (the absence of a "fair job" category means one cannot conclude that there has been a recent increase in approval of UN activities), if one recalculates the earlier figures to eliminate "fair job" responses (which is statistically dubious, but allows one to get some handle on the issue), a marked drop in the approval rating of the United Nations in the mid-1980s is evident, with successes for the United Nations in the late 1980s somewhat ameliorating this. This is further tested by the results of polls conducted in 1972, 1980, and 1990 (presented in table 4.3), which demonstrated a clear drop in "respect" for the United Nations at the beginning of the 1980s and a recovery by the end of the decade. When asked what had caused the change, the most common response was a belief that the United Nations had no influence and could not resolve the problems it faced. Several respondents also said the United Nations was not accomplishing what it set

159

out to do, suggesting that discontent could be addressed by a more efficient or effective organization, rather than by a radical reorientation of policies.

Over the 1980s, several more specific questions were put to Canadians. When asked if the United Nations was important, 93 per cent of Canadians thought it was "very or somewhat important," with only 7 per cent regarding it as "not important at all."[105] But when ranked against other foreign policy priorities, Canadians do *not* place participation in international organizations high on the list. A 1984 poll found "UN membership" ranked thirteenth of 24 possible issues of great importance to Canadian foreign policy, with 50 per cent of respondents considering it "very important."[106] A 1987 poll found that "strengthening international cooperation by supporting the United Nations and other multilateral organizations" was ninth of 11 possible priority issues, and was regarded as the highest priority by only 22 per cent of respondents.[107] Of course, many of the other issues (such as third world development and international peace) are pursued in multilateral forums, but they are not necessarily dependent upon them. On the other hand, when the specific issue of peace-keeping was raised, Canadians consistently placed it much higher in importance. In a 1979 poll, it was third of nine issues, directly behind protection of fisheries and ocean resources, and negotiation of trade and tariff agreements with other countries. In 1984, support for participation in UN peace-keeping efforts ranked eighth of 24 issues, with 60 per cent considering it "very important."[108]

How the Canadian public opinion profile compares with that of other countries is difficult to assess. Only the "good job–poor job" question has been asked widely and, in the 1985 series of Gallup polls, Canada scored sixth in approval ratings of UN activities of 17 countries polled, and was near the group average (the Canadian numbers are given in table 4.2). Only the United States (38 per cent), the Netherlands (66 per cent), Switzerland (49 per cent), Australia (49 per cent), and the Philippines (64 per cent) gave the United Nations a higher rating for doing a "good job."[109] American figures are strikingly close to the Canadian ones, and, most interestingly, Americans also strongly believe that UN member states should pay their full dues, suggesting that American policy was not consistent with public sentiment on this issue.[110]

The question of most direct relevance concerns Canadians' attitude to the issue of "reform" versus "withdrawal." In 1985, during a period of high concern over the workings of UNESCO and other

160

member agencies, Canadians were directly asked if Canada should withdraw from, or work for reform within, UN agencies with poor management or that favoured undemocratic ideas and governments. Canadians supported, by 77 per cent to 21 per cent, working for reform from within.[111] This underlines the ''adaptive reformist'' bent of Canadian public opinion (and foreign policy) towards the United Nations. Although disappointed with its effectiveness, ''the UN's shortcomings are seen by Canadians as those of its member states, not of the international body itself.''[112] Attempts to undermine the UN body have been viewed in official Canadian government statements as a direct and ''serious challenge to a principal vehicle of Canadian foreign policy.''[113]

Societal factors: Interest groups

Unlike its southern neighbour, Canada does not have a long tradition of active and influential foreign policy interest group activity, as most have been concerned with domestically based sectarian or economic issues. Not until the 1970s did foreign policy issues (with the traditional exceptions of Canada–US free trade and war) become of much political salience to the broad spectrum of the Canadian population.[114] The global economic and political changes that followed the 1973 Middle East war and petrodollar diplomacy found interest groups and associations increasingly pressed to articulate their concerns both to elected officials and directly to the relevant ministries, often bypassing Members of Parliament. In this period one sees a dramatic increase in the number and activity of Canadian interest groups, with one of the more sustained legacies of the Trudeau era being a greater mobilization of ethnic, economic, and issue-based groups representing sectors of society with cross-cutting concerns and allegiances.

In the 1980s this new aspect of the political process was extended. Changes in parliamentary procedure that enhance the roles and powers of the parliamentary committees regularized the procedures followed by Canadian interest groups in making their cases to policy makers. Committees have held hearings across the country on issues such as the review of Canada's foreign policy, defence policy, and aid and development assistance policy. Parliamentary committees also invite non-governmental witnesses to appear on such issues as the development of new refugee legislation, relations with various regions of the world, disarmament and arms control, and free trade. Al-

though proposed legislation remains the prerogative of cabinet, committees are now able to influence the legislative process directly. In addition, a regular consultative process was established in specific issue areas. For example, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament established a Consultative Group on Arms Control and Disarmament to bring together a cross-section of the Canadian community active in the field for regular discussions on Canadian policy. This mechanism also exists in other areas of Canadian foreign policy, and in some cases (such as human rights) consultative meetings are held prior to the convening of United Nations plenary or special committee meetings dealing with those issues. Members of these groups are also often seconded to Canadian delegations at various UN meetings for extended periods.

With respect to the United Nations system, two sets of interest group activity that could influence policy can be identified, one issue-oriented, the other organizational.[115] As regards the first, one has seen the full blossoming over the last decade of issue-based groups that have a common focus on some combination of third world development assistance, human rights, and disarmament, all key issues for Canada at the United Nations. A heightened awareness within Canada (especially among church groups) of third world activities also pushed the Canadian government early to the forefront of the North–South debate. Among the most prominent groups are the Canadian Council of Churches, the Mennonite Central Committee, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Project Ploughshares, Amnesty International, Operation Dismantle, Oxfam, Canadian Council for International Cooperation, and the Jesuit Centre for Social Faith and Justice. Many of these groups focus on specific aspects of Canada's UN activities and are in regular contact with the UN Division in the Department of External Affairs through both their volunteer supporters and their professional staff. They may contribute directly to the policy process through the unique expertise mobilized in their membership. This has been especially true of those who engage in direct fieldwork, such as the NGO aid workers in Central America or Africa. In addition, groups emerged to counter the conventional wisdom about Canada's role in the international community and its position on liberation movements, foreign aid, American definitions of global security, participation in military alliances, and so forth.[116]

One issue in which the influence of interest group activity on policy outputs is particularly clear is the advancement of women. The domestic impetus behind the Canadian position in the United Nations

was the product of a series of changes that can be traced back to the emergence in the 1960s of a strong women's movement in Canada. The leadership of high-profile Canadian women, in combination with the strong support of women from the three major political parties, women's groups, and business and professional women's clubs, galvanized a grass-roots movement that forced the Pearson government to address some of its concerns. By the 1980s, the lobby of the National Action Committee on the Status of Women, which claimed to represent more than 5 million women in 500 organizations, was in a position to force the government to make good on some of its promises with respect to women's rights, and the international promotion of the advancement of women was a specific target. It is hard to see how Canada would otherwise have been at the forefront of this issue.

On the second level, that of Canada's overall participation in international organizations and the UN system, general-purpose groups such as the United Nations Association of Canada, the Atlantic Assembly, and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs provided an early natural focus for those who, after the experiences of the 1930s and 1940s, wished to ensure Canada's active and responsible role in the international community. These organizations were joined somewhat later by government-sponsored "expert institutions," which fostered research and debate in the public domain and thereby perhaps influenced policy. The Institute for Research on Public Policy, the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, and the Institute on Human Rights and Democratic Development all fall in this category (although the CIIPS was closed in 1992 as a cost-cutting measure by the government). The North–South Institute, the Canadian Centre for Global Security, and the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS) also receive some supplemental support from government departments.[117] All have expertise and constituent interest in Canada's policies within the United Nations and have direct and indirect opportunities to participate in the policy-making process. The last two institutions have, not surprisingly, conducted extensive research and related activities on UN peace-keeping in the early 1990s.[118]

In spite of this dramatic growth in private expertise, interest, and commitment, it is difficult to judge the extent to which interest groups actually influence government decision-making and policy implementation at the United Nations. One suggestive hypothesis, however, is that issue-based or functional interest groups have more im-

pact on Canada's policy at the United Nations both because of their expertise and because of their perceived legitimacy.[119] This accords well with the examples of direct influence (such as on disarmament or women's issues) that can be identified. On the other hand, although the general-purpose organizations form an important part of the backdrop of Canadian foreign policy making, unlike the issue-based interest groups there is little evidence to suggest that they have played any significant independent role in the formulation of Canada's policies at the United Nations, especially with respect to its reformist orientation. One reason for this may be that:

for countries which play essentially subordinate or ancillary roles in the international system, the exercise of [politico-security] policy is more often about the conduct of diplomacy than the mobilization of material ... instruments of statecraft ... and [diplomatic options] are not usually subject to great influence from the public.[120]

Certainly the Canadian pursuit of reform within the UN system is primarily diplomatic, and hence less open to public input or attention. But the motive behind the policy, namely the desire to maintain a well-functioning arena for the expression of Canadian interests, is implicitly accepted by all interest groups attempting to influence Canadian policy within the UN system.

Societal factors: The media

Systematic information on Canadian media coverage of United Nations issues suffers from the weaknesses of content analysis research. But an overview of press coverage on Canadian policy towards the United Nations for the 10-year period from 1980 to 1990 is detailed in table 4.4, disaggregated by issue area. Material from the 1991–1993 period is not included because the overwhelming increase in attention to the United Nations that was associated with the Gulf War (and ancillary activities), with various peace operations, and with the short-lived 1991 candidacy of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney for the post of Secretary-General virtually drowns out other coverage.

Data have been derived from the clipping files of selected major Canadian newspapers, and, although there are always errors and omissions in such data, in this case they are likely random.[121] Further, the concentration of media ownership and sources in Canada makes it unnecessary to broaden the coverage, since the material can virtually always be traced to a shared wire service or freelance

164

Table 4.4 **Canadian media coverage of UN-related issues, 1980–1990**

Issue	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	Total
UNESCO				3	8	13		1				25
FAO								3	3			6
UN Human Rights Commission	2	1	1								1	5
UNICEF				1						2		3
UNEP				1		1						2
UNCTAD				2								2
ILO			1	1		1						3
ICAO				2								2
DPI							2			1	1	4
Security Council				1					20	6	1	28
Secretary-General						3				1	4	8
Apartheid					2	5						7
Peace-keeping									2	2	2	6
Women		1				3	2			2	1	9
Africa					3	2	4			1		10
Afghanistan	1	1					1					3
Disarmament	1		1		7	1		2		1		13
Environment									3		1	4
Terrorism								1				1
Middle East							1	1	2	3	3	10
Central America							1				1	2

165

Table 4.4 (*cont.*)

Issue	Year											Total
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	
Soviet Union				1		3						4
United States				1								1
Canadian domestic politics				1				1	5	3	5	15
UN reform					5	11	7					23
Financial crisis	2					2	8					12
General Canadian UN policy	1		1	3	4	3	2			1	2	17
Multilateralism	1		1									2
Public figures	2	4	1	3	22	17	3	2	14	2	1	71
Micscellaneous					2	4				6	3	15
Total	10	7	6	21	53	69	30	11	49	31	26	313

Note: 1990 figures do not include the debate surrounding UN action in the Gulf conflict, and are hence artificially low.

166

writers. The most serious caveat to note is that this sample includes only articles that deal directly with issues of Canadian policy towards or involvement in the United Nations, and not articles in which the United Nations is mentioned in the context of another issue (such as, for example, the changing American policy towards the United Nations, or general coverage of peace-keeping operations). This is justified on the grounds that the press coverage of Canadian policy towards the United Nations is a clearer indicator of support for specified policies or initiatives than broader coverage of the United Nations itself, whatever the specific implications for Canada.[122] Obviously, if this paper were examining general Canadian attitudes towards the United Nations, the broader coverage would be more important, but it has been excluded here.

Several important points can be noted from this table. The number of direct references to Canada–UN issues is low, especially in the early 1980s. This is consistent with a period of relative quiescence in the United Nations and with the decline in public support for the United Nations reflected in the public opinion data above. The increase in coverage between 1984 and 1988 can almost solely be attributed to the activities of then-ambassador Stephen Lewis, who brought a high profile to the job and played an active role in promoting the United Nations at home and abroad. This role was not without its controversies, in particular the public battle he fought with the conservative American Heritage Foundation over its attempts to push American policy towards a withdrawal from the United Nations.[123] There was, however, little critical coverage of his efforts in Canada. In the late 1980s, one sees an upsurge in attention on issues such as Canada's policy towards peace-keeping (and the volume of coverage on peace-keeping operations is enormous), or Canada's role on the Security Council. Canadian policy on other UN-related issues was, however, of extremely low salience throughout this period.

When one looks for consistent policy or issue themes, however, few appear to have received sustained attention over the decade. The seven most prominent *issue areas* are (in rank order, with percentage of overall citations): Security Council (9 per cent), UNESCO (8 per cent), UN reform (7 per cent), general Canadian UN policy (5 per cent), UN policy directly affecting Canadian domestic politics (5 per cent), disarmament (4 per cent), and the UN financial crisis (4 per cent). The issue of reform thus appears high on the media agenda, touching directly on three of these issue areas: UN reform,

the financial crisis, and UNESCO. Most of the coverage, however, was associated with (and tracked) a particular individual (such as the annual speeches to the General Assembly, or major appointments) rather than influencing the direction or conduct of that policy. The best example of this would be coverage of the Security Council: the vast majority of citations can be described as ''election-style coverage'' of Canada's 1988 bid for a seat on the Security Council, rather than political analysis of the role or importance of the Security Council or Canada's place on it. Finally, editorial or opinion comment is infrequent and confined to a handful of citations (not disaggregated from the data). When it did surface, on such issues as the non-payment of dues and reform of UNESCO, it is broadly supportive of the organization, and consistent with the orientation towards reform that marks Canadian policy overall.[124]

Although data for the most recent period are not included, it is noteworthy that general coverage of Canada's role did not increase significantly as Canada assumed its seat on the Security Council in 1989. Discussion of the Gulf War was extensive (and has not been tabulated above) but, when one put aside this issue, much of the coverage directly focusing on Canada's achievements was critical of its performance, which was seemingly ineffective and marginal. Some of this was attributed to disagreements between the Prime Minister and the Minister for External Affairs over the Palestinian issue (which led to several abstentions on Middle Eastern resolutions); some was attributed to the general tilt in Canadian foreign policy towards the United States (which resulted in opposition to resolutions condemning American military action against Panama and Libya).[125] Little analysis focused on the changed nature of the United Nations itself and the possible implications of this for Canada's traditional role.

The political process

The amorphous concept of ''political process'' can be analysed on two dimensions: the direct and ancillary activities of elected officials, and the bureaucratic/institutional process. The attention paid by the elected officials to UN issues is patchy and indirect, as illustrated by the data in table 4.5, which presents the number of times UN-related issues were raised in the House of Commons, either directly or indirectly, in the 1980s. Direct citations either referred to Canadian policy

Table 4.5 **References to UN-related issues in the House of Commons, January 1980 – July 1988**

Issue	Direct references	Indirect references
United Nations	28	154
UNESCO	13	20
UN Special Session on Disarmament II	7	23
General Assembly	7	17
Security Council	5	15
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea	4	12
Brundtland Commission	4	43
UN Human Rights Commission	4	19
UNEP	2	18
Secretary-General	2	11
FAO	2	5
UNICEF	2	3
UNCTAD	1	2
UNHCR	—	58
UN Association	—	3
UNIFIL	—	1
Total	81	404

Note: Some of the references may be double-counted.

towards a particular issue or institution or addressed a specific aspect of the work of the institution in question; indirect references most often took the form of responses to questions or speeches in which Canada's participation (e.g. in the UN Special Session on Disarmament) is discussed in the context of the larger policy issue (Canada's arms control policy). Table 4.5 demonstrates that UN issues do not engage the sustained attention of Canadian politicians (an average of 9.5 references a year!), suggesting that, despite recent evolution of the Canadian system towards greater parliamentary involvement in foreign policy issues, the United Nations ranks very low as an area of interest.[126] This conforms to the long-standing view that foreign policy making in a parliamentary system is dominated by the executive.

When these issues do receive attention, however, the references to UN-related matters are generally positive. When a simple ratings scale is applied to the record ($+2$ very positive; $+1$ positive; 0 neutral; -1 negative; -2 very negative), 67 per cent of the references were neutral, 27 per cent positive, and only 6 per cent negative.[127]

These figures also reflect a broad non-partisan consensus on Canada's relatively positive stance towards the United Nations, with no significant differences among the three parties.[128] The non-partisan nature of Canadian UN policy is also reflected in the absence of any discernible shift in policy after the election of the Progressive Conservative government in 1984, and the appointment by Prime Minister Mulroney of Stephen Lewis, a former provincial leader of the New Democratic Party, to the post of UN ambassador. Both men claimed no differences existed between them over the direction of Canada's UN policy (and Mulroney defended Lewis, especially when he was attacked by the Heritage Foundation for his criticism of its policy towards the United Nations).

It is in the institutional history and activities of the Department of External Affairs that one finds the most convincing explanations for Canada's participation in the process of UN reform. Within Ottawa, a relatively small core of officials work in the International Organizations Bureau, of which the United Nations Division is a subsidiary. This division coordinates Canadian policy with a staff (excluding support staff) of 10. The UN embassy in New York has a staff of 12. The number of individuals working on UN-related issues is small, even once one includes officers in Geneva, Paris, and elsewhere who devote a portion of their time to UN issues. On the other hand, one ought not to neglect the input of other government institutions that have a functional involvement in certain issues, such as the Agriculture Department in the FAO, the Secretary of State for the Status of Women, and the Canadian International Development Agency. The disadvantages of working with a small cadre of "experts" are clear, but some advantages should be highlighted. In particular, the officials in the UN Division as a rule have extended involvement with UN issues (in several cases, more than 10 years), and hence the institutional memory is long. Given the low political salience of reform issues, this may increase the input of civil servants into the form and content of specific proposals (such as the Blue Book). In addition, the coherence of Canadian policy in different forums (and hence the "quality" of input) is increased by the small numbers. As one official noted:

although we have smaller delegations, the ratio of delegation size is not so much against us [as is the overall ratio of resources devoted to international relations by larger states]. In some areas, we may actually "know" more about how to "use" the UN system than many larger states, [in part because] institutional issues require a lot of long-term expertise.[129]

170

Political cultural factors

The conduct of Canadian foreign policy cannot be fully understood without situating it in the context of the domestic political culture, for, as one analyst notes, there is a connection between "[our] diplomatic praxis abroad [and] ... [our] political praxis at home.[130] There is no tight causal link between domestic political culture and foreign policies, nor is there a tight link in domestic politics between political culture and policy outputs. In addition, only some facets of domestic political practice will be expressed in the behaviour of Canadian diplomats abroad, as the perceived interests of the state and the dominance of particular officials also help explain the conduct of Canadian foreign policy. But there can be no question that Canada's variegated polity has had some impact on its foreign policy. In the most general terms, Canadian politics operate within an environment in which the basic principles of liberalism are applied to "the governance of a polity composed of too few people, of too heterogeneous a composition, living in a space too large, with a topography too varied."[131] The political socialization that develops within this environment has generated a commitment to at least three broad "principles" or "characteristics" that can be identified as informing Canada's diplomatic praxis in the UN system: a preference for pragmatic non-ideological compromise, a belief in pluralism and tolerance, and a commitment to the orderly mediation and resolution of conflicts. These principles characterize much of the work of Canadian delegations at the United Nations since its inception, and may have contributed to the mixed success of their efforts to reform the UN system.

Canada's federal, bilingual, and multicultural polity has generated a domestic political praxis heavily oriented towards a non-ideological and pragmatic approach that emphasizes compromise and fence-sitting.[132] This has also been evident in the conduct of its foreign policy in the United Nations. Although Canadian delegations insisted on the full membership and participation of "middle powers," they also recognized that great power participation was crucial for the United Nations to remain credible as a channel for international cooperation and organization. Hence, for example, Canada supported from the outset the great power veto and supported the United States in the formation of a UN force during the Korean crisis.[133] As Denis Stairs points out, "the diplomacy practiced by Mr. Pearson and his colleagues in the context of the Korean War was a reflection of the prag-

matic, problem-solving approach to government which is the most characteristic feature of Canadian domestic politics.''[134] But when this tendency is projected onto the United Nations it may be applauded by some and denounced by others. Many of the newer member states in the United Nations "are not so amenable to Canada's style of multilateral diplomacy," which is perceived as being equivocal, lacking strong principles, and putting a premium on depoliticization, accommodation, and process over substance.[135] In the context of UN reform, this tendency to search for compromise hampers Canada's ability to build coalitions to promote its version of "process reform," and the attempt to depoliticize conflicts weakens the substance of its proposals. In addition, the quest for a middle ground can detract from Canada's image as a "neutral" defender of the institution when polarization occurs (as when Canada conditionally accepted zero-growth policies).

Pluralism, tolerance, and accommodation are also (in principle) accorded a high place as part of the Canadian domestic character, again as a consequence of the diverse nature of Canadian society. This "cautious, prudent, and sensible temperament – a quality for which Canadians are notorious" – seems to be a good qualification for the tasks of an intermediary, a crucial element of any reform process.[136] This role is particularly evident in the attempts at reform in UNESCO, FAO, WHO, UNEP, and other specialized agencies, as well as in the UN system-wide adaptation and reform process. But again, Canada's reputation for objectivity and inoffensiveness can hinder more than help its ability to effect change within the UN system when it prevents the issuing of the sorts of threats that could be effective. Finally, the preservation of order and the commitment to mediation and conflict resolution are the third set of enduring characteristics of Canadian domestic politics (usually expressed as a penchant for "peace, order, and good government"). One can find these domestic traits projected onto the conduct of Canada's policy towards the UN system in at least two areas. The most prominent would be Canada's commitment to expanded and institutionalized peace-keeping and to the greater implementation of the "peace and security" provisions of the Charter.[137] The second would be the great attention paid to the issue of arms control and disarmament in UN forums, as documented in detail by Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann.[138]

Domestic political discord associated with the rise of "identity politics" (manifested by aboriginal, women's, and ethnic groups) and the constitutional impasse, which is also refracted through the prism of

regional and linguistic identities, are also projected into Canadian foreign policy. Perhaps ironically, these domestic difficulties make it increasingly impossible for Canada to sustain an international commitment that relies on its reputation as "a political culture which has been viewed as one of the world's best models for the management of linguistic, ethnic and regional diversity."[139] As one analyst notes:

such distinctiveness as existed in ... the golden age of Canadian foreign policy, associated with peacekeeping, significant involvement in aid projects and in supporting genuine multilateral approaches to world problems is not likely to return in the foreseeable future ... Our role as an exemplary world citizen is not easily attained while our domestic politics is characterized by strife, ill-will and intolerance.[140]

The political fragmentation reflected in the 1993 federal election ensures that this situation will not soon be ameliorated.

External factors: Canada's position in the international system

It was noted at the outset that one of the factors most likely to influence Canada's position on reform issues is Canada's position in the international system. This is a product of both geography and relative status. As one analyst notes, "the choice of multilateralism is essentially a product of the fact that Canada finds itself, on the international scene, a country without a region" and sharing a continent with a superpower.[141] John Holmes expressed it more directly when he noted that, without its multilateral ties, Canada would have little control over its destiny and perhaps even no "purpose."[142]

Aside from purely geographic or historical considerations, this posture also appears natural for a "middle power." Throughout the post-1945 period Canada has shifted between being the archetypical middle power and being a principal power, in the changing shadow of American hegemony and the attendant alterations in the structure and relations of the international system. There is little doubt that in the early post-war period Canada's own self-image was that of a middle power. Canada employed the instruments of diplomacy in the corridors of the United Nations (as well as NATO, its other principal multilateral commitment) to uphold the ideals of the post-war international order, and worked successfully for revisions within both organizations that would curtail undue unilateralism by the United States and guarantee access to decision-making for other responsible partners. It is also in this period that Canada actively lob-

bied for the admission of new members to the United Nations in support of the principle of universality, provided guidance to those who wished to make the United Nations work in spite of the log-jams caused by the veto powers of the permanent members, and sought to strengthen the specialized agencies to meet better the expanding demands of the UN system. During the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, however, there is substantial evidence to support the "principal power" thesis, as it is during this period that one observes a dramatic increase in the number and variety of Canada's bilateral relations, increased stature within the Commonwealth and the *francophonie*, a willingness and ability to challenge American policies in bilateral and multilateral forums, and an interest in taking the lead on significant international issues.[143]

But "middle power" may be the appropriate designation for Canada in the last decade of the millennium, although the current fluidity in the international system may make old categories no longer helpful. In any case, if the United States remains the only country with dominant military and economic might then, in conjunction with the emergence of Japan and the realignment of Europe and Russia, Canada will remain relatively a middle power. Repeated official references to Canada's "middle-power" status reflect this thinking, and as a result, when faced with domestic pressure to "do something" about urgent international problems, "the instinctive reaction in Canada is to turn to multilateral fora." But, having selected the multilateral route, "[we] then decide what to do within it. Our inherent limitations lead us to either mediation or to a focus on institution building, the latter being more important."[144] It is this reaction to the exigencies of the external environment that permits specific units or individuals in the bureaucracy to work diligently on reform efforts. In the absence of high political saliency or clear domestic political pressures promoting it, "reformism" is justified by the need to have functioning multilateral forums to which one can turn. Middle powers are thus naturally more attentive to the functioning of the UN system, and their general lack of vested interests in specific outcomes means their motives for pursuing reforms are not normally suspect.

If this reasoning is correct, then it is also understandable that, in the late 1960s through the 1970s, Canada's primary attention would have turned away from the United Nations to those other relationships and forums more amenable to the opportunities available to a principal power actor. During this interlude, Canada quite strenu-

174

ously questioned its UN commitments.[145] Canada was not alone in this regard, as the other members of the G7 joined in these efforts to give leadership and engage in more narrowly based activities in the absence of assertive and credible US leadership. As a consequence, the UN system somewhat stagnated, and reform of the system did not engage the energies of these critically situated states in the international system.

Conclusion

Canadian efforts to reform the UN system are ultimately pursued "partly out of a perception that it has a clear need for a strong and relevant multilateral system, partly out of a genuine desire to see the UN fulfil better its political, economic and social mandate.[146] Support for reforms is almost dictated by the interest that middle powers develop in multilateral forums by virtue of their position in the international system, a position sharpened for Canada by geographical and historical factors. As a result, by now Canada's "lasting and visceral commitment to multilateralism ... is ingrained in and endemic to the Canadian character," and it has created a pattern of expectations that reinforces Canada's support of efforts to reform and adapt the institutions of the UN system.[147] Such a commitment is shared by other states with similar status in the international system, from some of the members of the G7 through to others such as the Nordics or Australians. This implies that the main factors determining attitudes to the UN system may be located largely outside of the domestic determinants of a state's foreign policies.

But the *kind* of reforms pursued by Canada appears to be determined by a combination of domestic and external factors. The issue areas focused upon (such as the FAO or the status of women) are linked to domestic political factors; the style of reform proposals is rooted in Canadian domestic political culture and practice and the institutional memory and emphasis of the bureaucracy. The choice of adaptive or process reform as opposed to more far-reaching transformational reforms is partly dictated by the stake Canada has in maintaining existing institutional arrangements. This "has driven the Canadian government ... often to give priority to the preservation of institutions at the expense of other considerations," especially the goal of making the UN system more responsive to the needs of the less developed countries.[148]

In a sense, this calls into question the framework for several of the

case-studies in this volume, with their implied assumption that a state's relative support for or opposition to reform efforts (and the resources it will devote to it) is somehow a function of domestic political, social, or institutional factors).[149] Such a causal link cannot be easily tested, as the evidence put forward in this paper suggests. Although support for the United Nations is high, we do not know if Canadian attitudes to the United Nations (as demonstrated from public opinion surveys, for example) indicate a *prior* commitment to multilateralism that drives policy-making, or if the commitment to multilateralism and Canadians' positive image of the role and function of the UN system are driven by the fact that it is the "only game in town" for the foreign policy ambitions of a middle power. Socialization into this role (and the self-image of a "helpful fixer") may also hinder the advocacy of more dramatic and creative diplomacy when opportunities or crises present themselves.

While middle powers may be the strongest supporters of institutional reform of the UN system, and may even be "experts" on such matters, they are systematically unable to garner enough *political* support to push their reform proposals. The relative difficulties encountered by the Canadian proposals for financial and budgetary reform, the lack of return on the investment in far-reaching proposals for ECOSOC reform, and the failed campaign sponsored by Canada in the FAO to change the director-general all suggest that middle powers are too weak to shepherd by themselves the process of institutional change. They rarely take the lead on major proposals and, when success is enjoyed, it usually comes in either process or adaptive reforms that may, by their "problem-solving" bent, not address the fundamental issues confronting the UN system. Only efforts by states such as Japan (with its push for the creation of the G18) or a strong consensus among the permanent members of the Security Council (as demonstrated since the 1990 Security Council summit meeting) or the other rough groupings that have emerged in the General Assembly are likely to be sufficient to galvanize reform efforts.[150] Many middle and lesser powers have complained, at times openly, that they are being marginalized in the current reform efforts at the United Nations.

There are good reasons to question the possible commitment of middle powers to more profound transformational reforms. Such changes would threaten the relative power and status of these states, unless they incorporated some version of the "functionalist principle," which argues that multilateral institutions should accord

176

power and influence to those states willing and able to make a contribution to a particular issue. It is unlikely, however, that the balance of forces that would need to be struck to create a successor institution would easily accommodate a principle that so clearly benefited "middle powers." In addition, there is a marked tendency to emphasize in the UN system the institutional expressions of liberal Western values, which tend towards the depoliticization of issues and the eschewing of the strong ideological commitments that necessarily form the backdrop for transformational reforms. This helps explain why states such as Canada are suspicious of grand designs and are among the most prominent supporters of adaptive reform, even as it becomes clear that such reform will not be sufficient to meet the requirement of relevance for the universal body. They may at times play the fortuitous role of catalysers, but are more likely destined to be eager followers and supporters, in the quest for an international organization able to cope with the challenges of the twenty-first century.

Acknowledgements

Notes and references

1. *Canada Reports* (Summer 1988): 3.
2. Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1993), 14.
3. A large volume of memoirs and biographies exist on this topic. See, *inter alia*, those by John Holmes, Escott Reid, and Lester Pearson. See also, for an overview of Canadian participation, Clyde Sanger, *Canadians and the United Nations* (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1988). See also Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Report on the United Nations Conference on International Organization*, Conference series, 1945, no. 2 (Ottawa, 1945), 37; Harald von Riekhoff, "Canadian Attitudes and Approaches to the United Nations Security Council," *Background Paper* (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1989), 1–2. On the functional principle see A. J. Miller, "The Functional Principle in Canada's External Relations," *International Journal* 35 (Spring 1980), no. 2: 309–328.
4. See G. P. de T. Glazebrook, *A History of Canadian External Relations* (Toronto: Oxford, 1950). For a good overview of Canadian activities in the UN, see Guy Gosselin, "Le Canada et les Nations Unies," unpublished paper, Oct. 1987.
5. Yves Beigbeder, *Management Problems in the United Nations Organizations: Reform or Decline*? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 147–158.
6. Canada's continued commitment to UN administrative and financial reform was re-

emphasized by Prime Minister Kim Campbell in her speech to the UN General Assembly, 29 Sept. 1993, in which she underlined that the UN must become "leaner, more efficient, better focused and more responsible" (*Toronto Star,* 30 Sep. 1993).

7. See *Foreign Policy for Canadians* (Ottawa: Department of Supply and Services, 1970), 9. The White Paper listed prime objectives of Canadian foreign policy as: fostering economic growth, safeguarding national sovereignty, working for international peace and security, promoting social justice, enhancing the quality of life, and ensuring a harmonious natural environment. Of course, the consistent themes or goals of Canadian foreign policy may reflect little more than the consensus interests of the political and economic élite.

8. From Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark, speech to the 39th session of the General Assembly, 25 Sep. 1984.

9. John Holmes, "The United Nations in Perspective," *Behind the Headlines* 44 (Oct. 1986), no. 1: 13.

10. For a good history of developments leading up to the adoption of the UN Charter, see Leland Goodrich et al., *Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents*, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); also see United States Department of State, *Bulletin* 13 (1 Jul. 1945), 13.

11. For example, Antonio Donini distinguishes three different foci of "reformist activity":
    (a) Institutional growth and development …
    (b) Structural changes within existing bodies …
    (c) Reforms of organizational policies and procedures.
    Antonio Donini, "Resilience and Reform: Some Thoughts on the Processes of Change in the United Nations," *International Relations* 9 (Nov. 1988), no. 4: 292. See also Marjorie Ann Browne, *United Nations Reform: Issues for Congress*, report 88–593F (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1988), 9–10. She distinguishes between reforms that involve "cost cutting," "restructuring of secretariats," or "reconceptualizing the purposes and role of the United Nations/UN system."

12. John Renninger, "What Structural Changes Are Needed in the System of International Institutions?" UNITAR/USSR Association for the United Nations Roundtable on the "Future of the United Nations in an Interdependent World," Moscow, 5–9 Sep. 1988, 1.

13. See Donald Puchala and Roger Coate, *The Challenge of Relevance: The United Nations in a Changing World Environment* (New York: Academic Council on the United Nations System, 1989); Gene Lyons, "Strengthening the United Nations," *International Journal* 45 (Autumn 1990), no. 4: 949–958.

14. A typical understanding of the South's position on UN reform is embodied in the recent work of K. P. Saksena, *Reforming the United Nations: The Challenge of Relevance* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993).

15. Proposals from the advocates of UN reform vary in range from the very radical (withdrawal from the UN system and from individual units within the system, or the creation of a third-generation international organization) to the very incremental (muddling through). Examples of the varying proposals for reforming the United Nations include Johan Galtung, *The United Nations Today: Problems and Some Proposals* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, Center for International Studies, Nov. 1986); Marc Nerfin, "The Future of the United Nations System: Some Questions on the Occasion of an Anniversary," *Development Dialogue* 1 (1985); Francis Wilcox and Carl Marcy, *Proposals for Changes in the United Nations* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1955); Douglas Williams, *The Specialized Agencies and the United Nations: The System in Crisis* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1987); Peter Fromuth, ed., *A Successor Vision* (Latham: University Press of America, 1988).

16. Richard Veatch, *Canada and the League of Nations* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 176; although, in 1929, Canada vigorously advocated (without success) a "transformational reform" proposal to delete Article 10 of the Covenant, the "collective security" clause. The fall-back was an amendment to amend Article 10, which failed in

strict procedural terms but in effect contributed to the elimination of the collective security function of the League (ibid., 72–90).

17. See ibid., 181–187, and S. Mack Eastman, *Canada at Geneva* (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1946).

18. Sanger, *Canadians*, 16–17. Chisholm also argued that the Charter could not "represent any final prescription by any means, because by the next generation human development will need to extend far beyond the limits prescribed in the present constitutions."

19. Frederic Soward and Edgar McInnis, *Canada and the United Nations* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1956), 186. The efforts of delegates such as Maurice Bourget and other Canadian representatives contributed to the adoption by ECOSOC of the following criteria to be used by specialized agencies for their priority setting: urgency, feasibility, scope, degree of preparation and coordination, and the possibility of concrete results.

20. Between 1945 and 1950 both the United States and the Soviet Union used their veto to block the admission of several states. For a full account of this, see John Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order*, vol. II (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 336–348; Goodrich et al., *Charter of the UN*, 86–89.

21. UN Document A/AC.80/L.3 and Add.1 and 2 and General Assembly Resolution 918 (x), 8 Dec. 1955. See Sanger, *Canadians*, 48–52.

22. The United States also threatened to cut its imports of oil from Canada for its stand on this issue (ibid., 50)!

23. St. Laurent, Pearson, Holmes, Martin, and Murray supported the new member principle, which was initially opposed by Ambassador Burt MacKay. It was also recognized that it would be impossible to allow certain states entry while denying others (*External Affairs* vii, Dec. 1955, 328–330).

24. Information in this paragraph from an interview with William Barton, 13 Dec. 1989.

25. Maurice Bertrand disagrees with this, arguing that "the process of reform has in the past been fostered by financial difficulties, the cyclical worsening of which is a permanent feature of the life of the organization" (Maurice Bertrand, "Can the United Nations be Reformed?" in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, eds., *United Nations, Divided World*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, 195–197).

26. Such as, for example, some of the ideas contained within a "successor vision."

27. Response by the Canadian government to General Assembly Resolution 2697 (XXV) A/8746, cited in von Riekhoff, "Canadian Attitudes," 3.

28. Interviews with Department of External Affairs officials.

29. Quoted in the *Globe and Mail*, 26 Dec. 1984. The role of mediator was explicitly advocated by External Affairs Minister Joe Clark in September 1984 (*Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 28 Sep. 1984).

30. By the end of June 1985, only 35.5 per cent of the expected financial contributions to the UN regular budget had been received. By the end of September another 18.1 per cent trickled in; 54 member states were still owing US$68.2 million of assessments from previous years (Frederick Lister, *Fairness and Accountability in UN Financial Decision-Making*, New York: United Nations Association of the United States of America, 1986, 5). The acuteness of this financial crisis was revealed by the UN Secretary-General in 1986. See United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, "Current Financial Crisis of the United Nations," A/40/1102 (12 Apr. 1986). See also Marjorie Anne Browne, *United Nations Reform: Issues for Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 6 Sep. 1988).

31. Based on a maximum 60 per cent possible withholding of the American contribution, and a 25 per cent American share of the budget.

32. United Nations, *Report of the High-level Intergovernmental Experts to Review the Efficiency of Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Nations*, A/41/40 (1986).

33. Interviews with Canadian officials in Ottawa and New York, Sep.–Oct. 1989. This view was also confirmed in an interview with the vice-chairman of the G18, Mr. Layachi

Yaker, 22 Nov. 1989, Paris. Various third world delegations shared the concern over Canadian sensitivity to the United States (interviews with New York-based diplomats, Aug. 1989).

34. Ambassador Gerard Pelletier, quoted in the *Globe and Mail*, 16 May 1983.

35. Interviews with External Affairs officials, Ottawa. As one New York diplomat put it, "Canada is not, and never has been, in support of zero budget growth" (interview, Oct. 1989). Another noted that "zero real growth is not a policy, but an admission of failure."

36. Interview with External Affairs official, Aug. 1989.

37. *Reform of the United Nations – Financial and Budgetary Questions* (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1987), 5. An alternative statement of its goals, which stresses fairness for member states, greater budgetary flexibility and transparency, and alleviation of the financial crisis, can be found in "Reform of the United Nations: Talking Points," Department of External Affairs, Files, *UN Reform*, 3 Jul. 1987.

38. Files, *UN Reform*, Department of External Affairs, and interviews with External Affairs officials.

39. Interviews with External Affairs officials, Sep.–Oct. 1989, Jan. 1990.

40. General Assembly Resolution A/42/225 (20 Apr. 1987), "Review of the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Nations: Questions Relating to the Programme Budget: Inflation and Currency Fluctuation, and the Level of the Contingency Fund."

41. See the proposals contained in the Secretary-General's 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992), and the speech by Canada's UN ambassador, Mme. Louise Frechette, to the General Assembly, 9 Oct. 1992.

42. This also included a tendency for some high-level Canadian officials to assume that reform was simply a problem of political leadership and staffing (interviews with External Affairs officials, Oct. 1989, Jan. 1990).

43. This was, of course, not the first effort towards ECOSOC reform, and others are noted by Maurice Bertrand, "The Role of the U.N. in Economic and Social Fields," in Fromuth, ed., *A Successor Vision*, 149–157.

44. The study was to tackle the support structures, including the agenda, calendars, and programmes of work of the General Assembly, ECOSOC, and other subsidiary bodies such as UNCTAD, UNDP, UNFPA, UNEP, UNCHS (Habitat), UNHCR, and the WFC.

45. It is interesting to note here that Canada was a prime mover behind the establishment of the ECOSOC. See Holmes, *Shaping of Peace*, vol. I, 269–275.

46. See the report of Ambassador Abdel Halim Badawi, Chairman of the Special Commission, to the first session of the ECOSOC, 13 May 1988.

47. "A Proposal for the Overall Organization of the Intergovernmental Structure and Functions in the Economic and Social Fields," Canadian paper to the Special Commission, 19 Nov. 1987.

48. The seven sectors were: Economic and Social World Watch, Economic Policy, Regular Economic Activities, Operational Activities, Human Development, Human Society, Human Environment (ibid., 11–14).

49. "Ideas and Suggestions in Reaction to the Proposals Presented by the Group of 77 and Other Countries," Canadian paper to the Special Commission, 5 Apr. 1988. The six new sectors were: Economic and Social Policy, Operational Activities, Regional, Environmental, Economic Technical and Functional, Social Technical and Functional (ibid., 12).

50. See E/1988/75 (June 1988), *Report of the Special Commission of the Economic and Social Council on the In-Depth Study of the United Nations Intergovernmental Structure and Functions in the Economic and Social Fields*, 22–34, 121.

51. This is also reflected in two internal statements of Canadian goals that argued Canada must retain its leadership role on institutional reform matters (Files, *UN Reform*, Department of External Affairs).

52. Files, *UN Reform*, Department of External Affairs, 29 Apr. 1988.
53. Files, *UN Reform*, Department of External Affairs, 11 Jan. 1988. This was echoed in an interview with a New York-based official.
54. Interview with K. Khaw, Chief, Programme Co-ordination and Evaluation Unit, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, Nov. 1989.
55. E/1988/75, 121.
56. Files, *UN Reform*, Department of External Affairs. The official also noted: ''we wonder about the broad brush approach that Canada appears (at least) to be taking in working towards an (apparent) de facto reworking of the UN system as a whole. There are ... real practical limits on how far the current shape and operation can be pushed.''
57. Canadian ambassador to the United States, Allan Gotlieb, quoted in the *Globe and Mail*, 30 Oct. 1983.
58. Letter from Minister for External Affairs Joe Clark, quoted in the *Winnipeg Free Press*, 11 Oct. 1984. Clark also singled out UNESCO for criticism in his September 1984 speech to the General Assembly.
59. There appear to have been mixed signals on this score, as the Minister of State for External Affairs appeared to take a stronger line that implied a threat to withdraw, before the prime ministerial clarification appeared (*Toronto Star*, 23 Oct. 1985, 10 Oct. 1985).
60. *Christian Science Monitor*, 6 Jul. 1987.
61. *Le Devoir*, 22 Feb. 1988; *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 21 Nov. 1987.
62. Canada also pushed for a coherent position on FAO reform within the Geneva Group after 1986, and it supported a 1986 Australian proposal in the Geneva Group to limit directors of UN agencies to two terms in office, which would have prevented Saouma from running for re-election. This initiative foundered on opposition from France and Italy. Files, *UN Reform*, Department of External Affairs.
63. Recommendations 15 and 37 of the G18 report.
64. A/42/234 (23 Apr. 1987). In his report, the Secretary-General called for greater and more effective use of universities, parliaments, NGOs, and the media as relay stations for United Nations bodies and agencies.
65. Interview with official of the Department of Public Information, Jul. 1989.
66. The *Globe and Mail*, 6 Nov. 1987, revealed that Canada supplemented her salary of C$90,000 by C$118,000. It also noted that she had spent roughly C$200,000 on outside consultants, many of whom were Canadians. See also ''Canada prods UN on Women's Status,'' *Vancouver Sun*, 22 Nov. 1986; ''Lewis wants Woman in UN Post,'' *Vancouver Sun*, 22 Nov. 1986.
67. Interview with a former DPI official, Jul. 1989.
68. Joint Inspection Unit, *Review of United Nations Public Information Networks: Reorganization of the Department of Public Information*, prepared by Alain Gourdon (Geneva: JIU, 1989), 39, 40.
69. The current head of DPI is Marco Vienello-Chiodo.
70. Interview with Canadian member of the UN Secretariat, 26 Jul. 1989.
71. Deborah Stienstra, ''A Feminist Perspective on the Canadian State at the International Level,'' *Resources for Feminist Research* 17 (1989), no. 3: 84. See also Department of External Affairs, *Annual Report, 1987/88* (Ottawa: External Affairs, 1988), 28.
72. ''Fourth Report of the Steering Committee for the Improvement of the Status of Women in the Secretariat,'' *Implementation of the Action Programme*, 30 Jun. 1988, 1. The percentage of women in posts subject to geographical distribution rose from 22.9 to 26.2 between March 1985 and March 1988, while the actual number of women in these posts declined from 708 to 668 over this period (ibid., 7). The opposition of some member states is noted in the Files, *UN Reform*, External Affairs.
73. *New York Times*, 17 Nov. 1992. The only Canadian woman currently in a high-level position is Elizabeth Dowdeswell in the UN Environmental Programme.
74. UN Document E/1987/15; also see Stienstra, ''Feminist Perspective,'' 84–85.

75. *Globe and Mail*, 5 Feb. 1989.
76. Stienstra, ''Feminist Perspective,'' 83–84.
77. For a comprehensive list see *Meeting New Challenges: Canada's Response to a New Generation of Peacekeeping*, report of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Ottawa, Feb. 1993, 67, 85–90.
78. See *Meeting New Challenges*; also *Peacekeeping: Norms, Policy and Process*, report of the 1993 peace-keeping symposium (Toronto: Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, 1993); Jack Granatstein, ''Peacekeeping: Did Canada Make a Difference? And What Difference Did Peacekeeping Make to Canada?'' in John English and Norman Hilmer, eds., *Making a Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1992), 222–236.
79. Details are provided in *Agenda for Peace*, paras. 69–74. For details of Canada's contributions see *Meeting New Challenges*, 57–64.
80. Details in Nancy Gordon and Bernard Wood, ''Canada and the Reshaping of the United Nations,'' *International Journal* 47 (Summer 1992), 479–503.
81. All citations from *Meeting New Challenges*, 81–82. See also the Canadian response to the *Agenda for Peace*, General Assembly, 47th session, 32nd plenary meeting, 9 Oct. 1992.
82. See Board of Inquiry, Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group, phase I, 31 Aug. 1993.
83. Africa Rights, ''Somalia: Human Rights Abuses by the United Nations Forces'' (London: Africa Rights, Jul. 1993), 29–30.
84. The most clear demonstration of this can be found in the House of Commons, Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, hearings on Canada's role in the United Nations, 18 Nov. 1992, 1, 3, 8, and 10 Dec. 1992, 17 Feb. 1993.
85. Interviews with External Affairs officials, Sep. 1989. An analysis of role call votes, however, may make this latter proposition debatable.
86. Michael Hawes, ''Principal Power, Middle Power, or Satellite? Competing Perspectives in the Study of Canadian Foreign Policy,'' Toronto: York University Centre for International and Strategic Studies, 1984, 3.
87. Files, *UN Reform*, Working Paper, Department of External Affairs, 1986.
88. Holmes, ''The UN in Perspective,'' 21.
89. Donini, ''Resilience and Reform,'' 289.
90. See ''Canada Adopts a New Tone at the UN,'' *Toronto Star*, 16 Oct. 1986.
91. Files, *UN Reform*, 27 Apr. 1988.
92. Gabriel Warren, ''What Went Right and What Went Wrong?'' in John Holmes et al., *No Other Way: Canada and International Security Institutions* (Toronto: Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, 1986), 56.
93. See ''Is Canada Wimping out at the United Nations,'' *Ottawa Citizen*, 21 Jan. 1989; ''Canada Accused of Giving up UN Influence, Reputation,'' *Ottawa Citizen*, 18 Oct. 1989. For an overview, see W. Andy Knight, ''Canada's Role in the UN Security Council: 1989–90,'' paper presented at a conference on Canadian federal policy, University of Waterloo, 10–11 May 1991.
94. *Toronto Star*, 14 Apr. 1989.
95. Holmes, ''The UN in Perspective,'' 21.
96. Dennis Stairs, ''The Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy,'' *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 15 (Dec. 1982), no. 4: 668.
97. Hawes, ''Principal Power,'' 3.
98. Stairs, ''Political Culture,'' 685.
99. Ambassador Gerard Pelletier, quoted in the *Globe and Mail*, 16 May 1983.
100. At that time, 81 per cent of Canadians polled had confidence that the new organization would be successful in keeping the peace (Clare Delbridge, ''Public Attitudes in Canada towards the United Nations,'' *Briefing paper no. 19*, United Nations Association of Canada, Dec. 1985, 3).
101. The specific breakdown was: 55 per cent ''very important,'' 39 per cent ''somewhat import-

ant" (*The Canadian Public and Foreign Policy Issues*, report prepared by Decima Research Limited for the Department of External Affairs, Aug. 1985, 111).

102. *The United Nations Study*, report prepared by Thompson Lightstone and Company for the Department of External Affairs, Dec. 1989; 40 per cent of respondents were "somewhat familiar" and 36 per cent "not very familiar" with the UN.

103. *The Gallup Report*, 21 Mar. 1985. In addition, the Decima poll found support for the UN among francophones to be much lower than among anglophones (38 per cent versus 60 per cent); Decima, *The Canadian Public*, 65.

104. Thompson Lightstone, *UN Study*, n.p.

105. The breakdown is 66 per cent "very important," 27 per cent "somewhat important" (*Perspectives on World Affairs and Foreign Policy Issues*, report prepared by Goldfarb Consultants for the Department of External Affairs, Aug. 1979, 28).

106. *Canadians' Attitudes to Foreign Policy Issues*, report prepared by Goldfarb Consultants for the Department of External Affairs, Jun. 1984, 10. The same poll found curiously that "ensuring that the United Nations treats all of its members according to the same standards" ranked *fourth*, with 68 per cent considering it "very important." This figure may reflect latent dissatisfaction with the UN.

107. *Canadians' Foreign Policy Attitudes*, report prepared by the Longwoods Research Group for the Department of External Affairs, Jun. 1987, 16. This figure compares with 54 per cent for "international peace," 45 per cent for "acid rain," and 35 per cent for "Third World poverty and hunger."

108. Goldfarb, *Perspectives*, 20; Goldfarb, *Canadians' Attitudes*, 10.

109. The average was: "good job," 34 per cent; "poor job," 33 per cent; "no opinion," 33 per cent (*The Gallup Report*, 18 Apr. 1985). A cross-national 1989 poll also demonstrated a systematic increase in support for the UN (*Globe and Mail*, Apr. 1990).

110. Ibid.; Jeffrey Laurenti, *The U.N. at a Watershed in U.S. Opinion*, report of the United Nations Association of the United States, 1989, 10.

111. Decima, *The Canadian Public*, 112.

112. Delbridge, "Public Attitudes," 1.

113. Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Competitiveness and Security* (Ottawa: DEA, 1985), 2.

114. An early statement on the role of interest groups in Canadian political life can be found in A. Paul Pross, ed., *Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1975). An overall assessment in the context of Canadian foreign policy is available in David Dewitt and John Kirton, *Canada as a Principal Power: A Study of Foreign Policy and International Relations* (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1983), chap. 5. See also Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, *The Domestic Mosaic: Domestic Groups and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985), for a compendium of foreign policy interest groups.

115. These distinctions are similar to Denis Stairs' division between politico-security and functional or issue-oriented interest groups, although in this case the term "politico-security" is decidedly too narrow. Denis Stairs, "Interest Groups in the Canadian Foreign Policy Process: A Changing Role?" in Don Munton, *Groups and Governments in Canadian Foreign Policy: Proceedings of a Conference* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1982), 5–9.

116. Dewitt and Kirton, *Canada as a Principal Power*, 179.

117. In 1990, External Affairs' disarmament fund provided C$158,799 in grants and other contributions to groups and individuals involved in arms control and disarmament issues. The Canadian Centre for Global Security was also granted C$100,000 for research purposes (Canada, Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Annual Report: 1990–91*, Ottawa: DEA, 1991, 49).

118. The Canadian Centre for Global Security has a Ford Foundation funded project; the CISS publishes a newsletter titled *Peacekeeping and International Relations*. University-based

research centres, such as the York Centre for International and Strategic Studies, have also been active in peace-keeping research. Interest groups have also lobbied for the creation of an international peace-keeping training centre.

119. Stairs, "Interest Groups," 8.

120. Ibid., 6.

121. The clippings are maintained by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto. The survey is restricted to files on Canadian policy towards, or activity at, the United Nations, and not the files that deal with various activities of the UN or specialized agencies without reference to Canada or Canadian policy. The newspapers surveyed are: *Toronto Star*, *Globe and Mail*, *Ottawa Citizen*, *Le Devoir*, *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, *Financial Post*, *New York Times*.

122. Research conducted between 1982 and 1984 found that, on most international issues, more than 8 of 10 Members of Parliament identified local and national Canadian newspapers as their principal source of information on international affairs and foreign policy, with some complementing that source with national radio and, occasionally, a news magazine. While those who identified themselves as having a special interest in foreign affairs and/or were members of relevant Standing Committees noted some additional knowledge base, even they acknowledged that there was insufficient time to secure the detailed information needed to develop real expertise. This situation may be improved now that Standing Committees have greater access to professional staff, expert witnesses, and foreign sources. See David B. Dewitt, "Canadian Parliamentarians and Foreign Policy: Where Is the Expertise?" unpublished paper, presented at a conference on Parliament and Foreign Affairs, 30 Apr. – 2 May 1984.

123. *Globe and Mail*, 30 Apr. 1985.

124. See, for example, "The UN's unpaid dues," *Globe and Mail*, 19 May 1986; "Reform, Don't Kill, UN Agency," *Toronto Star*, 9 May 1985.

125. See "Canada at the UN: A muffled voice in fast-changing times," *Ottawa Citizen*, 29 Dec. 1991; Knight, "Canada's Role."

126. For a general discussion of this see David Taras, "From Bystander to Participant," in David Taras, ed., *Parliament and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985), 3–19. The role of parliamentary committees is also low, and in recent years sustained attention has been focused only on particular issues such as Latin America or the Middle East.

127. The breakdown of 407 records was:

Very positive	(+2)	24
Positive	(+1)	85
Neutral	(0)	275
Negative	(−1)	15
Very negative	(−2)	8

128. The only potentially significant result is the near-total absence of negative references to the United Nations by the New Democratic Party.

129. Interview with Department of External Affairs official, Sept. 1989. Many non-American observers have noted that the high turnover of American officials, and their on-the-job training, result in a lack of preparation and poor negotiating skills for American proposals (interviews with New York-based officials, Aug. 1989).

130. Stairs, "Political Culture," 668, 685. See also the issue of *International Journal* devoted to "Domestic Sources of Canada's Foreign Policy," 39 (Winter 1983–84), no. 1.

131. Stairs, "Political Culture," 685.

132. As Thomas Hockin notes, "[our] tendency to put organization viability before purposes of organizations, our penchant to put ambiguity and peacekeeping in place of clear declaratory policy, our naive faith in the magic of negotiations: all these behaviour patterns flow genuinely from our domestic experience" ("Federalist Style in International Politics," in

Stephen Clarkson, ed., *An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada*? Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1968, 129).

133. Stairs, "Political Culture," 674; James Eayrs, *In Defense of Canada: Growing Up Allied* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 190–235. See also the memo by Lester Pearson and Brooke Claxton for the cabinet of 28 Dec. 1950.

134. Denis Stairs, *The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 312.

135. Denis Stairs, "Publics and Policy Makers: The Domestic Environment of Canada's Foreign Policy Community," *International Journal* 26 (Winter 1970–71), no. 1: 223–224; Gosselin, "Le Canada," 16; interviews with senior representatives from the third world on the Fifth Committee, Aug. 1989.

136. Peyton Lyon, "The Trudeau Doctrine," *International Journal* 26 (Winter 1970–71), no. 1: 26. For an examination of the diversified character of the Canadian polity see Douglas Verney, *Three Civilizations, Two Cultures, One State: Canada's Political Traditions* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1986).

137. This predates the *Agenda for Peace* initiatives. See, for example, the "Joint Appeal on Strengthening the United Nations," issued by the Canadian ambassador and seven colleagues (Argentina, Austria, Jordan, Malaysia, Senegal, Sweden, and Tanzania) of 27 Jun. 1985. It called explicitly for the Security Council to be strengthened to discharge more fully its "peace and security" responsibilities.

138. Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann, *A Diplomacy of Hope: Canada and Disarmament, 1945–1988* (Montreal: McGill–Queen's University Press, 1992).

139. Bernard Wood, *World Order and Double Standards: Peace and Security 1990–91* (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1991), 32.

140. John Meisel, "The Relationship Between Foreign Policy and the Domestic Political Culture in a Post-Meech, Post-Cold War, Canada," paper presented to the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Vancouver, Mar. 1991; cited in Gordon and Wood, "Canada," 503.

141. Gosselin, "Le Canada," translation by Keith Krause.

142. John Holmes, "Le Canada et les Nations Unies: hier et aujourd'hui," *Bulletin* (United Nations Association of Canada), 7 (Winter 1981–82), no. 4: 10. Cited in Gosselin, "Le Canada," 44.

143. See Dewitt and Kirton, *Canada*, passim.

144. Interview with External Affairs official, Aug. 1989.

145. As the 1970 White Paper argued: "l'adhesion aux organisations internationales n'est pas un fin en soi, et le Canada devra toujours s'efforcer de vérifier leur utilité et leur efficacité" (quoted in Gosselin, "Le Canada," 23).

146. "Reform of the UN: Canadian Position," Department of External Affairs, Files, *UN Reform*, 3 Jul. 1987.

147. Stephen Lewis, quoted in *Canada Reports* (Summer 1988), 4.

148. Gosselin, "Le Canada," 45.

149. This direction is provided in the various drafts of the paper written by Gene Lyons as the initial conceptual thrust of this multinational research undertaking. For the most recent version, see his "Reforming the United Nations," n.d.

150. Interview with James Jonah, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, New York, Jul. 1990. Also see John Gashko, "A World of Difference at the United Nations," *Washington Post*, 12 Nov. 1991.

5

France and the United Nations system

Marie-Claude Smouts

Introduction: The UN … what is it for?

In the long history of French foreign relations, the United Nations as an instrument of peace and international cooperation is a recent innovation. In its early years, the United Nations seemed to France to offer to be three things at one and the same time: a threat to avoid, an opportunity to seize, an instrument to use.[1] It was difficult to place great hopes in an organization made up of independent states, which are the ''least impartial and most self-interested'' of entities (Charles de Gaulle), and where European states were in the minority and France itself isolated. As to the future, who could predict what would transpire? Fifty years after its creation it is still not certain that its members know what they want to do with the United Nations.

It does not replace other methods of diplomacy and is far from being the major arena of multilateral activities, given the importance of the European Union (EU), the summits of the seven major industrialized countries (G7), and the Bretton Woods institutions. Above all, it has not modified the essential core of international relations with its precarious and often explosive combination of competition and cooperation. None the less, this universal and quasi-parliamentary organization has introduced a new dimension whose effects are difficult to measure and continue to surprise.

Each member state is permanently confronted with the totality of

186

states on the planet in an uninterrupted debate on almost all aspects of international relations, including those that it considers to be a matter for its exclusive jurisdiction. The fiction that the founders of the Charter entertained that foreign policy and international cooperation could be conducted separately from domestic politics (Article 2, para. 7) has been shattered; once there is a majority to put it on the agenda, no question escapes the attention of the organization. France has experienced the impact more than once. But it is difficult for a government to estimate what stakes are involved in debates in the United Nations. The effect is not necessarily immediate and the issues are often diffused and drawn out over a long period. The United Nations only partially fulfils the functions set down in the Charter and, at the same time, carries on activities that are not specified as such in the text and are implemented differently at different times. All of this complicates the calculation of the costs and benefits that can be expected.

The United Nations is the centre of the most massive exchange of information of all time and is at the heart of an institutional system whose ramifications touch almost all of human activities. It is also the only institution that can possibly assure at least a minimum of coordination in the efforts at collective action in the world. For some 20 years, a growing awareness of the need to regulate a certain number of problems that are vital to the future of humanity has reinforced the claim that the United Nations is an indispensable centre of discussion and cooperation leading to action for the common good. The large international conferences and the proliferation of centres, funds, and programmes linked to the United Nations are all evidence of this awareness.

Nevertheless, in actual negotiations and in the realm of ideas, the contribution of the United Nations is difficult to evaluate. The inconveniences of public diplomacy burden its work; for example, the difficulty of knowing whether speeches are directed at international public opinion or at friends or enemies; or propaganda that distorts the very object of discussion. Diplomacy through ''groups'' also impedes effective negotiation. If there is compromise, it is in the short run and about procedures, a formula, or over words rather than ideas. In the guise of negotiations, the majority uses its pressure to force the adoption of resolution after resolution without having the means to implement its policies and without any meaningful exchange of reciprocal concessions. These inefficiencies and the frequent lack of realism in UN debates explain, in part, why countries in the minority often ac-

cept defeat with a certain equanimity: their vital interests are rarely and only indirectly threatened.

Governments none the less remain vigilant since speechifying, posturing, and unfulfilled resolutions may indicate deep movements. Diplomacy through speechifying is not harmless, as France knows better than most, having been one of the targets in the long and tumultuous history that pitted the United Nations against the colonial powers and whose impact is still being felt. In no other field of activity was the United Nations better able to demonstrate its capacity for putting pressure on governments in the name of universal values than in decolonization. Legitimation of the struggles for national liberation and recognition of those who took up arms – the phenomenon that Inis Claude described so well as ''collective legitimation'' was well developed. On the initiative of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the United Nations granted privileges to liberation movements by permitting them to participate in the work of certain organs and giving them the status of observers. But France had already seen movements of what it considered to be terrorists and minorities recognized as legitimate with an international audience. Even more, in order to bypass the obstacle of Article 2, paragraph 7, the supporters of liberation movements, especially in the debates on Algeria, based their attack on the Charter provisions for human rights and the maintenance of peace and security (Article 11, para. 2, and Article 55). Over a period of seven years (1952–1959), France was accused of threatening the peace in all of North Africa and of demeaning the culture and dignity of the people whose affairs it administered. This was hard to take for the land of the Rights of Man! It is difficult to measure precisely the effects of these debates on the policy of decolonization, but it is certain that the role of censor exerted by the United Nations contributed to making exorbitant the political and moral cost of colonial domination.

The United Nations fulfils a very special function when it acts as a kind of opinion poll at the world level. For a state like France that seeks to play a world role but lacks the means of a superpower, prestige and moral position become the attributes of power. They give authority to what is said, encourage others to listen, and are instruments of influence. The United Nations serves as a ''diplomatic barometer.'' The French permanent mission pays great attention to every reflection on the image of France in the organization. Compared with the United Kingdom (the other European permanent

188

member of the Security Council), the United States, and the Scandinavian countries, France's record is credible and this is not without consequence since everything is, above all, symbolic in the United Nations and a vote on one subject can sanction or make up for a vote on an entirely different issue.

But how does information about status and image influence political choices? Most of the time, it is more significant for the professional staff than for their political masters. The United Nations is a very special social club with its own language, rites, and meanings. The games of the initiated often seem ridiculous, and outbursts during its proceedings often do not cross the East River and, positive or negative, are not reflected in bilateral relations. In contrast, when a question on the agenda directly affects their national interests, the French carefully prepare their case and seek support since the vote is an important test. Support and defections are taken seriously. Votes on colonial questions in the 1950s, on nuclear tests in the 1970s, and on New Caledonia in the 1980s were followed attentively and a careful count kept of otherwise "friendly" states that abstained or voted against the French position. The United Nations is thus a source of information on the way the winds are blowing in world opinion, on the margin of manoeuvre open to France, the support it can expect, the adversaries who need convincing, and the undecided who need to be wooed.

The pressures of the United Nations are not, in themselves, compelling. France has often resisted them. So long as a government feels strong and convinced that its position is solid, it can remain deaf to what is presented as the opinion of the world community but, from its view, has no legitimate basis. When doubt begins to creep in, however, when domestic opinion begins to withdraw support, when national feelings become divided, then the pressures exerted through the United Nations add to internal constraints and, at a given moment, make the price of maintaining the status quo prohibitive. This was the experience of the USSR in Afghanistan, South Africa in Namibia, Israel in the occupied territories, just as it had been the experience of France in the 1950s.

Since the passing of the great wave of decolonization, the United Nations has not found any grand design to replace it. The process through which a majority expresses the values of world society and transforms political claims into ethical and then juridical principles by repetition and insistence, by a kind of incantation, could succeed only because the superpowers were in agreement and the colonial

189

powers were not sure of themselves. It has only partially succeeded in other cases: the fight against racial discrimination, the Law of the Sea, the right of development. Once, following decolonization and continuing throughout the 1970s, the great hopes of constructing a New International Economic Order (NIEO) were dissipated, the UN "machine" seemed to become less significant. The North–South impasse, the stalemates in regional conflicts, the disarray among the countries of the third world, the blows struck by the Reagan administration, all of these combined to smother the organization in pessimism.

Then, at the end of the 1980s, certain changes, especially the new Soviet policies, combined to bring about a fresh start for the organization, at least in one of its major missions: the settlement of international conflicts. Afghanistan, the Iran–Iraq war, the Western Sahara, Central America, Cambodia – the United Nations is being called on from all sides. Its usefulness in terminating local conflicts is once more demonstrated. As a permanent member of the Security Council, France can only be pleased with this turn of events.

The United Nations in French diplomacy

France has never been able to accept the loss of its status as a great power. Although it does not have the capabilities of a world power, France still claims its "rank" on the international scene – it claims to have global ambitions and to carry a universal message. An active and efficient United Nations in which it could play an acknowledged role is consistent with France's interests. Multilateralism maximizes its assets: it allows it to reach beyond a regional role, to express its views, to display its skill. This is the reason France has always been very sensitive about the prerogatives of the Security Council and it strongly supports any move toward a strengthening of this UN body as long as France thereby enjoys all the privileges of a permanent member. But it currently has to face a new question: how far can the Security Council extend its authority, under the predominance of the United States, without thwarting France's free will and own interests?

The United Nations is, at one and the same time, *an embryo of an organized community and an instrument of foreign policy for its members*. France, like all states, tries to maintain a balance between the needs of international cooperation and the free determination of its own goals. This has proved to be difficult at times, especially when, against its will, key issues in its foreign policy have come up for dis-

cussion before the organization, not the least the administration of its overseas territories and its defence policy. In the early years, the functions of the United Nations – information, collective legitimation, regulation – worked more to the disadvantage of France than of other members, superpowers or small states, and, in its eyes, placed it in a more critical position. From that point, the interest of France in the organization began to fade and its attitude became one of open hostility.

1945–1965: A turbulent learning period

The French position on the United Nations was, for a long time, a product of the converging constraints of the Cold War and colonial conflicts. But, on these two issues, the French felt the United Nations to be of little usefulness. During the early years of the Cold War, the United States dominated the United Nations as it dominated the Western world. Although not all votes in the organization necessarily went the way the Americans wanted, when a question interested them or when they decided to support a position actively, they could gain a majority. Moreover, they defined the values and the goals of the organization: the fight against "ideological expansion" and "communist subversion"; safeguarding the "universal ideals" threatened by the USSR and the Cominform. This concept of the United Nations rang true with France, where a strong Communist Party existed with the support of the Soviets and where the outburst of nationalism in the third world was largely attributed to the manipulations of international communism. To the extent that the United Nations participated in defence of the "free world," France could only be supportive and take advantage of the world forum to denounce violations of human rights in the Eastern countries.

At the same time, UN military intervention was based either on the armed forces of the United States (Korea), or on superpower connivance (Suez), or on the determination of the Secretary-General (Congo). This was a far cry from the idea of a "directorate" foreseen in the Charter, where the permanent members of the Security Council would share responsibility for the maintenance of peace! As the price of Western solidarity, France resigned itself to a slow shift of the centre of decision-making from the Council to the General Assembly and the Secretariat (Res. 377(V)). This shift from the arrangements defined at San Francisco not only undermined France's prerogatives as a permanent member, but also allowed its own policies to

come under critical examination, as was the bitter experience of the Suez affair. Relegated to a secondary position when it came to dealing with the great issues that divided East from West, France resented being then pushed onto centre stage over issues that it believed were beyond the authority of the General Assembly. As a result, it was embarrassed and often acted in a contradictory way: UN intervention was accepted in all issues that protected the system of Western values against communism, but was rejected when it encouraged a new definition of freedom and human rights in non-self-governing territories.

During the 1950s, unable to choose between following its own overseas policy and maintaining international support, especially the support of the United States, which had granted France several loans during the colonial wars, France was stuck in a defensive position, characterized by a rigid legalism and a large number of abstentions. But it played the game. To avoid having the problems of North Africa (Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria) complicated by UN intervention, the delegation battled, discussed, and argued. On questions that did not immediately affect its national interests, France tried to play a mediating role, based as much as possible on facts and law. This deliberately technical position brought its representatives a certain amount of estime in the organization, but it emphasized how the status that France had regained in 1945 was only symbolic. Either the American–Soviet split paralysed the Security Council and reduced France to the role of a spectator as powerless as any small country in the General Assembly, or the USSR and the United States found a minimum basis of agreement to enable the United Nations to act, with France afraid of being the target.

All of these issues combined to exasperate Charles de Gaulle with the United Nations when he came to power in 1958. The General had nothing but contempt for parliamentary games, rejected any outside interference, and saw international relations in terms only of a concert among great powers. He had two main objectives: to settle the Algerian question and to restore France to its "rightful place" in the world. For the first of these, the United Nations was of no use. In the enormous risk that he was taking – to bring Algeria to self-government and independence without either secession overseas or a civil war at home – to fight for a vote here and a vote there in the United Nations was an exercise in folly. If France was to grant independence, it would do it alone, freely, and because it had chosen to do so. As for the second aim, there was a role for the United Nations, but only if

192

the voice of France was not drowned by a flood of "invective and insults" and if the Security Council began to exercise its proper responsibilities.

Since these conditions could not be fulfilled, the United Nations had to step aside, and de Gaulle made it quite clear by scorning, in turn, the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Secretary-General, the three principal organs of the United Nations. From 1958, France stopped participating in debates on the Algerian issue and, from 1960, no longer took part in the general debate that opened each session of the General Assembly. In the Security Council, it watched the response to the Congo crisis with increasing hostility, disapproving of what was done in both substance and form and abstaining but never using the power of the veto. At the same time, France refused to pay its assessed contribution for the operation. The events in Bizerte in 1961 brought the crisis with the United Nations almost to a point of no return. The Council schedules a meeting; France does not attend. A special session of the General Assembly is called; the French mission openly leaves New York. As for Dag Hammarskjöld, disdained because he dared give advice on what needed to be done in Guinea and Tunisia, for his broad vision of the United Nations, and for his ambitious interpretation of the role of the Secretary-General, he suffered the worst of insults. Add to all of this a deliberate campaign of sarcasm and mockery against "the so-called United Nations," which is "whipped up by frenetic and fanciful movements."

The General, moreover, could not care less if this "ivory tower policy" embarrassed the friends of France in the United Nations and weakened France's position. He meant to show the world the unwavering character of a France in charge of its own destiny. It was a strong position that went beyond being firm on the Algerian question and, in the context of the tensions outside and the divisions inside the country, the General began to do battle on another front: the development of a French nuclear weapon and building a national deterrent capability. Here, too, since a majority in the United Nations denounced French nuclear tests, the organization was little more than a nuisance. The opposition, moreover, was perceived as part of a vast movement orchestrated by the existing nuclear powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom) to prevent France from achieving the "supreme expression of power." The scorn was even greater since, in form and substance, disarmament talks were viewed more and more as an American–Soviet exercise

to retain their own supremacy. For that reason, from 1962 France refused to sit on the Commission on Disarmament that met in Geneva.

So long as France remained weak, the United Nations was seen as *a nuisance without any redeeming features*. In contrast, when the Algerian War was ended, the nuclear force built, and the domestic political system stabilized, France resumed the place in the organization that it had never completely abandoned. The decolonization of black Africa and the beginning of a *détente* between East and West after the Cuban missile crisis opened up new opportunities. France began to build up a clientele. The world organization to which new states were so attached now offered France a public of small and medium powers who were tired of a paralysing bipolarity and ready to applaud a voice that denounced domination by the superpowers, rejected American hegemony, and spoke of the independence and dignity of nations. On the one hand, the new and very prudent Secretary-General brought the United Nations back to practices more in line with the Charter, and the Security Council returned to its position as primary organ in matters of peace and security. On the other hand, policies that could be termed ''neutralist'' and were oriented in the direction of the third world coincided with the emergence of a North–South framework for UN politics that France encouraged. It opened up a special role for France: a great power speaking for the third world.

1965–1987: A period of quiet participation

The short period from 1965 to 1970 was a golden age in relations with the United Nations. France enjoyed considerable prestige, which was hardly justified by the very conservative position that it took on apartheid in South Africa and on the Portuguese colonies or by its refusal to help the United Nations out of its financial difficulties. In most other respects, France's positions coincided with those of the new majority: condemnation of the American intervention in the Dominican Republic (1965); condemnation of Israeli policy (1967); an emphasis on economic issues and the need to organize world commodity markets. In order to strengthen its relations with the non-aligned countries, France used the United Nations to test world opinion. What a turnabout! But the success of this diplomacy rested on the immense prestige of an exceptional man and the magic of words when "tone" was all. In truth, the interests of France could not completely coincide with those of the non-aligned states, and, from the

early 1970s, the contradictions became increasingly evident. Once again France found itself on the defensive – for its relations with South Africa and its nuclear tests. And once again it had to fight to limit the right of the United Nations to intervene in the evolution of its overseas territories.

France never stopped being vigilant about what the United Nations was doing. But a major change took place in its relations with the organization: it no longer emphasized UN actions, whether positive or negative. The French worked and took their place quietly. The reconciliation with the United Nations, moreover, became complete when France made a voluntary contribution to help the world organization meet its financial crisis. It was something of a welcome gift to Kurt Waldheim, who had just been elected, and opened a new era of peaceful cooperation, without either grandiose schemes or special fears.

Despite certain sensitive issues that periodically made life difficult for its representatives, France had no major quarrel with the United Nations, but simply accepted the organization as a reflection of the problems it faced in international relations. France was pragmatic, taking the United Nations as a fact of life that one needed to deal with. To love the United Nations or not to love the United Nations was not the question. The United Nations existed, it could be useful, and it needed to be used. When France found itself taken to task for its nuclear tests, for economic relations with South Africa, or for Mayotte or New Caledonia, its representatives responded, point by point, argued the case, and counter-attacked if necessary.

This pragmatism was certainly facilitated by the fact that the stakes involved were not especially important. Until the end of the 1980s, the United Nations had lost a good deal of its "punch." The plethora of recommendations voted but never implemented by the Security Council as well as the General Assembly, the attention given to matters of procedure, the lack of truly original ideas emerging from its debates – more and more the United Nations was not taken too seriously. The French people have always been poorly informed about their country's activities at the United Nations and this helped their government view the organization philosophically! But the stakes were also different from what they had been earlier. In the 1950s, France had tried desperately to slow down a really relentless process of decolonization. In the early 1960s, its aim was to insist on its right to decide on its defence structure and its relations with its overseas territories without outside interference. For some 20 years after that,

the situation was altogether different. On issues that could be embarrassing, France either had a certain margin for manoeuvre, or was not alone, or else its position was better understood.

Whatever the case, France no longer took an unfavourable vote as a crippling blow to its position. It learned how to discern, beneath the coded gestures, the real questions that were being asked about the great issues of the time: nuclear proliferation, disarmament, the future of the south Pacific, of southern Africa, etc. It understood, for example, that the votes on nuclear testing in the Pacific reflected the feelings of the people in the region. Whether they were spontaneous or artificially provoked, they were a fact that France needed to take into consideration in its relations with the states in the area. If there was no question of halting tests that were still necessary to establishing the credibility of its strategy of deterrence, on at least two occasions France was forced to show its good will: in 1974, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing ordered an earlier end to a series of tests in the atmosphere than the military experts wished; and in 1989, the Prime Minister announced a reduction in the number of annual underwater tests. Parallel to diplomatic moves at the bilateral and regional levels, France argued its case at the United Nations, increased scientific research, and tried to convince and assure others that the tests held no dangers for the people in the region. In April 1992, France announced a suspension of all its nuclear tests.

The United Nations is one among many instruments in the broad arsenal of world diplomacy. For the majority of states that cannot afford to establish embassies throughout the world, it is a significant instrument of socialization. It is there that they carry out their foreign policy and receive their diplomatic training and their information about the international system. How can one deal with these states in bilateral or regional relations, but refuse to heed what they say in the world organization? The issue of sanctions against South Africa was, perhaps, the most difficult in this regard. Of the 17 vetos registered by France until 1989, 9 came between 1975 and 1981 against mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa for its policy of apartheid and illegal occupation of Namibia. Certainly France was not alone and voted with the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany when they were members of the Council (1981). But doing so opposed France to the African group with which it sought to develop close relations but which comprised the principal opposition to the regime in Pretoria. It was also in contradiction with the effort to pur-

196

sue a policy in which France leaned toward the third world and served as an ardent advocate of human rights. The condemnations that were regularly voted at the end of the 1970s showed how these contradictions tarnished France's image and enfeebled its relations with Africa. France was no more harshly attacked than the United States and the United Kingdom, but it had more to lose. While continuing to refuse mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter, France began to ease its position and accept partial sanctions. In 1977, it participated in laborious negotiations that led to a unanimous vote by the Council on an arms embargo against South Africa (Res. 418/1977), which France then claimed never to have violated.

In 1985, a new phase started. In 1983, France had suspended its participation in the so-called "contact group" on Namibia in protest against the linkage established by the United States and South Africa between the settlement of the Namibian issue and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. France was also irritated that the negotiations on the Western side were increasingly monopolized by the United States. France had always rejected the idea of economic sanctions over the Namibian question in order to avoid tying up the negotiations and to maintain flexibility.

For the first time, on 19 June 1985, France voted for a resolution calling for voluntary sanctions against Pretoria (Res. 566), while the United States and the United Kingdom abstained. Moreover, to protest against a state of emergency proclaimed in South Africa, which aroused great anger and renewed criticisms from the left about what was considered as excessive complaisance on the part of the government, France took the initiative to propose a resolution before the Security Council that included the following measures: the suspension of all new investment in South Africa; the suspension of the sale of computer equipment that could be used by the South African army or police; the forbidding of any transactions involving nuclear materials; and a series of financial restrictions. While these did not involve overall economic sanctions, they were not far off. After that, in contrast with the United States and the United Kingdom, France no longer used its veto when the question of mandatory sanctions was raised in the Security Council but rather abstained in the voting.[2] Indeed, this position did not change during the two-year period (from March 1986 to May 1988) when the conservatives were in power in France. Like several European countries, France did not favour complete mandatory sanctions, which it probably could not

have implemented with all French corporations and which would have meant a complete break with Pretoria. Instead, it tried to involve the European Economic Community in a policy of voluntary sanctions and, in its bilateral as well as multilateral relations, increased its active hostility to apartheid until the new course in South Africa's policy in the early 1990s.

Among the difficult issues that at any moment could become explosive, the most sensitive are those that touch upon French sovereignty in its overseas territories. Even though the inhabitants of Mayotte have chosen to remain French rather than be integrated into the Comoros, the General Assembly has regularly launched an appeal, however moderate, that the problem be settled "in accordance with the political unity and territorial integrity of the Comoros." Regularly France insists that the resolution is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter and votes "no," while taking care to argue that the fundamental right of people to self-determination has been respected. And so it has gone since 1977.[3] The question of the scattered islands in the Channel of Mozambique has also been regularly raised, but the antagonism of neighbouring states has shortened the debate.

More serious has been the question of New Caledonia, where France has had to battle its case with vigour but where, nevertheless, the confrontation has not degenerated into an open crisis with the United Nations. On the contrary, it has shown how, by "playing the game" at the United Nations, by defending a position that is supported by domestic opinion and is well understood in the affected territory, such an issue could be diffused. On 2 December 1986, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 41/41/A, affirming "the inalienable right of the people of New Caledonia to self-determination and independence" by a vote of 89 to 24 with 11 abstentions. A year later a similar resolution (42/79) was voted 69 to 27 with 47 abstentions and 13 absences, thus winning with fewer votes than the total of those opposing and refusing to take part. Given the customs of the United Nations, the permanent delegation had to be satisfied! In 1988, the Fourth Committee adopted a very moderate resolution requesting all parties to continue discussions and refrain from any act of violence, which was not even raised in the plenary session. What had happened in the interim had been the negotiation of the "Matignon Agreements." None the less, the territory is on the list of the Special Committee on Colonialism (Committee of 24) and the issue could come up at any time, especially if there is renewed violence in

198

the archipelago. In this part of the world, France is under surveillance by the United Nations, which, in turn, reflects the views of the members of the Pacific Forum. But the experience has shown that it is better to participate in the debates, argue the case, and vote rather than to take refuge in a haughty but ineffective legalism. For that matter, the short-term costs in the organization are not very high.

