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Conflict Prevention in Nepal

Background Paper for the United Nations - World Bank Study on Conflict Prevention¹

Sebastian von Einsiedel United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan

Cale Salih United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan

About this Paper

The new UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, has made prevention his top priority. Conflict prevention is now understood not only in terms of averting the outbreak, but also the continuation, escalation and recurrence, of conflict.² The Secretary-General has recognised that in order for the UN to shift from its current, largely reactive, posture to a prevention-oriented approach, it will need to better integrate its peace and security, development and human rights pillars of work.³ Sustaining peace and sustainable development will need to work hand in glove, rather than along two separate tracks as has often been the case in the past. In an effort to help shift the system toward this new approach, the UN and the World Bank are undertaking a joint flagship study on Preventing Violent Conflict. UNU-CPR produced this case study on lessons learned from the experiences of the UN and other actors in conflict resolution in Nepal as a backgrounder for the UN-World Bank study.

Introduction

After suffering ten years of civil war between a Maoist insurgency and an increasingly autocratic government, the Nepali people in April 2006 took to the streets and forced the country's King to hand power back to the political parties. Peace negotiations between the leaders of the newly empowered political parties and the Maoists culminated first in a ceasefire agreement in May 2006 and then in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in November 2006. Since then, Nepal has struggled with interlocking transitions from war to peace, from autocracy to democracy, and from an exclusionary and centralised state to a more inclusive and federal one. Although the peace process was largely domestically driven, it was accompanied by wide-ranging international involvement, including initiatives in peacemaking by India, the United Nations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs); significant investments by international donors; and the deployment of a Security Council-mandated civilian UN peace operation, the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), complemented by an effort to reorient the international development presence towards conflict-sensitive programming.

This paper has three objectives: First, it will place Nepal's civil war into broader perspective, explaining both its structural and proximate causes, which are rooted in an exclusionary and centralised state that has fuelled grievances among the country's diverse ethnic, caste, linguistic and other groups. Second, it will analyse the factors that allowed the conflict parties to embark on a peace process and shed light on the challenges Nepal faced in bringing the peace process to a successful conclusion. Third, this paper will assess international efforts to contribute to the prevention of civil war and its termination, and to sustain peace through a range of peacebuilding activities, including through development programming, human rights monitoring, peace process support and good offices, and electoral assistance and longer-term peacebuilding activities.

1. Causes of the Conflict

1.1 Structural causes of armed conflict

Two of the most important structural causes of violent conflict in Nepal are endemic poverty and group inequality, both of which show a strong association with the outbreak of civil war in cross-country studies.⁴ Indeed, with a per capita GDP of around USD 200 in the early 1990s, Nepal, statistically, faced a civil war risk almost twice as high than a country with a per capita GDP of USD 2,000.⁵ In 1996, the year the conflict started, 42% of the population were living under the national poverty line.⁶ That same year, Nepal ranked in the bottom 12% of the Human Development Index, in the unhappy company of a number of conflict-affected countries in sub-Saharan Africa.⁷

A closer look at Nepal's development indicators over time shows a more nuanced picture. From 1951 to 2001, Nepal

enjoyed significant development gains, with the literacy rate growing from 2% to 43%, infant mortality decreasing from 300 to 61 per 1,000 live births, and life expectancy increasing from 35 to 59.⁸ Surprisingly, over the past 40 years, Nepal has been among the top ten countries in the world in the rate of improvement in the Human Development Index (although, as of 2015, the country remained in the bottom 25%).⁹ Paradoxically, not even the decade-long People's War stopped Nepal's steady progress in improving average national income, health, and education indicators.¹⁰ Although the \$11 billion in international development aid that Nepal received between 1980 and 2008 surely helped,¹¹ Nepal made these gains in spite of receiving only 70% of the average per capita disbursement to low-income countries over the same period.¹²

Yet, human development indicators based on average national figures can be deceptive. They tell only part of the story and leave out what is the most distinct feature of Nepalese society that has made Nepal ripe for conflict: deep social inequalities and injustices. For one, urban areas benefited from much of the development improvements, with poverty in Nepal increasingly becoming a rural phenomenon. In 1995–6, the rural poverty rate at 43.27% was almost exactly twice as high as the urban one (by 2004, the urban–rural poverty ratio had further widened to 3.6 to 1).¹³ This urban–rural divide is partly the result of the difficulties of bringing development to the more remote parts of the country and partly a reflection of the Kathmandu-based rulers' neglect of the rest of the country throughout Nepal's history.

In terms of income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient, Nepal in 1996 compared relatively favourably on a global level. Of 110 countries for which data were available, Nepal ranked 55, with most countries in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, 10 countries in Asia, and the United States all having greater levels of income inequality.¹⁴ However, Nepal has some of the world's highest levels of "horizontal" inequality, that is, inequality not among individuals but between groups or regions. No data or rankings are available for the mid-1990s, but the Failed States Index, which ranks states according to a number of indicators associated with state failure, in 2007 placed Nepal in the bottom 10 countries in terms of uneven development and 176 out of 177 in terms of group grievance, with only Zimbabwe ranking worse.¹⁵

These rankings are all the more relevant because quantitative studies, although failing to detect a correlation between income inequality and increased conflict risk, have identified major group or regional inequalities in economic, social, or political spheres as an important underlying cause of conflict in multi-ethnic societies. In these cases mass grievances can facilitate recruitment for violence, in particular where political and social inequalities overlap.¹⁶ In Nepal, a number of studies found a strong relationship between regional deprivation and the origin and intensity of the Maoist rebellion across districts, with caste polarisation having had an additional impact on conflict intensity.¹⁷

Poverty and malnutrition are concentrated particularly in the Maoist stronghold areas such as the hills of the far west and

mid-west.¹⁸ The Maoists exploited this sense of deprivation in their recruitment and mass mobilisation campaign in the run-up to the People's War.¹⁹

The pervasive exclusion of large parts of the population based on caste, ethnicity, religion, gender, or regional provenance features prominently in all explanations of the conflict. Inequality and exclusion in Nepal have to be understood in the context of Nepal's being among the most ethnically diverse – and socially stratified – countries in the world, with 36% of its population belonging to one of the more than 100 different indigenous nationalities with their own language and traditional culture.

The exclusionary nature of the state predates unification, when many small principalities, although not all, were ruled by Hindu rulers and thus practiced the caste system. Caste-based exclusion was reinforced when Nepal's founding fathers, in the mid-18th century, imposed the caste system as the unifying framework to facilitate political control over the newly conquered territories' diverse subjects. Close to a century later, in the 1854 civil code (Muluki Ain), the autocratic Rana regime, aiming at greater cultural homogenisation of the kingdom, force-fit all of Nepal's linguistically, religiously, and culturally diverse populations into a strict hierarchy of castes. Translating cultural differences into hierarchical caste categories, the Muluki Ain placed the high-caste Hindu hill elite on top of the hierarchy, the "untouchable" castes at the bottom, and bulk of the ethnic groups in between, even though as non-Hindu groups they had been outside the caste system until then.²⁰ Although it was formally replaced by a new civil code in the 1960s, the social stratification prescribed by the Muluki Ain reverberates to this day, with "caste status continu[ing] to affect social mobility and individual accomplishment."²¹ The exclusionary nature of the state has, throughout the 19th and 20th century, repeatedly led to violent uprisings and militant opposition movements among ethnic groups, a ferment of discontent that the Maoists effectively tapped in the 1990s.²²

