PROTECTING TOGETHER

LESSONS FROM MALI AND SOUTH SUDAN ON COHERENCE BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND MILITARY COMPONENTS IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS

DR ADAM DAY AND DR CHARLES T. HUNT
Dr Adam Day, Director of Programmes, United Nations University Centre for Policy Research
Dr Charles T. Hunt, Senior Fellow (Non-Resident), United Nations University Centre for Policy Research.

An earlier version of this paper was prepared by the authors based on a donation from the German Federal Ministry of Defence. It served as a discussion paper for the High-Level Conference Peace Operations and Human Rights on 6 July 2021.


All content (text, visualizations, graphics), except where otherwise specified or attributed, is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike IGO license (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO). Using, reposting and citing this content is allowed without prior permission.


Visuals: UN Photo/Marco Dormino (front), UN Photo/UNMISS (back)
INTRODUCTION

Challenges ........................................................................................................................................ 2

Good Practices .................................................................................................................................. 4

Lessons and Recommendations ...................................................................................................... 7

References ........................................................................................................................................ 12

ABBREVIATIONS

- **A4P**: Action for Peacekeeping
- **CAAC**: Children and Armed Conflict
- **CRSV**: Conflict-related Sexual Violence
- **DP(K)O**: Department of Peace(keeping) Operations
- **FAMA**: Armed Forces of Mali
- **FIOC**: Field Integrated Operations Centre
- **HRDDP**: Human Rights Due Diligence Policy
- **ITS**: Integrated Training Service
- **JMAC**: Joint Mission Analysis Cell
- **MINUSMA**: UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Missions in Mali
- **MOU**: Memorandum of Understanding
- **OHCHR**: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
- **POC**: Protection of Civilians
- **(R)JOC**: (Regional) Joint Operations Centre
- **SAGE**: Situational Awareness Geospatial Enterprise
- **SGBV**: Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
- **SOP**: Standard Operating Procedure
- **SPU**: Strategic Planning Unit
- **SRSG**: Special Representative of the Secretary-General
INTRODUCTION

The promotion and protection of human rights has been a core aspect of UN peace operations for more than 25 years. Over that time, the mandates of peace operations have grown in size and scope, today involving a far greater number of areas requiring collaboration between human rights and other mission components. UN policy and guidance have likewise evolved to place human rights as a central goal of peace operations, demanding that all mission components share a responsibility for promoting and protecting human rights, putting in place clear requirements for integrating human rights in mission planning, and giving the OHCHR an independent and lead role in supporting human rights work in peace operations. In this context, collaboration between human rights and military components has been recognized as an especially important relationship in peace operations, including in joint then-DPKO/OHCHR guidance issued in 2013 that articulates specific areas for cooperation, including analysis, planning, operations, investigations, and advocacy. These efforts to integrate and coordinate have led to significant improvements across peace operations, resulting in widespread acknowledgement that human rights and military components can be mutual enablers for implementing mission mandates.

During its UN Security Council presidency in July 2020, Germany convened an open debate on peace operations and human rights, during which several Member States highlighted the need for greater cooperation between military and human rights components in peace operations. In follow-up to that debate, Germany hosted a high-level conference on 6 July 2021 in which participants discussed how to improve collaboration between military and human rights components in UN peace operations. The following paper was developed by United Nations University Centre for Policy Research to provide an independent analysis in support of Germany’s high-level event. Specifically, it draws on a range of interviews and consultations with leadership and staff in the UN missions in South Sudan and Mali (UNMISS and MINUSMA, respectively) and experts across the UN system to identify: (1) current challenges confronting human rights and military components in volatile settings; (2) good practices and innovations in South Sudan and Mali; and (3) lessons and recommendations for enhancing cooperation going forward. The paper illustrates where UNMISS and MINUSMA have developed good practices that have facilitated closer coordination/cooperation and even integration of military peacekeepers and human rights officers.
The context and missions in South Sudan and Mali differ significantly. However, both missions have faced several common challenges when it comes to integrating human rights into the work of other mission components. While this paper focuses on these two missions, the authors have also drawn on a broader range of field research in other mission settings over the past five years to help identify challenges that may be present across a wider spectrum of peace operations.8

