Climate-driven Recruitment and Other Conflict Dynamics in Colombia

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OCTOBER 2021
KEY FINDINGS

- Climate change effects and human-induced environmental degradation (deforestation, mining, and oil drilling) were reported in all 11 municipalities included in the survey.

- Afro-Colombians and indigenous people were impacted at higher rates by climate-related displacement and conflicts over resources, respectively, than other populations. Women in both groups reported higher levels of these impacts than men.

- Human-induced degradation also impacted communities with 36 per cent of Afro-Colombians respondents reporting displacement due to deforestation, mining, and oil drilling, and 32 per cent of indigenous respondents reporting conflicts over resources and land due to the same.

- 13 per cent of respondents who acknowledged climate change effects in their community knew people who joined armed groups due to difficulties associated with climate change. 15 per cent of respondents who reported changes in deforestation, mining, and oil drilling knew people who joined armed groups due to difficulties associated with these activities.
Background

About MEAC
How and why do individuals exit armed groups – and how do they do so sustainably, without falling back into conflict cycles? These questions are at the core of UNU-CPR’s Managing Exits from Armed Conflict (MEAC) initiative. MEAC is a multi-year, multi-partner collaboration that aims to develop a unified, rigorous approach to examining how and why individuals exit armed conflict and evaluating the efficacy of interventions meant to support their transition to civilian life. MEAC seeks to inform evidence-based programme design and implementation in real time to improve efficacy. At the strategic level, the cross-programme, cross-agency lessons that will emerge from the growing MEAC evidence base will support more effective conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts. MEAC is supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland’s Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), Irish Aid, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and is being run in partnership with the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO), UNICEF, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the World Bank.

About this Series
The MEAC findings report series seeks to put evidence about conflict transitions and related programming into the hands of policymakers and practitioners in real time. The reports present short overviews of findings (or emerging findings) across a wide range of thematic areas and include analyses on their political or practical implications for the UN and its partners.

About this Report
This report is based on data collected from April to May 2021 as part of a phone survey of community members in 11 municipalities across Colombia. It presents findings on climate change and human-induced environmental degradation, including impacts such as displacement and association with armed groups. It also includes analysis of some of the different levels and types of impact that these climate trends have on women and ethnic groups. This data may be useful to government, UN, and NGO partners working in Colombia to tackle climate change and environmental degradation, and to dismantle armed groups and bring about peace, including through implementation of the 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC-EP. The report ends with an examination of key policy and programmatic implications of these findings.

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1This research was conducted in partnership with Fundación Conflict Responses, https://www.conflictresponses.org/
Climate-conflict Links in Colombia

Overview

Colombia is one of the most biodiverse countries in the world, with regional climates ranging from cooler mountainous areas to tropical valleys, the Amazon rainforest, and coastal ecosystems. This natural resource wealth makes Colombia highly vulnerable to a range of climate change dynamics, especially the El Niño Southern Oscillation and its changes in temperature, precipitation, and wind. It also makes the country particularly attractive for economic activities that impact the natural environment, especially deforestation, mining, and oil drilling. The 2021 report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), found that Colombia has experienced greater increases in temperature and sea level than the global average, and will likely continue along this path in the coming decades. Melting of glaciers and rainfall causing flooding in the Andes are also likely to increase. There are therefore a range of climate change and environmental dynamics that put Colombians and their natural resources at risk, especially in the context of ongoing violence and armed group activities that degrade the environment.

The effects of climate change in Colombia, however, are not felt evenly across its diverse geography. Climate change and its effects – for example floods, landslides, and droughts – have a significant impact on marginalized communities, including by contributing to forced internal migration. Adaptation to climate change and its impacts is particularly difficult in these communities, exacerbating existing inequalities and deepening their levels of socioeconomic need. Despite these high levels of vulnerability, human activity is further damaging its wealth of natural resources and the lives of people who depend on them. Among these human activities (e.g., carbon emissions and the use of fertilizers in farming), deforestation is perhaps the longest standing and the most damaging, and is carried out by both legal and illegal actors.