In rural areas, the most glaring manifestation of social injustice and group inequality, given Nepal's continuously heavy reliance on agriculture,²³ can be found in control over land and the labour necessary to cultivate it. It is the relationship between landlords and the peasant population that gave rise to the Maoist claim, not without justification, that Nepal remained a feudal society. Indeed, the practice by which the state assigned its revenue collection rights on land to employees or favoured individuals – common until the 1960s – created a class of landlords drawn almost exclusively from the Hindu hill elite.²⁴

One anthropologist who has done extensive field research in Nepal links the low-intensity ethnic tensions and conflict that have existed for years in many parts of Nepal to the control of land by one ethnic group (with ethnicity and class being congruent).²⁵ He concludes, "[T]he high intensity violence of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal... is in part a reaction to the everyday violence of 'normal' life and the grinding inequality of Nepal's agrarian sector."²⁶ This everyday violence is particularly glaring with respect to bonded labour practices, which remain common in Nepal today.²⁷

1.2 Proximate Causes of the Conflict

The underlying causes laid out in the preceding section are helpful in explaining why a country faces a higher conflict risk in general. To find some hints to when and in which contexts organised violence is likely to break out, one must turn to shorter term proximate causes. Chief among these is the post-1990 political and socioeconomic environment in which the dysfunctional features of a fledgling democracy proved unable to bring about meaningful improvement in living standards for much of the population. This led to disappointed expectations and widely felt disillusionment with the political parties and the political system, fuelling popular support for the Maoists, a movement with a charismatic leader, revolutionary agenda, and readiness to resort to the use of force.²⁸

The 1990 Constitution acknowledged for the first time Nepal's multi-ethnic and multilingual character, however it continued to define the country as a "Hindu kingdom" and affirmed the status of Nepali as the national language, underpinning the continued cultural exclusion of ethnic groups. A winner-takes-all electoral system prevented meaningful representation of marginalised groups in parliament.²⁹ In the bureaucracy, minority representation actually declined throughout the 1990s.³⁰ Lagging progress in addressing exclusion contrasted sharply with the awakening of ethnic identities that took place in the context of the opening of democratic space, leading an anthropologist to describe the period since 1990 as "a time of ethnicity building."³¹

In terms of development, the democratic transition brought some progress in some indicators.³² In the decade from 1990 to 2000, infant mortality fell from 10% to 7%, literacy rose from 39% to 58%, the road network more than doubled, and the number of telephone lines quadrupled (translating into a meagre 10 lines per 1,000 inhabitants, most of them in urban areas).³³ Yet, as Devendra Panday writes, "the democratic transition in 1990 brought little change... [and] failed to leave a positive impact on the GDP growth rate."³⁴

At the same time, there was growing discontent with the state's service delivery shortfalls in the early 1990s. As Pfaff-Czernanka has written, this occurred against the background of the significant centralisation and expansion of the state during the authoritarian "Panchayat" rule from 1950-89. This context gave rise to growing expectations that the state would play strong redistributive and service-provider roles. However, these expectations contrasted sharply with the de facto "gatekeeper" function played by centrally appointed state officials at the local level who, by diverting resources, "created scarcities and delays in provision [of goods and services]...to which the population holds legitimate right but has no means of claiming."³⁵ These state officials, as Pfaff-Czernanka points out, were often part, alongside politicians and entrepreneurs, of "distributional coalitions," which channeled resources away from their rightful recipients and into their own pockets.³⁶

Thus it was the abuse, rather than the absence, of the state's service provision capacity that exacerbated discontent,

which only grew worse with the lack of recourse mechanisms and any form of accountability. International development actors, by channelling significant amounts of aid money into the system, fed these corrupt dynamics.³⁷ According to one study from the year 2000, only 15% of Nepalese benefited from foreign aid, many of them businessmen and powerful bureaucrats.³⁸

The structure of Nepali parties and their role in the political system did not help. The two main parties alternating in power throughout the 1990s were the Nepali Congress (NC)³⁹ and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist [UML]),⁴⁰ either alone or in coalitions, and often, particularly in the case of the latter, as a prop for the royalist Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP). Inexperienced in democratic and parliamentary processes and programmatically unprepared, the mainstream parties were autocratically structured and tended to be organised around individuals rather than programs, with all major decisions (during the 1990s as well as later during the peace process) made by a small circle of largely male, Hindu high-caste party leaders. The parties were also marked by internal divisions and constant struggles for party leadership. As a result, governments during the 1990s, in particular after the 1994 election, were increasingly unstable – with the period of 1991–2002 seeing no less than 12 governments – a disarray that the Maoists (as well as the palace) readily exploited.

Party politics was a Kathmandu-centred “game of government making and unmaking” that led the parties to “grossly ignore the need for party-building at the grassroots-level.”⁴¹ Meanwhile, the local presence of mainstream parties was often in the form of “strongmen,” many of them landowners, who were key beneficiaries of the “distributional coalitions” mentioned above, and who used their privileged access to state resources to keep key members of their constituencies happy. Moreover, in rural areas, parties drew on established youth gangs to intimidate rival parties and voters during election time.⁴²

The poorly performing democracy significantly contributed to the radicalisation of the left in the early 1990s and the emergence of the Maoist Party.⁴³ The new party chose as its general secretary Pushpa Kamal Dahal, better known by his nom-de-guerre Prachanda, a Brahmin former high school teacher turned full-time communist who, until the peace process in 2006, had spent all of his political career underground. Key party leaders believed their goals could not be achieved within the parliamentary process and in 1991 a party conference endorsed Prachanda’s policy of achieving a “People’s Republic” through a “People’s War.” Starting in 1995, the party engaged in an extensive recruitment and propaganda campaign in the Maoist mid-western stronghold districts, Rukum and Rolpa, harnessing the disaffection of ethnic groups in the region. Excessive and indiscriminate use of force by the Nepal Police in response to Maoist mobilisation fed local resentment of the state.⁴⁴

2. THE PEOPLE’S WAR AND THE PEACE PROCESS

2.1 The People’s War

On February 13, 1996, the Maoist insurgency started with attacks on police posts in six districts in western, mid-western, and eastern Nepal. On the government side, the first five years of the war were exclusively fought by Nepal’s police forces. An important shift occurred in June 2001 when King Birendra and much of the royal family were killed in a drug-infused (and conflict-unrelated) rampage by Crown Prince Dipendra (who then committed suicide). Whereas King Birendra had been reluctant to deploy the army against its own people, the newly enthroned king, Birendra’s brother Gyanendra, decided to deploy the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) six months after the royal massacre.

Although it was incapable of suppressing the Maoist insurgency, the RNA deployment did lead to a massive escalation of the conflict and a skyrocketing number of battle deaths (more than 4,500 in the conflict’s peak year in 2002). That same year, the Maoists improved their war-making capabilities by forming the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Estimates of its strength at the height of the conflict generally range from 8,000 to 12,000 combatants. The intensification of the conflict in 2001 also precipitated more human rights violations, leading to mounting international concern. Moreover, the insurgency dramatically curtailed the reach of the already weak Nepali state. By the end of the People’s War, the Maoists had denied the state control over around 80% of its territory (which does not necessarily mean it was under Maoist control).⁴⁵

2.2 The Peace Agreements

Only after more than nine years of conflict did the conditions for successful peace negotiations emerge. The humiliating defeats the Maoists and RNA suffered in 2005 brought about a “mutually hurting stalemate,” convincing both camps that victory on the battlefield was elusive and that the time was right to engage in serious peace negotiations.⁴⁶ In addition, King Gyanendra’s gradual reintroduction of absolute monarchy from 2002–05 united the mainstream parliamentary parties against the monarchy in a Seven Party Alliance (SPA), which then sought peace negotiations with the Maoists. A major step was achieved in November 2005, when both sides signed an Indian-facilitated 12-Point Understanding.⁴⁷ The 12-Point Understanding set the stage for the April 2006 People’s Movement (Jana Andolan II), a popular uprising, driven by Nepali civil society, that forced the king to reinstate the elected parliament that he had dismissed in 2002 and to renounce all executive power. It then led to a Ceasefire Code of Conduct,⁴⁸ which formally started the peace process between the SPA and the Maoists, culminating in November 2006 in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and an Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA).