- **Cultural silos.** While there have been significant improvements in bringing the military and human rights components together, staff in both UNMISS and MINUSMA referred to differences in organizational culture – particularly approaches to handling sensitive information about human rights violations and violators – as inhibiting cooperation. “The force has a culture of keeping operationally sensitive information to itself, and so does human rights, even though they do it differently,” one senior mission leader noted. Indeed, staff pointed to significant and enduring cultural differences – e.g. the different terminology used to describe protection threats – as limiting the development of joined-up approaches. “Human rights doesn't [sic] understand things like weapons or military movements, just like we don't understand how they do investigations, so we keep our coordination at a very abstract level,” one member of the military component described. One interesting finding in this context was widely differing views on the extent of these cultural differences – several members of both missions suggested that the cultural divide was minimal, while others pointed to it as the overriding obstacle to greater collaboration.

- **Turnover.** One of the recurrent complaints in both missions related to the frequency of turnover of military personnel. Often, rotations take place every six to twelve months, meaning that incoming military staff must become acquainted with the context, systems for cooperation, and personnel of the mission on a regular basis.9 One human rights official noted, “By the time we develop a working relationship with our force [military] counterparts, they are packing up their bags, and we have no idea if their replacement will have the same mindset.” The result has been high degrees of uncertainty concerning the relationship between human rights and military components, where working relationships can be undermined (or indeed resolved) with a single rotation. When combined with the limited local language proficiency of some military contingents, human rights components often see themselves as possessing far better contextual knowledge and contacts than their military counterparts.

- **Structures for information-sharing.** While both missions do have forums for information-sharing and planning at the strategic level, many of the most important modalities for exchanging views remain informal and ad hoc, especially at the operational level. “Human rights is not formally present in operational planning,” one mission leader noted, “so the ability of human rights to be involved in the protection response of the mission relies on person-to-person relationships.” Both missions also noted that information-sharing in mission headquarters was often very different than in deeper field locations. “Getting information flowing in Headquarters is one thing, but in the field offices it depends 100 per cent on whether the head of office can bring people together,” a senior UN staff member noted. At times this may mean information-sharing is in fact better in field locations, especially if the head of office is an effective manager capable of bringing the components together.
• **Urgency “versus” collaboration.** “We have excellent collaboration when it comes to strategic planning about the coming year, but that disappears when there is an urgent protection threat,” one staff member described. Indeed, in both missions, there appeared to be an inverse relationship between urgency and coordination, where the most immediate military responses and human rights investigations were conducted largely within the respective components, often without meaningful information-sharing or coordination. This issue was most acutely noted in the work of the planning cell in the military component, which tended to develop most, if not all, of its operational planning without direct collaboration with human rights. This was not a uniform finding: some examples were provided of imminent protection threats that generated good cooperation between the components. Another area where tensions occasionally arose was the timeframes for work on the ground: human rights often needed significant time to initiate and conduct an investigation and interview relevant actors following an alleged violation, whereas timeframes for military responses – e.g. patrols intended as high-visibility displays for rapid reassurance and deterrence – sometimes do not align with those of human rights.  

• **Differing priorities.** Human rights and military components broadly share the strategic objectives of their missions, particularly when it comes to the POC mandate as a common whole-of mission activity. Despite this, their respective priorities and more immediate goals often diverge. This can give rise to deep disagreements around the use of military patrols, joint investigations, and how human rights advocacy should be employed by the mission. Particularly in high-risk settings such as Mali, this can result in the human rights component being seen as “pushing” the military into unsafe areas, or overly focusing on accountability for abuses by State security actors while paying less attention to the violations of non-State actors. At the far end of the spectrum, this can result in a mindset captured by one senior mission staff: “they simply don't understand what we are here to do, so of course we disagree on priorities.”

• **Perceptions of partiality.** When peace operations are perceived as impartial by local actors, human rights sections enjoy greater access to all parties, including non-State armed groups. In many mission settings, the close relationship between the mission (in particular, the military component) and national security services is sometimes publicly seen as tilting the mission towards one side in an ongoing conflict, potentially undermining the UN’s standing to conduct fair human rights work. From the military's perspective, the work of human rights can conversely be seen as creating too much distance from the kind of close relationships needed for effective joint operations with national security forces. This dynamic has broader implications: humanitarian agencies are often reticent to cooperate closely with UN missions when they are seen as too close to the government, with real impacts on collaboration around protection.
GOOD PRACTICES

Both MINUSMA and UNMISS have developed structures and internal guidance to address some of the above challenges and improve coordination between human rights and military components (indeed many of these steps are designed to improve mission-wide collaboration, though this paper focuses on the two components). Some of the key practices are here identified, with a view to extracting broader lessons for UN peace operations.