The challenges presented by climate change and human-induced environmental degradation are further exacerbated by the presence of armed groups. Armed actors contribute to deforestation both for the wood itself and to clear land for the cultivation of illegal crops and cattle farming. In recent years, since the peace agreement, deforestation has increased in intensity, as the departure of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) from areas over which they had historically held control has allowed the purchase of affordable land in densely wooded areas, which has led to people purchasing the land for its logging. Furthermore, FARC dissident groups are gaining control in some areas and charging tariffs on the purchase and sale of land for deforestation as well as incentivizing deforestation in some rural areas, as it allows them to open new communications corridors for the transport of illegal goods. They also operate in informal extractive economies such as illegal mining. Conflicts over land – and, in turn, displacements and the creation of informal settlements – generate environmental degradation, food insecurity, low access to water, and disorderly urbanization, all of which armed groups can take advantage of by offering to resolve related community problems and thereby strengthen their territorial control.

Existing data on climate and security in Colombia

Prior studies on perceptions and experiences of climate change in Colombia have focused on large cities, such as Bogotá, Cali, and Medellín. These studies show that citizens have experienced climate change. However, there have been few studies on experiences of climate change in rural areas, especially those that are more remote and potentially more impacted by climate change.
Above all, there is a gap in knowledge of the relationship between conflict and vulnerability to climate change in rural areas affected by the conflict. In terms of understanding the links between climate and security – including those that could put the peace agreement at risk – there is a lack of evidence of how action by armed groups impacts the environment in Colombia, and vice versa. This is particularly true of potential links between climate and armed group recruitment. The MEAC survey is therefore ground-breaking in that it rendered the first survey data on climate and security in rural conflict-affected municipalities in Colombia and sets the direction of future research by highlighting two specific areas that should be further explored: 1) the cyclical, mutually reinforcing relationship between climate change and human-induced degradation and conflict-related dynamics such as displacement and conflicts over resources, especially their impact on different ethnic groups, and 2) the links between climate change and human-induced degradation and armed group recruitment. Research on these two areas and others at the nexus of climate and security will be needed to support an agenda that will become ever more relevant as armed activity, climate change, and environmental degradation promise to evolve in a mutually reinforcing manner for years to come.

Findings

This report is based on data collected in a survey led by UNU-CPR and its Colombian research partner Fundación Conflict Responses from April to May 2021. The 30-minute phone survey with a sample of 2,460 community members from 11 municipalities across Colombia: Mutatá, Antioquia; Caldono, Cauca; San José del Guaviare, Guaviare; Guapi, Cauca; La Uribe, Meta; Puerto Asís, Putumayo; Villavicencio, Meta; Bogotá, Cundinamarca; Cali, Valle del Cauca; San Vicente del Caguán, Caquetá; and Apartadó, Antioquia. Eight of these municipalities (all except the cities of Bogotá, Cali, and Villavicencio) are “PDET” municipalities – conflict-affected, vulnerable, and socioeconomically marginalized communities that have been chosen for the implementation of “Planes de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial” or “Regionally-focused Development Plans” stemming from the 2016 peace agreement between the Government and the FARC-EP. Respondents were asked questions on a range of topics including socioeconomic status, experiences of conflict, perceptions of security, attitudes towards violence, climate change and environmental degradation, and other topics.

Findings on climate, environmental degradation, and security

In the MEAC community phone survey, the majority of respondents (86 per cent) across both urban and rural areas reported experiencing changes in rainfall, temperature, or weather events like floods during their lifetimes. Furthermore, a sizeable number of respondents reported human-induced environmental degradation had changed in frequency or severity: deforestation (29 per cent), mining (15 per cent) and drilling or extraction (11 per cent). As was to be expected, these phenomena were reported more frequently in rural contexts, given the higher levels of these activities there. Map 1 illustrates how the reported levels of both climate change and human-induced environmental degradation varied across the 11 municipalities included in the survey.
Map 1. Climate change and human-induced environmental degradation by municipalities in Colombia.\textsuperscript{iv}

In addition, climate change was recognized as causing economic difficulties in all 11 municipalities, as seen in Figure 2, with up to 89 per cent (in Guapi) of respondents who answered the question in rural municipalities reporting such difficulties. This rural-urban difference in Figure 2 is likely due to the fact that fewer people earn a living from agriculture, farming, or fishing in the cities; however, the level of positive response on this point in the cities is high, possibly indicating that they are reporting on friends or family members who live elsewhere.