In relations with the organization, the ratio of costs to benefits works out positive. Until recently, the United Nations used not to be expensive, financially or politically. Since 1988, the French contribution has been completely paid up. The French pay 6 per cent of the regular budget of the organization. France ranks fifth among contributors, which gives it a certain status without excessive cost. At the same time, it makes early payment on its contribution – in January – and thus demonstrates its support for the system. Nevertheless, it is clear that, if France were not a permanent member of the Security Council, the cost–benefit ratio might be reversed and interest in the organization seriously diminished.

New times, new challenges

In the past few years, since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations' peace-keeping ambitions and scope have expanded tremendously. French diplomacy has welcomed and supported this trend towards an enhancement of UN intervention through a more active role for the Secretary-General and the Security Council, coercive actions with economic sanctions and the use of force, humanitarian interventions, preventive deployment of military forces, and so on. France acts as if the United Nations might be becoming the guarantor of the new international system under the leadership of a few reliable and mighty states. It acts on the assumption that what reinforces the United Nations' capabilities reinforces France's international status.

This policy entails new risks and contradictions. On the one hand, it gives France an opportunity to play a regulating role in regional conflicts and the international system that a medium-sized power could not play alone. On the other hand, it links France's prestige both to the policy of the leading country in the United Nations – the United States – and to the success or failure of the world organization. The paradox is: in order to be able to express its own views on international affairs, France has to keep its permanent seat on the Security Council, but to keep its permanent seat it has to make con-

cessions and to rally to the view of the dominant power! The 1991 Gulf War was illustrative in this respect: although France did not entirely share US views, it had only a slight chance of being heard. After hesitation, it displayed total solidarity with its mighty ally. The French permanent mission was very active in toning down the most strongly worded passages of the resolutions passed, but it could contribute only cosmetic improvements. The only French resolution adopted during the conflict was Resolution 688, allowing the creation of safe havens for the Kurdish population.

Since 1991, France has ventured far down the road in large-scale peace-keeping missions. It is the biggest provider of troops to the UN forces, with more than 9,000 soldiers. In 1993, it was involved in eight operations on the ground; and its share of the UN peace-keeping budget was 7.6 per cent. But the very mitigated achievements so far – not to say failure – in former Yugoslavia or in Somalia have discredited the whole notion that the United Nations can effectively deal with civil war and ethnic conflicts. The success of the operation in Cambodia, in which France played a significant part, has been eclipsed by criticisms over the lack of a plausible strategy to halt "ethnic cleansing" and military abuses. As the credibility of the United Nations is questioned, the fact of placing French capabilities at the service of the world community essentially through the United Nations has become more and more questionable.

French policies at the United Nations

The domestic environment

French policies at the United Nations respond to changes in the international system as reflected in the organization and very rarely to considerations from the domestic order. Few constraints are imposed by domestic forces, so that the government enjoys considerable flexibility in the choice of both the goals that will be pursued and the means used to achieve them. Opinion about the United Nations is indifferent because it is ill informed and political parties are little interested. General sentiment is somewhat positive in the abstract, but suspicious when it comes to national interests. If there are any who are well disposed or particularly attached to the United Nations, they are not organized as pressure groups or as effective interests within political parties. Disapproval and support can be found on both the left and the right.

200

In France there are no movements that can be called either "pro-" or "anti-United Nations." The French United Nations Association is known only within a limited public. It had a brief spurt of activity in 1960–1961 to try to improve relations between France and the United Nations and proposed a series of reforms that were discussed in academic circles.[4] But these efforts came to nothing and, after 1962, reverted to inertia. Despite a brief push by François Mitterrand (in what is typically the way the French work, the president of the UNA is appointed by the head of state!), the UNA has not recovered and whatever activities it sponsors have remained largely unknown.

One exception was a public opinion poll in 1985, more than 15 years after a previous poll in 1969.[5] It should be pointed out that these two polls are the only ones ever conducted in France on the United Nations itself. Usually, the issue does not interest the media. French opinion about the United Nations can be tapped only through questions inserted here and there in polls taken on broader subjects. The 1985 poll found that a majority of the French considered the United Nations to be effective in the maintenance of peace (51 per cent), slightly less in assistance to the third world (48 per cent) and the protection of human rights (45 per cent). A similar majority thought that the United Nations "does not have sufficient power" (51 per cent), against 7 per cent who believed it has "too much power" and 29 per cent "sufficient powers."

If France had to participate in actions to maintain the peace abroad, 55 per cent of those polled considered it preferable that it be within, rather than outside (20 per cent), the United Nations. *Yet only 1 per cent thought that the United Nations is useful to France.* On the question, "Which states profit the most from the UN?", the answers were varied. While 27 per cent said "all states equally," 26 per cent said the third world, 20 per cent the United States, and only 1 per cent France. The idea that the United Nations could play a role in settling the problems of New Caledonia was rejected by 55 per cent against 30 per cent. Moreover, if the United Nations were to get involved in the issue, 50 per cent thought that it would be "somewhat unhelpful," 31 per cent "somewhat helpful," and 19 per cent had no views. In sum, *the United Nations is useful for others but not for us.* France should participate in UN action in issues of peace and security, but the United Nations should not intervene in issues affecting France.

The mixture of support and cynicism is not new. An American research project, conducted from 1954 to 1961, on the opinion of the

French élite about the United Nations had already identified this same absence, at one and the same time, of both hostility and interest. In 1961, the United Nations was considered less important for France than for Europe, Franco-German relations, and the Atlantic Alliance, but nevertheless seen as "the most desirable form of transnational community."[6]

In the past few years, things have changed slightly.[7] The French would still probably not accept direct UN intervention in their internal affairs, but they are in favour of a strengthening of the United Nations (86 per cent in March 1991) and they approve the use of French troops in Europe when deployed under the auspices of the United Nations to enforce international law (82 per cent in May 1991). During the Gulf War, the French were very sceptical about the so-called "new world order" hailed by President Bush (36 per cent). However, a large majority (71 per cent) agreed with Resolution 678 authorizing the use of force against Iraq; this was smaller than in England (74 per cent) but more than in all the other European countries. In the same polls, opinion was that French troops had to be placed under UN command (58 per cent), not US command (14 per cent), and not even French command (21 per cent). France's image of itself as a great diplomatic power when acting through the United Nations is quite new in its political culture. The time for "France alone" indeed seems to be over.

This does not mean that the French are very aware of how the UN machinery functions. Generally, foreign policy and international diplomacy are perplexing for the majority of the French and of little interest to them. They are subjects considered technical and unintelligible and thus best left to specialists. The complexity of UN politics adds to the difficulties. The media have enormous problems in presenting, in brief and comprehensible form, the grinding on of the UN machinery, the drawing out of its deliberations, and the real impact of its work. Of all the daily newspapers, only *Le Monde* covers the United Nations regularly and provides a summary of its activities. At the same time, the monthly *Le Monde Diplomatique* periodically carries retrospective articles on important UN problems like the financial crisis or reform, including occasional pieces by specialists like Maurice Bertrand. On the radio, "France Culture" about once a year will broadcast an early morning programme on the United Nations, and, when an important event has taken place, an expert might be interviewed for two or three minutes on the mid-day news. For someone who has a real desire to know what is going on at the

United Nations, it is not impossible to do so, but a sizeable effort must be made!

Action by private groups that might influence the government on UN issues remains limited. Unlike the United States and the United Kingdom where the great foundations, the churches, and other private associations play an important role in politics and society, French political culture provides only a modest place for non-governmental organizations (NGOs). There is nothing like the peace movement or the ecological movement. When France confronts groups like these in connection with UN activities on disarmament, nuclear weapons, or the south Pacific, it is usually as foreign adversaries rather than pressure groups operating within domestic policy processes.

Nevertheless, French NGOs do work closely with the government in three areas: humanitarian assistance, development, and human rights. The General Assembly resolution of 8 December 1988 on "humanitarian assistance" originated with a well-known French group "Médecins du Monde," before being formally proposed by the French delegation. Every month the UN desk at the Quai d'Orsay meets with 25 NGO members in a consultative committee on human rights, and NGOs help define the approach that France takes on the issue of development assistance. This collaboration contributes to what have become distinctive French themes: emphasis on the least developed countries, and the fight against extreme poverty, for example. There is more complementarity and synergy between the NGOs and the French administration than there is criticism and pressure.

It is in the schools of law, moreover, that international organizations, in general, and the United Nations, in particular, constitute a major interest in both teaching and research. Political scientists and specialists in foreign policy are not interested in the United Nations and essentially leave the whole field to their colleagues in international law, who have made important contributions. Examples include the work of Guy Ladreit de la Charrière and Michel Virally, the commentary on the UN Charter edited by Jean-Pierre Cot and Alain Pellet,[8] the first since the classic work by Goodrich and Hambro, and the major work on contemporary problems of the United Nations carried out under the auspices of the French Society for International Law.[9] There is also the significant *Annuaire français de droit international* in which one finds "everything": in-depth analyses, summaries of written and oral questions raised by members of

the *Parlement* on French positions in the United Nations, a chronicle of UN activities, the codification of international law, and a remarkable bibliography – among other things.

It is the diplomats themselves, however, who essentially keep others, including scholars, informed about the usefulness of the United Nations for French foreign policy. By their participation in seminars and conferences, by sharing their experience through written and oral presentations, and by their willingness to meet with scholars and facilitate their research, those who are assigned to the permanent missions in New York and Geneva and in the Foreign Ministry in Paris, especially retired ambassadors, are the best advocates for the United Nations.

Interestingly enough, recent studies on defence and strategy commissioned by the Ministry of Defence have devoted considerable attention to the rethinking of the army's missions in the post–Cold War era and to the prospects for international peace-keeping through the United Nations. Here the United Nations' role is scrutinized closely. Moreover, some generals who were former commanders of peace-keeping forces in Cambodia or in Bosnia no longer hesitate to say openly what they think about the United Nations, its cumbersome bureaucracy, and its lack of consistency. A new appraisal of the United Nations is about to come from unexpected circles.

Instructing delegations: Preparation and application

The Constitution of 1958 and the powers of control over nuclear weapons have made the President of the Republic the main decision maker in matters of foreign policy.[10] Except during those very peculiar so-called "power-sharing" (*cohabitation*) periods when the President does not have a parliamentary majority (1986–1988; April 1993–), the President sets the priorities and closely follows those issues that are his private preserve: African affairs, strategic questions, and East–West relations. He becomes involved in the details of negotiations in the United Nations only when basic French policies are in question before the Security Council: policies in areas like southern Africa, the Middle East, or the Persian Gulf. He may, however, choose to lay down the direction to take on economic and social issues when the stakes are clearly political, as was the example on policies on commodities at UNCTAD I or, more recently, on issues of human rights and humanitarian aid.

But, above all, the President sets the tone. Just as General de

Gaulle, as we have seen, was critical, so President Pompidou moved, discreetly, to reconcile France with the United Nations. His successors, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and François Mitterrand, avoided criticism while trying to heighten regard for the organization, each enjoying close relations with the Secretary-General. Also, the podium of the General Assembly, for the first time since Pierre Mendès France spoke there in 1954, became important enough for the head of state to use it as a forum for a major policy statement: in 1978 on disarmament, in 1988 on chemical weapons, the international debt issue, and a new approach to the problems of the third world, and in 1990 on the Persian Gulf crisis. More than any President before him, François Mitterrand has used the platform of the United Nations, the Assembly, UNCTAD, and others to make major political statements and, in this way, demonstrate the value that France accords to the UN system.

Two of his Prime Ministers have also taken special care to show their interest in the work of the United Nations: Pierre Mauroy in speaking before the General Assembly in 1982 and Michel Rocard, in an unusual move, appearing before the Commission on Human Rights in February 1989. Traditionally the Prime Minister is less directly involved than the President in the policies pursued at the United Nations, intervening only when financial issues arise or when there are domestic interests at stake such as commerce or industry or discussions about the transfer of technology. It was just these conditions that led to the Prime Minister providing very precise instructions to the French permanent representative in the case of South Africa in 1985. But, in contrast to European affairs, where coordination comes through the Prime Minister's office (specifically through the Secretariat for inter-ministerial cooperation), coordination in UN affairs is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It is up to the Quai d'Orsay to be sure that the French position is consistent within the different forums of the United Nations and over time. Precedent is a powerful factor in UN politics, and abrupt changes in policies only weaken the status of a state. The position taken at a given moment must be consistent with earlier positions, even when there has been a change in political leadership in the government. The instructions issued at the beginning of a General Assembly are illustrative: they are a collection of precedents, a veritable history of each item on the agenda. The Bureau for the United Nations and International Organizations is the centre of information-gathering and coordination. While France belongs to some 120 organ-

izations, the Bureau follows the activities of some 90 with 20 staff members. International organizations have multiplied and the number of conferences greatly expanded, but the staff has not been increased for 20 years, remaining under the direction of an officer at ambassadorial rank with a deputy director who, together, must keep track of all the questions that involve the United Nations.

The UN Bureau acts as a liaison office between the ministry and French delegations throughout the United Nations and the specialized agencies, especially administering both the mandatory and voluntary contributions to UN programmes. It is also the link between the functional bureaux of the ministry (political affairs, of which it is a part, legal affairs, economic affairs, and cultural affairs) and the geographic bureaux, receiving reports from all the missions, analysing and transmitting them to other offices in the ministry, and then assembling comments and reactions into new instructions. Certain subjects, especially the periodic conferences of the major specialized agencies, require lengthy and serious consultation. Most of the time instructions must first be submitted to the secretary-general of the ministry as well as to the minister's office, if not to the minister himself. The presidential office at the Elysée, as we have noted, makes the final decision only in the most difficult questions. Although the system is rather cumbersome, it still works and assures both vertical and horizontal coordination.

Generally the Bureau has no political influence, but neither is it simply a post office. With the expertise that it can mobilize, it has the task, together with the permanent missions, of finding the most effective way to apply French policies, as defined by higher authority, in order that they can be understood and supported at the United Nations.

Decision-making varies according to the problem and its urgency. In all cases, the permanent mission plays a key role in initiating and executing policies. In continual contact with Paris, it keeps the government informed about what is happening at the United Nations, presents its analysis of the stakes involved and of possible outcomes, and makes recommendations on the positions that should be taken. When questions are before the Security Council, they usually involve highly political issues on which decisions must be made rapidly. Given the time difference, the permanent representative must decide for himself what level of government needs to be consulted: the secretary-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? The minister himself? The Prime Minister? The President? In seeking instruc-

206

tions, the permanent representative may not recommend any particular position, but may still influence the decision by the views that he expresses.

In the case of the General Assembly, ECOSOC, or UNCTAD, there is less of a time factor and the process is somewhat different. Before any session opens, positions on each item on the agenda are prepared in Paris and assembled in a book of instructions that is used by the delegates as a guide. At the same time, during the session there are daily discussions with Paris when decisions are reviewed. Under the direction of the permanent representative, the mission has a certain flexibility. Once the major parameters of policy are clear, it has the latitude to choose the best way of following its instructions in the situation that it faces. When it states that it is taking a position "without objection of the Department" (an abstention, a joint move with a friendly delegation, an amendment or the replacement of one word for another, for example), its judgement is generally accepted. To the extent that the government accords importance to the impact that France makes at the United Nations, the permanent mission is in the best position to judge what move to make, a capacity that is enhanced by the fact that the mission in New York is recruited from among the most qualified and frequently the highest-ranking members of the diplomatic service. Even General de Gaulle, disdainful as he was of the United Nations, was careful to assign only people of high quality to New York. The UN post is considered to be one of the most prestigious, and the heads of the mission have been diplomats of considerable experience who have enjoyed the confidence of their ministers and whose advice has been closely heeded at the Quai d'Orsay.

In the specialized agencies, the situation varies greatly. The status of the permanent representative is less prestigious and delegates are not always career diplomats; often their advice is heeded primarily because of their expertise and personal qualities. They deal mainly with technical questions as experts whose instructions come directly from the relevant ministries and who are not fully under the control of the mission chief. More recently, the kinds of issues dealt with in Geneva (human rights, humanitarian aid, and refugee problems) have been of special interest to France and the position of permanent representative has taken on a new importance, with persons of some distinction being appointed to the post.

As often happens to negotiators assigned to a permanent institution, the missions have a tendency to magnify the importance of the

organization to which they are accredited. This attachment does not result in their not following instructions, but it does lead them to choose to continue discussion rather than ignore issues and to prefer conciliation rather than confrontation. Maintaining a healthy climate for negotiation and not becoming isolated are considered the primary objectives of foreign policy. There is also a desire to be playing an important role in the organization. More than others, those who are engaged in multilateral diplomacy know that France does not hold a permanent seat on the Security Council as a matter of divine right, but must merit the privilege through positive action. The main lesson from the experience of three or four years' service with the permanent mission is probably the conviction that *benign neglect* is the worst of policies.

Because France is a permanent member of the Security Council, the permanent mission considers that it must be represented at all sessions and in all commissions in order to present French policy and, at the same time, to be able to be involved in the always important "corridor diplomacy." The head of the mission himself sits on the Council, substituted only when absolutely necessary by his deputy or chief counsel, and spends the bulk of his time on its official consultations. For financial and economic questions, it has been the custom since 1949 to assign a senior official of the Ministry of Finance to the permanent mission as economic adviser. Because of the importance of this position, the incumbent has ambassadorial rank and is assisted by a highly qualified economic attaché. Together with four or five staff members, his group comprises a quite separate and relatively independent unit that reports directly to the ambassador who serves as permanent representative. The other members of the mission sit on the various committees and commissions according to their fields of specialization, together providing overall coverage of the problems under discussion and maintaining contact with other permanent missions and the UN Secretariat. The small number of permanent staff, only about 20, does not always permit the mission to be represented at all times on all subjects and additional staff are sometimes sent out from Paris, especially when the General Assembly is meeting.

The delegation to the General Assembly has a double function: symbolic and technical. It demonstrates the interest of France in the work of the United Nations and also reinforces the permanent mission in the daily committee assignments. There was a time when the French delegation numbered 60–70, not that the work was greater

but the costs were lower! For financial reasons, the number of delegates has been reduced to around 40. The head of the delegation is always the Foreign Minister and the mix between political officers and technical experts has varied. Under the Fourth Republic, the character of the delegation was more political and symbolic than it is now. Under the Fifth Republic, the delegation has become more technical in make-up, with ministry officials and outside experts in international affairs being appointed in order to mount the most effective representation possible. They work with the permanent mission, which is also part of the delegation, with members of the Foreign Ministry's UN Bureau who come to New York for part of the Assembly and otherwise follow the discussions from Paris, and with other specialists who might come from other ministries or from diplomatic posts abroad. The presence of members of the *Parlement* and trade union leaders in the delegation is a concession to democracy and essentially symbolic, with little practical effect.

The permanent mission works hard in what is a difficult assignment. The custom is to send young professionals who are ambitious and who, in an atmosphere that has something of a military character and is very hierarchical, can learn to react quickly in perfect French. It is not unusual to meet them later in high office in the ministries or assuming important responsibilities in the government. Even though it is exacting, there is an excitement in working in New York that is not to be missed. What is headier for a young diplomat than to sit in the French seat and speak for his country in an international conference? All those who have served in New York have fond memories of the experience.

International consultation

No state can act alone at the United Nations. By its very nature, multilateral diplomacy involves a permanent search for collective positions. French activities at the United Nations are thus carried out through several networks, of which the most important is certainly the European one. Consultation among members of the European Union takes up much of the time of the permanent missions and cuts across every subject, whether or not it is strictly a matter of EU concern. In Brussels, a UN group has been formed under the European Political Cooperation in order to coordinate the positions of the 12 on the major problems of the organization, especially reform. Inside the United Nations, the EU occupies a very special place,

being the only group of countries that speaks with one voice on a number of issues in the General Assembly or ECOSOC. Until 1991, France's stance was clear: its positions on the Security Council were its alone and were not to be negotiated. Issues for the 12 and issues for the Security Council were different matters. In spite of the wishes of some European partners (the Netherlands, Italy), France agreed to mutual *information* but not to *concertation*. Since the emergence of the common foreign and security policy concept, France has had to reverse its position. The Maastricht Treaty includes a clause that specifies an obligation for the European permanent members to give information to *and to consult* with the other EU countries.[11] Nowadays, France recognizes that its international influence is linked to its capacity to secure the agreement of the other European states.

The French-speaking countries (the "*francophonie*") constitute the second network within which France operates. The annual dinner of the *francophonie*, which is hosted by the Foreign Minister during the general debate, has become an institution. It is a network that is also nourished by the personal relations that every French ambassador cultivates with his counterparts, especially among the French-speaking Africans. The special bilateral relations with the African states are extended to the multilateral arenas. Immediately after independence, they developed links with France that have been beneficial in a number of cases. For example, in the vote on New Caledonia, no African state voted for the resolution presented by the countries of the Pacific Forum and nine voted against the resolution alongside the French,[12] with the others abstaining or not voting. But, as we have seen, it is rare for France to have to exert any special pressure to be supported in the United Nations, the close relations with the French-speaking Africans ensuring a reciprocal exchange of information and views. France knows what is happening in the African group and, more broadly, in the Group of 77.

The third network is the Western group, particularly in connection with the work of the Commission on Disarmament and the specialized agencies. Here coordination goes on at three levels: among the 12, among the countries of the Atlantic Alliance, and in the "Barton group" (named after a former Canadian diplomat), which brings together all of the Western countries. International consultation can, of course, become an end in itself. It absorbs enormous amounts of time and it is possible to lose sight of its ultimate purpose, which is to bring about a balanced dialogue among the different political and regional groups that coexist in the United Nations.

The Gulf War gave shape to new and very influential informal groups: the P3 (permanent three Western countries on the Security Council) and the P5 (the five permanent members of the Security Council). The permanent members began to meet regularly in informal sessions away from speeches and posturing, and their working procedures were considerably modified. The P3 and P5 ambassadors spend most of their time consulting among themselves and negotiating resolution projects behind closed doors. Official meetings are often reduced to public events designed to confirm a compromise. The real work goes on during informal high-level consultations in a small room that is a miniature of the Council hall, or even outside the United Nations in a mission of the permanent members. Most of the time, the United States takes the initiative in the P3, then France and the United Kingdom react and help to shape the project to be negotiated in the P5, which is then proposed to the non-permanent members of the Security Council. This type of behaviour is quite ambivalent. On the one hand, it gives France the rank amongst the great powers it yearns for; on the other hand, it can cut France off from its usual networks in the third world and blur its former image of an independent go-between country.

Putting the United Nations to good use

Its position as a permanent member of the Security Council is one of the major cards in French foreign policy, together with its nuclear capability, the strength of the economy, and the *francophonie*. The veto power is important for France but mainly from a symbolic point of view. Among the three Western members, France has used the veto power least. Indeed, of the 17 times that France used the veto between 1946 and 1989, those that achieved their objectives were voted in cooperation with the United States and the United Kingdom.[13] The other negative votes had little effect: in neither the Indochinese nor the mortifying Suez crisis, for example, did the French veto avoid the very intervention by the United Nations that it had voted against. The veto on the Comoros question in 1976 was only reluctantly exercised by the French ambassador, who did everything possible to avoid making it seem like a blunt refusal. In effect, what is a sign of a firm stand by a great power is only a regrettable admission of defeat for a middle power. It means that one is isolated and this is the worst thing that can happen at the United Nations. For a state that has founded its policy on good relations with the predominant forces (the United

States and the Group of 77), it is difficult to bear the moral cost of lonely opposition for any length of time. The main utility that the veto has for France is to oppose any revision of the Charter that is not in its interest. But, even here, France would feel great pressures if it found itself, year after year, isolated in the General Assembly on issues that it would have been the only state to veto in the Council.

If France holds on to its permanent seat on the Security Council, it is because this permits it to express its policies as an equal with the superpowers and means that it must be consulted on all questions. This is important for a middle power that still has global interests. France's interest in the United Nations is linked to the activity of the Security Council. The more the Council is active and effective, the greater the interest of France. Otherwise, the United Nations becomes a forum, not to be neglected, but not of great concern.

Maintaining the peace

France's concern about the prerogatives of the Security Council has long led it to withhold support for the peace-keeping operations that, in its view, have given too much responsibility to the Secretary-General and encroached on the authority of member states. Especially critical of the Congo operation, France did not accept "substituting an international body for national authorities exercising their prerogatives and fundamental responsibilities"[14] and refused to pay the contribution assessed by the General Assembly for an operation that was "in violation of the Charter." After that, when operations were established through normal procedures under the control of the Security Council, France insisted on being precise about the mandate, the chain of command, the financing, and the principal characteristics of the force so as to avoid "leaving to other organs" the need to apply the decisions of the Council.

This precaution has become needless. Secretaries-General have been very cautious themselves and have not asked for broad mandates. On the contrary, they are careful not to act without the consent of the major powers. Indeed, more than his predecessors, Pérez de Cuéllar leaned on the permanent members of the Security Council. Thanks to him, a number of successes came to the United Nations, beginning in 1987 at a time when the credibility of the organization was eroding.

The end of the Cold War and the willingness of the major powers to stop pursuing their rivalry through third world surrogates have

212

transformed the facts of international competition and restored importance to being a permanent member of the Security Council. Before that, France dreaded being faced with two extremes: one where the Cold War led the two great powers to lean heavily on their allies and the other where they agreed on a position and settled the problems of the world over the heads of their partners. Recourse to the United Nations was a way out of this dilemma. Alone, France had little weight in settling or containing contemporary regional conflicts. The stalemate over Namibia, for example, was broken only when first the United States and then the Soviet Union began to take a hand in the issue. Without the United Nations, France would have been out of the picture, notwithstanding its interests in southern Africa as evidenced by its increased relations with Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Angola since 1982.

Likewise, the Afghanistan question was dominated by the superpowers, the Afghan factions, and Pakistan. France was very much involved through humanitarian activities but, politically, had no influence on the major players outside the United Nations. In the Iran–Iraq conflict, France was restrained by a somewhat dubious policy, having supported Iraq against prudent financial and diplomatic advice and thus faced the collapse of a country that represented a severe financial risk: the United Nations became almost the only way to work for a settlement to the dispute. In two areas, however, France could play a role in its own name: former Indochina and Lebanon. Nevertheless, in both cases it has taken care to work with the United Nations. The Paris conferences on Cambodia included the permanent members of the Security Council and the Secretary-General. French policies in Lebanon were always matched by intense diplomatic activity in the United Nations.

Not all conflicts have to come before the United Nations. The former Secretary-General, Pérez de Cuéllar, himself recognized this when he said: "There is a constant misunderstanding: some believe that the United Nations wants exclusive authority over the solution to every international problem. It's not true. Certain problems need a bilateral approach and others a regional solution ... One should not believe that the United Nations wants to take on all problems and, even less, that the Secretary-General is such a masochist as to want to be burdened with all these issues."[15] Like most states, France tries, where possible, to settle questions of peace and security that concern it either alone or with its close allies. It turns to the United Nations when it recognizes that no solution is possible without the

combined pressure of the great powers on their respective allies or when it does not hold the key itself and cannot have influence in the region except through the United Nations.

French diplomacy on the Middle East is illustrative in this regard. Not having taken a direct hand in attempts at settlement since 1967, France has tried to take part by utilizing two possibilities offered by the United Nations: using its position as a permanent member of the Security Council to bring about consultation between the great powers; and supporting the non-aligned states in the General Assembly in putting pressure on American policy. At the time of the Six Day War, General de Gaulle called for consultations among the four (the five less China), only to have the proposal rejected by the United States, despite an effort by U Thant to ease the project along. In October 1973, irritated by seeing the United Nations transformed into "a condominium plus the Secretary-General,"[16] France wanted to take part in the new UN Emergency Force and reluctantly withdrew only when the Americans refused. When François Mitterrand came to office, he sought to renew French policy with a double objective: to establish a new relationship between Israel and the PLO; and to bring the Lebanese drama to an end. His bilateral initiatives – a trip to Israel with a speech to the Knesset, and strengthening ties with Egypt – were accompanied by intense multilateral activity. The culmination was to deposit a joint French–Egyptian proposition, with the support of Saudi Arabia, with the president of the Security Council in July 1982. The resolution set out the principles for a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict. It especially called for the simultaneous and mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO and the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people. Lacking the agreement of the United States, the project was never put to a vote. Officially the joint resolution was not withdrawn and, for two years, the idea of resurrecting it came up at every summit meeting of the French and Egyptians.

Throughout the 1980s, France defended the idea of an international conference run by the United Nations in which the five permanent members would participate. It was not heeded. Instead, the Madrid Conference (October 1991) initiated a peace talks process under the aegis of the United States outside the United Nations. Consequently, France can only sit back and watch, together with the rest of the European Union, waiting for the time to come when the United Nations has to be solicited to bring about international guarantees for a durable settlement to the conflicts in the Middle East.

214

In order to justify its position in the Security Council, France is ready to pay a price that may be heavy. Its first experience with peace-keeping was in 1978 when a French contingent was accepted into the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). There, France took a considerable risk. Unlike the Korean conflict, which was a classical war against a known enemy (to which France made a symbolic contribution[17]), this operation did not have a truly military character. It also differed from other peace-keeping operations by being mounted without the agreement of the contesting parties.

UNIFIL had the task of intervening between hostile forces, achieving the retreat of the Israeli troops from southern Lebanon, and restoring the authority of the government of Lebanon. The ambiguity of this mandate, dangerous on the ground and politically complex, was underscored by a series of incidents that cost the lives of several "blue helmets," including several French soldiers, and in which the first commander of the French contingent was gravely wounded.

These risks, already considerable, were heightened by the way that the media referred to French participation: "French intervention in Lebanon" and "French forces in Lebanon" could be read and heard everywhere in France in April 1978. Without any doubt, turning the UN force into an essentially French operation would have redounded to the credit of France had UNIFIL been able to fulfil its mission, deployed its forces effectively, and restored the authority of the Lebanese government. Instead it was the wounded and dead soldiers that brought home the actual conditions under which the French forces served the United Nations. This disturbing realization contrasted with the extreme prudence of the permanent mission in New York, always careful to insist on the temporary and limited character of the operation and on the need to re-examine its mission periodically and revise its composition.

The failure of UNIFIL (now up to 6,000 men) to oppose the invasion by Israel in June 1982 raised doubts about this kind of force. At the same time, the success of the multilateral force and observers (MFO) in the Sinai since April of that year led some to think of "maintaining the peace without the UN"[18] but with forces deployed by countries from the same political group. France participated modestly in the MFO and, on two occasions, sent forces to Beirut under a multilateral force with the United States and Italy. If France were thus to become involved, not with the United Nations but with the United States (and others, like Italy), it would not be without having tried to draw in the world organization.

A first non-UN multilateral force arrived in Beirut on 21 August to be made up of 800 American, 800 French, and 400 Italian troops. The French contingent was actually 867 men, supported by a naval force of some 2,500. The multilateral force had three objectives: to oversee the withdrawal of Palestinian and Syrian fighters (numbering some 15,000); to protect the inhabitants of Beirut; and to restore the Lebanese government. Only the first of these was achieved. Expected to stay in place for 30 days, the force was withdrawn after three weeks, leaving a dangerous void in a troubled country: the assassination of Bechir Gemayel on 14 September; the entry of Israeli forces into West Beirut on the 15th; and the attacks against Sabra and Chatila by the Phalangist militia in the days that followed. In the meanwhile, the United Nations was powerless; the presence of a group of observers from the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was the only sign of the international community.[19]

As the situation in Beirut deteriorated, the Secretary-General considered an extension of UNIFIL's mandate in order to send 2,000 men to Beirut. But Israel was opposed and Lebanon had no confidence in any such move, both preferring action by the United States rather than the United Nations. Although France greatly preferred the UNIFIL option, it agreed once again to join the Americans and the Italians in organizing what was now called the Multilateral Security Force for Beirut (MSFB). Of the other countries approached to participate, none responded.[20] This second force arrived in Beirut on 24 September 1982 and withdrew in March 1984, the French being the first to arrive and the last to leave. The force suffered two devastating attacks, losing 262 Americans and 92 French troops. The situation in Beirut continued to deteriorate.

There is no point in comparing the multinational force with United Nations units, whether it involves their mandates, their methods of operation, their potential, or their results.[21] What we should recall is that France always preferred a UN force to the MSFB and joined the United States-led effort only because it felt that it would have been humiliating to have refused. Not only was France relegated to second rank politically, but the negotiations between Israel and Lebanon were under the exclusive auspices of the United States. At the same time, quiet offers by France to provide good offices between the Lebanon factions did not get off the ground and French negotiators on the spot were handicapped by set-backs that were not of their making. After a last attempt to get the Security Council to call for a cease-fire and create a UN force in Beirut, France had to draw

what lessons it could from the set-backs it suffered and from its own weakness in the situation. The withdrawal of the French contingent began on 15 March 1984, a month after the Americans.

The day that this withdrawal was completed, the first French "white helmets" arrived as observers in Beirut at the request of President Gemayel following the inter-Lebanese conference in Lausanne.[22] Like many others who came before them, the French observers would prove how difficult it was for foreigners to insert themselves between the warring parties in a civil conflict without being suspected of favouring one side or the other and finishing up by gaining the enmity of them all. In 1985, the French in Lebanon were the victims of a wave of murders and kidnappings. The members of the observer team became the target of the rival militias, with eight military men killed and nine civilians taken hostage and no sign of any kind of national reconciliation. There was little justification for further French involvement and, the day after the French legislative elections, the observer team was dissolved. On 25 April, moreover, France asked the United Nations to release the 11 French officers who were serving in Lebanon with the UNTSO. This left the question of UNIFIL, since the worsening of the situation in Beirut was extended to southern Lebanon where there was an outbreak of Muslim extremism and a rapid deterioration in the overall atmosphere.

Accused by the Hezbollah of spying for Israel, UNIFIL faced a multiplying series of threatening incidents. In the Security Council, France was reluctant to renew, for the 19th time, "almost automatically the mandate of the force for six months." France's contingent, which was the largest (1,380 soldiers) and the most important in terms of logistics, would be difficult to replace. Still, a serious incident between the French contingent and the Amahl movement (11 August 1986), followed by a bombing of the French positions and a series of assassination attempts against French soldiers, led Paris to protest against the conditions under which its troops had to carry out their mission. French withdrawal from UNIFIL became a real possibility. In a tone that had not been used before, the new Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, harshly criticized the United Nations: "Our soldiers are courageous and obey an organization that, unfortunately, is not up to the responsibilities that it claims to assume."[23] For his part, President Mitterrand urged the Secretary-General to do everything possible to prevent a repetition of the confrontations that had led to the dead and wounded.[24] In the Security Council, on

22 September, France raised the question that was at the heart of the matter, the withdrawal of Israel, in proposing a resolution that would have asked the Secretary-General ''to take the necessary steps to deploy UNIFIL to the international boundary of Lebanon.'' The United States, however, had no intention of permitting the resolution to pass and it remained, like many others, on the shelf. On 24 November, the United Nations announced that the French contingent would be reduced to 520, a smaller reduction than Paris was ready to accept. None the less, it was said at UN headquarters that, ''if necessary, UNIFIL will live without the French.'' And live it does, with France participating at about the level of other contributors. Still, France is the only permanent member of the Security Council among them and this, together with the operational capability of its troops, gives it a certain influence in the force.[25]

Since 1986, the situation in Lebanon has gone from bad to worse, reaching a state of chaos by the summer of 1989 as Beirut was destroyed stone by stone. Of all the Western countries, France has been the most vigorous in raising the question and the most active in providing humanitarian and military assistance and in trying to mobilize the European states, the United States, and the entire international community. Meeting at France's request on 24 April 1989, the Security Council called for a cease-fire and instructed the Secretary-General ''to make every contact that he could'' to put an end to the divisiveness in Lebanon. And in August, France participated in another Council call for a cease-fire and new efforts by the Secretary-General under Article 99 of the Charter. By mid-September there was talk of a possible renewal of conciliation by a group of Arab states and that France and the Soviet Union would participate in a ''commission for the supervision of a truce and arms embargo'' under UN auspices. But Lebanon has been the subject of any number of diplomatic developments that have come to nought.

This first experience embodied all the hopes and contradictions, all the possibilities and limits of maintaining peace through the United Nations. Since this precedent, France has been engaged in several of the most dangerous peace-keeping operations. In 1993, it provided one-sixth of the UN forces: more than 5,000 soldiers in former Yugoslavia; 1,500 in Cambodia; 1,100 in Somalia; 440 in Lebanon. French blue helmets could be found in Salvador, the Western Sahara, Iraq, Jerusalem.[26] The total number, 9,500 men, puts France well ahead of the other permanent five: 4,500 Americans (mainly in Somalia),

3,265 British, 1,000 Russians (in former Yugoslavia), 500 Chinese (in Cambodia). For the first time in the United Nations' history (except in Cyprus in 1964) the command of peace-keeping forces has been given to a permanent member of the Security Council: French General Jean Cot commands the 23,000 strong UN force in Bosnia. At the UN headquarters France has a strong and influential military presence.

France can be proud of what is a diplomatic success and a recognition of its importance. But the human and financial burden is heavy. Several French blue helmets have been killed or seriously wounded in Bosnia and Croatia. The strains on the defence capabilities and budget have come to a climax beyond which France cannot go further.

In 1993 a very critical parliamentary report stressed that the cost of operations in the former Yugoslavia had increased fourfold in one year and the cost of French external actions had doubled. The French commitment in UN peace-keeping was not criticized in itself but the report expressed concern about a sort of uncontrolled spiral that gave France an endless general vocation to intervene everywhere the United Nations or the United States happened to be interested in.

The chances are that the United Nations and the P3 will come out of the war in Bosnia badly bruised. Again France has been the most vigorous in raising the question from a humanitarian point of view, and the most active in providing humanitarian and military assistance and in trying to mobilize the European states, the United States, and the entire international community. But humanitarian aid without political commitment sustained by military decisions has proved to be a trap. This raises the question of how far the United Nations can go in monitoring a new kind of security system.

The UN Secretary-General's 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace*, raises the question of peace-keeping and peace enforcement. France was the first permanent member to respond. It has welcomed the idea of "preventive diplomacy" contained in Mr. Boutros-Ghali's report, which involves the capacity to identify and draw attention to nascent conflicts and the resort to traditional methods of peaceful settlement of conflicts: arbitration, mediation, and so on. This suits France's legal and political culture: France has proposed those methods inside the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. As far as UN military capabilities are concerned, France has declared itself to be prepared to train and maintain permanent troops at the United

Nations' disposal. But the problem is: should expanded expectations of the United Nations' peace-keeping role be encouraged or have they already been extended beyond what is realistically feasible?

North–South relations

In addition to the opportunities that the United Nations offers in the field of peace and security, France has a second major interest in the United Nations: it is the only place where the rich and poor meet on a continuing basis under conditions of equality. It is there that the Group of 77 pursue their major policy objectives and receive at least a semblance of consideration. Seeking to play a major role in North–South relations, France cannot be indifferent to a system that the third world so values.[27] For this reason, even if they might share the complaints of some Americans, the French cannot say: "A world without the UN would be a better world."[28] Instead, France tried to serve as an intermediary between the developing and the industrialized countries.

That role was easier at the United Nations in the 1960s and 1970s than in the 1980s. There was a certain reality to the North–South dialogue and to the contribution of multilateral diplomacy. France took a different line than did the other major Western countries – the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. Given its mixed economy and long experience with the organization of agricultural markets, France had no preconceived fixation with the concept of free markets. More than the others, it was ready to accept state intervention in the economy and understood the need to compensate for market failure. This was a major thrust in its policies as pursued by representatives who had a deep interest in the issues and strongly believed in the approach they advocated.

The tactic was to emphasize French policies that corresponded to the demands of the third world: to support proposals to organize commodity markets, for example, but to take cover behind the EU on those issues that were highly contested, like protectionism, and to let the Western delegations that were taking the toughest line – the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany – lead the fight when it meant confrontation on fundamentals. During the entire debate over the NIEO and global negotiations, this approach permitted France to play a more important role than its economic position might otherwise have justified. It was able to serve as a go-between with, on the one side, the developing countries that were

demanding a revolution in international exchange and, on the other, the industrialized states that totally rejected the terminology of the NIEO.

There were limits, however, to this role of conciliation since French interests coincided more often with those of the West than with those of the third world. On issues that involved sharing power, France remained élitist: it willingly admitted that the South should participate in drawing up a new system of international regulation, but rejected a redistribution of power in areas where it enjoyed certain privileges, such as the Security Council, of course, but also the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Minor adjustments caused no such problem (e.g. creating the Committee of 20 in the IMF and the Committee on Development in the Bank). At the same time, France had few ways of gaining support for those of its policies that co-incided with the position of the developing countries. On regulating commodity markets, in particular, it could not get the approval of other Western delegations. It played a key role in UNCTAD IV on the adoption of the Integrated Programme for Commodities (the famous Resolution 93 of 30 May 1976) and the creation of the Common Fund. None the less, not only were the new agreements on commodities never concluded, but those that existed when Resolution 93 passed only barely survived when they did not collapse altogether. France continued to defend the agreements commodity by commodity, but its efforts were in vain.

In contrast with other developed countries, France remains convinced that there can be no durable international order unless the countries of the third world have a role in defining the rules. For some 10 years, it has insisted on the need for ''dialogue'' and supported the idea of ''global negotiations.'' But its scope for action was constantly reduced. As long as the major powers were willing to be engaged in multilateral diplomacy, France found the United Nations a forum in which to take a high moral position, at least in words and manner in the absence of action. But the progressive stalemate in the United Nations on matters of economic relations deprived France of a setting in which to pursue its policies.

ECOSOC is paralysed and if UNCTAD is valued it is more because of the work of the secretariat than what negotiations have produced. The important subjects are discussed elsewhere: trade at GATT and the debt problem at the IMF and the World Bank, with both institutions ignoring what happens at the United Nations. In New York, the Second Committee spends months negotiating a text

on the debt question and votes. Washington shrugs – and France keeps a low profile. There is no longer the same enthusiasm for engaging in debate as there was in the 1970s. No one believes that it matters and the atmosphere is gloomy.

Like other states, France mainly pursues its North–South policy outside the United Nations. In development assistance, for example, France channels 27 per cent of its total aid through multilateral agencies. But the majority is through the European Union and the programmes of the IMF and the World Bank, only 12 per cent being contributed to UN agencies. France is ranked only eleventh in contributions to the UN Development Programme (UNDP). French contributions to the United Nations for development assistance are managed through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the major part going to UNDP (about 50 per cent), UNICEF and the World Food Programme (about 4 per cent each), and the rest spread around a number of different agencies and programmes.

Not without political purpose in mind, France provided a major contribution to the International Fund for Agricultural Development just when American interest was lagging. Long reluctant to see new funds created, by the late 1970s France began to reconsider its position when they permitted shifting a major part of its assistance to Africa. This approach showed up in its concern for the least developed countries (LDCs) more generally, in the special programmes for Africa created by the World Bank, and by twice hosting a conference on LDCs in Paris (1981 and 1990). What France sought to do was to mobilize the international community to give priority to countries that were linked to France and that counted among the least developed. It defended the cause of the LDCs throughout the United Nations, including the Commission on Human Rights, at the risk of being accused of favouring one particular group and of splitting the third world. The special session of the United Nations on Africa in 1986 was, from this point of view, very critical. For the first time, North–South negotiations were approached on *a regional basis*. The last bastion of unity among the countries of the South began to fall.

Ever since the illusions of the NIEO were dissipated and the North–South dialogue stuck in a stalemate, the problems of development have been treated separately. Commodities, the debt problem, trade, and transfer of technology are all discussed in separate settings, even though they are clearly related. François Mitterrand is one of the few Western heads of state who continues to advocate a North–South dialogue and tries to unite the rich and the poor coun-

tries at summit meetings, but without response. Politically, the South is no longer an organized force, no country having replaced Algeria in the role it played in the 1970s in rallying the third world behind the NIEO. Focused on their own domestic difficulties, the developing countries no longer accept North–South as a framework for their foreign policy. Their responsible officials – in matters of finance, the economy, and planning – spend most of their time travelling between Washington, London, Tokyo, and Paris trying to deal with immediate problems. Their diplomats, often far from their capitals for long periods of time and far from the realities being faced at home, follow a dying debate at the United Nations with speeches that are more and more abstract. France, meanwhile, persists in arguing that a stable order cannot be based on the domination of some over others and looks for opportunities where the world community can be mobilized to come to the aid of the poorest, cases like flooding in Bangladesh and the desert locust plague in the Sahel.

There is also the UN Development Programme, which is becoming increasingly important and increasingly interesting for France. It increasingly acts like the World Bank, more and more assuming direct control over projects that were formerly managed by the specialized agencies, especially those administered by UNESCO. Until now, France, like the United States and the major European countries, has encouraged this trend rather than slowed it down. Generally, the continuing concern for European cooperation has taken precedence over a specific French position. The government's positions at the United Nations follow the common approach that can be found among members of the European Union. On fundamental issues, France differs little from Germany and the United Kingdom. In its approach to North–South relations, as in its domestic economic policies, France has returned to the fold.

Managing interdependence

When new world problems emerge that require collective action, France does not first turn to the United Nations. One example is the case of the environment, not necessarily a new problem, but one to which France was somewhat late in responding. The subject took on political salience in the late 1980s when it became necessary to respond to ecological groups that were organizing their efforts. Without taking into account the fact that the United Nations had already established an Environment Programme (UNEP) and been involved

for some years in problems of the biosphere or that it had been gen-
eral policy not to encourage the creation of new organs and new
funds, and without consulting the Quai d'Orsay or the Ministry of
the Environment, the Prime Minister, with two other heads of gov-
ernment, called for an international conference on protection of the
atmosphere.[29] The purpose was to invite every country on the planet
to establish an "international high authority" to which states would
delegate sovereign powers. Because of the reaction from the minis-
try, the United Nations, and several other governments, the project
was trimmed down to recognize existing institutions, and the final
statement that emerged from the subsequent conference in the
Hague spoke only vaguely of setting up, "in the framework of the
United Nations, a new international authority by strengthening exist-
ing institutions or by establishing a new institution."

The story is illustrative on several counts. One is the perception
that political leaders have of the United Nations: you do not go to
the United Nations if you want swift action and wish to take a dra-
matic initiative; just another declaration in just another meeting has
no effect. The way to advance matters is through an ad hoc confer-
ence at the level of the summit! But more seriously, if you want to
give a push to what is going on at the United Nations, it must come
from outside, since the system cannot be invigorated from within.
From the viewpoint of French policy, what France has to offer is a
set of procedures for stimulating that process. The Conference on In-
ternational Economic Cooperation (CIEC), the G7 summits, and the
Council of the European Communities were all French initiatives,
each designed to give new stimulus to an issue or problem that was
going nowhere; the North–South dialogue in the case of the CIEC,
cooperation on the monetary problem in the case of the G7, and a
new impulse for the European Communities in the case of the EC
Council. Two assumptions lay behind these initiatives: the import-
ance of having political leaders rather than "technicians" take the
matter in hand; and the advantage of dealing with an issue in a small
assembly of concerned participants rather than a universal forum.
The Hague Conference followed this reasoning. A cross-section rep-
resenting the countries of the world were brought together to brain
storm what major directions could lead, over time, to a new organiza-
tion of the world community. It is not unlike the model that Maurice
Bertrand has suggested for the reform of ECOSOC.[30]

For France, as for other states, there are two kinds of situations. In
one, there is a common interest in a world problem so that inter-

dependence can be managed through functional institutions, especially those that are highly technical such as the World Health Organization and the Universal Postal Union. In the other, there is no agreed-on common interest, which still needs to be negotiated and which France prefers to deal with within a workable framework that may not necessarily be universal. In the case of Antarctica, for example, France is resolutely opposed to opening up the negotiations to states that were not parties to the Treaty of 1959.

Of all the limited groups, the G7 seems to be the most effective. There, interdependence is managed among the advanced industrialized countries, including issues like monetary policy and the international debt that are key factors in North–South relations. France does not weigh in as heavily as the United States, Japan, and Germany, the framework not being particularly conducive to the ''declaratory'' diplomacy that France often indulges in to compensate for its relative weakness. For that matter, the G7 is more like a directorate of the rich countries that take it on themselves to decide on problems that affect everyone. France is left to try to find complementary forums where it has a wider margin of manoeuvre. The Hague Conference is an example where France showed its preference for a ''representative cross-section'' rather than the ideal of the world community.

Is the choice of the United Nations as a preferred forum related to the importance that is given to the developing countries? When it is not completely necessary to negotiate with all members of the Group of 77, the United Nations has only a residual function. On the other hand, when it is necessary to make it clear to all of them where matters stand, or to gain their support for healing fissures in the international system or for new legal obligations (such as the protection of the ozone layer or the fight against drugs or human rights), the United Nations once again becomes an essential centre for cooperation and collective action.

Conclusion: Reform with mirrors

The actual problem of the United Nations (what some have called a ''crisis'') is, in truth, a problem in North–South relations, however much the United States sees it otherwise in emphasizing the ''politicization'' and ''bureaucratization'' of the system. It has a unique character, even though there have always been problems in the United Nations, if not crises. In 1947, when the collective security system was paralysed by the Cold War, wasn't it a crisis? In 1950, when the

UN flag was entrusted to an American General (MacArthur), wasn't it a crisis? In 1953, when FBI agents penetrated the UN building to take the fingerprints of American staff members, when the United Nations sanctioned the suspicions, and the Secretary-General's legal counsel found that he could not live with the role that he was forced to play and committed suicide, wasn't it a crisis? The United Nations had become the instrument of one superpower against the other.

In 1960–1961, when a permanent member of the Security Council insulted the Secretary-General and demanded that he be replaced by a "troika," when UN soldiers were fighting and dying without the approval of the majority of member states, when the Secretary-General disappeared in circumstances never fully made clear, leaving the United Nations in a state of suspension, wasn't it a crisis? Remember also how impossible it was to open the 19th session of the General Assembly in 1964, how the Secretary-General was accused of being responsible for the withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force and the outbreak of the Six Day War in 1967, and the broad criticism of the system by the Jackson Report in 1969. Reread the annual reports of U Thant, with their long and bitter complaints and their inventory of the weaknesses of the organization and the failure of member states to meet their obligations. It has been clear for a long time that the United Nations has been in grave difficulty.

At the same time, the largest contributor accommodated itself to the organization so long as it could command a majority and avoid embarrassing questions being put on the agenda, like, for example, the Viet Nam War. Everything began to change in the 1970s when the United States realized that it had definitely lost its majority. It began to lose interest in the organization, but in a most destructive way. Instead of defending its position, arguing its case, and exerting pressure, it practised a policy of "benign neglect," leaving the G77 with the illusion of having the power to say and do what they wished in the organization. And, when the United States turned once again to the United Nations, it was to try to break those parts where the third world existed as a political force: withdrawal from UNESCO, attacks on UNCTAD and FAO, and unilateral reduction of the American contribution to the UN budget, arguing that the one state–one vote system did not give major contributors the weight that was commensurate with their financial support.[31] It was at that point that some spoke of a "crisis" and of the need for "reform." But what was really the problem?

"Reform" meant different things to different people – whether one

226

spoke to outside experts or member states, to the West or the G77, to specialists at economic meetings or delegates to political meetings. Only outside observers were asking meaningful questions about the conditions that had to be met if the United Nations was to become more effective.[32] Starting with the same analysis about the maladministration of the system, there were those who proposed reforms that were essentially managerial and budgetary[33] and others who went further and felt that the time had come for a complete restructuring of the economic and social sector.[34] But, within the organization, there was a single important question: what had to be done to overcome the hostility of the United States to the United Nations and to get past the prospect of financial insolvency?

The issue of reform became less significant and, by 1987, became little more than a matter of budget procedures. At the same time, the firmness of the United States began to produce some results: the atmosphere at the General Assembly became more cooperative, the attacks against the West were less common, and UNCTAD VII was conducted relatively calmly. But above all, the new Soviet diplomacy modified the climate at the United Nations – in supporting progress in settling several regional conflicts and showing new interest in peace-keeping operations, the Court of International Justice, and the Common Fund for Commodities, among other issues. The United States also began to take a more conciliatory position, the Bush administration seeking to deflect the anti-United Nations offensive that had imprudently been encouraged by his predecessor. No more was needed to turn the tempest of reform into a gentle wind.

During the tempest, however, the West had obtained greater rigour in financial procedures, a tightening of the budget process, and recognition of the practice of consensus in the Committee for Programme and Coordination. The G77 had vainly tried a diversionary move by resurrecting Resolution 32/197, which, 10 years earlier, had related restructuring to the NIEO. Trying to revive the North–South dialogue and to relaunch their earlier demands on the distribution of economic and financial power, they proposed that ECOSOC become universal and that the scope of its responsibilities be expanded.

Every time the question of reform comes up, France shudders. So long as it is limited to the administrative and financial functions of the United Nations, France is in favour of reform. This is something that has always interested the French. In the First Committee and in the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, where France's representatives are usually technicians rather than

political types, it always praised tight procedures and worked for the rationalization of the budget process. It wholeheartedly supported Resolution 41/213 to strengthen the planning, programming, and budget methods. In contrast, it shied away from the question that related to restructuring the intergovernmental mechanism in the economic and social sectors in implementation of recommendation 8 of the Group of 18.

The earlier increase in seats on the Security Council and ECOSOC came after the entry of new members and the need to ensure that the principal organs reflected the overall composition of the membership. It was ratified only reluctantly by the French *Parlement*. Universalizing ECOSOC would be a reform of a different kind, a true modification of the Charter rather than a simple adjustment. France fears that such a move could break the taboo of the Charter as a "sacred text" and open a Pandora's box that could one day bring into question the privileged position of permanent members of the Security Council. At the same time, it is not happy about having to oppose a demand from the G77 with its unpredictable political costs. It has thus confined itself to technical arguments in emphasizing, not without reason, that the overlapping between ECOSOC and the Second and Third Committees of the General Assembly confuses the balance between the two organs without enhancing the effectiveness of the organization.

For the moment, the discussion is at a stalemate: the Special Commission has been dissolved by the General Assembly and the Secretary-General is in the process of summarizing the views of member states – so it is *business as usual*. France has come out in favour of revitalizing ECOSOC and, in general, giving it greater powers. In the immediate, however, its concerns are quite precise: to avoid any combining of ECOSOC sessions that would cancel the annual session in the French-speaking city of Geneva; and to be sure that any reduction in the number of ECOSOC subsidiary organs did not affect those to which France gives priority, the Commission on Human Rights in particular. All in all, France's ambition for reform does not go very far!

The question of enlarging the Security Council is a far more important challenge. Since the suggestion that the EU be given a seat has been dropped, France is officially pretending not to be worried about reforming and expanding the Security Council. The candidacies of Japan and Germany for a permanent seat by 1995, supported by the Clinton administration, have not given rise to open resistance and bit-

terness in France. As long as the status of the existing five permanent members remains unaltered, France does not overtly object to a reform. It claims to be ready to consider an enlargement (from 15 to 20 or 25) that would include both new permanent members and rotating members. But France is very cautious about who should have the veto power. It is clear that it will not accept a change in membership that would mean a diminished status for France in the United Nations and on the world stage. Whatever the political majority in power, no French parliament would allow ratification of such an amendment to the Charter. For the time being France is taking a ''wait and see'' stand. It is counting on multiple obstacles to delay any significant change in the composition of the Security Council, especially the contention between several third world nations for additional seats alongside Japan and Germany, uncertainties about future Russian diplomacy, and American interest in not fundamentally changing a UN body in which the United Nations no longer has any rival.

Notes and references

1. For the French positions during the creation stage of the United Nations, see Marie-Claude Smouts, *La France à l'ONU* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1979), chap. 1.
2. 15 Nov. 1985; 23 May 1986; 20 Feb. 1987; 9 Apr. 1987; 8 Mar. 1988.
3. In 1975 and 1976, the declarations were more virulent and condemned France. France even had to veto a resolution of the Security Council relating to the territorial integrity of the Comoro Islands.
4. For instance, in order to ease the deadlock at the Security Council, it called for a ''shuttle'' system between the Security Council and the General Assembly, similar to the one existing in France between the Assembly and the Senate.
5. Result of a poll taken with a sample of 1,000 people on 15 Mar. 1985. The main results can be found in Hervé Cassan, ''L'ONU et l'opinion publique française,'' in *La France aux Nations Unies*, Cahiers du Centre de droit international de Nanterre, no. 2, Editions Montchrestien, 1985, 63–70.
6. Daniel Lerner and Marguerite R. Kramer, ''French elite perspectives on the United Nations,'' *International Organization* (Winter 1963).
7. See Louis Balmont, ''L'opinion française et l'ONU,'' *Le Trimestre du monde* (4th quarter, 1992), 53–65.
8. Jean-Pierre Cot and Alain Pellet, eds., *La Charte des Nations Unies* (Paris, Brussels: Economica, Bruylant, 1991), preface by J. Pérez de Cuéllar.
9. French Society for International Law, *Les organisations internationales contemporaines* (Paris: Pedone, 1988).
10. See Samy Cohen, *La monarchie nucléaire* (Paris: Hachette, 1986).
11. Article J.5: ''Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.''

12. Resolution 42/79, 4 Dec. 1987.
13. During the same period, the United Kingdom used its veto power 29 times, the USSR 116 times, China 4 times, and the United States 60 times.
14. S/PV, 903 meeting, 15 Sep. 1960.
15. Interview with the daily newspaper *Le Monde*, 25 Aug. 1988.
16. According to the formula of the Chinese representative, 23 Oct. 1973, S/PV 1748.
17. An aviso, an infantry battalion, and medical equipment.
18. Laurent Lucchini, "La Force internationale du Sinaï: le maintien de la paix sans l'ONU," *Annuaire français de droit international* XIX (1983): 121–136.
19. The creation of the GOB (Group of Observers in Beirut) was decided by the Security Council on 1 Aug. (Res. 516). Its number increased from 10 to 50 after the massacre of Sabra and Chatila (Res. 521, 19 Sep.). The leader of this group was a Frenchman. This outfit was to be reduced in number in September 1984.
20. The countries invited to mount the force were: Australia, Austria, Belgium, South Korea, Spain, Greece, Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden, Turkey. In February 1983, the United Kingdom dispatched a symbolic unit of 123 men. The MFSB was to have between 3,500 and 5,400 men. The French contingent grew from 1,200, to 1,600, and then to 2,000 men in September 1983, backed up by the French navy (up to 3,700 sailors) and by the air force.
21. See, for instance, Richard W. Nelson, "Multinational peace-keeping in the Middle East and the United States model," *International Affairs* (Winter 1984–1985); Alain Brouillet, "La seconde force multinationale à Beyrouth, 24 September 1982–31 March 1984," *Annuaire français de droit international* XXI (1985): 115–166.
22. The DETOBS (Dispatch of French Observers in Lebanon) was in Lebanon from 29 March 1984 to 3 April 1986. Its initial number was 40 and it grew to 80 in June 1984; in 1985 it was reduced to 45. There were 7 casualties. The death of one policeman who did not belong to DETOBS raised the number of French military casualties to 8.
23. 26 Aug. 1986; *Le Monde*, 28 Aug. 1986.
24. As of September 1986, out of a total of 131 casualties, 22 were French troops.
25. For a complete description of French participation in the UN peace-keeping forces, see Pierre Le Peillet, *Les bérets bleus de l'ONU. A travers 40 ans de conflit israélo-arabe*, Preface by General Siilasvuo (Paris: Editions France Empire, 1988).
26. See Monique Saliou, "La France et l'ONU: des ambitions mondiales," *Politique étrangère* (Autumn 1993).
27. On that subject, see Jacques Adda and Marie-Claude Smouts, *La France face au Sud. Le miroir brisé* (Paris: Karthala, 1989).
28. Burton Yale Pines, ed., *A World without a UN* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1984), xix.
29. The Hague Conference was convened on the initiative of the prime ministers of France, the Netherlands, and Norway, and met on 11 March 1989; 24 heads of state and government participated, representing 12 developing countries and 12 developed countries. The director of the UNEP was invited to the Hague *à titre personnel*. Mrs. Thatcher, who had convened 134 states to a conference on the depletion of the ozone layer just before (5–7 March 1989), opposed the creation of another international institution.
30. Maurice Bertrand, *L'ONU* (Paris: Editions La Découverte, 1994).
31. Kassebaum–Solomon amendment.
32. For a presentation of the various analyses (Bertrand Report, 1985; Fromuth Report, 1986; Report of the Group of 18, 1986; Report of the United Nations Association of the USA, 1987), see Gene Lyons, "La réforme des Nations Unies," *Revue internationale des sciences sociales* 120 (May 1989): 169–290.
33. Group of 18.
34. Bertrand Report and UNA-USA Report. See also Maurice Bertrand, *Refaire l'ONU, Un programme pour la paix* (Geneva: Editions Zoé, 1986).

6

Japan's policy towards the United Nations

Sadako Ogata

Introduction

Thirty years after its admission, Japan began to show a new activism in the United Nations. The 1980s marked Japan's rapid rise as a major contributor to the UN system. In terms of both assessed as well as voluntary contributions, Japan became the second-largest contributor after the United States. Japan also came to show strong interest in the management of the organization and took the initiative to set up a Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts to examine ways to improve the United Nations' administrative and financial situation. Since then the reform and reinforcement of the United Nations system have become a priority concern in Japan's UN policy. Japan finds that only a well-run United Nations can maintain a wide range of support not only internationally but also at home.

On several other fronts too Japan has taken a series of initiatives in the last few years. Of particular significance may be Japan's support for the strengthening of the peace and security functions of the United Nations. Japan collaborated with five Western states, and successfully promoted the adoption of the Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International Peace and Security and on the Role of the United Nations in This Field by the 43rd session of the General Assembly in 1988. The

main thrust of this declaration is to enable the United Nations to prevent the emergence or aggravation of disputes or situations. At the operational level, Japan provided special funds to help expedite peace-keeping activities in Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq. It also dispatched teams to monitor elections in Namibia and Nicaragua. On the humanitarian front, Japan has also taken an increasingly active part. By providing assistance to the Indo-Chinese refugees, Japan became a major supporter of the UN refugee programme in the 1980s. It also participated in mobilizing the UN emergency support to Africa and served as the coordinator in drawing up the Declaration on the Critical Economic Situation in Africa, which was adopted at the 39th session of the General Assembly in 1984. Since then, Japan has continued its interest in alleviating and preventing natural disasters. Together with Morocco, at the 42nd session of the General Assembly, it proposed to designate the 1990s as the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, a move that received consensus support.

Japan's recent involvements in the United Nations display an activism that was not apparent in previous decades. The purpose of this study is, first, to outline the trends in the historical position of Japan in the United Nations; second, to analyse Japan's policy towards the United Nations in light of its overall foreign policy; and third, to relate its UN policy to domestic factors. In identifying both the external and internal factors that constrain Japan's positions and activities, the study attempts to present a general framework of the decision-making structure underlying Japan's UN policy and to predict the future course that Japan will take in the United Nations.

Historical trends

Trends in the historical position of Japan with regard to the United Nations can be divided into three distinct periods. The first period covers the time from Japan's entry into the United Nations in 1956 to the end of the 1960s. The main characteristics of Japan's policy during this period were to gain international recognition in the United Nations through representation in the various forums, and to concentrate on a few selective items of importance, namely, Chinese representation and the Korean unification questions. Politically, Japan was able to attain its policy objectives relatively easily through reliance on its close relations with the United States. The second

period extends through the 1970s, during which resource nationalism of the developing countries set the agenda for UN policies. Japan underwent painful adjustments and revised its Middle East policy in the United Nations. It moved much closer to the Arab positions on the Middle East, although it maintained a common front with the industrialized Western countries on North–South issues. The third period coincides with the 1980s, in which Japan took greater initiatives and played larger roles. Since the period was marked by a financial crisis caused largely by American withdrawal of support for the United Nations, Japan found itself assuming an intermediary role. Its proposal to reform and restructure the administrative and financial system of the United Nations was an outcome of the particular position it came to occupy in the United Nations as a major contributor basically supporting the system.

It is interesting to note that these three periods reflect the growing pattern of Japan's overall foreign policy. The first period, which was marked by Japan's exclusive concern with Asian problems, coincides with the period in which its main foreign policy efforts were directed towards the consolidation of relations with neighbouring Asian countries. The San Francisco Peace Conference of 1951 did not restore Japan's diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, and the Democratic Republic of Korea. The United Nations became a strategic battleground in the development of relations with these countries in the midst of the Cold War era. The second period came in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis. Japan's main foreign policy goal was to strengthen its relations with the oil-producing countries of the Middle East and to establish friendly relations with all resource-rich developing countries. The United Nations was the forum in which Japan found itself torn between the need to demonstrate its support for the strong political causes of the resource-rich countries, particularly the Middle East, and the need to adhere to the interests of the Western industrial states. By the third period of the 1980s, Japan's economic activities had already become global. The multilateral diplomacy in the United Nations provided a new outlet for Japan's expanding bilateral relations. Africa began to loom large in Japan's UN activities, since Japan mobilized efforts in the United Nations to respond to the famine-stricken needs of African nations. Japan's UN initiatives, whether in development assistance or disaster relief, began to reflect its growing global perspective and interest.

First period: The 1950s and 1960s

Turning to a more detailed examination of the evolution of Japan's policy, it is important to recall the high expectations and enthusiasm with which Japan joined the United Nations in 1956. To the Japanese people, who had been isolated for some time following defeat in World War II, the admission symbolized a return to the international community. Aside from membership itself, Japan's single most important objective in joining the United Nations was to help guarantee its national security. At the time, such a guarantee was considered particularly important, because Japan, under its post-war constitution, had abolished armaments and renounced the right of belligerence. Although a degree of de facto rearmament took place with the build-up of the Self-Defence Forces, the security treaty with the United States was politically divisive. Relying on the United Nations to guarantee Japan's security had the advantage of appealing to a wider public that cut across those who were in support of allying with the United States as well as those who favoured a more neutralist course. The UN enforcement activities in Korea under the United States Command, consisting of 250,000 American troops and 26,000 soldiers from 15 member states, seemed to prove that the United Nations in fact provided a functioning collective security system.

After the voting that approved Japan's membership, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu made the following statement, which clearly reflected the national sentiment at the time:

We have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace. Japan is gratified that, together with the maintenance of peace, the United Nations places great importance on humanitarianism. It has taken up the problem of disarmament as a major task in the pursuit of its objective of maintaining peace. Being the only country which has experienced the horrors of the atomic bomb, Japan knows its tragic circumstances.[1]

A highly idealistic perception of the United Nations as a guarantor of peace and security was to persist for a long time in the minds of the Japanese people.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the United Nations occupied a focal point in the thinking of foreign policy decision makers. At the time of Japan's entry into the United Nations, the government proclaimed three basic principles of Japanese foreign policy: (1) it would be UN centred; (2) it would cooperate with the free demo-

234

cratic nations; and (3) it would identify closely with the Asian countries.[2] The Japan–United States Security Treaty was already in existence, providing a substantive guarantee of Japanese security. The principle of ''UN-centred'' diplomacy had the merit both of promoting cooperation with the United States in the United Nations and of satisfying domestic aspirations to become directly involved in a global forum.

The principle of ''UN-centred'' diplomacy, however, eroded in the next few years. Although prime ministers and foreign ministers continued to emphasize the importance of cooperation with the United Nations, references to ''UN-centred'' diplomacy as such disappeared from public statements by 1960. The immediate reason for the change was an increasing awareness of the United Nations' limitations as an effective collective security system. The frequent failures of the Security Council to act owing to the use of the veto were enough to undermine trust in the United Nations as a guarantor of peace and security. More fundamentally, the growing influence of the developing countries, supported by the Soviet Union, was gradually to diminish the usefulness and effectiveness of the United Nations as an instrument for the United States and Western industrialized countries. These changes significantly affected Japan's policy towards the United Nations. ''UN-centred'' diplomacy, in the sense of expecting the United Nations to guarantee Japan's security, became less and less a realistic objective. The importance of the United Nations rather came to depend on the extent to which Japan could usefully resort to that body to promote cooperation with Western or Asian countries in matters related to Japan's fundamental policy objectives.

In this connection, Japan's active promotion of the Chinese representation question and the Korean unification problem should be duly noted. The basic objective of the United States Far Eastern policy following the Korean War was to contain the spread of communism in Asia. In the UN context, the US containment policy took the form of endeavouring to offset the recognition of the representation of the People's Republic of China. With regard to the Korean question, the United States policy was to support the position of the Republic of Korea concerning the terms of unification with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the settlement of the Korean War.

Japan worked hard with the United States to prevent the recognition of the Beijing government to represent China in the United Nations until 1960, by aiding the American tactics in rejecting the ques-

tion as an agenda item. After the 16th session of the General Assembly in 1961, Japan joined a small group of co-sponsors to designate Chinese representation as an ''important question'' requiring a two-thirds vote. In spite of divided domestic opinion over the Chinese representation question, the Japanese government stood firm and defended the nationalists in the United Nations. At the 26th session of the General Assembly in 1971, it fought the last battle with the United States to realize a ''two Chinas'' over a ''one China, one Taiwan'' solution by accepting the representation of the People's Republic but also allowing Taiwan to remain as a separate member. The attempt to designate the expulsion of Nationalist China from the United Nations as an ''important question'' requiring a two-thirds vote failed by a vote of 55:59:15. No UN vote had such a direct and devastating effect on Japan's bilateral relations. The defeat on the Chinese representation question resulted in a drastic policy change by the government in the direction of expediting normalization of relations with the People's Republic.[3]

As to the Korean issue, Japan made great efforts to support the position of the Republic of Korea, which had claimed its legitimacy as the government that fought the communist aggression from the north, and demanded admission to the United Nations. However, after the armistice and the increase in the number of non-aligned countries supporting the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the issue turned into one over the withdrawal of the United Nations forces and the dissolution of the United Nations Commission for Korea. The two Koreas presented contending resolutions and engaged in an active campaign that neither party would be able to command majority support; the issue was withdrawn from the UN agenda in 1976 and left to be dealt with outside the United Nations.

Aside from Japan's heavy involvement in the two Asian issues, during the first period Japan's major interest was to become represented in the various forums. In particular, its interest in the Security Council was strong, a reflection of its high expectations of the peace and security role of the United Nations as expressed at the time of its admission. Japan was elected to the Security Council in 1958, just two years after joining the United Nations, and again in 1966. Japan began to show its desire to become permanently represented on the Security Council. Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi made statements at the general debate of the 24th and 25th sessions of the General Assembly that were interpreted to show Japan's aspiration to be a permanent member of the Security Council.[4] The difficulty of winning frequent

elections to the Security Council, mixed with a growing confidence over its economic strength, seemed to have prompted Japan to test the waters. Japan's financial contribution at the time of its entry to the United Nations in 1956 had been assessed at 2.19 per cent. By 1970 it had increased to 3.78 per cent.

Aside from the Security Council, Japan was elected to the Economic and Social Council from 1960 to 1965, and again from 1968 to 1970. It also began to serve on many of the functional commissions and the governing boards of development assistance agencies. Of special importance was the election of Kataro Tanaka to the International Court of Justice in 1961. Winning elections and gaining representation were considered important objectives for Japan as it tried to establish its status in the United Nations. There was, however, no Japanese appointed to any senior post in the United Nations Secretariat.

Second period: The 1970s

The central issue in the second period was North–South. Decolonization had resulted in a vast membership increase, and the majority interest in the United Nations turned more and more to the question of reorganizing economic relations between the developed and developing countries. Already by the mid-1960s a new approach to development theory had emerged in the United Nations that refuted the liberal economic theory that spontaneous self-correcting forces might operate and solve the economic problems of the countries in the South. What distinguished the 1970s was the vehemence with which the South embarked upon a confrontational strategy to win concessions from the North through the negotiation of fundamental changes in the world economy.

In the 1970s, two issues had preoccupied Japan in the United Nations. One was the Middle East question, which had added poignancy after the oil crisis of 1973. The other was the negotiations involving the establishment of a New International Economic Order. The oil crisis had a tremendous impact not only on the Japanese economy but also on its policy in the United Nations. Traditionally, Japan held the position (along with the United States) that peace in the Middle East should be achieved through the early and complete implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which recognized the "sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area," including Israel. However, when the

Arab states resorted to oil embargo measures in the course of the Middle East war in October 1973, and announced their policy of giving preferential treatment to countries that supported them in the war against Israel, domestic pressure in Japan mounted rapidly demanding a change in its Middle East policy. The Japanese government decided to depart from its equidistant stance between Israel and the Arab states. On 22 November, it issued a formal statement in the name of the Cabinet Secretary that it supported the Arab position that Israel should withdraw its troops from all the territory occupied in the 1967 war. Furthermore, it announced that it might reconsider its policy towards Israel, depending on the course of developments. This government statement brought assurance of preferential treatment for Japan in the Arab oil embargo. The United States regretted Japan's change in its Middle East policy, but Japan had already told the then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, at the time of his visit to Japan in mid-November that it could not afford to reject Arab pressure in view of the overwhelming dependence of its industries on Middle East oil. Japan departed from its traditional close cooperation with the United States over the question of oil and the Middle East.[5]

Japan's policy in the United Nations on Middle East questions in succeeding years reflected this fundamental change. In the 1973–1975 period Japan veered closer to the Arab position and voted for the resolution that invited the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), as the representative of the Palestinian people, to the deliberations of the General Assembly,[6] while it abstained on others that promoted the Arab cause.[7] In particular, Japan's abstention on the "Zionist" resolution[8] was widely noted as the resolution was adopted against the opposition of the entire Western group of nations and was to cost the United Nations dearly in terms of governmental as well as public support in these countries. Furthermore, Japan went beyond support for Security Council Resolution 242 and endorsed recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including the right of self-determination, by voting for two Security Council resolutions that were ultimately vetoed by the United States.[9]

In upholding the principle of the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people and in accepting the role of the PLO in the peace process leading to a lasting settlement in the Middle East, Japan made clear its support for the Arab position. Japan actively began to extend economic and technical assistance to the Islamic countries in

the Middle East. In the United Nations, Japan increased its contribution five times in 1974 to UNRWA (UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East) and continued to increase it, becoming the third-largest contributor by 1981.[10] At the same time, Japan exercised great caution in dealing with the PLO. Although it recognized the opening of a PLO office in Tokyo, Japan did not agree to grant the organization diplomatic status. Moreover, Japan gave full endorsement to the Camp David Agreement as the first step in reaching a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem.

As to the series of negotiations that took place in the economic forums of the United Nations in the wake of the oil crisis, Japan's major concern was to reach an understanding with the resource-producing developing countries. As an industrial country heavily dependent on imported raw materials, Japan was conscious of the vital need to gain the cooperation of the developing countries. Japan supported the Algerian initiative to convene a special session from 9 April to 2 May of the General Assembly devoted to "raw materials." It joined the consensus adoption of the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and its accompanying Programme of Action, in spite of the many difficulties that it had with the contents of these documents. It did make clear, however, that it had reservations over the unlimited exercise of "permanent sovereignty over natural resources," the linkage between the prices of exports of developing countries with those of their imports, and the introduction of a general system of preferential treatment.[11] When a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was adopted by a vote of 120:6:10 at the 29th session of the General Assembly later that year, Japan abstained, together with the Western industrialized countries.[12] Japan found that its basic interests as an industrial market economy could not be compromised in the face of the growing radicalism of the developing countries.

In 1980, the developing countries proposed to hold another special economic session in which five major areas were to be linked in a global negotiation. These five areas were energy, development, international monetary and financial reform, international trade, and raw materials. The demand for linkage of these five areas was strategically important, particularly in two senses. First, it signified a compromise on the part of the oil-producing countries to agree to a debate on energy matters in the United Nations, an option that they had pre-

cluded as divisive to the solidarity of the developing countries. Second, it showed the attempt to strengthen the bargaining position of the developing countries by insisting on the incorporation of the question of monetary and financial reform, an area that had been kept outside of the United Nations and left to the Bretton Woods institutions.

The 11th Special Session debated but deadlocked over the procedures to be followed by the global negotiations. The developing countries attempted to strengthen the competence of the General Assembly over all areas of economic activities, which, under the existing United Nations system, were delegated to the various functional organs. The industrialized countries, particularly the United States, were determined to keep the competence of the IMF and GATT intact. The United States, together with the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, were opposed to reaching any compromise. Japan, while sharing the basic concerns of these Western countries, seemed more prepared to engage in a global negotiation that might bring the energy issue in line with other developmental problems. The global negotiation was never launched, and North–South dialogue became a less important agenda in the United Nations in the next decade.[13]

One Japanese initiative in the 1970s that merits special attention was the establishment of the United Nations University. When Secretary-General U Thant proposed in September 1969 to consider the possibility of setting up a university based on the principles of the United Nations Charter, Japan responded with great enthusiasm. The idea of a United Nations university was appealing to a wide range of the Japanese public. Some saw in the university an opportunity to bring the UN presence closer to the Japanese people. Others were anxious to develop an international educational institution that might provide Japanese students and scholars with more direct access to the international academic community. Some others simply wanted a major project in their home region or district. At the time of its inception, the university was expected to serve as an educational institution with a strong liberal arts leaning, with a regular international teaching staff and students.[14]

The proposal to establish a United Nations university, however, faced enormous difficulties. The major powers were not in support of the idea, as they considered such an institution as overlapping the functions of many existing universities as well as UN agencies. Be-

sides, they were against any undertaking that might prove costly to the United Nations. The developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America were anxious to launch a UN university. After three years of intense debate and negotiation, the establishment of the United Nations University was approved by the 27th session of the General Assembly, but the final agreed function of the university was no longer one of teaching but one of networking international research. The Japanese delegation led the efforts to mobilize support in favour of the university on the floor of the General Assembly and UNESCO. Japan provided the largest financial contribution to the endowment fund of the United Nations University. It also succeeded in hosting the headquarters of the university in Tokyo. The university was to contribute to the promotion of research and training, in particular from the developing countries.

As far as Japan's status in the United Nations is concerned, it is important to note that by 1973 Japan's assessed contribution to the United Nations budget became 7.15 per cent and Japan was ranked third after the United States and the Soviet Union. This sudden jump, surpassing two permanent members, namely the United Kingdom and France, rekindled Japan's aspiration to join the ranks of the permanent members of the Security Council. In 1973, at the 28th session of the General Assembly, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger expressed US support for the permanent membership of Japan on the Security Council. In the Tanaka–Nixon Communiqué of the same year, President Nixon expressed his belief that ''a way should be found to assure permanent representation in that council for Japan, whose resources and influence are of major importance in world affairs.''[15]

With the exception of the United States, however, no support was forthcoming in favour of permanent representation for Japan on the Security Council. The Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France were reluctant to take up an issue that might undermine the established distribution of power. The People's Republic of China, although in principle favouring revision of the Charter, had not clarified its view on the desirable composition of the Security Council. Although some states showed sympathy for Japan's aspirations, no one seemed willing to take up an issue that might open up ''Pandora's box.'' In fact, many states demonstrated their own designs on permanent membership on the Security Council. Latin American states felt that their region should be represented by a permanent

member. The Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the group of non-aligned nations expected to see their president *ex officio* serving permanently on the Council. India felt it should represent the region of South and South-East Asia. When an ad hoc committee was formed in 1974 to deal with the question of reviewing the Charter, Japan supported the move in the hopes of gaining permanent membership. By the time the committee was formally launched the following year, however, the mandate itself was diluted so as to embody a general consideration of ways to strengthen the role of the United Nations.

In the 1970s, Japan made major efforts to expand its representation in the Secretariat. Since the Secretariat controls the collection, processing, and distribution of information, as well as acting as an intermediary in informal contacts and negotiations, member states have attempted over the years to exercise influence over the Secretariat through various means, including the appointment of their own nationals to important posts. Japan was able to have Genichiro Akatani appointed to the post of assistant secretary-general in charge of public information. It was the first appointment of a Japanese national at senior level. Japan also made systematic attempts to increase staff appointment by setting up a recruitment centre for international organizations in the Foreign Ministry, and placed personnel officers at its missions in New York and Geneva.

The appointment of Japanese international civil servants had been difficult for many reasons. First, Japan's late entry into the United Nations deprived Japan of the possibility of placing its nationals in strategic posts during the formative years of the organization. Second, Japan had to compete with other new arrivals from the developing countries that demanded representation in the Secretariat. Especially during the 1970s, women and nationals from developing countries pressed for priority treatment in UN appointments. Third, qualified Japanese nationals were not abundant owing to language limitations and the Japanese practice of life-long employment, as well as favourable employment opportunities at home. Japan's rapid increase in its contributions expanded the "desirable range" set up by the Secretary-General as a guideline for staff recruitment on the basis of the principle of equitable geographical distribution. Throughout the 1970s, however, the number of Japanese staff hovered at around 70 persons, i.e. virtually only half of Japan's "desirable range." The question of increasing Japanese staff appointments remained one of the important targets of Japan's UN policy.