Information-sharing

One of the most important contributions of human rights is its in-depth understanding of context at the local level. UNMISS has developed a practice for sharing this kind of contextualization regularly: on a weekly basis, human rights shares with other mission components (including the military) an analysis of ‘hotspots’, reported violations, and likely trends based on its longer-term analysis. This information-sharing has delivered tangible results, where human rights-driven analysis of violations has been used as the basis to deploy the military to conduct new patrolling patterns, resulting in a decrease in casualties in some parts of the country. “The key is to have human rights regularly updating and informing the military and the mission on what is happening, why it's happening, and where we should be going in the coming week,” a senior member of UNMISS military said. In MINUSMA, too, flash reports from human rights officials feeding mission-wide early warning analysis was said to have contributed to raising awareness and directing efforts to prevent attacks and protect civilians as intercommunal violence was escalating in Mali’s central regions (though some in the mission suggested that over-classification of documents hampered the speed of information flows).

Joint coordination mechanisms

At the strategic level, both missions have developed practices that bring the human rights and military components together into common structures. Two years ago, for example, the UNMISS Force Commander and the Chief of Human Rights agreed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) laying out main areas of cooperation, mutual goals, and broad ways to work together which has resulted in far more regular forums for joint planning. The mission also instituted a “Mission Planning Group” that draws from all components to generate scenario-based plans for key issues such as potential attacks on civilian sites, or another Ebola outbreak in the region. Both missions have also increased support to coordination at headquarters and the field office levels. Examples include the MINUSMA’s SPU at mission headquarters, and MINUSMA’s RJOCs and UNMISS’ FIOC at the regional level. Protection of civilian coordination mechanisms at mission headquarters and field office levels have also provided a forum that brings together the force and human rights components, along with other mission components.

Joint planning

Building on these joint structures, both missions have good examples of joint planning between the military and human rights (indeed involving other mission components as well, such as the police). In 2020, for example, MINUSMA’s military component and the regional head of office in Mopti jointly planned an investigation into human rights violations that involved military air transport, force protection for an investigation team, and coordination with local security actors on the ground. By having a centralized communication focal point within the military component, the operation was conducted with minimal disruption and good information-sharing. This built on what is generally described by mission
officials as a high point of cooperation between the military and human rights in the planning and execution of the joint/integrated Operation Folon, which also took place in the central regions of Mali throughout 2019 (though interviewees noted that these practices have not continued in subsequent missions). In UNMISS, joint planning between the military and human rights has likewise facilitated better access to sites of civilian vulnerability to monitor and conduct investigations into violations of human rights. It has also generated other opportunities to protect human rights, such as negotiating the release of women and children abducted by armed groups.

Early warning to action

It is crucial that missions develop effective ways to translate early warning information from one component into action by the mission as a whole. In MINUSMA, this was advanced through an MOU between the mission’s earlier intelligence cell – the All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU) – and the human rights section, the use of which gradually established trust around protection of sensitive information by both parties and allowed for planning based on more holistic analysis of threats according to officials interviewed.14 UNMISS has innovated by using the JMAC for generating early warning information. On a bi-weekly basis, the UNMISS JMAC hosts an early warning meeting where human rights and the military can participate in a mission-wide discussion of current trends and likely developments over the coming two weeks. This directly feeds into an “Operational Coordination Committee” overseen by the mission Chief of Staff, where decisions about early warning responses are made. This is an atypical use of the JMAC – which is usually tasked to provide the SRSG with medium-term analysis – but an effective one according to many staff in UNMISS. In a similar vein, MINUSMA has developed its Integrated Operational Planning and Coordination Mechanism that produces regular outlook analyses and brings together human rights and the military in regular formal meetings generating direct action – something mission officials described as working very well.

Liaison with national military

In some cases, national military actors are much more receptive to the military than civilian interlocutors, particularly around issues of accountability for human rights violations. At times, both missions have established focal points within the military to liaise with national military leadership, including on issues related to human rights accountability. Indeed, a good practice identified within MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was its use of military liaison to maintain constructive, principled relations with the Congolese military. A similar liaison arrangement at the field office level is also present in UNMISS.