Figure 2. In your lifetime, do you know anyone who experienced difficulties making a living from farming, herding or fishing because of these [climate] changes? Answer: Yes

\textsuperscript{iv} The summary statistics presented in Map 1 represent the responses of the 96 per cent of the total sample that answered the question “In your lifetime, do you think there have been great changes in rainfall, temperatures, or weather events such as floods and droughts?” and 99 per cent of those who answered the question “In your lifetime, have any of the following changed in frequency or severity in your community? Please select all that apply.” In the case of the latter question, the map does not include the “None of the above” answer.
With regard to other impacts, displacement, conflicts over resources and land, and disputes over water – all as a result of climate change – were reported in all 11 municipalities. As expected, given how rural communities more heavily rely on land and other natural resources for their livelihoods, and given their high levels of vulnerability to displacement and local conflicts over the course of the Colombian conflict, all of these impacts were reported at higher levels in rural areas, as evident in Figure 3. However, further research is needed to understand the dynamics around little-explored relationships between climate change and all of these impacts in both rural and urban contexts.

**Figure 3. Has your community experienced any of the following because of changes in rainfall and temperature?**

![Bar chart showing the percentage of respondents in rural and urban areas experiencing displacement, conflicts over resources and land, and disputes over water as a result of climate change.](image)

There were differences in reported levels of these impacts among different ethnic groups. Indigenous people reported the highest levels of conflicts over resources and disputes over water as a result of climate change. Afro-Colombians who answered the question reported the highest levels of displacement as a result of climate change (35 per cent). And within these groups, men and women reported significant differences in displacement as a result of climate change. 43 per cent of Afro-Colombian women who answered the question reported this impact, compared to 28 per cent of Afro-Colombian men. Similarly, 29 per cent of indigenous women who answered the question reported displacement as a result of climate change, compared to 21 per cent of indigenous men.

This difference reflects existing evidence on the disproportionate number of Afro-Colombian and indigenous people who are displaced in Colombia, as well as the disproportionate impact of displacement on women, including women in these ethnic groups. This may be due to women’s more tenuous land-holding, which makes them more vulnerable to land-grabbing and forced displacement. However, further research is needed to understand the links between climate and displacement and the potentially disproportionate impact on these groups. This data indicates a need for relevant public policies to take a gender and ethnic approach as well as for further research into why and how these groups experience climate-related displacement.

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*Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 represent the answers of those respondents who answered the respective questions analyzed in those graphs, i.e. not those who refused to answer.*
In terms of geographic diversity, municipalities where armed group activity is still prevalent had higher levels of reported conflicts over resources and land. For example, of those who answered the question in Caldono, San Vicente del Caguán, San José del Guaviare, and Mutatá, 17 to 21 per cent of respondents - compared to 8 to 10 per cent in Bogotá, Cali, and Villavicencio – reported land and resource conflicts. All municipalities reported disputes over water. Caldono and Mutatá reported the highest levels of these impacts, at 12 to 13 per cent. Taking into account historic patterns of disputes over land and other resources in Colombia, these reported impacts could indicate that as climate change worsens and fewer resources are available, armed groups will continue to co-opt land, rivers, and other resources for income-generating activities such as deforestation and mining – further decreasing communities’ power to leverage these resources themselves. This is consistent with existing evidence, for example reports of armed groups competing for control over rivers in Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities that act as strategic transport corridors towards the coasts, affecting communities’ livelihoods and access to food and water.\textsuperscript{12}

Survey data on the impacts of human-induced environmental degradation in the form of deforestation, mining, and oil drilling demonstrated some similarities to the trends identified in the data on climate change, with some notable exceptions in the impacts of these dynamics across rural and urban populations. For example, the impacts of human-induced environmental degradation were reported more evenly across rural and urban contexts than the impacts of climate change, as can be seen in Figure 4.

\textbf{Figure 4. Has your community experienced any of the following as a direct result of these changes in deforestation, mining, and/or drilling?}

![Bar chart showing the percentage of rural and urban respondents experiencing displacement, conflicts over resources and land, and disputes over water.]