The CPA and the AMMAA provided an ambitious roadmap for the peace process. In return for being accorded a central role in open politics, the Maoists also agreed to withdraw their People's Liberation Army (PLA) to 28 newly erected cantonment sites (to be supervised by the UN), dismantle parallel state structures, and return confiscated land. PLA members were also promised subsequent partial integration into the country's security forces, including a "democratically restructured Army." Other key elements of the agreements included the adoption of an interim constitution and the institution of an interim parliament and an interim government, the latter two with Maoist participation. Most importantly, the CPA committed the parties to: hold elections to a Constituent Assembly in June 2007, which would decide on the future of the monarchy and give birth to a new Nepal; and, in order to address the concerns of the marginalised groups, to the "restructuring of the State in an inclusive, democratic and progressive way by ending its present centralised and unitary structure."⁴⁹

After the ceasefire, identity politics intensified, afflicting transition dynamics. Most notably, in January 2007 an at-times violent Madhesi Andolan (uprising) broke out in the Terai. The Madhesi, who account for roughly a fifth of Nepal's population, have experienced a long history of discrimination and exclusion from politics and state institutions. The Andolan was triggered by Madhesi fears of being once again left out of the (re)-negotiation of Nepal's social contract. Madhesi violence was directed as much against state representatives as it was against the Maoists, whom they saw as selling out on the inclusion agenda by ignoring Madhesi demands for greater participation. The Madhesi Andolan also gave rise to a number of armed groups in the Terai that have contributed to a widespread sense of insecurity. By 2008, more than 100 such armed groups had emerged in the eastern and central Terai, although most were small criminal outfits involved in extortion and abductions, and did not pose existential challenges to the state as did the Maoist insurgency.

Nepal's new identity politics placed an ever-greater premium on the careful management of the transition and the development of a model of government that would satisfy the aspirations of major ethnic groups. However, the following years demonstrated the difficulties in achieving this.

2.3 Peace Agreement Implementation

The implementation record of the peace agreement is overall mixed. Shortly after the CPA was signed, an interim constitution was adopted and an interim parliament and government with Maoist participation was established. In April 2008, after significant delays, successful elections to a Constituent Assembly took place, in which the Maoists emerged as the strongest party. The elections were a watershed for three reasons. First, they resulted in the most representative legislature in Nepal's history. Second, shortly after the elections, Nepal was proclaimed a federal democratic republican state by the Constituent Assembly, ending the 239-year-old monarchy. And third, Maoists emerged as the strongest party, leading to the creation of a

coalition government under former rebel leader Prachanda. This government excluded the Nepali Congress party, marking the return of the "winner takes all" dynamics into Nepalese politics and ending the principle of power-sharing and consensus politics that had, up to that point, carried the peace process forward.

The Maoist government resigned in May 2009 after a tussle over control of the Nepalese Army, which resisted PLA integration into its ranks. The Army's positions were reinforced by India and the major political parties, both of which preferred a powerful and unaccountable military over what they feared might be one that was neutered through significant integration of Maoist combatants. The issue was finally resolved in 2012, as discussed further below.

Meanwhile, the Constituent Assembly was proving unable to agree on a new constitution – mainly because of disagreements over the federalist restructuring of the state. As a result, it was dissolved in 2012. Elections to a new Constituent Assembly were held in 2013, in which the NC and UML emerged victorious and the Maoists lost two-thirds of their seats. That Constituent Assembly, too, was unable to meet the January 2015 deadline for the adoption of a new Constitution, the issue of federalism once again being the central bone of contention. Traditional elite groups were highly reluctant to dismantle the unitary state that had guaranteed their privileges for so long.

Amid this political deadlock, a major earthquake hit Nepal in April 2015, killing over 8,000 people and leaving much of central Nepal in ruins. The leaders of the major parties represented in the Constituent Assembly responded poorly to the disaster. Keen to regain their credibility, they hammered out a hasty deal on a new constitution, which was eventually adopted in September 2015.

However, the new constitution, which was meant to constitute the crowning achievement of the peace process, became a highly contested document mainly because it failed to address concerns of the Madhesi, who felt their demands for inclusion and representation, especially with respect to the delineation of state boundaries, had been ignored in the drafting process.⁵⁰ The UN and most donor countries welcomed the deal to fast-track the constitution after the earthquake despite the clear lack of buy-in from the Madhesi and other disadvantaged groups.⁵¹ Months of violent protests in the Terai ensued, and clashes with the police left over 50 dead. With the partial support of India, Madhesi political and civic groups imposed a 135-day blockade of vital supplies coming into Nepal from customs points bordering India.⁵² The blockade was lifted in February 2016, but not before badly damaging the country's economy and causing further hardship among the poor and those affected by the earthquake.⁵³ Tensions in the Terai over the constitution remain high, and major unrest could recur.⁵⁴ The adoption of the constitution thus constituted a repeat of a pattern that marked the entire peace process, in which the political parties and the Maoists negotiated last-minute deals that did not take into account the interests of important minority groups, in particular the Madhesi.

3. ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO PREVENT AND END CONFLICT IN NEPAL

Nepal's peace process and the wider transition were largely domestically driven, but supported by various international efforts. This section aims to assess to what degree internationally supported development, peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts succeeded or failed in contributing to the prevention and termination of conflict and to sustaining peace. It also analyses the interactions between national and international actors, in particular in addressing root causes of the conflict.

International involvement in Nepal has evolved over time, from an early focus on development toward more political engagement in peacebuilding work. International aid has long financed key aspects of Nepal's development efforts, and the IMF and the World Bank began in the 1980s to engage in the country, bringing standby credit and structural adjustment programs, respectively.⁵⁵ Starting in the early 2000s, the UN, international NGOs and bilateral aid agencies began to play a more explicitly political role by promoting dialogue among conflict parties. Growing international criticism of the royalist government's human rights abuses pressured Kathmandu to accept in 2005 an OHCHR country mission. This mission, in turn, helped pave the way for the establishment in early 2007 of UNMIN to support the implementation of the CPA and the AMMAA. After UNMIN's withdrawal in 2011, DPA embedded a liaison office within the Resident Coordinator (RC)'s office, an innovative arrangement that helped ensure the UN's development activities were informed by ongoing conflict analysis.