Joint activities

Both UNMISS and MINUSMA have increasingly initiated joint activities between the military and human rights components, including joint patrols and investigations. In South Sudan, integrated field patrols – including the military, human rights, and a range of other civilian components – have been composed in response to the hot-spot analysis discussed above, prioritized and directed through joint analysis. These cooperative efforts provide further opportunities for coordination between military and human rights before patrols take place (e.g. UNMISS’ practice of a “sharing of information” document ahead of patrols) as well as joint briefings following these collaborative missions. While joint investigations into human rights violations present more nuanced challenges, there were examples from both missions illustrating positive experiences when the division of labour and comparative advantages were clearly delineated and adhered to. A point made by UN Headquarters colleagues was that many of these activities are typically coordinated under the POC component, as part of a cross-cutting protection approach.
Joint training

The missions in South Sudan and Mali both provide good examples of bringing together the respective strengths of the military and human rights division in delivering training to local and national counterparts – particularly aimed at promoting and protecting human rights. In UNMISS, the two components organized joint training for the national army and the opposition forces on conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). Such joint endeavours have generated tangible outcomes in terms of commitments (e.g. orders from command-level and a national CRSV prevention action plan). Similarly, MINUSMA military and human rights components have worked together to deliver training on human rights for the Malian Defence and Security Forces.

HRDDP as an enabler

In both missions, the role of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) was broadly described as essential to the work of the mission, though opinions differed sharply as to whether it enabled effective responses by the military. On one hand, several members of the military suggested that the HRDDP played an important role in helping the mission avoid unintentionally supporting known human rights offenders, also offering points of leverage with the national government alongside broader efforts to encourage adherence to international human rights and humanitarian law. On the other, some suggested that the HRDDP remained an inhibition on their work, particularly when the human rights component demanded comprehensive lists of national soldiers involved in operations. “When we have an operation stopped or delayed because the army hasn't provided a list of every name, we can't do our protection job,” one UN officer noted. Where the HRDDP appeared most effective, it was used by all key actors as an enabler for operations, helping to identify mitigating measures that would allow operations to go forward, rather than in effect prohibiting actions.

Communications/advocacy

There are several instances in both missions where a collaborative communications approach by the military and human rights have enabled advocacy and sensitization campaigns with potential human rights violators. For example, in UNMISS the military component has been able to create spaces for the human rights section to engage with parties to the conflict (e.g. in sensitization on CRSV). Leveraging the comparative advantages – i.e. military more likely to gain access to senior command-level actors in national armed forces – is an important way that working together can enable progress on shared goals.
LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following lessons and recommendations build on the good practices of UNMISS and MINUSMA, suggestions made by the personnel of both missions, assessments of the practices of other missions, and a recent internal review of peacekeeping conducted by DPO. Some may be transferrable for use in other UN peace operations settings as well as different phases of mission life cycles from start-up to drawdown and transition.

1. Revisit rotation schedules

It was clear from the experiences of UNMISS and MINUSMA that the high rate of turnover of military staff was a major impediment to more effective coordination between human rights and the military (and indeed between the military and other substantive components as well). Constructive working relations and a good understanding of the situation on the ground were consistently linked to time spent in the mission area, whereas the frequent rotation of military staff created, according to one interviewee, “an unstable situation where we don’t know what will happen to our coordination from one day to the next.” One solution might be to identify certain positions within the military that require longer, multi-year tours of duty in missions (e.g. strategic planning, military chief of staff, and/or a liaison function). Additionally, it would be helpful to bolster the handover processes (e.g. end of mission reports and in-briefing materials) and enforce extant SOPs for incoming military, making use of induction training, especially to ensure they are aware of the need to support processes like the HRDDP.

2. Develop issue-specific common workplans

To translate the broad strategic objectives into a more day-to-day set of joint processes, missions could develop common workplans that bring together human rights and military components in a number of key areas. For example, in areas like training of national security forces, vetting via the HRDDP, and joint operations/investigations, a medium-term joint work planning process would be a useful exercise. In some cases, joint workplans around the deployment of national forces (e.g. the FAMA to regions of Mali) would helpfully bring human rights, the military and others together.