Interestingly, disputes over water due to human-induced environmental degradation were reported at higher levels in urban contexts – in fact, it was the only impact reported at higher levels in urban contexts than in rural, as Figure 4 shows. Further research is needed to understand the reasons behind this difference; we know that people in cities have protested over access to water after systems could not keep apace of population growth and related pressure on urban water systems as supplies dwindle, however it is not clear whether respondents here were thinking of inter-personal or communal disputes over water when selecting this response.
The Amazon region municipalities of San Vicente del Caguán (Caquetá), Uribe (Meta) and San José del Guaviare (Guaviare) reported the highest awareness of changes in deforestation – coherent with above mentioned existing documentation of deforestation as the main environmental threat in Colombia today. Again here, of the different populations surveyed, Afro-Colombians and indigenous groups appeared to be the most impacted by human-induced environmental degradation. Like with the impacts of climate change, gendered differences among ethnic groups were seen in the responses on disputes over water as a result of human-induced environmental degradation: 17 per cent of Afro-Colombian women who answered this question reported this impact, compared to 12 per cent of Afro-Colombian men, while for indigenous respondents this trend was flipped: 29 per cent of indigenous men respondents reported disputes over water, compared to 11 per cent of indigenous women. Afro-Colombian respondents appeared to have been more likely to be displaced as a result of human-induced environmental degradation than other populations. Future research on these dynamics in Colombia should explore the ethnic and gender dimensions of these impacts.

Finally, the MEAC community phone survey rendered the first data in Colombia that suggests a link between climate change, human-induced environmental degradation, and recruitment by armed groups. The implications of climate change and human-induced environmental degradation therefore go beyond livelihoods and health; they also have an impact on conflict dynamics, and specifically on armed groups’ ability to recruit members. This further implies that climate change and human-induced environmental degradation could impact the success and potential impact of the 2016 peace agreement between the Government and the FARC-EP, as insecurity will continue to plague implementation of the agreement in the context of continued climate-related recruitment.

### Figure 5. Do you know anyone who joined an armed group due to economic difficulties caused by these changes in rainfall or temperature / economic difficulties caused by these changes in deforestation, mining, and oil drilling?

![Figure 5](image)

13 per cent of respondents who reported climate change also reported knowing people who joined armed groups due to difficulties earning a livelihood due to climate change. As highlighted in Figure 5, rural areas reported higher levels of this link: the highest being 19 per cent in Guapi, in the Pacific. In addition, across municipalities, 15 per cent of respondents who reported changes in deforestation, mining, and oil drilling also reported knowing people who joined armed groups due to difficulties associated with these activities. Again, rural areas reported higher levels of recruitment linked to this human-induced environmental degradation, with reported levels as high as 28 per cent in Apartadó.
This is perhaps unsurprising in places like Apartadó and San Vicente del Caguán (15 per cent), where existing evidence already suggested that one of the main sources of financing of the dissident groups is deforestation.

There are many possible reasons why these rural areas reported higher levels of recruitment linked to environmental degradation. In areas in which deforestation, mining, and oil drilling have had negative impacts on local livelihoods in conflict-affected contexts, community members – many of whom were already living in vulnerable situations – are more in need of income and may be more open to joining armed groups. At the same time, the armed groups who participate in illegal mining and deforestation have higher income, which potentially enables them to pay higher salaries to more members. These groups likely also have greater need for members to coordinate with local populations who work in activities such as illegal logging and mining. The push and pull of new recruits into armed groups due to human-induced environmental degradation is unlikely to cease until degradation activities are stopped, indicating a need not only to tackle human-induced environmental degradation because of its impact on the environment, but also to address it in the context of armed group activity in order to reduce their capacity to recruit in local communities. Further research is needed to understand these dynamics in depth, including their gender and age dimensions, and in order to explore how different policy options relating to conflict resolution and climate can address these dynamics in a holistic manner.

Finally, in an open-ended question about differences between the former FARC-EP guerrilla group and the new FARC dissident groups, five people noted – without being prompted to speak about the environment – differences in the dissident groups’ management of natural resources. Given that the former FARC-EP had strict environmental management guidance that prevented degradative activities in some parts of the country, it is possible that the new groups have left this guidance behind – perhaps in the interests of earning higher income from activities like deforestation and mining – and may carry out activities that have greater environmental impact in the future. Further research on this point, among others, is required.