242

Third period: The 1980s

The third period found a much more active Japan in the United Nations. During much of the 1980s, the United Nations underwent a series of crises, whether of finance, management, or identity. The United States turned its back on the United Nations as a result of deep-seated mistrust that had developed in the 1970s, when the non-aligned nations had targeted the United States. They concentrated UN debates on the Middle East, South Africa, and North–South issues in order to attack and isolate the United States. The Reagan administration no longer found the United Nations a useful instrument of its foreign policy. It withheld its contributions in protest against the voting system in the United Nations, which disregarded the will of the largest financial contributor. Japan's role became one of promoting the reform of the United Nations in order to regain and consolidate the support of the United States and major contributing countries. Japan's efforts in the 1980s concentrated on three main areas: reform of the UN administration and financial situation, strengthening the peace and security functions of the United Nations, and humanitarian activities, which Japan came to support as a major donor to the United Nations system.

The reform of the United Nations became a priority concern for Japan when the Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts was organized in 1986 on its initiative. At the 40th session of the General Assembly the previous year, Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe had proposed in his general statement the establishment of "a group of eminent persons for a more efficient United Nations," so that the "world body and its specialized agencies will function efficiently in the 21st century."[16] The mandate of the Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts, known as the Group of 18 (G18), was to "conduct a thorough review of the administrative and financial matters of the United Nations."[17] What motivated the Japanese government to take this initiative was its feeling that the United Nations was in a state of crisis. For some time, the United Nations could hardly claim credit for the peaceful settlement of disputes for the promotion of peace and security in the world. Its economic and social activities kept expanding without exerting much impact on a world faced with famine and poverty. Many governments of industrialized countries felt that UN expenditures had to be reduced and that some system should be introduced to correct the asymmetry between financial contributions and budgetary control. Although Japan did not condone

unilateral withdrawal or delayed contributions by member states, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, it was convinced that some fundamental change should be undertaken to address the issue.

The 1980s marked Japan's rapid rise as a major contributor to the UN system. By 1986, Japan's assessment surpassed that of the Soviet Union, and Japan ranked next to the United States. Japan's contributions to the specialized agencies and its voluntary contributions to the various operational activities also increased rapidly. As a large contributor, Japan found itself pushed to the forefront to cope with the administrative and financial problems of the United Nations at the time. Besides, serious efforts were being made within Japan to undertake administrative reform of the government structure.

The G18 held four sessions throughout 1986 and submitted a report with 71 recommendations to the 41st session of the General Assembly.[18] Ambassador Shizuo Saito, former Japanese permanent representative to the United Nations, served as vice-chairman of the expert group. The G18 laboured against the backdrop of the worst financial crisis that had faced the United Nations. As a result of Congressional action, the United States was expected to withhold a significant portion of its contribution for 1986–1987. The largest of the cuts was due to the passage of the Kassebaum amendment, which required the United Nations to adopt a weighted voting system on budgetary matters or face a ceiling of 20 per cent on US contributions to the assessed budget of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. The work of the Group became the focal point of attention in UN circles. In the end, the 41st session adopted the report of G18, which recommended the inclusion of a consensus principle into the budget programming process. The fact that a consensus principle was specified in the decision-making of the Committee for Programme and Coordination was taken by the United States to be an encouraging sign of the efforts by the United Nations to reform itself. At the end of 1986, the US administration softened its policy and provided a payment of US$100 million. Furthermore, it recommended to Congress to revise the Kassebaum amendment. The administrative reform initiated by Japan proved to be a successful exercise.[19]

The role played by Japan in the selection of the executive director of UNESCO in 1987 also shows Japan's growing management consciousness. After the United States' withdrawal from UNESCO in 1984, followed by the departures of the United Kingdom and Singa-

pore, Japan chose to remain in the organization and attempted to carry out reforms from within. UNESCO, under the leadership of Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, executive director, had been heavily imbued with third world radicalism, which was symbolized in the decision to create a New World Information and Communications Order. M'Bow also promoted third world interests, particularly African, in terms of both programmes and appointments. The financial situation reached a critical point owing to the continued expansionist programme even after the withdrawal of the United States and other members. When M'Bow decided to seek a third term in 1987, Japan, together with many European and other countries, took the lead to prevent his re-election. It was a decision that arose from the need to prevent further erosion of the organization and to restore North–South harmony and cooperation.[20]

The second area of Japan's priority concern was the strengthening of the peace and security functions of the United Nations. It should be recalled that Japan's single most important objective in joining the world organization in 1956 was to bolster its national security. Since then the ineffectiveness of the United Nations in maintaining peace and security somewhat dampened Japan's idealism but did not altogether undermine its expectations. Japan's UN policy in the peace and security field, therefore, generally followed two lines. The first line was to promote disarmament, in response to widespread public expectation that world peace must be realized through disarmament and that Japan's role was to promote this by publicizing the tragic consequences of nuclear weapons. The government accorded high priority to the disarmament issue and made strenuous efforts to become a member of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament when it was expanded in 1969 to 26 from the original 18. It also became a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1976 and took active part in calling widely for its universal acceptance. In the forum of the Committee on Disarmament, it promoted an end to all nuclear test explosions in order to arrive at the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The second line followed by Japan in the area of peace and security was to strengthen the various peace-keeping functions of the United Nations. In 1980, Japan presented a proposal to the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization concerning the reinforcement of the fact-finding functions of the United Nations. The content of the proposal was not particularly novel, but it reflected the

basic lines of Japanese reasoning on the United Nations' peace and security functions. There were two components to the Japanese proposal: one was the strengthening of the Secretary-General's functions under Article 99, and the other was the limitation of the Security Council prerogatives. By emphasizing the importance of fact-finding in dealing effectively with various disputes, Japan argued that a subsidiary organ should be established for fact-finding purposes. This organ could take the form of a Secretary-General's representative stationed for a certain period of time in dispute areas. The Security Council, on the other hand, should make clear that resolutions concerning the establishment and dispatch of fact-finding missions would not require the unanimous approval of the permanent members.[21]

After that Japan took several steps to seek ways to strengthen and reinforce the peace-keeping functions of the United Nations. It sent a working paper to the 12th Special Session concerning the strengthening and expansion of the United Nations peace-keeping functions.[22] At the 37th session of the General Assembly, Japan took the initiative to prepare and pass by consensus a resolution that emphasized the need to strengthen the role and effectiveness of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security.[23] The main feature of this resolution was to set up a group of experts under the Secretary-General "to undertake technical studies regarding the strengthening and expansion of the United Nations peace-keeping functions."[24] The particular move was taken in response to the appeal by Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar, who in his first annual report to the General Assembly had focused on the alarming world situation and the inability of the organization to play an effective and decisive role.[25]

It is interesting to note that the response of the Western nations to the Japanese proposal was lukewarm, if not negative. Japan worked closely with such states as Yugoslavia, Austria, India, Sweden, and Egypt – countries with either non-aligned or neutralist tendencies that support the United Nations as an important instrument in their foreign policy. Although 44 states eventually co-sponsored the resolution, none of the leading Western countries joined in the sponsorship. The permanent members of the Security Council seemed to have suspected that the resolution might eventually question the efficacy of the Security Council, as well as its responsibility for its paralysis. In the end, the resolution that was passed emphasized "the imperative need to strengthen the role and effectiveness of the United Nations,"[26] and called upon member states to continue their efforts

through offering views on the matter, but the plan to set up a group of experts did not materialize.

At the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization, Japan continued its quest of devising further means to strengthen the peace-keeping functions of the Secretary-General. Together with the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, and New Zealand, Japan made major efforts to draft the Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International Peace and Security and on the Role of the United Nations in This Field. The main purposes of this declaration were to emphasize the obligation of member states "to prevent in their international relations the emergence of aggravation or disputes or situations"; to remind the Security Council "to consider sending, at an early stage, fact-finding or good offices missions or establishing appropriate forms of United Nations presence, including observers and peace-keeping operations"; to encourage the Secretary-General "to consider using, at as early a stage as he deems appropriate, the right that is accorded to him under Article 99 of the Charter."[27] What the declaration tried to attain was to take the United Nations beyond its traditional role of dealing with disputes and situations after they are brought to its attention, and to act at an early stage to prevent or remove particular disputes or situations. The declaration passed the 43rd session of the General Assembly by consensus on 5 December 1988. The fact that the declaration on the prevention of disputes received the support of the General Assembly was perhaps not unrelated to the changing environment of the United Nations, in which leading member states, particularly the Soviet Union, were ready to give more authority to the Secretary-General to maintain international peace and security.

The third area in which Japan became heavily involved in the 1980s was humanitarian. For a long time, Japan's involvement in UN humanitarian activities had been limited. Refugee assistance had been regarded as a remote cause for Japan, and emergency assistance had not been considered a priority issue. The situation changed drastically in 1979 when Japan became an important country in the assistance of Indo-Chinese refugees. The flux of refugees from Viet Nam and Cambodia had caused an international uproar, and humanitarian assistance had become a priority agenda in international cooperation. Japan, which was pressed to help, especially by the United States, reversed its traditional policy of not allowing any permanent

refugee settlement on Japanese soil. During 1979, Japan increased its contributions to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) by more than six times, from US$10 million to US$65 million, becoming the second-largest contributor to the UNHCR after the United States, and has remained so ever since.

The Japanese government's support for Indo-Chinese refugee assistance triggered a drastic change in public attitudes toward humanitarian and development assistance. Several private groups, some of which began to undertake volunteer work in the developing countries, were organized at the time. When the news of famine in Africa reached Japan, the call for emergency assistance received great public support. A special month (September) in 1984 dedicated to Africa was observed. Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe, in his general statement to the 39th session of the General Assembly, characterized the deteriorating situation in Africa as "an affront to peace," and urged that "the United Nations agencies be mobilized to draw up a unified plan of Africa making effective use of the total range of United Nations capabilities."[28] Abe himself visited Zambia, Ethiopia, and Egypt in November, and pledged over US$100 million in food aid. At the United Nations, when the negotiations faltered over references to delicate questions involving debt burden and price stabilization of primary commodities, the African group turned to Japan to coordinate the adoption of a declaration on the dangerous situation in Africa. The Declaration on the Critical Economic Situation in Africa was subsequently adopted by consensus by the General Assembly on 3 December 1984. It was acclaimed as a document devoid of ideological trimmings and as a testament to the UN community's readiness to cope with the situation in Africa.

It was high time for Japan to assume a significant share in the burden of international humanitarian assistance. Since 1977, Japan's official development assistance has undergone a series of doublings.[29] Official funds not only became available for bilateral contribution but were even raised to 10.84 per cent. As the second-largest contributor to the United Nations, with an expanding quota under the system of "desirable range," the issue seemed to call for more drastic adjustment.

While the number of Japanese nationals in the United Nations had remained constant at about 70–80 throughout the 1970s, in the course of a year (1981 to 1982), 21 Japanese professionals were added to the staff. Over the next few years annual appointments were made to total 121 altogether by 1985. The advancement of Japanese nationals

was particularly notable in the higher echelons of the UN bureaucracy, with two assistant secretaries-general appointed in 1984. Such a substantial increase in Japanese personnel in the United Nations was the result of years of effort on the part of the Japanese government as well as of the fortuitous availability of qualified candidates. The expansion did seem, however, partly to reflect the Secretariat's growing recognition of Japan's importance as a major financial contributor. In the next few years, however, Japanese representation underwent a steady decline. As of 1988, the total number went down to 90.[30] The growing job opportunities in the international market for Japanese with UN training and experience were perhaps the general reason that took many away. More directly, the financial crisis of the late 1990s, the uncertainties over promotion and pay rises, and the moratorium on new recruitment were factors that contributed to the resignation of Japanese nationals, especially in the middle echelon. Although the Japanese contributions to the United Nations are expected to increase continuously, and the "desirable range" for national representation is also likely to grow, the prospects for expanding Japanese representation in the Secretariat at this point do not seem encouraging.

Selected issues

Voting patterns

It is recalled that, at the time of Japan's entry to the United Nations, the government proclaimed three basic principles: (1) it would be "UN centred"; (2) it would cooperate with the free democratic nations; and (3) it would identify closely with Asian countries. In evaluating changing policy positions taken by Japan in the United Nations in the last 40 years, it may be useful to take these three principles as a starting point, and see how they have affected Japan's decision-making.

As has already been discussed in this paper, the major characteristic of Japan's policy during the first years after its entry was its close adherence to the United States, especially in pursuing the anti-communist policy in the Far East. During this time, Japan's voting pattern showed high coincidence with US votes (80 per cent). After the mid-1960s, however, Japanese coincidence with US votes declined rapidly and reached the lowest level of 37 per cent in the mid-1980s.[31] Japan's drift away from the United States in General Assem-

bly votes, however, cannot necessarily be taken as a departure from its cooperation with the Western group of countries. Throughout the 1960s, the 1970s, and much of the 1980s, Japan's percentage coincidence with the votes of OECD countries remained constant at 60–70 per cent. In fact, it was the United States that parted more drastically from the voting practices of many Western countries and chose to "stand alone"[32] in the face of the growing majority control by the non-aligned group of nations.

Of the Western group of countries, however, Japan's percentage coincidence with the United States votes is lower than that of countries such as the United Kingdom, the FRG, Canada, Belgium, and Italy, and often stands slightly higher than that of France.[33] Two factors seem to account for Japan's relative distancing from the United States. The first derives from Japan's basic posture as a country belonging to the Asian group of nations. Japan's allegiance to the Asian group is reflected in a fairly high voting coincidence with countries of East and South-East Asia. Because of the change in its Middle East policy that followed the oil crisis in the early 1970s, Japan's voting coincidence with the Arab countries also tends to be high. Altogether Japan's voting pattern shows high coincidence with the non-aligned group. It is also interesting to observe that Japan shows high voting coincidence with the Soviet Union, not so much because their positions on various issues are similar but because the Soviet Union, since the mid-1960s, has moved closer in support of the non-aligned group.[34]

A second factor that contributes to Japan's low voting coincidence with the United States is the relatively large number of abstentions by Japan. Most studies of voting patterns exclude abstention votes from their analysis.[35] Depending on how Japanese abstentions are interpreted, however, Japan's coincidence with the United States or with the Soviet Union becomes subject to different interpretations. If Japanese abstentions on resolutions are taken to express common positions with the United States, Japanese positions become much more identical with those of the United States. If, on the other hand, Japanese abstentions on resolutions are considered to stand for positions different from those of the United States, Japanese positions turn out to be grossly dissimilar. The truth probably lies somewhere in between. Without examining a great number of specific cases, there is no satisfactory formula to assess Japanese abstentions. With the large number of negative votes that the United States exercised in the 1980s, the general pattern has become one in which the United

States votes "no" to many issues on which Japan abstains. Questions relating to Nicaragua, southern Africa, disarmament, human rights, North–South relations, and the Middle East generally follow this pattern. Japan's abstentions are often expressions of its reluctance clearly to take sides. So long as Japan tries to cooperate with the Western countries as well as closely identify itself with the Asian and other developing countries, abstaining will continue to hold sway.

Japan's voting record is a reflection of the many conflicting demands that it attempts to meet. In other words, it may be considered the outcome of adapting the three basic principles of its UN policy to the specific situations that call for position-taking. One notable change in Japan's voting pattern over the last 30 years has been the growing decline in voting with the United States and the gradual increase in support for the non-aligned states. When Japan proclaimed its "UN-centred" policy at the time of its entry, UN-centred in fact meant cooperation with the United States. The meaning of a UN-centred policy in today's UN context has not been clearly spelled out by the policy makers. The voting record suggests, however, that Japan has come to use the forum to show its support for some of the global concerns expressed by the majority group. While discussions and negotiations with the United States and the Western countries have moved to other forums, such as the annual economic summits, OECD, and many bilateral set-ups, the United Nations offers more and more opportunity for Japan to augment its global involvement encompassing the developing world. Today, Japan is faced with the need to heed the interests of a wide range of nations not only of the West and Asia, but also of Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere.

Peace-keeping operations

As already discussed in this paper, Japan's primary interest in joining the United Nations was to bolster its national security by relying on the capacity of the world organization to maintain international peace and security. Although the ineffectiveness of the United Nations in fulfilling its mission somewhat dashed Japanese expectations, Japan continued its efforts to strengthen the peace and security functions of the United Nations and took several initiatives in the 1980s. It should be recalled that at the 37th session of the General Assembly Japan promoted the passage of a resolution that called on member states to seek ways to strengthen the role and effectiveness of the United Nations in maintaining peace and security. However,

were Japan to follow the full implications of its proposal, it would have to clarify the extent to which it is prepared to contribute to peace-keeping activities.

The question of dispatching Japan's Self-Defence Forces for UN peace-keeping operations has been a political issue for a long time. Even prior to Japan's entry into the United Nations, questions were raised in the Diet about whether obligations under the UN Charter might not necessitate participation in military activities of the kind that were carried out in Korea, or whether a country like Japan without military forces could fulfil the obligations of a member state. On 2 June 1954, the House of Councillors passed a resolution prohibiting the dispatch overseas of Self-Defence Forces.

In the years following Japan's entry into the United Nations, the debate in the Diet centred on the question of the extent to which the Self-Defence Forces could cooperate with the United Nations under the existing constitutional framework. Article 9 of the constitution renounced "war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes." The government argued that the constitutionality of the troop dispatch for UN peace-keeping purposes depended on the particular objective, mandate, and organization of the operation. For cases of pure policing and maintenance of law and order that do not accompany the exercise of force, dispatch of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces might not necessarily violate the constitution.[36] The opposition parties took the position that cooperation with the United Nations did not necessarily require military cooperation, and that the government was attempting to expand the interpretation of the constitutional framework and was trying to open ways for an eventual troop dispatch overseas.[37] Aside from the question of constitutionality, however, what determined the question of the troop dispatch was the fact that no provision existed in the basic law concerning the organization of the Self-Defence Forces that allowed participation in the UN operations. In the face of the strong negative views of the opposition parties, the government had no intention of undertaking an action that seemed clearly beyond existing national consensus. From the UN side, there had been one attempt by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld on 30 July 1958 to invite the participation of 10 Japanese officers in the observer mission to Lebanon (UNOGIL). At the time the government felt obliged to decline. The prevailing domestic climate, and particularly the absence of any legal provision

252

that allowed the dispatch of Self-Defence Forces personnel, made it quite impossible to accommodate the UN request.

As Japan began to take positive steps to strengthen the peace and security functions of the United Nations in the 1980s, the question of its own contribution became more and more a realistic concern. It is recalled that, at the 37th session of the General Assembly, Japan took the initiative to set up a group of experts "to undertake technical studies regarding the strengthening and expansion of the United Nations peace-keeping functions."[38] Although this particular scheme did not materialize, the General Assembly called on member states to offer their own views on the question.[39] In response to this resolution, the Foreign Ministry invited a group of scholars and journalists to examine ways of strengthening the functions of the various UN organs involved in the maintenance of peace and security, as well as to come up with specific proposals concerning the Japanese role in this field.

In the final report to the Foreign Minister presented in August 1983, the study group emphasized that "Japan should play a more positive and broader-ranging role in peace-keeping operations," and proposed a seven-stage plan of action to be followed:

1. preparation and provision of funding and material supplies;
2. participation in the election surveillance activities of peace-keeping operations (e.g. participation in the civilian sector of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) for Namibia);
3. participation in the medical activities of peace-keeping operations;
4. participation in transport and communications activities;
5. participation in police activities;
6. participation in logistic support;
7. observation and patrol activities.[40]

It should be noted that, in the early 1980s, interest in the possible Japanese participation in the Namibian operation had been expressed because of the large civilian component foreseen in the UNTAG plan.[41] Step by step, Japan began to seek ways of contributing to peace-keeping operations through the provision of additional funds on a voluntary basis as well as dispatching civilians to operations whenever possible. At the Third Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita presented a new Japanese international cooperation scheme. One of the most important components of this plan was strengthen-

ing its cooperation to achieve peace. This idea consisted mainly of supporting UN peace-keeping operations. According to the Prime Minister, Japan was not only willing to provide financial support but also prepared to supply personnel to monitor elections or to assist in transportation, telecommunications, and medical care.[42]

In fact, in 1987, Japan made special financial contributions to the UN operations in Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq. Moreover, the Foreign Ministry sent two officers on secondment to the United Nations to participate in the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan and the UN Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group operations in the field. To the UNTAG mission in 1989, a team of 31 members was sent to Namibia to monitor elections. The government dispatched a monitoring team of six to Nicaragua to assist in the election observation by ONUVEN in 1990.

Compared with many member states that have actively participated in UN peace-keeping operations by sending observers or dispatching battalions, the Japanese participation has been minimal in scope. However, a clear signal seems to have been made – that Japanese participation in UN activities relating to peace and security will no longer be confined to the financial aspect alone. Does this mean that Japan will be dispatching its Self-Defence Forces to UN peace-keeping operations in the near future? The domestic political scene is still too uncertain to provide an early answer.

As far as the debate in the Diet is concerned, the government seems extremely cautious in suggesting any imminent change of policy. To questions raised with regard to the possible dispatch of Self-Defence Forces personnel to UN peace-keeping operations, former Prime Minister Takeshita and former Foreign Minister Uno emphasized the need to send only Japanese civilian personnel. To suggestions that participation by Self-Defence Forces might also be considered, they reiterated the legal argument that the basic law concerning the organization of the Self-Defence Forces did not provide such a mandate, and that it was probably difficult to enlarge it.[43]

At least two factors are expected to influence the outcome of the ongoing debate over Japanese troop dispatch. First is the importance of the United Nations in global peace-keeping and peace-making. At a time when *détente* between the United States and the Soviet Union is expected to grow, the United Nations may be allowed to play a more determining role in world politics. Japanese cooperation with the United Nations, including greater support of peace-keeping operations, might be considered a crucial factor.[44] Proposals have al-

ready been made to organize a "peace cooperation force" on a standby basis that would be separate from the Self-Defence Forces.[45] International political developments and the enhanced role to be played by the United Nations in the coming years may influence the national debate in the direction of new institutional arrangements.

The second factor to be taken into consideration is the nature of the political leadership in the next few years. So long as the opposition parties continue to deny any UN role to the Self-Defence Forces, no significant change can be foreseen. The opposition parties became the majority in the House of Councillors in 1989, and the Liberal Democratic Party is not likely to take decisions that might further undermine its position. However, depending on international political developments, the opposition parties, too, may be forced to accept a greater role for the United Nations and eventually face the question of the Japanese role. Meanwhile, the government will try to expand Japanese participation in the civilian components of peace-keeping operations. Since UN peace-keeping operations have been assuming the task of election observers and other civilian roles, Japan may have greater opportunities for enhancing its participation. In the final analysis, the Japanese contribution to global peace and security through the United Nations is likely to grow. The involvement of Japanese monitoring teams in the Namibia and Nicaragua elections, for example, has had a significant effect on Japanese public opinion in the positive appreciation of UN operational activities.

Domestic constituents

Public opinion

The United Nations is a well-known organization in Japan and commands considerable support from the public. According to a special opinion survey conducted in 1987 by the Foreign Ministry on the United Nations,[46] over 90 per cent of those polled had heard about the United Nations. Nearly 90 per cent thought the United Nations was necessary for the future, and almost 80 per cent thought it contributed to world peace and human welfare. On the whole, the Japanese public seemed to have high expectations of the United Nations. Of those who had heard about the United Nations, 75 per cent felt that Japan was cooperating with the United Nations. When asked whether Japan should be more positive in cooperating with the

United Nations, 39 per cent agreed, while 36 per cent felt that Japan should cooperate to a certain extent. Most people seemed to form their views on the United Nations through television (87.2 per cent) and newspapers (78.4 per cent) rather than through formal education (20.5 per cent), thus proving the importance of the media in developing public attitudes.

The general attitude of the Japanese public toward the United Nations certainly seems favourable. In order to determine in which direction the public is likely to lend its future support, it may be useful to examine specific issue areas, especially those on which Japan has concentrated its efforts in the last 10 years. With regard to the question of administrative and financial management, the public does not seem to possess much understanding or interest. Although the public seems to be aware of the inefficiency of the United Nations in general terms, almost half of those who were polled by the Foreign Ministry survey stated that they did not know much about this problem. Nor did they seem to have any clear idea of what it means to bear financial obligations to the United Nations.[47] Although the Japanese government is expected to carry on its efforts to reform the administrative fabric of the United Nations in the years ahead, it is not likely to be given much credit for this by the public.

With regard to the UN role in the maintenance of peace and security, there is considerable recognition of the importance of these activities, as well as appreciation of their usefulness. To the question whether Japan should cooperate with the peace-keeping activities by extending financial assistance, dispatching personnel, and providing equipment within the limits of the existing domestic law, the public reaction was quite positive.[48] However, in a more recent survey that directly raised the possibility of dispatching the Self-Defence Forces to the UN peace-keeping operations, there was considerable reservation – 24.5 per cent were opposed and 22.0 per cent were inclined to oppose, while only 8.3 per cent supported it and 14.1 per cent were inclined to support it. It is interesting to note that the same people showed willingness to dispatch the Self-Defence Forces overseas for disaster relief activities.[49] These results reveal the still undecided nature of the question of dispatching Self-Defence Forces for peace-keeping purposes in the mind of the Japanese public. The cautious approach displayed by government leaders is a reflection of the public mood.

In the area of human rights and humanitarian assistance, the public attitude is quite forthright. Of the four major areas of activities in

256

which the United Nations has concentrated its efforts – peace-keeping, development assistance, education and culture, and human rights and humanitarian assistance – the largest portion of those polled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs survey registered their knowledge of human rights and humanitarian activities (87.2 per cent). Their appreciation of the results was also high (68.5 per cent).[50] Considering that Japan's involvement in the area of human rights and humanitarian assistance has been relatively recent, these results are rather surprising. On the one hand, they may reflect the success of United Nations activities in this area. On the other hand, they may be related to the direct exposure that the Japanese public has had to the influx of refugees in the last 10 years.

On the whole, the Japanese public is favourably disposed to follow whatever initiatives the government may take in the United Nations or cases that the United Nations might promote. So long as there is no conflict with Japan's vital interests, or sudden exposure of widespread wrongdoing in the United Nations, the public will be ready to support it. The one uncertain question is cooperation with UN peace-keeping operations through the dispatch of the Self-Defence Forces. Since this is intimately involved with the issue of Japan's own defence and the role of the Self-Defence Forces under the constitution, no conclusive consensus is likely to evolve without strong international or political pressure.

Special interest groups

The fact that the Japanese public is favourably disposed towards the United Nations does not mean that there are well-organized groups that are supportive of UN affairs. On the other hand, there are no groups that are seriously opposed to cooperation with the United Nations. The United Nations Association is nationally organized but can hardly claim broad-based understanding or commitment to UN causes. Among the non-governmental groups affiliated to UN agencies, the National Federation of UNESCO and the Japan Committee for UNICEF have the greatest public following. The former has a membership of 20,000 and the latter has over 5,000 individual and 275 corporate memberships. Both UNESCO and UNICEF made a strong impact on the Japanese public during the early post-war years. The former appealed to Japanese pacifist idealism and assumed a semi-spiritual role by mobilizing support for education programmes relating to peace and international understanding. The lat-

ter became known by providing milk and other relief goods to under-nourished Japanese children. The Foreign Ministry opinion survey of 1989 shows that even today the best-known UN agency continues to be UNESCO (81.5 per cent), followed by UNICEF (70.3 per cent).[51] As far as UNICEF is concerned, it should be noted that there was a considerable drop in public support after the milk-giving years. It was only after the International Year of the Child in 1979 that appreciation for UNICEF as a development assistance agency grew and that fund-raising began to gain wide public response. A parliamentary group for children was formed in 1988, headed by a senior member of the Liberal Democratic Party, Masayoshi Ito, and a top actress, Tetsuo Kuroyanagi, served as UNICEF ambassador of goodwill.

Several parliamentary groups have been organized along functional lines to support the activities of other UN agencies. These have included groups on population, the environment, habitat, drugs, and disarmament. In 1986, a non-partisan parliamentary group headed by Susumu Nikaido was set up to provide overall support to the United Nations. Of all the parliamentary groups, however, the best organized is the group on international population problems. Established in 1973 and led by former Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, it has enjoyed wide non-partisan support. It has undertaken co-operative action with parliamentary groups of other countries. Its support has been considered instrumental in rapidly increasing Japanese voluntary contributions to the UNFPA (UN Population Fund), an organization to which Japan became the second-largest contributor in 1978 and in recent years has provided over 25 per cent of the budget. The parliamentary group on population attests to the importance of political backing in augmenting Japanese support to the United Nations agencies. More and more attempts are being made by executive heads of UN agencies to solicit support from influential domestic groups in Japan, in addition to the ministries directly in charge.

Aside from groups organized in close affiliation with UN organizations, there are others that have been inspired by UN initiatives, particularly by UN-sponsored world conferences held in the 1970s – the World Conference on Human Environment, Stockholm, 1972; the World Population Conference, Bucharest, 1974; International Women's Year, 1975; the International Year of the Child, 1979; and the special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. These events have had tremendous impact on the public and contributed to consciousness-raising and even social and policy changes. The

United Nations' role as communicator should not be minimized. In fact it might be considered to be the most significant function with far-reaching consequences depending upon how the messages are utilized at the national level.

Of special interest might be the growth of the women's movements in the wake of the International Women's Year and the subsequent decade. A national machinery was set up within the Prime Minister's Office to promote and monitor the Plans of Action adopted in Mexico City, Nairobi, and Copenhagen. Owing to the joint efforts made by women's groups and by women in the government and parliament, Japan became party to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women in 1985. The convention induced major reforms in the legal provisions relating to the status of women. Equality of the sexes has become much more firmly established in terms of educational and employment opportunities. The social changes involving the status of women in recent years prove the potential the United Nations possesses to bring about changes when supported by influential domestic constituents.

The academic community could hardly be classified as a group with a strong interest in UN affairs. It does, however, provide a pool of knowledge resources for policy makers and non-governmental groups. Some academics have served on government delegations, while others have participated in various UN forums in their personal expert capacity. The main bulk of academic research on the United Nations has been carried out by specialists of international law. Their research has tended to concentrate on the formal and institutional aspects of the organization, with special attention on the peace and security area. Some political scientists and former practitioners have also joined the community of researchers on the United Nations, and the range of research in recent years has spanned disarmament to North–South relations, human rights to environment. However, as far as the main approach to UN research is concerned, the tendency still remains that main efforts are directed towards analysing the general structural framework of the organization rather than to examining its functional performance or political dynamics.[52]

Government

The United Nations Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assumes primary responsibility for the policy-making and coordination of Japan's relations with the United Nations. Since the functions of

259

the United Nations tend to branch out in all directions, the task of the United Nations Bureau has also become more and more wide ranging. At the risk of simplification, it can be said that Japan's UN policy decision-making is carried out at three levels – within the Foreign Ministry; the UN Bureau of the Ministry in coordination with other functional ministries; the UN Bureau of the Ministry in consultation with outside groups.

Most issues that relate to UN management as well as to questions of peace and security are handled within the Foreign Ministry. The former in particular lies almost exclusively within the competence of the Bureau. Peace and security issues often involve the need to coordinate with other bureaux. Usually the most difficult negotiations take place with the geographical bureaux, which tend to defend geographical interests and Japan's bilateral relations with the countries in the region concerned. Much of the economic and social issues cannot be handled within the Foreign Ministry but require consultation with the functional ministries.

The UN Bureau takes overall responsibility for Japan's relations with specialized agencies. The ministry maintains permanent missions, headed by ambassadors, to the UN organizations in Geneva and Vienna. However, the functional ministries usually send their staff on secondment to these missions to deal with matters relating to the ministry's interest. For example, the mission in Geneva has staff from the ministries of International Trade and Industry, Finance, and others to deal with GATT, from the Ministry of Labour to deal with the International Labour Organization, or from the Ministry of Health to work with the World Health Organization. However, in matters relating to the financial management, election, or recruitment of staff of the specialized agencies, the Foreign Ministry takes on a greater role. Especially when politicization occurs in these agencies, such as over the recognition of the PLO or the membership of Israel, the responsibility falls on the Foreign Ministry. The Finance Ministry attempts to maintain exclusive control over IMF and World Bank matters, sharing the management of monetary affairs with the Bank of Japan. The involvement of the Foreign Ministry in matters concerning the Bretton Woods institutions remains minimal. The separation between the Bretton Woods institutions and the UN organizations is reinforced at the national level owing to the division of responsibilities between the two ministries.

The UN Bureau has to deal with many outside groups in order to win their support as well as cope with their demands. The role of the

parliamentary groups and their pressure for increased support and contributions have already been discussed. The non-governmental organizations have also been expanding, and every world conference or special session of the General Assembly has mobilized groups that demand compliance from the government with the aims of these meetings. At times of the special sessions of the General Assembly on disarmament, private citizens organized themselves to collect millions of signatures demanding nuclear disarmament. They sent hundreds of non-governmental delegates to observe the sessions on behalf of various citizen action groups. The world conferences on women in Mexico City, Copenhagen, and Nairobi also mobilized many women's groups to attend the meetings as observers. These meetings were used as rallying points to advance women's demands at home.

With Japan's increasing involvement in the operational activities of the United Nations, the Bureau has been obliged to solicit more and more support from various domestic groups. The dispatch of two election monitoring teams to Namibia and Nicaragua, for example, was made possible through recruitment efforts targeted at young provincial government officers and former peace corps volunteers and regional specialists. Efforts are currently under way to set up a personnel resource centre in order to cope with future needs on a somewhat more standby basis. Greater mobilization of domestic support beyond goodwill on the part of the general public will determine how much more Japan might become actively involved in future activities of the United Nations.

Conclusion

The international environment surrounding the United Nations in the 1990s will be full of uncertainties. Politically, *détente* is expected to take off the sharper edges of East–West relations. But at the regional and local levels, conflicts may grow as a result of long-standing political, economic, ethnic, religious, and other sources of discontent. Economically, the current debt crisis is unlikely to abate. North–South problems will persist, with growing disparities among the countries in the South. The United States and the Soviet Union will be devoting much of their attention to causes involving their domestic interests more. Their global management capability is expected to decline.

Will the United Nations in the 1990s be prepared to play a larger

role in global management? The issues that call for concerted action are no longer limited to the political, economic, and humanitarian as in the past. There are enormous problems of environmental protection, science and technology, population explosion, and cross-border movements that all nations must address. There is at least a growing sign that both governments and peoples are beginning to turn to the United Nations to deal with these global issues. The most encouraging development in the last few years is the change in the Soviet policy towards the United Nations. Gorbachev's *Pravda* and *Izvestia* article of 17 September 1987 unveiled the new Soviet thinking to promote the United Nations as the most important instrument for co-operation in an interdependent world.[53] With the arrival of the Bush administration in the United States, its policy towards the United Nations also became more cooperative. With the superpowers supporting and cooperating with the United Nations, the organization is bound to have a greater impact on global developments.

Japan will welcome opportunities to play an active part in an enhanced United Nations. In examining the historical trends in Japan's UN policy, the present paper has indicated how Japanese involvement in the United Nations developed from a fairly narrow interest in Asian affairs to a more global concern that encompassed the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, and how it came to assume institutional responsibilities by tackling UN administrative and management matters. It should be noted that Japan's efforts in the 1980s were directed to causes that strengthened and enhanced the capacity of the United Nations, whether in the case of the Group of 18 exercises over UN reform, or in encouraging the United Nations to act to prevent disputes through the adoption of the Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations.

It is important to realize that, although Japan ensures its security by its Self-Defence Forces and the conclusion of the US–Japan Security Treaty, the Japanese have tended to regard the United Nations as an additional safety net. This is the reason behind Japan's persistent efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of the UN functions with regard to the maintenance of peace and security and the attempts to reinforce the peace-keeping capacity. Japan's own modes of contribution to the peace-keeping operations still remain unresolved. What is clearly emerging, however, is the decision to provide, in addition to funds, personnel for peace-keeping operations as a token of international cooperation. Domestic public opinion and political division make it unlikely that consensus will develop on

262

the dispatch of the Self-Defence Forces. For the time being, Japan will participate in operations with a substantial civilian component, whether in the form of election monitors, logistic support staff, or medical teams.

Japan in the 1990s will continue to act as a major contributor to the UN system. With regard to many activities of the operational agencies, Japan's voluntary contributions are expected to increase, which will be compensated by due recognition. The question of gaining a permanent seat on the Security Council seems unlikely to be settled for some time to come. It is recalled that Japan raised this question in the 1960s and 1970s but has remained quiet ever since. A clearer realization of the difficulty of the question seems to have muted even any attempt at testing the views of governments concerned. The divisive atmosphere that prevailed in the United Nations in the last 10 years prevented any possibility of undertaking fundamental institutional change. Besides, the United States, which had been the one permanent member supporting Japan's permanent representation, was hardly taking initiatives of any sort in the United Nations. At present, Japan does not seem to be in a hurry to seek an enhanced status in the Security Council. For the time being, it will continue to seek representation at the Security Council within as short a time interval as possible. Nevertheless, the issue of the composition of the Security Council may gain greater significance at the domestic level. If Japan were to find the United Nations more disadvantageous compared with other organizations that assure it influential status, support at the leadership level might not be sustained for ever.

In the final analysis, Japan's future commitment to the United Nations will depend on the evolution of the organization itself. The United Nations Charter was prepared to reflect the power balance and alliance system of the immediate post-war world. The unification of Germany stands as a watershed event that will divide the post-war and the future world of the 1990s. As already stated, the United Nations is faced with challenges of global management on many fronts. It will also have to face the realities of changing power, if it is to fare well in the twenty-first century.

Postscript

The last few years have witnessed major changes in the international environment surrounding the United Nations.[54] With the end of the Cold War, the United States began actively to promote the solution

of regional disputes through the United Nations, as seen in the matter of Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the summer of 1990 and the Security Council endorsement of US-led multilateral enforcement action against Iraq heralded a new era of activism on the part of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security.

To Japan, the American decision to turn to the United Nations to apply Chapter VII sanctions against Iraq, and later to authorize the use of military action to enforce them, put the government and the public in a serious dilemma. How could Japan cooperate with the United States as well as fulfil the obligations of a responsible member state in the context of a UN military enforcement action? The initial reaction of the government to requests for active contributions was both cautious and slow. With growing international pressure, especially from the United States, the government in the end provided a financial contribution amounting to US$9 billion and later sent minesweepers to the Persian Gulf as a symbolic gesture of presence. It also submitted to the Diet, in the summer of 1990, a UN Peace Co-operation Bill, which, in its final draft, would have authorized the participation of Self-Defence Forces personnel in non-combat roles. Foreseeing difficulties, the Bill was withdrawn shortly before even being put to a vote in the Lower House.

The international demand for demonstrative Japanese contributions to the Gulf operation, and the half-hearted response by the government, provoked a major controversy over the fundamental principles of Japan's UN policy and role in the international community. At the heart of the matter was Japan's participation in UN peace-keeping operations. Again, in the fall of 1991, the government submitted to the Diet a law entitled "Cooperation for the United Nations Peace-keeping Operations and Other Operations." The age-long agenda of Japanese participation in UN peace-keeping activities became the primary topic of a national debate that lasted nearly a year. Significant changes emerged in the course of this debate at the level of both public opinion and party politics.

Opinion polls, which indicated strong opposition to the dispatch of Self-Defence Forces in the summer of 1990, showed a clear increase a year later in those in support of their dispatch in connection with UN peace-keeping activities. More important was the reorientation in the attitude of the opposition parties as they engaged in the debate over the proposed law. In particular, the second-largest opposition party, Komeito, and the fourth-largest opposition party, Minshato, which

264

together formed the centrist coalition, began to shift their position towards approval of the participation of the Self-Defence Forces in UN peace-keeping activities. Shakaito, the largest opposition party, maintained its opposition to the dispatch of Self-Defence Forces overseas. However, even this group revealed some subtle changes in recognizing the need to utilize the capacity of the Self-Defence Forces for international cooperation. While each party maintained its specific claims to ensure control over the Self-Defence Forces, it focused more and more on examining ways of realizing Japan's international contribution through its participation in peace-keeping activities. A major breakthrough was achieved when the UN peace-keeping cooperation law was passed by the Diet on 15 June 1992.

The passage of the law had immediate implications. The government informed the United Nations of its readiness to dispatch troops for peace-keeping activities. Three observers were sent to monitor elections in Angola. The first large-scale dispatch of Self-Defence Forces was to Cambodia in September. The forces consisted of 8 military observers, a 600-member construction unit, and 75 civilian police. In May 1993, another 40 Self-Defence Forces joined the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ).

It is important to note that, although the UN peace-keeping cooperation law enables the Japanese government to participate in peace-keeping activities, it carefully prescribes the basic principles under which Japanese participation is to be put to effect. The following principles are particularly relevant in judging the possible range of activities that Japan foresees in its involvement. First, the peace-keeping has to be based on the existence of an agreement to cease armed conflict and, furthermore, to maintain the cessation by all parties to the conflict. Second, the consent to Japan's participation in peace-keeping operations has to be obtained from the host countries as well as from the parties to the conflict. Third, the peace-keeping forces have to maintain a position of impartiality without leaning towards any specific party. The Japanese readiness to contribute troops to UN peace-keeping activities is very clearly confined to the so-called Chapter $6\frac{1}{2}$ traditional peace-keeping operations. It does not provide for involvement in peace-enforcement activity under Chapter VII. The cautious Japanese reaction to Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* proposal must be viewed in the light of the delicate domestic consensus-building that preceded the adoption of the UN peace-keeping cooperation law.

A second issue of Japanese UN policy that is likely to arouse

greater momentum is its claim to permanent membership of the Security Council. The Cambodian issue was a regional conflict of particular interest to Japan. The five permanent members of the Security Council held secret talks on a comprehensive settlement that foresaw a UN peace-keeping operation and a UN-supervised election. The Japanese government insisted that it be kept informed of developments that might bring about an arrangement with enormous financial implications, and from which it was denied from making any input. As the second-largest donor to the UN budget, with an assessment of 12.45 per cent, Japan has felt consistently denied its representation rights in contrast with the contributions of three of the permanent members – the United Kingdom, France, and China – which total only 11.8 per cent. Whereas financial and budgetary matters are functions of the General Assembly, those belonging to peace-keeping operations are decided upon by the Security Council, with primary involvement of the permanent five members. Japan has tried to overcome its disadvantaged position by setting up, for example, in the case of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia operation, a consultative mechanism consisting of Japan, Germany, Canada, Australia, and Indonesia in addition to the permanent five.

The issue of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council has become an agenda of the General Assembly. Seventy-four countries presented their views to the 48th General Assembly in 1993. Over 100 countries referred to this particular question in the course of the general debate. Recognition for the need to expand the membership of the Security Council is rapidly gaining support. The permanent members no longer insist that reorganization is necessary. However, there is still widespread division as to the size of Security Council membership. Considerable support seems to exist for adding Germany and Japan to permanent membership.

Japan has not hidden its interest in gaining a permanent seat. However, it has maintained a relatively discreet position in order to forestall any backlash. In fact, the Hosokowa cabinet, which consists of seven parties that were in opposition to the dominant Liberal Democratic Party, may be more inclined to refrain from taking a great power posture. Nevertheless, the time is ripe for a major review and reorganization of the United Nations in 1995 when it will observe its 50th anniversary. Japan is expected to make the most of the changing tide by actively contributing to a wide range of UN activities. The test

will be how soon it can attain its goal as a matter of the most natural course of development.

Notes and references

1. Statement by Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu, 11th session of the UN General Assembly, 18 Dec. 1956.
2. Statement by Foreign Minister Nobusuki Kishi at the 26th session of the Diet, 4 Feb. 1957.
3. For the impact of the Chinese representation question on Japan's China policy, see Sadako Ogata, *Normalisation with China* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1989).
4. Statements by Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi, 24th session of the UN General Assembly, 19 Sep. 1969, and 25th session of the UNGA, 18 Sep. 1970.
5. For Japan's Middle East policy in 1973–1979, see Yoshitaka Ishikawa, *Oirogaiko nikki* [Diary of oil diplomacy] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha).
6. UN General Assembly Resolution 3210 XXIX.
7. UN General Assembly Resolution 3236, 3237 XXIX.
8. UN General Assembly Resolution 3279 XXX.
9. Security Council resolutions on the Middle East problem including the Palestinian question, 26 Jan. 1976, and the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, 26 Jun. 1976.
10. Japan's contribution to UNRWA was less than US$1 million until 1972. It increased to US$7 million in 1974. In 1981, Japan's contribution was increased to US$10.6 million.
11. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Waga gaiko no kinkyo* [Japan's recent diplomacy], no. 19 (1975): 329–330.
12. Ibid., 332–333.
13. For an analysis of the global situation, see Sadako Ogata, "Gurobaru negoshieishun wa genso nanoka" [Is the global negotiation an illusion?], in *Nanboku mondai* [North–South problems] (Tokyo: Chuokoronsha, 1984), 163–185.
14. On the process leading to the establishment of the United Nations University, see Yasushi Akashi, *Kokuren no mado kara* [From the windows of the UN] (Tokyo: Simul Shupankai, 1984), 122–133.
15. Joint communiqué between Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and President Richard Nixon, 1 Aug. 1973. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Waga gaiko no kinkyo* [Japan's recent diplomacy], no. 18 (1974): 26–30.
16. Statement by Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe, 40th session of the General Assembly, 24 Sep. 1985.
17. UN General Assembly Resolution 40/237.
18. *General Assembly Official Records*, 41st session, Supplement no. 49, A/41/49 (New York, 1986).
19. For evaluation of the efforts of the Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts, see Maurice Bertrand, "Can the U.N. be Reformed?" in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, eds., *United Nations, Divided World* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 198–200.
20. Statement by Mizuo Kuroda, Japanese representative on the UNESCO executive committee, *UNESCO Shimbun* [UNESCO Newspaper], 1 Nov. to 1 Dec. 1987.
21. *Japan: Working paper on strengthening of the fact-finding functions of the United Nations*, A/AC, 182/WG/441, Rev 1 (12 Feb. 1980).
22. Note verbale dated 25 Jun. 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, A/S-12.1/45 (28 Jun. 1982).
23. UN General Assembly Resolution 37/67, 3 Dec. 1982.
24. Note verbale dated 25 Jun. 1982.

25. *Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization* (New York: United Nations, Sep. 1982).
26. UN General Assembly Resolution 37/67, 3 Dec. 1982.
27. *General Assembly Official Records*, 43rd session, Supplement no. 33, A/43/33 (New York: United Nations, 1988).
28. Statement of Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe at the 39th session of the UN General Assembly, 26 Sep. 1984.
29. Japan set up a series of medium-term plans to increase its official development assistance. As a result, its ODA was increased five times in ten years between 1977 and 1987. For the fourth medium-term plan of 1988, it decided to double the amount of the previous five years and provide more than US$500 million in the next five years.
30. Japanese staff in the Secretariat; 1974 – 74; 1975 – 65; 1976 – 70; 1977 – 69; 1978 – 74; 1980 – 80; 1981 – 80; 1982 – 101; 1983 – 106; 1984 – 113; 1985 – 121; 1986 – 101; 1987 – 91, 1988 – 90.
31. Kio Urano, *Kokusai shakai no henyo to kokuren tohyo kodo 1946–1985* [Changing international society and UN voting behaviour 1946–1985] (Tokyo: Kokusai chiiko shiryo Centre, 1989). Urano's voting behaviour analysis is based on roll call votes taken at General Assemblies.
32. See Jeanne Kirkpatrick, "Standing Alone," in *The Reagan Phenomenon and Other Speeches on Foreign Policy* (University Press of America, 1983).
33. US Department of State, *Report to Congress on Voting Practices in the United Nations* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1984, 1985, 1986), shows the following results:

All UNGA plenary votes: Percentage coincidence with US votes (Yes/No)

	38th session (1983)	39th session (1984)
Australia	65.6	63.0
Austria	36.7	38.7
Belgium	73.7	76.6
Canada	76.8	71.2
Denmark	51.5	58.1
Federal Republic of Germany	82.0	80.0
Finland	38.8	39.4
France	67.6	72.1
Greece	26.8	27.6
Iceland	56.7	60.4
Ireland	44.4	47.6
Italy	71.3	72.8
Luxembourg	73.7	76.0
Netherlands	66.3	74.5
New Zealand	66.7	60.6
Norway	60.4	59.6
Portugal	57.0	56.2
Spain	41.6	47.6
Sweden	42.9	41.9
Turkey	40.5	35.0
United Kingdom	84.2	82.1
Japan	69.0	70.9

34. Urano, *Kokusai*.
35. Voting behaviour analyses by both Kio Urano and the US Department of State exclude abstentions from their calculations.
36. Statement by Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda, 38th session of the National Diet, Record of the Budget Committee, House of Representatives, no. 20 (4 Mar. 1961), 10–11.
37. Statement by Seiji Ishibashi, 38th session of the National Diet, Record of the Budget Committee, House of Representatives, no. 9 (23 Feb. 1961), 92. Statement by Kazuo Asukada, Record of the Budget Committee, House of Representatives, no. 26 (22 Feb. 1961), 17.
38. Note verbale dated 25 June 1982.
39. UN General Assembly Resolution 37/67, 3 Dec. 1982.
40. The members of the study group were Ribo Hatano, Gojiro Kotani, Shigeru Kozai, Kiichi Saeki, Shizuo Saito, Hideo Yamamuro, and the author. The report of the study group, excluding the section concerning proposals on the Japanese role, was presented to the Secretary-General by Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe.
41. The UNTAG operation is composed of 6,000 peace-keeping forces and 885 civilians.
42. Statement by Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita at the 3rd Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, 1 Jun. 1988.
43. Statement by Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, Record of the Audit Committee, House of Councillors, no. 2 (27 May 1988), 26. Sosuke Uno, Record of the Audit Committee, House of Councillors, no. 4 (3 Aug. 1988), 78, Record of the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives, no. 3 (24 May 1989), 14.
44. *Sankei Shimbun*, "Kokuren ga shuyaku wo enjiru jidai" [Time for UN to play the leading role], 24 Oct. 1989.
45. *Tokyo Shimbun*, "Heiwa kyoryokutai wo sosetsu" [Establishing a peace cooperation force], 22 Oct. 1989.
46. UN Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Kokusai rengo ni kansuru yoron chosa* [Opinion survey on the UN] (Tokyo, Apr. 1987).
47. Ibid.
48. Prime Minister's Office, *Gaiko ni kansuru yoron chosa* [Public opinion survey on foreign affairs] (Tokyo, 1986). The survey on cooperation with peace-keeping operations showed the following results:

	Should cooperate	Should not cooperate	Others	Don't know
1982	43.9	18.4	0.7	37.8
1983	42.3	22.7	1.2	33.8
1984	45.7	25.4	1.7	27.1
1985	39.7	25.1	1.4	33.8
1986	39.2	25.3	0.9	34.6

49. Prime Minister's Office, *Waga kuni no heiwa to anzen ni kanzuru yoron chosa* [Survey on peace and national security] (Tokyo, 1989).
50. UN Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Kokusai*.
51. Ibid.
52. For a survey of research on international organizations in Japan, see Sadako Ogata, *Nihon ni okeru kokusai soshiki kenkyu* [International organization research in Japan] (Tokyo: NIRA, 1982).

53. Mikhael Gorbachev, ''The Reality and Guarantees of a Secure World,'' *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, 17 Sep. 1987. For an evaluation of Soviet policy towards the UN, see Edward C. Luck and Toby T. Gati, ''Gorbachev, the United Nations, and U.S. Policy, '' *The Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 1988), and Sadako Ogata, *Kokuren wo sosei saseta Gorbachev* [Gorbachev who revived the UN] (Tokyo: Chuokoron, Feb. 1989).

54. The editors are most grateful to Professor Ogata for taking time from her demanding duties as UN High Commissioner for Refugees to prepare this December 1993 postcript to her earlier draft.

7

The Netherlands and the United Nations: The future lies in the past

Peter Baehr

Introduction

What will happen in the future is, to a great extent, determined by the past. In this paper we look at issues that have been the concern of the Netherlands in the United Nations in the past, discuss dilemmas they raised, and look at possible future developments.

This paper has been prepared by a study group consisting of academicians and officials of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acting in their personal capacity. Case-studies were prepared on issues in the United Nations in which the Netherlands has been or is currently strongly involved. The selection of the cases contains an obvious subjective element. It may have led to a disproportionate degree of attention being paid to some issues, at the expense of other issues. Nevertheless, the authors feel that, taken as a whole, the paper provides a fair picture of Dutch interests expressed in the United Nations. The findings of the case-studies form an integral part of this paper. This chapter summarizes the results of the studies and contains general observations and conclusions.[1]

The Netherlands' position in the United Nations

General background

On the basis of criteria such as size of territory and population, the Netherlands belongs to the category of "small nations." The country ranks on a world scale 135th in size of geographical area (16,000 square miles) and 53rd in population size (14.9 million). Yet, on the basis of economic data alone, it may be considered a middle-rank power. It is 14th in rank in annual GNP per capita.[2] Be it small or medium-sized, in either case the new worldwide organization was seen from the outset by the Dutch as of great importance. It meant a continuation of efforts begun under the League of Nations to achieve collective security. It was also meant to be a further stimulus to the establishment of the rule of law in the world – a traditional feature of Dutch policy dating back to the times of Hugo Grotius (1583–1645). Owing to its geographical location, the Dutch economy from time immemorial has been dominated by its dependence on international trade. Such trade has always greatly depended on freedom of the high seas – *mare liberum*. This explains the traditional Dutch interest in the development of international law in general and the law of the sea in particular. In view of its strong commercial interests and its relatively weak military position, the maintenance of international peace has always been a foremost goal of Dutch governments. Johan de Witt, the famous seventeenth-century statesman, put it in the following terms: "The interest of the State demands that there be quiet and peace everywhere and that commerce be conducted in an unrestricted way." These words have remained a maxim of Dutch foreign policy ever since.

A strong attachment to principles of international law is linked to a desire to work for the improvement of the international political and economic situation. In modern times, this has found its expression in an emphasis on international development cooperation and respect for human rights. The legal tradition and the wish to improve conditions in the world act as mutually reinforcing factors. Both find expression in the Dutch support for international organizations.

Ever since its establishment, the United Nations has been a constant theme in Dutch foreign policy.[3] The Netherlands has shown a constructive engagement with the aims and principles laid down in the Charter of the United Nations. It sought an active role in the Security Council, offered troops for peace-keeping operations, and took

various diplomatic initiatives. There have also been periods, such as the 1980s, of less explicit involvement in UN matters. This has, however, definitely changed in the 1990s, as can be seen from, *inter alia*, the deployment of almost 3,000 peace-keeping personnel and the successful bid for the seat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the seat for the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Dutch UN policy has been characterized by a mixture of engagement, appreciation, disappointment, frustration, and hope. Seen from the national level, it has largely been a consensus policy, given the broad support the United Nations has always received in parliament.

Dutch policy of support of the United Nations found its expression in active contributions to efforts to strengthen the United Nations and to streamline its functioning. The latter element is even considered a cornerstone of Dutch UN policy. The government was regularly put under pressure by parliamentarians to take initiatives in rationalizing the procedures and structures of the United Nations. This explains its preoccupation during the 1980s – aside from the policy fields dealt with in this chapter – with more general Western concerns, such as the questions of universality, bloc voting, automatic majorities, the voting rights of micro-states, double talk, politicization, paper resolutions, the number of speeches, and the lack of democracy in most member states. Since the mid-1960s, criticism of the United Nations has been formulated more emphatically than before; it peaked in the mid-1970s, without ever compromising Dutch membership of the United Nations. The argument has always been that it is better to participate in a critical manner than to withdraw.

A retrospective of 17 years of parliamentary debates about Dutch participation in the United Nations has shown that discussions focused on the question of how active its diplomats were in negotiations and where and when they should take initiatives. Confronted with pressure from parliament to take the lead in its role as "pilot country," the government repeatedly stressed the need for proper preparation, including the seeking of sufficient international support. There was consensus about the role the Netherlands could play, especially in the field of international development cooperation, in establishing a bridge between the interests of the rich and the poor countries.

Dutch UN policy has been incorporated in a gradual development of the European integration process. As part of that process, the 12 member states of the European Union have, since the 1970s, shown

a tendency, in the context of European Political Cooperation, toward regular consultations in New York, Geneva, and Brussels, in an effort to harmonize their policies in the United Nations as much as possible. This was further strengthened by the coming into force on 1 November 1993 of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, which provides for a common foreign and security policy.

The role of non-governmental organizations in the field of Dutch foreign policy is unique in the sense that there appear to be more of such "single-issue groups" dealing with matters related to foreign policy than in other Western democracies. Since 1945, the number of such organizations and associations in Dutch society that deal with international problems or relations with other countries has increased dramatically, from about 24 to more than 200 in 1993.[4] Many of these groups or "action committees" have a geographical focus and address themselves to a particular region or country. Thus, in the Netherlands there exist such committees dealing with southern Africa, Western Sahara, Indonesia, Viet Nam, Sri Lanka, Palestine, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chile, and many other countries. There are also organizations with a more functional focus. Well-known examples are: the Dutch section of Amnesty International (which is the second-largest national section of that organization, trailing only that in the United States), the Netherlands Organization for International Assistance (NOVIB), promoting aid to developing countries, the Inter-Church Peace Council (IKV), advocating nuclear disarmament, and the Helsinki Committee, promoting the "Helsinki process" in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In 1987, the Dutch Association for the United Nations (NVVN) was re-established, which aims at the promotion of the purposes of the United Nations in the Netherlands; it is a member of the World Federation of United Nations Associations (WFUNA). Greenpeace, whose international headquarters is located in Amsterdam, and "Milieu Defensie" (Environment Defence) are organizations that work for the protection of the human environment.

These groups' major sources of influence would seem to be moral appeal, mobilization potential, and the provision of reliable information. They draw public attention to international problems that otherwise might be ignored. They speak out more freely against manifestations of injustice abroad in cases where a government might hesitate to do so for fear of violating the domestic jurisdiction of another state.[5]

The Dutch government has always included representatives of non-

governmental organizations in its delegations to the General Assembly of the United Nations and to other international conferences, for example the International Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro and the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993 in Vienna.

The founding of the United Nations

From the beginning, the Netherlands strongly supported the United Nations. It achieved membership of the Security Council four times: in 1946, in 1951–1952, in 1965–1966, and in 1983–1984. This does not mean, however, that the Netherlands fully favoured the way the new organization was established. Directly after World War II, it still had the ambition to be, if not one of the major powers, at least one of the middle rank. The Dutch government called attention to the fact that it had almost 80 million subjects – 9 million of whom lived in Europe and 70 million in the Dutch East Indies. That was one of the reasons it strongly objected to the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council. In an interview in August 1946, Foreign Minister Eelco van Kleffens called the veto a violation of democratic principles:

The small powers have reached a mature judgement a long time ago. They do not wish to be treated as minors and they feel sick of being told time and again that the big ones have such awesome obligations. After all, they remember only too well how the major powers discharged their obligations, that they brought war and destruction instead of peace. It would at least be desirable to limit the veto to a few clearly defined items.[6]

In a memorandum on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals for a United Nations Organization the Netherlands objected to the veto; it proposed instead that a ''yes'' vote of at least three of the then six non-permanent members of the Council should be needed for any substantive decision.[7] The Netherlands and the other small powers were, however, unsuccessful in these efforts. The major powers made clear that for them it was a matter of a world organization with a veto or no world organization at all.[8] The Big Five told the other nations in so many words that there could be no question of the kind of semi-major power status for the Netherlands and other allied powers that Van Kleffens had in mind. The Netherlands was not very successful either in its efforts to introduce more specific references to international law in the Charter. Thus it proposed to insert in Chapter I,

sub 1, after the words "to maintain international peace and security" the words "in conformity with the elementary principles of morality and justice and on the basis of due regard to international law."[9]

It was a small consolation that there was widespread support for keeping the seat of the International Court of Justice – one of the six main organs of the United Nations – in the Hague. A Yugoslav motion expressing gratitude to the Netherlands for its hospitality to the Permanent Court of International Justice, but recommending that the new one be established elsewhere, did not even reach a vote.[10]

When the UN Charter came up for ratification in the Dutch parliament, both the government and several members of parliament expressed misgivings about the results of the San Francisco Conference. They wondered whether the new organization would be strong enough to uphold international law against the great powers. Still, as Voorhoeve puts it, the government felt it better to join without hope than to stay out; there was no viable alternative.[11]

The Netherlands in the United Nations

From the very beginning, the Netherlands participated actively in UN activities. It rendered military assistance to the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) established in 1949 to supervise the truce agreements between Israel and the Arab states. It took an active military part in the Korean War, which was seen as a beginning of collective security operations by the United Nations – though not quite in the manner envisioned in the Charter. Dutch peace-keeping commitments fell to a minimum during the second half of the 1980s after its withdrawal from the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, but rose slowly to a level of 3,000 men at the beginning of the 1990s.

The Netherlands supported efforts to make the United Nations into a universal organization and did, for instance, not join in efforts to keep Franco's Spain out of the United Nations. At first it supported, then later it abstained on Communist China's claim to replace Nationalist China in the United Nations; it was one of the first Western states to extend diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic (1950).

From the outset, it gave strong support to the UN specialized agencies and to economic cooperation within the UN framework. It has made relatively high voluntary contributions to UN programmes

276

such as the UN Development Programme, the UN Population Fund, and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees.

A number of Dutch individuals have served in important positions in UN organs: G. J. van Heuven Goedhart was the first High Commissioner for Refugees (1951–1956), Adrian Pelt served as Special Representative to the Secretary-General and was UN Commissioner in Libya (1950–1952), Addeke Boerma was director-general of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO; 1968–1975), Johannes Witteveen was director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF; 1973–1978), Jan Pronk was deputy secretary-general of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD; 1980–1986), and Theo van Boven was director of the Human Rights Division (1977–1982).[12] From 1985 to 1992, the present Foreign Minister, Peter Kooijmans, was special rapporteur on torture for the Commission on Human Rights. Max van der Stoel serves as special rapporteur on Iraq to the Commission on Human Rights.

Support for international organizations, in particular the United Nations, has been a long-standing feature of Dutch foreign policy. The constitution explicitly mentions the promotion of the rule of law in international relations as a task for the national government.[13] Subsequent Dutch governments have expressed themselves strongly in support of such organizations. A major reorganization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was effectuated in the early 1960s to emphasize the importance given to international organization affairs and to development cooperation. To pursue a global policy is considered to be in the Dutch national interest.[14] Only the activities of the United Nations with regard to Indonesian independence met with strong criticism from the Dutch. That case shows how ideas about the importance of the establishment of the rule of law in international relations may change – if only temporarily – once a country is itself the target of actions by the Security Council. It is no coincidence that, at the time, public opinion in the Netherlands with regard to the United Nations was least favourable.[15] The Indonesian question is looked at briefly next, because it shaped early attitudes of the Dutch toward the United Nations and of the outside world toward the Netherlands.

The Indonesian question

The Netherlands was confronted with its own principles regarding the establishment of the rule of law in international relations in 1947,

when the question of Indonesian independence came before the United Nations. The Netherlands considered it a domestic matter in which, according to Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, the United Nations had no competence. The international community, however, took a different view.

When the first Dutch "police action" took place against the newly established (but not yet internationally recognized) Republic of Indonesia in 1947, Australia and India put the matter on the agenda of the Security Council. India considered the situation a threat to international peace and security, while Australia saw it as a breach of the peace under Article 39 of the Charter. The Netherlands rejected the authority of the Security Council to deal with the matter, which it considered to be strictly a matter of domestic jurisdiction. According to the Dutch, the police action took place fully within its own sovereignty; it was a matter not of war, but merely of the restoration of law and order.[16] The debates eventually resulted in a truce agreement and the installation of a Committee of Good Offices.

Far more serious, however, was the situation during the second police action in December 1948, when the Netherlands took strong military action against the Indonesian forces, which resulted in the detention of the principal Indonesian leaders. When the Security Council convened in emergency session, the United States accused the Netherlands of having violated the truce agreement of 1947. Some members of the Council wanted enforcement measures taken against the Netherlands. Eventually, a call was made for cessation of the hostilities and the release of the Indonesian leaders. The Dutch representative rejected the Security Council's authority to deal with the matter. He argued that the UN Charter dealt only with relations among sovereign states – which the Republic of Indonesia was not. Moreover, the matter belonged entirely to the domestic jurisdiction of the Netherlands. Finally, he argued that the situation did not present a threat to international peace and security.[17] The members of the Security Council were, however, not convinced by the Dutch arguments. Under considerable pressure from the United States and other Council members, the Netherlands was forced to agree to a round table conference of all parties concerned. This led eventually to the establishment of Indonesia as an independent – as well as sovereign – state.

The Dutch "trauma of decolonization"[18] reached a final phase in 1961 when Foreign Minister Joseph Luns tried in vain to have the General Assembly adopt a trusteeship arrangement for Western

278

New Guinea (nowadays called West Irian), the only part of the Netherlands East Indies that thus far had not been handed over to the Indonesians. His belated appeal to grant self-determination to the local population – the Papuans – failed because, among the majority of the Afro-Asian states, loyalty to Indonesia prevailed. Nor was the Netherlands successful in obtaining the full support of its Western allies – the United States in particular.[19] Although the "Luns Plan" was presented in terms of self-determination, it was in fact a final effort by the Netherlands to retain a role in part of its former colonial empire. This effort might have been successful in earlier years; now it was destined to fail. The difference with the issue of Indonesian independence was, however, that this time the competence of the United Nations to deal with the matter was fully accepted.

In the early 1960s, the Netherlands did an about-turn. It voted in favour of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.[20] In subsequent years, it continued to vote in support of similar resolutions.

Chapter outline

The Netherlands has used the United Nations as a forum to achieve results in a number of concrete policy fields. *Development cooperation* has been for many years a main item of Dutch foreign policy as formulated by the government, and supported by parliament, public opinion, and all political parties. To a somewhat more limited extent, this holds also for policy in the field of *human rights*. At least since the late 1970s, the government has made strong efforts to show itself in the vanguard of the struggle for the improvement of respect for human rights all over the world. In these efforts it has tried to cooperate with "like-minded" countries, such as Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. As part of its efforts to work on behalf of the establishment of the rule of law in international relations in general and to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the field of international peace and security, the Netherlands has tried to play a role in the area of *peace-keeping*. Another effort in this field has been its policy toward the establishment of a system of *fact-finding*. As a small nation dependent on outside support for its national security, it was a founding member of the NATO alliance. Yet it has always seen it as a national interest to make a contribution to regional and global *disarmament* and arms control. A UN role in those fields has been notably supported where a universal approach was found useful: chem-

279

ical and biological weapons and the non-proliferation of nuclear arms. Traditionally, the Netherlands has supported strong measures for the verification of those agreements, which is in line with the legal tradition of strengthening the international legal order. As one of the most densely populated countries in the world, the Netherlands has shown a natural interest in issues of *population policy*, which greatly increased after the adoption of more liberal attitudes in this field by a large proportion of the Dutch people. Finally, owing to its geographical position on the Rhine estuary and on the borders of the North Sea and in view of its high level of industrialization, the Netherlands in particular has a strong interest in the maintenance and improvement of the *human environment*.

In the following section a survey is given of Dutch efforts in the United Nations in these policy issues in which it has expressed a special concern.

Issues of particular concern to the Netherlands

International development cooperation

Since the early 1960s, development aid has been a main theme in the foreign policy of the Netherlands, whatever the political composition – centre–left or centre–right – of the government. In 1992, the Netherlands spent the equivalent of US$2.54 million on net official development assistance, which was about 0.86 per cent of GNP. The Netherlands and Norway have for many years alternated in spending the largest percentage of GNP on development aid. The other Scandinavian countries, Sweden and Denmark, have been close runners up. About 31 per cent of official Dutch development assistance is destined for multilateral agencies, mainly the institutions of the World Bank, the European Development Fund, UNDP, and other UN agencies and regional development banks.

The interest of the Netherlands in development cooperation dates back to the late 1940s and early 1950s, when it, among others, actively participated in the debates and negotiations on development financing, which resulted in the establishment of the early UN technical assistance programmes (1948), the UN Special Fund (1958), and the International Development Association as a new World Bank affiliate (1960).[21] The interest of the Netherlands in issues of development policy increased strongly after the termination of the dispute over Western New Guinea.

280

Since 1963, the Dutch government has always included a Minister for Development Cooperation – first at junior minister level, since 1965 at cabinet level. This minister's task was to supervise bilateral and multilateral development aid programmes and to coordinate development policy among various ministries. In order to promote the intensive involvement of various segments of Dutch society in the formulation of government policy with regard to development cooperation, the government instituted the National Advisory Council for Development Cooperation (NAR) in 1964. This is a permanent council, which advises the government on request or on its own initiative. The Council is intended to represent the cultural, economic, and social segments of Dutch society. Its members are appointed by the Minister for Development Cooperation and selected on the basis of their personal expertise and their active interest in the subject. Parliament created a permanent committee for development cooperation, which focused its attention on major lines of policy toward the third world. During the 1960s, public awareness in the Netherlands of third world economic and social problems also increased considerably. A number of non-governmental organizations dealing with development problems was established.

Some of these non-governmental organizations and "action committees" are indirectly government-financed through the National Commission for Development Information and Education (NCO), which was set up in the 1970s to stimulate interest among the Dutch public in the problems faced by third world countries. This has at times led to considerable political controversy, when a government composed of right-of-centre political parties questioned why the activities of groups that were mainly left-of-centre (the anti-apartheid movement and activist country committees such as the one on Indonesia) should be financed from public funds. Although on occasion subsidies were cut, the system has, however, survived.

In the United Nations, the Netherlands took an active part in the preparations for the Second Development Decade, including the co-sponsorship of a number of preparatory resolutions during the years 1967–1969. Nobel prize winner Jan Tinbergen was one of many leading Dutch academicians and politicians who worked on the further elaboration of policy regarding development cooperation. In 1964, he was appointed to be the first chairman of the Dutch National Advisory Council for Development Cooperation. Tinbergen also headed the UN Committee for Development Planning – a committee consisting of non-governmental experts and scholars – which had a major

impact on the formulation of international strategy for the Second Development Decade.

This overview focuses on a discussion of (a) one notable Dutch initiative for a ''Charter for Development'' and (b) the Netherlands' attitude towards the various UN development decades and strategies. Other initiatives and trends in Dutch development policy are given less attention.

A notable initiative in the field of development policy was undertaken by the Netherlands in 1965, when it launched its proposal to formulate a ''Charter for Development.'' Such a Charter would contain a well-considered equilibrium of mutual socio-economic and cultural rights and obligations in the field of development, including:
– the right of all peoples to share in the world's expanding prosperity;
– the necessity to take into account the particular requirements of developing countries in an effort to shape a new world economy;
– guidelines for the proper exploitation and utilization of natural resources;
– principles of economic cooperation applicable to the world community as a whole;
– the right of all peoples to share in the world's knowledge.[22]

In 1966, the Netherlands submitted a draft resolution that requested the Secretary-General to prepare a concise and systematic survey of already existing principles, directives, and guidelines for action in the field of development. This resolution was adopted by the General Assembly by consensus.[23] It recognized that the formulation of a consolidated statement of the rights and duties of peoples and nations might sustain and enhance international development efforts and cooperation and could help to enlist wider public support for the strengthening of development policies. The following year, the Netherlands submitted a memorandum on this question,[24] but it did not insist on its incorporation in the resolution on the preparation for the Second Development Decade.[25]

In subsequent years, the Netherlands did not return to its proposal, for a number of reasons. First of all, other Western countries were not very keen to formulate such a Charter. Some of them were not willing to accept any international obligations in the field of development cooperation through such a Charter. Others feared that it could erode the UN Charter itself, in particular the obligations arising from its Chapter IX on principles and aims of international economic and social cooperation. At the multilateral level, the specialized agencies,

UN organs, and other intergovernmental institutions had hardly responded to a questionnaire sent out by the Secretary-General. Concurrent initiatives, such as the formulation of an International Development Strategy for the Second Development Decade by the UN Committee for Development Planning and the report *Partners in Development* issued by the Pearson Committee, had more appeal to the member states.

The Netherlands took an active part in discussions at the United Nations on the establishment of a New International Economic Order, and worked closely with such like-minded countries as Canada, New Zealand, and the Scandinavian countries. This supplemented the sometimes negative common denominator in the policies of the members of the OECD (the ''B-group'') or the European Communities. This policy of ad hoc coalitions with like-minded countries was pursued during major sessions of the UN General Assembly, e.g. those on the establishment of a New International Economic Order in 1974 and 1975 and in the context of UNCTAD. In the 1960s and 1970s, UNCTAD was considered by many as the prime mover for more equitable international economic relations and in particular as the central forum for commodity negotiations.

In the 1970s, the Netherlands advocated structural changes in the relations between the North and the South. It was at times even identified as the 78th member of the Group of 77! This active development cooperation policy had to be embedded in overall Dutch foreign policy and balanced with its other main objectives, including the promotion of European political cooperation and the protection of national and business interests.

In the latter half of the 1970s, policy coordination in the context of the European Communities gained considerable importance, and the Netherlands put additional emphasis on cooperation with its European partners. This became especially evident during the Paris-based North–South dialogue (1975–1977) in which 19 developing nations, 17 developed countries, and the EEC participated. However, in subsequent years, not all members of the European Communities were prepared to accept far-reaching commitments to new development measures. This appeared especially on the issue of the allocation of 0.7 per cent of GNP to official development assistance during the adoption of the Second UN Development Decade resolution (DD II).

In the course of the 1980s, the nature of the North–South discussions changed. Less emphasis was given to overall development strat-

egies and more attention was paid to specific themes such as the development problems of Africa and international debt issues. An exception was the active participation by the Netherlands in the drafting of the UN Declaration on the Right to Development, which was adopted in 1986.[26]

Throughout the years, Dutch development cooperation policy retained the following basic characteristics: a structurally determined relatively high budget was set aside for development aid (approximately 1.5 per cent of Net National Income); development cooperation policy was structurally oriented, with a view to integrating the development dimensions of policies on international trade, commodities, and agriculture, as well as financial and monetary policies. Basic objectives of Dutch development cooperation policy have been since then: (1) the economic, social, and political emancipation of developing countries and their participation in international economic decision-making, and (2) the alleviation of the poverty of people living on or below a decent minimum living standard.

Human rights

The Netherlands government has for a number of years given high priority in its foreign policy to human rights. It considers human rights, in the words of a policy memorandum published in 1979, "an essential part of its foreign policy."[27] That policy memorandum still contains the main lines of Dutch human rights policy, both within and without the United Nations. In 1987 and 1991, the government published brief follow-ups to the 1979 memorandum in which some of the policy items were reiterated and expanded.

As a founding member of the United Nations, the Netherlands committed itself from the outset to the promotion and encouragement of "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."[28] It served four times as a member of the UN Commission on Human Rights: 1961–1966, 1970–1975, 1980–1985, and again since 1992, which should be considered as an indication of the government's interest in the subject.

In 1946, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) adopted a resolution asking UN member states to set up national advisory commissions on human rights affairs.[29] The Dutch government established such a commission to review the problem of human rights in its entirety and, when so requested, to give advice to the govern-

ment. Its activities concerned mainly the draft of a Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which had been prepared by the UN Commission on Human Rights. The Dutch government accepted the main points of the advisory commission's report, including its support for the idea of having a separate declaration and a separate legally binding covenant. However, when it turned out that the General Assembly, for the time being, would adopt merely a non-binding declaration, Dutch enthusiasm waned. Nevertheless, given the lack of support for its views among other states, the Netherlands supported the final draft of the Universal Declaration. It did try – together with Lebanon and Brazil – to include a reference to the divine origin of the human person. This effort met with strong opposition, in particular from the communist bloc countries, and was not accepted. Other Dutch initiatives aiming to safeguard the family as the cornerstone of society and to weaken the proposed article that dealt with the right to seek asylum were equally unsuccessful.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Netherlands adopted a rather passive attitude with regard to South Africa's policy of apartheid, mainly in view of what it called its "special historical and cultural ties" with that country. It took part only rarely in the debates on the issue in the General Assembly and abstained when called to vote on resolutions that condemned South Africa. Although it rejected apartheid in principle and supported the competence of the United Nations to debate racial discrimination as a violation of fundamental human rights, it considered apartheid as a matter "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of South Africa, under Article 2, paragraph 7, of the UN Charter, which precluded United Nations intervention. However, in the late 1950s a gradual change of attitude occurred. In 1959, the Dutch delegate on the Special Political Committee argued that, as apartheid continued, the question should be raised whether this domestic policy did not result in such serious atrocities that it would be the duty of the United Nations to intervene on humanitarian grounds.

From the outset, the Netherlands joined the other Western states in favouring the drafting of two separate covenants on human rights rather than one. It argued that civil and political rights were different in nature from economic, social, and cultural rights. The former on the whole envisage government abstention, whereas the latter demand an engagement on the part of the government. Moreover, political and civil rights are directly enforceable, while social–economic rights can be only gradually realized. The communist bloc countries,

on the other hand, insisted that all rights are inseparably intertwined and therefore should be codified in one document. They argued that the efforts on the part of the Western governments to separate the two were intended to deny economic and social rights to their subjects.

An item that obtained the full support of the Netherlands in the 1960s was the right of complaint for individuals. During the drafting of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by the General Assembly in 1965, the Dutch delegation proposed to include a right to individual complaint, in addition to the system of reporting by states and a right for state parties to submit complaints. This proposal was accepted. The following year, the Netherlands proposed to add to the draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights a right of complaint for individuals. The government considered it "a matter of principle that the human being whose rights are violated, may by himself – if necessary without the goodwill or the mercy of the state – seek redress."[30] This proposal met with strong opposition, in particular on the part of some of the Arab states. Thereupon, the Dutch delegation, together with Nigeria, drafted an Optional Protocol, which was accepted by a large majority.

During the 1970s, the Dutch government became more active in the promotion of human rights, mainly as a result of growing domestic public support for this item. During these years, the Netherlands pushed adoption of a Declaration Against Torture, which was adopted by the General Assembly in 1975. Furthermore, the Dutch delegation took initiatives with regard to the principles for universal recognition of conscientious objection to military service, the Convention on the elimination of discrimination against women, and the Declaration against religious intolerance.

The Netherlands has used its membership of the UN Commission on Human Rights to develop a number of initiatives. For example, the Dutch, together with Sweden, steered the draft Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment through the Commission toward final adoption by the General Assembly in 1984.[31]

The Netherlands was actively involved in the drafting of the following human rights documents: Principles of Medical Ethics in Relation to Detained Persons; Principles of Conscientious Objection to Military Service; the Declaration on the Right to Development; and the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of

Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. Furthermore, the delegation was involved in the steering of an Optional Protocol on the death penalty and the Convention on the Rights of the Child – the second of which was adopted by the General Assembly in its 1989 session.

In the field of implementation of human rights norms, the Netherlands cooperated with other states in trying to strengthen the role of UN organs in the supervision of respect for human rights. The idea of appointing a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, launched by Costa Rica and other countries in the 1950s and for years supported by the Netherlands, met initially with strong opposition. That was one of the reasons the Dutch and other delegations started to take initiatives for establishing fact-finding procedures and sought for ways to make thorough studies of human rights situations by international organs possible. One such initiative was the proposal (1975) to create an ad hoc working group to study the situation in Chile. Later, this working group was replaced by a special rapporteur, whose activities received continued support from the Dutch. Similar initiatives concerned the appointment of special representatives of the Secretary-General or special rapporteurs to study the situation in El Salvador, Guatemala, Iran, and Poland. The last appointment, in particular, was quite remarkable, as it was the first time that the Commission on Human Rights had taken such action in the case of a state that belonged to the communist bloc (1982).

Proposals for fact-finding mechanisms in the field of human rights were not limited to country situations alone. In the 1980s they were supplemented by a thematic approach. Mainly in reaction to the considerable number of ''disappearances'' in Latin American countries such as Argentina, some delegations, including the Dutch, took the initiative for the creation of the UN working group on disappearances. In 1982, the Netherlands was among the initiators of a resolution – based on a suggestion by the UN Secretariat – calling for the appointment of a special rapporteur on summary or arbitrary executions. Dutch support for this organ received additional stimulus by the summary execution of 15 political opponents of the military regime in the former Dutch colony of Suriname in December 1982. Since then, the Netherlands has repeatedly called attention to the situation in Suriname.

Finally, it was the Dutch delegation that took the first steps in the creation of a special UN rapporteur on torture. It pointed out that, as long as the proposed international convention on torture and the implementation mechanisms contained therein had not yet come into

force, it was necessary to create a monitoring system. Moreover, the implementation mechanisms refer to states parties only. The special rapporteur on torture was appointed in 1985. Incidentally, it can be said that the initiatives for the creation of the above-mentioned fact-finding organs achieved at least as much as – or more than – a UN Commissioner for Human Rights would ever have been allowed to accomplish. However, the proposal for a High Commissioner has been revived and was adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993 to be considered by the General Assembly "as a matter of priority." It remains to be seen what functions such an organ, if adopted, would be given.