3. Develop mission-specific MOUs

Mission leadership should be encouraged and incentivized to reproduce the good practice in UNMISS of agreeing MOUs between the head of human rights and the force commander. Such an arrangement would help clarify shared objectives, areas for cooperation, and modalities for interoperability with the aim of facilitating joint action, particularly in the area of planning. Indeed, MOUs that outlast the individuals heading human rights and the military promise more sustainable forms of collaboration.
4. Conduct joint operational planning

The most important forum for actions by the military at the mission headquarters is the operational planning unit, whether long-term plans or current operations. But these are also the forums where human rights personnel are most systematically excluded. “The military is happy to have us in the broader strategic discussions, and happy to have us in information-sharing forums, but when it comes to deciding where to send a patrol, the door is closed to us,” one human rights staff member noted. While it is important to acknowledge the military's prerogatives to safeguard confidential information about troop locations and plans, missions should seriously consider how human rights and some other substantive components could be brought more directly into operational planning at the headquarters and sector levels, including through the leadership of the POC coordinator. A dedicated discussion of this amongst UN leadership and TCCs would helpfully move this issue forward.

5. Build routines and focal points into the mission

Given the fluidity of staff rotations and shifting priorities on the ground, it is crucial that missions develop a “battle rhythm” to ensure coordination in their work. Within the military, missions should consider: (1) designating a focal point for human rights (not just HRDDP) with an appropriate skill set and background to ensure coordination from headquarters level to field locations; (2) following existing guidance to establish routine meetings and information-sharing protocols that allow for collective review of threats, trends, and priorities; and (3) ensuring comprehensive and timely handover for incoming staff (including briefings from the human rights section), particularly for positions involving military planning where coordination with human rights is crucial. Together with human rights sections, the military and human rights should also seek to produce joint analysis and reporting whenever possible. In addition to the internal focal points, missions should consider whether a permanent military liaison with the national security forces around issues of accountability and vetting might facilitate human rights work in these areas. These routines and focal points should not be dictated by UN Headquarters in New York, but appear most useful when they are developed in-mission, often by the mission chief of staff.

6. Draw the military into the work of human rights

Most of the focus in missions (and indeed guidance from UN Headquarters) concerns the incorporation of human rights and other civilian components into the work of the military, for example through joint structures like the JOC and JMAC. But it is equally important to identify how the human rights components might benefit from greater involvement of the military in their own analysis and planning. One proposal suggested by an interviewee in mission was to more systematically involve the force in the activities of other mission components that can facilitate the efforts to protect and promote human rights. “The force is often brought in only when we are thinking of a military operation, but they would be extremely useful in helping us analyse armed groups when we are going into a mediation, or any community-level engagement,” one senior mission staff suggested. This is particularly the case in remote locations where the military has a presence but human rights do not or cannot access due to insecurity.

7. Clarify roles/responsibilities in investigations

Human rights investigations are the core activity of the human rights components of peace operations, and often – for security and logistical reasons – these investigations can only be taken forward jointly
with the military. In addition to the broader areas of collaboration between the components, some specific steps that could be taken by the military to support human rights investigations include: (1) developing clear terms of reference to guide collaboration; (2) designation of a military focal point for liaison with human rights; (3) early communication of the limits of support that can be provided by the military; and (4) early identification of escort requirements, including through a pre-mission briefing. UNMISS' practice of a “sharing of information” document ahead of patrols offers a good practice here as well. It would also be helpful to build a clearer understanding within the military of how to handle sensitive issues like sexual violence and violence against children, where often specialized human rights capacities are needed.

8. Close the “analysis/action gap”

In line with the recent review of peacekeeping, missions should prioritize the flows of information (particularly from remote field locations) to enable rapid transition from analysis to action. This means persistent attention by the mission leadership to avoid “siloing” of information, along with building the structures that can translate timely threat assessments and contextual information into operational planning. Here, UNMISS' Operational Coordination Committee, MINUSMA's Integrated Operational Planning and Coordination Mechanism, and MINUSMA's Early Warning and Rapid Response SOP offer examples that could be followed by other missions.

9. Frame HRDDP as a mission-wide enabler

While there has been progress in both missions towards a more constructive vision of the HRDDP, some mission actors continue to see it primarily as an inhibitor on the work of the military. The issue becomes most acute in contexts where the military is committed to providing support to a national military unit, but must wait for HRDDP clearance. MINUSMA's practice of instituting a mission chief of the staff-led task force on the HRDDP offers a helpful example of moving due diligence into a mission-wide priority with the potential to reduce conflict or friction between human rights and military components. Beyond this, the HRDDP can be used to gain leverage with national leaders, helping to provoke behavioural changes that can progress the country towards a wider range of mission goals.