Policy and Programmatic Implications

The peace accord signed in 2016 between the Government and the FARC-EP includes a chapter on rural reform that could mitigate the negative impacts of the relationship between armed conflict and environmental degradation. However, this chapter has seen little progress in implementation. Other commitments that have the potential to catalyze change on climate in Colombia include international agreements and standards (including the Paris Climate Agreement and the Kyoto Protocol) as well as relevant policy in the form of CONPES 4021.vi All of these commit the State to adopting measures to mitigate climate change, but implementation has been slow. In a glimmer of hope, however, in August 2021 the Colombian Congress approved a law that defines new environmental crimes, such as deforestation and makes these crimes punishable with up to 15 years in prison.14

The MEAC survey data suggests that these initial positive actions should be accelerated, as climate change and human-induced environmental degradation in Colombia have widespread impact across the population and require urgent attention from policymakers and practitioners, in the context of both environmental policy and management and conflict resolution and peacebuilding – including

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vi “CONPES” policy documents are enacted by the “Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social” (National Council for Economic and Social Policy) on public policy issues.
efforts that aim to address the historic impacts of conflict, such as displacement and disputes over resources. The MEAC data therefore supports at least three areas in which policy and programming could be focused and adjusted to address these dynamics: peacebuilding policy, which should be climate- and environmentally-sensitive; strengthened use of existing tools such as the peace agreement and the PDETs to address both security and livelihood issues relating to climatic shifts; and expanded non-military State presence including coverage of local justice mechanisms that can adjudicate disputes over land, water, and other resources, so that as these climatic shifts increase, the risk of increased conflict is mitigated.

With regard to security and peacebuilding policy, as new dissident groups proliferate and other groups such as the ‘Ejército de Liberación Nacional’ (ELN) or the ‘Clan del Golfo’ continue operations, efforts to prevent recruitment, resolve conflicts, and dismantle these groups will be ever more necessary, especially as the climate-related drivers of recruitment considered here increase. It is essential that such peacebuilding efforts are sensitive to climate change and human-induced environmental degradation both as sources of socioeconomic vulnerability that could drive local populations to join armed groups, and, especially in the case of human activities such as deforestation, sources of financing that bolster armed group activities. As was suggested in MEAC’s report on climate-driven recruitment in Nigeria, these efforts should be complemented by support for communities whose livelihoods have been negatively impacted by climate change, including for those who are transitioning out of armed groups and may be at risk of rejoining if their livelihoods are not sustainable.

Many of the measures to address these dynamics already exist in Colombia but need to be fully and comprehensively implemented. The rural reform chapter of the 2016 peace agreement contains many policy and programmatic tools to implement climate-sensitive interventions at the nexus of conflict resolution and development. Furthermore, the PDETs allow for localized approaches to peace agreement implementation that take into account context-specific dynamics in conflict-affected communities, including climate risks. For example, the PDETs include support to communities in building local governance and natural resource management structures, as well as, crucially, support – including investment - for sustainable socioeconomic development. Implementation with adequate financial and institutional support of the rural reform chapter through the PDETs, including by engaging stakeholders across the policy and practice spectrum – from community-level to international – would represent a significant step forward in addressing climate stressors and conflict risks and impacts in a mutually reinforcing manner. The rural reform chapter also includes a National Irrigation and Drainage Plan for “campesinos” (directly translated as “peasants”), their families, and their communities. One goal of this plan is “to mitigate the risks caused by climate change.” Another key point of the chapter is the land titling system, the great “atlas” of land ownership that, if updated with property records for all Colombia, would show legal ownership and prevent legal uncertainty around titling that allows activities such as deforestation to take place. Today, the atlas covers only 15 per cent of land in Colombia, but would be 100 per cent updated upon implementation of this part of the peace agreement.