3.1 Development Interventions Before and During the Conflict (1990s-2006)

As explained above, Nepal's economic growth has excluded large parts of the population, in particular marginalised ethnic groups and castes, rural communities, and women. In the lead-up to and during the conflict, donors failed to address the necessary structural changes that would enable more equitable and sustainable development. Foreign aid sustained traditional power structures, leading even positive aid achievements to add to conflict risk. In particular, aid was unevenly distributed in ways that benefited urban centres over rural districts, some rural districts over others, and some classes and castes within urban and rural districts over others.⁵⁶ A number of studies exploring the link between foreign aid and violence found a positive correlation between insurgent intensity and areas targeted by foreign aid programs.⁵⁷

The development community's inadequate attention to the exclusionary nature of the state – the root cause of Nepal's failed development – was, among other factors, the result of: Kathmandu-centrism (which led development actors to interact primarily with representatives of high-caste elites; an apolitical outlook; and a tendency to follow a one-size-fits-all approach to development with little regard to local conditions.⁵⁸ Donors shied away from promoting the types of (admittedly hugely challenging) reforms that could have

sustainably addressed deeply entrenched social injustice, such as land reform. Where development aid targeted marginalised groups, the benefits were often captured by high-caste elites within those groups. For instance, USAID in 2006 recognised that long-running (donor-funded) community forest and water irrigation management programs had disproportionately benefited socially and financially empowered villagers.⁵⁹ In the case of forestry, the landless poor had been cut off from resources that, under prior open access arrangements, had been more open to them.⁶⁰

For the first few years after armed conflict broke out, aid agencies saw the violence primarily as a law and order challenge and struggled to understand its political dimensions. As Jörg Frieden has detailed, donors followed a mistaken strategy of promoting macroeconomic reforms in the hope of addressing what they saw as the "root cause" of the conflict, namely structural poverty, ignoring exclusion as an explanation of aid ineffectiveness. They also turned a blind eye to the increasingly autocratic rule of the King, failing to understand that they were intimately associated with an ever more illegitimate state. During this period, both the leadership of the UN Country Team (UNCT) as well as the World Bank remained attached to the King, with the latter, in particular, praising his economic policies despite growing evidence of the unsustainability of his rule.⁶¹

Because of these analytical gaps, the development actors' programs allowed the lion's share of development resources to be captured by a small elite, tainting international assistance in the eyes of many Nepalis. Development agencies also failed to defend the development space against the pretensions of the insurgents and the interference of the security forces.⁶² Donors' hiring practices tended to reinforce caste and class divisions, as well as their own myopia, as they recruited heavily from traditionally elite groups, which offered the most Western-oriented candidates with the most advanced English-language skills.⁶³

After the conflict escalated in 2000, some donors began to recognise socio-economic disparities as a root cause, and to integrate social inclusion in their assistance plans. For instance, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), in 2000, became one of the first donors to commission an assessment of how the conflict affected their aid programs.⁶⁴ The World Bank in 2003 issued the first Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) to recognise inequality and social inclusion as central issues, and established a Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF) that explicitly targeted disadvantaged groups.⁶⁵ Mirroring this trend, Nepal in 2001 began drafting its first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which, at least on paper, emphasised themes related to the root causes of the conflict such as social inclusion and good governance over stabilisation and structural adjustment programs aimed at correcting market distortions and macroeconomic imbalances.⁶⁶

These small shifts in donor practice gained momentum in 2005, after King Gyanendra's coup spurred donors to distance themselves from his regime. At this point, a number of donors embarked on a learning curve, displaying enhanced sensitivity for the need to ensure that poor

and marginalised groups would benefit from external interventions.⁶⁷ Some donors and UN agencies also slowly began to: embed development activities in broader context analyses (starting with attempts to identify the agents and beneficiaries of development programs and their links to the conflict parties); constructively engage with the Maoists as a valid political interlocutor; proactively promote human rights; and help push for a UN role in the peace process amidst Indian resistance. However, a more fundamental repositioning of the international development presence in Nepal in line with peacebuilding priorities only took place in the wake of the peace accords, which is discussed in detail below.

3.2 Peacemaking

India played the most important international role in breaking Nepal's political deadlocks at key moments and encouraging the negotiation of the CPA. After the 2005 coup, India also led the international community in shifting from support for the king in his military campaign against the Maoists to considering the Maoists as part of a negotiated solution. India subsequently facilitated the 12-Point Understanding in 2005, which injected momentum into the peace negotiations and set the stage for the May 2006 ceasefire agreement, and ultimately the CPA.⁶⁸

Other international actors, including the UN, bilateral actors, and NGOs played at best a modest role in assisting domestically-driven peacemaking efforts. The UN Secretariat dispatched a mid-level DPA official (Tamrat Samuel) in 2003 to quietly engage the conflict parties, including the Maoists, in "talks about talks." This behind-the-scenes activity, a rare deviation from the UN's usual preference for high-profile envoys, enabled the UN to navigate the extreme sensitivities around engaging a rebel group that Kathmandu, New Delhi and Washington all had labelled "terrorist." While India, averse to any third-party involvement in its backyard, denied the UN a formal mediation role, Samuel's early engagement helped build good relations with the conflict parties and paved the way for UN involvement in the implementation of the CPA. Samuel's engagement of Indian officials also proved crucial in warming New Delhi to the idea of a formal UN role in the peace process implementation.⁶⁹

From 2000-2006, a wide range of NGOs and individual conflict resolution experts, some of which had been funded or deployed by donor agencies, crowded and at times confused Nepal's peacemaking space.⁷⁰ The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) in 2002 began efforts to facilitate dialogue between the monarchy and the Maoists (but excluding the political parties, which retrospectively turned out to be a mistake when their role became central following the Jana Andolan); DFID in 2003 began to organise visits to Nepal by representatives of the Community of Sant'Egidio and the Crisis Management Initiative; a UNDP human rights adviser in 2003 met with the Maoists' leading representative to talk about a draft human rights accord; and Switzerland in mid-2005 dispatched to Nepal a special adviser for peacebuilding (Günther Baechler) who in 2006 became deeply involved in helping the emerging Maoist and SPA negotiating teams prepare a draft

ceasefire Code of Conduct.⁷¹ Amid the bustle of activity, the actors that pursued sustained engagement with the conflict parties may have made some helpful contributions, if only by "initiating a discourse of dialogue."⁷²

In 2005 and early 2006, when the conditions for successful peace negotiations finally emerged, many external actors enthusiastically engaged the government and offered to facilitate and host talks. However, these efforts mostly took place on the side-lines of the domestic process, which was dominated by political elites, and international advice and expertise found ultimately little traction.⁷³

3.3 Human Rights Monitoring

The deployment of an OHCHR mission in 2005, which brought increased international attention and scrutiny of abuses committed by both the RNA and the Maoists, had a moderating effect on the conflict, helping to reduce violence, provide a degree of protection to key leaders on both sides of the conflict, and create an environment in which national actors could push for a pro-human rights and democracy agenda.⁷⁴ As Fred Rawski and Mandira Sharma have detailed, OHCHR enjoyed one of the most robust mandates that a UN human rights field operation has ever had, thanks to joint national-international advocacy efforts. OHCHR's visits to individuals in military custody and proactive public advocacy reduced the pervasiveness of abusive practices by the conflict parties, including torture and disappearances, and appears to have encouraged both sides to do more to limit civilian deaths. OHCHR's mandate allowed the head of mission (Ian Martin) to engage non-state actors, thus enabling him to quietly promote dialogue among the conflict parties.⁷⁵ OHCHR advocated strongly for inclusion of Nepal's marginalised communities in the political discussions during and after the peace talks. Its presence helped raise awareness within the country around issues of non-discrimination and equality.⁷⁶ In Nepal, thus, OHCHR's human rights activism and the UN's peacemaking efforts complemented, rather than complicated, one another.⁷⁷