In the early 1980s, the Netherlands also played a more active role than before with regard to South African apartheid. It supported recommendations to cut oil deliveries to, and investments in, South Africa. It co-sponsored resolutions calling for the suspension of new investments and international loans to South Africa and proposing the establishment of a trust fund for the victims of apartheid. In December 1984, the Security Council adopted a Dutch proposal calling for an extension of the mandatory arms embargo of 1977 with a voluntary arms boycott against South Africa. The Dutch efforts to have the United Nations deal with the situations in Iran and in China had little success.

Peace-keeping

Since 1963, the Netherlands has put military units on stand-by to be used for UN peace-keeping operations. Other nations such as the Scandinavians who had made a similar stand-by offer regularly participated in UN peace-keeping operations. However, in the 1960s and early 1970s, apart from one small exception, the Secretary-General did not call upon the Netherlands for this purpose. He never stated explicitly why he did not do so. But presumably it had something to do with the fact that the Netherlands was a faithful NATO member and close ally of the United States. Also the fact that it was a former colonial power, which for a long time continued to hold on to a part of its empire (Western New Guinea), made the Netherlands less suitable as a peacekeeper in the eyes of many countries of the third world. The only participation by Dutch military in UN operations had so far consisted of serving as observers in a number of operations, e.g. in the Middle East and along the Indian–Pakistani armistice line in Kashmir. However, in 1979 the Netherlands

was asked by the Secretary-General to participate in UNIFIL, the United Nations peace-keeping operation in Lebanon.

The Dutch parliament was asked to approve the participation in UNIFIL at a very late stage, when all initial preparations had already been made. It formally approved the operation, but also adopted a motion in which it requested the government that, in view of the major interests and personal risks involved, future decisions on participation in UN peace-keeping operations were to be taken only after prior consultation with parliament.

The original contribution consisted of an infantry battalion of about 800 men. In July 1983, the Netherlands announced in the Security Council that it intended to withdraw its units if circumstances did not change and UNIFIL remained incapable of fulfilling its mandate. In October 1983, the force was reduced to a company-sized contribution of about 150 men. In the period 1979–1981, the Netherlands spent a total of more than 85 million guilders (about US$40 million) on its contribution to UNIFIL, only half of which was reimbursed by the United Nations. The reduction of the Dutch contribution resulted in a restructuring of the contingent, involving lighter *matériel* and reduced costs.

In 1985, the Netherlands government decided to withdraw the remaining Dutch units from UNIFIL. It explained the reasons for this decision in a letter to the second chamber of parliament, which formally approved it. In the letter, the government expressed its concern over the inability of UNIFIL to fulfil its mandate and the dangers encountered by the military personnel. On 24 October 1985 – the very day that the United Nations celebrated its fortieth anniversary – the Dutch UNIFIL soldiers returned home.

The withdrawal was not in violation of Dutch policy, announced at the outset.[32] It was, however, somewhat in contradiction with the support for peace-keeping operations often enunciated by the Netherlands government. Only one month before the withdrawal, on 25 September 1985, the Dutch Foreign Minister, in a speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations, had referred to peace-keeping operations as one of the more successful actions of the organization. He expressed concern over the fact that UNIFIL had not been able to fulfil its mandate. In spite of the unsatisfactory situation in Lebanon, the Netherlands government expressed its gratitude to the Secretary-General and his staff for their unrelenting efforts to improve the situation.

It was a somewhat curious expression of that "gratitude" that the

Netherlands decided unilaterally to withdraw its contingent, even be-
fore the semi-annual debate in the Security Council about the con-
tinuation of UNIFIL's mandate had taken place. Its offer to retain a
"symbolic unit" of a few military policemen was rejected by the
United Nations. The decision was even more curious, as, looking
from the outside, there seemed to be hardly any concrete reason for
it. The situation in Lebanon was less tense in October 1985 than six
months before, when the Israeli forces were in the process of with-
drawal. The Dutch forces had suffered no combat casualties. More-
over, to take part in peace-keeping operations entails certain ob-
vious risks, and soldiers who enlist for this task on a voluntary basis
should be expected to be aware of those risks. Interestingly enough,
the Netherlands government had been well aware of these risks back
in 1979, when it decided to participate in UNIFIL. It stated then that,
in view of its overall policy and in view of UNIFIL's difficult situation
after the withdrawal of the Iranian contingent and the decrease by 50
per cent of the French contingent, these risks should not be consid-
ered decisive in the decision-making process.[33]

In fact, the main reasons for the withdrawal would seem to have
been of an internal nature: the desire on the part of the Ministry of
Defence to use the military personnel and *matériel* for their usual
NATO tasks and the Ministry of Finance's reluctance to pay for the
rather costly operation. Views within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
were sharply divided. In the end, the economy-minded views pre-
vailed.

As to the duration of the operation, the government declared that
it adopted the views that were expressed by a Member of Parliament
during a debate regarding Dutch participation in UNIFIL, i.e. the
Dutch would remain in Lebanon as long as the Security Council
found it necessary, as long as they could properly fulfil their tasks,
as long as no open war broke out in the territory, as long as no ag-
gression was directed against the UN units, and as long as the United
Nations and the Dutch contingent had the confidence of the parties
concerned.[34] By its unilateral decision to withdraw, the Netherlands
government put less emphasis on one of its own criteria ("as long as
the Security Council finds it necessary"). This makes its commitment
less reliable than could be expected.

On 19 December 1985, the Dutch government sent a note to the
UN Secretary-General concerning a revised offer of stand-by forces.
The offer was made to meet the most pressing needs of the United
Nations, especially at the start of a peace-keeping operation. The

Dutch units would normally be available for a period of up to six months. Though marines formed the main part of the offer, other units could be designated in the light of circumstances and availability. Preference would be given to the deployment of specialized units. The offer was designed to ensure both rapid deployment and maximum flexibility in assembling specific units for UN duties in the long term. In this way the Dutch government wished to underline its continuing support for UN operations as an instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security. It stated that it considered participation in peace-keeping operations as an integral part of its security policy.

After the end of the Cold War, the Netherlands became one of the main contributors – with military units, observers, and police monitors – to UN peace-keeping operations (UNTAG – Namibia; UNAVEM II – Angola; UNTAC – Cambodia; UNPROFOR – Yugoslavia; UNOMUR – Uganda–Rwanda; ONUMOZ – Mozambique). According to official government policy, all military branches (army, navy, and air force) can in principle participate in peace-keeping and peace-enforcement operations. There is capacity to participate in a maximum of four peace-keeping operations at one time. Apart from national defence within the framework of NATO, peace-keeping in its widest sense has become the main task of the armed forces.[35]

Fact-finding

In an effort to make a contribution to the establishment of the rule of law in international relations, the Dutch government proposed setting up a fact-finding mechanism within the United Nations.[36] This proposal was put before the General Assembly in 1962 and eventually resulted in the adoption of a considerably watered-down resolution in 1967.[37]

The original proposal of the Netherlands had been to bring about a merger of various ad hoc organs and existing arrangements for fact-finding and to create a permanent fact-finding body to institutionalize these procedures. The basic idea behind the proposal was an old one, already recognized at the peace conferences in the Hague in 1899 and 1907: to establish the facts in a particular case or dispute as a contribution of its own to the solution of such a dispute. In the debate in the Special Political Committee in December 1965, the Dutch representative, in discussing the peaceful settlement of disputes, remarked:

In actual practice there are in nearly every dispute one or more aspects where parties disagree about the facts and where factfinding can eliminate at least that aspect of the dispute.... There have been several cases where one country accused another of having pursued alleged invaders on the territory of the other country and having molested the local population, or attacked villages or killed citizens of the latter country. There have likewise been complaints of bombing by foreign planes. Very often such allegations have been denied. There have likewise been many complaints of foreign intervention or subversion in the form of aid given to rebels or intruders, allegations which are almost invariably denied. In all such cases a fact-finding mission on the spot can settle the dispute at least as far as the facts are concerned.

The absence of such fact-finding had, in the view of the Dutch delegation, increased tensions in the past and contributed to a deterioration of the situation. When introducing the proposal in the General Assembly, the Dutch delegate presented fact-finding as a sequel to the principle of inquiry, one of the means to the peaceful settlement of disputes listed in Article 33 of the Charter. Central to the Dutch proposal were: its complementary character – i.e. complementary to other, already existing, arrangements; its limitation to fact-finding, thus not dealing with arrangements such as conciliation and arbitration; its optional character. The following tasks were envisioned for the new institution: to check the observance of treaties; to discover previously unknown facts; and to verify disputed facts.

International reception of the Dutch proposals was lukewarm, if not outright hostile, either because they competed with similar proposals of others, or because states were firmly opposed to the idea as such. As one commentator put it, "facts" are usually not as neutral and as objective as suggested in the Dutch proposals; they do not speak for themselves.[38]

In particular, the idea of setting up a new permanent institution met with little positive response. On 16 December 1963, the General Assembly adopted a resolution,[39] sponsored by the Dutch delegation, on the question of methods of fact-finding that invited member states to submit views on the subject. The Secretary-General was requested to study the relevant aspects and to report on the results. Only 12 countries responded to the request to submit their views. The rapporteur had to conclude that most countries "did not attach great importance to the matter."

The report by the Secretary-General[40] was published in May 1964.

It made clear that the General Assembly had established by far the largest number of fact-finding bodies, most of them on an ad hoc basis. The study covered 11 fact-finding bodies established by the Security Council since 1946, none of which was of a permanent nature. It also covered cases where fact-finding missions had been conducted under the Secretary-General's own authority. The study made clear how difficult it was to distinguish fact-finding from conciliation and how a comprehensive concept like ''inquiry'' encompasses different procedures like inspection, observation, and finding facts.

The report was used as an input for the discussion in autumn 1964 in the Special Committee dealing with principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation between states, together with a Dutch working paper on methods of fact-finding. The Netherlands government had come to the conclusion that the question deserved further study. It presented an outline of possibilities for establishing a special organ for fact-finding. The Dutch felt that any fact-finding body should always be auxiliary to higher, decision-making bodies or to the parties in a dispute. The tasks of such a body were to be determined by the goal of the investigation of facts, events, situations, and circumstances.

There appeared at the time, however, to be little international support for the idea of institutionalizing fact-finding. Eventually, a resolution was adopted, introduced by the Netherlands, that asked the Secretary-General to complete his earlier report by including fact-finding as a means to secure the observance of treaties. This study was published in April 1966.[41]

In the Netherlands the view had grown that fact-finding could now be discussed on its own merits. A Dutch paper that contained a more detailed plan for a permanent organ for fact-finding, its tasks, composition, and procedures, received little international support, however. In 1967, the General Assembly adopted a resolution[42] recognizing the usefulness of impartial fact-finding as a means towards the peaceful settlement of disputes. The resolution implied that existing methods of fact-finding were not sufficiently used. It also distinguished fact-finding from reconciliation. Parties to a dispute may more readily be prepared to use available machinery for fact-finding in the knowledge that the investigation will be confined to reporting the facts rather than in combination with efforts of reconciliation. In its final operative paragraph the resolution requested the Secretary-General to prepare a register of experts in international law who

might be consulted, if the need arose. Such a Register of Experts was eventually created. So far, however, no single appeal has ever been made to this Register.

In presenting its proposal the Netherlands had two principal aims:
– to draw attention to the importance of fact-finding as a means of solving disputes; and
– to institutionalize the concept by establishing a permanent UN organ.

The first aim was to a large degree realized: the issue of fact-finding was discussed at different levels of the UN structure, a study of the issue was undertaken, the Secretariat published two reports on methods of fact-finding, and the discussion was drawn into the political sphere. However, institutionalization was realized only on paper.

Although considerable effort was displayed by Dutch diplomats to launch the idea, they were unable to mobilize sufficient support for it, even among their Western allies. One of the reasons for its failure may have been its overly legal character. It is one thing to argue in favour of the rule of law in international relations on an abstract level, but quite another to create the institutions necessary for putting that rule of law into practice.

In later years, the Netherlands tried to keep the issue on the political agenda. During the 1970s and 1980s, it stressed with a certain regularity the utility of fact-finding. On a number of occasions the concept of fact-finding was referred to in various official documents. Thus fact-finding was part of the discussions in the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization, established in 1975. In 1981 and 1983, the Netherlands referred to fact-finding in the debates in the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly.

In his 1982 report on the work of the organization, the Secretary-General stated his intention to develop a wider and more systematic capacity for fact-finding in potential conflict areas. His suggestion was, of course, warmly welcomed by the Netherlands. However, in his 1983 report the Secretary-General limited himself to repeating the idea in the same words as the year before, without any further clarification. He, in his turn, waited in vain for reactions from the members of the Security Council, who had held a number of informal consultations on the suggestions he had made as to the use, misuse, or non-use of the United Nations, including fact-finding.

More recently, the issue of fact-finding has received renewed attention – this time also beyond the Netherlands. In March 1989, a group

of Western states submitted a working paper in the Special Committee on the Charter,[43] dealing exclusively with fact-finding by the United Nations. According to this document, the United Nations should make full use of the information-gathering capacities of the Secretary-General and consider sending fact-finding missions to relevant areas. He should be encouraged to prepare and update lists of experts in technical fields so as to have them available at any time. During the same session, two East European states – Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic – expressed an interest in the subject. In a working paper[44] they urged a strengthening of the fact-finding capabilities of the United Nations, especially by the Security Council in its role of maintaining international peace and security. This document also reflected the spirit of ''New Thinking'' in the Soviet Union's ideas about strengthening the role of the United Nations in world politics. In an *aide-mémoire* of September 1988,[45] the Soviet Union had already suggested strengthening the role of the General Assembly by the dispatch of observation and fact-finding missions, in agreement with the Security Council and with the consent of the receiving countries. This was a theme that was to recur on several occasions.

The Dutch representative in the 1989 session of the Special Committee stated that the presence of two separate documents on fact-finding underscored the renewed interest in the subject. He referred, by way of illustration, to the Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes, adopted by the General Assembly in November 1988. In that document the direct use of impartial fact-finding or good offices missions was recognized as a means to prevent the further deterioration of international disputes. This confirmed, in the Dutch view, the institutional basis for a UN fact-finding unit. The Netherlands considered the prevailing international political situation conducive to investigating once again the feasibility of impartial fact-finding.

During the discussion in the Sixth Committee of the report of the Special Committee on the Charter in the fall of 1989, the representative of the United Kingdom praised the ''intensive debate'' on fact-finding, while the Cuban delegate thought that there was still ''a universe of questions'' involved that required further debate. In the February–March 1990 session of the Special Committee, again two separate working papers were submitted for discussion, leading subsequently to a single text.[46] East and West agreed on a definition of fact-finding, either by sending a mission or by the use of the existing

information-gathering capabilities of the Secretary-General. In deciding to whom to entrust the conduct of a fact-finding mission, the Security Council and the General Assembly should give preference, in general, to the Secretary-General, who may designate a special representative or a group of experts reporting to him.

During its February 1991 session, the Special Committee, notwithstanding political sensitivities on the part of the non-aligned countries, completed its work on the consolidated text by adopting a draft Declaration on Fact-Finding by the United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance of International Peace and Security and decided to submit it to the General Assembly.[47] On 9 December 1991, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration without a vote.[48] In that document, fact-finding is defined as ''any activity designed to obtain detailed knowledge of the relevant facts of any dispute or situation which the competent United Nations organs need in order to exercise effectively their functions in relation to the maintenance of international peace and security.'' Fact-finding, in short, is aimed at having ''full knowledge of all relevant facts.''

The adoption of the Declaration by the General Assembly coincided, at the beginning of the 1990s, with a growing interest in the use of fact-finding as an instrument of practical policy. A new momentum for fact-finding arose, partly as a result of the post–Cold War political climate, partly as a result of the publication of *An Agenda for Peace*. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, in his report, recommended an increased resort to fact-finding as a tool of preventive diplomacy.[49] Both the Security Council and the General Assembly supported his recommendations. To meet the needs for fact-finding, the Council and the Assembly asked the Secretary-General to strengthen the capacity of the Secretariat and to consider the secondment of experts.[50] Meanwhile, the Secretary-General hinted at the fact that more fact-finding missions would have to take place during 1992–1993 than in any previous biennium. Over 40 such missions took place in 1992 alone.[51]

Disarmament

Since the early 1960s, the Netherlands has taken an active part in debates on disarmament and arms limitation issues in the United Nations. Basic to Dutch policy in this realm was to give priority to opportunities for worldwide arms control, with the United Nations as one of the central instruments, while at the same time remaining

strongly committed to a security policy based on NATO membership. In conceptual terms, the aim has always been to deal with arms control in the most suitable forum, i.e. weapons that can be banned or regulated on a worldwide scale should be treated in a worldwide forum (e.g. chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons as opposed to specific types of nuclear and conventional weapons in the arsenals of the superpowers).

The period between 1960 and 1963 can be considered as somewhat of a watershed in the role of the United Nations in disarmament affairs. Whereas the first 15 years of its existence were primarily characterized by discussions on the organization of disarmament talks, this changed around 1960 primarily owing to two developments. First, there was the aim of "general and complete disarmament under effective international control" established by the General Assembly, which led to the development of a comprehensive set of disarmament policy goals. These were worked out over the years leading to the adoption of a policy document in 1978 at the First Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament (often called the "disarmament bible"). Secondly, there was the gradual acknowledgement of the fact that bilateral US–Soviet negotiations were of vital importance to any progress on the issue at the United Nations.

In 1962, the Netherlands became a member of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) in Geneva. It published a disarmament policy document in the middle of the 1960s that gave ample attention to UN efforts.[52] The Netherlands has been noted within the UN framework for its large degree of involvement in the drawing up and implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It acted both within NATO and in EC/Euratom as "honest broker" between divergent interests and positions.[53] It also played an important mediating role at the various treaty review conferences in 1975, 1980, and 1985. The Netherlands and the United States were the only countries with a separate ambassador for non-proliferation issues.

In 1969, the Netherlands joined the Conference of the Commission on Disarmament (CCD) – the successor to ENDC. In 1973, the Dutch expressed an interest in improving the institutional structure of disarmament talks by proposing the establishment of a standing organ or an International Disarmament Organization (IDO), an initiative that was supported by Sweden, Italy, and France. This organization was to serve as a central body for the verification and review of the implementation of (multilateral) disarmament agreements and to coordinate the UN role in disarmament, for example in the com-

mon collection of information. The Netherlands elaborated on this proposal during the First and Second Special Sessions of the General Assembly on Disarmament in 1978 and 1982. In the 1980s, however, when multilateralism in general and the United Nations in particular were subjected to review and the bilateral approach produced more results, the proposal was not renewed.

More recently, in 1988, the Netherlands developed an initiative to look into the practical role the United Nations could play in the verification of multilateral disarmament treaties and how the United Nations could serve as a service centre or data bank for parties to regional arms control treaties. A proposal presented to the Third Special Disarmament Session of the General Assembly by Canada, France, and the Netherlands failed, however, to reach consensus. On the basis of that proposal a resolution was passed at the 43rd session of the General Assembly, over the opposition of the United States, requesting a study by the Secretary-General of this issue, with the assistance of government experts.

The Netherlands has also been responsible for numerous initiatives trying to strengthen the Convention on Bacteriological Weapons, which, so far, contains no provisions for verification. To rectify this situation, at least in part, it was agreed at the Second Review Conference of the treaty in 1986 that member states would voluntarily implement confidence-building measures, such as the exchange of information on laboratories and relevant research activities. The Netherlands was involved in consultation and decision-making on these measures from the outset, mainly in investigating measures to reinforce the treaty further in the area of verification and the accession of new states parties.

The banning of chemical weapons has been another subject in which the Netherlands was strongly involved. It has emphasized institutional questions such as the international inspectorate, which is to bear responsibility for the verification of the comprehensive ban on the production of chemical weapons. It offered to serve as headquarters for the new Chemical Weapons Treaty Organization, which was accepted in 1993.

The involvement of the Netherlands in the discussion on the limitation of nuclear weapons has been principally through its membership of NATO. Domestically, extensive debates concerned the development of the neutron bomb and the stationing of cruise missiles. These issues – particularly the nuclear ones – did not lend themselves to treatment in the UN framework, with the exception of a

very brief Netherlands' flirtation with the "freeze" concept. After following, for a long time, a rather outspoken policy in favour of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, the Netherlands changed course to some extent in the mid-1980s. More emphasis was put on a step-by-step approach by the superpowers to reduce the number and yield of tests, in conjunction with an effective process of (nuclear) disarmament. In the conventional field the Netherlands has tried to promote the thought that conventional weapons deserve more prominence on the UN agenda. As a new UN item, the Netherlands co-sponsored a resolution in the General Assembly on international arms transfers.

In line with the Netherlands' legal tradition, much attention has been devoted to institutional and legal questions in the field of arms control.[54] Another rather characteristic role has been that of acting as mediator. The drafting of the Non-Proliferation Treaty has already been mentioned. Equally, in discussions on nuclear matters in Non-Proliferation Treaty review conferences it avoided taking extreme positions, for example in the debate on full-scope safeguards as a condition for supply.

Population policy

Up to the early 1960s, the Netherlands government's view on population issues, both within and without the United Nations, had been opposition to state interference in the individual rights of its citizens, e.g. in the determination of the size of their families. It did not approve of actions that would imply that the United Nations would offer a helping hand in such trespassing upon individual rights. It opposed all references to population policies and technical assistance for national projects and programmes.

Around 1965, a fundamental change took place in that position, reflecting changing perceptions and attitudes within Dutch society. This was partly due to increasing concern about the implications of population growth in the Netherlands itself. It also marked the beginning of the second demographic transition in Western Europe characterized by a rapid decline in fertility. The mid-1960s also show in the Netherlands the development of more liberal attitudes regarding marriage, family, and sexuality. Of importance was the impact of such more liberal attitudes among Dutch Roman Catholics, constituting more than 30 per cent of the population, whose political influence is a constant and critical factor in Dutch coalition governments.

The new policy found its way into the instructions to the Dutch delegation at the General Assembly in the fall of 1965. Accordingly,

the delegation endorsed the expanded population programme as re-commended by the Population Commission, the invitation to the specialized agencies to consider the extension of their population activities, the call to make more funds available for this purpose, and the request to the Secretary-General to formulate a priority programme.

In the following years, the government's new policy directive took shape within the framework of its development assistance programme. The 1966 Policy Memorandum on Development Aid was the first official expression of the new approach. It described population policies as stemming from the necessity to decrease the demand for food in developing countries. At the same time, it emphasized the need for caution and sensitivity in dealing with population programmes in bilateral relationships. At the 1966 General Assembly, the Netherlands co-sponsored a resolution on population growth and economic development.[55] At its suggestion, two amendments were included: one relating to the need for demographic problems to take into consideration economic, social, cultural, psychological, and health factors in their proper perspective; the other relating to the recognition of the sovereignty of nations in formulating and promoting their population policies, with due regard to the principle that the size of the family should be determined by the free choice of each individual family.

The relationship between human rights and population policies was seen as essential. Population growth was on the one hand the recognition of the basic human right to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of children; on the other hand, rapid population growth provided a threat to the enjoyment of the human rights of life, freedom, and security. Both elements were included in the conclusions of the International Conference on Human Rights held in Tehran in 1968.

The Netherlands preferred, for various reasons, a multilateral approach for providing technical assistance in the field of population policy: it provided the politically desired and essential neutral framework based on the recipient countries' sovereignty, access to international expertise, and the integration of population policies in socio-economic development. Against this background, the Netherlands made its first contribution in 1969 to the Secretary-General's trust fund for population activities. Within five years, the Netherlands' contribution rose to 11 per cent of the resources of the fund, which was transformed into the UN Fund for Population Activities (UN-FPA).

A report by a State Commission on Population, published in 1977, formed the basis for future government policy. It recommended the achievement of zero natural population growth and, for the longer term, a stationary population in the Netherlands. Regarding international policies, a ''carefully balanced, yet clearly profiled position'' in international forums was recommended, based on the necessity for an early control of world population growth, ultimately aiming at replacement level.

At the first intergovernmental World Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974, the Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation focused on the need for development policies, including population policies, to improve the quality of life. Calling upon the rich countries to add a new dimension to their efforts to contribute to a worldwide redistribution policy by stabilizing their material consumption so as to make available a larger share of world resources to the world's poor, he stressed the need for developing countries to increase their standard of living through the reduction of natural population growth.

In the years following the Bucharest conference, emphasis was placed on the need for developing countries to integrate the population factor in their development plans. UNFPA played an important role in achieving recognition of this need. Within the overall growth of the Netherlands contribution to UN development programmes, financial support for UNFPA continued to grow.

In the 1965–1975 period, the Netherlands thus first discovered the world population problem as a legitimate governmental concern; subsequently searched for proper instruments to deal with it; and, finally, established its framework within its development cooperation policies. The following 10 years were mainly a period of policy stabilization. The Netherlands' policy pronouncements in the annual development cooperation budget memorandum were limited to its participation in UNFPA's policies and programmes as they related to two Dutch development cooperation policy objectives, i.e. the attainment of self-reliance and the orientation of its programmes towards the poorest developing countries.

Increased attention to the development problems in Africa provided a major impetus for the Netherlands for a higher profile in international population discussions and assistance programmes. At the 1984 World Population Conference in Mexico, it reiterated its view of population policy as one essential element of an integrated development strategy. It questioned the acceptability of policies pursued on

the basis of national sovereignty, in view of doubts about the voluntary character of population programmes in India and China. Particular importance was attached to the reassertion of the right to family planning as a basic human right.

The Mexico Conference (a) further stimulated the already strong Dutch support for UNFPA and other multilateral organizations, and (b) provided a strong impetus towards a greater explicit recognition and operationalization of population activities in the various programmes of Dutch bilateral development cooperation. The former also provided the basis for additional financial support to offset the shortfall in the Fund's resources after the United States' withdrawal as contributor to the Fund in 1986; the latter culminated in the government's Policy Memorandum on the population problem and development cooperation of April 1988. Population activities would be supported through the rural development sector programme and would occupy a more prominent place in development aid for education and research. It envisaged increased support to multilateral programmes through UNFPA and the specialized agencies such as WHO, FAO, and the World Bank as well as through UNICEF.

The Netherlands presented its views on international population issues in various UN forums. Apart from the two world population conferences in 1974 and 1984, these forums included: the Population Commission and the UNDP/UNFPA governing council; ECOSOC and the General Assembly; and regional meetings under the auspices of the Economic Commission for Europe. The Netherlands has been a member of the Population Commission during 20 of the past 25 years and has played a very active role in its deliberations.

Over the 20 years of UNFPA's existence, the Netherlands contributed more than US$200 million, or approximately 10 per cent of the general resources of the Fund. As one of its largest donors, the Netherlands played an important role in the policy discussions on UNFPA, being part of the ''inner circle'' of delegations on which UNFPA officials frequently called for advice. After the withdrawal of the United States as contributor to the Fund in 1985 because of the alleged involuntary character of UNFPA's programme on China, the Dutch delegation was among the first to speak out publicly and worked actively behind the scenes in support of efforts to persuade the United States to resume its support, which it did in 1993.

The active role and high profile of the Netherlands in the various UN forums reflected broad domestic support for its international population policies. The content of its policy was carefully balanced

and broadly based, reflecting the thinking in Dutch society. By advocating in international forums the same principles and policy objectives applicable to the national situation, the government succeeded in achieving broad, multipartisan support. In November 1989, the Netherlands government hosted an intergovernmental conference, to help celebrate the 20th anniversary of UNFPA, which resulted in the Amsterdam Declaration for a Better Life for Future Generations.

Presentation at the United Nations and policy debates in the Netherlands itself contributed to a high degree of consistency and continuity on population issues and the role of the United Nations therein. Supported by a broad political consensus, a careful balance was maintained between recognition of the need and support for active population policies, their integration in economic and social development, and respect for basic human rights in family planning and access to information, means, and services. The Netherlands' willingness to enter into bilateral agreements for that purpose has increased over the years.

Human environment

In 1968, the General Assembly called for the organization of a conference on the protection of the human environment. That conference took place in Stockholm in 1972 and resulted in the Declaration on the Human Environment and in the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), through which most UN activities in this field are channelled.

Concern for environmental issues arose first in the Western industrialized states. Many developing nations originally saw environmental pollution as chiefly a concern and consequence of production and consumption patterns in the West. In an effort to emphasize the importance of environmental issues to both developed and developing nations, the Netherlands was the main initiator of the symposium on environment and development that was convened by the UN Secretary-General at Founex, near Geneva, in 1971 to prepare for the Stockholm Conference. In that meeting an attempt was made by a panel of experts from 27 countries all over the world to spell out the relevance of the human environment to issues of development. It resulted in a report on Development and Environment, the Founex Report, which was one of the basic documents submitted to the Stockholm Conference.[56] The Founex Report stressed the need to find a synthesis between environmental demands and the need for economic development of the poor nations in the world. While the devel-

303

oping nations should make the protection of the human environment part of their development planning, the Western states should guarantee that their concern for environmental problems would not be at the expense of economic progress in the lesser developed world.

The Founex Report was instrumental in helping to overcome the misgivings of many developing nations *vis-à-vis* the Stockholm Conference. At that time and in the follow-up to the Stockholm meeting, it has been the policy of the Netherlands to try to see the environmental issues also from the point of view of the developing nations and to make the environment an integral part of more overall development planning.

The United Nations Environment Programme that emerged from the Stockholm Conference has remained rather modest in terms of operational and financing capacity. It was never, especially by the industrialized countries, conceived as an executing agency, but rather as a catalytic organization, which should provide a survey of environmental problems and should try to facilitate and promote international cooperation in the environmental field. Proposals to expand its activities have so far not been successful, partly because of opposition from both national governments and international organizations, which see an expansion of UNEP as a potential infringement on their own mandate and position.

In an effort to overcome this opposition, the Netherlands – together with West Germany and Sweden – proposed in 1978 to give UNEP a clearing house function. UNEP was to act as a broker to prepare requests on the part of environmental organizations in developing nations to be translated into aid programmes by donor countries. The three countries contributed around US$1 million each in cash or kind for that purpose, but the project has so far not really matured.

The international symposium of UN experts in Cocoyoc in Mexico in 1974 on patterns of resource use, environment, and development strategy contained a strong indictment of life patterns in the industrialized nations. It condemned "overconsumptive types of development" and stressed the need for fundamental changes in the consumption and production patterns in Western countries in order to make human survival possible. Most Western states were strongly opposed to this statement. The Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway were the only Western states that made a sympathetic reference to the results of the Cocoyoc meeting in their speeches in the Second Committee of the General Assembly.

Another area in which the Netherlands played an important role was in the realm of the development of environmental law. It strongly promoted and chaired a working group on the development of draft principles, guidelines, and recommendations in the conservation and harmonious utilization of natural resources shared by two or more states. Although opposed by a number of states, such as the United States, France, India, and Brazil, these principles were adopted by the governing council of UNEP. However, to the disappointment of the Netherlands and the other sponsors, the General Assembly of the United Nations limited itself to "taking note" of these principles.[57] Nevertheless, the principles subsequently served as a basis for a number of regional and international agreements. Together with Canada and Uruguay, the Netherlands furthermore promoted and achieved, through a special expert group meeting in Montevideo in 1978, the adoption by the UNEP governing council of a programme on the progressive development of environmental law. This programme has served as a basis for many of the present conventions concluded or in progress regarding worldwide environmental problems, such as the transportation of hazardous waste, the protection of the ozone layer, regional seas, etc.

A further environmental subject on which the Netherlands has been very active is international cooperation on climatic change. It has given strong support to the Intergovernmental Panel for Climatic Change (IPCC) initiated by UNEP and the World Meteorological Organization. That group had been given the mandate to address climate problems and, *inter alia*, prepare the ground for the second World Climate Conference and a Climate Convention. In order to promote and accelerate the process towards such a convention and the establishment of appropriate institutional and financial mechanisms, including a mechanism for law enforcement and control with regard to the implementation of climate-related activities, the Netherlands, together with France and Norway, organized a climate conference for heads of government, which met in the Hague in March 1989. Partly building on the conclusions of that conference, another conference of environmental ministers was convened by the Netherlands in Noordwijk in November 1989. These consultations contributed to the conclusion of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which was opened for signature during the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, in June 1992.

One of the notable outcomes of UNCED '92 was the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. In the preparatory phase this

document came to be known as the "Earth Charter." The Netherlands actively participated in its drafting, especially during the second part of 1991 when it held the chair of the European Communities. It introduced a set of legal principles to be included in the Earth Charter. Developing countries feared that the name "Earth Charter" would give the impression of a purely environmentally oriented document. Therefore, they strongly preferred the title "Environment and Development," since that would do more justice to the development problems involved. Ultimately, the final document was called a Declaration rather than a Charter. From a legal point of view this makes no difference since it was obviously never the intention to adopt this as a binding document. The Rio Declaration includes an elaborate list of 27 Principles, addressing such issues as the right to a healthy environment and development, the correlation between development and environmental preservation, and domestic and international measures to be taken.

Apart from the Global Climate Change Convention, the 1992 Rio Conference also resulted in the Convention on Biological Diversity, a Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, and Agenda 21, entailing an international programme of action with concrete measures for the implementation of principles following the Conference and leading into the twenty-first century. After the Conference, various debates, both within and outside the Dutch government and parliament, took place on how to translate Agenda 21's explicit targets, priorities, assignment of responsibilities, and specific strategies relating to environment and development into Dutch and EC policies, including time-frames and costs involved. Several advisory reports were presented to the government, both by its formal advisory bodies and by non-governmental organizations. In order to stimulate public awareness and discussion of Agenda 21, the government arranged for the translation and publication of the Rio documents, including the voluminous Agenda 21.

By way of summary, it may be said that the Netherlands from the outset has been very active in the promotion of UN activities in the protection of the human environment. It differed from other Western nations in its emphasis on the relationship between environmental protection and overall economic development. With regard to the latter it has shown more understanding for the views of the developing nations and at times has helped to bridge the gap be-

306

tween the developed and the developing world. In line with its traditional interest in the development of the rule of law, it has put great emphasis on developing principles of international environmental law.

The future

When looking at the future in the United Nations, the question of what role the Netherlands can play will undoubtedly be influenced by the further development of the European integration process. Already, under the Single European Act adopted in 1987, efforts must be made to develop a common European foreign policy. For that purpose, the 12 member states of the European Union inform each other and consult with each other about all problems of foreign policy that are of common concern. The Single European Act provided for the establishment of a joint secretariat in Brussels to assist the presidency in the preparation and execution of the activities of European Political Cooperation (EPC). The Maastricht Treaty on European Union, which entered into force in 1993, provides for a common foreign and security policy. Though, traditionally, permanent Security Council members the United Kingdom and France have opted to keep Security Council issues outside EPC consultations, more recently France has shown a willingness to exchange views with its EC partners on all subjects relating to the maintenance of peace.[58] The Dutch Foreign Minister has even publicly raised the question whether the Security Council seats of the United Kingdom and France should be replaced by one ''European'' seat, representing the 12. EPC is of increasing importance, though of course not all foreign policy of the 12 is as yet made in Brussels. It is mainly a matter of periodic consultations and efforts towards harmonization of national policies. It remains to be seen to what extent ''Maastricht'' will radically change the foreign policy-making process of the 12 European partners. To the extent that a common European foreign and security policy is developed, it will of course further limit the freedom of manoeuvre of the individual European partners. This will affect their role in the United Nations as well. Keeping this in mind, what is the most likely role in the near future for the Netherlands in the United Nations?

A state that lacks the strength to compel others to accept its views needs other sources for international action. One such source may be to take initiatives in order to develop further the rule of law in inter-

national relations. It is likely that the Netherlands will continue to press this point and to look for support from like-minded nations. It is difficult to say with any degree of certainty which specific issues will present themselves on the international scene in the future, but a number of general themes are likely to feature in future Dutch UN policy. What is said here for the Netherlands applies to other small or middle powers as well. The following suggestions for future developments are all based on the case-studies presented in this paper.

International development cooperation

Development cooperation is most likely to be an area of continued Dutch foreign policy concern. More diversified needs of different categories of people in different developing countries will call for more diversified approaches at the United Nations and its specialized agencies. In recent years, the linkage between the promotion of respect for human rights and development cooperation has become increasingly recognized. Indeed, such a linkage is rather obvious: aid to developing nations, either through governments and multilateral agencies or through non-governmental organizations and grass-roots movements, should be seen as helping them to realize the economic and social rights of their population, such as the right to food, the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to health, etc. In the United Nations, the Netherlands has always emphasized this point, witness the fact that it was one of the few Western nations that supported the General Assembly Declaration on the Right to Development.[59] Domestic support for this policy item remains nearly unabated. Continuation of efforts in this field, also in the United Nations, is therefore what can be expected in the future.

A part of these efforts could be a revival of the idea of a global Charter for Development, proposed by the Dutch almost 30 years ago. Admittedly, an effort has been made to codify the existing and evolving principles of international development cooperation in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, which was adopted by the General Assembly in 1974.[60] In spite of its name, this Charter has no more value than any other resolution adopted by the General Assembly. It met with a great deal of opposition and has not since acquired a higher political or legal status. Therefore, after 30 years of considerable practice, it might be relevant to lay down the fundamental principles of international development cooperation in a global framework, to be called "Charter for Develop-

ment.'' Such a treaty should be as clear and brief as possible, providing a framework for more specific undertakings. The latter could be adopted in the form of additional protocols to the original treaty, as in the case of the 1985 Ozone Layer Convention. These protocols would be legally binding and could be called ''development contracts.'' Whatever the political feasibility of the proposal for a global Charter for Development, there is an obvious need for clear-cut commitments in the relations between developed and developing countries. Areas to be covered in such development contracts could include: (a) the amount of development aid; (b) special measures for the least developed countries; (c) additional measures for the liberalization of trade for the benefit of subgroups of developing countries; (d) special measures for the protection of the environment, e.g. an international charge on carbon dioxide or the use of tropical timber; and (e) debt rescheduling. Developed and developing countries would be free to decide whether or not to sign these more specific agreements. Such an approach would enable more development-oriented industrial nations to step ahead, preferably but not exclusively in the framework of regional groupings such as the European Union. It would also provide opportunities for a more differentiated approach. For example, a group of industrial nations could decide to enter into a special relationship with certain developing countries, as the European Union has done with 70 developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP) in the context of the Fourth Lomé Convention (1989–1999). The approach could also be differentiated towards certain sectors; e.g. a development contract could be concluded as regards the shipping sector, foreign investments, or the trade in textiles and clothing as an alternative to the Multi-Fibre Agreement.

In 1989, the Norwegian Foreign Minister advocated a similar approach during an OECD meeting, replacing the proposed World Bank/IMF adjustment programmes with more comprehensive ''development contracts,'' which he defined as a comprehensive instrument for the financing of a medium- and long-term development plan prepared by the developing country itself with outside technical support.

The conclusion of a global Charter for Development, in combination with the proposed development contracts, would put international development cooperation on a firmer and more business-like footing, while tailoring it to the level of political readiness of various groups of industrial nations and taking into account the different

needs of developing countries or specific sectors. This approach could thus be a useful additional way of tackling the development problems of the 1990s.

Human rights

One important theme is most likely to be the general area of the promotion of human rights, which has been a strong feature of Dutch foreign policy. What is more, the Netherlands – together with the Scandinavian countries and Canada – has managed to develop a position where other states expect it to take initiatives in this field.[61] A great deal has been achieved so far in the development and codification of international norms. Therefore, future initiatives in the field of human rights will necessarily be more concerned with the implementation of these norms and the further expansion of international supervision. This will not be an easy task. Violations of human rights take place on a wide scale and the governments involved do not welcome what they tend to see as interference in their domestic affairs. There is all the more reason to press this issue – especially for a government that likes to stress the importance of developing the rule of law in international relations.

In 1988, the Dutch Foreign Minister asked the independent Advisory Commission on Human Rights and Foreign Policy[62] to offer suggestions for improving the supervision mechanisms under UN human rights conventions. The lack of financial resources, the financial problems of the United Nations itself, the increasing lag in the obligatory periodic reporting on the part of states parties, and the working methods of the human rights committees themselves have led to a crisis in these supervisory mechanisms. At the time, more than 100 states were late in submitting no fewer than 300 periodic reports to the various committees. The committees are not able to deal with the reports in the time available.

The Advisory Commission's report[63] contained a number of suggestions and recommendations. With regard to the backlog of reports, it suggested that possibilities should be investigated to lighten the burden on the part of governments without detracting from the informative value of the reports. Especially for those human rights treaties that require full implementation from the moment of their entry into force, only the first report needs to be a comprehensive one with extensive information on relevant legislation and legal practices in general. Subsequent reports should concentrate on updating

310

and new developments and should respond to requests for additional information. Duplication in reporting should be avoided as much as possible. Therefore, governments should be permitted to make reference to relevant information in recent reports prepared for other supervisory procedures. It might be of help to governments if the intervals between submission dates for different reports could be harmonized as much as possible. Moreover, technical assistance and advisory services should be provided to those governments that are confronted with practical problems or lack of experienced personnel to fulfil their reporting obligations. Timely reporting should be promoted by the Secretary-General through regular consultations with representatives of states parties.

The Foreign Minister adopted the Commission's recommendations and submitted its report to the international meeting of chairpersons of the UN supervisory committees, which met in October 1988 to consider ways to improve procedures. The chairman of the Advisory Commission presented its findings to the Third Committee of the General Assembly in November 1988. The Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution[64] that requested the Secretary-General to entrust an independent expert with the task of preparing a study on possible long-term approaches to enhancing the effective operation of existing and prospective bodies established under UN human rights instruments. That study,[65] prepared by the Australian professor of international law Philip Alston, was discussed by the 1990 session of the Commission on Human Rights and referred to relevant committees.

The Dutch proposal to strengthen the supervisory mechanisms under UN human rights conventions can be seen as a typical example of the kind of activity a small or medium-size state can undertake in this field. The suggestions contained in that proposal may not seem grandiose; yet, if adopted, they could serve in a very practical way as a stimulus to improve effective implementation by UN bodies in this field. Many of these and similar suggestions were the subject of discussion at the World Conference on Human Rights that met in Vienna in June 1993. Although the Final Document of that meeting contains a number of useful suggestions, it remains to be seen whether a majority of the member states is really willing to work toward a strengthening of UN supervisory mechanisms.

Perhaps even more important is the question of in what circumstances international military action for humanitarian purposes should be permitted. Recent developments in Iraq, Somalia, and the

former Yugoslavia have shown the relevance of that question. In 1992, two advisory commissions to the Dutch government published a report on the use of force for humanitarian purposes.[66] They refer to the use of the authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter with reference to gross human rights violations in a country as "enforcement action for humanitarian purposes." The two advisory commissions proposed the adoption of a resolution by the Security Council or the General Assembly as a contribution to clarification and more consistency in the interpretation of the said Article and to establish a balance among the purposes of the United Nations: the maintenance of international peace and security (in the sense of prevention of armed conflict) on the one hand and the promotion and protection of human rights on the other.

Such a resolution should contain the following elements:

– There should be an emergency situation with gross violations of fundamental human rights, i.e. a broad interpretation of the right to life including not only mass killings of civilians by the military or the police but also famines or natural disasters where it is made impossible to give adequate care to the victims.

– The measures to be taken should be proportional in relation to the seriousness of the situation. Armed intervention would be allowed only if less drastic (peaceful) actions were no longer possible. It should also be proportional in the use or threat of the use of force and the duration of the intervention. A short intervention and quick withdrawal may have only a short-lasting effect and may in the end be even more damaging. Therefore attention should be paid to the need for aftercare, such as the building of a new governmental structure and the organization of elections. In this context, the role of UNTAC in Cambodia is specifically referred to.

– The effect of the intervention on the structure of the state against which the measure is taken should be limited to whatever is necessary for attaining the intended result.

– The intervention should by itself not create such a threat to international peace and security that the number of victims as a consequence of the action is greater than the loss of lives one is trying to stop.

The advisory commissions acknowledge in their report that it will not be a simple matter to draw up such a resolution and that in any event the actual decision to take such action remains with the Security Council. That is probably the main reason their proposals have, so far, remained mainly of academic interest. In a policy paper concern-

ing the United Nations, which the Dutch Foreign Minister sent to parliament, he reiterated that, even if the General Assembly expressed itself in a general resolution on the mutual relationship between security, human rights, and national sovereignty, the Security Council should remain free to decide when to act under Article 39 of the Charter. The policy paper then continues: "Nevertheless, the government finds it desirable that in the UN attention is paid to the great importance of the application of enforcement measures on behalf of the protection of fundamental human rights and other humanitarian purposes and to provide criteria as to when intervention would be possible and thus to contribute to the development of an international legal practice."[67] Unfortunately, the Foreign Minister did not explicitly react to the concrete proposals of the two advisory commissions.

Nevertheless, the two commissions have done useful work in trying to spell out the conditions under which the Security Council should decide on enforcement action for humanitarian purposes. The majority in the United Nations will not be easily inclined to accept such a proposal, but that does not relieve governments and scholars alike from the obligation to work further on the elaboration of such criteria. It would seem to be highly unsatisfactory to leave the formulation of the conditions under which enforcement action for humanitarian purposes is allowed entirely to the political whim of the members of the Security Council, as seems to be the case now.

Peace-keeping

A further theme to be emphasized is peace-keeping. The general area of UN military observation and peace-keeping operations has recently undergone a great deal of expansion. These operations vary in size and operate under different mandates and responsibilities. They have in common that they were established by the Secretary-General under the authority of the Security Council and that they consist of national military or semi-military units under a UN-appointed commander. If the current international climate continues, the use of this type of UN operation may further expand, as they fulfil a useful function in supervising armistice lines and the transfer of political authority to a new regime. For obvious reasons, the Secretary-General prefers to use military contingents of small and middle-rank states and shuns participation by the major powers.[68]

The Netherlands has participated in UNTSO, UNIFIL, and UN-

TAG. Since then its participation in UN peace-keeping activities has greatly expanded and included operations in Angola, Cambodia, Yugoslavia, Uganda–Rwanda, and Mozambique. In 1993, the cabinet decided to send a combat unit to the former Yugoslavia, in addition to the communication unit that already operated there. There seems to be a sufficient measure of domestic support for this type of operation, though that might decrease if Dutch army units were to suffer a considerable number of combat casualties – which so far has not happened. The decision by the Foreign Minister to make UN peace-keeping operations a permanent item in the budget can be seen as a step in the right direction.

Peace-keeping is an interesting example of how UN operations can be expanded without formally amending the Charter. Peace-keeping operations are seen as not contrary to the Charter, since they serve the main purpose of the United Nations – the maintenance of international peace and security.

UN peace-keeping operations have developed in response to practical situations. Every new operation was built on the experience of previous ones. This so-called ''ad-hocracy'' has needed neither a formal Charter amendment nor even the adoption of general guidelines. However, there would now seem to be at least two reasons why the time may be ripe for making an attempt to draft general guidelines of some sort. First, peace-keeping is again topical, as there are now operational activities in a number of problem areas, which seem to prove the viability of the doctrine of peace-keeping as distinct from enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter. Second, the traditionally negative attitude of the Soviet Union towards UN peace-keeping operations has changed radically under the influence of the ''new thinking'' on foreign policy. Therefore, the chances that the ''Committee of 33'' might realize some sort of codification of general principles for UN peace-keeping operations would seem to be now better than ever. Such a codification should be based as much as possible on previous practice and experience. Undoubtedly, the existence of general guidelines would give UN peace-keeping operations greater institutional transparency for all parties concerned – the United Nations itself, the host state, as well as the troop-contributing countries. From a legal perspective, it would also seem important that the parties concerned should know in advance how rights and duties are distributed among them. Certain principles would, of necessity, be mandatory. Any deviation from those provisions (such as the principle of host state consent) would deprive an operation of its peace-

keeping character. However, most provisions would be complementary in character, being applicable only if the parties concerned have not deviated therefrom (e.g. regarding the status of UN military units in the host country).

The following general recommendations regarding the organization and regulation of UN peace-keeping operations are based mainly on study of Dutch experiences:

– More UN member states should take a stand-by position. The making of reservations with regard to actual participation should be restricted in order that the United Nations can call on a sufficient potential of troops at all times.
– A permanent fund for the financing of UN peace-keeping operations should be established to prevent any future problems in this regard.
– Troop-contributing countries should be urged not to take recourse to the unilateral withdrawal of their troops, but to leave it to the Security Council to decide on the continuation of an operation.
– Standardized guidelines for UN peace-keeping operations should be established in order that all parties concerned know their rights and obligations at all stages of an operation.

Fact-finding

The Dutch initiative on fact-finding in the 1960s clearly came too early. Today, prospects for the establishment of fact-finding mechanisms, though not institutionalized, are better than ever before in the history of the United Nations. The ''state of the art'' with respect to fact-finding is well summarized in the following statement by the Security Council:

In accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter, the Security Council notes the necessity to strengthen the United Nations potential for preventive diplomacy. It welcomes United Nations General Assembly resolution 47/120 [concerning the Declaration on Fact-Finding]. It notes with satisfaction the increased use of fact-finding missions. It invites Member States to provide the Secretary-General with relevant detailed information on situations of tension and potential crisis. It invites the Secretary-General to consider appropriate measures for strengthening the Secretariat capacity to collect and analyse information. The Security Council recognizes the importance of new approaches to prevention of conflicts.[69]

A combination of factors, since the second half of the 1980s, has contributed to this situation: the *rapprochement* between East and

West as reflected at several levels within the United Nations system, the new role for the United Nations in the post–Cold War era, and the recommendations on preventive diplomacy, as contained in *An Agenda for Peace*. These developments have created a new momentum for fact-finding and, consequently, have led to the agreement in the General Assembly on a Declaration on Fact-Finding, the sending of fact-finding missions to an increasing number of conflict areas, and the debate on the further modalities of fact-finding as an instrument of preventive diplomacy, in the wake of the publication of *An Agenda for Peace*. In this latter respect, a broadening of the scope of fact-finding can be foreseen. The Secretary-General has stressed the importance of the economic and social roots of many potential conflicts; the information needed by the United Nations should also encompass economic and social trends to be synthesized with political developments that could lead to dangerous tensions. Apart from the United Nations, regional organizations, such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), already make use of the dispatch of fact-finding missions to potential conflict areas. New emphasis has been given to fact-finding as a verification instrument, e.g. in the field of arms control, or as an instrument for conflict prevention in the environmental sphere (with the help of a register of experts and even "green helmets").

The present situation seems to confirm that the original intention of the Netherlands – to draw attention to the importance of fact-finding as a means of solving disputes – has been honoured. But it should be stressed that the focus of the concept, as applied in the present circumstances, has shifted to the use of fact-finding as an instrument of preventive diplomacy. The institutionalization of fact-finding remains a bridge too far. Its ad hoc character and the political sensitivities involved (the notion of national sovereignty) are reflections of an approach similar to the development of the concept of peace-keeping, which is also an issue where the United Nations has successfully tried to avoid political constraints in a flexible, pragmatic way.

Disarmament

A crucial question will be how to secure in a realistic fashion that arms control and disarmament talks in the UN framework will keep pace with bilateral and regional arms control, where a number of important results (e.g. on intermediate nuclear forces) and interesting

perspectives (on achieving conventional stability in Europe) can be noted. For the Netherlands, the adage is that arms control should be studied and tackled in the appropriate forums. From that it follows logically that, as things stand now, most attention will be given to banning chemical weapons in a comprehensive and global convention, strengthening the biological weapons convention, and further supporting the Non-Proliferation Treaty through successful review conferences in 1990 and 1995 (extension of the treaty, with possible alternative schemes suggested by non-parties such as India, emphasizing a staged programme of nuclear disarmament). A real dilemma would seem to be that, whereas many (mostly non-aligned) nations call for more attention to be paid to nuclear weapons within the UN framework, the Netherlands and its NATO allies see the role of the United Nations and the UN Conference on Disarmament in this area as only limited. In their view, nuclear arms control is first and foremost a matter for the nuclear powers and their respective allies. The comprehensive test ban is, to a certain extent, an exception to that rule, although the Netherlands, especially in the second part of the 1980s, has put great emphasis on the so-called step-by-step approach of the United States and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Netherlands will probably continue to see a role for the UN Commission on Disarmament in discussing at least the outline of a comprehensive test ban. This position would conflict with the insistence by the non-aligned nations on curbing the nuclear arms race by putting a cap on nuclear modernization by means of a comprehensive test ban.

In political terms, the question will be whether the Netherlands – still a staunch supporter of NATO – will continue to attach prominence to multilateral arms control efforts. Although in principle a two-track approach is feasible, it would depend on the choice of priorities how much emphasis would be put on activities within the UN framework. It would seem safe to predict a continued rather critical ''no-nonsense'' attitude on the part of the Netherlands towards the classic UN subjects of the 1970s, e.g. the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Population policy

In the discussions on UN reform, the Netherlands has so far been more successful in strengthening the role of the Population Commission and UNFPA on a step-by-step basis than in its efforts to bring about a comprehensive reform of UN population activities.

317

During the 1970s and 1980s, a number of reform proposals were discussed aimed at strengthening cohesion and coordination among UN bodies involved in population policy activities. Some of the most recent thinking has focused in particular on strengthening the role and functioning of the Population Commission and of UNFPA. To develop the Commission to its full potential, organizations belonging to the UN system should seek its substantive advice. The Commission could thus play a larger role in providing feedback of experience into their programmes and in achieving a sufficient degree of coordination. A strengthened Population Commission could provide for a mechanism to give coordinated intergovernmental direction on overall policy throughout the UN system. This would by necessity make it into a more intergovernmental, i.e. "political," and less technical body.

Proposals for strengthening UNFPA include the establishment of a governing body of its own, constituted in the same manner as the UNDP governing council. This would have the advantage that UNFPA would stand on its own feet and become independent of UNDP's governing council machinery; it would provide UNFPA with resources in excess of US$200 million, with a higher profile among UN organizations. While it might be worth considering such a change, provided sufficient guarantees be given to ensure its continued close links with UNDP's administrative framework, it is likely that such a change would be opposed by donor countries because of its possible financial if not wider implications. An attractive alternative – as contained in the report of the Group of 18 – would be to establish one single governing body for all UN operational activities for development. Such a UN development council could meet in permanent session to discuss the operations of the various UN development funds and apply the same managerial criteria to all of them, while preserving the identity of each of the funds for fund-raising and other purposes.

The effective delivery of population assistance would be enhanced by the consolidation in UNFPA of the operational units of the UN secretariat dealing with population assistance. In addition, better coordination among the various UN development organizations could serve to integrate population activities in development programmes. In this respect, the Joint Consultative Group on Policy in which UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, and the World Food Programme cooperate, could play a useful role. Together with the strengthening of UNFPA's field staff, these steps could contribute to overcoming some

318

of the disadvantages of the current strict separation of research, funding, and project implementation in UN population assistance.

The relationship between human rights and population issues deserves increased attention in the years ahead. Contraceptional family planning, changes in the age structure in industrialized and developing countries, and the impact of scientific and technological developments on human rights are likely to be high on the agenda of international population meetings. They may well call for new institutional approaches at the national and international level.

Human environment

A final theme of activities concerns the human environment. In 1987 the World Commission on Environment and Development, commonly known as the Brundtland Commission, published its report *Our Common Future*. In its report, the Commission pointed to the limits of the carrying capacity of our planet to sustain human activities. It introduced the notion of ''sustainable development'' in international politics, which it defined as development meeting ''the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.''[70] The Commission advocated a new approach to economic growth based on this concept. The relief of poverty should have top priority in this connection, given that poverty can be both a cause and a consequence of environmental degradation. Furthermore, the Commission proposed institutional and legal changes within the UN system and its specialized agencies, including the drafting of a Universal Declaration and a Convention on Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development, reorienting the policies of the multilateral development and financing institutions, and searching for new sources of revenue and automatic financing of environmental policies. These and related policy recommendations are elaborated in a major Dutch policy memorandum of 1989, the so-called ''National Environmental Policy Plan.''[71]

In March 1989, the prime ministers of France, Norway, and the Netherlands convened an international meeting on problems of the environment in the Hague, in which 24 government leaders participated. This conference was not a UN activity as such, but it may have repercussions for further activities in the UN framework. It resulted in a declaration (The Hague Declaration) proposing the establishment of new institutional authority within the United Nations, either by strengthening existing institutions or by creating a new insti-

tution, to be charged with the protection of the natural atmosphere. The new institutional authority, which would be put under the control of the International Court of Justice, should be enabled to take decisions in the absence of consensus among the states concerned. It should determine international norms for improving and guaranteeing the protection of the atmosphere. It should also be charged with the supervision of the implementation of these norms. Countries in the third world for which the proposed measures would be too heavy a burden should receive fair and equitable assistance. The Declaration was "noted" by the UNEP governing council[72] and was sent by the UN Secretary-General as an official UN document to the ECOSOC meeting of the summer of 1989. The UNEP governing council also "noted" the initiatives on the part of the Netherlands and Norway with regard to the establishment of a world climate fund and their expressed willingness to contribute to such a fund.

The strengthening of existing institutions would obviously be easier than setting up an entirely new organ. One way in which such strengthening might occur would be a further build-up of the UN Environmental Programme. If UNEP were to become a full-fledged specialized agency, this might be a way to express the importance the world community attaches to the solution of environmental problems. Obviously, this should not be to the detriment of activities in the field already undertaken by existing agencies, such as the activities of WHO in combating water pollution or the work of FAO in the protection of tropical forests. A drawback could be that not all UN members might choose to become members of the new specialized agency; and they could withdraw from it if dissatisfied with its policies.[73]

Another new institutional arrangement, which has been proposed by the World Federation of United Nations Associations (WFUNA), is the establishment of an Ecological Security Council with wide-ranging authority. One may well wonder, though, whether such an arrangement would be in any way more successful than the existing (political) Security Council after which the proposal is patterned.

Finally, the office of the executive director of UNEP could be upgraded into that of an International Environmental Commissioner. This office could (a) receive petitions from individuals and groups and (b) have the right to submit questions to governments and private corporations.[74]

The 47th session of the General Assembly endorsed the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, and the Statement of Principles on Forests.[75]

320

As suggested in Chapter 38 of Agenda 21, the Assembly also requested ECOSOC to establish a high-level, 53-member UN Commission on Sustainable Development with the status of a functional commission of ECOSOC. ECOSOC installed the Commission in February 1993.[76] More far-reaching earlier proposals, such as establishing an Environmental Security Council or reconstituting the Assembly's Fourth Committee as an Environmental Committee, were thus put aside.[77]

The Netherlands successfully campaigned to be elected to the Commission on Sustainable Development. The government views membership of the Commission as an important element in its strategy to play an active role in the formation of international environmental and developmental policies. The mandate of the new Commission includes monitoring the progress made in the implementation of Agenda 21, considering information provided by governments such as national reports on the implementation of Agenda 21, reviewing the adequacy of funding, receiving input from competent NGOs, considering the progress made in the transfer of environmentally sound technologies to developing countries and the implementation of international environmental conventions, and making recommendations on the need for new cooperative arrangements related to sustainable development to ECOSOC and the General Assembly. It may be concluded that the Commission has wide *functions* but hardly any *powers*. It has been requested to organize quite soon a high level meeting, with ministerial participation, to take an integrated view of Agenda 21's implementation. Not later than 1997 the General Assembly will convene a special session for an overall review and appraisal of the implementation of Agenda 21 and, if necessary, adjustments of the effectiveness of the Commission.

Conclusion

The cases presented illustrate both the possibilities and the limits of Dutch policy in the United Nations. They also illustrate the dilemmas faced by a state that declares the establishment of the rule of law in international relations to be a main item of its foreign policy, yet does not want to give up the defence of what it considers to be its national interests.

From the cases emerge at least five major elements of Dutch policy in the United Nations:
(a) a strong emphasis on the development of international law;

(b) a strong interest in issues of concern to developing nations;

(c) a tendency towards ''bridge-building'' between North and South, for instance in the realm of population problems;

(d) concern for the promotion of human rights;

(e) concern for environmental issues.

(a) As already described, the Dutch interest in the development of international law is part of a long tradition. It is strongly linked to the geographical position of the country and its related commercial interests. In the cases dealt with in this chapter, it has found its modern expression with regard to proposals in the realm of human rights law and environmental law. Fact-finding has also been treated as part and parcel of the further development of international law. The idea of an ''objective'' fact-finding body under UN auspices was to take an issue out of the context of (Cold War) politics. It was an effort to let legal procedures take the place of political controversy.

However, even the Dutch respect for the rule of law in international relations has its limits. One such limit is where perceived vital national interests are at stake, witness the Dutch opposition to the Security Council's involvement in the struggle for Indonesian independence. Another limit may be of a financial and material nature, as was shown in the case of the unilateral withdrawal from UNIFIL.

(b) The Netherlands has probably been matched only by the Scandinavian nations in its concern for development policy and its efforts to improve the economic and social position of the inhabitants of third world countries. One may well speculate about the reasons for this phenomenon. Joris Voorhoeve refers to ''a tinge of Calvinist penance.'' He relates it to Dutch political culture and states: ''It is no coincidence that countries like Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands, who share a Northern Protestant political culture, are very much in agreement on development co-operation and have the highest budgets relative to GNP among the industrialized states.''[78] It has been argued that it might also reflect the social democratic character of these societies, in particular the central role of their governments in the provision of social welfare.[79] Development aid has also promoted economic activity in the Netherlands itself and therefore, on the whole, is also regarded positively by business circles.

In the case of the Netherlands, an additional factor has undoubtedly been its colonial past. Next to hard-boiled commercial considerations there has always been a tinge of moralism in the way the

Dutch approached their colonial burden. After the loss of the colonies, activities of the government as well as the churches and other non-governmental agencies turned toward the provision of development assistance.

(c) More than most other Western nations, the Netherlands has made a genuine effort to note the interests of the developing nations – as well as its own. Illustrations can be found in the realm of development policy, but also in the area of population and environmental policy. The active Dutch interest in world population problems can be related to their own demographic situation and the implications of sociocultural changes affecting a densely populated country. The Netherlands was among the first to advocate, at both the national and international level, policy objectives to stabilize the population. Its broadly supported and consistent international population policy similarly reflected sensitivity to, and support for, efforts aimed at deepening the understanding of the relationship between human rights and population issues.

(d) The traditional Dutch interest in human rights policy stems from the same roots – what Voorhoeve has called the Dutch internationalist–idealist tradition.[80] Emphasis on the promotion of human rights is by no means limited to one political school. All major political parties emphasize the importance of the issue of human rights in their programmes. It is striking to watch their competing efforts to claim the issue of human rights as part of their own political philosophy. Dutch governments composed of different coalitions have all stressed the human rights issue.

(e) The interest in environmental problems is again closely linked to geographical origins. Geographically, the Netherlands is located on the Rhine estuary, at the receiving end of a river that has collected polluted refuse from Switzerland, France, and western Germany. As a great deal of Dutch drinking water supply depends on the Rhine, it is obvious that the Netherlands has – to put it mildly – a strong concern in cleaning up the Rhine. It is also subject to prevailing south-westerly winds, which bring it in direct touch with industry in Great Britain. Finally, roughly one-third of its territory borders on the North Sea, which – partly owing to a lack of supervision by the Dutch themselves – has become more and more polluted in recent times. These European-based factors, as well as considerations of a

more global nature, are good reasons for the Dutch to take a keen interest in international rule-making on environmental policy.

There thus exist from the point of view of Dutch national interests a number of reasons to pursue an active policy in a worldwide international organization – the United Nations. The issues dealt with here are most likely to stay with us in the future. There is thus ample reason to look at the future of the United Nations – as seen through Dutch eyes – from the perspective of the issues dealt with so far.

At the time of the establishment of the United Nations the Dutch discovered the limitations of their position as a small power when – together with other small nations – they lost the fight against the veto of the permanent members of the Security Council. One may assume that the Netherlands' relative position further weakened as the size of the international community expanded.[81] It should be noted that a study of the influence of the Netherlands in international relations has found no evidence of a reduced role, or of reduced effectiveness in the implementation of Dutch foreign policy.[82] That study did not limit itself, however, to the Dutch performance in the United Nations nor did it compare the Dutch position in 1945 with that of 1989. It remains rather likely that one's voice is more heard in a body of 50 members than in one of 185.

A small state can perhaps achieve most in the United Nations if it limits its objectives to the legal sphere and issues of norm-setting. That was not yet the case in the 1960s when the Netherlands tried to institutionalize the notion of fact-finding in the United Nations. It was far more successful in its activities on behalf of the International Convention against Torture. Its efforts to improve the supervisory mechanisms under the human rights treaties are mainly of a procedural nature and may meet with some degree of success.

In this chapter an effort has been made to show the possibilities for small or middle-rank powers such as the Netherlands in the United Nations. We have also tried to show the type of dilemmas such a power may have to face. The wish to establish the rule of law in international relations may be tempered by considerations based on the defence of what are seen as national interests. Provided there is sufficient domestic support, small or middle-rank powers may take useful initiatives in the United Nations. The issues dealt with in this paper illustrate the possibilities for constructive activities to be undertaken in the United Nations by such a small or middle-rank power. All of these issues are likely to remain well beyond the year 2000. They

may thus become part of an action programme for the United Nations that is of vital importance to the survival of mankind. Small and middle-rank powers can make a most useful contribution to such an action programme.

Notes and references

1. The full case-studies have been published in Peter R. Baehr and Monique C. Castermans-Holleman, eds., *The Netherlands and the United Nations: Selected Issues* (The Hague: T. M. C. Asser Instituut, 1990). The following cases were studied: international development co-operation (by Nico Schrijver), human rights (by Peter Baehr and Monique Castermans), peace-keeping (by Rob Siekmann), fact-finding (by Dick Leurdijk), disarmament (by Jan Hoekema), population policy (by Henk Gajentaan), and environmental policy (by Frits Schlingemann, Peter Baehr, and Monique Castermans).

   Chadwick F. Alger, Jan Berteling, Theo van Boven, Herman Burgers, Leon Gordenker, Dirk van der Kaa, Johan Kaufmann, Jan Meijer, Gerben Ringnalda, and Jaap Walkate commented on specific subjects. Their comments are gratefully acknowledged.
2. The view that the Netherlands is a small country is by no means universally shared. When it was suggested to Foreign Minister Joseph Luns that the Netherlands was indeed a small, powerless state, he replied: "That has never been said by me – never, never, never. I have never said that the Netherlands is a small puny country. The Netherlands is a very important country."

   No less than 38 per cent of members of the Dutch foreign policy élite, interviewed in 1976, felt that the Netherlands did not necessarily belong to the group of small nations (see Peter R. Baehr, "The Dutch Foreign Policy Elite: A Descriptive Study of Perceptions and Attitudes," *International Studies Quarterly* 24, Jun. 1980, no. 2: 238).
3. The following paragraphs are based on: D. A. Leurdijk, "Nederland en het Functioneren van de VN" [The Netherlands and UN functioning], in M. van Leeuwen et al., *Het Woord is aan Nederland: Thema's van Buitenlands Beleid in de Jaren 1966–1983* [The Netherlands has the floor: Themes of foreign policy in the years 1966–1983] (The Hague: Clingendael, series no. 1, 1983), 36–55.
4. Cf. Ph. P. Everts, ed., *Controversies at Home: Domestic Factors in the Foreign Policy of the Netherlands* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), 62; *Pyttersen's Nederlandse Almanak 1993–1994* (Houten: Bohn, Stafleu, Van Loghum, 1993), A221–251.
5. Everts, *Controversies*, 64.
6. *Keesing's Historisch Archief* (1946), 6854.
7. Suggestions presented by the Netherlands government concerning the proposals for the maintenance of peace and security agreed on at the Four Powers Conference of Dumbarton Oaks. Reprinted in S. I. P. van Campen, *The Quest for Security: Some Aspects of Netherlands Foreign Policy, 1945–1950* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1957).
8. Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1958), 715.
9. "Amendments to the Proposals for the Maintenance of Peace and Security agreed on at the Four Powers Conference of Dumbarton Oaks supplemented as a result of the Conference of Yalta, submitted by the Netherlands Delegation to the San Francisco Conference," as quoted by Van Campen, *Quest for Security*, 16.
10. Russell, *History of the UN Charter*, 872.
11. Joris J. C. Voorhoeve, *Peace, Profits and Principles: A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), 200. See also Van Campen, *Quest for Security*, 19–20.
12. Van Boven's appointment was not renewed by Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar, after Van Boven had publicly condemned flagrant killings by certain governments such as Iran,

which he identified by name. See Howard Tolley, Jr., *The UN Commission on Human Rights* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987), 107; Iain Guest, *Behind the Disappearances: Argentina's Dirty War against Human Rights and the United Nations* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), 321–332.

13. Netherlands Constitution, article 90.
14. Cf. Voorhoeve, *Peace*, 198.
15. Ibid., 97.
16. Speech by Mr. E. N. van Kleffens, 31 Jul. 1947, in the Security Council, in Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, *Indonesië in de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties, Januari 1946 – September 1947* [Indonesia in the Security Council of the United Nations, January 1946 – September 1947], publication no. 5 ('s-Gravenhage: Staatsuitgeverij, 1947), 82.
17. Speech by Dr. J. H. van Roijen, 22 Dec. 1948, printed in Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaten, *Indonesië in de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties, November 1948 – Januari 1949* [Indonesia in the Security Council of the United Nations, November 1948 – January 1949], publication no. 19 ('s-Gravenhage: Staatsuitgeverij, 1949), 534.
18. A. Lijphart, *The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and New Guinea* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966).
19. A. E. Kersten, "Decolonization of Dutch New Guinea: The Luns Plan," in Philip Everts and Guido Walraven, eds., *The Politics of Persuasion: Implementation of Foreign Policy by the Netherlands* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1989), 219–230.
20. UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV).
21. See for the Special UN Fund for Economic Development, Johan Kaufmann, *United Nations Decision Making* (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), 179 ff., and H. W. Singer, "Aid not Trade? The Evolution of Soft Financing in the Early Years in the United Nations," in J. Kaufmann, ed., *Effective Negotiation: Case Studies in Conference Diplomacy* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers/UNITAR, 1989).
22. Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, *De eenentwintigste Algemene Vergadering van de Verenigde Naties, September–December 1966* [The twenty-first General Assembly of the United Nations, September–December 1966], publication no. 83 (The Hague, 1967), 73–75.
23. UN General Assembly Resolution 2218 (XXI).
24. UN Document A/C.2/235, 1967. Text also in Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, *De Vijfde Bijzondere Zitting en de Tweeëntwintigste Zitting (eerste gedeelte) van de Algemene Vergadering der Verenigde Naties 1967* [The Fifth Special Session and the twenty-second session (first part) of the General Assembly of the United Nations 1967], publication no. 87 (The Hague, 1968), 253–254.
25. UN General Assembly Resolution 2305 (XXII).
26. UN General Assembly Resolution 41/128.
27. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, Memorandum presented to the Lower House of the States-General on 3 May 1979, 71.
28. UN Charter, Article 1, para. 3.
29. ECOSOC, Res. 2/9.
30. Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, *De eenentwintigste Algemene Vergadering*, 276.
31. For a detailed presentation of this case-study, see Peter R. Baehr, "The General Assembly: Negotiating the Convention on Torture," in: David P. Forsythe, ed., *The United Nations in the World Economy: Essays in Honour of Leon Gordenker* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1989), 36–53; J. Herman Burgers, "An Arduous Delivery: The United Nations Convention Against Torture (1984)," in Kaufman, *Effective Negotiation*, 45–52.
32. Cf. R. C. R. Siekmann, *National Contingents in United Nations Peace-Keeping Forces* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991).
33. Answers by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence, Proceedings, Second Chamber of Parliament, Appendix 15 441 no. 3, 25 Jan. 1979, para. 19.
34. Proceedings, Second Chamber of Parliament, 1 Feb. 1979, 2959.

35. See J. G. Siccama et al., *Nederland's Agenda voor de Vrede* [The Dutch agenda for peace] (The Hague: Netherlands Institute for International Relations, "Clingendael", 1993).

36. This case is dealt with in more detail in Dick A. Leurdijk, "Fact-Finding: The Revitalization of a Dutch Initiative in the UN," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 21 (1990), no. 1: 59–69.

37. UN General Assembly Resolution 2329 (XXII). The proposal had originated mainly in the minds of Professor A. J. P. Tammes, Dutch delegate to the Sixth Committee, and C. W. A. Schürman, then permanent representative to the United Nations. See the latter's *A Center for International Fact Finding: A Review and a Proposal*, Occasional Paper, School of International Affairs, Columbia University, New York, 1983.

38. Cf. G. Walraven, "A Dutch Initiative in the United Nations: Fact-finding," in Everts and Walraven, *Politics of Persuasion*, 239.

39. UN General Assembly Resolution 1967 (XVIII).

40. A/5694.

41. A/6228.

42. UN General Assembly Resolution 2329 (XXII).

43. A/AC.182/L.60.

44. A/AC.182/L.62.

45. A/43/629.

46. A/AC. 182/1990/CRP.2, 21 Feb. 1990.

47. A/C.6/46/L.9, annex.

48. UN Press Release GA/8307, Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly during the first part of its forty-sixth session from 17 September to 20 December 1991 (21 Jan. 1992).

49. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992).

50. The General Assembly invited member states to submit names of "suitable individuals" whom the Secretary-General might wish to use at his discretion in fact-finding and other missions; A/RES/47/120, 18 Dec. 1992. For Security Council, see S/24872, 30 Nov. 1992.

51. A/47/965-S/25944, Report of the Secretary-General, Implementation of the Recommendations contained in *An Agenda for Peace* (Jun. 1993).

52. In 1964, the Minister for Foreign Affairs established an Advisory Committee on Questions of Disarmament and International Security and Peace, mainly composed of non-governmental experts, which subsequently submitted several advisory reports to the minister. See J. H. Burgers, "The Netherlands and Disarmament," in T. M. C. Asser Institute, *International Law in the Netherlands*, vol. 2 (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff/Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications Inc., 1979), 249–290.

53. Cf. L. M. van der Mey, "Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," in Everts and Walraven, *Politics of Persuasion*, 118–132.

54. Cf. Burgers, "The Netherlands and Disarmament," 270.

55. UN General Assembly Resolution 2211 (XXI).

56. UN General Assembly, A/Conf. 48/10, 22 Dec. 1971, Annex I.

57. UN General Assembly Resolution 34/186.

58. See chapter 5 in this volume.

59. UN General Assembly Resolution 41/128.

60. UN General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX).

61. Cf. Jan Egeland, "Focus On: Human Rights – Ineffective Big States, Potent Small States," *Journal of Peace Research*, 21 (1984), no. 3: 210.

62. Cf. Peter R. Baehr, "Human Rights, Development and Dutch Foreign Policy: The Role of an Advisory Committee," in David P. Forsythe, ed., *Human Rights and Development: International Views* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1989), 154–170.

63. Adviescommissie Mensenrechten Buitenlands Beleid, *Mensenrechtenverdragen onder VN-Toezicht* [Human rights treaties under UN supervision] ('s-Gravenhage, 12 Jul. 1988). Also: UN General Assembly, 43rd session, A/C.3/43/5.

64. 1989/47.

65. A/44/668, 8 Nov. 1989.
66. Advisory Commission on Human Rights and Foreign Policy and Advisory Commission on Issues of International Public Law, *The Use of Force for Humanitarian Purposes* (The Hague, 18 Jun. 1992).
67. *De Verenigde Naties in een Veranderende Wereld* [The United Nations in a changing world], Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, vergaderjaar 1992–1993, 22 828, no. 1 (17 Sept. 1992), 24.
68. British participation in UNFICYP and French participation in UNIFIL are exceptions to the rule that permanent members of the Security Council do not normally contribute military contingents to UN peace-keeping operations. The UNTSO, in which currently Soviet, American, and French officers participate, should be seen as a separate category.
69. Press Release SC/5632, 28 May 1993.
70. The World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 8.
71. Proceedings, Second Chamber of Parliament, 1988–89, 21 137, nos. 1–2.
72. Decision 15/36 of 25 May 1989.
73. Cf. Nico Schrijver, "International Organization for Environmental Security," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, 20 (1989), nos. 2: 119.
74. Ibid., 120.
75. UN General Assembly Resolution 47/190, 22 Dec. 1992, adopted without a vote.
76. ECOSOC Resolution 1993/225.
77. See, for a discussion of these proposals, Schrijver, "International Organization," 115–123.
78. Voorhoeve, *Peace*, 281.
79. J. P. VerLoren van Themaat, *Ontwikkingssamenwerking. Hoe en Waarom* [Development cooperation. How and why] (Amsterdam: Evert Vermeer Stichting/NOVIB, 1989), 20.
80. Voorhoeve, *Peace*, 49 ff.
81. Cf. J. J. C. Voorhoeve, "De Slinkende Rol van Nederland" [The diminishing role of the Netherlands], *Internationale Spectator* 35 (1981), 69–78.
82. Everts and Walraven, *Politics of Persuasion*, 333.

8

Nigeria and the United Nations

Humphrey Assisi-Asobie

Introduction

Nigeria was granted independence by the United Kingdom on 1 October 1960. On 7 October Nigeria was admitted to the United Nations. Neither the United Nations nor any other international organization was, in any direct manner, involved in the process of Nigeria's independence. Nevertheless, every Nigerian government has given international organizations in general, and the United Nations in particular, a prominent place in its diplomacy.

In official diplomatic thinking and practice, the significance of the United Nations has increased over the years.[1] In contrast, the Commonwealth has dropped in the Nigerian government's scale of diplomatic preferences. Its place has been taken by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was established on 25 May 1963. The non-aligned movement (NAM) later displaced the Commonwealth in Nigeria. Among multilateral intergovernmental organizations of the political type, the Commonwealth came to occupy a poor fourth position.

Over the years, the reason for Nigeria's participation in international organizations in general and the United Nations in particular has changed. At first, membership in the United Nations was sought to demonstrate Nigeria's independence and to reap benefit from the free interchange of ideas and multilateral consultation. As Chief

Simeon Adebo, Nigeria's ambassador to the United Nations between 1962 and 1967, recalls, the United Nations was highly valued in Nigeria primarily because Nigerian leaders believed the United Nations was "the most prestigious international forum of them all."[2] Later the objectives of Nigeria's participation in the United Nations in particular, and in international organizations in general, became more specific. At the United Nations, Nigeria's principal aims were to seek support for national liberation movements in Africa and to find a solution for the economic problems confronting Nigeria and other African states. Changes also occurred in the Nigerian government's attitudes and orientations towards, as well as expectations of, the United Nations.

Trends in the orientations and attitudes of the Nigerian government towards the United Nations

In the early 1960s the United Nations was seen and portrayed in Nigerian official circles as an assembly of individual sovereign states, interacting freely and harmoniously on the basis of equality and frankness with one another. The view of the *raison d'être* of the UN system was romantic. Its supreme goal was taken to be the attainment of peace and progress for all humankind. The United Nations and its agencies would be a forum where African problems and aspirations "would be considered on the basis of justice divorced from selfish considerations."[3]

The Nigerian government harboured an idealist's notion of the structure of the United Nations as a political entity. It was a shock to the Nigerians that the United Nations existed as a patchwork of blocs of states or an "arena where party politics could be played at the highest level." They did not easily adjust to the idea that the United Nations could be a forum "where ideological differences would obscure the objectives of peace among the nations and stability of the world at large."[4]

In this period (1960–1965), the Nigerian government expected the United Nations to play three major roles in the international system. First, the United Nations would assist in bringing every dependent territory, especially in Africa, to a state of "responsible independence." And it was believed that this process would be peaceful and orderly. Second, the United Nations would shield the continent of Africa particularly, and new states in general, from the ideological rivalries of the superpowers and their allies (i.e. from the Cold

330

War). Third, it would promote the "economic security" of the new states and, by so doing, help consolidate, and therefore guarantee, their independence.[5]

The concept of Nigeria's role at the United Nations was affected, too, by a heavy touch of idealism. Prime Minister Balewa went so far as to promise that Africa's, and therefore Nigeria's, interests would be pursued with due regard to the interest of the international community.[6] The general principles of the United Nations were incorporated into Nigeria's foreign policy guidelines and, to a lesser extent, its laws. Loyalty to the United Nations was made a basic principle of Nigerian diplomacy. Of the 12 principles of Nigeria's foreign policy, three made direct reference to the United Nations. More important was the weight assigned to the United Nations. For instance, the first principle declared that the Nigerian government's "primary duty" was to "promote the interest of the Nigerian federation and its citizens." But policies considered "most advantageous to Nigeria" would be pursued "*subject always to Nigeria's belief in the principle of the United Nations.*"[7]

It was, however, only to a limited extent that general principles of international law or standards of behaviour upheld by the United Nations were directly incorporated into Nigerian law. Few human rights provisions were included in the independence constitution. The Nigerian Bill of Rights of 1960 was reproduced in the 1963 (Republican) constitution, its provisions being borrowed from the European Convention on Human Rights, which originated from the UN-inspired Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). The provisions in the Nigerian constitution were, however, inferior in quality and coverage to those of the Universal Declaration. Their inclusion was expediently meant to meet domestic political needs, rather than being the result of a commitment to the principles of the UN Charter or associated documents.[8] While the Nigerian government was prepared to accommodate the United Nations in its foreign policy guidelines, it was reluctant to subject Nigeria's domestic laws to those emanating from international organizations, particularly the United Nations.