In terms of deforestation, our findings also suggest the need to prioritize strategies that reinforce the non-military presence of the State. For example, bringing in judges to resolve land disputes or implementing national and international commitments, such as the Escazú agreement, which focused on climate and human rights in Latin American countries. With regard to the Escazú agreement in particular, implementation of its provision on protection of environmental defenders is essential to ensuring that individuals in this profession are able to carry out their work safely. Alongside this is a need to better connect community-level environmental protection work with national efforts, so that the latter are better informed by good practices and experiences across
Colombia’s diverse territories. Furthermore, State institutions such as healthcare and livelihood support mechanisms will be key in combatting the effects of climatic shifts and supporting communities as they adapt to new ways of life.

Comprehensive, cross-sectoral implementation of these national and international measures to tackle climate change and bring about peace would go a long way in addressing the trends revealed here. It is clear from the MEAC data that climate change and human-induced environmental degradation are interacting with conflict dynamics, often in very intimate ways. Especially in rural municipalities, which have historically seen higher levels of armed group recruitment, displacement, and conflicts over resources, climatic shifts are an added driver behind the continuation of these impacts and present new challenges to efforts to resolve conflict. Similarly, the conflict, specifically armed actors, are contributing to climatic shifts, and therefore create a cycle in which the two – climate change and conflict – are intrinsically linked. Only through comprehensive implementation of measures to tackle climate change, prevent human-induced environmental degradation, and prevent and resolve conflict in Colombia, will this nexus be broken. Colombia has the tools, the next step is to use them.
Annex 1: The Sample of Municipalities

The MEAC team selected the 11 municipalities included in this survey with the goal of exploring some of the ways that the conflict’s impact has varied across urban and rural geographic locations and diverse ethnic groups, among other sub-populations, and based on information needs from key stakeholders working to advance peace in Colombia. The following table summarises the criteria and characteristics that were taken into account in the selection of these municipalities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Afro-Colombians</th>
<th>Indigenous</th>
<th>Urban/Rural</th>
<th>PDET</th>
<th>TATR</th>
<th>Venezuelan migrants</th>
<th>Referendum Vote</th>
<th>Armed groups present</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>203</td>
<td>Apartadó</td>
<td>Antioquia</td>
<td>121,003</td>
<td>42%25</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1,940</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Clan del Golfo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>188</td>
<td>San Vicente del Caguán</td>
<td>Caquetá</td>
<td>50,719</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>FARC dissident groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203</td>
<td>Mutatá</td>
<td>Antioquia</td>
<td>13,991</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Clan del Golfo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>207</td>
<td>Caldono</td>
<td>Cauca</td>
<td>39,946</td>
<td>0%26</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>FARC dissident groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>207</td>
<td>San José del Guaviare</td>
<td>Guaviare</td>
<td>52,815</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Rural</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>201</td>
<td>Guapi</td>
<td>Cauca</td>
<td>27,616</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>ELN; FARC dissident groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189</td>
<td>La Uribe</td>
<td>Meta</td>
<td>9,284</td>
<td>0%27</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>FARC dissident groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>Puerto Asís</td>
<td>Putumayo</td>
<td>64,867</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>FARC dissident groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205</td>
<td>Villavicencio</td>
<td>Meta</td>
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<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4,587</td>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>357,000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Clan del Golfo; ELN</td>
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<td>347</td>
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<td>0%</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>63,696</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>ELN; Los Rastrojos</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
have categorized all municipalities as either urban or rural.

20 "PDET" municipalities are conflict-affected, vulnerable, and socio-economically marginalized communities that have been chosen for the implementation of "Planes de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial" or "Regionally-focused Development Plans" stemming from the 2016 peace agreement between the Government and the FARC-EP. Source: Colombian Territory Renewal Agency -ART.

21 “Former Territorial Areas for Training and Reincorporation” or “Antiguos Espacios Territoriales para la Capacitación y la Reincorporación” are the sites at which the former FARC-EP laid down their weapons and began their transition to civilian life as a result of the 2016 peace agreement. As of July 2021, there were 2,487 former members of the FARC-EP living in 24 former TATRs across the country. A further 9,634 former members are living in the sites at which the former FARC-EP laid down their weapons and began their transition to civilian life as a result of the 2016 peace agreement. Source: Colombian Territory Renewal Agency -ART.


24 Private Database. Fundación Conflict Responses.