However, after the peace agreement was signed, OHCHR lost some of its efficacy and legitimacy. This was in particular due to its inability to pressure successive Nepalese governments to pursue accountability for those who committed abuses during the conflict (for a more detailed discussion of transitional justice developments in recent years, see the below section on long-term peacebuilding).⁷⁸ OHCHR's credibility suffered further when it delayed publication of a December 2008 report on disappearances due to government concerns, demonstrating the difficulties of working on human rights amidst an unreceptive government.⁷⁹ OHCHR was also undercut by tense relations with its national counterpart, the National Human Rights Commission - Nepal, which came to view the UN body as competition.⁸⁰ As ICG wrote in 2010, "once the military ceasefire opened up the space for political negotiations [OHCHR] was increasingly unable to build political pressure for domestic action on human rights issues."⁸¹

3.4 Support to Peace Process Implementation

One of the international community's key tools to prevent conflict relapse in Nepal was UNMIN, which was deployed from 2007-11 to support peace process implementation. As neither of the parties nor India wanted an armed peacekeeping mission, UNMIN was configured as a purely civilian "focused mission of limited duration."⁸² Specifically, UNMIN was tasked with providing technical assistance for the election of a Constituent Assembly, monitoring weapons and armies on both sides, and supporting the monitoring of non-military aspects of the ceasefire. Being headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, UNMIN also had an inherent (though not explicit) good offices mandate.⁸³

When evaluated against its limited mandate, UNMIN has been widely considered a success. The mission competently discharged its arms monitoring role, including with respect to the cantonment of 32,000 Maoist combatants (and the eventual verification of about 19,600 of them),⁸⁴ with important support from the local donor community (in particular Norway, which compensated for the UN's logistical shortcomings) as well as UNDP and UNICEF. UNMIN also helped generate the conditions for credible elections to a Constituent Assembly (details on which are provided in the following section). Perhaps most importantly, UNMIN's credibility among the conflict parties (built first through DPA's quiet diplomacy starting in 2003, and later through the work of OHCHR) helped build the confidence needed for the Maoists to accede to cantonment arrangements. More broadly, UNMIN's presence encouraged political actors to stay focused on the peace process,⁸⁵ and raised confidence among the Nepali population that peace was possible.

UNMIN managed to build good relations with and confidence among the conflict parties, in particular through a UN-chaired joint body constituting representatives of the Nepalese army and its Maoist counterparts (the Joint Monitoring and Coordination Committee or JMCC). This enabled it to defuse potential crises that could have threatened to derail the peace process.⁸⁶ In one notable episode, UNMIN intervened to convince Maoist forces to release off-duty Nepal Army personnel it had abducted in the run-up to the 2008 elections, thus preventing an Army raid on Maoist facilities.

At the local level, too, UNMIN played at times an important conflict resolution role, relying in particular on its civil affairs presence in the provinces. For instance, shortly before the elections, civil affairs staff helped head off a crisis triggered by the killing of several Maoists in the Terai "in what seemed an attempt to provoke the Maoists and derail the elections."⁸⁷ However, the office of civil affairs struggled to define its role in monitoring the non-military aspects of the ceasefire, mainly due to the lack of a credible and capable national institutional counterpart engaged in this work.⁸⁸

Even though the mission, with its 186 unarmed observers, had neither the mandate nor the strength to prevent the former conflict parties from returning to war, its presence served as a security guarantee - a "tripwire," as one scholar put it - that was linked to the Security Council.⁸⁹ The

involvement of the Security Council, although it was distant and not unduly preoccupied with Nepal, may have helped deter the parties from returning to violence.

That UNMIN was a success despite its non-coercive and light footprint owes much to the existence of local conditions militating against a return to armed conflict. By the time the CPA was signed, the conflict had already dwindled to low levels of intensity, with battle deaths having dropped by about 90 percent compared to the peak in 2002, making a return to intense fighting less likely. In addition, the Maoist leadership, realising that military victory would remain elusive, had taken a strategic decision to pursue their goals through the ballot box rather than bullets.⁹⁰ By 2010, the Maoists had become entrenched in local politics and comparably ill-prepared for armed conflict.⁹¹ Moreover, because India saw an interest in Nepal's stability, it supported the Maoist entry into mainstream politics (while trying to keep Maoist influence over state institutions marginal) and restrained elements of the Nepal Army that favoured a return to conflict.⁹² These factors helped keep a lid on parallel destabilising conditions, including the Maoists' retention of an armed presence in seven cantonment sites up until 2012 (how this thorny situation was resolved is detailed below).

3.5 Electoral Assistance and Monitoring

Given that elections in post-conflict settings often serve as flashpoints for conflict relapse, much of the international, including UNMIN's, efforts following the peace agreement were focused on ensuring violent-free 2008 Constituent Assembly elections. The elections turned out to be remarkably peaceful and, despite the highly unexpected Maoist electoral success, the results were widely accepted. In fact, the Maoists' victory, which allowed them to take the helm of a coalition government, enhanced their stakes in the peace process and reduced their incentives to return to violence. The elections also yielded the most inclusive legislature in Nepal's history, with most marginalised groups represented in rough proportion to their share of the population.⁹³

Four factors contributed to the success of the election. First, the independent Election Commission, headed by the widely respected Bhojraj Pokharel, enjoyed wide credibility. Second a relatively inclusive mixed electoral system that introduced proportional representation with inclusion quotas for marginalised groups alongside the first-past-the-post system ensured representativeness of the outcome.⁹⁴ By contrast, in the 1990s, Nepal had used the first-past-the post system in single member constituencies, which generated winner-takes-all-politics at the expense of inclusion. And third, international support to the election provided by the UN and others enhanced confidence in the elections. Technical electoral assistance facilitated by the UN proved helpful in developing the formula for translating minority quotas into number of seats.⁹⁵ UNMIN was able to intervene at key junctures to prevent escalations among the armed actors in the lead up to the elections.⁹⁶ UNMIN, though it lacked an electoral observation mandate, and OHCHR ensured visible staff presence in districts deemed particularly

vulnerable to electoral violence in a deliberate effort to deter violence. This made possible electoral campaigning in areas that had been previously off-limits for mainstream political parties. Reinforcing the calming effects of the UN's presence were approximately 850 international observers (from various NGOs), and 60,000 domestic observers, mostly financed by international donors.

3.6. Security Sector Reform

Despite its achievements, UNMIN was ultimately unable to generate sufficient momentum to help bring the peace process to its conclusion, particularly after the 2008 elections, when its presence yielded ever diminishing returns. After the elections, UNMIN's civil affairs component was withdrawn, robbing the mission of its eyes and ears on the ground. Moreover, in the wake of the elections, UNMIN faced growing hostility from national elites and India who, at heart, blamed UNMIN for the Maoist electoral victory.⁹⁷

In combination with UNMIN's limited mandate, this precluded the mission from addressing the two biggest challenges of the peace process: ensuring greater participation of marginalised groups in the peace process; and Maoist army integration. Kathmandu rejected UNMIN's efforts to engage with leaders of marginalised groups as unacceptable interference into Nepal's internal affairs. Meanwhile, India and the Nepal Army resisted UNMIN's discreet efforts to assist with the integration of the Maoist army as the first step of broader security sector reform. UNMIN withdrew in January 2011 with Maoist Army integration still unresolved.