Nigeria's commitment to the principles of the United Nations Charter was, on some issues cited, circumscribed by the government's concern to retain sovereign control over matters within the country's domestic jurisdiction. An important exception was the area of adjudication. In 1965, Nigeria became the forty-first state to declare its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Interna-

tional Court of Justice without the sort of reservations that, indirectly but essentially, render the acceptance clauses nugatory. The only condition that Nigeria attached to its acceptance was reciprocity.

The Nigerian government's commitment to the survival and development of the United Nations is manifested in its readiness to support, morally, financially, and materially, all major UN activities. It paid its proportion of the expenses incurred by the United Nations on its peace-keeping forces in the Middle East even though the operations were begun before Nigeria became a member. The Nigerian government "loyally accepted and paid up its assessments" for the UN peace-keeping operations in the Congo (now Zaire), subject only to the special concessionary rate granted the poorer states.[9] It also contributed to the UN Bonds Scheme, to enable the United Nations to close the shortfall, created by the refusal of some member states to pay their assessments, in the cost of its peace-keeping operations in the Congo. The Nigerian government made important material contributions, including troops, to the UN peace-keeping efforts in the Congo. Similarly, in the conflict over Kashmir between India and Pakistan, it "agreed to contribute to the team of observers required to assist in the maintenance of the cease-fire ordered in 1965 by the United Nations Security Council."[10]

In Nigeria's official commitment to the survival and effectiveness of the world body, the government always supported proposals that would strengthen the United Nations. And it unequivocally rejected or opposed those that, in its view, might weaken the organization.

Nigeria's faith in the UN system was a reflection of the Nigerian preference for multilateralism against bilateralism. As a strategy for neutralizing the danger inherent in external dependence, it was a more effective approach; a safer road to the survival and development of small and weak states.

Nigeria's commitment to evolutionary change, and to the entire doctrinal foundation of the United Nations, may be seen as a dimension of ideological empathy between Nigeria and the leading Western powers at the United Nations. In the earliest days of Nigeria's independence, this empathy was quite evident. The Western leaders' distaste for non-alignment was echoed in Nigerian leaders' initial reluctance to take Nigeria into the non-aligned movement.[11] Communism was branded an "evil" and dreaded as much in Lagos as in London and Washington. Even colonialism was seen in the same light by some of the Western countries, including some of the ex-colonial powers. Although considered morally repugnant, it was regarded,

nevertheless, as a vehicle for "modernization." Given this degree of similarity of world view, it is hardly surprising that a special relationship developed at this period between the Nigerian government and the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States in particular, and the Western countries in general.

A consequence of this unequal relationship was that Nigeria, between 1960 and 1963, took its cue in global diplomacy from the position adopted on major issues by the United States. The testimony of Adebo, Nigeria's ambassador to the United Nations (1962–1967), revealed that Nigerian officials at the United Nations received instructions from Lagos to "take their cue from Great Britain and the U.S. on vital Cold War issues." They were asked either to "vote along with" the two powers or to abstain, rather than oppose a Western position. In general, abstention was an escape mechanism to avoid taking stands in controversial East–West issues. Most of the Nigerian abstention votes were cast on resolutions favoured by the West, but on which Nigeria's previous stand did not coincide with the position adopted by leading Western powers.

The seeds of change in Nigeria's official attitude and orientation towards the United Nations were, even in these early years, embedded in a number of contradictions between appearance and reality. First, there was a contradiction between Nigerian leaders' image of the UN system and the real nature and structure of the organization. Second, there was a gap between the lofty goals that Nigerian leaders expected the United Nations to have and the real goals toward which the concrete and objective interests of the United Nations' member states impelled the organization. Third, there was a conflict between the official statement of Nigeria's role at the United Nations and what Nigeria's concrete interests dictated as the country's actual role at the United Nations.

The international system of the early 1960s was at the strategic or military–political level, which was bipolar in structure. True there was an emergent bloc of largely post-colonial states that rejected routine association with any of the power blocs. In reality, however, many of them, including Nigeria, were directly or indirectly linked with one of the power blocs through formal or informal bilateral military alliances. Nigeria belonged to both the Commonwealth and African blocs. This created problems for Nigeria's representatives at the United Nations, who often had to choose between one or the other.

In the sphere of international politics, the high expectations that

Nigerian leaders had of the UN system were dashed in the face of the reality of the world body's constitutional limitations and structural weaknesses. The United Nations was limited by some of the provisions of its Charter; for instance, it could not freely intervene in matters that were within the domestic jurisdiction of its constituent member states. More important, its effective performance in the field of peace and security was predicated on cooperation and harmony among a few states adjudged to be the most powerful of them all. These states – the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France, and the United Kingdom – had a veto power over decisions pertaining to the maintenance of global peace and security.

On international economic relations, Nigeria's experience with the UN system between 1960 and 1965 was slightly different. The expectation of the Nigerian leaders that the United Nations would serve as a relatively safe source of economic aid was at least partially met. In quantitative terms, Nigeria gained substantial external assistance from the United Nations system, a fact that the Nigerian government acknowledged. Whether the Nigerian government considered this multilateral assistance the safest kind of aid in 1965 is difficult to ascertain. What is certain is that Nigerian representatives at the United Nations soon came to realize that they needed to secure the favour and cooperation of the leading Western powers or to convince them that "Nigeria was worth supporting with economic aid" in order to obtain this multilateral assistance. It is likely that the material benefit that Nigeria derived from the United Nations system reinforced its leaders' faith in and commitment to the organization even when the philosophical and effective bases of their loyalty to the organization had weakened.

The first diplomatic phase of Nigeria's participation in the United Nations was an age of innocence, when Nigerian leaders entertained a romantic image of the organization. In the second phase (1966–1975) the new Nigerian leaders developed a keener consciousness of the structural defects and operational deficiencies of the United Nations. Consequently, frustration and traces of disillusion with the United Nations spread among them.

During the era of awakening (1966–1975), the intricate network of political diplomatic relations, military/ideological alliances, and the socio-economic polarization that then characterized the international system were mirrored in the United Nations. As Nigerian leaders became aware that politics within the United Nations, like all others, is

bloc politics, there grew an appreciation of the importance of belonging to a caucusing group or groups within the United Nations. They began to value the usefulness of adopting a predetermined position at caucus level on issues before the United Nations. By 1970, Nigerian leaders had learned important lessons on the value of American consensus when dealing with extra-African powers.

There is yet another consequence of the fact that at this time Nigerian leaders became fully aware of the structural defects of the United Nations and its operational deficiencies. A corollary of its domination by the great powers was, in the Nigerian leaders' view, the wide gap that existed between rhetoric and action in the United Nations' approach to both the issues of the liberation of Africa from colonialism and racism and the matter of the creation of a New International Economic Order (NIEO).[12]

Ironically, as the image of the United Nations among Nigerian officials worsened, their faith in and commitment to the United Nations became stronger. Nigeria's expectations of the United Nations' future role in the international system waxed expansive. Generally, it encouraged the United Nations to play a more active, even interventionist role in resolving international problems. And it was ever ready to support the United Nations in this direction, as indicated by payments to the regular budget and in support of endeavours of the UN system.

The Nigerian government expected the United Nations to serve as a means for the inauguration of a new international order, without exploitation and inequality in the distribution of the global social product. It demanded that the United Nations deal with the problem of unequal exchange, domination, and exploitation between developed and underdeveloped nations. During this period at the United Nations, the Nigerian government set out deliberately to achieve for itself the leadership of not just Africa but the entire third world.

The role as Africa's leader was sought by the federal military government of Nigeria because the Nigerian government's active and vanguard role in African affairs would serve, they believed, as an inspiration to Nigerians and motivate them to work for sustained rapid economic development and the social integration of Nigeria. It was hoped that the success achieved in playing such a role might rub off on the military regime and thus strengthen its legitimacy at home.

The unfavourable image of the United Nations that prevailed in Nigerian official circles in the late 1960s and early 1970s was the result of not always pleasant experiences. In the course of its struggle

to end the secession of Biafra, the federal military government was involved in international politics and diplomacy both within and outside the United Nations. In that process, although Nigerian political leaders and official representatives at the United Nations were happy with the official position of the United Nations, they were often frustrated by the intricate power play with the system and were not pleased with the position adopted by some individual Western powers. They were also disappointed that the United Nations was often unable to act in the face of the defiance and arrogance of the South African government and its Portuguese and Rhodesian collaborators.

Nigerian delegates at the United Nations, reversing an earlier stand, recognized, accepted, and embraced bloc politics. In his memoirs, Nigeria's permanent representative to the United Nations, Adebo, identified six blocs or groups at the United Nations: West European, East European, Latin American, Asian, African, and Commonwealth. He conceded that bloc politics could inhibit free debate and voting, but he argued that the benefits outweighed the disadvantages.

Experience gained in the process of playing bloc politics at the United Nations altered Nigeria's previous perception of friends and foes. It was in the process of playing international politics and conducting the diplomacy of the Nigerian civil war that the Nigerian government came to regard the Soviet Union and its allies in a more favourable light. In an internal memorandum produced in 1968, Nigeria's Foreign Ministry identified the Soviet Union as the most dependable ally of Nigeria: of all the permanent members of the Security Council, the Soviet Union was the only power that could be relied upon to veto any resolution at the United Nations aimed at making concessions to the Biafran viewpoint.[13] A critical evaluation of the patterns of support for Nigeria and Africa on ending colonialism and apartheid resulted in Nigerian leaders perceiving the Soviet Union and its allies as friends and the West as a foe of Africa.

The continued existence of Nigeria as a united political entity was threatened between 1966 and 1969. But the danger was averted in part by the role played by the United Nations. Despite the ambivalence or, in some cases, opposition of some of its leading members, the United Nations as an organization stood solidly behind the position of the federal military government in defence of Nigeria's territorial integrity during these difficult years. The support of the United Nations for the federal side, which emerged victorious, was later ad-

duced by Nigerian leaders as a major motivation for Nigeria's increased faith in the United Nations.[14]

Disappointment was expressed by Nigerian representatives in the area of decolonization and eradication of apartheid. Yet Nigeria's faith in the United Nations remained strong and its commitment to the organization was unflagging. Among the Nigerian leaders there was the conviction that, despite its defects, there was really no credible substitute for the United Nations as a multilateral diplomatic forum. As Oiko Arikpo, Nigeria's Commissioner for External Affairs (1967–1975), put it, the Nigerian government believed that, in spite of the "structural and moral deficiencies" of the United Nations, it was still the best means of suppressing "the criminal system" in southern Africa. On this issue, neither the NAM nor the OAU, let alone the Commonwealth, was seen as a true alternative to the United Nations. None was universal in membership, none was, therefore, an embodiment of the moral conscience of the entire world.

As for the paradox of stronger commitment to the United Nations and rising expectations of it in the face of a relatively unfavourable image of the organization, the explanation lies in the hope of eventual reform. But there was a strong determination to accept the United Nations as it was and make the best use of it. The wider international system came to be seen as divided primarily between North and South and only secondarily between East and West. Correspondingly, at the United Nations there was a redefinition of Nigeria's opponents and friends, and a greater complexity of the power bloc structure of the United Nations was perceived and accepted in Nigerian official circles.

In Nigeria during the third diplomatic phase (1975–1989), the hope of a fundamental restructuring of the UN system dimmed; Nigerian leaders began to accommodate themselves to achieve only a minor reform of the system. Nigeria's emotional attachment to the African caucusing group and rigid adherence to the African consensus at the United Nations weakened. In its place emerged a more flexible and pragmatic attitude to all blocs. In Nigeria's international diplomacy, emphasis began to shift from continental (i.e. pan-African) to the narrow national interest of Nigeria and, therefore, from political issues to economic problems. The name of the new game was "economic diplomacy." Doubts began to develop among Nigerian leaders about the continued feasibility of multilateralism as a central diplomatic strategy, given the apparent loss of faith in it by some of the Western powers.

During the earlier part of this phase (1976–1979), the Western powers and their multinationals were regarded as exploitative and viewed with suspicion. In the same vein, the USSR and its allies were no longer regarded as reliable friends. The Soviet bloc was now, along with the United States and its allies, classified as the exploitative and oppressive "North" from whose domination Africa in particular and the South in general should be liberated. Only states of the South could be trusted and regarded as Nigeria's dependable friends. This redefinition of Nigeria's friends and foes at the United Nations was in line with the new perception of the structure by the non-aligned countries.

Foreign Minister Garba, in his memoirs, speaks of the "bewildering proliferation of groupings" within the UN system. He only realized how complex the power bloc structure of the United Nations was when in 1977 he "embarked on full-scale lobbying for the Nigerian candidacy" as a non-permanent member of the Security Council.[15] Disenchanted with the nomination of the Niger by the African group, on the ground that the Niger had never occupied a Security Council seat, the Nigerian government contested, and eventually won, the seat. Further, other African states did not recognize Nigeria as Africa's leading power but regarded it as arrogant because of its size and oil money.

In 1984 at Addis Ababa, under the auspices of the OAU, African states arrived at a consensus on two issues before the United Nations: apartheid in South Africa and the colonial status of Namibia. But in New York the solidarity of the African group collapsed under the diplomatic pressure of the United States of America. The Nigerian Foreign Ministry was bitterly disappointed at the lack of loyalty among African states that had voted against or abstained on resolutions on these two issues. Attributing the disloyalty of the African states to the high value they attached to financial assistance from the United States, the Nigerian Foreign Ministry condemned it as treachery.[16]

Despite the disappointment with the African group, the Nigerian government continued to use it as a central instrument of its diplomacy at the United Nations because Nigeria has no other dependable group of political allies outside the African continent. In fact, the African group is its only bridge to other third world diplomatic groupings.

The crisis that arose in Nigeria's relation with the African group stemmed, in part, from a determination to give Nigeria a distinct na-

tional voice, separate from the voice of Africa, in global (political though not economic) issues. Both Garba (Foreign Ministry) and Akinyemi (director general of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs) made the point early in this period that Nigeria would take a clear and independent stand on international issues, and stake out a distinctive position for itself, both in the generation of ideas and in the establishment of the parameters of debate on a number of issues.[17] Between 1976 and 1980, Nigeria tried to do so within and outside the United Nations, with regard to the elimination of colonialism and racism in southern Africa.

On global economic issues Nigeria kept within the mainstream of African and third world policies. As a senior official of the Foreign Ministry averred during my interview with him in 1989 on economic issues, "Nigeria's position is indistinguishable from the position of the Group of 77 at the United Nations. On economic matters coming before the UN, Nigeria deals with the issues as a member of the Group of 77. She follows the lead of whoever is the chairman of the Group of 77."[18]

In the third world approach to economic issues, a new realism was noticeable in the 1980s. There was a general acceptance of a long-standing Western view that Africa's economic crisis was the product not of inequities in the world economic order but of the structural imbalances in their national economies. Consequently, during this period, the Nigerian leaders played down their demands for a New International Economic Order. And they accepted the IMF/IBRD-inspired and supervised Structural Adjustment Programme. However, for Nigeria and a number of other African states, the main attraction of the Structural Adjustment Programme, in contrast to, say, the Lagos Plan of Action, was the assurance of increased external (especially multilateral) financial aid. By 1989, barely three years after its adoption in Nigeria, disenchantment had set in among the Nigerian people, and, to a lesser extent, the leaders too, concerning the programme. As Nigeria's Foreign Minister put it, "the expected international support" had turned out to be either "a trickle" or "even non-existent." Moreover, the "political risks and social costs" incurred in the process of implementing it were considered enormous.[19]

Finally, despite these changes in Nigeria's attitudes and orientations towards the United Nations, its faith in the organization remained unshaken. Indeed, the United Nations' relevance to the solution of various global problems was regarded as beyond contention;

and its appropriateness as an instrument for protecting and advancing Nigeria's interests unquestionable. What came under doubt in Nigerian official circles during this period was the commitment of the advanced industrialized countries, especially the United States, to multilateralism in general and the United Nations in particular. As for Nigeria and other underdeveloped countries, the conviction remained strong that, as a diplomatic strategy, there was no meaningful alternative to multilateralism and, as an instrument of multilateral diplomacy, the United Nations was almost indispensable: it could, and should, be reformed to make it more effective.

The orientation and attitude of the Nigerian government towards the United Nations in the post–Cold War era

In the post–Cold War period, on the face of it, the Nigerian official spokesmen perceive the United Nations as an organization ''moving towards its renaissance.'' The post–Cold War United Nations is seen as undergoing a process of rejuvenation, resulting in its added strength and greater effectiveness. It is also viewed as having ''matured.''

That there is now a mature, stronger, and more effective United Nations is, in the opinion of Nigerian political leaders, manifest in several ways. It is evident in: the passing of several important resolutions at the United Nations by consensus; the United Nations' remarkable progress in conducting a variety of operations aimed at managing peaceful transitions in societies that, in the past, were scenes of conflicts or that had suffered serious upheavals (e.g. Namibia, South Africa); and the key role increasingly played by the United Nations in resolving domestic and international conflicts through peace-keeping and peace-enforcement (Cambodia, Bosnia, Hercegovina, Somalia, Western Sahara, Kuwait–lraq). Other indications of the greater strength and effectiveness of the United Nations identified by Nigerian leaders are: its new role of providing assistance to member states in the conduct of elections in particular (e.g. in Haiti) and the democratization process in general; its response and initiative in dealing with some of Africa's pressing economic problems (e.g. the external debt burden); and its enhanced role in negotiations in disarmament.[20]

These developments are attributed by Nigerian leaders primarily to what they term the ''de-ideologization of international politics.''

340

The United Nations is said to have benefited from the "remarkable spirit of reciprocity" among the UN member states in general and the "growing *rapprochement*" between the United States and the former Soviet Union in particular. In turn, this favourable social climate is put down, by Nigerian official spokesmen, squarely to the ending of the rivalry between the two military–ideological blocs that formed the principal protagonists of the Cold War.

It can thus be seen that, at a superficial level, the image of the United Nations harboured by the Nigerian authorities in the post–Cold War era is simple and favourable. At a much deeper level, however, the image of the post–Cold War United Nations that came across from Nigerian official circles is both complex and less favourable. While the General Assembly is perceived as changing in response to the rapidly evolving international environment, the Security Council is regarded as fossilized, imprisoned by its past, so to speak.

In more specific terms, on the one hand the UN General Assembly is believed, by the Nigerian official spokesmen, to have been transformed from a useless "talking shop" of the 1960s, to a forum where serious discussions were held in the 1970s and 1980s, and now, in the post–Cold War era, to "a multilateral negotiating arena *par excellence*."[21] On the other hand, the Security Council is said to give the United Nations the ugly image, still, of an organization of the great powers for the great powers. On the whole then, viewed narrowly from the portals of the Security Council, the post–Cold War United Nations in its political dimension is perceived, in Nigerian official circles, as an organization that acts expeditiously only on issues that are of interest to the great powers but responds tardily on matters of importance to all other member states, including especially the African states. In addition, at the economic level, the Bretton Woods institutions, which are now seen by Nigerian leaders as part and parcel of the UN system, are also viewed as unchanging, unresponsive, and partisan. They are thought of as oppressive of and interventionist in the underdeveloped countries and partial as well as liberal in their approaches to the developed states.

The complicated image of the post–Cold War era United Nations that exists in Nigerian official circles is matched by the complexity of Nigeria's evolving attitude to the emerging "new world order." The great anxiety that characterizes that attitude is also reflected in the latent suspicion with which the Nigerian government approaches the post–Cold War United Nations.

On the face of it, the Nigerian government is positively disposed towards the emerging new world order. It apparently welcomes it on several grounds: an expectation that it would be characterized by collaboration and cooperation among the major parties; the hope that, in the new world order, many regional conflicts that previously defined their essence in the context of East–West rivalry would now be evaluated according to the merits of the case made by the direct antagonists or protagonists; the belief that the dramatic changes in the former Soviet bloc have released "an unstoppable wave of democratization" across the globe, which, in the Nigerian official view, is a good omen for global peace.

There are two further reasons that Nigerian official spokesmen seem to welcome the positive fallouts from the United States/Soviet Union *rapprochement* and the ending of the Cold War: one is the faith in a more assured and peaceful future made possible partly by the agreements in the areas of nuclear disarmament and the reduction of conventional forces; the other is the hope that the unfolding events carry with them a historic opportunity for enabling relatively new nations, like Nigeria, to participate in the process of shaping the new world and, by so doing, to partake in shaping the destiny of their peoples. All these, however, represent the superficial picture.

On deeper examination, it becomes evident that Nigerian official representatives harbour a heavy presentiment about the prospects and implications of the emerging new world order. The Nigerian government is worried that, in spite of the United Nations, the new world order might not be different from the old, in terms of the place of Africa and the black race with it. As the self-proclaimed leader of Africa and the black world the Nigerian government is concerned that, like the "old" world, the new one would leave Africans and blacks as "mere recipients of order" from on high.[22] It is gripped with fear that, the United Nations notwithstanding, the forces of micro-nationalism that have evidently become resurgent in Europe might ultimately endanger world peace. It is unhappy that the United Nations is not doing enough to ensure that Africa is not bypassed by the peace dividends flowing from the emerging new world order. It is also troubled by the fact that, in spite of the United Nations, and in some cases with the collaboration of the United Nations, events happening in other parts of the world have rapidly upstaged the problems and the serious social, economic and political crises in Africa.[23]

Clearly then the underlying current in the Nigerian official attitude to the post–Cold War United Nations is anxiety born out of a sense of uncertainty. At the level of rhetoric, Nigerian authorities describe the United Nations as stronger, more mature, and effective. In practice, however, they wonder whether the United Nations will be able to manage the changes arising in the wake of the emerging new world order; whether the United Nations will be sufficiently responsive to the demands on it from all fronts; and whether the United Nations, as presently constituted, can be evenhanded enough in distributing the positive fallouts of the new world order.

It is this anxiety, this doubt, that seems to shape the expectations of the United Nations by the Nigerian government. As a result, the Nigerian authorities are ambivalent in their expectations from and demands on the post–Cold War United Nations – expecting it to be strongly interventionist, yet dreading the reach of that interventionist hand and being anxious to check it. They feel that the United Nations should be strengthened and equipped to act with single-minded decisiveness, but they recommend a further diffusion of the cultural content or composition of its strongest organ, the Security Council, and an extension to a few more members of its debilitating veto power. A democratization of the organs of the United Nations or the international institutions associated with it, equality of membership in all organs of the system, and the extension of its power and privilege to a few more members would be in order.

In practice, however, in the post–Cold War period Nigeria does not, in fact, demonstrate genuine and unequivocal commitment to the new United Nations, although it actively participates in UN peace-keeping operations by sending Nigerian contingents or observers/monitors in various UN missions all over the world. One gets the impression that in some cases, such as Somalia and Bosnia–Hercegovina, the Nigerian involvement represents not so much a commitment to the United Nations as a concern for national prestige and a desire for private financial gain by some Nigerian officials from UN operations. Besides, Nigeria's commitment to UN objectives and goals is doubted owing to the amount of the arrears in its contribution to the UN regular and special budgets. In 1991, Nigeria's indebtedness stood at US$2.7 million – $1,965,272 in unpaid assessment under the UN's regular budget and some $697,374 for peace-keeping operations. Nigeria is the third-largest African country indebted to the United Nations next to South Africa and Libya.

Colonialism/racism and the New International Economic Order: UN issues of special interest to Nigeria

Nigeria regards the United Nations as an important instrument for furthering its foreign policy goals. Its UN participation helped develop its foreign policy, with the United Nations playing a central role in evolving Nigeria's policy on the issues of colonialism and apartheid. When it became a member of the world body, it had no definite foreign policy on colonialism. However, between 1960 and 1963, it pursued two parallel polices: one emerged in the course of Nigeria's UN participation and developed as an integral part of Afro-Asian consensus; the other, in response to domestic pressure, came later in Lagos, primarily by its Foreign Ministry.

The Lagos policy on colonialism, publicly inaugurated in 1961, declared that "colonialism, in all its manifestations anywhere in Africa must be ended" and that Nigeria would utilize its "full resources – mental, moral and material – in the struggle for the emancipation" of all dependent territories of the continent. To this end, the government initiated and implemented a programme of financial assistance to nationalist movements. The aid was meant, however, to enable nationalist movements (the FNLA of Angola, the ANC of South Africa and Rhodesia, and the UNIP of Southern Rhodesia) to fight for national independence through constitutional methods and train indigenous administrative and technical personnel. It was not to be used for equipping and training military personnel or guerrilla warfare cadres and fighters.

In 1961, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Wachuku, presented to the Nigerian House of Representatives a government programme of action on the decolonization of Africa, targeting 1970 as the end of colonial rule. Its central strategy was non-violent and constitutional, ruling out the use of force as a means of national liberation and assuming that the colonialists, especially the United Kingdom and its allies, would yield or succumb to moral and diplomatic pressures exerted by the United Nations.

The Nigerian plan was presented to the UN General Assembly in October 1961 in a slightly modified form. Nigeria co-sponsored a resolution that called for "a preparation of all colonial and dependent territories in Africa for the attainment of independence *by, before, and not later than December 1970*" (emphasis added). This resolution and the plan on which it was predicated provoked such strong opposition from other African states at the United Nations that ev-

entually the Nigerian delegation withdrew it.[24] This is hardly surprising as it ran counter to the letter and spirit of Resolution 1514(XV) of December 1960 (Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples), which Nigeria had supported and which declared *inter alia* that "inadequacy of political, economic and social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence."

Despite the United Nations' rejection of the Nigerian plan for decolonization, the Nigerian government continued to canvass international support outside the United Nations for some of its elements. It also intensified its campaign against non-constitutional and violent means of liberating dependent territories.

At the inaugural summit of the OAU in 1963, Nigeria tried once more to sell its peaceful and gradual approach to decolonization to other African states, which again failed. In the Addis Ababa meeting of African heads of state and government, it was resolved to "launch a full-scale guerrilla war against colonial regimes and white minority governments" in Africa.[25]

Two months later, at the inaugural meeting in Dar-es-Salaam of the newly created African Liberation Committee (ALC), the Nigerian representatives pressed for the incorporation of dialogue with colonialists as part of the liberation strategy.[26] This time the Nigerian government was successful. The ALC prescribed persuasion and negotiation "where the colonial powers had accepted the principle of independence and had shown signs of pursuing this goal." It also agreed on the use of "all means at [the] disposal [of the Committee] to help in the achievement of independence" where "the colonial powers showed no sign or willingness to recognize the right of the people concerned to self determination and independence."[27]

Subsequently, Nigeria tried to follow the dual approach endorsed by the ALC, thus contributing to the African Liberation Fund and implicitly accepting the use of violence as a means of immediate liberation. However, it insisted that the ALC and other agencies should stop assisting the so-called "High Commission" territories, namely, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, with the argument that the British government had already decided to grant independence to these territories and had set up representative governments working towards self-rule.

By 1963 Nigeria had fully accepted the African group's consensus on colonialism as forged at Addis Ababa. In the same year, at the UN General Assembly, Wachuku pledged that Nigeria would work with

other African states to see that the continent was liberated from colonialism "within the shortest possible time."[28] By 1965, the Nigerian government had become unequivocal in its advocacy of the use of force for the elimination of colonialism in Africa. Thus, by then, the New York and Lagos strands of Nigeria's policy on colonialism had merged.

Between 1966 and 1969, the Nigerian government placed African liberation second to Nigeria's national security, interpreted essentially as the security of the regime in power. In this period of internal political crisis and civil war, Nigeria's national interest was narrowly defined and the Nigerian government scaled down its support for African liberation.

At the United Nations, the Nigerian representatives showed less interest in and concern for the problem of colonialism. They were noncommittal on resolutions dealing with this problem as they were more preoccupied with attracting and retaining the support and sympathy of all states, and especially the major Western powers, for the federal side in the civil war. Thus, through abstentions Nigeria tried to avoid taking stands on issues that might lead to diplomatic confrontation between Nigeria and the Western powers, some of which were the colonial powers in Africa.

Within the OAU, too, Nigeria showed little practical interest in the African liberation movements. In principle, it was committed to decolonization and continued to favour the use of military or coercive means. In practice, Nigeria's prosecution of the civil war considerably weakened its commitment to financial assistance to the liberation movements in Africa. Between 1966 and 1974, the Nigerian government withheld its contributions to the Special Fund for African Liberation. The critical factor was the apparent conflict between concern for security and support for the liberation of dependent territories in Africa. Relying on a report by a Nigerian appointed to the staff of the executive secretariat of the ALC in Dar-es-Salaam, Nigeria came to believe that funds and arms meant for the liberation movements were being diverted to the secessionists in Biafra by the Tanzanian government.

In the post–civil war period, Nigeria's policy on colonialism was essentially a return to the 1960s' African consensus on the strategy for Africa's decolonization. Convinced of the efficacy of armed struggle in particular and coercion in general as strategies for the liberation of African dependent territories and peoples, from 1970 the Ni-

gerian government resumed its keen interest and participation. As a corollary to the elevation of force as a preferred strategy, the United Nations was used only to mobilize international, moral, and material support for the liberation movements.

Right after the civil war, the government (now under Gowon) presented its programme of action on decolonization. Significantly, it chose to present the outlines of the plan to the United Nations first, rather than to the Organization of African Unity. It was only when Nigeria discovered that the United Nations, at that time, was not particularly active on the issue of colonialism that it turned to the Organization of African Unity.

The plan centred on a timetable for bringing an end to colonialism and racism. It embodied a suggestion that a special UN fund be established to support the liberation movements in Africa and other colonial territories throughout the world. The plan as presented to the OAU was implicit in its assumption that force would be the only viable option. Underlying it was the premise that armies of some independent African states would be involved in the liberation struggle. Nigeria and a few other ''medium'' powers in Africa were expected to bear much of the burden. It was apparent that the Nigerian government regarded the liberation of Guinea-Bissau in the West African region as Nigeria's responsibility.

Naturally the Nigerian plan had a favourable reception at the OAU. At the OAU summit in Rabat in 1972, it was decided that African efforts and resources should concentrate on assisting the liberation movements fighting in the Portuguese colonies in Africa. However, other states in the subregion were not willing to have an African Task Force established to back up the liberation movements. Most important, the liberation movement most concerned, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), insisted on doing its own fighting.

The usefulness of the United Nations for Nigeria on the issue of decolonization lies in its availability as a handy forum to apply collective African pressure against colonial powers. The Nigerian government attempted to mount its own unilateral pressure to ensure that UN-imposed sanctions against colonial powers or racist regimes were observed. But, trapped in an embarrassing contradiction, it was unwilling/unable to enforce similar sanctions within its own territory. Although the Nigerian government intensely pressured the US government between 1972 and 1973 to repeal the Byrd Amendment,[29]

as Fasehun[30] has shown, Nigeria continued to trade with Portugal until 1974 in opposition to OAU resolutions 23a and b. Nigeria's claim to lead Africa became suspect because of its actions.

Under the Mohammed-Obasanjo regime (1975–1979), Nigeria's foreign policy focused on colonialism and racial discrimination/apartheid. During this period, a very high level of official attention was devoted to the problem, and a considerable amount of resources – human and material – was used in solving them. Every opportunity, every forum, was transformed into an occasion for articulating Nigeria's position. Between 1975 and 1979 the government stepped up its financial and material assistance to liberation movements in South Africa and the Front Line States. Nigeria also sent military and civilian planes to assist freedom fighters in Rhodesia. Determined to break out of the confines of OAU consensus and to adopt a distinctly Nigerian position on colonialism, the government espoused African political liberation as its central goal. On this point, Nigeria's diplomacy under Mohammed-Obasanjo was pursued with greater vigour and more determination. There was a new style, too, characterized by great panache and high drama.

The Nigerian government sought solutions mainly within the framework of the United Nations for the problems of colonialism in Rhodesia and the illegal occupation of South West Africa by South Africa. The importance the Nigerian government attached to the United Nations is demonstrated by the method used in securing a seat as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, even defying African consensus and ignoring the OAU decision on the matter. In the process, Nigeria was alienated from the majority of the African states, which accused it of arrogance and behaviour like an African superpower.[31] Foreign Minister Garba later claimed that the faith that the Nigerian government had in the fruitful outcome of Nigeria's membership of the Security Council was justified since "it was Nigeria's persistence, made possible by our continuous presence in the Security Council, that prodded the British and Americans on Zimbabwe and the Western Five on Namibia towards serious results."[32]

Perhaps that was true. But, to the Nigerian public, what distinguished the Mohammed-Obasanjo regime was not its diplomatic skill in prodding the British and Americans towards serious results but the government's defiant resistance of the orchestrated moves by the United States (in 1975–1976) and the United Kingdom (in 1977–1978) to impose foreign-inspired solutions on Africa with regard to

the decolonization of Angola and Rhodesia. The government's willingness and ability to take on these great powers by denouncing their manoeuvres publicly and boldly applying economic sanctions against their companies fitted the Nigerian people's image of a truly independent government.

Unknown to the people, however, was the fact that the same government that was so uncompromising in its public dealings with the West in advancing the cause of African liberation was also highly flexible. It cooperated with the Western powers on a number of issues relating to decolonization: for instance the Mohammed-Obasanjo regime worked hand in hand with the Carter administration in the United States and the Callaghan government in the United Kingdom to promote acceptance of the Anglo-American plan on Rhodesia. The Nigerian Foreign Minister held secret meetings with Tiny Rowland of Lonrho, Abel Muzorewa (then regarded as a Western stooge and a traitor to the African cause), and, at some point, even Ian Smith to find a solution for Rhodesia.[33] The greatest strength of Nigeria's diplomacy was the energy expended in the pursuit of decolonization; its weakness was the absence of a clear-cut national policy, as distinct from the African position.

The period 1980–1989 brought three regimes: a civilian one under Shehu Shagari (1980–1983) and two successive military regimes under Muhammadu Buhari (1984–1985) and Ibrahim Babangida (1985–1989). Both civilian and military regimes were committed to the elimination of colonialism, racial discrimination, and apartheid in South Africa. There was, at least at the rhetorical level, no difference between them and the Mohammed-Obasanjo administration. All were also one in their advocacy of the strategy to be adopted in both the liberation of Namibia and the eradication of racial discrimination and apartheid in South Africa. For all, the central strategy was armed struggle waged by the liberation movements in South Africa, reinforced through concerted action by the international community in the form of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa.

In the United Nations, Nigerian representatives strived to get the world body to adopt resolutions that would confer legitimacy on the armed struggles waged by the liberation movements, mobilize financial and material support for them, and impose sanctions. During this period, there were several developments conducted at the United Nations by Nigeria in its diplomacy towards South Africa. One was the deliberate attempt to strike a balance between a preoccupation with

349

colonialism and apartheid, on the one hand, and an increasing concern for the deplorable economic conditions of Nigeria and Africa, on the other. In the 1990s, there was an increasing interest in economic issues and a declining emphasis on colonialism, racial discrimination, and apartheid.

Evolution of Nigerian government policy and attitudes on racism and apartheid in Africa, 1960–1989

In 1960, Nigeria had no definite policy on racism or apartheid in South Africa. As Wachuku admitted years later, in a private interview, "we were developing our policies as issues arose."[34] The Sharpeville massacre on 21 March 1960 forced the Nigerian government and people to take a stand to stimulate the evolution of a policy. The United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution on 1 April 1960 deploring the massacre. Nigeria was not yet independent at the time and had not been admitted to the United Nations. None the less, there were strong reactions to these developments.

In 1961, a formal statement on Nigerian policy on racial discrimination was issued by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. As he put it,

The total eradication of all forms of racial discrimination ... is one of the pillars of Nigeria's foreign policy. We will never regard racial discrimination as an internal affair in any state. Nowhere in the world, in no state, however powerful, however wealthy, will Nigeria countenance humiliations to people of African descent; and we will not consider any action on our part as interference in the internal affairs of another state. This includes South Africa.[35]

The policy statement considered racial discrimination as humiliating to the black race and Nigeria considered it to be its destiny to lead the movement for the eradication of this evil.

Nigeria's policy on apartheid, racism, and colonialism in the post–Cold War era

As the new world order evolved, the Nigerian government found it necessary to review old policies and adopt new ones to cope with the changing times. One of the policies that underwent serious review was that on apartheid and racial discrimination. The other was anti-colonialism. The new policy introduced to replace the two was known as "the new economic diplomacy."

Over the years it had been a cardinal plank of Nigeria's foreign policy to provide the African continent with leadership in the struggle against apartheid, colonialism, and racial discrimination, particularly in South Africa. However, in 1991, it began to emerge that the Nigerian government wished to reverse its policy of non-fraternization with or isolation of the apartheid regime in South Africa. As a response to the request from South African President F. W. de Klerk and as a reaction to the lifting of economic sanctions on South Africa by the European Communities, the Nigerian government hinted in April of 1991 that it would place before the OAU summit at Abuja in July of the same year a proposal to lift the sanctions, provided de Klerk removed the remaining vestiges of apartheid by May 1991.[36]

In contrast, Nigeria's permanent representative and ambassador to the United Nations in 1991, Ibrahim Gambari, who was also chairman of the UN Anti-apartheid Committee, defended the maintenance of economic sanctions against South Africa. He noted that the international community, at the level of the United Nations, had decided not to relax existing sanctions against South Africa until there was clear evidence of "profound and irreversible changes"[37] in South Africa. However, in April 1992, the Nigerian government unilaterally abandoned this position for good. It invited, received, and hosted President F. W. de Klerk and other members of the South African racist regime in Abuja, to the shock and anger of both the African National Congress and the Pan-African Congress, the main liberation movements in Africa. In so doing, Nigeria abandoned its 30-year policy of non-fraternization with the following justifications: positive changes in South Africa, the need to influence events there, and Nigeria's national interest.[38]

The change of policy was, in fact, merely a step in Nigeria's search for a post-apartheid foreign policy that preoccupied the Foreign Ministry under Ike Nwachukwu. It was a search born from the conviction that "Nigeria's foreign policy since 1960, which is decolonization, was almost at the end of the line." The Nigerian government then decided to "switch from the early political thrust ... placed on [Nigeria's] foreign relations to economic relations as the motive power for economic development."[39] Thus, the fraternization with de Klerk's minority regime marked the end of the old policy and the beginning of a new one.

The new economic diplomacy had economic, political, and cultural dimensions. At the economic level, it involved the search for foreign investment and aid, mostly from the advanced capitalist countries,

the quest for outlets for Nigerian products, and the exploration of areas for profitable investment abroad for Nigerian businessmen. In his address in 1991 to newly appointed Nigerian ambassadors, Foreign Minister Nwachukwu stressed the prominence of economic mission as their new mandate.

In view of this new thinking, it is hardly surprising that, a week before de Klerk and his team arrived in Nigeria, Ike Nwachukwu announced a trade policy that would allow Nigerian businessmen and companies (including subsidiaries of foreign companies) to trade openly with South Africa. De Klerk took the cue: significantly his delegation included three South African businessmen, including the chairman of the South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

The political dimension of the new economic diplomacy involved normalizing relations with all countries and consolidating political relations with those states adjudged capable of assisting the process of Nigeria's economic recovery. Thus, Nigeria's foreign policy was directed towards winning the friendship and confidence of all countries that could purchase Nigerian products and provide foreign investment and technical aid. This policy was particularly predicated on the assumption that there was an urgent need to cultivate the goodwill of advanced capitalist countries in order to secure their assistance and support. Nigeria also set out to normalize relations with known allies of the West. Thus, as it moved to establish economic and political ties with South Africa, Nigeria also took steps to normalize relations with Israel. Significantly, barely a month after hosting de Klerk, the Nigerian government received Yitzhak Shamir, the Israeli Foreign Minister, thus opening the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel.

At the cultural level, the Nigerian government embarked on a reparation project that later came to be known as "reparation for compensation." At this point, the central issue for the Nigerian government was to demand compensation from the former colonial powers of Europe as well as the United States for past wrongs, such as slavery, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, done to Africans and persons of African descent.

Later, following the first Pan-African Conference, organized jointly in April 1993 by the Organization of African Unity's Group of Eminent Persons on Reparations and the Nigerian government, the latter became acquainted with the broader notion of the reparation project. It became aware of a second dimension, which the conference considered even more important – "reparation for repair." This in-

volves repair of the damage done to the African psyche, culture, economies, and societies by centuries of enslavement, colonization, and neo-colonization, through, *inter alia*, the reconstruction of African history. The point was to demonstrate that, while being brutalized and impoverished through slavery and colonialism, Africans enriched Europe and America. Even though the Nigerian government participated in the conference, there is no evidence that the government came fully to appreciate, let alone totally accept, the implications of the second dimension of the reparation project. In his address to the United Nations in October 1993, Chief Ernest Shonekon, head of the dismantled Nigerian Interim National Government, showed no appreciation of this cultural dimension of the historical project.

Even more important, although racism generally has become an urgent problem in the world of the 1990s, the Nigerian government has as yet produced no coherent policy on how to deal with the problem in its global dimension. In its wider context, the racism problem was put on the international agenda not by Nigeria, which is vice-chairman of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), but by Algeria. In 1993, Algeria, acting on behalf of the African group at the United Nations, introduced a draft resolution for the inauguration of a Third Decade to combat racism and racial discrimination. The draft resolution, among others, urged the UN General Assembly and the Security Council to keep a close watch on South Africa until a democratic regime is established in that country. The Nigerian government undoubtedly supported this draft resolution. However, its preoccupation is somewhat different: it is to reap economic benefits from the changes in South Africa.

Nigeria and the demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), 1960–1989

If Nigeria's core interest will be, in the future, economic development, how appropriate will the United Nations be as the central diplomatic forum for the furtherance of this goal? From the start, Nigeria had set out to use the United Nations as a means of attracting external financial and technical assistance for Nigeria. Nigeria saw the United Nations as a neutral non-partisan organization that could serve as an appropriate forum in which to convince advanced nations that providing disinterested aid to the new and poorer nations means laying a solid foundation for international peace and security.

Like most other African states, Nigeria preferred and tried to apply "a model of economic development" that emphasized "a mixed economy providing for the simultaneous development of the private and the (public) sectors of the economy, fed by Western capital and technology and supervised by Western technical personnel."[40]

Nigeria's participation in the search for an NIEO was only at the vanguard of the movement. Its concept of the new order consisted of three interrelated aspects: internal (domestic), regional/subregional, and global/international. In the first decade (1960–1969) of its independence, the government stressed the global, multilateral approach. In the second decade (1970–1979) attention was shifted to the national and subregional aspect. The third decade (1980–1989) saw the restructuring of the national economy under the direction and supervision of international agencies, an approach that implied the suspension of the search for a New International Economic Order. Another factor that led to the abandonment was frustration arising from the use of the United Nations as an instrument for dismantling the old and the inauguration of a new world economic order. The United Nations operates to preserve the existing international political and economic order rather than to overthrow it.

Nigeria and the New Agenda for Africa

The New Agenda for Africa was adopted by the United Nations in December 1991. Under this agenda, the African governments reaffirmed their determination to carry through the difficult economic reforms prescribed by the UN-related multilateral financial institutions and to ensure the effective participation of their people in development planning and governance, and donor countries and international development agencies pledged their full and tangible support to the African efforts.

The UN Secretary-General, who authored the agenda, strongly emphasized respect for human rights and its strong link to democracy and development. His position was that "without deep respect for human rights, efforts at development [would] be undermined by perpetual dissension and repeated conflict." Africa and the international community, therefore, must search for new and more effective approaches to the solution of Africa's persistent development problems because "past approaches have so far produced results commensurate with the effort."[41]

354

Nigeria expressed support for the new agenda. While on a state visit to Spain in December 1991, Ibrahim Babangida, the Nigerian leader, spoke of the "symbolic relationship between democracy and development." He noted that African states were pursuing economic reforms side by side with the restructuring of the political process.[42] Two months earlier, in his address to the UN General Assembly, he spoke of the convergence of views among member states of the United Nations on the linkage between democracy and development. He urged all African states fully to embrace the democratic culture to enable "our peoples to enjoy fundamental human rights and participate fully in decisions that affect their life and well-being." Turning to the other aspect of the United Nations' New Agenda for Africa, Babangida called for "debt forgiveness [in return] for credible and sustained structural adjustment programmes." He argued that, beyond the issue of "debt forgiveness," what Africa "needs is a special financial package, a kind of Marshall Plan." This "would demonstrate the sincerity of the developing world [in addressing] the plight of Africa, right historical wrongs and set the world on the path to a new world order that is just and equitable."[43]

All this was rhetoric. It soon became clear that the Nigerian government was not truly and sincerely committed to the New Agenda for Africa. Nor was it interested in truly carrying out the kind of economic reforms prescribed by either the Bretton Woods institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) or the Economic Commission for Africa. Both political and economic reform programmes were abandoned by the Nigerian government in 1991.

As to the question of the link between reform and the alleviation of the external debt burden, the Nigerian government also soon became impatient with UN-related international institutions. The very policies that are integral parts of the prescriptions of the multilateral institutions within the UN system became subjects of trenchant criticism by Nigerian leaders. The government now argued that there was no such thing as a flawless market or even a perfect socio-economic system; rather there were "failures inherent in both private market and public domain." It also contended that there was "nothing conceptually in economic liberalisation which negates the need and necessity for national economic planning and selective protection under conditions of underdevelopment." At any rate, it insisted that the more a state deregulates, the more it would need to monitor and guide the system – a form of deregulated management. State inter-

vention in the economy is not bad when pursued; what is important is the ''nature of the instruments employed to intervene and the qualitative sophistication of the intervention modality.''[44]

By 1991, Babangida warned those external agencies, institutions, and power centres that sought to write Nigeria's reform agenda in the image of their own world view that they were doing damage to its long-term interests as well as theirs. The endless conditionalities, he said, could only retard Nigeria's economic recovery process. He recommended instead Africa's own comprehensive conditions for a true new world order in place of the standard Structural Adjustment Programme of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

On his part, Nigeria's current military leader, General Sani Abacha, in his 1994 speech, urged the international community to try appreciating the social and political consequences of insisting on the kinds of economic reforms that the Bretton Woods institutions have imposed on African countries. He said that the Structural Adjustment Programme, the heavy burden of external debt, and the painful effects of democratization are all sources of conflict that threaten social order and peace in Nigeria and other African states. It was necessary, therefore, to space them in order to be able to manage the conflicts they generate. On this basis, he announced the formal suspension of some aspects of the economic reform programme started in Nigeria in 1986 under the supervision of the IMF and the World Bank.

Nigeria's proposal for UN reform in the post–Cold War era

In the post–Cold War period the main talk about UN reform coming out of Africa is the reconstitution of the United Nations Security Council. African states, including Nigeria, show little or no interest in other proposals for UN reform, such as those that touch on how to make the United Nations more operationally efficient and financially sound.

Nigeria is keen on having the Security Council reformed as well as the United Nations itself. It has now advanced several new and fresh arguments in support of its demand for an expansion of the permanent membership of the Security Council. First, Nigeria argues that the United Nations cannot be regarded as a credible force for democracy all over the world if it does not democratize its principal organs.

As Babangida put it, "the logic of democracy cannot be confined within the borders of individual states but must, of necessity, be applicable to the operation of international organisations."[45] Emphasis is placed on democratizing the Security Council because not only is it one of the major organs of the United Nations, but also, more importantly, it is regarded as the least democratic or least representative organ. Yet it is a body that many people look up to for support and assistance in the quest for democracy and freedom from oppression and aggression.

As in the past, Nigeria continues to predicate its demand for the expansion of permanent membership of the Security Conncil on the ground that the creation of additional seats on the Council would ensure equitable regional representation in that body and thereby enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the United Nations. However, it now suggests that the number be increased to 12, which means 7 new permanent seats. But there will be only 9 non-permanent members, bringing the total to 21, a number Nigeria has always favoured. Africa, Asia, and Europe should each get two of the additional seven permanent seats, while Latin America would get one. By Nigeria's proposal, the composition of the UN Security Council would still be lopsided, favouring Europe.

Secondly, the Nigerian government now insists that, having played a prominent role in several peace-keeping operations of the United Nations, it should be admitted to permanent membership of the Security Council. It also further argues that, since the Security Council is charged with the maintenance of international peace and security, it is only appropriate that Nigeria, being chairman of the UN Committee on Peacekeeping, and whose troops are currently engaged in peace-keeping operations in at least seven countries, be admitted to the Council as a permanent member. In 1993, Mathew Mbu, the Foreign Minister, said that Nigeria is "a very strong advocate that the Council be enlarged"; and "we want to see an African member on that body, and Nigeria is a candidate for membership."[46]

Proposals for reform made by the advanced industrialized states

Nigerian governments have supported proposals by other states, including the great powers, to restructure the United Nations. The reaction of Nigeria to the report of the Group of 18, a committee set up

by the General Assembly to review the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations, was characterized by ambivalence. It rejected the argument that the crisis in the United Nations was either financial or a crisis of multilateralism and maintained that it was a "political crisis inflicted on the UN by its membership, arising from the disagreement about the *management* and *control* of the organisation's budget and the determination of its programmes." The Nigerian government argued, albeit reluctantly, with the Group of 18 that the problem was also administrative and financial: "there can be no denying the fact that the UN can be more *cost-effective* and efficient."[47]

Nigeria's support for reform was ambiguous and was given on two conditions: first, that the much-talked-about administrative and financial efficiency would be achieved without a "diminution in adequate resource allocation, be they human, financial or materials," to the programmes of the United Nations; second, that the reform must be carried out "in full cognizance of the tenets of the United Nations Charter regarding the sovereign equality of all member states."[48]

Nigerian government support for the key sections of the report was dependent on the extent to which a section served Nigeria's national interests. Sometimes support was given in principle to a section and almost withdrawn in practice. It raised objection to recommendations or aspects of the report that tended adversely to affect the implementation of programmes valued by African states. While conceding that cost-saving measures needed to be instituted in the United Nations and that readjustments in the quota contributions might even be necessary, Nigeria rejected any proposal that detracted from the resolve and ability of the United Nations to maintain the UN-endorsed Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (PAAERD). Along with other African states, Nigeria was concerned that these resources might not materialize. The Nigerian government insisted that essential programmes and activities of high priority should continue to attract the lion's share of the available resources. Accordingly, it insisted that the PAAERD approved under UN General Assembly Resolution S-13/2 should remain a priority list that deserved high resource allocation.

In general Nigeria was committed to the reorganization of the United Nations and believed that the recommendations of the Group of 18 would provide a basis to revitalize the world body. But it did not want this at the expense of the interests of Nigeria and Africa and was sensitive to any proposal that smacked of attempts

to impose solutions on Africa and the third world. It was suspicious of innovative procedures of decision-making that appeared democratic but on deeper examination meant the imposition of the will of the strong over the weak. This was how Nigeria viewed the proposals that embodied recommendations that decisions be made by consensus rather than by majority vote.

One of the critical issues that bothered the United States and other great powers was the planning and budget mechanism. The Report of the Group of 18 makes it very clear: "Notwithstanding the points of convergence [on the issue] the Group could not reach a consensus on the different proposals submitted."[49] The proposal favoured by the major powers at the United Nations was the recommendation that the budgeting process and programme planning in the United Nations be merged – that these two functions be entrusted to a single intergovernmental expert body that should work on the basis of consensus. Nigeria rejected these recommendations and proposals.

Nigeria's position was that those who advocated consensus meant imposition. The Nigerian government agreed in principle that the United Nations can function only on the basis of consensus but maintained that this consensus must be one that pays adequate respect to the concern of each and all. It pointed out that the countries that resorted to the withholding of their financial contributions to the system as a means of registering their disapproval of the United Nations' budget and programmes could hardly be said to be genuinely interested in the principle of consensus, nor could they be seen to be acting in good faith. Rather they were bent on getting other states to accept their own preferred proposals for reform. Nigeria warned that reform measures should not be dictated or imposed by any member or group of states.

The reform acceptable to Nigeria, without qualification, was the restructuring of ECOSOC (the Economic and Social Council). Like other members of the Group of 77, Nigeria favoured the merging of the two sessions of ECOSOC and a reduction in both the number of issues handled and the volume of documentation for meetings. Generally, it welcomed reforms directed at reducing the frequency and duration of meetings of the organs and agencies of the United Nations. Nigeria also accepted proposals that enhanced rather than reduced the influence of Africa and the third world in these institutions, such as the suggestion for the replacement of the procedure of weighted voting in multinational financial institutions with that of majority ballot.

Evaluation of the Nigerian government's position on proposals for the reform of the United Nations

Nigeria wants a strong, effective, and efficiently managed United Nations, but it also wishes for a United Nations that would have an influential voice and that would serve Nigeria's national interest. It asks for democratization of the structure and decision-making procedures in the principal organs of the world body, especially the Security Council. The logical corollary of this position is that it would support the position of Liberia, which is that, at the regional level, the UN Security Council seats be shared on a geographical basis, and, at the subregional level, they be rotated among such members. Nigeria's general attitude is that other African states should recognize Nigeria's regional ''medium'' power status, and defer to it to occupy the permanent seat when it is available. This attitude has to be discarded if Nigeria wants to be taken seriously in its proposal for reform. Another trap that Nigeria stands in danger of is the temptation to base its argument for the redistribution of power at the United Nations on the assumed emergence of a new centre of power in Africa. Now that the global economic crisis is reducing Nigeria and other African states to a position of weakness beyond what was imagined in the heady days of the early 1970s, there is a limit to which this position can be pushed.

A potential area of contradiction is the emphasis on the sovereign equality of states. This contradicts the principle of regional representation. More importantly, it begs the important question of redistribution of the financial burden at the United Nations. To claim equal right with all states is to imply a preparedness to bear an equal share of the burden. Yet, as some senior External Affairs officers maintained when interviewed in Lagos in 1989, Nigeria does not want to pay more than it does now. Nigeria's position is that neither it nor any African state should be reassessed in a manner that would make them carry a greater financial burden of these institutions than they do already. If indeed this is Nigeria's position (and this is doubtful, given Akinyemi's public declaration of Nigeria's stand on the matter), it also casts doubt on Nigeria's claim to the right to represent Africa at the Security Council. It opens to question its claim to ''medium'' power status.

Having the largest concentration of human and material resources in Africa, Nigeria's claim to African leadership is credible. As Africa gradually moves in the direction of a common foreign policy, through

coordination and harmonization of national viewpoints, the bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council is justified. Africa should influence how its own resources are exploited. Nigeria can reconcile the two positions by adopting the Liberian position referred to earlier. Surely the international community will benefit from increasing the harmony of interests and viewpoints within groups. The United Nations will be stronger for it.

Conclusion

In the past 30 years, successive Nigerian governments have used the United Nations to protect and advance Nigeria's national interests. Sometimes that interest was narrowly defined and sometimes it was broadly interpreted. From time to time, two interpretations or dimensions of Nigeria's national interest came into conflict. The narrow interest of mobilizing external economic and financial resources – chiefly from the advanced capitalist countries of the West – for Nigeria's economic development was often in contention with the broader interest of establishing a New International Economic Order. The narrow interpretation of Nigeria's national security interest, often confused with the security of the regime in office or of the social group in power, was frequently in contradiction with the wider interest of African liberation from colonialism and racism. Sometimes the narrow national interest of Nigeria was allowed to prevail; at other times, the broad view was dominant.

When the broad concept of Nigeria's national interest triumphed, the Nigerian government found itself acting in harmony with the aspirations and objectives of most other African and third world countries. It discovered that it carried the most active and politically volatile domestic social groups with it. At such times, it moved nearer to achieving Nigeria's abiding ambition, explicit or unexpressed, that is, providing leadership for a diplomatic coalition of African and third world states at the United Nations. At such periods, Nigeria was able to play a leading role in mobilizing international support for the political liberation of Africa. If it could not play a similar role on the issue of the third world demand for a New International Economic Order, it was partly because of the tendency of the narrow perspective to intrude forcefully and frequently in the interpretation of Nigeria's external economic interests. This was partly because, on this issue, unlike on the question of colonialism and racism, no clear domestic voice was raised in favour of the use of the United Nations

as an instrument for the establishment of the New International Economic Order. In Nigeria, few governments were able to ignore the preferences of the people on the objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy.

At the United Nations, external influences helped shape Nigeria's behaviour. The Western powers, especially the United Kingdom and the United States, exerted influence over Nigerian delegates in the early years of the country's diplomatic history. They were soon displaced not by the Soviet Union and its allies, with whom Nigeria's relations had improved remarkably in later years, but by the emerging African and third world blocs. However, at no time did any Nigerian government become captive to either the Western bloc or later the African and third world blocs. An idiosyncratic Nigerian hand was often discernible in the African and third world diplomatic gatherings.

The major constraints on or facilitators of Nigeria's ability to pursue its interests at the United Nations derived from the domestic environment. When there was strong domestic political support, reinforced by adequate administrative capacity, behind a Nigerian government, it was effective at the United Nations. Conversely, when either one or both domestic resources were lacking, especially when the bureaucratic foundations of Nigeria's diplomacy were weak, then Nigeria became ineffective in playing a leading role in the protection and advancement of Nigeria's African and third world interests in the United Nations.

However, Nigeria's interest was defined and, whether the domestic base for its pursuit was weak or strong, the United Nations was, throughout the last 30 years, regarded by every Nigerian government as the most diplomatic forum for the achievement of the country's foreign policy goals. The universality and apparent anonymity of the United Nations were, at least at first, taken for effectiveness and neutrality. And the decision-making structure and process of each of its organs and agencies, which, with few exceptions (the Security Council, the IMF, and the Word Bank), were perceived as democratic, were interpreted as a mark of the United Nations' commitment to the principles of equality of states and majority rule. These presumed qualities helped to endear the United Nations to Nigeria. Consequently, the Nigerian government gave the United Nations unflinching loyalty.

In the future, Nigerian governments are likely to continue to use the United Nations as the principal instrument of Nigeria's multilat-

eral diplomacy and to demonstrate strong commitments to its object-ives and principles. But, at the same time, Nigeria's demand for UN reform, although somewhat weakened in the late 1980s, is likely to become more strident and persistent in the future. This is partly be-cause the United Nations will be less able to satisfy Nigeria's and Africa's future aspirations. In the last three decades, the political lib-eration of Africa was seen by successive Nigerian leaders as the pre-eminent pan-African duty. In the twenty-first century, the liberation of Africa from foreign economic domination and exploitation will be adjudged the critical pan-African task. As the experience of the de-mand for an NIEO has shown, the United Nations as now consti-tuted is inappropriate for the pursuit of this goal. Another reason Ni-geria is likely to grow more insistent in demanding radical reform of the world body is that more intense domestic issues will pressure the Nigerian government to seek a more effective voice for Nigeria and Africa at the United Nations.

If the apparent convergence of interests between the Eastern and Western blocs in the world becomes real, and the growing harmon-ization of policies among European powers attains full fruition, two possible scenarios may emerge in Nigeria. The first is that develop-ments may be interpreted in ideological terms as the polarization of the world into two main classes: the dominant class made up of the North – the advanced industrialized countries; and the dominated and exploited class – the states of the South and the underdeveloped third world countries. The second scenario is that these same devel-opments will be defined in racist terms. The technological backward-ness of Black Africa may be perceived and interpreted by race-conscious leaders and groups in Nigeria as the product of racial prejudice against the Black peoples of the world. This viewpoint will reinforce the belief now held in certain quarters in Nigeria that it is its manifest destiny to liberate the Black race from political, social, and economic thralldom.

Whichever scenario prevails, the United Nations will be called upon to play a central role in resolving the conflicts. The United Na-tions, appropriately reformed, can cope. In order to meet the emer-ging demands of member states, the United Nations must be restruc-tured not merely to neutralize the purported tyrannical tendencies of the numerical majority, but also to curb the alleged hegemonic proclivities of the powerful minority, which is developing new solidar-ity bonds and looking ever more menacing to the third world. While drawing on and making creative use of the positive developments in

the practice of international governance of the last two centuries, those in a position to shape the future of the United Nations should free themselves from the incubus of historical perception and interpretation of international governance in terms of the concert of European powers. For a more effective world organization, peoples, not states, should be the main target of the reform. Maximization of welfare, not the balancing of power, should be a guiding principle. Allies of the future United Nations should be sought among those who favour people's welfare over governmental security, among those who value human rights and developments over and above the acquisition of war materials or profits derived from the sale of arms and ammunition.

Notes and references

1. David M. Gray, "The Foreign Policy Process in the Emerging African Nation: Nigeria," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1965, 403.
2. Simeon Ola Adebo, *Our International Years* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1988), 24–25.
3. Gordon J. Idang, *Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy, 1960–1966* (Ibadan: University Press, 1973), 131–134.
4. "Speech Delivered at the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Occasion of the Admission of Nigeria at the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization on October 7, 1960 by the Late Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Nigeria," in George A. Obiozor, *Nigerian Participation in the U.N.* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1985), 190–197.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. See the Policy Statement as reproduced in Gray, "The Foreign Policy Process," 319–321 (emphasis added). See also *House of Representatives Debates*, 20 Aug. 1960, cols. 2661–2672.
8. Oluwole Idowu Odumosu, *The Nigerian Constitution: History and Development* (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1963), 243–244.
9. Adebo, *Our International Years*, 123.
10. *General Assembly Official Records* [GAOR], 20th session, 1348th plenary meeting, 5 Oct. 1965, 3.
11. A. Asobie, "Nigeria and the Non-aligned Movement," in G. O. Olusanya and R. A. Akindele, eds., *Nigeria's External Relations: The First Twenty-five Years* (Ibadan: University Press, 1986), 145–149.
12. Babatunde Olatunde Adeniran, "A Developing Country in the United Nations System: A Study of Nigeria's Participation in the United Nations, 1960–1975," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colombia, 1978, 252.
13. John J. Stremlau, *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 278.
14. Joe Garba, *Diplomatic Soldiering: Nigerian Foreign Policy, 1975–1979* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1987), 173–174.
15. Ibid., 183.
16. Federal Ministry of External Affairs, First United Nations Department, Lagos, "Report of the 13th Session of the United Nations General Assembly," mimeo, 11 Feb. 1985, 16.

17. O. Oyediran, ed., *Survey of Nigerian Affairs, 1975* (Ibadan: University of Ibadan Press, 1988), 112 and 117.
18. Interview, Federal Ministry of External Affairs, Sep. 1989.
19. An address by the Honorable Minister of External Affairs, Major-General I. O. S. Nwachukwu, at the 44th session of the United Nations General Assembly, *National Concord*, 10 Oct. 1989, 7, and 11 Oct. 1989, 7.
20. Ibrahim A. Gambari, "The Role of the United Nations in a Changing World" (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs Lecture Series, no. 73, 1992), 9–11.
21. Joseph N. Garba, "Post-Cold War Politics: World Politics as seen by the President of the United Nations General Assembly" (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs Lecture Series, Jun. 1990), 24.
22. Ibrahim B. Babangida, "Nigeria in the Emerging New World," in George A. Obiozor, ed., *Basic Issues in Nigerian Foreign Policy: IBB's Foreign Policy Pronouncements (1966–1991)* (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1992), 77–81.
23. Ibid., 63.
24. Gray, "The Foreign Policy Process," 4, 11.
25. Zdenek Cerveka, *The Organisation of African Unity and its Charter* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1969), 7.
26. The African Liberation Committee (ALC) is a committee of the OAU, established at the inaugural summit of the organization in 1963. Its full name is the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa.
27. Emmanuel M. Dube, "Relations Between Liberation Movements and the O.A.U.," in N. M. Shamuyarira, ed., *Essays on the Liberation of Southern Africa* (Dar-es-Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1975), 46.
28. GAOR, 1965, 4, 11.
29. The Byrd Amendment, named after its author, Senator Harry F. Byrd, an independent congressman from the State of Virginia, was passed by the US Congress on 11 Nov. 1971. It authorized the import from Rhodesia of 72 "strategic and critical" materials into the United States. See Bassey E. Ate, *Decolonisation and Dependence: The Development of Nigeria–U.S. Relations, 1960–1984* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987), 187.
30. Orobola Fasehun, "Politics and Roles of Nigeria in the Organisation of African Unity," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, USA, 1979, 303–304.
31. C. O. C. Amate, *Inside the O.A.U.: Pan-Africanism in Practice* (London: Macmillan, 1986), 201–202.
32. Garba, *Diplomatic Soldiering*, 188.
33. Ibid., 84–86.
34. *Daily Times*, 13 Apr. 1960; cited in I. A. Gambari, *Party Politics and Foreign Policy* (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1980), 77.
35. Cited by Sonni Gwanle Tyoden, "Africa in Nigeria's Foreign Policy: 1990 and Beyond," in G. Aforka Nweke, ed., *Nigerian Foreign Policy and the Political System: 1990 and Beyond* (Nsukka: Nigerian Society of International Affairs, 1987), 389.
36. *Timesweek* (Lagos), 20 Apr. 1992, 38–39.
37. Gambari, "The Role of the UN," 10.
38. *The African Guardian*, 20 Apr. 1992, 12–14.
39. *West Africa*, 14–20 Oct. 1991, 1724.
40. *The Guardian* (Lagos), 14 Jan. 1994, 1–2.
41. *West Africa*, 27 Apr.–3 May 1992, 730; 29 Jun.–9 Jul. 1992, 1106. See also, *African Business*, Jan. 1994, 16–18, and *The Guardian*, 1 Jul. 1993, back page.
42. *West Africa*, 2–8 Dec. 1991, 2003.
43. *West Africa*, 14–20 Oct. 1991, 1724.
44. Address of the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, at the 27th Ordinary Assembly of OAU Heads of State and Government, Abuja, 3 Jun. 1991.

45. *West Africa*, 14–20 Oct. 1991, 1724.
46. Ibid., 29 Mar. – 4 Apr. 1993, 501–502.
47. Statement by H. E. Professor A. Bolaji Akinyemi, Minister of External Affairs of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, at the 41st session of the United Nations General Assembly, 26 Sep. 1986, 3; emphasis added.
48. Ibid., 2.
49. *Report of the Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts to Review the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Nations*, GAOR, 41st session, Supplement no. 49 (A/41/49) (New York, 1986), Item 69.

9

The United Kingdom and the United Nations

A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor

The historical legacy

The modern British can draw upon a long and rich experience of foreign policy making. The United Kingdom has been a significant actor in the European state-system since its inception through the process that culminated in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. For a while, indeed, the world system was Eurocentric, and this period coincided with the United Kingdom's apogee as the leading power in two "long cycles" of world history, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[1] The second cycle, from the end of the Napoleonic Wars until the outbreak of the Great War, saw the birth of international institutions in a recognizably modern form. In some ways they were a response to two apparently contradictory trends. First, the industrial revolution was creating a single, integrated world economy, while, second, the growth of nationalism, which was given a great impetus by the French revolution, was leading to a decline in dynastic loyalties and class ties and to a consolidation of state structures buttressed by a welfare state and encompassed by increasingly impermeable territorial boundaries. International organization made these seemingly contradictory trends compatible by providing the medium for international flows of goods, services, ideas, and people and a forum through which national governments could exercise some control

over them. Moreover, they provided a means for states and other actors to approach new system-wide problems of a technical, economic, social, or political nature. Britain played a leading role in all of these developments.

There emerged, in the nineteenth century, four traditions of international organization that remain with us today. The first concerns general political and security questions and is a long-standing attempt to manage great power rivalries with the aid of institutional mechanisms and procedures to facilitate the degree of cooperation necessary for the successful functioning of the balance of power. While the British Foreign Secretary, rather helplessly, watched the lights go out in Europe in the summer of 1914, the need for an institutionalized system of management for power politics was, by then, fully recognized by the powers, and not least by the United Kingdom, which played a leading role in creating a successor system in the form of the League of Nations.

The United Kingdom's role in the development of international organization in the nineteenth century was not limited to the Concert system. In the Americas, as in Europe, increasing resort was made to legal means to settle political disputes, and the United Kingdom encouraged this. For instance, no attempt was made by the United Kingdom to burn the White House again over the ''Alabama'' question. Although UK willingness, as the hegemonic power, to submit to arbitration was a major contribution to this trend, the British diplomatic tradition is not as imbued with the legal spirit as that of Continentals or Latin Americans, in part because legal training is not such a fundamental element in the education of British public servants and public figures as it often is elsewhere. The UK approach is more pragmatic, and less principled in a legal sense – not for nothing is the United Kingdom feared and admired as ''perfidious Albion.''

This pragmatism revealed its positive side in the birth of the ''peace movement'' in the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century. Gentlemen in the United Kingdom, with the public and international interest at heart, began to meet to discuss international issues of high politics from the middle of the nineteenth century.[2] They were concerned to create a more peaceful and orderly world and sought to abolish such sores on civilization as the slave trade and slavery. Human rights were at the heart of their concerns. They were a starting point for the pressure groups that were later to give currency to ideas for a ''League of Nations,'' particularly in the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. Their impact upon

368

the thinking and actions of governments was considerable. The United Kingdom was even then a major centre of activity by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and so it remains. Furthermore, as the functional integration of the world increased apace, so did the need for enabling organizations, as the Rhine River Commission. And so it was with weights and measures, patents, the Greenwich meridian, and the like. Moreover, given the United Kingdom's role in the world economy and the emerging global power structure, the United Kingdom's interests, values, and policies were well served.

The Eurocentric world came to an end in 1914, but not, in practical effect, until 1945. The call for a League of Nations was the last of President Wilson's Fourteen Points and became an Allied war aim and part of the Treaty of Versailles. The Covenant of the League was itself based largely upon UK and US drafts as amended by others, principally the French. General Jan Smuts of South Africa also played a major role in the drafting process (as he did later in the drafting of the Preamble of the UN Charter). Governments sought to bring together the trends that had emerged in the nineteenth century. Collective security and an elaborate system of legal, administrative, and political dispute-handling procedures were allied to processes for peaceful change. An attempt was made to integrate existing international public unions into a systematic whole, and the League stimulated and saw the birth of a large number of institutions that have since become familiar as UN specialized agencies and programmes. At the centre of the system lay a new international phenomenon – an international secretariat. This was permanent, it had a wide remit, it was loyal to the principles of the Covenant above all else (at least in theory), and it had a degree of political independence – potential if not actual. The idea of an independent secretariat staffed by career officials in both the League and the United Nations owes much to British insistence. Nevertheless, the League was intended not to bring about supranational integration but to foster the growth of a sense of international community between governments and peoples.

At the heart of the enterprise were the UK and French governments and peoples. Germany and the USSR were pariah states only briefly and later to become members; the United States retreated into isolation; Japan and Italy were slighted by the Anglo–French–American domination of Versailles, and later their actions in Manchuria and Abyssinia in defiance of the League helped to destroy it. The

two Secretaries-General were first Sir Eric Drummond of the United Kingdom and then Joseph Avenol of France (Sean Lester of Ireland held the post during the war years). The success or failure of the political and security provisions depended crucially on the United Kingdom and France, and for both countries the League was a major factor in policy considerations. The League quickly became an organic part of the world political system and to that degree it was a success. It was an integral and important part of UK foreign policy. Moreover, British public opinion, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like the League of Nations Union and the "Peace Pledge," ensured that the League would have salience for any UK government. The governments could not ignore the League. That the League failed in its security aspirations cannot be ascribed to UK policy, as the basic conditions necessary for the creation of a system of collective security did not exist in the political circumstances of 1919 and still less those of the 1930s. Nevertheless, the League made its mark and, more than that, in its functional aspirations it was an undoubted success, as the Bruce Report at the end of the 1930s clearly attested. This success was not forgotten as statesmen and peoples began to consider the question of world order with the turning of the tide in the fortunes of war for the Allies in 1943 and 1944.

The individuals in question were British, American, and Soviet. They concluded that, although the moribund League should be wound up, there should, nevertheless, be another organization – the United Nations Organization – in the same genre. Moreover, the success of the functional aspects of the League would be built upon in the shape of the specialized agencies, each with its own constitutional document, membership, budget, and secretariat – a striking tribute to the functionalist ideas of David Mitrany, himself a British national, though born in Romania.[3] After many discussions between the Big Three, 50 of the United Nations convened in San Francisco on 25 April 1945 to consider and, on 26 June 1945, to sign the draft Charter.[4] The United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union stood together firmly and resisted the attempts of other powers to bring about substantive changes in the Charter. This was particularly the case during the sustained attack, led by Australia, on the provision for five permanent, veto-holding powers in the Security Council. Once the Big Three had reconciled their conflicting interests, and safeguarded their mutual interests, they were little disposed to make further substantive changes. The United Kingdom's

370

position as a sponsor of, and major actor in, the UN system was made structurally secure in the Charter. Henceforth, to change it, whatever the relative decline in the United Kingdom's power, prestige, and resources, would, perhaps of necessity, also be to cast doubt upon the privileged position of the superpowers and other permanent members of the Security Council. In the years since 1945, the United Kingdom's structural position in the UN system has not been eroded, and it wields an influence significantly greater than its place in world affairs would otherwise suggest. As the present Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, is wont to say, Britain punches above its weight.

The situation in 1945 is unlikely to repeat itself for the United Kingdom. It is no longer conceivable that the United Kingdom could act as the political patron of a general global organization and approach to world order as a member of a "Big Three." For a century and a half the United Kingdom was a principal patron and a central pivot of international organization. But now the United Kingdom is one of those powers whose advice is sought, whose policy is important, whose initiatives are taken seriously, but upon whom the organization does not, in the last resort, depend. Without the United Nations, however, UK diplomacy would be weakened in a significant manner. The structural privileges of 1945 are a considerable asset for the United Kingdom, and the present UK government, like its predecessors, has sought to justify their continuation by using them to good effect, particularly in the Security Council.

The United Kingdom and the United Nations: The organizational framework

The United Kingdom is a permanent member of the Security Council, which confers numerous rights and duties as well as opportunities and costs for British diplomacy, but is also closely involved with the other principal organs of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. In so far as the General Assembly is concerned, the five permanent members are always members of the General Committee of the Assembly, where they look at the agenda and generally act as a business committee. The United Kingdom also tends to be a member of other restricted member committees, like the Committee for Programme and Coordination (CPC). However, on occasion it does appear that British candidates have failed to be elected or re-elected on committees because of UK policy on the Falklands since repossession or its policy on sanctions against South Africa. Otherwise British uni-

lateralism on these issues has had little real consequence. However, there is now a regular annual review by British officials of the committees on which the United Kingdom serves and the positions it holds throughout the UN system, presumably to ensure that there is no slippage in the United Kingdom's favoured position in the system as a whole.

The United Kingdom is always voted on to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and is a member of the Trusteeship Council by right. There has always been a British judge on the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The United Kingdom is the foremost supporter of the Court among the permanent members. Moreover, the United Kingdom would welcome the use of chambers of three or more judges at the choice of the parties to adjudicate in particular cases. The United Kingdom has always accepted the Optional Clause. There is an awareness that in so doing it is putting itself in a position to be sued, but it usually manages to settle disputes before they get to the Court. The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) never accepted the Optional Clause. France and the United States withdrew – the French being concerned about nuclear testing (1974) and the United States with Nicaragua (1985). In the Secretariat, although British nationals continue to hold high office, the number of British nationals in the Secretariat is below the historic highpoint of the early years, but this is to be expected with the need for geographical representation owing to expanded membership of the United Nations.

The United Kingdom's contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations for the period 1989–1991 was assessed at 4.86 per cent. Britain was thus the sixth contributor after the United States (25 per cent), the former USSR (in effect 11.57 per cent), Japan (11.38 per cent), FRG (8.09 per cent, but 9.31 per cent with the DDR), and France (6.25 per cent).[5] This rate of assessment of approximately 5 per cent is typical of the specialized agencies as well.

The United Kingdom is well placed in the specialized agencies, being a permanent member of the IMO (International Maritime Organization) governing board, which is decided by tonnage, and of the ILO (International Labour Organization) governing board, which includes the principal industrial powers. In the case of the ILO, however, the "privileged" position of the 10 states of chief industrial importance is to be abolished, and then the United Kingdom will, as a consequence, no longer be guaranteed a seat on the governing body. British membership of the governing bodies of other important spe-

cialized agencies has been as follows: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) – 1957–1990; UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) – 1946 until withdrawal in 1985; World Health Organization (WHO) – 1948–1991 (except every fourth year); International Civil Aviation Organization – 1947–1989; Universal Postal Union – 1974–1984; International Telecommunication Union – 1947–1989; World Meteorological Organization – 1979–1991; International Atomic Energy Agency – 1957–1990; UN Industrial Development Organization – 1967–1991. The position of structural privilege is striking. But the United Kingdom has been determined to protect this position, in part, at least, because of a wish to do what it can to shape a better world. As the then Prime Minister put it on the fortieth anniversary of the organization, in a sentiment shared by other British political leaders, what the United Nations "can do – and has done – is to encourage civilised standards of international behaviour by member states and to secure the resolution of international disputes by peaceful means."[6]

Although many home ministries maintain direct relations with the specialized agencies, as do British-based INGOs and NGOs, the organizational hub is the UN Department (UND) in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), which falls under the remit of an Assistant Under-Secretary who is responsible for a range of departments in the FCO. It is a relatively small department in part because the FCO's structure tends to give priority to issues over particular institutions. In the 1950s and the early 1960s, the United Kingdom even had two ambassadors at the United Nations in New York, one of whom was solely concerned with Fourth Committee and Trusteeship Council affairs. There was then a long period during which Her Majesty's Government (HMG) considered that the United Nations' role on the issues that mattered was marginal and consequently the UND was not a front-rank FCO department. This has changed as governments have come to feel that the United Kingdom could use the United Nations positively, especially the Security Council. However, the geographical and functional departments generally take the lead, and the role of the UND is to get them to think of the UN angle. What frequently gives UND an *entrée* is the need for a brief on a particular issue that requires coordination between departments, and the UND is well placed to bring this about. Moreover, in the new climate the UND is making more policy suggestions, and policy in the United Nations is no longer a damage limitation exercise. Nevertheless, the South African department, for example, will lead on South African

affairs, but in conjunction with the UND, and the same is true of the Middle East, the problem of drugs, and the like.

The UND can be small because it works in a "mutual education" process with geographical and functional departments. In all there are some 10 professionals in the UND and the work is divided between a head, his deputy, and specialists on human rights, refugees, political and legal affairs, and a political and financial section. The UND leads in the FCO on how the United Kingdom uses the United Nations; it coordinates and it has a general remit for UN affairs. It deals with the Secretary-General's visits to the United Kingdom, liaises with British missions to the United Nations, of which there are four fully fledged permanent missions (New York, Geneva, Vienna, and Disarmament in Geneva), and generally acts as a postbox *vis-à-vis* the agencies and home departments. In addition to this, it leads on the important question of the UN budget and on the principles of peace-keeping, but not in relation to particular disputes. Some 8 per cent of FCO personnel are assigned to intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Subscriptions to international organizations amount to £79.7 million out of a total financial provision for the FCO in 1988/89 of £725.4 million. The UND did not, therefore, have a high profile in the FCO, but there is evidence of a recent trend towards task expansion and a greater prominence for UN questions.

The United Nations has a modest physical and operational presence in the United Kingdom. Although the United Nations started its active life in London with a General Assembly and a Security Council meeting, only one specialized agency, the IMO, has its seat in the United Kingdom. The British government of the day did not encourage UN bodies to take root in the United Kingdom because of the cost and the demands on the scarce resources of the early post-war period that this would have entailed. Moreover, the United Kingdom, at the time, still ruled more than a quarter of humanity and, as one of the Big Three, it had no need to garner further political kudos. In addition, Parliament has always been chary of granting privileges and immunities and these would have been required to a significant degree if there had been a substantial UN presence in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, despite governmental and parliamentary attitudes in the past, there has emerged a greater involvement in UN affairs in London, but more indirectly since – with Geneva, Paris, and Brussels – London is one of the INGO and NGO capitals of the world, and a substantial proportion of these organizations' business

has a UN orientation. Moreover, the United Nations does have an official presence in the United Kingdom.

The League of Nations began the practice of establishing offices – virtual embassies – in the capitals of important member states. In the early days the United Kingdom and France were exceptions, perhaps because there was a symbiotic relationship between the Foreign Office, the Quai d'Orsay, and high-ranking British and French officials respectively in the Secretariat that made formal ties unnecessary. Elsewhere League offices undertook political reporting, sought to give political salience to the League and establish its relevance, and undertook information work. However, circumstances have changed and UN offices are now more concerned with information work and that of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) rather than with political work. Of the 59 UN Information Offices, 18 are joint offices; they are not for the most part UN "embassies."