10. Map together

While it might seem obvious, both human rights and military components rely heavily on mapping for their respective workstreams. In UNMISS, human rights hotspot mapping was considered one of the best tools to inform the military of potential protection risks and priority areas for patrolling. And, of course, the JOCs, JMACs, and POC units in both missions frequently provide maps that indicate the presence of armed groups, trends, and incidents. Given these practices, missions should consider the production of joint human rights/military maps (and better might be joint protection mapping), where the analysis of many mission components is brought together in a single visualization that can guide joined-up analysis and operations. This would also help the cross-pollination of institutional cultures. “Whenever we sit over a map,” one civilian staff noted, “the cultural and language differences seem to disappear, and we can both understand what needs to be done.” Indeed, the practice of mapping could be expanded beyond geography to include actor mapping, or indeed digital mapping linked to other information-gathering tools in peace operations (e.g. SAGE).
11. Build up intelligence capacities

MINUSMA was the first mission to institute a dedicated intelligence cell, though other missions have built similar capacities to meet their intelligence needs (e.g. MONUSCO’s Joint Analysis Collection and Early Warning Cell, which was formed on a temporary basis in 2016). Indeed, the UN has recently developed a peacekeeping intelligence policy to oversee such capacities across missions. Intelligence, however, remains an underdeveloped set of capacities in peace operations, and one of the most frequently cited reasons for shortfalls in protection responses. Notwithstanding the need to protect the identities of survivors and witnesses of abuses, human intelligence is an area where the work of human rights can meaningfully contribute to military operations, and can help to provide a forum where both components can collaborate to identify priority areas for action. Allocating greater resources to intelligence capacities within peace operations, and encouraging greater evolution of the UN's intelligence doctrine, are both important next steps.

12. Develop guidance and training around military/human rights coordination

In order to overcome the barriers to participating in military planning processes, missions should develop pre-deployment and/or in-mission bespoke training for human rights focal points, to give them the expertise they need to understand and engage in military planning processes as well as a better awareness of sensitivities and military exigencies. This would help to ‘train them into the room’. Tailored training for military staff on CRSV and CAAC – in particular, how to coordinate with human rights components in handling sensitive information and investigations – are important areas in this regard. Such training should be accompanied by the guidance necessary to ensure that the inclusion of human rights in military planning processes adds value in a tangible and sustained way. Across this work, one clear lesson from both missions has been on the importance of field-driven innovation; allowing mission leaders the flexibility to adapt the tools they have has proven extremely effective.

13. Establish local coordination structures under strong leadership

Both missions described significant differences between human rights/military coordination at headquarters and field office levels, with the latter largely contingent on the quality of leadership at the local level. “Everything depends on whether we have a head of office who can bring human rights and military together and drive their action,” one mission leader described. In addition to examining the terms of reference for heads of offices, missions could establish clearer standard operating procedures for field offices to systematize information-sharing, conduct joint/integrated patrols, protection responses, and investigations, to ensure that all components are clearly tasked and placed under the responsibility of the head of office. This would of course need to be done with the military chain of command and OHCHR’s dual reporting lines in mind. UNMISS’ FIOC offers one such model for this.

14. Use human rights data to measure impact

The data and analysis that human rights sections gather and analyse as a matter of course can be put to work by missions in assessing the impacts of the military’s patrolling and general presence. In MINUSMA, for example, human rights and POC analyses of threats to civilians were – working closely with the military – used to ascertain the effectiveness of current locations and durations of patrols. If aligned with other mission assessment frameworks such as the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System, these can contribute to evaluating the relative benefits of current deployment plans and feed into future planning around base locations.
15. Embed human rights advocacy in strategic communications

In line with one of the seven A4P+ Priorities for 2021-2023 and the recommendations of a recent DPO review, the advocacy and communications efforts of human rights and the military should be incorporated within a broader strategic communications approach designed to promote successes, manage expectations, and help address disinformation, misinformation and hate speech. Such a meta-narrative should lay out how the promotion and protection of human rights is central to peace operations while clearly delineating what the mission – for whom the military is often the most visible component – can (but also cannot) be expected to do about it.
REFERENCES

1. The first modern human rights component in peacekeeping was deployed in 1992 in the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).