The Nepal Army soon emerged as the biggest potential spoiler of the peace process. The Army, which continued to see the PLA as a "rag-tag illegitimate entity,"⁹⁸ resisted the integration of Maoist combatants into its ranks as well as broader pressure to downsize and democratise. India, which wanted to preserve the force it had trained and armed for decades, only reinforced the Army's intransigence. The UN, notably, failed to use its leverage over the Army, which has long been a major peacekeeping troop contributor, to push for Maoist integration. (Meanwhile, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) also proved reluctant to even properly vet and bar Nepal Army individuals and units accused of having committed serious abuses in the conflict from participating in peacekeeping missions, signalling to the army that the UN's rhetoric about the importance of accountability might be just that).⁹⁹

A shift started to take place in early 2011, when the new Chief of Army Staff, General Chhatra Man Singh Gurung, who had in 2009 replaced a hardliner against PLA integration (General Rookmangud Katawal), began to demonstrate openness to the idea of "controlled integration of Maoists."¹⁰⁰ India also gradually began to shift toward a stance more supportive of accommodation of the Maoists.¹⁰¹ Moreover, in August 2011, after months of political deadlock, a Maoist-led government was formed. Holding again the reins of political power, the Maoists proved significantly less reluctant to relinquish its army.¹⁰² In 2012, a major breakthrough took place, when some 1,500

Maoist combatants were incorporated into the (otherwise un-restructured) Nepal Army, while the rest retired with cash packages. The dissolution of the Maoist Army made a return to conflict – at least in its old guise – highly unlikely. That said, the absence of a systematic reintegration programme beyond the cash payments created a number of challenges. According to a recent study, many ex-PLA combatants, in particular women and those who had been disqualified (due to being either underage or having been recruited into the PLA after an agreed-upon cut-off date) by UNMIN for integration into state security forces, face severe stigmatisation.¹⁰³ There is also widespread resentment among demobilised combatants, including those who received reintegration packages, of their poor economic conditions and prospects, which are exacerbated by their lack of education or work experience. As a result, many ex-combatants have joined radical breakaway factions of the Maoist party, and three-quarters of Maoist ex-combatants could foresee using arms in the future for political means.¹⁰⁴ One splinter faction in particular, led by an influential former Maoist commander, is engaging in extortion and other activities "reminiscent of wartime Maoist actions," raising concerns.¹⁰⁵ While a return to conflict remains unlikely, the presence of a sizeable group of angry and insecure demobilised combatants which remain organised in political chains of command that resemble those of the PLA could constitute a destabilising factor in years ahead.¹⁰⁶

3.7. Transitional Justice

A key area in which national actors have resisted progress on the implementation of the peace accord and pushed back on international efforts is transitional justice. The CPA included several, mostly vaguely worded, references to transitional justice, including with respect to establishing a truth commission, impartial investigations, the "right of relief" of victims, and a commitment "not to encourage impunity."¹⁰⁷ The Maoists and Nepal Army, both of which have individuals within their ranks who were complicit in wartime abuses, have forcefully resisted progress toward accountability.¹⁰⁸ The Maoists, for obvious reasons, have portrayed amnesty as the key to post-conflict reconciliation.¹⁰⁹ A heated tussle between the government and rights groups over the issue of amnesty delayed the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a Commission on Enforced Disappearances until 2015. Around the same time, Nepal's Supreme Court rejected the possibility of these commissions, which are mandated to investigate serious human rights abuses, to grant amnesties to perpetrators of grave violations.¹¹⁰ Nevertheless, Nepali criminal courts have heard few conflict-related cases to date,¹¹¹ and a nine-point deal signed by the four main political parties in 2016 includes a provision for withdrawing, or granting amnesty to those implicated in, conflict-era cases before the courts.¹¹²

Several international rights organisations have campaigned vigorously against amnesty provisions for conflict-era crimes.¹¹³ The International Center for Transitional Justice contends that the failure to prosecute serious wartime crimes "undermines the ability of [Nepal's] security forces to maintain the rule of law and protect a new era of peace."¹¹⁴

However, some experts have argued these campaigns focus too narrowly on violent crimes committed by identifiable perpetrators, at the expense of addressing broader violations of social and economic rights that lay at the root of the conflict.¹¹⁵ Relatedly, the disproportionate focus of international advocacy organisations on prosecutions has arguably neglected the importance of other transitional justice measures, namely reparations, which could more directly benefit victims' families than protracted trials focused on a symbolic but small number of perpetrators.

3.8. Post-conflict Peacebuilding and Addressing Root Causes

After the peace accord, international development actors made greater efforts to align their programming with peacebuilding priorities and take more proactive steps to address root causes of the conflict.

As mentioned in section 3.1, some learning and adaptation took place in the years 2002-2006, leading the development community to place greater emphasis on social inclusion and marginalised groups. The signing of the CPA in 2006 made more obvious the need for development actors to underpin the peace process by helping to address underlying conflict drivers. Acknowledgment of this is reflected, for instance, in the UN's 2007 Common Conflict Assessment (CCA),¹¹⁶ which focuses on human rights, governance and inclusion.

However, a number of challenges hampered a concerted reorientation of the development community towards peacebuilding. Although UNMIN invested significant energy into helping the UNCT understand more deeply the political dynamics in which they were operating, the fact that UNMIN was not an integrated mission (due to its limited and short-term mandate), meant that it was poorly positioned (and did not see it as its role) to lead the UNCT in developing a common peacebuilding strategy. Some members of the UNCT expected to leave peacebuilding to UNMIN, while awaiting a return to normality to continue their business-as-usual development work. Many UN agencies remained stuck in the bubble of Kathmandu, with the notable exceptions of OHCHR, UNICEF and WFP (the latter of which generated for UNMIN reports on political and social dynamics from difficult-to-reach districts around the country). The senior leadership of the UNCT "differed widely in their post-conflict experience and readiness to adapt activities under their authority to the particular circumstances of Nepal" and struggled to deploy staff with relevant backgrounds.¹¹⁷ Although the scopes of all UN agencies were, in varying ways, relevant to addressing structural drivers of violence (e.g. ILO with respect to inequalities in the labour market; UN Women with respect to inclusion of women; FAO with respect to land reform), prior to 2008 very few understood their work in these terms. The fact that the donor community did not share a common analysis of the peace process at various points did not help matters.¹¹⁸

Meanwhile, national actors, too, continued to approach peace and development largely separately in the post-accord era. For instance, the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, with support from the Nepal Peace Trust

Fund (NPTF), established Local Peace Committees (LPCs) in almost all of Nepal's 75 districts to help ensure peace at the local level. While a few LPCs are reported to have made positive contributions to inclusive peacemaking and peacebuilding at the local level, the majority have been largely ineffective, suffering from weak capacities, unclear mandates and politicisation.¹¹⁹ In hindsight, Jörg Frieden has argued, "it would have been better for the cause of peace as well as for development purposes to promote mediation activities within the established district- and local-level Development Committees instead of establishing parallel and ineffective Local Peace Committees."¹²⁰

With respect to international assistance providers, a noticeable shift occurred with the arrival, in early 2008, of a new UN Resident Coordinator (RC), Robert Piper, who became a driving force for rallying the wider development community behind a common peacebuilding strategy. Piper also pushed the UNCT towards more conflict-sensitive programming and reconfigured his office in ways that allowed him to play a more political role. With the support of a small team of conflict specialists within his office,¹²¹ he led a process in late 2009 to formulate a "Peace and Development Strategy" that articulated a common vision for UNCT members and donors. The Strategy detailed how these actors could "assist Nepal in the years ahead [to] realise the agenda laid out in the [CPA]," with emphasis on inclusion, good governance and state restructuring.¹²² (Remarkably, the World Bank was the one significant development actor that chose not to sign the document). Piper and the UNCT in 2010 also spearheaded the development of a new CCA centred on questions of which groups had been left behind by recent development gains, and how longstanding group grievances might jeopardise peace.¹²³ On this basis, the UNCT negotiated with the Nepali government a new UN Development and Assistant Framework (UNDAF), which "pushed uncomfortable buttons"¹²⁴ by raising issues around the discrimination of marginalised groups, including in the Terai.¹²⁵