The UN Information Centre in London was established in 1947 (it also serves Ireland). Although it is mainly an information centre, nevertheless it does have a clear role in political reporting. With seven principal staff it is the largest such office in the world. One of the reasons for this is that London is a major centre for the English-language media, including those of Africa and Asia. The existence of Reuters and the BBC is important. The role of the Centre is first of all representation, but also looking after UN visitors to London as well as the dissemination of information. In addition, there is an administrative support role for UN activities elsewhere. This involves financial transactions since many UN projects are paid through the London office. The office is also important for UN communications, with a large throughput of material, including diplomatic pouches. There is a local administrative role, for example concerning Namibian scholarships, and there is support for the specialized agencies and UNDP in recruiting and interviewing personnel. London is also often the site for global launches of UN programmes. The United Kingdom it seems is, willy-nilly, a UN centre.

Peace and security

The United Nations Organization grew out of the Grand Alliance to defeat the Axis powers. The Charter gives prominence to the need "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." It signifies this concern by giving pride of place to the Security Council,

375

which has "teeth" in the form of political, economic, and military sanctions at its disposal if it can generate the will to use them. The Council itself is dominated by the five permanent members with their power of veto. The Council's fortunes have fluctuated. Many of its powers have lain dormant throughout its history and other organs have seized its role in peace and security questions to the extent of its reaching a nadir of only five meetings in 1959. Peace-keeping, a largely fructuous innovation in the UN system, has been shared with the General Assembly and Secretariat in the past. But the wheel now appears to have turned full circle and there has been a return towards the situation envisaged in 1945. In particular, events in the Gulf in August 1990 led to very considerable Security Council activity.

The United Kingdom has three particular concerns in these developments: it wishes to sustain and expand cooperation between permanent members of the Security Council, it supports the revived UN peace-keeping role, and it wishes to protect and put to good use its status as a permanent member of the Security Council. Moreover, this is one of the few areas of UN activity in which the United Kingdom does not insist upon a policy of zero real growth in financial terms.

Both John Major, and Mrs. Thatcher before him, like the United Kingdom's status as a permanent member of the Security Council and wish to see it used. The veto is useful on particular issues, for example it could, if needed, be used on questions such as Hong Kong, Gibraltar, and Ireland, but the British have made a conscious effort to use their status to facilitate relationships between the five permanent members (P5). The consultation process was sparked off by the then British ambassador, Sir John Thomson, in the mid-1980s, who, sensing a change in mood in the Iran–Iraq war and in Soviet attitudes towards the United Nations, acted as a catalyst. Thomson talked to his French counterpart with a view to making a joint suggestion for P5 consultation. However, for various reasons of an accidental nature, it was Thomson who made the telephone calls. He did not consult the FCO before issuing the invitations, and his Soviet colleague responded without consulting Moscow. The Chinese dithered but, in fact, were present at the initial meeting in the autumn of 1986. A second meeting took place two days later, and on that occasion the FCO and the Secretary-General were both informed. The Secretary-General, however, was not invited to join the group. As the initial coordinator, Thomson (and his successor, Sir Crispin Tickell) briefed the Secretary-General and others, such as

376

the non-permanent members and the non-aligned movement, either alone or with representatives of the other permanent members. The United Kingdom has, until recently, been the coordinator, and the meetings are weekly or even more frequent, depending on items on the agenda. The meetings themselves are informal, of a confidential character, and work, in English, on a basis of consensus. They are also somewhat dependent on the good personal relationships between the five ambassadors. They were initially concerned with the Iran–Iraq war and Namibia, on which there was a high degree of unanimity between the Five, and then Cambodia and Afghanistan. Cooperation so far has been good, but this is a delicate area because non-permanent members are sensitive to their exclusion and this has given rise to some resentment.

The meetings themselves are now coordinated in turns on a three-monthly basis, since France was resisting a "permanent" coordinating role for the United Kingdom. This has given the United Kingdom the opportunity to present its views with greater vigour, since it is no longer constrained by the need for the chairman to be "fair." The meetings are at the level of counsellors, who are responsible for much initial drafting, and ambassadors. The ground rules are that no member will insist on discussing an issue that another member does not wish to have considered. However, any question can be raised. There is no point-scoring. The work, which started at the end of 1986, is on the basis of written documents and comes into operation when the Five have a definite objective in mind. It therefore meets on demand. In this way the Security Council has become a venue for serious consideration of regional issues, although not all of them. A further reflection of this is the meetings of the five foreign ministers with the Secretary-General – another British initiative. Moreover, it was under British chairmanship in January 1992 that the heads of government of the members of the Security Council met in session for the first time – a meeting that invited the Secretary-General to prepare his *Agenda for Peace*. However, the United Kingdom's role in the P5's private consultation is to act to further British interests rather than to assume a role as a bridge-builder, although the two are in fact far from being incompatible. Reflecting on his experience with coordinating permanent member cooperation, Sir Crispin Tickell told a University of Georgia audience,

Two things are necessary for success. First . . . is an identification of common interest, and political will to construct joint policies based on it. Second is a

good relationship between the Permanent and non-Permanent Members: for while the Five can stop anything, they do not, by themselves, carry a majority in the Security Council. You will note an important point: the *negative* power of the Five has always been vital; but now we are seeing the development of the *positive* power of the Five, and that may turn out to be more important still.[7]

The retention by the United Kingdom of one of the five permanent seats on the Security Council is in some ways anachronistic in that the United Kingdom's power in the world has declined relative to that of a number of other states since 1945, and the United Kingdom's role has changed with the disappearance of the empire and membership of the European Union (EU). Indeed it might be said that the seat adds to the United Kingdom's power rather than reflects it, which explains a certain defensiveness in attitudes towards the reform of the United Nations, and in particular the question of the permanent membership of the Security Council. Yet, in defence of the United Kingdom's permanent membership it must be acknowledged that the United Kingdom (and France) are different from countries such as Germany and Japan. The United Kingdom is a nuclear power and it does have a global military reach surpassed only by the United States and the USSR. Moreover, again like France, the United Kingdom has a will to act. The United Kingdom can still play a role in a *Security* Council in a manner that only France can equal and the two military superpowers can surpass. The various inhibitions of other potential candidates in the Kuwait crisis is instructive. Nevertheless, the evident strengthening of the European Union's foreign policy and security arrangements over the years and through the Treaty of Maastricht inevitably threatens the right of both the British and the French to their own individual seats in the Council, though the prospect of an EU seat is, of course, still far distant. For the time being the common foreign and security policy of the EU and the daily and detailed exchanges of information and coordination have induced the British and French to conceive of their role in the Security Council as having an EU dimension, although they are far from being, in letter or in spirit, EU representatives.

India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia have raised the issue of the United Kingdom's permanent membership, but not with any great conviction. Japan and the FRG have ambitions to be permanent members, not necessarily at the United Kingdom's expense, but when they have been on the Security Council they did not inspire any great confidence. Among the reasons for this was that they did

not have Commonwealth ties with the third world and they were not used to being isolated and having to stand up and be counted. However, Japan has now taken the United Kingdom's "second place" in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and both Japan and the FRG have provided high-ranking international civil servants in WHO and NATO respectively. Nevertheless, in the Security Council it has, so far, been a chastening experience for them. The United Kingdom is, therefore, seen as a reliable member of the Council, one on whom ideas can be tested prior to going to the United States. To that extent the United Kingdom is the United States' surrogate, but the question arises of whether it is the Americans' poodle, and this question is discussed below. British officials, at least, appear to be aware of the danger that this could undermine the United Kingdom's role as a permanent member of the Security Council.

Although the British are determined to cling on to what they have in terms of memberships in committees and special voting rights, it cannot be denied that they also have something special to contribute that is recognized by the representatives of other leading states, in New York as in Geneva. The British are unique in having both a large number of technical skills, in drafting, committee work, and so on, and great ability in the processes of multilateral diplomacy, and in the possession of a world view. The other major states are all deficient, it is said, with regard to one or other of these criteria. The point is often made that British diplomats are likely to have a contribution to make, in, say, the executive board of the World Bank, or in the Security Council, on a very wide range of issues with a global reference.

Skills in multilateral diplomacy involve a flexibility in negotiation, which also implies a certain kind of relationship with the home government, and a sense of status and confidence. For a British diplomat, a posting to the United Nations is regarded as a good career move, and at the middle levels is preferred to a posting to the EU; even at the senior level it has happened that an ambassador has moved "up" to the United Nations from Brussels. For these reasons British diplomats in New York tend to be of outstanding quality. Furthermore, they have the confidence of the home-based officials, and instructions are normally full but allow flexibility. Others, not only in the Commonwealth and not least the United States, apparently often rely upon the British to make the appropriate points. Indeed, in the daily business of the United Nations the British are far from being the Americans' poodle: the lead is often in British hands, with the British guiding the Americans round the more difficult corners. This

wealth of experience and practical skills goes some way in justifying the British retention of its position of privilege in the Security Council and elsewhere.

The pattern of use of the United Kingdom's veto in the Security Council is clear from table 9.1. Apart from the Suez crisis, it was concerned almost exclusively with southern African questions. Sir Crispin Tickell made a forthright defence of the veto in his Georgia lecture.

Perhaps the main strength of the Council is that there is no damned democracy about it. The veto power of the Five Permanent members has always been an essential element … it is vital. First the veto, paradoxically, does more than anything else to ensure that the United Nations bears some resemblance to the real world and it is treated seriously as an organization. Imagine what would happen if there were no veto. Resolutions of mounting fatuity would be passed, instructing the Permanent Members to do things which they had no intention of doing. Through ignoring these resolutions, the leading countries of the world would soon ignore the Security Council, thereby devaluing not only the Security Council, but the whole UN system.

However, since the P5 are now extremely abstemious in their use of the veto, the Security Council has had to face its responsibilities. Over the invasion and annexation of Kuwait it responded with great vigour and the United Kingdom played a leading role.[8] Although the shine has gone off the Security Council, the United Kingdom continues to play a major role and to put, as much as any, its troops and reserves where its mouth is in Security Council operations.

Secretary-General, Secretariat, and finance

The UK government's view is that the Secretary-General can act only in a manner complementary to the P5 and not by using Article 99 as a basis for an important and potentially adversarial initiative. The British liked Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar's combination of third world credentials and Western perceptions – a blend of Hammarskjöld and U Thant, in sharp contrast to Dr. Waldheim, who was frequently criticized. There is also a drawing back from some of the activism of Dr. Boutros-Ghali and an awareness of the tension between the Secretary-General's functions as chief administrative officer of the United Nations, and thus its servant even (and perhaps especially) in Security Council affairs, and the Secretary-General's independent political responsibilities derived from Article 99, which specifically relate to the Security Council.

380

Table 9.1 **Permanent members' use of the veto in the Security Council**

	Soviet Union	United States	United Kingdom	France	China
1946	9 (M3)			1	
1947	13 (M7)			1	
1948	7 (M3)				
1949	14 (M9)				
1950	3				
1952	8 (M6)				
1954	4				
1955	17 (M15)				1 (M1)
1956	2		2	2	
1957	3 (M2)				
1958	5 (M2)				
1960	5 (M1)				
1961	7 (M1)				
1962	1				
1963	1				
1964	2		1 (1Rh)		
		Enlarged Security Council			
1966	1				
1968	1				
1970		1 (1Rh)	2 (2Rh)		
1971	3		1 (1Rh)		
1972	1 (1ME)	1 (1ME)	2 (1Rh)		2 (M1)
1973		3 (1Rh, 1ME)	1 (1Rh)		
1974	1	1 (1SAf)	1 (1SAf)	1 (1SAf)	
1975		6 (M4, 1Nb, 1ME)	1 (1Nb)	1 (1Nb)	
1976		6 (M2, 3ME, 1Nb)	1 (1Nb)	2 (1Nb)	
1977		3 (3SAf)	3 (3SAf)	3 (3SAf)	
1979	2				
1980	2	1 (1ME)			
1981		5 (1SAf, 4Nb)	4 (4Nb)	4 (4Nb)	
1982		8 (6ME)	1		
1983	1	2 (1ME)			
1984	1 (1ME)	2 (1ME)			
1985		7 (1SAf, 1Nb, 2ME)	2 (1Nb, 1SAf)		
1986		8 (2SAf, 3ME)	3 (2SAf)	1	
1987		2 (1SAf, 1Nb)	2 (1Nb, 1SAf)		
1988		6 (1SAf, 5ME)	1 (1SAf)		
Total	114 (M49)	62 (M6)	28	16	3 (M2)

Source: Sally Morphet, ''The Significance and Relevance of the Security Council and Its Resolutions and Vetoes,'' *Review of International Studies* 16 (Oct. 1990), no. 4.

M = membership veto
ME = veto on Middle East Question associated with Palestine/Israel dispute
Nb = veto on Namibia Question
Rh = veto on Rhodesia Question
SAf = veto on South Africa Question

In so far as the Secretariat is concerned, the United Kingdom urges the need for reform. The current "end of term report" reads something along the lines of "seems to be trying harder but still much room for improvement." As the former UK ambassador, Sir Crispin Tickell, has put it,

the Secretariat is at present being reduced in size. But it also needs rationalization. The shape of the pyramid is wrong. There is still too much overlapping of responsibility and administrative confusion. It is easier to create new committees than to get rid of old ones. The need for an impartial international civil service of high quality is undiminished ... National wheeling and dealing for posts continues unabated. We need tougher and more ruthless management.[9]

On another occasion, Sir Crispin said that

there is a long way to go in tackling the endemic problems of wasted resources, overlap, personal empire building, lack of responsiveness and poor co-ordination. There is, quite simply, too much bureaucracy and too little management.

But he also pointed out that, by not paying their subscriptions promptly, and in full, member states impede the process of reform. He added:

It is ironic that the United States received far more from the United Nations (by virtue of its presence in New York) than the US Administration pays – when it pays – in the form of its subscription.[10]

It was also true that the United Kingdom was making a net financial gain from UNESCO, so there is an element of the pot calling the kettle black. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom disapproves strongly of the United States' practice on its financial dealings with the United Nations and is willing to stand up and be counted on this issue – clearly a bulldog and not a poodle of the United States.

The United Kingdom is still well placed at senior levels regarding posts held by its nationals. However, some posts have been "lost" in the middle ranks and the United Kingdom would like to see more of its nationals at that level. The United Kingdom nevertheless does not lobby for posts in a crude manner and its behaviour in such matters is generally seen throughout the system, including the agencies, as being exemplary. British nationals in secretariats are of good quality and the British government is widely acknowledged as acting in the spirit of the Charter towards the Secretariat in personnel matters. Strictly speaking, given the staff regulations of the UN system as a

whole, the nationality of officials ought not to be of interest since, supposedly, they are not appointed to represent national interests: they are international civil servants. The United Kingdom, as a patron of the United Nations, always had, and continues to have, a large number of its nationals in the various secretariats as well as a large number of experts. The British government plays the game according to the rules regarding its nationals, to its credit. But then it can afford to do so in the sense that the British government has many other channels of effective influence throughout the system and, in any case, officials of British nationality are unlikely to rock the boat from the British government's point of view, particularly if, in the case of senior appointments, HMG's advice has been sought regarding particular individuals for particular positions. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom could play a useful role if it gave stronger support to the Secretary-General and the executive heads of the agencies in ensuring greater respect for the independence, competence, and integrity of the international civil service. The United Kingdom behaves well, but is perhaps too passive.

Relating to the Secretary-General and his staff is one of the immediate tasks of the UK mission in New York. The mission consists of about 30 diplomats, although some functions are shared with the British Information Office, the Consulate in New York, and the Trade Mission in New York. Contact between the mission and Whitehall is daily and most contacts are with departments in the FCO dealing with particular issues. The United Nations Department (UND) in the FCO acts as a "postbox," but there is a feeling that the United Kingdom's policy and activities in the United Nations could be more frequently and usefully conceived and examined as a whole from the UN point of view. However, the United Nations is now seen as central to UK policy. There are few purely British items on the UN agenda, but there are some items that the United Kingdom does not want to see on the agenda – Northern Ireland being a case in point. Rather the United Kingdom's privileged position in terms of the UN system enables the government to ensure that the United Kingdom's voice is heard and British interests looked after in the context of the global agenda.

Finance and the policy of "zero growth"

The "reform" that has concerned the United Kingdom most in UN matters has been that of finance, where the United Kingdom has pur-

sued a policy of "zero growth" of the regular budget in real terms. In technical terms, the United Kingdom has a good record on finance, always paying its dues, usually at intervals during the year and occasionally earlier in the year, at the request of the United Nations or a specialized agency, in order to enable the body to meet its commitments at a time of real financial peril. The United Kingdom does have some arrears on peace-keeping, but these are due to accounting procedures regarding supplies to operations in the Near East and are not "real." However, the United Kingdom's policy on finance reflects a political position regarding the United Nations and the agencies. This concerns the relationship between those paying the piper and those playing the tune. To put it crudely, the United Kingdom insists that those who pay the piper should call the tune. Sir Crispin Tickell has made the point less crudely with reference to the General Assembly.

One reason for the General Assembly's relative loss of prestige has been the lack of commitment of the industrial countries. This is related to the way in which the budget is decided as a one-man one-vote basis. We should look again at some means of recognising the weight – and corresponding responsibility – of the main contributors. It is no accident that in the UN organs where there is weighting, including the Security Council, things work relatively well. There is also a need for firm budgetary ceilings: in short, each institution and organ should be obliged to choose its priorities.[11]

Finance is therefore being used to wrest political control of the organization from the numerical majority, to encourage reform in the Secretariat, to bring about a diminution in anti-Western politicization of the agencies and the political rhetoric of resolutions passed, to restrict the agencies to a narrow definition of their mission, stressing operational activities rather than technical cooperation, and to use UNDP as the main vehicle for technical cooperation (together with bilateral programmes as well as multilateral programmes in other bodies such as the EU and the Commonwealth). And such a policy is succeeding. The United Kingdom is, however, willing to allot special funding for specific purposes. For example, the United Kingdom's contribution to the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) was increased substantially and the United Kingdom has provided ready support for peace-keeping operations. But behind British policy is a deep conviction that programmes and resources must be matched and kept under strict political control and that control should be exercised by the few Western countries that fund the UN system. The money must be made to talk.[12]

In the past, the Secretariat had, with the General Assembly, the upper hand in deciding the budget, but more recently the United States and the United Kingdom have made financial control and discipline a priority. This has given rise to a twin demand for consensus, that is a "veto," in decision-making procedures and zero financial growth in real terms. The United Kingdom has played its part in both the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and the Committee for Programme and Coordination (CPC) for these ends, but it has played an even more prominent role in the funding of the specialized agencies.

Britain's policy of zero growth in real terms and its leading role as co-chairman of the Geneva Group, which is a watchdog of some of the agencies, have not led to its being the object of political vilification. This is because a number of significant countries, not only Western ones but also the USSR/Russia and Latin American countries, have been in broad agreement with the policy and the agencies themselves see some virtue in discipline and stability. It is noted by many that in pursuit of its policy, and in fulfilling its role, the United Kingdom is fair and acts in a reasonable manner. Yet the United Kingdom is a net beneficiary, in financial terms, of UN programmes if the salaries of British experts and officials, purchases in the United Kingdom, and payment for use of British facilities are taken into consideration. It is a tribute to the skill of British officials in implementing British policy and making the most of what possibilities government policy does permit (and the crass behaviour of the United States and the vagaries of its policy) that Britain does in fact have such an easy ride.

The Geneva Group was founded by the United Kingdom and the United States, which remain co-chairmen, in the early 1960s to review informally the budgets and programmes of the specialized agencies based in Geneva. A similar process has now spread to other UN centres. The 13 countries[13] participating in the Geneva Group in 1990 paid some two-thirds of the agencies' budgets. The agencies cooperate with the Group and recognize its competence and seem to value the stability that it provides. The Geneva Group functions towards the agencies as a very influential and respected pressure group on financial and budgetary matters. However, the Geneva Group can only recommend, but, given its membership and that, in the United Kingdom's case, its major meetings have officials from London present, it does carry weight. While some non-members of the Group resent its role, for example Norway, others are glad that it performs

the "donkey-work." Moreover, where the Group is in agreement, non-members will now tend to accept its recommendations. Thus, as the principal animator of the Group, British influence permeates through the agency system. Furthermore, British influence, already great through the recognized competence of its officials and their skill in drafting, was enhanced by the refusal and inability of the United States to pay its dues. United States policy has now changed and dues are to be paid in full and the arrears gradually cleared. This calls for the Geneva Group to be more active than ever to limit the damage caused by the financial shortfall for some time to come. The United Kingdom is "Mr. Five Per Cent," with "cash on the nail," and this goes a long way in backing British influence. However, an increased contribution might give greater influence, which would be further enhanced if the United Kingdom were more forthcoming in its voluntary contributions to the agencies and programmes.

The Geneva Group works on several levels: a general level for Geneva as a whole and local meetings for each agency. In New York, the Fifth Committee, the CPC, and the ACABQ have this function. The Group meets every month, or every two months, and recently it has benefited from stable personnel. It prepares for forthcoming meetings, which will include specialists from national capitals as well as officials from missions; in the British case, the mission often has to rein back on the proclivities of the home departments to contravene the policy of zero growth by spending on enticing new agency programmes. The UK mission acts as a "vetoer" on such occasions. Occasionally the Group has general meetings called by the co-chairman to discuss more broadly based matters.

The philosophy of the United Kingdom is that programmes should not exceed income and the Geneva Group will denote income on the basis of zero growth in real terms. The coherence of the Group rests on this premise as a means of ensuring that the agencies establish priorities, improve efficiency, and undertake reform. Moreover, the United Kingdom insists that funding for the technical assistance programmes of the UNDP should be separate from the regular budget of the agencies and thus subject to direct control and not available for use to subvert the disciplines promoted by zero growth. The function of the Geneva Group and, in the British case in particular, the mission is to stop the creation of an alliance between home department and agency to promote programmes that would feather their nests. Sometimes, however, the insistence on zero growth brings direct penalties. For instance, the International Telecommunication Union pro-

posed an increase in its budget of 15 per cent, which the Treasury and mission said the United Kingdom could not support. However, this prejudiced the United Kingdom's position in the organization because it does have a major role in providing experts through whom ultimately orders for British equipment may arise. This is why the Department of Trade and Industry was quite happy to see greater expenditure. When the Group has a consensus, its influence on the agencies is considerable and it can persuade recalcitrant home governments to fall into line behind the Group consensus. To this extent the mission rather than the FCO makes policy.

Within the Geneva Group the hard-liners are the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, the FRG, Canada, and the Netherlands. Although tactics are kept confidential, information is widely dispersed through the EU caucus, to the USSR/Russia, to Nordic countries through Sweden, and to the Latin Americans by Spain. Besides the hard-liners, France plays a major role but the Japanese say little, while Italy and Switzerland play significant roles on some issues. In general, individuals, usually the ''No. 2'' of a mission, are as important as countries, and the British representative is often particularly active.

The co-chairmen of the Geneva Group, sometimes with one or two colleagues, call annually on the directors-general of the specialized agencies and there are many informal meetings with the finance directors of the agencies. Indeed, agency officials are invited to Group meetings from time to time and this helps to establish a degree of trust, as do social meetings. The process is thus not wholly adversarial; indeed, some of the agencies have welcomed the work of the Group.

The story is not dissimilar in the agencies and programmes. The United Kingdom takes a hard line on zero growth in the regular budget, but within that context it is viewed as fair and it is much praised for paying its dues in full and on time. On particular programmes it can make significant extra-budgetary contributions. It is, for example, the fourth-largest donor for refugees and it is prepared to make experts available for a variety of purposes. But the United Kingdom wishes to see the system reined back, tighter control exerted, and priorities set, although it implements its policy with flexibility. Such a policy risks being the victim of its own lack of vision. Indubitably, there is a need for reform and greater financial responsibility, and this is acknowledged by many in the agencies and in the UN Secretariat. Yet to condemn the entire system to zero growth in real

terms for the foreseeable future risks throwing out the baby with the bath water.

The danger for the United Kingdom has been revealed that its structural position could be placed under threat because of its unwillingness or inability to provide funds. There could be pressure against electing the British onto key committees in favour of, say, the Japanese, who have shown a willingness to pay but also a concern to get their people onto as many controlling committees in international organizations as possible.

The point should not be missed, however, that the Conservative governments of the late 1980s and early 1990s have been in favour of zero growth in budgets not just because of a belief in sound finance. There is also an ideological element in that there is a determination to halt any further advance in the scale and power of international organizations. The zero growth doctrine is a two-edged weapon: it could threaten the United Kingdom's structural position in the United Nations, but it is hoped that it would also help to prevent international organizations in general from getting more important.

It is not enough to relax financial control for some approved ''good causes,'' as the United Kingdom has done with the UNEP. It is also necessary to look to the well-being of the system as a whole, and especially its structural aspects, which will give it the flexibility and diversity to respond effectively to changes in the world environment. Tight detailed control emasculates vision; no control permits excesses, whether political or financial. The balance was wrong and it is still wrong because the pendulum has swung too far and needs to move again to maximize the totality of a range of values, including political and financial responsibility, reform of secretariats and programmes, the enhancement of flexibility and diversity, and the encouragement of vision, and not just some of these values.

It is difficult not to sympathize somewhat with the dilemma of the agencies when faced with the ''programme irresponsibility'' of their members. For example, in ECOSOC, conferences, and the governing bodies of the agencies and programmes, many resolutions are passed urging the expansion of existing programmes or the adoption of new ones. Most of these resolutions are adopted by consensus, thus with at least the tacit consent of the United Kingdom. Yet this consent does not translate itself into additional financial appropriations. Of course, internal adjustments to the budget can be made by the agency in question, but when it comes to identifying ''lower-

priority'' programmes the agencies are given no help from the members. On the contrary, they plead virtue in not interfering in the internal affairs of the agency. But members cannot have it all ways: zero growth in real terms is flatly opposed to the adoption of expanded or new programmes, especially when there is a refusal to establish priorities. As one international civil servant commented,

The result is that the resources of the UN system are today far too thinly spread over far too many programmes, some really worthwhile activities are strangled by inadequate resources. No doubt, the Secretariats bear some of the responsibility for this state of affairs, but member States cannot wash their hands of it either ... member States, such as the UK, who most vociferously ask for financial discipline, also need to exert some ''programme discipline'', rather than pass the buck to the Secretariats. Failing that, they should recognise that imposing zero growth everywhere is going to lead to a gradual paralysis of the system.[14]

British views on the policies and organizations of the agencies and programmes

At the operational hub of British policy towards the agencies in Geneva is the UK mission. This has an ambassador with more than 30 staff, together with a separate ambassador and staff for the disarmament negotiations. In so far as relations with Whitehall are concerned, the mission deals directly with the key people on technical and functional matters, depending on which home department has the lead in Whitehall. However, on administrative and personnel questions the mission works through the UND in the FCO.

Of the four principal agencies, two are not situated in Geneva: UNESCO and the FAO. British policy towards UNESCO is easy to summarize. Although there was no likelihood of an early British return to the organization while Mrs. Thatcher remained in power, Mr. Major seems to be little concerned with the United Kingdom's continued absence. The issue is likely to climb the agenda only if the United States returns to UNESCO. The work of the organization is monitored and the old British National Commission for UNESCO remains in informal contact. The FAO, in Rome, is the one agency on which the British may be said to have had a beady eye. British withdrawal was never an immediate option but some concern was expressed about the work of the agency, its need for reform and its unwillingness to acknowledge or accomplish it, and the personality of its former director-general, who had a capacity to raise British hackles.

However, the United Kingdom does not play a leading role in the FAO because agriculture is not a major British concern. This gives the United Kingdom the leeway to "take it or leave it." Nevertheless, Britain, with the United States, FRG, Australia, New Zealand, and the Scandinavians, created an informal reform group.

The two other agencies of the "Big Four" – the ILO and WHO – do not elicit such concerns, although WHO is clearly most favourably viewed by the British. The British consider that the ILO has not been sufficiently well managed in recent years from an administrative point of view, although the political skills of the former director-general, Francis Blanchard, were appreciated. However, it is acknowledged that the ILO has responded positively to the strictures of the Geneva Group, so there is no sense in which the ILO falls into the same category as UNESCO did in British eyes. There are, nevertheless, some political issues that cloud the horizon.

A major issue is the question of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) where the government has banned trade unions on security grounds, contrary to the principles of the ILO of which the United Kingdom was a founder member. This is not a new problem since it was Labour's Michael Foot who had de-unionized MI5 and MI6. The British government's view is that ILO Convention 87 on freedom of association makes exceptions for military or police work, and that the associated Convention 151 similarly exempts those doing work of a highly secret or confidential nature. The use of a Special Paragraph to condemn Britain would be, in the government's view (but not in that of the British Trades Union Congress), inappropriate. In the event, HMG escaped condemnation by the skin of its teeth. Nevertheless, that is not the end of the United Kingdom's "hard time" in the ILO since the 1988 Trades Union legislation in the United Kingdom is criticized as being contrary to ILO principles. However, for the most part the United Kingdom's image is a good one in the agency. This is hardly surprising since the ILO is a very Western organization in philosophy and rationale, for its establishment was to counter the siren calls of Bolshevism to Western workers after World War I.

The ILO has a tripartite structure and both British unions (TUC) and employers (CBI) are active and respected. Neither fears to criticize government policy when it thinks fit, but neither gives the ILO its highest priority as a forum since there are other relevant bodies, notably in the EU, through which they can attempt to realize their goals. Contact with the agency is facilitated by its office in London. The

390

ILO, like the League, set up "embassies" after its formation, and the London office owes its existence to this historic link. Other offices exist in Washington, Ottawa, Paris, Bonn, Ankara, Rome, and Brussels and in South America. In London the office has a staff of eight, of whom two are professionals. There is "daily" contact with the International Department of the TUC, which acts as a conduit to the organization and the movement. Relations are good since the TUC sees the ILO as being on "its side." Regular contacts exist with the CBI, which is generally supportive of the ILO. While the CBI sends good delegations to ILO meetings, it cannot be said to exhibit great enthusiasm for the agency. In addition, the London office facilitates the agency's reach into other areas of British society such as multinational corporations and the academic world.

There are periodic contacts with junior ministers and Opposition spokesmen. In Whitehall the London office has almost daily contact with the Department of Employment and ties with the department's agencies: the Arbitration and Conciliation Advisory Service, the Health and Safety Executive, and the Training Commission. There is a labour adviser in the FCO with whom the office is in close touch and contacts are maintained with the Departments of Health and Social Security.

The ILO makes considerable use of British experts – some 30–40 per cent of the total being British. The reasons for this are the English language and their extensive knowledge of the third world. Britons also tend to be cheaper in the sense of being a better person for the money, less political than the French, and less suspicious than the Americans. Most of the recruiting is done from Geneva, but the London office assists and some use is made of the Overseas Development Administration's International Recruitment Unit. In addition, a similar proportion of all ILO-sponsored trainees come to the United Kingdom. The benefits to the United Kingdom are obvious and give it a considerable stake in the organization – often financed by the voluntary contributions of others, since the United Kingdom does not contribute much in this way. The Scandinavians have complained about this. This pattern of benefits accruing to the British that exceed contributions is also apparent in other agencies and programmes.

The United Kingdom's image in the ILO is such that its influence in the agency is a good deal greater than its position in the world would justify. Many Commonwealth countries come to the British TUC delegation at ILO conferences for information and advice. Brit-

ish unions are very important in the union caucus. There is always a British union, employer, and government delegate on the governing body as of right. Commonwealth ministers of labour meet every other year before the ILO's annual conference. The United Kingdom also caucuses with the EU on a regular basis. In short, the United Kingdom's place is central, secure, and appreciated – provided that it abides by ILO principles.

The British position is strong in WHO, with a seat on the executive board (except every fourth year) and overrepresentation of nationals in the secretariat, especially at higher levels, which is likely to continue because of good scientific and technical backgrounds and the salaries being attractive to Britons. British delegations, too, are of high quality and show continuity, which is a great asset. The British have the reputation of being "real internationalists," who play fair and accept the rule of law and majority rule. They are also valued for exerting a moderating influence on the United States in the Geneva Group. British criticisms of the agency are seen as honest and not hostile. In its relationships with the United Kingdom, the WHO works through the Ministry of Health and the Overseas Development Administration (ODA). The relationship is felt to be an easy and friendly one. The United Kingdom and WHO see broadly eye to eye.

The United Kingdom has been active in the area of human rights in the agency network. Indeed, in the UN context human rights have become a "growth industry." Since they have become salient relatively recently, the issue is not constrained in ways that other issues have been in the past, so that there is a promise of progress. The United Kingdom, of course, is subject to scrutiny over its own record, especially in Northem Ireland, but this evokes little controversy, which the British explain as resulting from their assiduous efforts to impart information, the Anglo-Irish agreement, and the opposition of the IRA to Dublin as well as to London. British policy in Hong Kong is also questioned, but it was soon recognized that the problem of Vietnamese immigration was one of considerable magnitude, that the United Kingdom has responded positively to criticism of the running of the camps, and that it has tried hard to get an international solution to a real difficulty. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) works closely with the Hong Kong government.

The United Kingdom takes a lead more generally on human rights and refugees. It pays a significant amount of attention to the Third Committee in New York and the Human Rights Commission and

Sub-Commission in Geneva. It sends large delegations to human rights meetings, made up of individuals from the missions in Geneva and New York and from London, and fairly big delegations to meetings on refugees, drawn from the FCO, the ODA, and the Home Office. The UND usually has a coordinating function. The United Kingdom is a permanent member of the executive committee on the UNHCR, to which it is, in British terms, financially generous. The United Kingdom plays a full and leading role in the Humanitarian Liaison Working Group, which is mainly concerned with the sharing of information. On both refugees and human rights the main caucusing group is a broad Western one, with occasional meetings of EU countries, where the United Kingdom has acted as coordinator on this issue.

The United Kingdom takes a favourable view of the secretariats in both areas, but considers that it is underrepresented as far as the human rights secretariat is concerned. The United Kingdom is particularly concerned with the question of political prisoners and has also made special efforts in the area of the treatment of the mentally ill and of the abuse of psychiatric medicine. The British position is that in general the ''basis is now firmly set'' in so far as universally recognized standards are concerned and that ''Our principle [*sic*] task now must be the implementation and maintenance of existing standards.''[15] In this the United Kingdom does not mince its words but generally seeks to be diplomatic in presentation, first giving private warnings, for example over human rights violations in the Israeli-occupied territories. The United Kingdom's approach is not therefore conceived as adversarial. On refugees, the United Kingdom is well pleased with an executive committee limited in membership, dedicated, and very little politicized. It is the United Nations ''at its best.''

The United Kingdom has an unusually large number of well-known and internationally respected NGOs in the area of human rights and refugees. A good relationship exists with the UK mission in Geneva, although activity and lobbying tend to bypass the mission, focusing directly on London or on the institution concerned, or to have practical expression in the field. Government representatives are invited to NGO meetings on human rights in Geneva and the NGOs are an important source of information. There is a process of mutual ''education.'' The high reputation of British NGOs rubs off favourably on the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom is also well regarded in ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) circles and sup-

ports the Red Cross in its humanitarian role and in the protection of individuals. The ICRC's neutrality and secretariat are both respected.

The United Kingdom's role in the UN system as a whole can also be gauged from its position in a technical agency – the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). The United Kingdom is normally on the executive council and provides one of the vice-presidents of the organization. It is always a member of the finance advisory committee, which includes the eight largest financial contributors, with some additional regional representation. The United Kingdom always pays its subscription on time and when the United States did not pay its assessments until very late in the day the United Kingdom responded to a request to pay in advance and, unlike other countries, it did not attach strings to this advance payment. There is little caucusing in the WMO and the United Kingdom plays a "superpower role" because it still has an "imperial meteorological service," reflecting the country's far-flung economic interests. This is also reflected in the secretariat, where Britons hold more professional posts than any other nationality. Britons also constitute 30 per cent of the short-term experts.

The WMO normally deals with the Meteorological Office, as this is stated in the WMO convention. There is, however, also liaison with the FCO, the ODA, the Department of the Environment, and various national laboratories. The United Kingdom concentrates on issues such as the North Atlantic Observing System, it is generally very keen on marine weather observation, and it is active on the question of climatic change. The United Kingdom is not alone in insisting on zero growth in the budget, and its technical cooperation is mainly through UNDP or WHO projects, a contribution to trust funds and to the WMO Voluntary Cooperation Programme to help the weather services of small countries. In short, the image is of high competence and cooperation but a watchfulness in budgetary questions. The United Kingdom could not be termed generous, particularly if the increasingly important role of this organization in global environmental issues such as the greenhouse effect and climate change is taken into account.

British aid that goes through the UN system amounts to nearly 8 per cent of the total and roughly a fifth of British multilateral aid, the rest going through other IGOs, such as the EU and the Commonwealth, while the bulk of it (60 per cent of all British aid) is bilateral. The Overseas Development Administration is the principal body involved in British aid policy and it is a part of the FCO. Under Labour

governments it has often been a separate ministry, the main consequence being the enhanced status of the minister. The ODA has parallel structures with the FCO, but it controls its own funds.

The ODA is the lead department in Whitehall for several of the UN agencies and programmes, apart from the ILO and WHO, although the UND in the FCO has responsibility for general matters such as membership of the governing councils or the election of new agency heads. This can sometimes lead to disagreement, with the ODA generally taking a pro-United Nations line not always congenial to parts of the FCO. The ODA has dealings with seven agencies, such as UNIDO. The representative in Rome and to the Banks are ODA staff. In appropriate cases they are the Geneva Group participants for particular organizations. The United Kingdom has good relations with most ODA-linked agencies because of its scrupulous behaviour. The ODA helps to recruit experts for the agencies from the United Kingdom, who are favoured because of competence, and, given low UK salaries, a better person for the salary can often be recruited from the United Kingdom than elsewhere. Britons also hold senior secretariat positions in the agencies.

The ODA is linked particularly closely to the UNDP. The UNDP's governing body is seen as being quite good, although it is felt that it could exert more of a management role and become the "brain" of the system rather than merely dispensing funds. The ODA prefers the country emphasis to the sectoral one, that is, the UNDP to the agencies. Decision-making in the UNDP, as in UNICEF (the UN Children's Fund), is on a basis of consensus and in many agencies politicization is "not really a major problem." As a financial contributor to the agencies and the UNDP, the ODA keeps to the policy of zero growth in real terms for regular budgets. However, the UNDP is exempt from this and it had a growth of 0.8 per cent per annum in the late 1980s. The ODA is flexible on special programmes and it does have some contingency monies. The ODA seems satisfied that there is order in "its" agencies and informal contacts are thought to be helpful, as, for example, when the UNDP's Committee of the Whole meets off the record. The United Kingdom caucuses with the Western donors in the UNDP, usually in a capital away from New York, and UNICEF is developing a similar practice. In UNIDO the European Union acts together.

The United Kingdom, as the home of many NGOs concerned with matters falling within the remit of the ODA, is subject to pressures from such bodies. However, this occurs on an ad hoc basis apart

from contacts with the NGO meetings in Geneva and elsewhere. There is no central point of contact, as, for example, in Canada. Alongside the bilateral and multilateral aid there is an ODA–NGO co-financing scheme and the ODA is the major financier of the old British Volunteer Programme, made up of Voluntary Service Overseas, the UNA International Service, the Catholic Institute for International Relations, and the International Voluntary Service. Moreover, the ODA consults NGOs on questions such as women's rights, volunteers, and medical questions. The ODA is also lobbied by NGOs, often to put pressure on IGOs; for example, Oxfam and Save the Children Fund are quite critical of UNICEF, although there is also much cooperation between NGOs and the UN system. Parliament, however, is interested in the ODA only when there is a major dispute such as over UNESCO. Thus, despite many British NGOs in the ODA area, they do not constitute a major lobby on the government, which is reasonably untrammelled in its pursuit of policy. This was the case even in such a dramatic instance as the withdrawal from UNESCO.

While the ODA has a happy working relationship with its agencies and with the UNDP in particular, Conservative British governments have less sympathy for the ethos of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The United Kingdom's policy is correct, but not enthusiastic, although there is no pillorying of the secretariat. The United Kingdom plays a major role in the organization in the sense that it is always on the committee to discuss the medium-term plan and takes an active part in its work. Moreover, British diplomats are seen as professional, well-informed, and constructive, irrespective of the position and policy of the United Kingdom. They have a facilitating aspect in helping to find a consensus in Group B of developed market economy countries. However, the United Kingdom strives to keep major issues outside UNCTAD, but, because there is a growing consensus in the organization, the United Kingdom is getting more involved since it now feels more comfortable with the decision-making process. As is customary, British experts are frequently called upon, with Britons holding 43 of the 272 current positions. UNCTAD has direct ties with relevant home departments but the UK mission in Geneva is kept informed. UNCTAD also makes use of contacts with British-based media such as the BBC World Service, Reuters, and the *Financial Times*. However, UNCTAD is not a major vehicle for British policy. The same could also be said of the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE).

396

The ECE, which has the considerable distinction of being the only pan-European body to survive – under the wise leadership of Gunnar Myrdal – the vicissitudes of the Cold War, is an organization that is always poised for task expansion. But in periods of *détente* it has never quite fulfilled its promise. The UK mission in Geneva is one of the few missions to have a specialist for ECE affairs. This reflects the British view that the ECE is useful for practical economic and technical questions such as the norms for the construction of vehicles or the harmonization of rules regarding the transmission of dangerous substances as well as for environmental regulations. The European Union states have supported its work.

The British representatives are seen as being a "cut above average" and relations between the ECE and the United Kingdom usually go directly to the functional ministry concerned, with the mission being kept informed. The United Kingdom is particularly interested in trade facilitation and is also active on transport, agriculture and forestry, housing and planning, the environment, and some industrial committees such as chemicals and engineering automation. At the intellectual level, there are strong ties with British consultants and universities, the English language is important, and the British academic tradition dominates the ECE.

The Economic and Social Council

The overlapping of economic organizations, the rivalry between agencies, the tension between sectoral and country approaches, the funding of the UNDP as opposed to direct programmes in the agencies, the lack of a "brain" in the system overall, all serve to raise the question of the function of ECOSOC. British policy is to limit technical cooperation programmes in the agencies and to use the UNDP as the main vehicle for this in the UN system in conjunction with the agencies. British funding is largely outside the UN system but, within the general framework of zero budgetary growth in real terms in the agencies (but not the UNDP), the United Kingdom is willing to countenance financial and practical support to specific projects on a voluntary basis. The British goal is order, priorities, practical relevance, efficiency, and value for money. There is a strong aversion to what is seen as "third world cant and nonsense," especially in the form of ideological and rhetorical politicization of functional institutions.

Despite their anxiety about not altering the underlying principles of the Charter, and thereby making it easier for others to question

their current position, the British have pushed hard for reform in some areas. A pressing concern is to get the organization more closely involved with the main economic and social questions on what is called the new global agenda, namely the problems of the environment, drugs, terrorism, and AIDS. In 1989 a considerable effort was made by the British to improve the working of ECOSOC following a strong EC appeal in April 1989 in response to a set of proposals from the Secretary-General.[16] In the event, however, the specific British ideas attracted little support from the other EC members, with the exception of Denmark, Ireland, Holland, and Italy.[17] The net effect of this effort was negligible. It remained the case that there was too much effort over too wide an area with too little effect. In the end, British diplomats in New York declared that they had had enough of trying to get structural reform: it was a waste of diplomatic resources.

An alternative way in which the British sought to engage the organization more closely with current major world problems was by getting them onto the agenda of the Security Council on the grounds that they were matters that affected security, at the same time as removing from the agenda some of the long-standing non-active issues. Sir Crispin Tickell tried to get environmental questions onto the agenda of the Security Council, and also the question of drugs, but failed on both counts. He summarized the situation regarding ECOSOC at a meeting on 6 July 1989:

There is still lack of direction in the Council's work; still sterile repetition of work done elsewhere; still too many people working at high cost on problems which are marginal; still lack of action in the critical area of co-ordination between the work of the central organs of the United Nations and the Specialised Agencies, and between the work of the Specialised Agencies and the subsidiary bodies of this Council ... [P]rogress, albeit modest so far, has been made. The working methods of the Council have improved ... and we have introductory key themes to give Council deliberation sharper focus. This is a good beginning.... I should underline that our overriding concern is not to look for financial savings, but to make ECOSOC an efficient and effective member of the United Nations family of institutions at a time when the prospects for the United Nations look better than they have been for over 40 years.

Arms control

Geneva, while being the pre-eminent centre for the agencies, is, in addition, the most important centre for negotiations on arms control

and disarmament in the UN system.[18] The United Kingdom, therefore, has a separate mission to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, which also services meetings in New York. The Disarmament Mission consists of an ambassador, a counsellor dealing with non-chemical warfare issues, a military adviser who is a colonel from the Ministry of Defence (MOD) concerned with chemical warfare issues, a First Secretary, a technical adviser from Porton Down, who is also an MOD employee dealing with chemical weapons, and a Second Secretary. The relationship in London is with the Arms Control and Disarmament Unit in the FCO and with the Defence Arms Control Unit. There is a strong emphasis on chemical warfare, with the ambassador devoting two-thirds of his time to the subject. The mission wishes to be seen as highly professional and certainly gives that impression. It is willing to listen to others; indeed, it is well respected. The 10 Western countries in the CD generally meet weekly and more frequently on chemical warfare. EU members who are not in the CD ask for and receive briefings.

Besides its competence in technical questions and the quality of its representatives, the United Kingdom's views are also given some additional importance by its being a nuclear power. Moreover, the United Kingdom is a depository power for a number of important arms control treaties and this gives the United Kingdom an enhanced role in the context of review conferences pertaining to these treaties. In general, other powers welcome the United Kingdom in a leading organizational role. This the United Kingdom is prepared to do, even though it may not wish to see the substance of the conclusions of the review conference accepted.

The United Kingdom in context

Once again the United Kingdom has a service role that is a product of its competence in diplomacy, its command of the issue, its skill in drafting in English, and its absence of threat – actual or structural – simply by not being a superpower. But this is also derived from the United Kingdom's ties that go back to Churchill's conception of being at the hub of three overlapping circles. Perhaps in those days, when the United Kingdom was still acknowledged as one of the Big Three, the notion was that of a directing role. Now the role is one of servicing derived from being historically relevant, competent, acceptable, and in place. As has been shown above, the United Kingdom is not often America's poodle, nor is there a special relationship, except

perhaps in intelligence matters. However, in the last decade other powers have on occasion treated the United Kingdom as a surrogate for the United States and they have used the United Kingdom as an advocate with the United States, while the United Kingdom, for its part, has usually used its influence with the United States and its ties with and knowledge of others to moderate US policy in and towards the UN system. This dimension is well understood and appreciated.

The Commonwealth tie is less well understood and appreciated. The Commonwealth is not only Commonwealth heads of government meetings (CHOGMs) and an association of independent states but also a vast transmission belt for the flow of ideas and people as well as of goods and services. Intergovernmental ties are buttressed by well over 200 Commonwealth INGOs. The system is more than it seems at first sight.[19] It may be small beer but it is, nevertheless, a good local brew. And it is, in so many ways – economic, political, and social – an exemplar for the UN system. Yet British governments have not used the system to its full potential, perhaps being more concerned to avoid its inconveniences, particularly in relation to southern African questions, than to take advantage of its potentialities. However, Commonwealth ties are important in the UN system for they represent a bridge between North and South and between regions on a basis acceptable to all. The United Kingdom, the Commonwealth Secretariat, and a variety of its members perform a servicing role for other Commonwealth countries, nearly a third of UN membership, in the UN system. It is a role that, if done properly and well, can be of great benefit not only to the United Kingdom and the countries concerned, but to the UN system as well. The United Kingdom has been repaid, for example, through support on Gibraltar, Belize, and the Falklands, which many Commonwealth countries equated with the right of self-determination in the light of their own ex-colonial experiences rather than as a territorial claim. The Commonwealth deserves not to be neglected as has been the tendency for British governments and officials in the 1980s and 1990s.

The United Kingdom's European dimension is now well developed and no longer seriously in question. Britain's policy everywhere is permeated by information, ideas, and pressure from the constant interaction in EU bodies, and the more so since the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht, with its strengthened provisions for political cooperation and a common security and foreign policy. Visibly this takes the form in the UN system of caucusing and, although the United Kingdom caucuses in a variety of groups, the European

Union caucus has become a key one. It depends, of course, on the issue. In Security Council affairs, the P5 caucus plays an important role for the United Kingdom and the Council; in the agencies, the Geneva Group, with the United Kingdom and the United States as co-chairmen, is a crucial caucus, but so is the weekly meeting of EU experts and the bimonthly EU ambassadors' meeting in Geneva, while in economic bodies the EU clearly comes into its own; in all of these, the United Kingdom plays an important role. During meetings of the General Assembly, the 12 EU countries hold daily meetings in New York. The United States does not caucus in the same manner and, therefore, British ties with the United States are useful as a link with the caucus in question or through the Western European and Other Group. The Commonwealth does not caucus regularly, except when ministers meet to exchange information immediately prior to annual agency ministerial meetings; for example, the finance ministers meet before the IMF. Yet the influence of the United Kingdom is more subtle in the Commonwealth dimension because ties of language, administrative practice, training, and thought enable a more flexible and informal means for the exchange of ideas to be used. But it is all part of the United Kingdom's major service role in the UN system – an asset greatly to the United Kingdom's advantage and one that, once lost, is never likely to be regained.

Political parties, and others

The UN Charter begins with the words: "We the peoples of the United Nations …," but the rhetoric is belied by the predominant role played in the system by the governments of member states. Nevertheless, governments and international institutions are subject to influence by other actors, be they other political parties, NGOs, IGOs, or INGOs. And this is particularly the case in liberal parliamentary democracies, of which the United Kingdom is an (increasingly flawed) example.

   Although Parliament has an All-Party Committee on UN Affairs, the UN system does not generate much activity or excitement except when a major issue emerges, as with the decision to withdraw from UNESCO. Although the political parties make mention of the United Nations in their manifestos and there is a flow of written questions on UN affairs, the interest is minimal. The FCO sponsors the visit of six MPs to the United Nations in New York each year, and MPs are occasionally to be found in British delegations, but such ac-

tivities are best classified as routine. Labour, "Liberals," and the Tory "Wets" tend to be UN-minded, but the radical right-wing Thatcherite Tories are not at all so inclined.

The Labour Party has international cooperation written into its constitution, which states that the Party will

Support the United Nations Organisation and its various agencies, and other international organisations for the promotion of peace; the adjustment and settlement of international disputes by conciliation or judicial arbitration; the establishment and defence of human rights; and the improvement of the social and economic standards and conditions of work of the people of the world.

Labour sets store by the United Nations' contribution to peace and progress, though it is admitted that "Not everything the UN does is successful, but the world would be a much more dangerous place without it." A Labour government would take Britain back into UNESCO without any conditions being set. Indeed, Labour has pledged itself to play a "full part" in the United Nations as a whole.[20]

Labour has committed itself to reaching the UN aid target of 0.7 per cent of GDP after it is returned to office. However, it acknowledges that this cannot be achieved immediately. British aid policy under Labour will tilt more towards multilateral aid, since this is considered to have less of a neo-colonialist aspect. Indeed, aid questions are likely to have greater salience for a Labour government, since Labour intends to create a Department of Overseas Development and Cooperation of which the Secretary of State will be in the cabinet.[21] Thus the ODA will be separated from the FCO, and British delegates and missions to various international organizations will, in appropriate cases, come from the new department. Labour has changed the word "aid" to "development" and added "cooperation" to emphasize that cooperation and development are intended to be between equals on a reciprocal basis. In other words, it symbolizes a move from a donor–recipient relationship to a mutual relationship.

However, Labour does share much with the present government. It is, for instance, strongly in favour of the continuation of the British role in the cooperation between the permanent members of the Security Council. Indeed, the Labour Party is keen to use British membership of the Security Council, as well as that of the EU and the Commonwealth, for positive purposes. Certainly, Labour would res-

402

ist any challenge to Britain's position as a permanent member of the Security Council, although it would not necessarily oppose an extension of permanent member status to others. Labour would encourage the Secretary-General to be interventionist and to give his special envoys an element of leeway.

On the agencies, Labour takes a more relaxed attitude than the present government, while remaining determined to obtain value for money and, where necessary, pressing resolutely for reform. Besides returning to UNESCO, Labour would seek to improve its standing with the ILO, with which organization it has a natural sympathy, especially after ILO criticism of some aspects of current British government policy towards trades unions. More generally, although Labour would not have a policy of the open purse, it would abandon the policy of zero growth in favour of one of positive growth, while seeking value for money.

The United Nations is central to foreign policy of a future British Labour government. Labour would appoint as ambassador to New York (and possibly also to Geneva) a political appointee who would, therefore, it is hoped, have more clout in both New York and London. Labour starts from a view of the centrality of the UN system for British policy as well as a favourable and proactive inclination towards the organization and its activities.

The British-based media, especially the BBC, Reuters, and the quality press, constitute an important focal point in the world information network. It is for this reason that some UN agencies choose to launch new programmes from London. However, coverage by British-based media has been minimal, with some exceptions such as the *Financial Times* concerning the economic agencies, notably the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the World Bank group, and the IMF. Now, however, the major British involvement in UN peace-keeping and enforcement operations has brought the United Nations into a central focus for the British media. These media have revealed no great understanding of the nature of UN processes, and reporting has been essentially superficial and comment largely ill informed. Perhaps this reflects the absence of British correspondents attached to the United Nations or the agencies, although there were some in earlier years. Nevertheless, the UK ambassador in New York gives a weekly press briefing. On the whole the British media concentrate not on the United Nations as such but upon issues, such as enforcement, peace-keeping, human rights, or drugs, that involve

the United Nations. In this the British media are not dissimilar from others, with some continental exceptions such as *Le Monde* and the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*.

For British-based NGOs, the United Nations is seen more as an issue-related phenomenon and not as an interesting process and institutional framework in itself. Where an agency or body concerns itself with an issue on the NGO agenda it will attract their attention, but there is only one major British body that concerns itself principally with the system itself as well as the substance – the United Nations Association (UNA). There are no bodies in the United Kingdom that are "anti-United Nations," such as can be found in the United States, although the Adam Smith Institute may be inclined in this direction.

The UNA has nothing like the political clout of its predecessor – the League of Nations Union. The Association was opened with an impressive participation of the "great and the good" at a meeting presided over by Prime Minister Attlee in 1945.

UNA seeks to educate the British public about the UN and its role in all these spheres of activity. It lobbies the British Government, Members of Parliament and other influential figures, so that UK policy may more fully and firmly accord with the principles of the UN Charter and thereby help to promote the better functioning of the United Nations.[22]

The organization reflects the caring, liberal wing of the Establishment. Its chairman of the executive committee is Ivor Richard, a former UK ambassador to the United Nations in New York, ex-member of the European Commission, and a prominent member of the Labour Party. At the end of the 1980s there were approximately 12,000 members and a youth movement of 1,000. Members paid £12 per annum and the UNA received an annual grant of £24,000 from the FCO. It has undertaken some direct fund-raising in connection with a Mozambique appeal but it is not a member of the voluntary committee of British aid NGOs. It has set up a UNA Trust with a small capital sum.

The UNA has a regional structure, with Wales being a very active region and Scotland somewhat less so. Other regions include London and Northern Ireland, while the Isle of Man has a special status. The executive committee is elected by the general council and the branches send representatives to the council. There are advisory committees dealing with political, economic, and social questions,

and topics such as human rights, disarmament, women, and religious affairs. These committees interact with the UN Affairs Committee of the House of Commons and may include non-UNA members. The UNA council sets out the broad manifesto of the organization and it is then up to the executive committee or the director to give priority to particular items such as the environment.

The UNA is worthy and well intentioned, but it tends to fall between two stools – that of an Establishment-based pressure group on government and that of a galvanizing mass movement. Given the grey hairs of many of its branch members, who have been reinforced more recently by an influx of 30–40 year olds attracted by such issues as the environment, it is likely to be more effective as an élite pressure group. UNA officers have access to ministers on issues such as British withdrawal from UNESCO, the question of Namibia, and that of the UN budget. Local UNA groups also lobby their MPs. However, the UNA has difficulty in overcoming a tendency to be reactive rather than proactive. It would like to promote the use of UN machinery by the United Kingdom and it is active on human rights and disarmament questions. In addition, it keeps British interest in UNESCO alive. Although it has good relations with Amnesty International, it was careful not to get too close to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and would not work with groups on the far right of the British political spectrum. The UNA has easy access to the FCO. Initiatives are taken by both bodies in regard to the other. A UNA initiative to send a delegation to Moscow towards the end of the Cold War was followed by conversations with the FCO. It can also invite visitors to the United Kingdom that the FCO feels it cannot itself invite but whose visit the FCO would see as advantageous. Sometimes, FCO officials ask the UNA to approach MPs to put questions in Parliament on particular issues. The UNA also interacts with other departments, for example the MOD on issues of arms control, disarmament, and military confidence-building, and the ODA minister. On occasions it has visited the Treasury, but for the most part it concentrates on political questions. The UNA also has good working relations with the Labour Party. But an organization dependent on its principal target for finance to the tune of 10 per cent of its annual income and, more importantly, for access is hardly likely to become a political carnivore. There is little wonder that one FCO official termed it ''sweet.''

There is one other British-based body with a principal interest in

the United Nations and that is the International Network for a UN Second Assembly (UNFUSA). Its purpose is to infuse the NGO network with the idea of a second UN chamber more representative of "We the peoples …" than is the General Assembly. A number of groups in other countries have embraced similar ideas and an inaugural annual international conference was organized in New York in October 1990, on the broad theme of "Building a more democratic United Nations system." The UNFUSA network is said to consist of 103 organizations and institutions but it has yet to make a mark. Of such things dreams are made – and sometimes more!

Conclusions

The United Kingdom is immensely privileged in terms of the UN structure; but it gives good value in return. Its role in the Security Council in recent years has been particularly helpful, and its "service" role to many countries through the organs, committees, and agencies, both formally and informally, is both significant and appreciated. For example, the United Kingdom is frequently the auditor of programmes and agencies. Moreover, the UN system can draw upon what is still the infrastructure of a world power to its (and the United Kingdom's) advantage for experts, training, and research. Whereas the United Kingdom is well served with the human skills of diplomats, delegates, secretariat officials, and experts, the gloss is perhaps somewhat tarnished by a Thatcherite ideological commitment to zero growth of the regular budget in real terms. Sometimes the money is made to squawk rather than talk: "good housekeeping" taken too far is no longer so. Yet there is a learning process, and flexibility is now evident in programmes on human rights (about which British policy has been called incandescent), AIDS, the ozone layer and the environment more generally, as well as peace-keeping, enforcement, and permanent member consultation in the political sphere. Indeed, there is now talk of a new UN agenda, which, besides these issues, includes refugees, population movements, extreme poverty, and terrorism.[23]

From the point of view of many Western governments, these issues constitute, both individually and interactively, not only a catalogue of global problems but, in effect, a threat to their very well-being. There is thus a need for some form of global problem-solving or, failing that, and, in many governments' perceptions, prior to that, a need for global riot control. Either way, salience is given to the UN sys-

406

tem, and this gives added point to the United Kingdom's privileged position. But the government needs to respond by further loosening its purse-strings on questions such as the environment. There is a long way to go, because third world countries are suspicious that riot control measures may be applied against their interests. Moreover, their agenda for riot control is different, at least in its priorities. Poverty and the like come first and they are resentful of the industrial powers' reaction of *non possemus* to the NIEO. It is a challenge to the British government to use its assets to ensure that global riot control does not get in the way of global problem-solving.

For the moment the diplomatic round proceeds. The Prime Minister goes occasionally and the Foreign Secretary goes annually to the General Assembly, and other ministers, both political and functional, regularly go to New York and other UN centres where the contacts the United Nations provides are appreciated. There are, after all, not enough funerals or bicentenaries to go round!

The United Kingdom is still a heavyweight in the United Nations and its role in the Security Council after the invasion and annexation of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990 is a testament to this. But there are also indications of pressures towards change. The United Kingdom sees the United Nations as a context in which it can slow down the decline in its own power. It is a forum in which its special resources in experience and diplomatic skills can be used to particularly good effect, but at present there is a mismatch between the ambitions of some British diplomats, like former UN ambassador Sir Crispin Tickell, and some scholars for the organization and the government's capacity and preparedness to pay. It should also be recalled that, for over a decade, the British have had governments that are in some ways highly nationalist and whose instinct has been to resist any tendency for international organizations to expand their distinctive role, especially on the economic and social side.

There is also no doubt that the United Kingdom is facing increasing pressure to give ground on its structural position in the system. Already it has been overtaken by richer states in the economic organizations and has had, since Maastricht, to modify its previous position on the separation of its role as a member of P5 from that of its obligations in political and security questions in the European Union. However, EU seats on the Security Council are more likely to come about pragmatically in an evolutionary de facto manner than they are constitutionally – and that would be a very British way of doing things.

Acknowledgements

Notes and references

1. George Modelski, *Long Cycles in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1987).
2. See F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1963).
3. See David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1960) and A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor, eds., *Functionalism* (London: University of London Press, 1975).
4. Poland was not present, but was allowed to be one of the signatories. The United Nations were in fact, and intended to be (as the Charter states), the victorious Allies.
5. UN General Assembly Resolution 43/223 of 1988.
6. Margaret Thatcher, "The United Nations at 40," in *The United Nations Still Humanity's Best Hope* (London: UNA, 1985), 7.
7. Crispin Tickell, "The Role of the Security Council in World Affairs," The Sibley Lecture 1989 delivered to the University of Georgia, Athens, 2 Feb. 1989.
8. Paul Taylor and A. J. R. Groom, *The United Nations and the Gulf War, 1990–91: Back to the Future?* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Discussion Paper 38, 1992).
9. Crispin Tickell, "The Future of the United Nations," Talk to the East–West Center, Honolulu, 19 Jan. 1989.
10. Tickell, "The Role of the Security Council."
11. Tickell, "The Future of the UN."
12. Paul Taylor, "Reforming the System: Getting the Money to Talk," in Paul Taylor and A. J. R. Groom, eds., *International Institutions at Work* (London: Pinter, 1988).
13. Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, FRG, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain (from 1981), Sweden (originally an observer), Switzerland (an observer), the United Kingdom, and the United States. Austria was refused membership. Membership usually indicates payment of 1 per cent of the budget.
14. Agency official, private communication.
15. Speech by Tim Eggar to the UN Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, 7 Feb. 1989, London Press Service, COI, 10 Feb. 1989.
16. See Economic and Social Council, *Revitalization of the Economic and Social Council, Report of the Secretary-General*, E/1989/95 (29 June 1989).
17. See General Assembly, *Review of the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Nations*, A/44/L.53 (1 Dec. 1989).
18. See A. J. R. Groom and Jean-François Guilhaudis, "UNSSODs: In Search of Structure and Norms," in Paul Taylor and A. J. R. Groom, eds., *Global Issues in the United Nations* (London: Macmillan, 1989).
19. See A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor, eds., *The Commonwealth in the 1980s* (London: Macmillan, 1984), and A. J. R. Groom, "A Commonwealth for the Twenty-First Century?" *Kent Papers in Politics and International Relations*, Series 1, no. 5 (1992).

20. Labour Party publication L/138/86.
21. Labour Party publication B/008/87.
22. John Ennals, ''Mobilising public support,'' in *The United Nations Still Humanity's Best Hope*, 68.
23. See Giorgios Kostakos, A. J. R. Groom, Sally Morphet, and Paul Taylor, ''Britain and the New UN Agenda: Towards Global Riot Control?'' *Review of International Studies* (Jan. 1991).

10

The past as prologue: The United States and the future of the UN system

Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst

The end of the Cold War and proliferating issues of global interdependence such as environmental degradation, migration, AIDS, and economic development have fuelled popular perceptions that multilateral institutions matter. Thus, the United Nations – once moribund and constrained by the exigencies of Cold War politics – has enjoyed new attention. With that revival has come renewed discussion about the United States' relationship with the organization. That relationship has never been a static or easy one. Over the course of almost 50 years, Americans have regarded the United Nations with euphoria, ambivalence, indifference, and hostility.[1] Thus, whether the United States will be willing or able to assume a leadership role in the United Nations, such as that thrust upon it by the end of the Cold War, will depend on both domestic politics and the actions of other states.

The history of the US–UN relationship leads us to approach the post–Cold War relationship with caution. Since the mid-1970s, in particular, US commitments to multilateral institutions have come under attack. The difficulties with the United Nations and several of its specialized agencies were particularly marked during the Reagan administration. But the "crisis of multilateralism" in US foreign policy in reality mirrored and also contributed to a crisis of multilateralism in the UN system itself. The United Nations' peace and security ma-

chinery functioned poorly, unable to manage a series of regional conflicts; North–South negotiations over economic development were at a stalemate; the long negotiations over the Law of the Sea failed to produce a universally acceptable treaty; UN agencies were hobbled by poor administrative performance and escalating costs; specialized agencies were threatened by politicization. These problems fuelled criticism of the United Nations and its specialized agencies within and outside the US government and perceptions that international institutions were obstacles to the promotion of American foreign policy goals.

Although the Reagan administration later modified its early antipathy to multilateralism, the erosion of support in the Congress for upholding American financial commitments to international organizations poses a long-term problem that is compounded by the US budget deficit and congressional budget process. The real crisis of multilateralism in the 1990s, despite the post–Cold War imperatives, therefore, may be one of domestic support for US financial obligations to the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

International factors helped to change the US attitude toward the United Nations in the late 1980s. Yet domestic factors are of particular salience in shaping US relationships with the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Thus, we shall devote much of our attention to analysing how the major domestic actors – the Congress, the executive branch, public opinion, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – have responded to selected issues concerning the United Nations over the last 20 years and how their interactions are likely to shape the future directions of US policy toward the role of the United Nations and proposals for UN reform. Will domestic factors constrain the United States from playing a critical leadership role? Or will they support or enable the United States to do so? Peter Cowhey argues that "domestic politics are critical for the credibility of a dominant power." A multilateral order is more stable if it has a minimum base of support in the domestic politics of the dominant power and the domestic political institutions of that power contribute to the credibility of its commitments.[2]

In order to understand the changing US attitudes toward the United Nations, we need to explore the evolution of the US–UN relationship. How has that relationship changed over time? What major issues concerning the United Nations have most troubled United States' decision makers and the American public? What role may the United States play in shaping the future of the UN system?

The US and UN relationship: An historical overview

The United Nations and its allied organizations were an important part of the international system structure that the United States as the dominant political economic and military power emerging from World War II helped to shape. Although American support was not automatically assured (witness the failure to approve the charter of the proposed International Trade Organization in 1948), governmental and public commitment was generally strong. As Ruth B. Russell reported in 1968, "On the whole, Washington has found the standards of the Charter in line with the United States interests, and was for long in the happy position of having a majority of Members on its side in both of the major organs and on most of the major issues."[3] Thus, from 1945 onward, the United States supported the United Nations and its agencies broadly as instruments of its national policies. The United States utilized the United Nations and its specialized agencies to create the broad outlines of regimes compatible with American interests, within which specific policy proposals could be initiated. The charters of the various organizations set forth key principles, norms, and, in some cases, rules; the organizations themselves provided decision-making processes for further norm and rule creation, for rule enforcement and dispute settlement, for the provision of collective goods and information, and for supporting operational activities. These organizations also served domestic political purposes for the United States. Among those was the creation of a web of international entanglements that made it difficult for future administrations to return to more isolationist policies.

From the beginning of the post–World War II period, the United States used the United Nations and its specialized agencies for collective legitimation of its own actions, particularly in crisis situations such as Korea, and for delegitimating the actions of others that it opposed, such as the British, French, and Israeli occupation of Suez. The United Nations was particularly useful for this purpose during the height of the Cold War and the process of decolonization. Iran's seizure of American hostages in 1979 and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 demonstrated that the United States had not forgotten the value of the United Nations for collective legitimation (nor lost entirely the ability to mobilize votes). However, in general, changing majorities in the UN system after 1960 made it more difficult for the United States to muster support for its own actions. It

412

has generally proved easier to gain support for resolutions condemning others than for those taking action.

The United States has tended to place high value on the rule-enforcement and dispute-settlement activities of some of the specialized agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In the security area, the lack of consensus on basic norms has generally reduced the value of the United Nations for dispute settlement *per se*. Historically, the United States has placed high value on UN peace-keeping, though political support for it steadily eroded over the years.[4] The resurgence of interest in the late 1980s and 1990s led to proliferating operations and expanding missions that by 1993, however, began to strain the capacity of the organization. This, coupled with questions about the effectiveness and risks of peace-enforcement operations such as in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, again began to raise public and congressional doubts. The United States has also had high regard for certain other UN operational activities, including World Bank lending, IAEA safeguards, and WHO disease eradication programmes. It has not used the United Nations' information-gathering and analytical resources to a great extent given its own domestic capabilities. Nevertheless, those information resources do enhance information about the behaviour of *other* states and, hence, predictability, and gain importance to the United States as a result of their salience to *other* states.

Until the early 1970s most of the scholarship on the US–UN relationship concerned the United States' use of the United Nations as an instrument of its foreign policy. For example, Lincoln P. Bloomfield described the United Nations as an American diplomatic instrument, although he acknowledged the difficulties of using the organization as a focal point in US policy. Similarly, Ruth Russell emphasized US use of the United Nations for pursuing security objectives.[5]

Our own study of the United States and multilateral institutions affirmed the continuing utility of many UN institutions as instruments of US policies and for the maintenance of a number of regimes.[6] The usefulness of the specialized, technical agencies, in particular, has tended to remain constant over time, although, in the case of the major economic institutions, changes in international economic relations resulted in periods of decreased utility, followed by renewed salience. Both the World Bank and IMF enjoyed a renais-

sance in the 1980s, establishing new norms for multilateral development assistance, structural adjustment, and international debt. Despite its concern for human rights, the United States has never fully embraced the core UN human rights regimes, although the Congress finally ratified the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1992 and the Clinton administration embraced the Covenant on Economic and Social Rights in 1993. The United States has used the UN human rights organs for occasional efforts at rule creation, such as a 1986 resolution on religious discrimination.

The perceived utility of the United Nations and its specialized agencies has been strongly shaped by the ability of American representatives to influence procedures and outcomes. Yet changes in the organizations, particularly those stemming from the membership increases that accompanied the decolonization process, made it more difficult for the United States to use them as instruments of US policy, for international organizations not only enlarge the possibilities of multilateral diplomacy but add to the constraints under which member states operate. As Duncan Snidal notes, "much of its frustration with IGOs [in recent years] reflects America's own difficulties in coming to terms with changes in the US–IGO relationship more than it reflects any significant change in the effectiveness of IGOs themselves."[7]

In short, the creation of the UN system both enhanced American influence and also sowed the seeds of its decline. The United States found that it could not always control outcomes within the United Nations and its agencies; they could serve as vehicles for other states' interests and their use by other states contributed to an erosion of US influence. After 1960, changing majorities in the UN General Assembly increasingly reflected interests of less developed states that were different from those of the United States. Voting agreement between the United States and the UN General Assembly majority dropped.

Other changes within the international system contributed to the erosion of American economic and political power: the war in Viet Nam, the formation of coalitions by the newly independent and assertive third world states, the resurgence of Western Europe and of Japan, the weakening of US trade and monetary positions, the growth of Soviet military power, and the expansion of interdependence. The changes were symbolized by the rise of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the US withdrawal from Viet Nam. As Robert Keohane noted, "The inability of the United

States to prevent or counteract the oil price increases of 1973–74 seemed to symbolize the drastic changes that had taken place."[8] The débâcle in Viet Nam also led to the erosion of consensus on the broad goals of American foreign policy. Other states realized that the United States could no longer affect outcomes as easily as it had before. The less developed countries, with the impetus of "cartel power," tested and challenged the United States in international forums, particularly in the UN General Assembly. Third world demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) involved the United States in a debate over the structure of the international economic system and added a plethora of new items to the agendas of many intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and added new IGOs, too. Actors within the United States also increasingly questioned the United Nations' utility and effectiveness. Indeed, because the United States was frequently on the defensive in the United Nations in the 1970s, US support was tested by programmes and activities regarded as detrimental to American interests.

Despite erosion in the power of the United States relative to what it was in the early post–World War II years, in the 1990s the United States' role in the UN system has been and is likely be much greater than that of any other member state in the 1990s. As the sole global power, the United States remains a major actor whose ability to shape actions and through them the behaviour of others makes it a critical member (or non-member). The United States is still the largest contributor of funds. The United States has continued to sponsor a variety of multilateral programme initiatives. Although international factors will continue to shape American perceptions of the United Nations, we hypothesize that domestic factors will be critical to US responses in the future. If key domestic actors are to support the United Nations and efforts to strengthen its effectiveness in the 1990s, they will have to be convinced that certain issues have been addressed and that the organization is worth reforming.

UN-related issues salient to the United States

A number of issues concerning both the operation of the United Nations and the organization's ability or inability to handle key problems have proved troubling to US decision makers. In the recent past these included politicization, international regulation, and statism, as well as inequities in UN budget decision processes and administrative inefficiency. In the 1990s, with new demands on the United

Nations, the last two issues became even more pressing. Other issues are relatively new, such as the debate over the role that the United States should play in the new world order – a world order characterized in part by reliance on multilateral diplomacy.

Charges of politicization tend to be rooted in the functionalist assumption that the operations of the specialized agencies and technical activities of the United Nations could be free from the intrusion of political factors. Although definitions of politicization vary considerably, the focus of this discussion is on three uses of the term: the intrusion of extraneous politics into the work of an organization; a double standard with respect to national sovereignty; and the exercise of selective morality on the part of the new majority in the UN system.[9]

During the 1970s, American charges of politicization of the UN system grew. Members of Congress spoke with disdain of UNESCO as primarily political.[10] The media and interest groups also used the politicization issue to criticize UN bodies. Key US officials complained that extraneous issues were being introduced into the specialized agencies that had little relationship to their basic tasks and for which there were more appropriate forums for debate. These issues most frequently concerned apartheid in South Africa, Palestinian rights, and the state of Israel – all issues on which the United States was frequently in the minority.

The case of Israel has been of concern to the United States. Beginning in 1974–1975, a series of actions in UN bodies called into question Israel's right to exist. Israel was excluded from the UN Economic Commission for West Asia and from the Asian group within UNESCO on procedural grounds.[11] The UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 3379 equating Zionism with racism.[12] Other General Assembly resolutions singled out Israel for policies of "hegemonism" and "racism," and "for committing war crimes." They called for members to break diplomatic and commercial ties with Israel.

Concurrently, the United Nations legitimized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In 1974, the United Nations created the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, gave the PLO permanent observer status in all conferences held within the UN framework, and permitted PLO chairman Yasser Arafat to address the General Assembly. Also in November 1974, Resolution 3236 endorsed the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, independence, and sovereignty. For

the US government, such actions interfered with a member state's right to participate and affirmed the legitimacy of a non-state member – both clearly contrary to the United Nations' mandate.

A second source of politicization was the double standard with respect to national sovereignty that the third world majority displayed.[13] Third world states persistently maintained the inviolability of their sovereignties, while at the same time trying to limit other states' sovereignty in fields essentially within states' domestic jurisdiction. This charge of politicization parallels the issues of both selective morality and international regulation discussed below.

A third source of politicization stems from the exercise of selective morality on human rights issues. While third world countries introduced agenda items in UN agencies condemning white racism, Zionism, and neo-colonialism, they selectively ignored black racism, sexism in Muslim countries, and violations of human rights in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.[14] UN members were more eager to condemn South Africa's abuse of human rights than to take even modest steps criticizing Idi Amin's murderous rule in Uganda. The United Nations was silent while Cambodia's Pol Pot murdered millions. Particularly for American conservatives, selective treatment of human rights has been the most troubling case of politicization in the UN system, undermining its legitimacy.[15]

The issue of politicization, although not forgotten, is no longer a major stumbling block to US participation. Several of the underlying issues are being resolved. South Africa is in the midst of dramatic political changes, dramatized by Nelson Mandela's appeal to the UN General Assembly in 1993 to lift economic sanctions because of impending Black participation in South African politics. The 1993 accord between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel has dramatically altered Middle Eastern politics. There is cause for optimism that politicization can be averted in the 1990s.

Another issue that particularly troubled conservatives in the United States was the trend toward increasing international regulation in UN bodies. The United States has consistently advocated economic liberalism as the best route to promote global welfare. Yet for much of the 1970s and 1980s the Group of 77 supported principles and policies calling for more authoritative allocation of resources and market shares, believing that economic regulation can soften market failure and ensure predictable policies not achievable under liberalism.[16]

Attempts to regulate the activities of multinational corporations

were particularly troubling. The United States opposed the establishment of the UN Centre for Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and efforts to negotiate codes of conduct for TNCs. Similarly, in WHO the United States criticized the limitations put on multinational pharmaceutical companies under the Action Programme on Essential Drugs and the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes, and the effort to limit the marketing activities of multinational tobacco companies. It opposed the Food and Agriculture Organization's attempt to control seed patents, sales, and distribution. UN efforts to regulate multinational corporations conflict with the American tendency to see multinationals as engines of economic development. They also coincided with the domestic trend in the 1980s toward deregulation.

What the American news media in particular perceived as UNESCO's attempt to control press freedom through the proposed New World Information and Communications Order led the United States to withdraw from that organization in 1984. Although, in fact, the outcomes of UNESCO communications debates after 1981 were relatively positive from an American perspective, news media coverage (which had a powerful impact within the US government) continued to report the debates "as though the ultimate agenda was censorship."[17] Yet the trend toward international regulation seems to have run its course as economic liberalism has emerged triumphant.

Along with international regulation, a state-oriented approach to economic development in the UN system proved problematical for the United States. In the 1960s and 1970s, the third world majority advocated significant degrees of governmental intervention – i.e. national regulation – to facilitate the process of economic development. In large part because of this, the United States chose to commit resources for UN development programmes only selectively and intermittently and to oppose those that were statist in orientation. For example, the United States was sharply critical of the FAO's statist orientation and its shift from a mandate to promote the free flow of agricultural products to one advocating state control of the agricultural sector and controlled pricing to the exclusion of market-oriented policies and the private sector.[18]

By the mid-1980s, US concern over state-directed approaches to economic development being advocated in the UN economic development institutions lessened. Privatization not only had become the dominant ideology of the Reagan and Bush administrations but was, albeit with much reluctance, increasingly accepted in the institutions

of the UN system concerned with economic development, most notably the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and regional development banks.

While some of these troubling issues have become less salient – politicization, regulation, statism – other issues continue to affect the US–UN relationship adversely.

Dissatisfaction with political bias and inefficiency in UN administration is not new. Charges of political bias stem from the "political pressure and interference exerted by member governments at all levels of the Secretariat in the areas of recruitment and promotion."[19] Several executive heads of specialized agencies have been charged with representing specific interests, most notably UNESCO's former head, M'Bow, the FAO's Saouma, and the WHO's former director-general Mahler, who were each accused of being militant spokespersons for the third world. These accusations have been coupled with charges of mismanagement and ineffective administration. For example, in withdrawing from UNESCO, the United States criticized the agency for poor staff performance, an overly complex internal structure, wasteful and duplicative programmes, lax financial control, and secretariat mismanagement through political favouritism.[20]

Since 1970 a number of studies, some commissioned by the United Nations itself, have pointed to problems in UN economic development programmes, to programming conducted with little consideration of budgetary matters or programme evaluation, and to the inadequacy of staff qualifications, excessive remuneration, and rapid increase of staff costs.[21] A 1988 UNA-USA study lamented: "Yet there is no center at the center of the UN System."[22] Former UN Under-Secretary-General Brian Urquhart similarly noted a "serious erosion of the standards of the international civil service ... too many top-level officials, political appointments, rotten boroughs, and pointless programs [which] had rendered the Secretariat fat and flabby over the years."[23] Given these critiques and other studies by US governmental agencies, it is no surprise that administrative reform emerged as a key issue in the 1980s for the United Nations' major contributors and again in the 1990s when an inefficient and sometimes wasteful system faced increasing demands.[24]

Likewise, problems persist with the UN budget decision processes. Although the United States supported the one-state, one-vote formula for voting in the UN General Assembly and the principle of universal membership for all independent states, the effects of membership expansion and shifting orientation of a majority of that mem-

bership undermined US commitment to the United Nations. American critics of the United Nations pointed to the inequity between voting power and financial support, particularly the fact that over 70 members pay only 0.01 per cent of the budget; the 20 or so leading contributors can thus be easily outvoted by the majority of members.

Over the years, the loss of Western controlling influence in the United Nations and many of its specialized agencies, dissatisfaction with specific UN actions and programmes described above, and the steady growth of UN budgets, fuelled disaffection in the US Congress. Why should the principal contributors have only one vote each? Resolutions were passed and programmes created that were counter to the interests of major contributors, yet for which they were expected to pay. Although there are problems of waste, duplication, and slipshod management, and a lack of processes for both programme planning and project evaluation, the major issue is political: the relationship between financial contribution and control over budgetary allocations. This pits those with financial resources (the haves) against those with the votes (the have-nots).