3. In this paper, the terms “military component” and “force” are used interchangeably, as they tend to be in field missions.


7. The below findings reflect interviews and feedback from the following mission components in UNMISS and MINUSMA: Force, Human Rights, Chief of Staff, Protection of Civilians, Planning, and cross-cutting consultations with other actors. Drafts of the paper were also consulted with relevant desks and Integrated Operational Teams in UN Headquarters, and with recognized experts in UN peace operations. This paper was also consulted with the DPO team tasked with updating the UN's guidance on collaboration between military and human rights components in peacekeeping. The findings reflect the views of the authors and not necessarily those of the UN Secretariat, the peace operations consulted or the donor, the Government of Germany.

8. The authors have conducted field research on human rights and protection in peace operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Mali and the Central African Republic in the past few years. One author also served as the Senior Political Adviser to MONUSCO in 2016 and was directly involved in strategic planning for addressing armed group activity in eastern Congo.

9. UN guidelines provide that all the UN military staff officers' or UN military experts on mission "standard tour of duty shall be one year and military female posts may be permitted a shorter tour of six months and the extension, s/he may be extended up to a maximum period of 12 months beyond his/her original tour of duty in the Mission". To this end, U5 staff officers are encouraged to be deployed to serve a minimum of one year including the Service/Branch Chief and Deputy Chief. Only UN contractual positions may require longer fixed tours of duty, whereas the UN may grant extensions to the mentioned military categories for a maximum period of 12 months, which is subject to a Force Commander's approval.

10. The opposite can also occur, where human rights investigations need to get somewhere to respond to an incident and the Force patrol planning which has been planned in advance and is less adaptable.
11. POC and human rights mandates are overlapping and mutually reinforcing, but they are distinct. The POC mandate requires all mission components to contribute to protecting civilians under threat of physical violence. Human rights components contribute to this through analysis, threat assessments and some capacity-building efforts. However, protection efforts by human rights officials extend beyond the POC mandate to include everyone and all human rights, not just physical integrity. Human Rights promotes protection and prevention based on law through advocacy, capacity-building and a range of monitoring, investigation and public reporting activities.

12. In most other missions this function is performed by the POC unit, based on a range of sources, including but not limited to human rights information.

13. The OHCHR guidance being updated contains relevant references on page 12. [Draft on file with authors]

14. MINUSMA has a relatively new “Early Warning/Rapid Reaction system” which was cited by some experts as an emerging good practice. However, based on the field interviews, we were unable to ascertain the impact it has had on joined-up responses. For a good report on this issue, see Seán Smith, *Early Warning and Rapid Response: Reinforcing MINUSMA’s Ability to Protect Civilians* (Washington DC: CIVIC, 2021), https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/CIVIC_Peacekeeping_EWRR_Report_EN_BAT_web.pdf.

15. The HRDDP, adopted in July 2011, requires all UN entities to ensure that support to non-UN security forces is provided in a manner that is consistent with the purposes and principles as set out in the Charter of the United Nations, and is compliant with and promotes respect for international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.

16. Going a step further, the HRDDP could be implemented like any other risk management process, a sort of “cost of doing business” that was priced into the overhead of peace operations. See HRDDP Expansion Paper [internal].

17. “Review of Peacekeeping Responses in Four Critical Missions,” November 2020 (UN Confidential, on file with authors).

18. This is already done via the POC unit in other missions such as MINUSCA.

19. “Review of Peacekeeping Responses in Four Critical Missions,” November 2020 (UN Confidential, on file with authors)

20. Indeed, other missions not covered in this paper (e.g. MONUSCO) have similarly had the Deputy SRSG play a more direct role in leading the HRDDP process.


23. One of the authors conducted in-depth field research in 2018 on this matter, including interviews with dozens of peacekeepers in peace operations.

24. The 2020 peacekeeping review suggested an “overhaul” of patrolling with greater links to intelligence.

25. NB: we recognize this may be a sensitive issue for some Member States but nonetheless believe the research bears out this conclusion. It could be a topic for discussion at the event.


28. The 2020 review called for “more deliberate, leadership-driven and holistic strategic communications” that shape mission decision-making processes and operational configurations. Strategic communications is also part of the A4P+ priorities for the coming two years.