DPA and the RC in Nepal also piloted an innovative model on how to ensure continuity in terms of political engagement in the context of a transition from a mission to a non-mission setting. Upon DPA's initiative, a small DPA liaison office was established within the Resident Coordinator's Office to provide political analysis and support beyond the departure of UNMIN. The RC also created four field offices with humanitarian and early warning capacities, allowing for analysis of trends in the Terai and elsewhere.¹²⁶

Since the signing of the peace accord, the UN Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN), established in 2007 to complement the NPTF, has underpinned the UNCT's peacebuilding activities.¹²⁷ Receiving contributions from the UN's Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) in New York and donor countries, the UNPFN addresses gaps in the implementation of the CPA that cannot not be implemented or funded by other mechanisms.¹²⁸ By 2016, all UN agencies active in Nepal had participated in UNPFN-funded projects around the country.¹²⁹ A recent review praised the UNPFN for its consistent support for projects that addressed root causes of the conflict, namely issues of inclusion of marginalised groups, especially women, Dalits, and indigenous ethnic

groups (Janajatis).¹³⁰ It found that “there are indications that UNPFN has made a strong contribution” to the prevention of conflict relapse in Nepal, in particular through its support to the management of the cantonments, the reintegration of demobilised Maoist combatants, the 2013 elections and demining.¹³¹ However, the review criticised the low level of coordination between UNPFN and donors at the project level, and pointed to the outstanding need for a more integrated focus on development and conflict.¹³²

The World Bank also made efforts to shift its programming in the post-accord era, namely with respect to its PAF (discussed in section 3.1), which appears to have had some corrective effect on horizontal inequalities by benefiting disadvantaged groups, including Janajatis, Dalits and women, more than privileged groups.¹³³ However, as late as 2012, other minority groups, including Muslims, were underrepresented in the PAF, indicating that even donors who explicitly mainstreamed inclusion in their assistance programs had trouble ensuring proportional attention to all marginalised groups in a country as socially stratified as Nepal.¹³⁴

Although these and other efforts constituted important progress, there is little evidence that they translated into significant addressing of the root causes of Nepal’s conflict. This is due to their own persistent shortcomings, but also a function of the resistance of Nepali elites to changing the status quo. Beyond the election of the Constituent Assembly, the country’s political establishment has impeded progress toward fulfilling the CPA’s commitment to a restructured, more inclusive, state capable of redressing the grievances of marginalised groups. Despite the CPA and other on-paper commitments, including a 2007 civil service law requiring 45% of posts to be reserved for women and marginalised groups, the representation of women, minorities and Dalits in state institutions remains low, especially in the highest ranks of government.¹³⁵ Poverty and illiteracy rates remain significantly higher among Hill and Terai Dalits than among other groups, and Dalits and Terai Janajatis continue to experience discrimination in the labour market.¹³⁶ Progress has stalled on the land reform mandated by the CPA.¹³⁷

The main reason for this lack of progress is that elites remain invested in the status quo, in which the state’s role is to generate patronage networks that ensure its own survival. As ICG has written, “State dysfunction is systemic and logical: it rests on an interlocking set of incentives which reward poor performance and penalise improvement.”¹³⁸ Civil society, which is dominated by NGOs that are largely extensions of their political mother parties or their foreign donors, has been largely unable or unwilling to call into question a corrupt system it is also part of.

Ultimately, throughout the decades of work to bring an end to the conflict and prevent its recurrence, neither national nor international actors have managed to significantly address root causes. The Madhesi flare-up after the Constitution was hastily passed in the wake of the 2015 earthquake are testament to Nepal’s unresolved inclusion challenges. Waves of international aid continue to carry the risk of reinforcing, rather than mitigating, Nepal’s

horizontal inequalities. In particular, the influx of emergency and reconstruction funds after the earthquake has once again raised the risk of unequally distributed international assistance reinforcing social divisions and inflaming local tensions.¹³⁹

Conclusion

This review of international engagement in the run-up to, during, and in the aftermath of Nepal’s civil war points to seven key lessons relevant for the international community’s effort to strengthen its performance in preventing conflict, ending wars, and building sustainable peace.

First, the role of development actors in Nepal throughout the 1990s and early 2000s shows that to improve upstream prevention, development interventions need to be sensitive to political contexts. In fragile countries affected by pervasive exclusion, aid agencies need to be more attuned to the dangers of elite capture of aid flows, which might fuel horizontal inequalities and exacerbate conflict risk. This implies that development actors need to have access to capacities to design development interventions based on in-depth analysis of conflict risk.

Second, the Nepali experience demonstrates the benefits of long-term engagement by outside actors with conflict parties and other relevant political actors. In particular, DPA’s experience in below-the-radar diplomacy starting in 2003 demonstrates one way to engage non-state actors despite member state sensitivities, and to pave the way for high-level diplomacy and UN support in peace agreement implementation down the line.

Third, the OHCHR mission in Nepal illustrates the potential of human rights monitoring missions to mitigate and deter violence and contribute to generating conditions conducive to reaching a peace agreement. In addition, the Nepal experience demonstrates how the UN’s human rights and peacemaking actors can complement one another, particularly when the former enjoys a robust mandate.¹⁴⁰

Fourth, UNMIN has shown that a small, civilian peace operation can help reduce the risk of conflict relapse, not least by instilling confidence in a peace process.¹⁴¹ A civilian peace operation enjoying credibility among the conflict parties may be able to act as a political guarantor of a peace process and thereby help parties overcome security dilemmas. However, in order to be able to play this role, civilian missions require a conducive national environment that may include factors such as: relatively low conflict intensity; commitment by conflict parties to a peace process; and regional politics that are conducive to peace. The UNMIN model will face lower odds of being effective in situations in which the security environment is significantly less permissive.

Fifth, multifaceted international support to elections – through a combination of technical assistance, confidence-building measures, and monitoring functions – can help reduce the risk of election-related violence. The Nepal case also shows how electoral system design can advance

political inclusion, and thus mitigate conflict risk. In diverse and socially stratified societies such as Nepal, proportional representation systems facilitate minority representation in parliament, whereas majoritarian systems, such as the “winner-takes-all” first-past-the-post system actively exclude them. Quotas, in particular, have proven effective in Nepal in ensuring representation of marginalised groups. That said, each electoral model will need to be adapted to local circumstances. Although the ability of the UN to meaningfully affect electoral system design will remain circumscribed in most places, the Nepal case shows international actors can effectively advocate for features that increase inclusion or improve the system through technical assistance.

Sixth, light footprint interventions can at best provide breathing space for national actors working to set post-conflict countries on a path that improves the chances of addressing structural conflict risks over time. Short-term interventions, such as OHCHR and UNMIN, are inherently ill-positioned to address root causes of conflict, such as systemic exclusion and deeply ingrained horizontal

inequalities. They also face limitations in addressing contentious issues at the crux of many conflicts, such as security sector reform and impunity, which tend to threaten entrenched interests and often require a long-term approach.¹⁴² In brief, international actors cannot expect to achieve social reengineering in a context where the most powerful national actors are resistant to change.