UN budget problems have been aggravated by secretariats that have been ''unduly responsive'' to highly contentious actions by the General Assembly and, in other agencies, have exploited and initiated actions to expand bureaucratic tasks and revenues.[25] Increases in secretariat salaries and benefits have been far greater than those for comparable-level officials in even the wealthiest member states – a development that could hardly escape the attention of members of the US Congress. Indeed, the debate over US contributions and, directly or indirectly, over UN budget processes and UN reform that began in the late 1970s has persisted, despite the reforms of the mid-1980s. The report of the UN Group of 18 on the efficiency of the administrative and financial functions of the UN was endorsed by the General Assembly in December 1986. That report reflects changes that the United States supported, as Lyons recounts in chapter 2. The Group of 18 proposed cutting back UN staff. And, to give the United States a greater role in the UN budgetary process, the Group had the Committee for Programme and Coordination (CPC) review programme content and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) conduct a financial and administrative review. The procedure of consensus voting was institutionalized, giving an effective veto to the United States as well as to other members. More recently, charges of waste and corruption led the

United States to campaign for adding an Inspector General to the UN Secretary-General's staff.

In the post–Cold War era, the expanded demands for UN peace-keeping pose challenges for the United States and other members. The issue is the types and level of commitment required to meet these demands, particularly if the United States wishes to maintain a leadership role. For example, will the United States provide the ne-cessary financial and logistical support for expanded peace-keeping and peace-enforcement operations? Will funds be available so that the United Nations can respond immediately to a crisis? Will the United States train troops for peace-keeping, as middle powers have done? Will the United States work with coalition partners more col-laboratively than it did in the Gulf War? Will the United States per-mit its troops to serve *under* UN authority? Will the United States *sustain* this level of commitment even when the going gets difficult?

But whether and how the United States takes up the challenges posed by the post–Cold War era and expanded multilateralism will be heavily influenced by domestic policies. Structural factors – sep-aration of powers within the US government, the division of author-ity between the legislature and the executive branch, public opinion, and non-governmental actors – heavily determined the US responses to selected issues concerning the United Nations in the past. Their interactions are likely to shape the future directions of US policy in the United Nations also.

Domestic sources of American policy toward the United Nations

Executive branch leadership

Presidential leadership (or the absence of it) is critically important in shaping American foreign policy. The attitude of the President and of key executive branch officials toward multilateral institutions in gen-eral and the United Nations in particular sets the tone for an admin-istration and guides policy responses. It also influences the responses of members of Congress.

Prior to the Reagan administration, changes in presidential admin-istrations had relatively little impact on US relationships with most international organizations. Successive administrations sustained American commitments to multilateralism. The Reagan administra-

tion, however, was far less interested in international cooperation, except as such cooperation might support unilateral American goals. Almost as soon as the administration took office, Budget Director David Stockman suggested that cutting contributions to UN agencies, or even withdrawal, would be a good way to trim the US budget deficit. Thus, it was hardly surprising that the Reagan administration translated long-standing US displeasure with UNESCO into withdrawal, scaled back support to the international food institutions because of their statist orientation, and opposed efforts in WHO to control multinational corporations' marketing of pharmaceuticals, infant formula, and tobacco. As Puchala and Coate note, "some of the highest officials appointed to deal directly with the UN both in the New York Delegation and the State Department's IO Bureau, harbored strong reservations about the worth of the organization."[26]

During the second Reagan administration, the antipathy to multilateral institutions moderated somewhat. There was increased interest in and support for the United Nations' peace and security functions. The approval of the administrative and budgetary reform programme recommended by the Group of 18 led UN ambassador Vernon Walters to state to members of Congress, "The reforms respond particularly to the concerns expressed by the United States over the past years.... We must now demonstrate our support for the reform effort and for the United Nations by fulfilling our obligation to pay our assessed contributions, or risk having reform set aside."[27] President Reagan, in his final address to the General Assembly, enumerated a long list of areas where, he said, "we see not only progress but also the potential for an increasingly vital role for multilateral efforts and institutions like the United Nations." He added, "Yes, the United Nations is a better place than it was 8 years ago."[28]

The 1988 election of George Bush, the first US President to have served as ambassador to the United Nations, raised hopes among UN supporters for strong presidential leadership at home and abroad with respect to multilateral institutions. The appointment of Thomas Pickering, a well-respected career foreign service officer, to the post of ambassador was another positive sign, although the post's subsequent demotion from cabinet status suggested otherwise. Indeed, hopes were well placed. Virulent UN bashing from administrative officials stopped. Pragmatic people were put in key positions. Administrations make a difference.

Even before the Bush administration took office, the shift in Soviet attitude toward the United Nations and especially toward the role of

UN peace-keepers in settling regional conflicts in Namibia, Central America, Afghanistan, and elsewhere signalled a revitalization for the organization. The demise of communism in Central Europe, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the surge in ethnic conflict raised a host of new challenges. To undertake such activities would require American leadership and commitment to the organization. But it was the 1990 Gulf crisis that proved to be the test case – as Gregg points out, "a turning point in the US–UN relationship" – for American leadership and commitment to the United Nations.[29] Security Council Resolution 660 coincided with the Bush administration's position, condemning the invasion and demanding the "immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait." Once again, the United Nations served as a valued instrument of US foreign policy and a forum for collective legitimation.

The Gulf War, however, highlighted a key issue. The US-led military operation occurred without a direct link to the United Nations and with little input from other contributing UN members. Germany and Japan were expected to finance the operations, but were excluded from important decision-making. And many developing countries, while supporting the action, worried about precedents for United Nations interference in states' internal affairs and the diminution of national sovereignty when the United Nations supported construction of refugee havens for the Kurds in northern Iraq under the mantle of humanitarian intervention. The Gulf War also highlighted another important problem: "The ambivalence of many states toward a stronger UN is now coupled with apprehension about a pax Americana, even a UN-centered one, without a Soviet counterweight."[30]

The Clinton administration, while concentrating on domestic health and economic issues, quickly found it could not ignore a series of pressing international problems, many involving the United Nations. Initially the administration was very supportive of UN peace-keeping activities and multilateral institutions generally. Before even the end of his first year in office, however, President Clinton mirrored the concern of many Americans, saying "The United Nations simply cannot become engaged in every one of the world's conflicts. If American people are to say yes to U.N. peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say no."[31] The Clinton administration backed efforts to strengthen UN headquarters' capacity to manage peace-keeping operations more effectively. It provided leadership at the 1993 Vienna Human Rights Conference and for the creation of a High Commissioner for Human Rights. It was far more supportive

than either the Reagan or Bush administrations for a broad range of other UN system activities and institutions: the environment, WHO efforts to combat AIDS, UNICEF and other children's issues, population and UNFPA, as well as arms control, among others.

Historically, however, US Presidents have often found their foreign policy leadership dependent upon congressional support. In this, President Clinton's efforts to give credibility to US leadership in the United Nations by completing payment of all arrears in regular and peace-keeping contributions floundered on the shoals of congressional "budget-cutting fervor."[32]

The role of Congress

Congress as an institution is a conservative organization – cautious and reluctant to initiate change. It responds to old stimuli better than new. When it opposes the Executive, it is usually to protect some interest group or some aspect of the status quo rather than to initiate action. (Congressman Les Aspin, 1976)[33]

Among the domestic sources of US foreign policy toward the United Nations, the separation of powers among the branches of the federal government has proven to be particularly important. Increased tension between the executive and legislative branches and congressional assertiveness in the post–Viet Nam era have affected US relationships with many of the organizations in the UN system. However, Congress was somewhat slower to initiate restrictive and constraining legislation affecting US participation in UN bodies than it was to act in the areas of war powers, arms sales, covert activities, and human rights. Although there had always been individual members of Congress who were sceptical of the value of US participation in multilateral institutions and certainly of multilateral economic assistance (especially of the "returns" on American contributions), a pattern of accommodation in executive–legislative relations and, hence, support for multilateralism held until the early 1980s. The antagonism of senior officials in the Reagan administration to multilateralism, combined with the growing budget deficit, contributed significantly to the erosion of congressional support.

Congress's role in US policy toward UN institutions derives from both constitutional and statutory sources. As with other treaties, the Senate must provide its advice and consent to US ratification of the charters of international organizations. It must also concur in the ap-

424

pointments of ambassadors accredited to UN agencies worldwide. In addition, both houses of Congress conduct oversight hearings on various aspects of US relations with UN bodies. Most importantly, congressional power to authorize and appropriate funds has specific and direct impact on US participation in UN bodies. Because members of Congress frequently link an issue such as human rights to funding legislation, their concerns may set agendas for the executive branch and for US representatives in UN bodies. Finally, members from each house serve on the delegations to the UN General Assembly each year and on delegations to global conferences under UN auspices.

Historically, Congress has tended to reflect more deeply than the executive branch the attitudes of its constituents, the American public. Public opinion polls showed overwhelming support for the United Nations in 1945. Bipartisan leadership in the Senate and strong cooperation with the executive branch "laid such a firm foundation for support that United States involvement in the United Nations was, for many years, rarely questioned,"[34] though the initial enthusiasm waned as the international context changed. In addition, payment of the assessed contributions was regarded as an international legal obligation.

The roots of congressional (and public) disaffection with the United Nations lie in developments in the 1970s, particularly concerns over politicization, statism, and regulation. But Congress was most concerned with the size of US contributions and the processes for UN budget decision-making.

The budgetary issue came to the fore after the 1980 election. That election brought a major change in congressional membership, with a large number of new, conservative Republican members elected on President Reagan's coat-tails.[35] The new conservatives tended to be both activists and also supportive of the President. The result was a marked change in the tone of debate on the United Nations, especially in the House of Representatives. Although many of the issues were not new, the hostile atmosphere was. Control over US contributions (especially to the multilateral development banks) and the amount of those contributions were strongly debated, along with the value of foreign aid overall. Ironically, for the first time in three years, Congress managed to pass the foreign aid appropriations bill in 1981! Also on the congressional agenda were the United Nations' handling of human rights issues, and hearings on the WHO infant formula vote, US participation in UNESCO, the Law of the Sea, and the

IAEA safeguards system. Despite the new conservative membership, however, the prevailing sentiments were often positive and opposed to the positions of the Reagan administration.

It is clear, none the less, that congressional debates on the United Nations from 1982 onward were prompted both by developments in the United Nations and specialized agencies *and* by actions of the Reagan administration that reflected the latter's hostility to multi-lateral institutions. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick's speech, indicating that members of the United Nations would be held "account-able" for their votes, found responsive echoes in the Congress among those concerned about anti-Americanism in the United Nations and sceptical of the value of foreign aid. What better approach than to link the two? Linking the two required record-keeping on UN votes, and record-keeping, in turn, inevitably brought attention to how much the United States "won" or "lost." Highly critical (and often distorted) reports on the United Nations published by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think-tank, got wide circulation and comment among members of Congress, further fuelling the atmosphere of scepticism and negativism.

In addition, the growing, general budgetary crisis of the US government, prompted by the Reagan administration's efforts to cut expenditures, reduce taxes, and simultaneously raise defence spending, inevitably increased pressure to cut American contributions to the United Nations. There would be few repercussions from voters and domestic interest groups for such cuts, in contrast to the controversy over almost every other target except foreign aid itself. Initially, budgetary cuts were targeted against activities deemed contrary to the UN Charter or damaging to US interests, for example programmes aiding the PLO. In 1983 (and the subsequent four years), the Reagan administration significantly reduced its request for voluntary contributions to international organizations and programmes below the amounts appropriated for the previous year. The primary targets for cuts were the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and UNICEF – both headed by Americans. Congress successfully resisted these efforts of the Reagan administration to cut or even eliminate funding for voluntary contributions by appropriating even more than in the previous year.[36]

Since 1983, the legislation authorizing and appropriating funds for US assessed and voluntary contributions has provided the occasion for most congressional discussion of the United Nations' value and activities. In that climate, other concerns of members often reflected

the perceived efficacy of using contributions as a means of exercising influence, especially in the 1980s. Although the Reagan administration's antagonism toward multilateral institutions peaked between 1983 and 1985 with reduced funding requests and the initiation of steps to withdraw from UNESCO, it had just begun to have its full impact on Congress. Prompted by what Senator Nancy Kassebaum described as unsuccessful efforts to "control the growth in spending of the various UN agencies," members of Congress proceeded to use their funding powers to link reductions in US contributions to the reform of UN budget decision-making. Senator Kassebaum first tried in 1983 to amend the FY1984 authorization act for US assessed contributions by mandating reductions in those contributions to the United Nations and specialized agencies over a three-year period to a level of 70 per cent of the assessment for the calendar year *1980*. She noted, "It has been the Congress, and not the executive branch, that has always had to take the lead in reducing the American taxpayers' burden with respect to these agencies [in 1952 and 1972].... I believe that it is time to act again."[37] The amendment was approved by the Senate by a vote of 66 to 23. The administration opposed the amendment, as did an impressive bipartisan group of former Secretaries of State, National Security Advisers, and US Representatives to the United Nations. No similar action was initiated in the House, however, and the amendment died when the State Department appropriation was approved in a continuing resolution.[38] Senator Kassebaum's action in 1983 was a prelude to her successful 1985 effort to reduce contributions, this time encouraged by the administration.

As it had endeavoured to do with voluntary contributions, the Reagan administration in 1985 requested US$119 million less than its assessment for the United Nations, the specialized agencies, and other international organizations. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April, spoke of the desirability of distinguishing between "those bodies that are effectively managed toward the achievement of constructive goals of the charter and those that are ineffectively managed and wastefully run, and often serve very negative goals." She further suggested that such discrimination could be applied in appropriations and would make the UN Secretariat "more budget conscious."[39] Congress did not adopt Ambassador Kirkpatrick's suggestion to discriminate among agencies. Prompted by the obvious administration support for cuts in assessed contributions, however, the Senate

and House passed amendments sponsored by Senator Kassebaum (Republican–Kansas) and Representative Solomon (Republican–New York) linking reductions in contributions to UN budget reform.

The Kassebaum amendment and its House counterpart, the Solomon amendment, stated:

No payments may be made for an assessed contribution to the United Nations or its specialized agencies in excess of 20 percent of the total annual budget of the United Nations or its specialized agencies (respectively) for the United States fiscal year 1987 and following years unless the United Nations and its specialized agencies have adopted the voting rights referred to in section (b) – the voting rights shall be proportionate to the contribution of each such member state to the budget of the United Nations and its specialized agencies.[40]

The passage of the Kassebaum and Solomon amendments to the 1985 State Department bill was a victory for those in the Congress (and executive branch) who wanted to use shortfalls in US contributions to force the United Nations to adopt reforms (and in the process help reduce US budget deficits). The Kassebaum and Solomon amendments also contained a provision requiring certification by the Secretary of State that "the organization has adopted a plan to reduce the salaries and pensions of the organization's employees to a level no higher than that paid United States civil service employees for performing comparable duties." Other amendments relating to the United Nations required the President to report on the UN voting records, the secondment of UN employees, especially those from the Soviet Union, and their reported intelligence activities, and the use of US funds for population assistance (including contributions to the UN Population Fund – UNFPA) in any country that permitted infanticide or coerced abortion. The last requirement reflected the domestic debate over abortion and, particularly, the use of governmental funds to support it.

Testimony by Alan Keyes, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, in early 1986 made clear that the Kassebaum amendment accorded with Reagan administration interest in using US contributions to push the United Nations toward reform. He described the amendment as providing "a unique opportunity for pushing for a reformulation of the UN decision-making process in some significant ways ... an opportunity also for the organization to revive that sense of service to the peoples of the world that was the original reason for its mandate and Charter."[41]

428

The Report of the UN Group of 18 on the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations (A/41/49), and its endorsement by the General Assembly in December 1986, then, put the executive branch and the Congress under pressure to restore US contributions. Reagan administration officials were quick to applaud the programme of reform as a US foreign policy accomplishment, "a historic step" in President Reagan's words, "designed to strengthen the organization's effectiveness and efficiency in carrying out its important political, economic, and social objectives."[42] Assistant Secretary Alan Keyes again noted the importance of the Kassebaum amendment in referring to "the stark fact that nothing would have been accomplished absent the pressure generated by congressionally mandated cutbacks."[43]

The changes at the United Nations prompted lengthy debate in both the Senate and House on the nature of the reforms that had been initiated. Administration officials testified on their importance to the United States. The House Conference Report referred to the consensus-based decision-making procedures adopted by the United Nations as "a significant step forward."[44] The new language provided that 40 per cent of the US assessed contributions could be paid any time after 1 October 1987; that the second 40 per cent could be paid upon the President's determination that the United Nations' new procedures were being implemented, progress being made toward the 50 per cent limitation on seconded employees, and staff reductions being implemented; and the final 20 per cent could be made available 30 days after the presidential determination unless Congress adopted a joint resolution prohibiting payment. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report also noted that the budget adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1986 had showed no real programme growth – a positive step. Senator Kassebaum herself supported modification of the original amendment and payment of the full assessment. She and other members, however, expressed concern over where the funds would come from given the severe budget difficulties.[45] While endorsing full funding of the US assessment for 1987, the Senate Committee regretted that authorized funding levels would not allow the United States to pay its arrearages and noted, "means need to be found to make up these arrearages if the US is to fully meet its treaty obligations as a member of the UN."[46]

In fact, Congress did not appropriate adequate funds to meet US assessed contributions in 1987 or in any year to date. Even the 1987 Soviet pledge to pay its arrearages in full did not prompt Congress to

be more forthcoming, though members had been quick to note other nations' arrearages.

When the UN peace-keeping forces were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988, Senator Pell (Democrat–Rhode Island) used the occasion to say, "This honor should remind us of our embarrassment of the United States deadbeat status in failing to meet our financial obligations to the United Nations."[47] To the dismay of many members of Congress, the Nobel prize came at a time when the Reagan administration, in a demonstration of its continuing ambivalence on the United Nations, had yet to pay US$44 million in outstanding dues for calendar year 1988.[48] Senator Pell was among those who noted that as a result the United Nations faced a funding crisis precisely at a time when it was furthering the US security interests through its role in a number of regional conflicts. Representative Bereuter (Republican–New England) commented, "Recently, the UN has undertaken serious internal reforms and has begun exercising the neutral international peacemaking role it was designed to undertake.... It is indeed appropriate that the US Government pay its arrearages."[49] Only shortly before President Reagan was to address the 44th General Assembly did he make the necessary certifications to release US funds. Even so, the United States arrearages for both regular assessed contributions and peace-keeping continued to mount, with neither Congress nor the executive branch closer to solving the funding problem.

The arrearages mounted even while the United States sought UN support for its position in the 1990–1991 Gulf conflict and members of Congress called on President Bush to work through the United Nations. Senator Gorton expressed the feelings of many members when he stated on 4 January 1991, "if we cannot followup on the most decisive action the United Nations has taken since the onset of the war in Korea, the United Nations will become a useless organization, and the lack of belief in America's seriousness of purposefulness will cause us to be abandoned by existing and potential friends around the world."[50] The Joint Congressional Resolution on 4 January 1991 supported US action by references to five different UN resolutions, with two references to Security Resolution 678 alone.[51]

The strong support for the United Nations during the Gulf crisis and for new peace-keeping efforts, along with the General Assembly's repeal of the Zionism as Racism resolution, led Congress to change the status of UN funding as well as to support other UN-related measures. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fis-

430

cal Years 1992 and 1993 (PL102–138) permitted full funding of the US assessment to the United Nations for the first time since 1986. Congress also granted President Bush toward the end of his administration a two-year, US$700 million supplement to help cover the country's 30.4 per cent share of new peace-keeping costs. And, in 1991, Congress accepted a Bush administration proposal for repaying the arrearages over four years (by the end of 1995), linked to a policy of ''no growth'' in UN programme budgets. At that time, the total US arrearages amounted to US$220 million.

The United Nations' ''honeymoon'' with the US Congress was relatively short-lived, however. By mid-1993, concern over the effectiveness, mounting cost, and complexity of UN peace-keeping operations, the US share of these costs, as well as waste and corruption in the organization, led Congress to make heavy cuts in funds for peace-keeping and the regular UN contribution. It cancelled entirely the 1993 instalment payment on the arrearages, thus leaving the plan and future payment in doubt. Congress also withheld 10 per cent of the US regular 1993 budget contribution pending appointment of an Inspector General by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali.[52] Further cuts were made in contributions to specialized agencies, including the UN Development Programme, just when a US national, Gustave Speth, assumed the directorship.

In the wake of mounting problems with UN peace-keeping operations, Congress has also pressed for reduction in the US share of peace-keeping costs from the current 30.4 per cent on the grounds of fairness. In October 1993, the House and Senate killed a proposed peace-keeping contingency fund that would have enabled the United States to contribute emergency start-up funds for UN peace-keeping operations. In this climate, proposals to shift the appropriation of peace-keeping funds from the State Department to the Department of Defense have not elicited strong support. And, any sensitivity Congress may have shown in the early 1990s to the negative effects on the US image of withholding funds to force changes at the United Nations appeared to have vanished.

Thus, the Clinton administration's efforts to show strong support of multilateral peace-keeping and elements of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* were hampered by congressional concerns. Events in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia fuelled scepticism about the ability of the United Nations to manage effectively the wide range of peace-keeping and enforcement operations that it had undertaken by mid-1993. Thus, in debates about placing US forces

under UN command, Congress strictly circumscribed the President's authority, requiring certification that a series of conditions had been met.[53]

The "difficult choice" faced by members of Congress is how to provide the funding to fulfil current US obligations to the United Nations and its specialized agencies, let alone make up the arrearages, when the country faces a severe budget deficit and pressing domestic priorities. Most members of Congress do not place the United Nations high on the list of funding priorities. They are concerned about waste, corruption, and the implementation of consensus-based decision-making procedures on budgetary matters and, hence, continue to link US contributions to specific improvements in management of UN agencies.

The pressures of the budget deficit and the budget process itself will more than likely continue to hamper efforts to enable the United States to fulfil its full financial obligations to the United Nations, let alone increase its funding to meet new demands for peace-keeping, enforcement, and other activities. The continuing funding shortfall threatens seriously to undermine the US ability to exercise leadership. Although some veteran members of Congress recognize this, there is a much larger educational and leadership task in persuading many members that the United Nations matters to the United States. This has been complicated by very high turnover in the House in 1992.

What conclusions, then, can we draw from this examination of congressional concern with UN matters over the last 20 years and from the literature on Congress to shed light on how this branch of the US government is likely to deal with issues concerning the future of the UN system and US participation over the next few years?

As noted earlier, increased tension and congressional assertiveness have marked the post–Viet Nam era of US foreign policy-making. What distinguishes executive–legislative confrontations since the 1970s from those of earlier periods is greater congressional interest in the management of foreign affairs and the inclination of members "to perceive themselves as chiefs, not Indians." "In the past," Franck and Weisband note, "the Congress has generally been led into battle by its captains."[54] Thus, the assertiveness is not just of Congress as a whole but of its individual members. This trend, combined with other developments, has fuelled an exponential growth in foreign policy by legislation, legislation often limiting executive branch flexibility. Although Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan all decried

congressional limits on their ability to shape foreign policy, the legislation has also placed a significant burden on the State Department in particular through reporting requirements such as those on human rights violations and UN votes, efforts to link aid allocations to the reported data, or negotiating ''mandates'' such as that on the UN budgetary process. Thus, legislation has been used to force the executive branch to stop doing something; it has also forced the executive branch to initiate actions. The result is ''a statutory basis of American foreign policy which establishes procedures for consultation, outlines criteria for assessing options and, in some instances, mandates certain objectives and prohibits others.''[55] By turning foreign policy into an ''exercise in lawmaking,'' Congress has placed what one State Department official described as a ''straitjacket of legislation around the manifold complexity of our relations with other nations.''[56] And, one might add, around US participation in multilateral institutions.[57] Indeed, the general effect of a more assertive Congress has been to limit US–IGO involvement and to make the United States a less flexible international actor.

Destler, Gelb, and Lake suggest that, as legislators have moved from ''instinctive support of Presidential policy to aggressive skepticism, from acquiescence to activism … the new taste for foreign-policy engagement was buttressed by the staff explosion.'' Policy debates have become more ideological and unreal, with legislators pressing unreal policy goals and developing ''new ways of exploiting issues for personal and political gain, while ducking responsibility for policy consequences.''[58] In the case of the United Nations, our analysis suggests that, although Congress had long been unhappy with anti-Americanism in the United Nations, budget growth, increasing third world influence, and declining American influence, it was the hostility of Reagan administration officials more than congressional assertiveness that fuelled support for the Kassebaum–Solomon amendment and other actions. Once the precedent had been set for deliberately funding shortfalls in American assessed contributions, however, it became increasingly difficult to rebuild support for fulfilling US obligations.

The reasons for that difficulty have to do with Congress's traditional parochialism, the decline of leadership influence, the committee system, and the budget process itself.

Historically, members of Congress have tended to pay more attention to domestic than to foreign affairs, driven by their preoccupation with re-election (which is fuelled by the fact that all members in the

House and one-third of the Senate face elections every two years). This creates pressure to satisfy interests of constituents, which are seldom directly linked to foreign affairs. Indeed, Sundquist has observed that "being national-minded can be a positive hazard to a legislative career."[59] With the pressures to focus on constituent interests, congressional interest in and attention to foreign policy issues have also tended to be short-lived, their duration determined by how newsworthy the issue is. Thus, having brought attention to the issues of UN reform in a dramatic way in 1985, Congress was likely not to pay much further attention. Likewise, both UN funding and foreign aid tend to be frequent targets for budget cuts because they rarely affect the interests of local constituents.

A perennial problem for legislators anywhere is information and expertise. The US Congress has historically used hearings for this purpose. It also has created several special offices to provide additional expertise, among them the General Accounting Office (GAO), which has been a particularly important source of studies on various aspects of the UN system over the past 15 years.[60] It is not at all clear from the legislative record, however, how widely read GAO's studies are, or how they have influenced debate. Franck and Weisband note that congressional staff members maintain close ties with GAO personnel to shape the terms of requests for GAO studies and pick up ideas for "hot topics."[61] Destler, Gelb, and Lake, on the other hand, note how seldom members read the reports they mandate.[62]

Since the early 1970s, larger congressional staffs have been an additional source of information, expertise, and, on occasion, legislative initiatives. Members of Congress have significantly increased their own and committee staffs from less than 10,000 in 1972 to more than 21,000 in 1985.[63] As Destler has noted, the results are not always salutary for national policy making: "Institutional decentralization, policy conviction, and ample staffing encourage legislators to become involved in the detail of policy. This not only takes away executive flexibility, but it also adds new uncertainty because no one can predict what Congress ultimately will do."[64]

In recent years, the increased fragmentation of decision-making among congressional committees has had a particularly negative effect on Congress's handling of UN matters. The Foreign Affairs Committee in the House and the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate have responsibility for matters involving US participation in international organizations, but committees with responsibility for

specific issue areas such as agriculture, energy, trade, international economic policy, national security, oceans, space, and energy of necessity take an interest in US policies in various UN specialized agencies. Furthermore, procedural reforms instituted in the 1970s decentralized power from committees to subcommittees and thereby reduced the importance of leadership positions by increasing their number.[65] The result has been to encourage initiatives (e.g. amendments) by individual members of Congress, often members who are not part of the congressional foreign policy "establishment."[66] Party leaderships' power has also been weakened by the increase in single-issue politics and the activities of lobbyists, political action committees, and interest groups, which we shall address shortly.

The fragmentation of decision-making, the breakdown of party unity, and the erosion of leadership thus have slowed and complicated the entire legislative process in ways that are particularly evident in the funding process. Sundquist notes, "The result is that any piece of legislation must surmount an obstacle course of unparalleled difficulty ... And in the process of overcoming the countless legislative hurdles, policies may be compromised to the point of ineffectiveness."[67] As Kegley and Wittkopf describe, "Within each house of Congress, authorizations for expenditures are specified by the substantive committees having jurisdiction over particular programs but the actual appropriations are made by another committee."[68] Though the foreign policy committees have increased available expertise through staff expansion, "their ability to translate that into a greater voice in policy making has fallen victim to purely fiscal, budgetary, and intracongressional political considerations."[69] For example, in the late 1970s the Senate Foreign Relations Committee authorized multi-year appropriations for the International Development Agency only to have the Budget and Appropriations committees deny a long-range commitment. The deleterious effects of these developments on UN funding have been readily apparent in Congress's failure to appropriate authorized funds for US assessed contributions since 1987 (except in 1991 and 1992) and frequent resort to continuing resolutions in the absence of agreement on funding legislation.[70]

Congress, however, historically has tended to reflect public opinion in the United States and to be relatively slow to change attitudes. Congressional elections in the post-war period have contributed to stable membership in Congress, with the same states and districts electing members of the same party through time.[71] Public opinion may fluctuate, however, and it is to that we now turn.

Public and élite opinion

The relative importance of public opinion as a domestic source of American foreign policy is subject to dispute. Some scholars argue that, since public opinion is uninformed, unstructured, and capricious, it has not constrained US foreign policy decision makers, while others suggest that, since public opinion is, indeed, structured, consistent, and stable, decision makers react to or seem to reflect public opinion. Recent studies give enhanced credibility to the second view.[72] For example, Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro, in a major review of public opinion and government policy change between 1935 and 1979, found that in two-thirds of all cases (including foreign policy issues) there was a shift in public opinion and a *subsequent* change in public policy.[73] Furthermore, the policy change was in the same direction as the public opinion change, the government shifting in the direction of public preferences rather than vice versa. Even if public opinion, particularly on foreign policy issues, does not play a direct role, arguably it identifies a range of policies that elected officials must consider if they are not to face repercussions in subsequent elections.

Traditionally, public and élite opinion has been described in terms of degrees of internationalism and isolationism. Recently, analysis has focused on varying dimensions of internationalism. How have public and élite attitudes supporting American internationalist or isolationist tendencies changed over time? How have public and élite attitudes toward the United Nations changed over time? What do both these general attitudes and specific views concerning the United Nations portend for US support for the United Nations and UN reform? If the US government is to be an advocate of reform in the 1990s and beyond, then the optimum condition is that both public and élite attitudes would be supportive – hence the relevance of examining public and élite attitudes. If mass opinion only is supportive of reform, then US-supported reform will probably not be forthcoming. Mass opinion alone acts as a stimulus to foreign policy innovation on only a limited range of issues. But if élite opinion is supportive, then the possibility of reform is enhanced, for it has been consistently found that mass opinion tends to acquiesce to decisions made by leaders.[74]

Public opinion studies relying on data compiled by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) since 1974 have elucidated several relevant dimensions of American internationalist thinking.[75]

Eugene Wittkopf, using 200 survey items from the CCFR studies, has identified two somewhat different dimensions of internationalism: co-operative and militant. From these two dimensions he proposed a fourfold typology:

Internationalists are those who support active American involvement in world affairs, favoring a combination of conciliatory and conflictual strategies consistent with the pre-Vietnam internationalist foreign policy consensus. **Isolationists**, on the other hand, oppose both militant internationalism (which reflects fear of communism and a willingness to use American troops abroad) and cooperative internationalism (which reflects an emphasis on cooperative links with the rest of the world). **Accommodationists** are one of two presumably newly emergent groups of ''selective internationalists'' who, in this case, embrace cooperative involvement with the world but eschew its more militant manifestations, while **Hardliners**, ''selective internationalists'' at the opposite end of the spectrum, manifest just the opposite preferences.[76]

Using this fourfold categorization to analyse élite attitudes, Wittkopf found that élite people in the 1974 survey fell into the following categories: accommodationists, 46 per cent; internationalists, 47 per cent; isolationists, 2 per cent; and hard-liners, 6 per cent. In the 1978 survey, élite people were 45 per cent accommodationists; 36 per cent internationalists; 6 per cent isolationist; and 13 per cent hard-liners. The distributions of the masses varied considerably from that of the élite. There were higher proportions of isolationists and hard-liners: 24 per cent isolationists in both 1974 and 1978 and 22 per cent in 1982; 27 per cent hard-liners in 1974 and 1978 and 24 per cent in 1982.[77] Evidently, then, higher proportions of accommodationists and internationalists are found among élite people.

What do studies suggest about the general predisposition of the mass public and the élite toward a cooperative form of internationalism? First, among *both* the élite and the mass public there is considerable within-group consistency since the 1970s and 1980s. Given this finding, we are not apt to witness radical changes in the general predispositions of either group. Second, there is a marked difference between élite people and the mass public, élite people evidencing relatively more accommodationist and internationalist attitudes.

A key question underlying future US participation in the United Nations is whether the United States should play an active role in world affairs more generally. Table 10.1 reports the responses of both leaders and public over time, showing that American leaders

Table 10.1 **Desires for an active US role in world affairs, 1948–1990 (% saying US should take an active part in world affairs)**

Year	Public		Leaders	
	Active part	Stay out	Active part	Stay out
1990	62	28	97	2
1986	64	27	98	1
1982	54	35	98	1
1978	59	29	97	1
1974	66	24	n.a.	n.a.
1973	66	31	n.a.	n.a.
1956	71	25	n.a.	n.a.
1952	68	23	n.a.	n.a.
1948	70	24	n.a.	n.a.

Source: John E. Rielly, ed., *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1987* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1987), 11; *1991*, 6.
n.a. = not asked.

overwhelmingly believe the United States should take an active part in world affairs; the attitudes of the general public have fluctuated more and are clearly somewhat less supportive of an active US role. This gap has persisted from the initial 1978 survey to the 1990 survey. This does not tell us, however, whether the élite's perception of a more active role includes participation in international organizations generally or the United Nations specifically. Nor does it yet tell us how attitudes may be changing in the post–Cold War environment.

If the United States should play an active role, should this role be a leadership role? How influential do the public and the élite perceive the United States to be? Table 10.2 charts the perceptions of US power and importance over time. If the United States is to exert leadership in the United Nations, both public and élite attitudes must be supportive. In 1986, 41 per cent of the public saw the United States as more important and powerful than it was 10 years before, but only 33 per cent of the sampled American élite people saw the United States as a more powerful and important leader than it was in 1976. In 1990, prior to the Gulf War, both groups saw the United States as less important – 35 per cent of the public and 43 per cent of the leaders.

Table 10.3 reports more specifically on public and élite attitudes about the relative importance of various foreign policy goals. The relative position (approximately ninth) of strengthening the United Nations remained almost unchanged between 1978 and 1986. The issue

Table 10.2 **Perceptions of the United States as a world leader as compared with 10 years before, 1974–1990 (%)**

Year	Public		Leaders	
	More important and powerful	Less important	More important and powerful	Less important
1990	37	35	26	43
1986	41	26	33	27
1982	27	44	10	52
1978	29	41	16	59
1974	28	38	n.a.	n.a.

Source: John E. Rielly, ed., *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1987* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1987), 11; *1991*, 13.
n.a. = not asked.

was certainly not a high priority for the United States. Yet what is particularly interesting is that the public attached a higher priority to it than did the élite, by a two to one ratio in the first three time-periods. In other words, the élite supported an active role for the United States in world affairs, but not necessarily by strengthening the United Nations; the public was more reluctant to advocate an active role, but placed much higher priority on strengthening the United Nations. In 1990, the data suggest convergence between the public and leaders' views. Most striking is the 17 per cent increase among the leaders for strengthening the United Nations, while the public's support for strengthening declined 2 per cent. What explains the change? Alger suggests that a slight change in the wording of the question may have made the difference.[78] The Gulf crisis and then the realities of the dénouement may also explain the change.

Despite the immediate effects of the Gulf War, assessment of the United Nations' job performance has not shown significant variation. Time-series data of the public's evaluation of UN performance show a steady increase in the number of people evaluating UN performance as good or fair between 1950 and 1959 – from 57 per cent to 87 per cent. In the early 1960s, public evaluation remained high, between 78 per cent and 81 per cent.[79] A sharp downturn began in 1967 and continued through the 1970s, with an upward turn in the 1980s as shown in table 10.4. In 1980, only 31 per cent of the respondents thought the United Nations was doing a good job. When probed why the United Nations was doing a poor job, 12 per cent did say the problem was that the United Nations does not have enough power. A

Table 10.3 **Foreign policy goals for the United States, 1978–1990 (% saying that goal is "very important")**

Goal	1990		1986		1982		1978	
	Public	Leaders	Public	Leaders	Public	Leaders	Public	Leaders
Protect jobs	65	39	78	43	77	43	78	34
Secure energy	61	60	69	72	70	72	78	88
Arms control	53	80	69	83	64	86	64	81
Combat world hunger	—[a]	—[a]	63	60	58	64	59	67
Reduce trade deficit[b]	56	62	62	n.a.[a]	71	38	86	73
Contain communism	56	10	57	43	59	44	60	45
Defend US allies	61	56	56	78	50	82	50	77
Match Soviet military power	56	20	53	59	49	—[a]	52	—[a]
Strengthen UN	44	39	46	22	48	25	47	26
Protect US business interests	63	27	43	32	44	25	45	26
Protect human rights	58	45	42	44	43	41	39	35
Improve LDC living standard	41	42	37	46	35	55	35	64
Protect weaker nations	57	28	32	29	34	43	34	30
Promote democracy	28	26	30	29	29	23	26	15

Source: John E. Rielly, ed., *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1983, 1987, 1991* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations).
n.a. = not asked.
a. Not available.
b. In 1982 and 1978, the question was asked in terms of keeping up the value of the dollar.

1989 Roper poll on UN job performance showed almost as many respondents indicating "don't know/no opinion" as those indicating the United Nations was doing a good job. Results from the polls in the 1990s show dramatically the effect of the Gulf crisis. The highest positive evaluation of UN performance was found in the two 1991 polls

Table 10.4 **UN job performance, 1970–1992**

Year	Question: Do you think the United Nations is doing a good job or a poor job in trying to solve the problems it has had to face?		
	Good/fair job %	Poor job %	Don't know/no opinion %
1992 (Mar.)	45	35	20
1991 (Dec.)	78	13	9
1991 (Jul.)	66	28	6
1990	54	34	12
1989	38	29	34
1988	46	33	21
1985	38	44	18
1983	35	42	23
1982	36	49	15
1980	31	53	16
1977	32	39	29
1975	33	51	16
1971	35	43	22
1970	44	40	16

Source: Gallup Organization, 1977, and Roper Poll, 1989.

(78 per cent and 66 per cent respectively). Several months later, however, amidst the lingering difficulties of the Gulf War settlement, 33 per cent of the public changed their opinion, giving the United Nations either a poor job rating or having no opinion.

The public's ambivalence is underscored in Roper poll responses to the question whether the United States should increase or decrease participation in the United Nations. Table 10.5 shows only a small difference in 1988 and 1989 between the number of respondents supporting increased US participation and those desiring no change in the level of US participation. So in 1989, while 38 per cent of those expressing an opinion thought that the United Nations was doing a good job, 34 per cent thought that there should be an increase in US participation. The mandate for change is not overwhelming. The mandate that polls do confirm is that the United States should not pull out of the United Nations. In 1983, 80 per cent of those sampled said that the United States should continue to belong; in 1986, the figure was 76 per cent.[80] These figures clearly indicate that many of those who think the United Nations is doing a poor job support continued US participation.

To project future public opinion toward the United Nations, we

Table 10.5 **US participation in the United Nations, 1980–1989**

| Year | Question: Do you think that the USA should increase or decrease its participation in the UN? | | | |
	Increase %	Decrease %	No change %	Don't know %
1989	34	16	31	19
1988	39	12	45	—
1980	40	21	26	—

Source: Roper Poll, 1988; 1989 survey was conducted by "American Talk Security," using a comparable but somewhat different question.

need to examine how these attitudes break down by age cohort groups. If older cohorts give the United Nations more favourable ratings than younger cohorts, we would not expect the public to be more predisposed toward the United Nations in the future. If younger cohort groups are more supportive than older ones, then one would expect more support in the future for US participation in the United Nations. The 1989 Roper poll reported that the baby boom generation, those born between 1945 and 1960, did give the United Nations more positive assessments than older cohorts, but provided no specific figures. A 1985 Gallup poll revealed only slightly higher evaluations of UN job performance by the 18–29 cohort group, and approximately comparable ratings by the 30–49 group and by the 50 and over cohort.[81] A Gallup poll taken earlier in the same year divided the older cohort group and found significantly higher ratings of the United Nations among the younger groups (47 per cent for the 30–49 group and only 26 per cent in the over 65 cohort). These data suggest that, as the younger cohorts age, we might expect more positive support for the United Nations and perhaps more support for reform, although differences in support by gender may cancel this effect.[82]

Finally, we examined the areas where the public would like to see increased UN involvement. Perhaps the most striking findings shown in table 10.6 are the relatively high percentages supporting increased use of the International Court of Justice, UN involvement in environmental issues, and use of UN forces in regional conflicts. However, when it comes to financing such activities, the public is reluctant. Support for UN peace-keeping, control of weapons, and defence forces ranked in the lower half of areas to be financed in the public's mind.[83]

442

Table 10.6 **American attitudes toward UN involvement by issue**

Issue	Increase UN involvement %	Should not/ ignore UN %	Don't know %
Control of nuclear weapons	46	36	18
Control of chemical weapons	49	33	18
Use of UN forces in regions	49	17	34
Deal with environment	56	27	17
Use of International Court of Justice	58	15	26
Deal with trade disputes	25	54	21

Source: Roper Poll, 1989.

Surveys show that the public has little concrete knowledge about the United Nations, however. For example, in 1989 only 15 per cent could identify Javier Pérez de Cuéllar as the UN Secretary-General; and only 16 per cent could name even one UN agency or institution. Support for the United Nations, therefore, is not correlated with knowledge. The fact that the public is not knowledgeable and rather inconsistent – giving the United Nations high priority without accepting financial responsibility – gives the élite wide latitude in deciding US policies toward the United Nations.

There are few élite survey data on UN-related questions. Holsti and Rosenau included two relevant questions in their surveys.[84] In the 1984 data, they report 60 per cent of their leadership sample of 2,515 thought it vital to enlist cooperation with the United Nations in settling international disputes.[85] Different subgroups, however, have quite divergent opinions. For example, only 48 per cent of the Republican leaders, 46 per cent of military leaders, and 46 per cent of State Department personnel sampled thought that the United Nations should be enlisted; in contrast, 70 per cent of Democratic leaders, 73 per cent of labour, and 81 per cent of the clergy held that position.[86] Only 27 per cent indicated that strengthening the United Nations was very important.[87] In Holsti and Rosenau's 1992 survey of opinion leaders, 39 per cent of the accommodationists and 28 per cent of the internationalists considered the strengthening of the United Nations and other international organizations as an effective approach to world peace. Yet, tellingly, other more general approaches – accelerating technical and economic interdependence, promoting better communications, and enhancing collective security through alliances – ranked as more effective approaches to peace

among both the accommodationists and the internationalists.[88] So even in this latest survey, taken at the Cold War's end, the attitudes among élite people generally supportive of the United Nations do not indicate that strengthening the organization is a high priority.

In conclusion, although élite people support a more activist role for the United States in the world, strengthening the United Nations is not a high priority, even though the 1990 data suggest significant changes in attitudes of the leaders on this question. Paradoxically, it is the general public who support strengthening the United Nations but evidence increasing ambivalence. These findings suggest broad public support for US participation in the United Nations and even for a much stronger role for the United Nations on certain issues. But the public is more ambivalent about a leadership role for the United States than are those who would have to lead; élite people are not inclined to use the United Nations for that purpose.

Public opinion is clearly influenced by certain non-governmental groups. And these groups are playing a stronger role in the foreign policy process than in the past.

The role of non-governmental groups

Non-governmental groups have long been important in American politics and policy-making, but their numbers, variety, and influence, particularly in the foreign policy arena, have grown enormously since the mid-1970s. The efforts of some of those groups to influence US policies in the United Nations and its specialized agencies likewise grew, especially in the late 1970s and 1980s. This was in part an outcome of the efforts of majorities dominated by less developed countries (LDCs) to initiate more regulatory and redistributive programmes and activities that would impinge on specific interests. US groups mobilized to identify and publicize those issues for US policy makers and to influence US policy responses. Domestic groups have also pressured Congress and the executive branch to adhere to international norms in the areas of human rights and security. They have played major roles in the increasing efforts to address global environmental problems, most notably in the preparations for the 1992 UN Rio Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) and subsequent efforts to implement Agenda 21.

Studies of interest groups and American foreign policy have largely endorsed a pluralist view of multiple competing groups and cross-cut-

ting interests; however, competing views that emphasize the domination of special interests also exist.[89] Studies have also concluded that domestic groups' influence on foreign policy remains limited, varying with the issue, the degree of urgency (crisis), and congressional interest. It is greatest on non-security issues and during election years. Our own study confirmed that the role of domestic groups is highly issue- and IGO-specific.[90]

The emergence since the early 1970s of single-issue groups and ideologically motivated political action committees (PACs) has altered the "game" somewhat, as the analysis of Congress suggested. These groups focus their attention on one cause, judge policy makers' actions in terms only of that cause, and are intolerant of compromise. Their tendency to single out individual votes (or votes on a single issue), for example, has increased pressures on members of Congress to obscure those votes in procedure or take what they know to be irresponsible positions. Domestic groups have not been consistently either supportive of or antagonistic toward US relations with IGOs. Hunger groups support greater US participation in food aid and distribution through all available channels. Other groups have lobbied against the FAO's anti-market orientation. The media led the campaign for withdrawal from UNESCO, while scientists, academic groups, and educational groups lobbied in opposition.

Two issues – politicization and international regulation – particularly aroused the opposition of US domestic groups, which played both agenda-setting and policy-influencing roles. The network of Jewish organizations led by the American–Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) was very active in response to the anti-Israeli resolutions introduced in many UN agencies (and, of course, the references to Zionism as racism). It also called attention more generally to politicization in UN agencies. For example, Burton Levinson, chairman of the national executive committee of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, speaking in 1984 hearings on UNESCO said, "UNESCO has become so politicized that it has been used by the enemies of the Western World, and particularly the enemies of the United States, as a vehicle for constantly putting us in a position of almost having to explain or justify our commitment to those Western values."[91]

Many studies have documented the strength of the Israeli lobby as a force in US foreign policy in the Middle East and more generally.[92] The lobby has enjoyed an unrivalled capacity to secure a hearing from the American public, especially in contrast to pro-Palestinian

445

or pro-Arab groups. Uslaner describes it as "the best organized, best funded, and most successful of the ethnic lobbies, indeed perhaps of all foreign policy lobbies."[93]

AIPAC's influence was reflected in the legislation that withheld US contributions to programmes and activities benefiting the PLO, as well as that which mandated withdrawal from the United Nations or affiliated agencies that expelled, suspended, or denied Israel the right to participate. It was behind congressional efforts to close the PLO's offices in New York and Washington, which began in 1985 and culminated in legislation (PL 100–204) in 1988.[94]

The American business community and mass media (especially the print media) have been particularly active in calling attention to issues of international regulation and in trying to shape US responses. Although the business community, including such groups as the Grocery Manufacturers' Association of America, banking lobbies, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association, and the International Chamber of Commerce, has tended to oppose international regulations, the positions of its constituent groups are not uniform. For example, speaking on behalf of the American Home Products Corporation in hearings on the WHO infant formula code, Charles Hagan raised objections: "We feel strongly that neither WHO, nor any of the international organizations in which our country holds membership should be developing codes relating to commercial or marketing practices."[95] In contrast, Wayne Davidson, president of Mead Johnson, noted that his company's opposition to the WHO code did not represent opposition to "the concept of rational and carefully developed codes in general."[96] And, in 1987 hearings on the UN Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, the International Chamber of Commerce indicated that a code that gave "equal weight to the sections on activities, and on the treatment of TNCs, could ... enhance the positive climate for foreign direct investment to benefit the economic growth and welfare of all countries concerned."[97]

These statements reaffirm the conclusions of Bauer, Pool, and Dexter in their classic study of American business and public policy.[98] The American business community's interests are not uniform, and, therefore, competing interests will often cancel each other out.

The media were particularly active in shaping US responses to the debates over a New World Information and Communications Order (NWICO) in UNESCO. As Coate notes in his study of the United States and UNESCO, representatives of media organizations in the United States and Western Europe formed the World Press Free-

dom Committee "to work and speak out against advocates of state-controlled media and other opponents of a free press. This group became especially active in monitoring activities in UNESCO and shaping US communications policy toward the organization."[99] Coate notes how obsessed American reporters became with the NWICO debates and with what they saw as a threat of international censorship. Leonard Sussman, executive director of Freedom House, documented American press coverage of UNESCO activities, concluding that it "reflected the *possibilities* of press-controls, not actualities, and that important distinction has never been made clear."[100] As Coate notes, "such incomplete and biased reporting, when internalized as an important component of the policymaking process, can have quite a significant impact on policy and policymaking processes." The outcomes of UNESCO's debates were relatively positive from a US perspective, but their impact on American policy was "increasingly negative" after 1981 – more attention was focused on UNESCO and the communications issue than was warranted.[101]

UNESCO also illustrated another problem in US–IGO relationships: the consequences for US policy-making when an organization touches many interests. In the UNESCO case, as a result of the very diversity of UNESCO's activities and the scattered nature of its constituencies, there was no centralized group to coordinate the opposition to US withdrawal. And, we might add, the media controlled much of the critical information flow.

During the 1980s, the media also evidenced more general anti-UN sentiments, particularly in columns of noted conservative editorialists. James J. Kilpatrick for example wrote, "The purpose [of the UN] as a forum has been reduced to nullity," suggesting that the media "should carry news of the UN back on the comic pages to dwell with Doonesbury and his friends."[102] Charles Krauthammer writing in the liberal *New Republic* argued, "The U.N. is more than just a failed instrument. It is a bad instrument. We have the power to see it shelved. We should use that power."[103] Likewise, a *Wall Street Journal* editorial commented, "The Babelists of the United Nations are experts at obfuscation. This can have its purposes at times, but there's no reason to cloud the importance and allure of Western concepts of freedom and justice. We can see plenty of freedom and justice. We can see plenty of reasons to stay out, and none to rejoin UNESCO."[104]

Much of the offensive against the United Nations in the 1980s, however, was led not by the media but by the conservative think-

tank, the Heritage Foundation. Founded in 1973 with funding from Joseph Coors, Richard Mellon Scaife, Mobil Oil, and Reader's Digest, the Foundation was best known for providing 3,000 pages of recommendations for the newly elected Ronald Reagan in 1980. Being strategically positioned in Washington, its researchers supplied analyses and background information to members of Congress (reportedly often within one day of the introduction of legislation). The Foundation laid much of the groundwork for the Reagan administration's policies opposing the United Nations and favouring business.[105]

Under the leadership of its vice-president, Burton Yale Pines, the Heritage Foundation commissioned studies of the United Nations focused on the question, "If the UN did not exist, would the situation in each area be worse or better or unchanged."[106] The world would be no worse off, Pines concluded on the basis of the studies.

The Heritage Foundation's publications, *The Backgrounder* and *Policy Review*, provided the basis of its public relations and education effort. Many of them had provocative titles such as "Africa Is Starving and the United Nations Shares the Blame."[107] They were widely circulated to editorial writers across the country and appealed to a mass constituency concerned that taxpayers' dollars were being wasted in support of the UN system.

Armed with an ideological outlook and "pocketbook" economics, the Heritage Foundation proved a formidable anti-UN lobby throughout the 1980s. Its publications, analyses, and memoranda were widely distributed on Capitol Hill and frequently cited (positively) by members of Congress. A 1983 *Backgrounder*, "The United States and the United Nations: Time for Reappraisal," called universal organizations like the United Nations and UNESCO of "very doubtful" value to the United States. "The democratic dictum of one man, one vote may work within communities or nations," its author suggested, "but apparently cannot be applied to organizations containing large numbers of nations which differ dramatically from each other."[108] Another *Backgrounder* was highly critical of UN reforms and called for continued withholding of US funding.[109] Another dealt with the legal case for cutting US funding to the United Nations.[110]

In 1989, two Heritage Foundation publications dealt with UN reform. Their titles did not evidence the same UN-bashing approach of earlier publications, suggesting that the Foundation had moderated its stance. In fact, during the early 1990s, the Foundation turned its attention to domestic issues. Neither its annual reports nor its

printed matter make any reference to UN matters. So the major UN opponent among non-governmental groups has turned to the domestic agenda.

The primary organization countering the anti-UN efforts of the Heritage Foundation and promoting the United Nations' value has been the United Nations Association of the United States (UNA-USA). UNA is a citizen-based group with 28,000 members organized in 165 chapters across the country and a 130-member Council of Organizations. After being largely moribund in the 1970s, it seized the initiative in several areas, strengthening its public education programmes, for example, to emphasize how little the United Nations actually costs the individual American taxpayer (to counter the Heritage Foundation's charge of *how much* the United Nations costs). UNA has held seminars for media editors and disseminated teaching kits to public schools. It has encouraged multilateral citizen study groups to develop proposals on specific problem areas for transmission to US government decision makers. In the later 1980s, the UNA Policy Studies Program developed links with UNA-Soviet Union for a multi-year US$1.2 million programme. The organization has commissioned periodic public opinion surveys by the Roper organization that have provided more detailed information on attitudes toward the United Nations than other polls.

To address the questions of UN reform, the UNA organized a 23-member panel of eminent persons (nine Americans, five persons from other industrialized countries, and nine individuals from third world countries) to study UN management and decision-making. The resulting report, *A Successor Vision: The United Nations of Tomorrow*, is a comprehensive assessment of the United Nations and proposals to strengthen its capacity.[111] There is no evidence, however, that the study has had much impact on thinking among American policy makers.

UNA-USA, like the Heritage Foundation, has used its Washington office and staff to educate congressional staff members. It provides regular information on congressional action affecting multilateral issues and institutions to people in and out of government through its *Washington Weekly Report*. Its impact is far harder to measure, but a former House committee staffer described it as "symbolically and practically important."[112]

The ability of the Heritage Foundation, UNA-USA, and other major lobbies to turn out informational memoranda in a very short time and to deliver copies to all members of Congress long before they

receive anything from the State Department has given them an opportunity to shape congressional debates on many UN-related (and other) issues. The ability of many groups, and most notably AIPAC, to mobilize local groups for grass-roots lobbying provides an additional source of influence on the policy process. The importance of political action committees as a source of funding for election campaigns gives them added leverage. None of the activities of interest groups, however, guarantees influence.

Non-governmental groups, therefore, remain an important part of the policy-making process. In the 1980s, they became involved more than ever before with UN-related issues, blurring the distinction between domestic and international policy and underscoring the increased importance of multilateral institutions as both instruments and influencers of policy.

To this point, we have concentrated on analysing domestic factors shaping US participation in the United Nations and its specialized agencies. That is not to ignore the importance of developments in the international arena, but to underscore the special importance and complexity of those domestic factors in the US case. Before completing our analysis, we turn briefly to examining some key external developments and their influence on the US–UN relationship.

Changes in the international system

The predisposition of the United States in the 1990s to provide leadership as well as to sponsor, support, or reject UN reform does not depend exclusively on domestic factors. Indeed, the United States is likely to be influenced to a significant degree by general changes in the international system, just as it was in the 1970s and 1980s. Of all the external factors affecting US attitudes in the past, the most important was the changing views of the former Soviet Union. It was the single state likely to have the most impact on US thinking. Hence, just as the third world's anti-United States resolutions and demands for ''new orders'' in the 1970s paved the way for US disillusionment with the United Nations and some of the specialized agencies, the ''new thinking'' of the Soviet Union about the United Nations provided the catalyst for the US government to renew its interest in the United Nations' role in resolving regional conflicts in the late 1980s. The Soviet Union's disintegration in the 1990s has provided the international vacuum for American leadership to fill.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the US view of Soviet participation in

the United Nations was coloured by the Soviet Union's frequent use of its veto in the Security Council. In the 1970s, the United States was the defensive, obstructionist power in the eyes of many countries. The Soviets were, in their thinking, the "most dynamic and consistent factor influencing the progressive forces in the U.N."[113]

The application of Soviet "new thinking" to the United Nations in 1987 was a complete surprise – "most intriguing" yet "least understood."[114] The rhetoric of the past was replaced by a proposal from Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev for a comprehensive system of international security – with the United Nations as a core player. Among his proposals, Gorbachev suggested more extensive use of UN military observers and UN peace-keeping troops in disengaging warring factions, more use of UN mediation and good offices, more attention to international terrorism, a renewal of the Security Council mandate through periodic meetings with foreign ministers and closed door proceedings, and use of the permanent members of the Security Council as guarantors of regional security.[115] In short, as two American observers noted, "Gorbachev has presented a far more comprehensive and positive view of the United Nations than any of his predecessors."[116]

Beginning in 1987, the Soviet Union, much to the surprise of many American sceptics, acted on Gorbachev's "new thinking." It cooperated with UN observers in Afghanistan, supported UN peacekeepers in Iran–Iraq, and sent Soviet observers to Namibia. The Soviets paid up arrears on the regular budget and gradually paid off arrearages for the maintenance of peace-keeping forces. The United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 42/93 (Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security) embodying the Soviet initiatives outlined above, despite some member states' scepticism about the change in the Soviet position.

The United States, at both the governmental and non-governmental level, responded favourably to the Soviet initiatives. First, the United Nations Associations of both the United States and Soviet Union have held two joint meetings of former policy makers and scholars. A number of recommendations emerged during the 1989 session, including ones for strengthening the International Court of Justice role, committing the United States and the USSR to greater involvement in peace-keeping, considering multilateral naval peace-keeping, renewing an activist approach by the Secretary-General on regional issues, and calling for the General Assembly to "do no harm" when it considers contentious issues.[117] Second, at the gov-

ernmental level, on 3 November 1989 the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to co-sponsor a new resolution on peace, security, and international cooperation to improve UN effectiveness. The press release noted,

Perhaps the most important thing about this resolution is not its specific language, but what it symbolizes as a new beginning at the United Nations – a new spirit of constructive cooperation. We hope that it may offer an example to other member states that it is possible to set aside the tendentious polemics that have been too common in the United Nations in the past.[118]

Gorbachev's initiatives stimulated US policy makers to cooperate with the Soviets in the United Nations, particularly on peace and security issues. The two countries have long shared common ground on administrative and fiscal matters at the United Nations, and both pushed for the 1986 reforms.[119]

But no Soviet change proved as momentous as the speed and thoroughness of the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, leaving its successor state and its new leader Boris Yeltsin to pull back from international obligations, even supporting UN–US actions in the Gulf, against former Soviet ally Saddam Hussein of Iraq. Russia, despite its seat on the Security Council, is no longer able to have the same impact on UN politics. Thus, the United States, which during much of the history of the United Nations was reacting to or against Soviet actions, is no longer circumscribed by just one country's policy or behaviour.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the ensuing instability, including ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet republics as well as in Yugoslavia, have increased demands for UN peace-keeping and economic development assistance. Between 1988 and 1993, 18 new UN peace-keeping operations were launched, eight of them after 1990.[120] The heavy demand for UN peace-keeping has also dramatically increased the financial resources and personnel required to support operations. Thus, member states continue to be far quicker to approve new peace-keeping operations than to meet their financial commitments. Yet this demand comes at a time when domestic priorities are high on the national agenda in the United States, as well as in other major contributors like Japan and Europe.

Changes in the international system demand that the United States increase its support for and use of the United Nations and specialized agencies. Whereas many of the US problems with the United Nations in the 1970s and early 1980s reflected difficulties adjusting to the com-

parative decline in American influence in the world, the problem of the 1990s may well be how to meet the demands for leadership in the UN system. The importance of multilateral institutions, including those of the UN system, is increasing, making issues of their effectiveness and efficiency critical. Institutional reform, which was given impetus by the withholding of US assessed contributions in the latter half of the 1980s, remains high on the agendas of all institutions.

Reform, especially reforms designed to improve effectiveness and efficiency, will not necessarily come any more easily than it does in national governments. As Inis Claude has noted, international organizations are not necessarily any better than any other organization, nor necessarily any more or less successful at producing compliance and cooperation. Nor is the quality of multilateral decision-making inherently any better than decision-making in national governments.[121] Reform of the UN system, then, could well be like reform of the US Department of Defense – frequently studied and highly recommended, but politically and bureaucratically very difficult to achieve. Reform of the UN system could also be an important factor shaping the attitudes toward the United Nations of key US domestic actors. Yet, our analysis of those actors, their actions, and interactions on UN-related issues over the last 20 years suggests that domestic factors will be critical in shaping the future US–UN relationship.

Conclusion

Certainly, the domestic politics of building and sustaining support for the United Nations in the United States will be no small challenge, as our study demonstrates. The constraints of domestic politics – the administration's focus on domestic social/economic issues, a Congress constrained by the already huge budget deficit and demands for health care reform as well as economic revitalization, a public generally supportive of the United Nations but reluctant to support the use of US troops in risky UN peace-enforcement operations such as Somalia, Haiti, or Bosnia – mean that the United States is unlikely to take on responsibilities of UN leadership without the strong support of other powers in providing people and financial resources. Although changes in the international system and developments in multilateral institutions will inevitably be influential, domestic factors in American politics are going to play a major part, as they have in the past, in shaping US support for or opposition to the United Nations.

Those factors can operate in one of three ways:

453

- to *enable* or *enervate* US leadership in the United Nations and its specialized agencies;
- to *support* policies that sustain participation but not leadership;
- to *constrain* the United States from participation or *circumscribe* that participation in significant ways.

The choices of US policy makers, however, whether to give the United Nations and particular agencies centrality as instruments of US policy, whether to accept the constraints multilateralism imposes as well as its costs, whether to exert leadership, will depend primarily on the dynamics of American domestic politics and, in particular, on presidential leadership (or absence of it) and congressional concurrence. There are certainly more areas of convergence between the United Nations and the United States than there have been in a long time. However, there are still important divergences. In the face of scarce resources and complex challenges, both domestically and internationally, the post–Cold War euphoria for the United Nations has been tempered by post–Cold War realism.

Acknowledgements

Notes and references

1. Richard E. Bissel, "US Participation in the UN System," in Toby Trister Gati, ed., *The US, the UN, and the Management of Global Change* (New York: New York University Press, 1983), 82.
2. Peter F. Cowhey, "Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments: Japan and the United States," *International Organization* 47 (Spring 1993), no. 2: 160, 162.
3. Ruth B. Russell, *The United Nations and United States Security Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968), 331.
4. Edward C. Luck, "Reviewing the Mandate: The UN's Role in Peace and Security," in UNA-USA, *A Successor Vision. The United Nations of Tomorrow* (Boston: University Press of America, 1988).
5. See Lincoln P. Bloomfield, *The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy: A New Look at the National Interest* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1960) and Russell, *The United Nations*.
6. Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, *The United States and Multilateral Institutions: Patterns of Changing Instrumentality and Influence* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990).

7. Duncan Snidal, "Regimes and Cooperation: Challenges to International Relations Theory," in ibid., 327.
8. Robert O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967–1977," in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander George, eds., *Change in the International System* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), 132.
9. For further discussion of politicization, see Gene M. Lyons, "The Politicization Issue in the UN Specialized Agencies," in David A. Kay, ed., *The Changing United Nations* (New York: Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 1977), 81–92; Mark F. Imber, "The Many Meanings of Politicisation," paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association and the British International Studies Association, London, 1989; and Clare Wells, *The UN, UNESCO and the Politics of Knowledge* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987).
10. Wells, *The UN*, 1.
11. Imber, "Politicisation," 6.
12. For discussion of this issue, see Avi Beker, *The United Nations and Israel: From Recognition to Reprehension* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988), 56–57.
13. Thomas M. Franck, "Of Gnats and Camels: Is There a Double Standard at the United Nations?" *American Journal of International Law* 78 (1984), 811–833.
14. Wells, *The UN*, 8.
15. William F. Buckley, Jr., *United Nations Journal: A Delegate's Odyssey* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1977), 63.
16. For discussion of third world strategies, see Stephen F. Krasner, *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
17. Roger F. Coate, "Changing Patterns of Conflict: The United States and UNESCO," in Karns and Mingst, *The United States*, 250.
18. Raymond F. Hopkins, "International Food Organizations and the United States: Drifting Leadership and Diverging Interests," in Karns and Mingst, *The United States*, 177–204.
19. Seymour Maxwell and Nina Hanan, "The United Nations Secretariat Revisited," *Orbis* 25 (Spring 1981), no. 1: 198.
20. See Richard Hoggart, *An Idea and Its Servants: UNESCO from Within* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1978); Roger Coate, *Unilateralism, Ideology and United States Foreign Policy: The U.S. In And Out of UNESCO* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1988); and Coate, "Changing Patterns of Conflict."
21. See United Nations, *A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations' Development System*, Sir Robert Jackson chair, UN No. E70I10 (New York: United Nations, 1970); Martin Hill, *The United Nations System: Coordinating Its Economic and Social Work* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Maurice Bertrand, "Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation in the U.N.," in UNA-USA, *A Successor Vision*, 255–287; and Yves Beigbeder, "Financial Crisis and Management Reform in U.N. Organizations," paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association and the British International Studies Association, London, 1989.
22. UNA-USA, *A Successor Vision*.
23. Brian Urquhart, *A Life in Peace and War* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 352.
24. In 1978, the President issued a *Report on Restructuring and Reform of the U.N. System*, following which the House of Representatives held extensive hearings on UN finances, US participation in the United Nations, and UN reform. The Government Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a series of studies that provided additional input. It is interesting to note that the 1978 hearings and a subsequent set on "Management and Mismanagement at the United Nations" in 1993 are the only ones dealing specifically with these topics during the entire 18-year period we analysed. For the text of the 1978 report and hearings, see US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations, *Hearing: U.S. Participation in the United Nations and U.N.*

Reform, 96th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979). For the 1993 hearings, see US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights, *Management and Mismanagement at the United Nations*, 103rd Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993).

25. John Gerard Ruggie, "The United States and the United Nations: Toward a New Realism," *International Organization* 39 (Spring 1985), no. 2: 350.
26. Donald Puchala and Roger Coate, *The State of the United Nations, 1988* (Hanover, N.H.: Academic Council on the United Nations System, 1988-2), 21.
27. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings: Foreign Relations Authorization Act*, 100th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987), 57.
28. US *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988), 40–41.
29. Robert W. Gregg, *About Face? The United States and the United Nations* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 94.
30. Edward C. Luck and Tobi Trister Gati, "Where Collective Security," *The Washington Quarterly* (Spring 1993), 43.
31. From President Clinton's address to the United Nations, 27 Sep. 1993, excerpted in the *New York Times*, 28 Sep. 1993, A4.
32. Steven A. Dimoff, "Congress's Budget-Cutting Fervor Threatens U.S. Standing at U.N.," *The Interdependent* 19 (Fall 1993), no. 3: 6.
33. Les Aspin, "The Defense Budget and Foreign Policy: The Role of Congress," in Franklin A. Long and George W. Rathjens, eds., *Arms, Defense Policy, and Arms Control* (New York: Norton, 1976).
34. Dante B. Fascell and Gus Yatron, "Congress and the United Nations," *Proteus* (Spring 1988), 173.
35. There were 52 new members of the House (12 per cent) and 16 in the Senate (16 per cent) and, for the first time since 1954, the Republicans commanded a majority in the Senate. Conservative Republicans did not command key positions in the Senate, however, because moderates tended to have seniority. In the House, the ranks of liberal Democrats were thinned by the defeat of 29 incumbent Democratic congressmen.
36. US Senate Committee on Appropriations, *Report: Continuing Appropriations, 1984*, No. 98-304 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983), 7; US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Report: International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1984*, No. 98-628, 98th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984).
37. *The Congressional Record*, 22 Sep. 1983, S12732.
38. When regular fiscal year appropriations have not been enacted by the beginning of the fiscal year, continuing resolutions provide budget authority for specific ongoing activities. They usually specify whether the agency may spend at the level of the previous year, the President's budget request, or an appropriation bill passed by either or both houses of the Congress. Given the increasing complexity and difficulty of the congressional budget process since the late 1970s, continuing resolutions have frequently been required for the State Department appropriations covering both US assessed and voluntary contributions to the United Nations.
39. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearing: International Organizations and Multilateral Diplomacy*, 99th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), 10.
40. P.L. 99-93.
41. US House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, *Hearings:*

Department of State Appropriations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), 951, 953.

42. *Department of State Bulletin* (Jun. 1988), 88.

43. Ibid., 89.

44. US House of Representatives Conference Report, *Report: Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989*, No. 100-475, 100th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987).

45. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings: Foreign Relations Authorization Act*, 100th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987). The withheld contributions were not, in fact, appropriated and hence not put in escrow. Thus, the Congress has had to authorize and appropriate funds for the arrearages in current budgets for each successive year.

46. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Report: Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1988*, No. 100-75 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987), 6.

47. *The Congressional Record*, 30 Sep. 1988, S13743–44.

48. One of the factors that complicates the picture of US contributions toward its annual UN assessments, and consequently its arrearages, is the discontinuity between the US fiscal year (1 October to 30 September) and the United Nations' calendar year (1 January to 30 December).

49. *The Congressional Record*, 4 Jan. 1988, E3208.

50. Ibid., 48.

51. Ibid.

52. HR2295 (1993).

53. Amendment #1069 to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1994 HR3116 (1993) allows the President to place US forces under foreign (i.e. UN) control as long as the commanders are qualified, they "have clear and effective command and control arrangements; appropriate rules of engagement; and clear and unambiguous mission statements." The President is required to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours of putting US forces under foreign control and must provide an exact logistical description of what he has promised.

54. Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, *Foreign Policy by Congress* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 213.

55. Ibid., 159.

56. Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., and Pat M. Holt, *Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President and Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1984), 233–234.

57. The Congressional Research Service has compiled a report on *Legislation Affecting Participation and Contributions* (98th, 99th, and 100th Congresses) authored by Vita Bite and Lois B. McHugh that represents a valuable guide to various restrictions and requirements imposed in this period, 1984–1989 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1989).

58. I. M. Destler, L. H. Gelb, and A. Lake, *Our Own Worst Enemy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 129–130.

59. James L. Sundquist, "Congress and the President: Enemies or Partners?" in Henry Owen and Charles L. Schultze, eds., *Setting National Priorities: The Next Ten Years* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976), 583–618.

60. On the role of the GAO, see Stephen H. Collins and Joseph F. Moraglio, "The Role of the GAO," *Journal of Accountancy* (April 1987), 58–70.

61. Franck and Weisband, *Foreign Policy by Congress*.

62. Destler, Gelb, and Lake, *Our Own Worst Enemy*.

63. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*, 3rd. ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 434.

64. I. M. Destler, "Congress as Boss?" *Foreign Policy* 42 (Spring 1981), 176.

65. On the subject of declining influence of leadership, see Barbara Sinclair, ''The Distribution of Committee Positions in the U.S. Senate: Explaining Institutional Change,'' *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (May 1988), 276–301.
66. See Franck and Weisband, *Foreign Policy by Congress*.
67. Sundquist, ''Congress,'' 588.
68. Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, 454.
69. Ibid., 455.
70. It is extraordinarily difficult to piece together a clear picture of exactly what Congress has authorized and appropriated for US assessed contributions each year, let alone what has actually been contributed.
71. Barbara Hinckley, *Stability and Change in Congress*, 4th ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 73.
72. Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley, ''How are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model,'' *American Political Science Review* 81 (Dec. 1987), no. 4: 1099–1120. For a review of the literature on public opinion and foreign policy, see Ole R. Holsti, ''Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond–Lippmann Consensus,'' *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (Dec. 1992), no. 4: 439–466.
73. Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, ''Effects of Public Opinion on Policy,'' *American Political Science Review* 77 (Mar. 1983), no. 1: 175–190.
74. Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, 297.
75. The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations has commissioned the Gallup Organization to conduct the surveys of both the general public and national leaders at periodic intervals since 1974. All of the interviews for the public are personal, in-home interviews, selected according to a stratified, systematic national sample. The smaller leadership sample includes individuals in senior positions with knowledge of and influence upon international affairs and foreign policy. They are chosen from the national political and governmental world, officials with international responsibilities, and officials from the business, communications, and educational communities. The results of these surveys have been edited by John E. Rielly and published as occasional papers by the CCFR under the title, *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy*.
76. Eugene R. Wittkopf, ''On the Foreign Policy Beliefs of the American People: A Critique and Some Evidence,'' *International Studies Quarterly* 30 (Dec. 1986), no. 4: 428.
77. Ibid., 429.
78. Chadwick F. Alger, ''U.S. Public Opinion on the United Nations: A Mandate for Multilateral Foreign Policy,'' paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Acapulco, 23–27 Mar. 1993, 11.
79. Alfred O. Hero, Jr., ''The United States Public and the United Nations,'' in David A. Kay, ed., *The Changing United Nations: Options for the U.S.* (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1977), 19.
80. National Opinion Research Center, 1986, reported in *Index to International Public Opinion 1986–1987* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988).
81. Gallup Poll, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1985* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1985).
82. Alger, ''US Public Opinion,'' 12.
83. Ibid., 23.
84. Ole Holsti and James Rosenau have conducted five nationwide surveys of American leaders since 1976, using a number of specialized directories and *Who's Who in America* to select a sample of approximately 4,000 leaders. The response rates to their mailed surveys range between 53 per cent and 63 per cent. The results of the first two surveys are analysed in Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, *American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown of Consensus* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1984). Their interpretations have been the subject of scholarly dispute. See, for example, Thomas Ferguson,

"The Right Consensus? Holsti and Rosenau's New Foreign Policy Belief Surveys," *International Studies Quarterly* 30 (Dec. 1986), no. 4: 411–423.

85. Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, "The Domestic and Foreign Beliefs of American Leaders," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32 (Jun. 1988), no. 2.

86. Data provided by Ole R. Holsti from his national leadership study with James N. Rosenau, reported in Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, *World Politics: The Menu for Choice* (New York: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1989), 217.

87. Holsti and Rosenau, "Domestic and Foreign Beliefs," 256.

88. Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, "The Structure of Foreign Policy Beliefs Among American Opinion Leaders – After the Cold War," *Millennium* 22 (1993), no. 2: 261.

89. For the pluralist view, see, for example, Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy* (New York: Atherton, 1963); Lester Milbrath, "Interest Groups and Foreign Policy," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1967), 231–252; Bernard C. Cohen, *The Influence of Non-Governmental Groups on Foreign Policy* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1959); and Bernard C. Cohen, "The Influence of Special Interest Groups and the Mass Media on Security Policy in the United States," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds., *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 222–241. For the opposing view, see Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1979).

90. See Karns and Mingst, *The United States*, chap. 11.

91. US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations and Subcommittee on International Operations, *Hearing: Recent Developments in UNESCO and Their Implications for U.S. Policy*, 98th Congress, 2nd session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984), 17.

92. See, for example, C. Ruberberg, "The Middle East Lobbies," *Link* 17 (1984), no. 1; Chung-In Moon, "Complex Interdependence and Transnational Lobbying: South Korea in the United States," *International Studies Quarterly* 32 (March 1988), no. 1: 67–89; and Wells, *The UN*.

93. E. M. Uslaner, "One Nation, Many Voices: Interest Groups in Foreign Policy Making," in A. Cigler and B. Loomis, eds., *Interest Group Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1986), 16.

94. *Congressional Quarterly*, 20 Feb. 1988, 357.

95. US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and on Human Rights and International Organizations, *Hearing: Implementation of the World Health Organization (WHO) Code on Infant Formula Marketing Practices*, 97th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), 54.

96. Ibid., 42.

97. US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, *Hearing: Review of the UN Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations*, 100th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987), 38.

98. Bauer, Pool, and Dexter, *American Business*.

99. Coate, "Changing Patterns of Conflict," 250.

100. Cited in ibid.

101. Ibid.

102. James J. Kilpatrick, *The Baltimore Sun*, 22 Sep. 1981.

103. Charles Krauthammer, "Let It Sink," *New Republic*, 2 Aug. 1987, 23.

104. "No Tears for UNESCO," *Wall Street Journal*, 1 Nov. 1989, A14.

105. Thomas Byrne Edsall, *The New Politics of Inequality* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1984).

106. Burton Yale Pines, *A World Without a UN: What Would Happen If the United Nations Shut Down* (New York: The Heritage Foundation, 1984), xii.
107. Roger A. Brooks, "Africa Is Starving and the United Nations Shares the Blame," *The Backgrounder* (Heritage Foundation), no. 480 (14 Jan. 1986).
108. *The Congressional Record*, 30 Sep. 1983, E4678–4680.
109. *The Congressional Record*, 10 Nov. 1988, E3761–3.
110. *The Congressional Record*, 9 Jul. 1987, 2831–3.
111. UNA-USA, *A Successor Vision*.
112. Personal communication.
113. V. Petrovsky, "The UN and World Politics," *International Affairs* (Moscow) (Jul. 1980), 11.
114. Edward C. Luck and Toby Trister Gati, "Gorbachev, the United Nations, and U.S. Policy," *The Washington Quarterly* 11 (Autumn 1988), no. 4: 19.
115. M. S. Gorbachev, "Secure World," printed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, 17 Sep. 1987, 23–28.
116. Luck and Gati, "Gorbachev, the United Nations, and US Policy," 22.
117. Tobi Trister Gati, "The 'New' U.N.: Through Soviet and American Eyes" (New York: United Nations Association of the United States of America, 1989).
118. US Mission to the United Nations, "Joint Statement of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Bolton and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky," Press Release USUN 113-(89), 3 Nov. 1989.
119. Luck and Gati, "Gorbachev, the United Nations, and US Policy," 34.
120. Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, "Maintaining International Peace and Security: UN Peacekeeping and Peacemaking," in Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas, eds., *World Security: Challenges for a New Century* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 188–215.
121. Inis L. Claude, Jr., *States and the Global System: Politics, Law and Organization* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), chaps. 9–10.

Part III
Convergence and divergence

11

Foreign policy and the United Nations: National interest in the era of global politics

John E. Trent

Introduction

First and foremost, the United Nations is a creature of the nation-state system. Created in 1945 in the aftermath of World War II, the policies, actions, and patterns of change in the United Nations must be approved by, and be in step with, the foreign policies of member states, particularly the more powerful. Second, the United Nations, to a large degree, is a mirror of the principles and the evolving power structures of the post-war world, albeit informed by the cumulative experience of international organizations over the past century. These factors are likely to be at the core of any efforts to transform the organization. So too is the fact that the United Nations is governed by a Charter that can be changed only with the agreement of governments. These conditions are part of the baggage the United Nations carries as an institution and are at the root of this series of essays on national foreign policies towards the United Nations, the first comparative study to be undertaken in 40 years.[1]

This chapter draws on the eight national studies in order to identify certain similarities and differences about the United Nations in the foreign policies of selected states that represent several regions, stages of development, and levels of power within the international system. Our synthesis has as its first objective *to study the expecta-*

tions states have of the United Nations and the *functions* it fulfils for their foreign policies; second, *to understand who makes decisions* about the United Nations and who and what they represent; and third, *to explain* the general nature of *foreign policies* towards the United Nations. Are decision makers more or less free agents or are they to a greater degree prisoners of their national cultures, or their institutions, or their country's position in the international system? Do they reflect the ideas of governing élites or of a broad consensus in the country and its public opinion? Finally, we want to see what these expectations, functions, and decision-making processes tell us about the *process of reform* in the United Nations and the potential for major transformation of the organization.

Our major findings can be summarized within four themes. To the degree that the eight cases are representative, we can make the following generalizations. First, relations with the United Nations, as founded on the foreign policies of member states, rest firmly within the state-centric model of international relations, aimed at the maximization of national interests. Second, there is, nevertheless, a gradual movement toward a global system in which states as members of the international community seek rules of common governance even while they advance national interests. In effect, the United Nations hovers between traditional state-centric demands and global system requirements. Third, to the degree that there are differences in foreign policy orientations towards the United Nations, they are chiefly explained by variations in the international power positions of states. Fourth, because of national interests, changes in the United Nations system are likely to be limited to modest, ad hoc, and incremental reforms within the logic of the present system.

Not everyone will enjoy these conclusions. Obviously some individuals, organizations, and perhaps even a few governments think in terms of a fundamental strengthening of the United Nations system. But this is not the dominant objective of state policies. The message of this chapter is that those who wish to transform the United Nations must ultimately take into consideration the realities of national interests and foreign policy methods and objectives of member governments. Essentially, reformers must seek to change the perception of self-interest.

In looking at the foreign policies of member states, we should none the less keep *the broader context* of the United Nations in mind. Only the United Nations, because of its universal, permanent, and generalized characteristics, is a serious forum for world diplomacy as well as

an instrument for peaceful settlement, arms control, human rights, development, and environment cooperation. The end of the East–West conflict has made all these functions even more relevant.

Nevertheless, there is great diversity of opinion about the United Nations, including a kind of ''debilitating negativism,'' fed in part by media that want to report only ''the hot issues and our mistakes,'' as a recent Secretary-General candidly admitted.[2] For this reason and because one never knows what changes alternative national élites will bring, it is wise to have a broad historical perspective on the United Nations. In the first chapter, Chadwick Alger points not only to the organization's universality but also to its capacity for dealing with global problems through its functional agencies, its presence in 134 cities, the gradual development of procedures for multilateral decision-making and peace-keeping, the linking of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and scholars to international management, and the impetus to the formation of global values. Alger correctly suggests that these trends, seen over the long run, have been gradually preparing the United Nations for world governance, a growing need in a period when more and more states are less and less capable of fulfilling their sovereign functions. All of these trends toward the global system should not be lost to view as we use a state-centric analysis to examine the interface between the United Nations' legitimacy and the sovereignty of member states.

During its first 50 years the United Nations has always been a vehicle for both idealism and realism. Early on, many had unbounded hopes for the new world organization and the principles expounded in its Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights. As we see in the Nigerian example, moreover, idealism was not restricted to naive public opinion:

In the early 1960s the United Nations was seen and portrayed in Nigerian official circles as an assembly of individual sovereign states, interacting freely and harmoniously on the basis of equality and frankness with one another. The view of the *raison d'être* of the United Nations system was romantic. Its supreme goal was taken to be the attainment of peace and progress for all humankind. The United Nations and its agencies would be a forum where African problems and aspirations would be ''considered on the basis of justice divorced from selfish considerations.'' (p. 330 above)

None the less, those who had created the United Nations knew very well the intense struggles for positioning and power that surrounded the founding conference in San Francisco in 1945. These

465

struggles were of *realpolitik* as well as of belief. The United Nations, to be useful, must reflect world reality, it was said. The United Nations never was the "We the peoples …" that the Charter proclaims; it was more to be "we the governments" of the states that purport to speak for the peoples. These struggles have not ceased to this day and form part of the backdrop for the "reform" and revitalization of the world body that have gone on, especially since the end of the Cold War. As Gene Lyons asks at the end of his essay in chapter 2: what do the national studies that comprise the main part of this volume tell us about the future of the United Nations? Let me turn to that question.

Foreign policies toward the United Nations

Expectations: National interest and the United Nations

Our primary conclusion is that the United Nations is still predominantly a locale for power politics as dictated by perceptions of national interest by member states, with some movement toward the transformation of the organization into an independent institution in global politics. Needless to say, power politics and national interests may also motivate states, on occasion, to work together for common purposes. But, for most states, most of the time, the United Nations is primarily an instrument of foreign policy to protect interests, enhance influence, or achieve specific goals. Few states (if any) have a coherent United Nations policy in which the United Nations is seen as an object unto itself. Even middle powers support the United Nations because it is in their interest to do so. Nor is the United Nations the most important locale for the real exercise of power, especially by major states. Other milieux such as G7 summits, the European Union, military alliances, other regional and ethnic groupings, and the Bretton Woods institutions (part of the United Nations system) are seen as more important.

In the United Nations, as so often in international politics, the contradictions between appearances and reality are striking. For example:

First, there was a contradiction between Nigerian leaders' image of the UN system and the real nature and structure of the organization. Second, there was a gap between the lofty goals that the Nigerian leaders expected the United Nations to have and the real goals toward which the concrete and objective interests of the United Nations' member states impelled the orga-

nization. Third, there was a conflict between the official statement of Nigeria's role at the United Nations and what Nigeria's concrete interests dictated as the country's actual role at the United Nations. (p. 333 above)

All our case-studies note the difference between rhetoric and reality as states pursue their own goals within the UN system. These goals may be pursued either alone or in the company of other "like-minded" states.

National interest is pursued through caucusing groups as well as by individual states
UN politics are heavily influenced by a mixture of relatively permanent caucuses and relatively impermanent issue- and topic-specific coalitions.[3] In fact, much of the politics within the United Nations appears to be a function of mutual-interest blocs, whether this be as a continuing process or as temporary issue-specific coalitions and whether this be within special caucuses and groupings or with regard to particular policies. The landscape of the case-studies in this volume is littered with such groupings. In earlier days we had the East and West (Warsaw Pact vs. NATO) and the "non-aligned" Group of 77, African states, OPEC, and the Arab League (to name but a few). More recently these groupings include new associations alongside the North–South divide, major contributors, the Geneva Group, the permanent member caucus in the Security Council, and "daily consultations" of the European Union countries during the General Assembly. Let us take but two observations from our authors.[4]

The [Algerian National Liberation] Front was able to become familiar with the practices of world politics, … including … alliances[,] … contacts and network of relations. (p. 94)

As Nigerian leaders became aware that politics within the United Nations, like all others, is bloc politics, there grew an appreciation of the importance of belonging to a caucusing group or groups within the United Nations. (pp. 334–5)

Yet, even within caucuses, the very heavily "pro-United Nations" small and middle states, no less than major powers, clearly act, in great part, in their own interest. They have been aware that they gain most from a system of effectively operating multilateral diplomacy. As Joe Clark, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, said to the General Assembly in 1984: "Smaller and middle powers … need effective global institutions to make each of our voices heard in the world."

Yet, despite the influence of bloc or regional politics within the United Nations, the real expressions of self-interest come to the surface through national positions, particularly when specific national policies run contrary to dominant trends in the United Nations over an extended period of time. In our case-studies, the realism of national interest is most clearly expressed by France and the United States, both of which consider the United Nations to be one tool of national foreign policy among others. France calculates its UN policy from a rational perspective that sees the United Nations as an instrument with which to balance potential threats and opportunities. In the past, such threats included its colonial position and nuclear tests or, more generally, the possibility of being isolated or being placed in a minority situation. Advantages include the power that comes from its prestige and moral position at the United Nations and the fact that its permanent Security Council seat means it is continuously consulted and is thus at the centre of international politics. All in all, the United Nations is relatively inexpensive for France, provides high status, and rarely threatens its vital interests. So it pays to balance UN cooperation with national goals.

If anything, the portrayal of United States interests is even more explicit. As Karns and Mingst suggest: "Until the early 1970s most of the scholarship on the US–UN relationship concerned the United States' use of the United Nations as an instrument of its foreign policy … The perceived utility of the United Nations and its specialized agencies has been strongly shaped by the ability of American representatives to influence procedures and outcomes" (pp. 413–14 above). The United Nations is useful in so far as it is an instrument of US policies or a tool for the maintenance of "regimes" (that is, normative international structures of acceptable behaviour) that are beneficial for the attainment of American goals. American foreign policy makers do not believe the organization can serve as a primary focal point for US policy. In the pre-1970 period, the United Nations was seen as a limited instrument for diplomatic communication with, and embarrassment of, the Soviet Union, as well as for enforcing the peace and facilitating humanitarian projects. The seeds of its decline in US eyes were sown by the growth of third world majorities and the ensuing loss in American ability to control outcomes in programmes and activities.

The US Congress wants returns on American contributions and Americans are opposed to what they claim is the "politicization" of

the United Nations, its tendencies toward international economic regulation, state-oriented development, increasing budgets, and administrative inefficiency. It remains to be seen whether the more recent UN mobilization for peace and security after the Cold War will change American perceptions of the utility of the United Nations in pursuit of US foreign policy goals. While the 1990 Gulf crisis may have been "a turning point ... for American leadership and commitment to the United Nations" and the Clinton administration that took office in 1993 was "initially ... very supportive," it is still true that "US Presidents have often found their foreign policy leadership dependent upon congressional support" (pp. 423–4). In his September 1993 address to the United Nations, President Clinton was obliged to admit that his intention of paying all arrears had floundered on the shoals of congressional "budget-cutting fervor." Karns and Mingst report that a severe budget deficit and events in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia fuelled scepticism about the United Nations in Congress, so that there was still "concern over the effectiveness, mounting cost, and complexity of UN peace-keeping operations [and] the US share of these costs, as well as waste and corruption in the organization" (p. 431).

There are also cases where national interest plays a double role in both moving member states to favour the United Nations but forcing them to withdraw support when opposed by the UN majority. A classic case is that of the Netherlands, which, generally supportive, found itself drawing back from the United Nations during the Indonesian affair and, later, over the cost of peace-keeping contributions. Canada, too, when it had pretensions of being a "principal power," tended to turn its back on the United Nations during the 1970s.

Interests change over time
National interests with regard to the United Nations do not necessarily hold steady over time. Positions may change either because of an evolution in the state or its élite or because of a modification in the international political system or the dominant coalition at the United Nations. The United Nations itself has gone through a number of "dominant agendas," including post-war idealism, US domination, decolonization, East–West rivalry, non-alignment, and readjustment. In response, the Americans moved from general support for the United Nations prior to 1970 to almost open hostility in the 1980s.[5] Ogata refers to the three periods of Japanese relations with the

United Nations going from the pre-eminence of regional concerns, through "resource distribution diplomacy," to the current role of institution-building (pp. 232–3).

France had at least two distinctive foreign policy stances until recently: one emphasizing cohesion with its allies, and a second exemplified by the policy of Charles de Gaulle. General de Gaulle was set on establishing Algeria's independence without foreign interference, maintaining French support behind his Algerian policy, and building France's independent nuclear deterrent. For all these goals he considered the United Nations worse than a meddling nuisance. Now, claims Smouts, "France has returned to the fold" (p. 223). Admitting that historical divisions are arbitrary, Cheikh, writing on Algerian policy, nevertheless feels that benchmarks are useful, although he is sanguine about the current effect of fundamentalism on traditional trends.

Two main periods can be emphasized: one covers the armed struggle for national liberation in which the foundations of Algerian foreign policy were built; and the second is the period of independence in which policies, grounded in these foundations, evolved in terms of the needs of national construction and the shifts in international developments. (p. 91)

The effect of national interests

The continued use of power diplomacy has a profound influence on the nature of the United Nations. States are determined to use their power resources to achieve their exclusive ends. The North, for example, seeks control through its financial leverage and the South through its numbers, especially in the General Assembly. Algeria, among other states, attacked the "oligarchic character" of the United Nations, including the right of veto in the Security Council and the "weighted voting in the financial institutions of the UN system, which ensures that the principal contributors will monopolize the decision-making system" (p. 113). Within developed countries, moreover, finance ministries dominate decision-making on economic issues and thus tilt policies in conservative directions. This process is described by Ogata:

The Finance Ministry attempts to maintain exclusive control over IMF and World Bank matters, sharing the management of monetary affairs with the Bank of Japan. The involvement of the Foreign Ministry in matters concerning the Bretton Woods institutions remains minimal. (p. 26)

In recent years, the clout of the financial power of the wealthy con-

tributors has been extended into the United Nations itself through the new consensus (read veto) budget process and the use of extra-budgetary funds, which place whole sections of United Nations activity at the discretion of the wealthy donors. The Geneva Group also enables the major financial contributors to coordinate their policies. The most thorough exposition of the Geneva Group is in the chapter by Groom and Taylor. The Group was founded in the 1960s to "review informally" the budgets and programmes of the specialized agencies of the United Nations based in Geneva (WHO, ILO, ITU, WMO). The Geneva Group, chaired by the United Kingdom and the United States, in the 1980s had as its major members Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Spain, which, collectively, account for about two-thirds of the budgets. While it can be said that the Group has tried to instil a sense of priorities and efficiency, it is also true that, with no legal status and operating quietly behind the scenes with permanent staff from the missions in the various United Nations centres, the Group has been able to enforce the British–American policy of zero budget growth (which meant a real budget decline) for the United Nations since the 1980s.

On the other side of the ledger are the efforts of such third world countries as Algeria to "reform the international order" through what Cheikh has dubbed "the dialectic of numbers and power." As he points out, numerical importance gave the "non-aligned" a counterbalance to established countries by passing resolutions in favour of respecting sovereignty over natural resources, the right of nationalization, reform of the international monetary system, development assistance, and control over commodity pricing. In their desire to counteract the veto, consensus decision-making, weighted voting, and closed groups, the non-aligned states pursued the goal of transforming international relations "in the direction of democracy and the equality of all states" (p. 113). Yet these goals could be achieved only through legally binding application of majority rule in the General Assembly, based on the principles of universalization and "one state, one vote". In reality, Assembly resolutions are no more than recommendations, however they may signal majority positions.

On the surface, the idea of majority rule seems unassailable, but it again appears to be the rhetorical use of one-sided principles to reinforce a power position, just as the Western states do when they appeal to notions of equity and efficiency in order "to make money talk." The simple fact of being a state says little about political real-

ity, that is, about the size of population; the representivity of the government; territorial, economic, and technical capacity; and the ability to fulfil obligations. It is hard to imagine a political system that does not reflect a balance of power as well as the majority. At root, what we are witnessing in the United Nations is but another of the eternal struggles, already acted out in the world's federations and democracies, between the principles of territorial representation and representation by population and between the principles of élite and mass representation.

Functions performed by the United Nations for member states
A corollary conclusion is that the functions that the United Nations is seen to fulfil are largely those that are perceived to serve evolving national interests. Even systemic functions are those of the traditional state system.

The functions considered worthwhile by UN members are those that respond to their needs rather than to the requirements of system maintenance or support of global regimes. In order to gain a clearer vision of the expectations member states have of the United Nations, we can categorize them under the three headings of influence, diplomatic, and systemic functions.

The *influence functions* are determined as much by mutual-interest blocs (more or less regional groupings) as by the specifics of the particular state. As we have seen, the rich, Northern states want to be able to influence the United Nations to provide a stable, international system based on "civilized" standards of international behaviour and delivered by an efficient organization in which "he who pays the piper calls the tune." Stability, in their terms, is to be found within normatively based regimes (e.g. economic, legal, security, and human rights) through which rule enforcement and dispute settlement are managed by UN agencies. Efficiency means value-for-money, cost-effective, coherent programmes in which priorities are matched to existing resources in an open, unpoliticized process. The "pipers" are the major contributors, who should have effective control over budgets through their "consensus-vetoes," voluntary funding programmes, and zero-growth budgeting.

For their part, small and medium powers, including some from the third world, see the United Nations in part as a means of extending their influence by gaining voice through a multilateral institution that, because of the theoretical equality of its members, at least has the effect of equalizing diplomatic capacity. Different terms are

472

used – independence, prestige, status, internationalization of conflicts, or mobilization of pressures – but all lead to the same expectation: extension of national capacity.

Owing to a lack of resources in personnel, experience, and finance, relatively new states from the developing regions look to the United Nations as the single locale in which they can exercise their influence as well as protect and extend their interests through the strength of their numbers. Traditionally the United Nations was an instrument in the emancipation of peoples from their post-colonial dependence. Increasingly it has become the principal forum in which they can bring their weight to bear to re-equilibrate North–South relations and get Southern issues back onto the international agenda.

Scattered throughout our studies there are also references to more specifically national expectations of UN functions. Some countries like the United Kingdom and France see their privileged position in the United Nations as a bulwark against the decline of their power, while others like Japan and Germany expect due recognition of their increased contributions. States also see the United Nations as providing collective legitimation for their national interests. Japan, in addition, looks to the United Nations to supplement its capacities for defence through mutual security. Canada imagines the United Nations as a forum for middle powers in which states can have influence according to their capacity to contribute to UN functions. Almost all middle powers look to the United Nations for collective regulation of the largest powers. French diplomacy welcomed an enhancement of UN intervention in the 1990s because "an active and efficient United Nations in which it could play an acknowledged role is consistent with France's interests. Multilateralism maximizes its assets" (p. 19). Nigeria and Algeria use the United Nations not only to demonstrate independence and gain prestige but also as an amplifier that can add the weight of international mediation and mobilization to African causes. Bulwark against power decline, re-equilibrator of power imbalances, amplifier of the weak, and controller of the strong, the United Nations must attempt to be all things to all states – as well as responding to demands for real policy output for the people in an increasingly interdependent world.

Perhaps most typical are the *diplomatic functions* the United Nations is expected to perform. Smouts summarized them well as "information, collective legitimation, regulation" (p. 191). But states also see the United Nations as a diplomatic forum for continuous consultation and communication, minimal coordination of collective

action, arrangement of alliances, contacts, and networks, and the multilateral exchange of ideas. Smouts also puts her finger on the utility of the United Nations as a sort of "diplomatic barometer" or "opinion poll at the world level" (p. 188).

The third category of functions, which we have dubbed "*systemic*," revolves around the United Nations' two main characteristics, its universalism and its responsibilities for international security. Its universal membership permits the United Nations to serve as a promoter of socio-economic cooperation and regulation, multilateral aid, human rights, and a North–South forum. Second, as the world's chief institution for peace and security, the United Nations, especially since the end of the Cold War, is expected not only to promote norms of peaceful conduct and to step into the breach with conflict resolution, but also increasingly to take action for peace-making; it is clear from our authors that preventive diplomacy is back.

The return of cooperative action among the five permanent members of the Security Council has increased expectations of the United Nations. At one level it is expected to promote arms control, disarmament, and nuclear non-proliferation. At another, it should strengthen fact-finding under the Secretary-General as well as give him a new capacity to act early with a UN presence to prevent aggravation of conflicts before "they are brought to the Security Council's attention." However, whereas some countries like Japan are very keen for the United Nations to provide an additional "security net," others are still sceptical about an enhanced role for the Secretary-General. As Lyons points out, "Major governments undoubtedly did not want the Secretary-General to get out ahead of them" (p. 63).

The thread that runs through most of these functions is that they are still very much at the level of the inter-state (rather than the "global") system. Only very seldom do we find the United Nations called upon to achieve the Netherlands' traditional goal of "peace everywhere and unrestricted commerce" or Japan's desire for enhanced "global management." Much more frequent are the specific reminders that the United Nations must not threaten the national interests or positions of its members. The functions it is to perform are those that are intended to improve the power positions and the diplomatic and commercial capacities of states.

The United Nations is one international organization among others
As far as other international functions are concerned, most states look to other multilateral forums. French leaders appear to be clear-

474

est about seeing the United Nations as only one locus of diplomacy among many. Real power diplomacy takes place elsewhere – in the G7, the European Union, NATO, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Bretton Woods institutions, and various other conferences and summits. When new international problems arise, French political leaders do not turn first to the United Nations if they want swift, dramatic action.

They are not alone. In Algeria's case, it looks at least as much toward institutions of African unity, the Arab brotherhood, and the Maghreb. Canada is active in the *francophonie*, the Commonwealth, G7, NATO, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the Organization of American States, as well as at the United Nations. Japan will go where it is accorded prestige. The United Kingdom sees its role in the United Nations as one hub of a series of overlapping circles including relations with the United States, the Commonwealth, and the European Union.

Thus, diplomacy at the United Nations is in constant competition for saliency and resources with other global institutions and regional agendas, some of which impinge on the United Nations. The building of the European Union is but one example. France reports that EU consultation consumes much of its mission's time at the United Nations. Dutch foreign policy at the United Nations has been gradually incorporated with that of the European Union: "the 12 member states of the European Union have, since the 1970s, shown a tendency, in the context of European Political Cooperation, toward regular consultations in New York, Geneva, and Brussels, in an effort to harmonize their policies in the United Nations" (pp. 273–4). Even though the United Kingdom and France have in the past opted to keep their position as permanent members of the Security Council outside European Political Cooperation, under the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, with its common foreign and security policy, they are obliged to inform and consult the other members about the Security Council activities.

This is but one example of a very important issue for the future of the United Nations. Over the years, small and medium powers have often been the backbone of efforts to make positive commitments to the development of the world body. To the degree that middle powers, say, like Canada and the Netherlands, are drawn into new regional arrangements, and to the degree that these new arrangements represent nascent "superpowers," who then will work for development and conciliation within the United Nations?

475

Towards globalism

A qualification to our basic conclusion is that there are indeed indicators at the state level that there is some movement from the state system to the global system with regard to the United Nations. There are also some signs of feedback into state foreign policies from the United Nations as a semi-autonomous actor. Amongst our cases this is best exemplified by Japan, the Netherlands, and Canada, although most states recognize that, of necessity, they must balance the requirements of national interest against the needs of UN cooperation.

The United Nations is, at one and the same time, an embryo of an organized community and an instrument of foreign policy for its members. France, like all states, tries to maintain a balance between the needs of international cooperation and the free determination of its own goals. (p. 19)

There is even some indication of a similar trend in the case of the United States:

Changes in the international system demand that the United States increase its support for and use of the United Nations and specialized agencies. (p. 452)

Japan, because of its *historical* situation, lacking national resources and having foresaken a national defence force, is perhaps the prototype of a post-Westphalian state of the twenty-first century. Thus Japanese leaders want an effective United Nations to move toward international security and global management. But, as Ogata points out, Japan's policy makers have traditionally still understood international relations in the restricted sense of inter-state affairs. The ambiguity of their position can be seen in two examples. It took them a decade to accept a role in UN human rights and humanitarian activities and another to accept participation in peace-keeping. International demands for demonstrable Japanese contributions led to a new law in 1992 entitled "Cooperation for the United Nations Peace-keeping Operations and Other Operations." Ogata concludes that Japanese public opinion will follow its government's positive policy toward the United Nations, "[s]o long as there is no conflict with Japan's vital interests, or sudden exposure of widespread wrongdoing" (p. 257). Furthermore, Japan is quietly determined to have its financial contributions to the United Nations recognized through a seat as a permanent member of the Security Council, an ambition

that has gained much support. For this reason, "Japan is expected to make the most of the changing tide by actively contributing to a wide range of UN activities" (p. 266).

The Netherlands too, because of its small land base, its dense population, and its situation at the mouth of the Rhine and surrounded by larger neighbours, has always favoured international law and stable trade relations. But it also is torn by the dilemma of having to temper considerations of national interest with its wish to strengthen the rule of law. Nevertheless, for three decades the Netherlands has had an action-based UN policy with specific goals including development aid, population policy, human rights, peace-keeping, fact-finding, and environmental protection. Its "not grandiose" but "practical and effective" efforts paid off, after decades of East–West stalemate, with the 1991 Declaration on Fact-Finding, and now the Netherlands has become one of the first states to earmark both budget and personnel for peace-keeping.

Canada too, despite its relative wealth and status, has generally eschewed the power path to influence because of its huge territory, small population, and long common border with the United States. Rather, like Japan and the Netherlands it counts on the United Nations (and other multilateral institutions) to enhance peace and security, promote stable international relations, and improve the world environment and humanitarian conditions. Each of these countries, and others, refer repeatedly to their desire to make "effective contributions" to the development of the United Nations system. Perhaps we see here the embryonic conditions for a global system based on the inadequacies of individual states to ensure, by and of themselves, a satisfactory international milieu.

The evolution of national policies such as these has been matched by ever more activities and an increasing recognition of the United Nations in national foreign policies. The signs are subtle but real. Take the example of France. Smouts notes that the United Nations, as a universal and quasi-parliamentary organization, has introduced a new dimension into international relations "whose effects are difficult to measure and continue to surprise" (p. 186). Continuously confronted by the totality of states in uninterrupted debate, in the past France found itself obliged to backtrack on certain policies such as nuclear testing and its refusal to support sanctions against South African apartheid. Now, because of the United Nations' increased activism and relevance as an instrument of peace and international co-

operation, "France acts as if the United Nations might be becoming the guarantor of the new international system under the leadership of a few reliable and mighty states" (p. 199).

The United States has taught states they can now rarely act alone. In and outside the world body there is a continuous searching out of alliances and issue-relevant coalitions. But the influence of the United Nations has not been felt by governments alone. The feedback from the United Nations also operates on and through national political systems. Smouts, for example, reports that, when specific policies come under attack,

When doubt begins to creep in,... when domestic opinion begins to withdraw support, when national feelings become divided, then the pressures exerted through the United Nations add to internal constraints and, at a given moment, make the price of maintaining the status quo prohibitive. (p. 189)

The United Nations, as Smouts maintains, is where France is consulted on a permanent basis, where it maximizes its foreign policy assets. The United Nations acts as a significant instrument of socialization and links national prestige to its successes or failures, to the point of reversing foreign policy processes.

French policies at the United Nations respond to changes in the international system as reflected in the organization and very rarely to considerations from the domestic order. (p. 200)

The dilemma of the United Nations in the 1990s is that it is caught between two world systems, two configurations of world power relations – one in the winter of its decline, the other in gestation. Both systems are composed of states, a global problématique, and a nascent world social community. The state system is based on state sovereignty, Western principles, and a hierarchy of powers. Even so, increasing interaction among states and regions obliged the international community to develop the United Nations' functional agencies and to take such early "global" initiatives as the international conferences on population, environment, and law of the sea starting as early as the 1960s.

The coming global system, in Robert Cox's prognosis, will be:
• post-hegemonic: in that the Western ethos will have to give way to universalization of thinking and values;
• post-Westphalian: in that it will go beyond the conventional control of sovereign states and will consider sovereignty a relative concept;

478

- post-globalization: in that the currently dominant movement toward liberal economic globalization, with its consequences in growing social inequities and polarization, will be countered by demands for the re-embedding of economic processes within the framework of the norms and aspirations of an emerging global society.[6]

The United Nations has to represent and be a forum for not only state interests and diplomacy in the established system but also the future, more universal system beyond national boundaries where supranational decision-making can cope with worldwide problems, values, and politics. The dilemma of the United Nations in the 1990s is that it must respond to both systems. The United Nations appears stuck between Westphalia and globalism.

Orientations toward the United Nations: Sources of member state policies and actions

Our third conclusion is that participation of most member states in the United Nations is handled by the executive branch, normally with an undercurrent of rather indifferent, non-partisan support from the legislative sector.

More concretely, decision-making with regard to the United Nations is normally managed by the Foreign Ministry with direction and/or support from the political élite, which for the most part is influenced by increasingly active non-governmental organizations (NGOs, voluntary and interest groups) and followed by poorly informed public opinion.

Exceptions to these general patterns would be exemplified by the United Kingdom, which has a more partisan division with regard to orientations on relations toward the United Nations, and the United States, where these relations are more dependent on domestic political conditions and the national legislature. In third world countries the executive branch would appear to have the freest hand in dominating relations with the United Nations.

It should be noted that this general conclusion deals especially with the UN Secretariat because much of the work of the United Nations' functional agencies (the UN ''system'') can escape the ambit of foreign ministries.

Decision-making
A major finding on foreign policy-making from our case-studies is the degree of similarity in the way governments from different countries

479

manage their relations with the United Nations. The following description (based on the Japanese example), with minor adjustments, could fit most of the countries studied (with the important exception of the United States).

In Japan, the United Nations Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assumes primary responsibility over all policy-making and coordination. It acts at three levels: coordinating within the ministry, coordinating with other functional ministries, and consulting with outside groups. Policy is carried out under the direction of executive political leadership, which usually mobilizes only around high-profile issues. It generally enjoys consensus legislative support, which, again, is usually mobilized around specific agencies or policies, especially peace and security issues. The UN Bureau's main difficulties come from ministries that are protecting the turf of their functional responsibilities. The Bureau has overall responsibilities for agencies and missions (New York, Geneva, Vienna), including financial management, staffing, politics, and staff secondments from functional ministries. The main exception is with regard to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund where control either rests with or is shared with the Ministry of Finance. Finally, it is the UN Bureau that deals with outside groups and parliamentarians to gain support and cope with demands.

In brief, decision-making on the United Nations comes from professional diplomats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (''UN hands'') directed and supported by the executive and other political élites, influenced by knowledgeable interest groups, and followed by public opinion, which is moulded by the political leadership as well as by communications from the United Nations.

The Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs set the tone and the UN Bureau coordinates and advises, based on their authority which derives from expertise, collective memory of precedents, and the mixture of complexity and irrelevance that the United Nations represents. Within this context, relations with the United Nations tend to fluctuate from centrality to marginality depending on the political leadership at any given time. Except in the United Kingdom, where the Labour Party has written international cooperation and support for the United Nations into its constitution, there are few if any significant alternative élite policies on the United Nations.

United States relations with the United Nations are much more politicized, in that they are more subjected to ideology and electoral

politics, and much less influenced by the foreign service bureaucracy. They are therefore open to more radical shifts. US relations with the United Nations were traditionally directed by presidential fiat and therefore by the personality and the administration in the White House. A conservatively organized Congress responded to presidential leadership as well as reflecting its constituents and moved in the 1970s from "acquiesence to activism." Although the United Nations is not high on its agenda, the US Congress certainly debates it much more than do most parliaments. Votes on UN budgets are victims of fiscal and budgetary intra-congressional political considerations. Since the 1980s, these have included domestic budget complexities of "authorization and appropriation," countless legislative hurdles, traditional parochialism, a decline in party leadership, growth of congressional staffs, fragmentation of committees, and single-issue politics – all underlining the individualism of American politics that has led representatives and senators to press for "unreal policy goals ... for personal and political gain" (p. 433). A "legislative straight-jacket" means limits to executive flexibility in the complex world of UN affairs. Presidential leadership is no longer automatically followed. Such strident politics are hardly muted by the International Organization Bureau of the State Department, which is considered to be weak and understaffed, with limited career recognition and a lack of multilateral training.

Public opinion
Although the United Nations is well and favourably recognized by the population at large, the public is poorly informed about the United Nations, which is known mainly through television coverage of international issues and personalities and UN action programmes. For instance, people tend to think the United Nations is a much more autonomous body than it is in fact. While public opinion, as tested in polls and other forms of surveys, is much more supportive of the organization than are political élites, people are also relatively indifferent to or even cynical about the United Nations. Some decline in respect for the United Nations was particularly true of the 1980s, though it had been regained by the 1990s. Because the United Nations is so complex and distant, the public is ready to leave it to specialists or follow the lead of élites, as long as there is no perceived conflict with national interests. In fact, there is little sustained interest outside the bureaucracy. Perhaps the hazy mixture of sentiments is best captured by Baehr's portrayal of Dutch UN policy, which "has

been characterized by a mixture of engagement, appreciation, disappointment, frustration, and hope'' (p. 273).

None the less, public opinion is not immutable and tends to respond to changes in the international system and in technology, economics, national conditions, and generalized orientations. It is also clear that opinion shift is a *sine qua non* for effective policy shift within states. Thus, for instance, reform of the United Nations has remained an élite issue not a broad public opinion concern, and therefore has not been high on national agendas. To stimulate public appreciation for the United Nations, Ogata proposes that UN activities (conferences, thematic years and decades, special sessions and assemblies, etc.) have the most dramatic effect for heightening visibility and capturing the support of new population sectors and generations. Public opinion would appear to depend first on government leadership, secondly on UN leadership, efficacy, and vitality, and thirdly on national interests. Opinion is consensual and superficial. The United Nations itself has been partly responsible for this situation.

Distance is compounded by patterns of communication. It is abundantly clear that public opinion is strongly influenced by media coverage. It was found in Japan, for instance, that while only a fifth of the people formed their views about the United Nations through formal education, 87 per cent claimed to be influenced by television. However, our reports show that the media concentrate only on issues and personalities, not on structures, functions, or effectiveness. And the media provide only poorly informed, unsustained, and minimal coverage of UN activities. The United Nations has not helped as much as it might have to rectify this state of affairs. The Secretary-General's report of 1987 admitted that the "second tier global constituency of the United Nations has been largely ignored." There have been calls for the United Nations to make better use of universities, parliaments, NGOs, and the media as relay points for communication with the public. A 1989 report of the United Nations' Joint Inspection Unit concluded that there is still a need for "coordination and coherence, for rationalization and for simplification" in the Department of Public Information.

Public opinion in developing countries is even less formulated and has less impact on policies regarding the United Nations. This conclusion is similar to the findings in international relations in general. Owing to language problems and lack of education it is generally more difficult for the public in the third world to know about the United Nations. But it is also true that there is a circular problem in that we

have very few opinion surveys in developing countries so that studies of relationships with the United Nations give hardly any credence to the possibility of public opinion having direct influence for or against the United Nations.

In contrast, scholars in the United States, much more than elsewhere, have undertaken numerous studies of public opinion and have found support for the general proposition that mass opinion tends to acquiesce to leaders and élite people, even if the orientations are not the same. Thus, relations with the United Nations are determined by élite attitudes – and this holds true for patterns of change as well. In part the Reagan administration was able to move against the United Nations because it was supported (or led) by interest groups, congressional leaders, and the media, which, in turn, had modified American opinion so that by 1980 only 31 per cent thought the United Nations was doing a good job. Of course there is rarely smoke without fire. Opinion also reflected perceptions of the United Nations' *actual* performance at the time. On the other hand, there are major differences in opinion orientations. Élite people are found to be relatively more internationalist and accommodationist with regard to US foreign policy in general, but are ill disposed toward strengthening the United Nations (only about 25 per cent favoured it in the 1980s). The opposite is true for general opinion on both scores. Public support for strengthening the United Nations, especially in areas such as the environment, justice, and dispute settlement, is twice as high as élite support. But the US public seems to agree with its leaders that power should not be transferred to international organizations in the fields of trade and the economy.

Non-governmental organizations

Another factor in politicization of international relations is the finding that interest groups and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) related to UN activities have increased considerably since the 1970s in their numbers, variety, and influence in economically developed countries. For the most part, the NGOs are issue specific, dealing with ideological orientations and such causes as women, peace, business, media, and developmental aid. Groups are oriented in terms of geography, function, or values. There are also "expert institutes" such as foreign affairs councils or research centres that deal with the exercise of diplomacy rather than public mobilization. The issue-specific groups employ lobbying, moral suasion, education, information, mobilization techniques, and electioneering.

Except in the United States, where the conservative Heritage Foundation supported the anti-UN policies of the Reagan administration during the 1980s, there are no other specifically anti-UN organizations. United Nations Associations (UNAs) lead support for the United Nations around the world. In Japan, they are aided by large federations that support such agencies as UNESCO and UNICEF. All of these groupings use publications, media and staff briefings, teaching kits, and situation and cost analyses to influence journalists, politicians, academics, government officials, and the public. Most analysts suggest that the UNAs had slumbered into an irrelevance of uncritical cheer-leading by the 1970s but were reprofessionalized by the end of the 1980s. Nevertheless, Groom and Taylor's assessment of the British UNA may speak to their fundamental weakness:

The UNA is worthy and well intentioned, but it tends to fall between two stools – that of an Establishment-based pressure group on government and that of a galvanizing mass movement ... reactive rather than proactive ... dependent on its principal target for finance ... and for access. (p. 405)

There is a growing tendency for issues (other than peace and security) to be dominated by interest groups. In the Netherlands, for example, it might be Amnesty International, Greenpeace, or the Inter-Church Peace Council. The number of organizations or associations in Dutch society dealing with international relations has grown from 24 in 1945 to 200 in 1993, Baehr reports. In Canada, changes in parliamentary rules in the 1980s have given interest groups and parliamentarians increased access to foreign policy. In the United States, single-issue groups and ideologically motivated political action committees (PACs) "became involved more then ever before with UN-related issues, blurring the distinction between domestic and international policy" (p. 450). Although the influence of competing American business groups may have a cross-cutting effect on certain issues, it has certainly carried corporate America's basic principle that "international organizations should not develop codes relating to commercial or marketing practice into American foreign policy."

Power and the United Nations: Explaining variations in foreign policies toward the United Nations
How can we understand both the similarities and differences in foreign policy positions on the United Nations? To start with, the explanation of our findings can be located in the linkages between the various conclusions themselves.

484

If member states still treat the United Nations as a foreign policy tool, subject to national interests, it is because the United Nations not only was created within these limits but also still very much reflects the global distribution of power. UN Secretariat members are still citizens of member states. The diplomats whom they must ultimately obey are representatives delegated by governments. Of course, it is to be expected that those who have their knowledge, expertise, and interests wrapped up in the United Nations as it is would want to maintain its current form. Public opinion, shaped to a large extent by the national media and education systems that focus on the nation-state, remains largely ill informed and acquiescent. The hold of national power and interests is still dominant. Assisi-Asobie speaks for most states when he concludes that, despite the desire of the Nigerian government for a strong, effective, and efficiently managed United Nations, "[i]n the past 30 years, successive Nigerian governments have used the United Nations to protect and advance Nigeria's national interests" (p. 361).

These power motivations are very profound. Acting as spear-heads during the past decade, the United States and the United Kingdom mobilized the Western major contributors to demand administrative and financial "reform" of the United Nations. Their agenda, however, was both broader and deeper.

The point should not be missed, however, that the [British] Conservative governments of the late 1980s and early 1990s have been in favour of zero growth in budgets not just because of a belief in sound finance. There is also an ideological element in that there is a determination to halt any further advance in the scale and power of international organizations. (p. 388)

In the American case, there appears to have been as much concern about the loss of influence at the United Nations and the move toward programmatic directions of which they disapproved as there were concerns about budgets and efficiency, which were somewhat spurious issues. The 1980s and early 1990s, then, were dominated by a conservative, Western motivation to ensure that the United Nations serve Western interests, including a stable international environment with an efficient United Nations that did not become a countervailing power and did *not* contravene Western international diplomacy.

To the small degree that foreign policies have been dragged toward a strengthened United Nations it is because, as Mitrany argued many years ago, functional ties pulled them in that direction willy-nilly and

485

because it suited the national interests of middle powers and developing countries. The recent major increase in UN activity and support has been in the field of peace and security, which takes us back to the organization's primary *raison d'être*. Slower accretions of support for strengthening the United Nations are to be found in such fields as human rights, welfare, and the environment, as well as technical functions, from health to airlines, that countries cannot handle outside their borders. Of course, new international organization functions are simply the flip side of globalism, which itself is the result of new worldwide capacities in technology, transport, and communication. For the rest, it is countries such as Japan, the Netherlands, and Canada, whose objective world situations can be enhanced by strong international programmes, that lend the most support to the drive for an effective and stronger United Nations.

If we are to explore differences as well as similarities in orientations toward the United Nations, there are other explanations that go back to the roots of theory and practice in international relations and political science. From the international relations perspective, the major question, one analysed by Krause, Knight, and Dewitt in their chapter on Canada, is to try to define and order the variables that influence a country's foreign policy toward the United Nations. Both logically and theoretically these influences could be internal or external to the particular country.

Our studies rather conclusively demonstrate that the dominant influences on policies toward the United Nations come from a country's position in the international system, its self-defined role within the system, and the image the United Nations is able to project. While not insignificant, domestic variables, including the political culture, leading individuals, and foreign policy élites, act as mediating factors between the basically determinant international position of a country and its behaviour toward the United Nations.

Both the structures of the international system and the images projected of the United Nations' competence evolve over time. So the determining factor in basic, long-term policies toward the United Nations is the position of the state within the shifting international constellation, and the self-image a country's leaders have of this position, that is to say, the role that a country gives itself.[7] By "position" I mean power position as determined by size and geographic situation, long-term natural and human resources, and historical experience as translated into the national political culture, which acts as an intervening variable.

486

Several examples should serve to underscore this conclusion. Japan is one of the few supporters of the United Nations that wants it to be not only efficient but stronger. Because of its lack of natural resources and its constitutional prohibition of offensive military forces, Japan, while an economic "giant," is a dependent power that requires an international security net. Japan's requirement for a stable global environment in which its economy can thrive makes it prepared to envision a greater role in world management for the United Nations. Japan's 1992 vote to participate in peace-keeping is an indication of major domestic shifts in policy. We can see that Japan's orientation toward the United Nations is dictated by its economic, geographic, military, and technological position, as interpreted by its leadership, within an evolving international system.

The position of the Netherlands (another firm supporter of a strong United Nations) is very similar. Its basic orientation toward international organizations is heavily determined by its historical, geographic, economic, and military positioning as translated into its political culture. The country's traditional dependence on international trade, symbolized by Johan de Witt's aphorism, "peace everywhere ... commerce unrestricted," has led the Dutch to integrate in their constitution the requirement for the national government to promote the rule of law in international relations. The Netherlands' unique geographic origins, literally reclaimed from the sea, at the estuary of the Rhine, neighbour to the North Sea's pollution, and buffeted by other countries' industrial winds, have led it to be a leader in demands for strong, international environmental norms. The country's dependent size and geographic position, and lack of natural resources have pushed it to compensate through technological skills, education, and human resource development to permit it to compete in an international milieu that it works hard to make stable and law-abiding through an effective United Nations.

The United States is at the polar extreme. Its vast resources and continent-straddling territory have given it a much more voluntarist orientation toward international organization. Because of its capabilities, the United States is able to envision international organizations as tools of its foreign policy more than as forums of cooperation. Time and time again in recent decades it has refused to be drawn into consensus positions on the Law of the Sea, North–South relations, population policy, human rights, or the environment. It still believes it has the power to fashion the world in its image. If international organizations do not conform to this image then either the

organization will change or the United States will retire to the sidelines.

However, American foreign policy specialists are very ambivalent when it comes to *explaining* American behaviour toward the United Nations. On the one hand, they admit that the crisis of multilateralism in US foreign policy in the 1980s "mirrored and also contributed to a crisis of multilateralism in the UN system itself" (p. 41) and, overall, they declare that "US problems with the United Nations in the 1970s and early 1980s reflected difficulties adjusting to the comparative decline in American influence in the world" (pp. 452–3). Despite these assertions, Karns and Mingst conclude that "domestic factors are of particular salience in shaping US relationships with the United Nations" (p. 411).

This issue is of considerable importance for our conclusions about why and how member states influence the United Nations and what this means for potential changes in the United Nations, especially its strengthening. Either internal or external factors are determinant in this relationship. We must keep our eye on the objective of understanding the chain of long-term causality. It is, of course, clear that domestic factors in the United States, as in most countries, can and will either constrain or support the leadership's orientation toward the United Nations. But even in the United States domestic influences appear to be relatively benign once all the drama of the debate is completed: "domestic groups have not been consistently either supportive of or antagonistic toward US relations with IGOs" (p. 445).

However, it appears clear that the executive branch itself *reacts* to situations that have been building over a long period in the international system and the United Nations, albeit in light of the interpretation of the country's national interests by the ruling administration. Certainly this is how one explains the early post-war US support for the United Nations and the later antipathy of the Reagan administration. Indeed such a conclusion would also seem to flow from Karns and Mingst's prevalent introductory concerns about how the crisis of multilateralism in the UN system itself fuelled criticism of the world organization within the United States.

Comparing two countries with some similarities also helps reinforce our hypothesis. The United States and France under the Fifth Republic both have presidential systems, but they operate in different political settings. France deals with the United Nations as a diplomatic process, whereas the United Nations is much more of a political issue in the United States. United Nations policy in France is directed

by the President and the foreign service. In contrast with the United States, the French *political culture* ensures that public opinion is poorly informed by disinterested parties and media, that little place is accorded to interest groups (those that are active are "complementary and synergetic" to government policy), and that academic interest is formalistic rather than critical and interpretive. Policy-making is authoritative, with "bows to democracy." France has no "preconceived fixation" with the concept of free markets, given its mixed economy (p. 22).

But when Smouts seeks to explain this situation, she turns mainly to factors related to international *position and power*. France no longer believes the United Nations affects its "vital interests." Nowadays France recognizes its influence is linked to Europe's, so it is concerned for European cooperation. The United Nations is a fact of life with which one must live and in which one must play the game by the rules, pragmatically. France's power can in fact be enhanced by the world organization. All of which leads to the conclusion,

France's image of itself as a great diplomatic power when acting through the United Nations is quite new in its political culture. The time for "France alone" indeed seems to be over. (p. 202)

But it was not always so. Not very long ago, the same country, with the same political structures and the same political culture but a different image of its international position and power, still closely related to its colonial era and global interests, practised the politics of "grandeur" under Charles de Gaulle and snubbed its partners and the United Nations at every turn in the road.

And so it has been in the United States, which believes it has the means to make the international organization bow to its will. At the height of American attacks on the United Nations in August 1987, Charles Krauthammer said it all when he wrote in the *New Republic*, "The U.N. is more than just a failed instrument. It is a bad instrument. We have the power to see it shelved. We should use that power" (p. 447).

It would be an error to think the Americans have a singular political culture or that there is not a growing awareness of the relativeness of its power. Karns and Mingst note that the first Kassebaum amendment to mandate reductions in US assessed contributions to the United Nations was opposed by "an impressive bipartisan group" and that there are congressmen who are embarrassed by the

American "deadbeat status in failing to meet our financial obligations to the United Nations" (p. 43). Congress is as much motivated by "the already huge budget deficits and demands for health care reform" as by opposition to the United Nations (p. 453). Still these limitations on US power had cast only the slightest of shadows on congressional images of American power by 1994.

One should not conclude that the US foreign policy process toward the United Nations is unique simply because, at times, the United States is "out of step" with most other countries in its orientations to the United Nations. Rather, at root, the basic motives and objectives are similar in all states. All of them seek to maximize their national interests through the United Nations, national interests being a code for international positioning. What is unique about the United States is that, because of its capabilities and because of its worldwide interests and commitments, it believes it is more able to walk alone and to bend international organizations to its will. The Soviet Union behaved in the same way while it had the power to do so. The United States does not want the United Nations interfering too much in international economic, environmental, cultural, or foreign aid issues because such practices might unduly constrain the activities of its own interests and limit the influence of its own foreign and military policies. From this we can hypothesize that the greater the capabilities of a state and the more it believes it can act independently because of its position in the international system, the more it will treat the United Nations as a foreign policy object rather than as a forum of collegial activity, and the more it will consider the United Nations as simply one among many diplomatic forums, often preferring other bilateral and multilateral locales for exercising international politics. The contrary is equally true. The more a state believes it has weaknesses that make it dependent on effective multilateral action for the furthering of its national interests, the more it will favour strengthening of the world body. This hypothesis leads us to conclude that the single most important factor pushing states toward the strengthening of the United Nations as an autonomous actor will be their awareness of their inability adequately to direct the international system and respond to the global problems that afflict them.

Our last case is that of Canada. The Canadian authors, after exploring several hypotheses concerning possible domestic and international sources of Canada's commitment to multilateralism and the United Nations, arrive at a conclusion that needs to be cited fully.

490

Support for reforms is almost dictated by the interest that middle powers develop in multilateral forums by virtue of their position in the international system, a position sharpened for Canada by geographical and historical factors. As a result, by now Canada's "lasting and visceral commitment to multilateralism ... is ingrained in and endemic to the Canadian character," and it has created a pattern of expectations that reinforces Canada's support of efforts to reform and adapt the institutions of the UN system. Such a commitment is shared by other states with similar status in the international system, from some of the members of the G7 through to others such as the Nordics or Australians. This implies that the main factors determining attitudes to the UN system may be located largely outside of the domestic determinants of a state's foreign policies. (p. 175)

Nevertheless, as with other countries, international positioning is not a singular explanatory variable. In Canada's case these external factors are reinforced by Canada's federal, bilingual, and multicultural policies, all of which generate a domestic political culture heavily oriented towards a pragmatic, non-ideological, compromise approach, a belief in pluralism, and a tolerance for the resolution of conflicts. These principles lend themselves to the multilateralism that characterizes much of the work of Canadian delegations at the United Nations.

Of course, interpretations of international positioning evolve over time. Canada's leadership has at times interpreted the country's international position as that of a "principal power" more than a "middle power" and has consequently relegated UN activity and mediation to a much lower position in Canada's foreign policy priorities – once again confirming our conclusion that the greater the capabilities of a state the more it will believe it can act independently of, and within, the United Nations.[8]

There is a third major explanation of state behaviour toward the United Nations, which comes more from general political theory than from international politics. The ideological bases of domestic disputes are now being transferred to the international level. This explains not only the lines of conflict and cooperation in the United Nations but also the variations in orientations of foreign policies towards the institution. The transfer can be observed in three domains: (1) socially based class, status, and power struggles are being internationalized; (2) ethnic conflict is threatening to raise its ugly head in the world organization; and (3) from a theoretical perspective the United Nations is now the scene of classical federalist disputes. Such observa-

tions confirm that globalism has at least *started* to make its weight felt in the United Nations or, in other words, that world politics is truly beginning to replace international relations. This in turn suggests that the basis for world governance is being created and we should use regular political categories for analysing it, alongside traditional, balance of power, international relations theories.

To a growing degree, relations in and towards the United Nations can be explained as a traditional political conflict between rich and poor. The poor, that is, the developing, non-industrialized states of the South (and to some degree the East), want to use the United Nations as a full-fledged, ''democratic'' political forum to create conditions that will force the transfer of wealth to the impoverished. During the 1960s and 1970s the non-aligned third world countries in the Group of 77 tried to use the United Nations and its agencies for these ends. Their goal was not just colonial liberation and national control of resources. They also wanted to create international standards for corporations, to gain some control over media sources, to increase levels of aid (i.e. voluntary taxation), to garner a portion of the bounty of the seas (''the global commons''), and to create new conditions for trade. All of this meant increasing the use of the state (including the United Nations as an embryonic government), the imposition of regulations, the redistribution of wealth, and the politicization of issues to mobilize the forces of the many poor against the wealthy few. This is classic politics, no more, no less.

The rich, that is, generally speaking, the industrialized, Northern states in the ''Western'' bloc of OECD countries, took time to perceive the game and react, but react they did, starting in the 1980s. To the South's politics of numbers, the North opposed a more subtle but equally effective politics of money to overcome ''third world cant and nonsense'' (p. 397). If poor countries wanted aid they had to abandon state intervention and adopt the market philosophy dictated by the IMF's ''adjustment policies.'' Withdrawal of funding and ''zero growth'' policies were used to curb the United Nations' scope and powers and to limit its capacities for regulation and intervention. The major powers' reputation and strength were employed to keep issues on or off the United Nations' agenda. As Groom and Taylor put it, this appears to mean ''global riot control'' rather than ''global problem-solving'' (p. 406).[9]

Assisi-Asobie points out that these North–South relations may not be viewed simply in terms of economic exploitation in Nigeria. And Nigeria may not be alone.

492

The second scenario is that these same developments will be defined in racist terms. The technological backwardness of Black Africa may be perceived and interpreted by race-conscious leaders and groups in Nigeria as the product of racial prejudice against the Black peoples of the world. This viewpoint will reinforce the belief now held in certain quarters of Nigeria that it is its manifest destiny to liberate the Black race from political, social, and economic thralldom. (p. 363)

In recent years there has been a swelling chorus of accusations about double standards in the United Nations, in effect that the United Nations is being used to impose the hegemony of the wealthy, white North. Such accusations underlay the argument that the UN resolutions on Iraq were enforced but not those on Israel and that UN efforts for the Muslims in Somalia and Bosnia were too little, too late. Of course, the United Nations cannot afford to become a tool of anyone's racial bias, intentional or not.

Finally, the politics of the United Nations may be seen in terms of territoriality and not only in economic or cultural terms. The analogy here is with classical attempts in federalist theory and practice to find adequate institutional mechanisms to represent *both* regionally defined communities *and* population concentrations, both the territorial and the "rep. by pop." imperatives. At the international level, however, the territorial and population concentrations may be in one and the same place (China and India, for example). So, we are really into a very complex set of contradictions between international relations principles (territorial sovereignty, one state–one vote, no matter what the population base) and federalist theory (interpenetrated sovereignties with dualist representation by population and territory).

In another sense, we are also seeing the age-old federalist fight between levels of government. The prior provincial (state, canton, land) governments begrudge each transfer of power and jurisdiction to the new, higher, central level of government. In this sense, the attacks by the OECD countries on the "inefficiencies" of the United Nations are highly reminiscent of the charges of corruption and waste that state and provincial governments in the United States and Canada levelled against Washington and Ottawa in the nineteenth century. We are witnessing the traditional turf struggles and jealousies (sometimes justified) when there is a transfer of functions from one level of power to another. How strange it is to see the American Congress accuse the United Nations of budgetary extravagance when we learn that the American legislators themselves more than doubled their own

and committee staffs during the single decade of the 1970s (p. 434). How strange it is to hear national military commanders complain about the United Nations' embryonic system when their own politicians accuse them of waste and incompetence every year. The pot calling the kettle black!

None the less, these three examples of class, ethnic, and territorial struggles being transferred from the national to the international arena serve three purposes. First, they heighten our awareness of growing global interdependence. Second, they open our eyes to the potential for interpreting international politics through sociological, nationalist, and federalist theory. And, third, they underline, once again, our explanation of foreign policies towards the United Nations in terms of power politics.

"Reform" and change at the United Nations

The second objective of this essay is to see what an analysis of foreign policies toward the United Nations can tell us about the process of reform and the potential for transformation of the world body. All our authors are in agreement that the world is at another of its turning points (but no one is predicting a date). Institutional changes will have to be made in what we may loosely call "world governance" so that it may catch up with technical, cultural, and economic modifications that have already transformed the distribution of wealth, power, and status in the world community as well as creating global problems requiring global solutions. These real changes in the United Nations' environment are bound to require a shift in relations between member states and the organization and within the United Nations itself.

The proliferation of mini- and micro-state members of the United Nations has created a situation where now more than 70 of its members contribute only 0.01 per cent of the organization's budget and just 13 major contributors cover approximately two-thirds of the United Nations' expenses. Such a situation is unlikely to be tenable for very long.

And then, as Ogata asks,

Will the United Nations in the 1990s be prepared to play a larger role in global management? The issues that call for concerted action are no longer limited to the political, economic, and humanitarian as in the past. There are enormous problems of environmental protection, science and technology, population explosion, and cross-border movements that all nations must address. There is at least a growing sign that both governments and peoples

are beginning to turn to the United Nations to deal with these global issues. (pp. 261–2)

Perhaps the most telling word in the above quotation from Ogata is the word "peoples," signalling that the days of the United Nations as simply a confederation of state governments may be slowly winding down. In this context, the questions for us concern the relevance of the "reform" processes of the 1980s for understanding continuing change and possible transformation in the United Nations. What can we learn from the studies of relationships between states and the international organization that will help us understand the demands, the potential and limits, and the techniques of change regarding the world body? To study the potential for changing the United Nations, we will consider, first, the lessons to be drawn from the "reform" crisis of the 1980s and then consider the foreign policy motivations of member states with regard to modifying the world body.

The meaning of reform

First, what is meant by "reform"? Originally, reform had been used in the broad sense of progressive development of the United Nations as an institution to strengthen its capacities to deal with new functions. However, the term became captured in the 1980s by the American-sponsored programme that was centred on financial and administrative "reform." While this had broader political aims of limiting the United Nations' capacity as a regulator and making recalcitrant states feel more "responsible" for anti-Western votes, the "reform" goals became mainly centred on budgetary controls and managerial efficiency.

While I will continue to use "reform" (in quotation marks) in this latter sense, in recognition of the degree to which the meaning of the term has been limited in the UN context, it is perhaps best generally to abandon its broader use and substitute the terms "change" and "transformation." In this sense, change refers to explicit, continuing evolution *within* the UN system, dealing mainly with managerial, administrative, financial, and programmatic issues that the Canadian study subsumed under the titles of "process" and "adaptive" change. Transformation, in turn, refers to the broader modification *of* the UN system itself to deal with new global functions, implicating, for instance, institutional structures, allocation of powers and resources, major principles and purposes, methods of representation, and pos-

sible reform of the Charter.[10] ''Change'' is thus continuing, evolutionary change within the status quo; ''transformation'' is substantive, radical transformation toward a new system.

Lessons of 1986

In 1986, the Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts (G18), formed to conduct a thorough review of the administrative and financial matters of the United Nations, made its report to the 41st session of the General Assembly. As a result of this report, reforms were made to committee structures and voting practices (consensus voting) in the Committee for Programme and Coordination and in the secondment of nationals to the Secretariat. In addition, the United Nations' personnel and budget were cut or limited to zero growth. New procedures for transferring administrative expenditures to programmes and for determining priorities and coordinating projects were established. Similar practices were enforced on the specialized agencies.

Although the organization is reforming itself all the time and evolving with regard to such items as the role of the Secretary-General, peace-keeping measures, and General Assembly procedures, the action taken on the Group of 18's report was one of the first formal, concentrated efforts at quasi-structural administrative reform. The earlier 1974–1975 Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization, known as the Committee on the Charter, ''became increasingly lost in interminable debates over procedure ... and dilatory manoeuvres that slowly dampened the will for reform'' (pp. 120 and 121). A later Special Commission study in 1987–1988, aiming at a drastic overhaul of ECOSOC structures, ultimately failed (pp. 143–4). How is it that the Group of 18 ''reform'' package succeeded when others failed?

All our authors are unanimous: it took a crisis manufactured by the withdrawal of United States funding and the threat of financial insolvency. Some called it financial blackmail. As Smouts puts it, the affair began ''in the 1970s when the United States realized that it had definitely lost its majority,'' and ended when, ''within the organization, there was a single important question: what had to be done to overcome the hostility of the United States to the United Nations and to get past the prospect of financial insolvency?'' (pp. 226–7).

Ogata confirms that the main motivating factor for the Japanese-

led reform efforts was to bring the United States back into the UN process. Smouts, as well as Karns and Mingst, conclude that, whereas outside observers thought the ''reform'' crisis was all about managerial efficiency or restructuring the social and economic sector, insiders knew it was a question of satisfying US demands. Karns and Mingst have provided an excellent overview of the ''slow burn'' that led to the boil-over of American anger and their radical actions toward the United Nations.

Almost all states were finally lured into supporting the budgetary ''reforms'' for the same reasons. Most importantly, changes in the balance of power in the international political and economic systems had made it prudent to appease the Americans. Only secondarily, the preservation of the world organization became an end in itself. As the Algerian Minister for Foreign Affairs said in his address to the General Assembly in 1987,

The United Nations finds itself at an essential crossroads. It must take on problems that involve the very survival of humanity when its own existence is threatened. There is no alternative to the preservation and strengthening of our organization. If, to assure this, reforms are necessary to increase its efficiency and if, from this point of view, there is a need for structural changes, we must all encourage and contribute to this process. (p. 122)

Although most developing countries of the South rallied to the demands for a more efficient United Nations, even so the American-sponsored initiative did not sit well with them. ''Reform'' had turned into a Western exercise to satisfy the industrialized countries. There was no climate of change that would attract the support of the South because the proposed changes did not address the economic development agenda that the South believes should be the central issue. The real problem is the conflict between ''conservative'' versus ''liberal'' agendas at the United Nations. Smouts states:

The actual problem of the United Nations (what some have called a ''crisis'') is, in truth, a problem in North–South relations, however much the United States sees it otherwise in emphasizing the ''politicization'' and ''bureaucratization'' of the system. (p. 225)

On the other hand, because of the similar ideological postures of their governments, many Western countries, led by Mrs. Thatcher of the United Kingdom, were on the same wavelength as the United States and also sought to limit the United Nations' expansion of programmes, personnel, and expenditures.

497

But the Canadian case-study suggests that the acquiesence of the middle powers had a more profound explanation. Conditions of relative power, alliance with the United States, and the rise and fall of perceived crises are the limiting factors on middle-power orientations to change in the United Nations, orientations that clearly favour process reforms over institutional transformation. As a result,

Canadian attempts to accommodate divergent demands on the UN system over the years have meant that Canada's contribution to the reform process has been seen by some delegations as dominated by process over substance, the depoliticization of issues, an absence of issue-linkage, and incremental reform rather than more radical approaches to change. (p. 155)

No matter what one's position may be on the American-instigated "reform crisis" of the 1980s or its outcomes, it allows us to draw a number of conclusions about change processes at the international level, all of which are substantiated by our case-studies.

(1) Change in the United Nations system (there have been no examples of transformation) takes a long period of time, a decade or more, and seems to have to come to a head in the form of a crisis promoted by a state or a coalition of states including permanent members, propelled by their leadership, interest groups, and relevant political élites, and having the capacity to compel others to accept their views.

(2) Change corresponds to major modifications in international socio-economic conditions that lead to shifts in the balance of power and new dominant philosophies amplified by political élites and accepted by public opinion, as well as to changed domestic conditions impacting on foreign policy, such as budgetary imperatives.

(3) Most states, especially middle powers, will rally to a crisis in the United Nations, the one body available for world action, but middle powers usually must limit themselves to process reform *within* the institution rather than transformation *of* the institution. If transformation is to come about it will have to be in response not only to crisis conditions but to an attempt to balance advantages for all partners in the global system through "package" deals.

Motivations and goals of change

Generally speaking, once the "reform" agenda of the 1980s had been more or less achieved, the major powers want few changes in the

United Nations except to reinforce the status quo ante; the middle powers favour evolution and adaptation to new world conditions within the current architecture of the system; developing countries want economic development placed at the top of the UN agenda, a goal that many believe will require weakening the present oligarchical control of the major contributors. Paradoxically, however, the newly formed states in the South oppose transformation that endangers the principle of national sovereignty. For this reason, many refuse to open the Charter to serious amendment. These generally are the orientations to change in the United Nations. It remains to be seen how much the modifications in the international system since the end of the Cold War will force the member states to modify their motivations.

Smouts is most explicit about France's reticence concerning change. Although, in principle, France recognizes that the United Nations will be healthy only once the third world has a role in defining the rules, in practice,

Every time the question of reform comes up, France shudders. So long as it is limited to the administrative and financial functions of the United Nations, France is in favour of reform.... Universalizing ECOSOC would be a reform of a different kind, a true modification of the Charter rather than a simple adjustment. France fears that such a move could break the taboo of the Charter as a ''sacred text'' and open a Pandora's box that could one day bring into question the privileged position of permanent members of the Security Council.... All in all, France's ambition for reform does not go very far! (pp. 227–8)

Needless to say, the United Kingdom's position is very similar, although a Labour government would likely take a more positive position on strengthening the United Nations. Karns and Mingst say that there is no evidence that the USA-UNA's study *A Successor Vision* has had any impact on US policy makers. Less than 50 per cent of American foreign policy leaders even think it is vital to enlist the United Nations in dispute settlement. Both France and the United States report that their countries would prefer regional alliances rather than the United Nations to settle security problems – as in the Middle East. Less than 40 per cent of America's most outward-looking élite people want the United Nations strengthened. So the United States, like other great powers, is mainly interested in improving administrative and financial functions, as well as collective security and legal order – and even then the United States welcomed UN

Gulf resolutions only because they coincided with US policy goals. Few of these governments want any extension of UN development programmes, or UN interference in the international economy, or an increase in its authority. Nor do they want structural modification to the post–World War II deal that gave the major powers privileged positions. In fact, the ''major contributors'' would prefer to reinforce the status quo. Reports of new Western proposals to take abstentions into account in General Assembly voting; to introduce weighted voting on the financing of development programmes; and to create a new, non-paying, non-voting category for micro-states, have been circulating for some time. Even charity has a national interest. France held a conference on least developed countries in 1990 hoping to get others ''to give priority to countries that were linked to France'' (p. 222).

As we have seen, middle powers like Canada and the Netherlands seek adaptive, procedural, incrementalist, minimalist reform that works within the existing structure. The problem is that the Canadian style deals only with issues that are bureaucratic or administrative not historical or systemic ones. Middle powers have no commitment to transformation.

Yet all is not darkness. Both France and Canada have carried out opinion polls in the 1990s showing much higher respect for the United Nations and, in France, 86 per cent support its strengthening. Canadian opinion shows it can distinguish between inherent UN weaknesses and those caused by member states. In the United States, younger cohorts give more positive support to the United Nations.

Japan requires an efficiently functioning United Nations for the twenty-first century. This includes not only the financial and administrative reforms of the 1980s but also a stronger capacity to manage world affairs. In the meantime, Japan was one of the main driving forces behind the adoption in 1988 of the Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International Peace and Security. This resolution was responsible, in part, for untying the hands of the Secretary-General so he could more easily exercise his preventative powers under Article 99, and for encouraging the Security Council to make earlier use of fact-finding, good offices, and the United Nations' presence. Since 1988 we have seen an expansion of UN attempts at dispute resolution not only with regard to Iraq and Kuwait but in Namibia, Lebanon, ex-Yugo-

500

slavia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somalia, and numerous other cases.

Algeria believes that effective change in the United Nations can be brought about only in the context of reform of the international system. Founded on the tenets of dependency theory, Cheikh refers to it as a "globalist approach," which is still the long-term hope of Algeria. This means establishing more equitable relations between states, essentially through the goals of the New International Economic Order and its Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted in 1974. Carrying these principles into the United Nations, Algeria proposed an enlarged and more geographically balanced Security Council with a limited veto and a restricted peace and security role, much of which would be transferred to the General Assembly. The one state–one vote principle and majority rule would be given greater force through the elimination of weighted votes in the International Monetary Fund and World Bank and by giving General Assembly resolutions the force of law.

Nigeria's position on the United Nations has fluctuated between the "narrow" national interest of using the organization to mobilize external economic assistance, chiefly from the advanced capitalist countries, and the "broader" interest of establishing a New International Economic Order, which is similar to that of Algeria. In the past, the broader goal was to be attained through Nigerian leadership of a diplomatic coalition in the United Nations of African and third world states, supported by the most active and politically volatile domestic social groups. However, the "narrower" foreign policy always interfered with the attainment of NIEO owing to the realities of international economics and the pressures of more "established" groups in business and the public service.

Assisi-Asobie believes that, in the twenty-first century, Nigerian demands for reform of the United Nations will become more strident because liberation from foreign economic domination and exploitation will become the dominant goal, and the United Nations, as currently constituted, has proved inappropriate for its attainment. More intense pressures from domestic groups, interpreting the world economic order either as exploitive or as racist (or both), will demand a more powerful voice for Nigeria and Africa at the United Nations, particularly in the Security Council. Personally, Assisi-Asobie is convinced that the best path would be to make peoples not states, welfare not governmental security, the goal of UN reform (p. 364).

Conclusions on change in the United Nations

As with foreign policy orientations toward the United Nations in general, policies with regard to "change" and "transformation" analysed in the previous sections have demonstrated that notions of change at the United Nations are founded on conceptions of national interest as influenced by the state's position and role in the international power system, national leadership of political élites and NGOs, and images of UN activity and effectiveness. Policies can evolve over time within limits. Middle powers generally promote not just "efficiency reforms" of the United Nations but some strengthening of the organization and of international norms of behaviour, because this is seen as being in their national interest as well as favouring global survival.

If there is one, major conclusion it is that those who favour transforming the United Nations for "global" governance must heed the reality of the state system and the demands of national interests.

We should not be breathlessly surprised by these conclusions. The vast majority of political leaders in the world were brought up with two feet firmly planted in the traditional state system. They are bound to be limited by its assumptions. True, interdependence is a galloping phenomenon, but it is too early to expect fundamental modification of behaviour patterns. Nor can we forget that many states have only recently gained independence, therefore the attention of their leaders is focused on nation-building not supranationalism.

Any prognosis about change in the United Nations, aside from trying to decide on the most useful theoretical conceptions for understanding an evolving situation, can be most helpfully articulated around two questions:

(1) Will change in the United Nations be in the form of piecemeal adaptation on an ad hoc basis (or the refusal thereof), or in the form of radical, constitutional transformation of the world body?
(2) Will basic change in the world organization, if it is to happen, be brought about from the inside (the UN secretariats and governmental delegates) or from the outside?

Judging by the findings of our case-studies of foreign policy toward the United Nations, we must conclude that movement toward globalism, that is, some preliminary forms of multinational governance, will not be initiated from within the intergovernmental system. Although the United Nations will continue to evolve gradually, it will not have the capacity in and of itself to carry out the transformation required

to be able to deal with the new functions of world governance imposed by the rapid growth of global problems and interdependence. Intergovernmental personnel, either in the UN secretariats or as state delegates, do not have the will or the power to promote institutional transformation and often have a conflicting mandate. Favourably disposed middle powers lack the influence and, with regional integration, are rapidly losing the political flexibility to promote basic modifications.

Yet change the United Nations must. The most likely path is through political movements of alternative political élites and NGOs creating a new climate for transformation that will come to a head in a crisis that will permit, or oblige, state power élites to act for institutional change.

To arrive at this conclusion is not to suggest that in their minds and hearts those most closely involved with the United Nations do not want change. On the contrary, these are the very people who must deal with global problems on a day-to-day basis. Most often they are working at the intergovernmental level because of their understanding of the changes to the world system and their dedication to helping humanity. Rather, they are obstructed by the enduring logic of the state system embodied in what Donini calls the "principality syndrome" and the resistance of the secretariat.[11] The secretariats behave like any other ensconced bureaucracy and the personnel of the missions and delegations are creatures of the states by which they are nominated. They act under instructions – however broadly or narrowly defined. The states themselves are prisoners of domestic politics and rivalries.

Never has this been clearer than at the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development where it was repeatedly said of President George Bush that he would not sign any agreement that might endanger American industrial jobs in an election year. This was the same president who had declared a "new world order" barely two years earlier. Nor is the United States alone in this situation. As *Newsweek* analyst Robert Samuelson said of the 1992 Group of 7 summit,

Contented electorates liberate their political leaders to follow outward-looking foreign policies. Voters in all industrial democracies expect politicians to deliver at least three things: Jobs, security and rising living standards.

The trouble is, hardly a government remains that can easily fulfil these promises . . .

Little wonder that the United States, Europe and Japan have to struggle

503

to define common interests or agree on issues from world trade to aid for Russia. Everyone feels too poor and insecure to meet the demands made by others.[12]

In addition, as the Japanese, Canadian, and American authors have reported, institutional reform at the United Nations is just not a high-priority, high-salience issue for domestic public opinion or even formal decision-making circles. Reform is triggered by a perceived generalized threat or, as Maurice Bertrand prefers, "the process of reform has in the past been fostered by financial difficulties, the cyclical worsening of which is a permanent feature."[13]

[I]f you want to give a push to what is going on at the United Nations, it must come from outside, since the system cannot be invigorated from within. (p. 224)

The question before us, then, is why, when, and how autonomous political units become persuaded to give up a portion of their power and sovereignty to achieve common goals? Certainly there seems to be a consensus that, if there were more balance and equity in the United Nations, that is, if middle and smaller powers had more of a say in the definition of the rules of international organizations, then there would be more impetus for joint action to confront global problems. Groom and Taylor have posed the problem in all its acuity when they demand that "global riot control ... not get in the way of global problem-solving" (p. 407). There are indeed urgent matters of security *and* welfare that transcend national boundaries and the capacity of state governments to deal with them.

One of the first conundrums is selecting a framework for helping us to think about the future. We have already noted Robert Cox's proposal that such a framework would have to be "post-hegemonic, post-Westphalian and post-globalization." The trouble is, as Stephen Krasner has pointed out, "no convincing alternative cognitive construct has been presented. There is no consensual knowledge about what principle might replace sovereignty."[14]

Perhaps we are looking too hard. Perhaps the gap between international relations specialists and other social scientists is too large for them to learn from each other's works. It *is* relatively clear that the world must find some form of transnational governance to help it deal with problems that surpass the capacities of territorial states. The question is not so much "why" and "if" as "what" and "how." We even have models for the what and how. Human governance,

504

ever since the formation of sedentary societies, has almost always operated at least at three levels: local, regional, and global – whether these levels be called fiefdoms, princedoms, and empires or municipalities, states, and international organizations. Humans have almost always been faced with the problems of shared sovereignty, of centralization and decentralization, of integration and the struggle over shifting responsibilities to higher levels of governance. The struggle between local mayors and regional, metropolitan formations is different in substance but not in form from the issues we are dealing with at the international level. No one gives up power easily. Power holders can always rationalize the best interests of their constituents.

The model we are looking for, then, is of shared, not absolute, sovereignty, of multiple loyalties, and of power transmission to higher levels of governance. Far from being unique, history is replete with such transformations. Perhaps the most recent analogy (although no analogies can be adhered to slavishly) is the formation of the great nation-states of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. State- and nation-building analogies are not out of place. But our first step is to conceptualize the world as a political, social, and economic system.

It is helpful to think of the global system as an embryonic political system, so that we put ideological, class, and political dimensions on the table along with territorial and intergovernmental issues. International politics is now as much an economic and cultural struggle as it is a political conflict. The struggle over the protection and the distribution of wealth is operating as much and perhaps even more on an inter- as on an intra-state basis. Even more, as Assisi-Asobie warns, we are in danger of these economic issues being associated with the inflammable mixture of race and ethnicity. Forms of political analysis that seem promising candidates for borrowed frameworks are federalist constitutional theory, integration theory, sociological analysis, and social change theory.[15]

Our studies and the analysis of socio-political change also tell us that, if we are talking about political process and forces from outside the United Nations, we should look first toward socio-political movements and specialized transnational groups to prepare the terrain over a long period of time for an eventual "moment of transformation." Two such movements are INFUSA (International Network for a UN Second Assembly) and, in Canada, the Independent Commission on the Future of the United Nations. Ogata believes that change in attitudes toward world governance depend to a large extent on domestic groups and social movements that are inspired by

United Nations actions, and on the communication of these actions to focus attention on specific issues that, in turn, contribute to consciousness-raising.

However, it is unlikely we will see much energy for transformation until the "fire in the belly" frustrations of the various movements dealing with global problems are added to the rather "intellectualist" approaches of the UN transformers. In other words, it will probably take several disappointments like the Rio de Janeiro environment conference to convince the greens and other socio-political movements that the fundamental problem lies not just in their own domain but in current political structures. UN-sponsored conferences cannot deliver more efficient and effective world policies because the political structures are not there for their debate and implementation. As Modesto Seara Vasquez points out: "The trouble with the UN is that people ask too much from it; much more than it can deliver ... the Organization cannot be made more efficient for the simple reason that it was not conceived to be efficient."[16] Just the same, United Nations "progressives" should not be caught in the trap of "waiting for Godot." Reformers cannot simply wait for the great transformation. Rather, those individual delegates, middle powers, and members of the secretariats who have been struggling for continuous "reform" of the UN process and its adaptation to current problems must continue to push for evolution within the present system.

It is clear the social movement process will take some time to arrive at satisfactory political change. But the process can be helped along, as our various authors have pointed out, by relevant UN activities that stimulate consciousness-raising; by a greater visibility of UN institutions in the different countries and regions of the world; by exploiting the potential of the present Charter to develop global value systems through the provision of non-military security (food, ecology, water, etc.); by information and cultural exchanges, educational and research cooperation, the creation of "global" textbooks; by developing a flexible and independent international civil service as Groom and Taylor have suggested; by the development of policies for demobilization and economic conversion of military establishments; and by the United Nations improving its capacity to provide information and communications to the public (p. 147). It is also likely that a more representative Security Council package could be voted, especially if helped out by negotiations in private by an independent, high-level group of experts.

506

Then too the agenda for adaptive change within the United Nations is without end, as the Dutch have shown through their programme of pragmatic and effective reform. The United Nations needs permanent peace-keeping structures and procedures as well as designated troops, administrative personnel, and budgets. ECOSOC must be given teeth and backed up by a Charter for Development with clear-cut commitments and contracts replacing the IMF and World Bank adjustment programmes. A comprehensive nuclear test ban could be implemented. Population policy needs its own governing council or, better still, a joint one within ECOSOC for all developmental programmes. UN budgets could be standardized. Women could find their rightful place . . .

It is to be hoped there will be sufficient time for the various elements of the process to be accomplished. The point, however, is that all the above proposals are practical, achievable, "do-able." There is a potential for action for concerned people at all levels of the political system. "Political will" is now in the realm of the citizens as well as of the politicians. We do not have to "wait for Godot."

Notes and references

1. In the late 1950s the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace sponsored a 19-volume project. Published by the Manhattan Publishing Company, New York City, it included volumes on Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, China, Denmark, Egypt, Greece, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States (two volumes), and Uruguay. In addition there were overview volumes in both English and French.
2. Former UN Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, at the annual meeting of the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS), New York, Jun. 1990.
3. As originally proposed by Richard Mansbach et al. in *The Web of World Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1976) with regard to the world system.
4. Other examples could be drawn from each of our case-studies. But, for the sake of brevity, most points will be illustrated by only one or two examples.
5. Karns and Mingst (chap. 10) point out that the change in the US position is quite relative. By 1992, the United States was still paying 30 per cent of peace-keeping costs of the United Nations.
6. For a fuller development of this thesis, which Robert Cox presented at the Ottawa Conference on the "Future of the United Nations," see Robert Cox, "Toward a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order," in J. Rosenau and E. O. Czempiel, eds., *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
7. K. J. Holsti has analysed the notion of "role" in international politics at considerable length in his *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983), chap. 4.
8. See David Dewitt and John Kirton, *Canada as a Principal Power* (Toronto: John Wiley, 1983).
9. Also see, Giorgios Kostakos, A. J. R. Groom, Sally Morphet, and Paul Taylor, "Britain and

the New UN Agenda: Towards Global Riot Control?'' *Review of International Studies* (Jan. 1991).

10. For an essay on definitions, see Alain Rouquié, "Changement politique et transformation des régimes," in M. Grawitz and J. Leca, *Traité de science politique* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1985). The issue is also analysed in chapter 4 of this volume.

11. Antonio Donini, "The Process of Change in the United Nations," *International Relations* (Winter 1988).

12. Robert Samuelson, *Newsweek*, 8 Jul. 1992.

13. Maurice Bertrand, "Can the United Nations be Reformed?" in A. Roberts and B. Kingsbury, eds., *United Nations: Divided World* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), 195–197. Modesto Seara Vasquez has provided an elaborated rationale and model for institutional transformation to bridge the nation-state and global systems in his paper "The Reform of the United Nations Charter: A Step Toward World Government," presented at the World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Buenos Aires, July 1991. The United Nations Association of the United States' 1987 report, *A Successor Vision: The United Nations of Tomorrow*, provides another model, as does its *Partners for Peace: Strengthening Collective Security for the 21st Century* (1992). See also Lee A. Kimball, *Forging International Agreement: Strengthening Intergovernmental Institutions for Environment and Development* (New York: World Resources Institute, 1992) and *The United Nations at a Critical Crossroads: Time for the South to Act* (Geneva: South Centre, 1992).

14. Stephen Krasner, "Regimes and the Limits of Realism," in *International Regimes*, p. 367.

15. See, for instance, Richard Simeon and Keith Banting, eds., *Redesigning the State: The Politics of Constitutional Change in Industrial Nations* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983); Rouquié, "Changement"; *International Political Communities: An Anthology* (New York: Doubleday, 1966); Charles Pentland, *International Theory and European Integration* (New York: Free Press, 1973); Ernst B. Haas, *The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory* (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1975); W. Andrew Axline, "Underdevelopment, Dependence, and Integration: The Politics of Regionalism in the Third World," *International Organization* (1979): 83–105; special issue of *International Journal*: *Getting to the Table: Processes of International Prenegotiation* 44 (1989), no. 2.

16. Seara Vasquez, "Reform of the UN Charter," 8–15.

508

Contributors

Chadwick F. Alger is professor of political science at The Ohio State University. He has been secretary general of the International Peace Research Association and president of the International Studies Association. He has published widely on the United Nations and on international connections of local communities, and is co-editor and contributor to *A Just Peace through Transformation*.

Humphrey Assisi-Asobie is a member of the faculty of political science at the University of Nigeria and served as secretary general of the Nigerian Society of International Affairs. He has written on Nigerian foreign policy and on regional organizations, particularly in Africa.

Peter Baehr is professor of human rights at Leiden University in the Netherlands and was staff director of the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy. His publications include *The United Nations in the 1990s* (co-author with Leon Gordenker).

Slimane Cheikh is professor of political science at the University of Algiers and served as Minister for Education in the Algerian government.

David Dewitt is professor of political science at York University, Toronto, and director of the Centre for International and Strategic Studies. He is co-author of *Canada as a Principal Power*, among other publications.

A. J. R. Groom is professor of international relations at the University of Kent, UK. A former president of the British International Relations Association, his publications include *International Relations Theory, International Organizations and Functionalism*.

Contributors

Margaret P. Karns is professor of political science and director of the Center of International Studies at the University of Dayton, Ohio. She served as co-editor and contributor to *The United Nations and Multilateral Institutions*.

W. Andy Knight is assistant professor of political science at Bishop's University, Quebec. He directed a research project on the role of Canada in UN reform and is co-editor of the second series of national studies on the United Nations to be published by the UNU Press.

Keith Krause teaches political science at York University, Toronto, and has served as deputy director of the Centre for International and Strategic Studies. He is author of *Weapons between States: The Arms Trade in International Relations* and co-editor of the second series of national studies on the United Nations to be published by the UNU Press.

Gene M. Lyons is professor of government at Dartmouth College, New Hampshire. He served as executive director of the Academic Council on the United Nations System and is co-editor and contributor to *Beyond Westphalia? International Intervention and National Sovereignty*.

Karen A. Mingst is professor of political science at the University of Kentucky. A former chair of the international organization section of the International Studies Association, she is co-editor and contributor to *The United States and Multilateral Institutions*.

Sadako Ogata was director of the Institute of International Relations at Sophia University, Tokyo, and a former member of the Japanese mission to the United Nations. She currently serves as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Marie-Claude Smouts is professor at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques in Paris and research director at the National Centre for Scientific Research. Her latest publication (with Bertrand Badie) is *Le Retournement du monde: Sociologie de la scène internationale*. She has been a member of the French delegation to the United Nations General Assembly.

Paul Taylor is on the faculty of the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He has served as co-editor of *International Organizations* and *Global Issues in the United Nations* and is author of *The Limits of European Integration*.

John E. Trent is professor of political science at the University of Ottawa. He served as secretary general of the International Political Science Association and as a member of the International Social Science Council. He is co-author of *Global Crises and the Social Sciences*.