Finally, RC leadership can be crucial in aligning a UNCT and the donor community behind common peacebuilding goals. RCs’ ability to play this role is significantly strengthened if supported by additional capacities, such as Peace and Development Advisors. The reconfiguration of the RC Office in the aftermath of UNMIN’s departure, and in particular the establishment of a DPA Liaison Office and of regional sub-offices, can provide a useful model for other transitions from a mission to a non-mission setting. The existence of a pooled peacebuilding fund available to support all UN agencies in maximising the relevance of their work to post-conflict peacebuilding can help underpin the realignment of UNCT programming around peacebuilding priorities.

ENDNOTES

1. This paper draws in parts on Sebastian von Einsiedel, David Malone, and Suman Pradhan (eds.), *Nepal in Transition: From People's War to Fragile Peace*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). This paper's analysis is indebted to the insights provided by the authors who contributed chapters to this edited volume, in particular Rajeev Chaturvedy, Jörg Frieden, Prashant Jha, David Malone, Ian Martin, Devendra Raj Panday, Frederick Rawski, Mandira Sharma, Catinca Slavu, Deepak Thapa, and Teresa Whitfield. The authors also thank Chuck Call, Ian Martin, Robert Piper, Bhojraj Pokharel and Catherine Sung for providing helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
2. Security Council Resolution 2282 (27 April 2016).
3. Guterres highlights importance of recognizing the links between peace and sustainable development, UN News Centre, 24 January 2017.
4. Paul Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, A World Bank Policy Research Report (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97 (2003): 75–90; Collier, Paul and Anke Hoefler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (2003): 563–95. Although empirical research on the motivation of those joining the conflict has yet to be undertaken in the Nepali context, such research in other contexts suggests that grievance-based models are incomplete because poverty is also a factor in people's decisions to join both insurgency and counterinsurgency rebellion and counter-rebellion. In addition, involuntary participation is a fundamental, poverty-related aspect of revolutionary mobilization and political violence. See Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein: "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War." at http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/who_fights.pdf.
5. For Nepal's historical GDP per capita figures, see http://www.indexmundi.com/nepal/gdp_per_capita_%28ppp%29.html. For the civil war risk associated with certain GDP per capita levels, see Macartan Humphreys and Ashutosh Varshney: *Violent Conflict and the Millennium Development Goals: Diagnosis and Recommendations*, CGSD Working Paper No. 19, August 2004, p. 9.
6. World Bank, *Nepal: Resilience amidst Conflict An Assessment of Poverty in Nepal, 1995–96 and 2003–04*, Report No. 34834-NP, June 26, 2006.
7. UNDP, 1996 Human Development Index.
8. Sarah Kernot, "Nepal" A Development Challenge," *Journal of South Asian Studies*, 23 (August 2006): 297.
9. See UNDP, *Human Development Report 2015* (New York: UNDP, 2015).
10. The Nepalese case thus seems to confirm other studies that have identified the paradox of improving health and declining mortality indicators in wartime. For instance, from 1970 to 2008, the child mortality rate has declined in 90% of country-years in war (i.e. the sum of years in which countries have been at war?). Reasons for this paradox can be found in the largely localized nature of today's low-intensity conflicts, the lasting effect of the decades-long international campaign to promote public health in developing countries, and the increase in the level and scope of international humanitarian assistance. See Human Security Centre, *Human Security Report 2009/2010*.
11. See <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD/countries/NP?display=graph>
12. Between 1980 and 2008, Nepal received an average of \$17.6 per Nepali per year compared to \$25 per capita received by the average low-income country. Calculations made by authors based on World Bank data; see <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.PC.ZS/countries/NP-XM?display=graph>
13. Government of Nepal, Central Bureau of Statistics, *Poverty Trends in Nepal (1995–96 and 2003–04)*, Kathmandu, September 2005, at www.cbs.gov.np/Others/Poverty%20Assessment.pdf.
14. For global income inequality data for the mid-1990s, see UNDP, 2001 *Human Development Report: Making New Technologies Work for Human Development* (New York: UNDP, 2001), pp. 182–5.
15. See Fund for Peace, 2007 *Failed States Index*, at http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=229&Itemid=366.
16. For an overview of recent cross-country and intra-country studies establishing a link between horizontal inequality and conflict see Frances Stewart, *Horizontal Inequality and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies* (Palgrave: Houndsmills, 1998), p. 287. For a more critical review of the relevant literature, see James D. Fearon, "Governance and Civil War Onset," Background paper for 2011 *World Development Report*, August 31, 2010, at <http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/governance-and-civil-war-onset>.
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20. Rajendra Pradhan, "Ethnicity, Caste, and a Pluralist Society," in Kanak Mani Dixit and Shastri Ramachandaran (eds.), *State of Nepal* (Kathmandu: Himal Books, 2005), p. 9.
21. Deepak Thapa, "The Making of the Maoist Insurgency," in Sebastian von Einsiedel, David Malone, and Suman Pradhan (eds.), *Nepal in Transition: From People's War to Fragile Peace*. (New York: Cambridge UP, 2012), p. 37-58.

22. Mahendra Lawoti, "Ethnic Politics and the Building of an Inclusive State," in Sebastian von Einsiedel, David Malone, and Suman Pradhan (eds.), *Nepal in Transition: From People's War to Fragile Peace*. (New York: Cambridge UP, 2012), p. 129-154.
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37. Panday, "The Legacy of Nepal's Failed Development," p. 81-99.
38. Dhruva Kumar, "What Ails Democracy in Nepal?", in Dhruva Kumar (ed.), *Domestic Conflict and Crisis of Governability in Nepal* (Kathmandu: Center for Nepal and Asian Studies, 2000), p. 24.
39. The NC, formed in the 1940s modelled after India's Congress party, is the country's leading conservative party and a long-time supporter of the constitutional monarchy, with its support base drawn largely from the establishment, the middle class, the business community, and sections of the security forces.
40. The UML, founded in 1991 and emerging as the largest party in the parliamentary election in 1994, was communist in name only and over time adopted a social democratic agenda.
41. Krishna Hachhethu, "The Nepali State and the Maoist Insurgency," in Michael Hutt (ed.), *Himalayan People's War: Nepal's Maoist Revolution* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), p. 61.
42. International Crisis Group, *Nepal's Political Rites de Passage*, ICG Report 194, September 29, 2010, p. 19.
43. Deepak Thapa, "Radicalism and the Emergence of the Maoists," in Michael Hutt (ed.), *Himalayan People's War: Nepal's Maoist Revolution* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), p. 23-36.
44. Whelpton, *A History of Nepal*, pp. 202–5.
45. During the 10-year conflict, the PLA destroyed about 90% of the buildings of the roughly 4,000 village development committees (VDCs), the Nepali equivalent to municipalities, and displaced 68% of VDC secretaries, forcing them to withdraw to district capitals. Of 1,979 police units in the country, 1,271 were forced to withdraw, and in areas under their control, the Maoists established parallel state structures, in particular the "People's Courts" and "People's Governments."
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48. Code of Conduct between the Government of Nepal and the CPN (Maoist), published on May 26, 2006.
49. Comprehensive Peace Agreement, para. 3.5.
50. The Terai is the southern flatlands bordering India, inhabited in its eastern and central regions mostly by Madhesi who share a common culture and languages with people across the border in India, and in its western portion by Tharus, an indigenous group with a separate identity from Madhesi.
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