



Changing Multilateralism: the EU as a Global-Regional Actor in Security and Peace, or EU-GRASP, is a European Union (EU) funded project under the 7th Framework Programme (FP7).

EU-GRASP aims to contribute to the articulation of the present and future role of the EU as a global and regional actor in security and peace.

Therefore, EU-GRASP is aimed at studying the processes, means and opportunities for the EU to achieve effective multilateralism despite myriad challenges.



What Role for the EU in 2030 in Peace and Security?*

Executive Summary

In 2011-2012, EU-GRASP has organized a foresight exercise to project the consequences of the project's findings into the near future building on the analytical work and the results of a number of case studies and transversal reports. The central research question adopted was: 'What can be the role of the EU as a security actor in the framework of security governance in the future?' The aim is to raise awareness on possible relevant issues in the field of multilateral security governance and to look at the consequences for the EU as a regional actor. This document reports the results of this exercise and formulates a set of recommendations for EU officials.

The exercise was divided into three 'phases'. The first concerned the identification of key variables likely to affect the future multilateral security governance on the basis of a questionnaire to experts and scholars involved in EU-GRASP. The second phase consisted of a two-day participatory workshop (5-6 October 2011) aimed at identifying future 'scenarios' on the environment of the EU. The scholars and practitioners in this workshop relied partly on the identified key variables or driving forces of the first phase. The time horizon adopted by the EU-GRASP scenario exercise was of approximately 20 years from today in 2030. Finally, the third phase included a second participatory workshop (24 January 2012), this time involving a larger number of EU policy makers, aiming at identifying security and policy implications for the scenario.

Scenarios

A scenario is an internally consistent story of the future. A set of scenarios does not try to predict what will happen by mere extrapolation; instead it gives an overview of what could happen on the basis of exploring the underlying connections of key driving forces. Driving forces include changes in demographic, social, technological, environmental, economic and political/institutional factors. In our exercise, key driving forces were analyzed such as technological innovation, migration patterns and ecological degradation which might shape the environment of the EU. A small subset of three drivers was believed to be both highly uncertain and with a high impact on security governance: unipolarity vs. multipolarity; state-centric governance vs. growing influence of non-state actors; open vs. closed (inward-looking) societal values. Participants agreed that while the unipolar-multipolar dichotomy was highly relevant per se as a key characteristic of the future distribution of power at the global level, the two other factors (influence of non-state actors and societal values) could be combined into one single axis. As a result, two axes were put together leading to the following four scenarios in each of the quadrants of the graph (See Table A).


Scenario 1: Progressive Hegemony

In this scenario unipolarism in the global distribution of power is associated with increasingly open societies and cosmopolitan values as well as a growing influence of non-state actors on the political and social agenda. A new 'hegemon', such as the US or China, could emerge out of new balances of power that are difficult to foresee at this stage.

Security governance would be centred on 'coalitions of the willing' assembled in NATO or in ad hoc groups. Institutions such as the UN and the G20 would become less and less relevant. Instead, a G2 may see the light and the influence of private security companies and NGOs would grow through civil society. In this context, some issues concerning security governance, such as international terrorism and possession of weapons of mass other destruction, may be given priority over areas. Energy security would also grow in relevance and the abuse of human rights would be dealt with through both hard-measures and civilian means.

Scenario 2: Backward Hegemony

This scenario is characterized by unipolarity, inward-looking societies and a low influence of non-state actors. This type of hegemony would be exercised in a rather regressive fashion, with limited resources and little propensity of the only 'superpower' to be directly engaged in too many fields. In this context, energy security and the possession of weapons of mass destruction would become the hegemon's most significant concern.



Also migration may be increasingly framed as a security threat. Terrorism, meanwhile, is likely to be downgraded to secondary concern.

In accordance with this distribution of power, the G20 may transform into a weak and obsolete G1+, in which the superpower forges alliances with different partners on a needs basis. Threats to the international system would be dealt with through military action resulting in more repression of internal contestations.

Scenario 3: Fragmented Multipolarity

This scenario describes the intersection between a multipolar distribution of power, a low impact of non-state actors and the dominant presence of inward-looking attitudes among public opinion. In this context, the world would be likely to experience a fragmentation of the international system into state-led alliances along with other major powers and also emerging regional powers. The relationship among them would be generally conflictual. Moreover, the economic relationship between the regions would be leading to frequent currency 'wars'. This 'colder war' would see the emergence of an extremely conflictual multipolarity resulting in 'local' wars.

With regard to security governance, a reformed UN Security Council consisting of new regional powers would have diminishing impact and influence because of continued vetoing. Next to it, 'Clubs' of powerful states might replace the UN; regional powers would not manage to modify the G20 into a smaller and more

effective Group of Regions; and security governance would remain firmly in the hands of states; non-state actors would be marginalized; and alliances led by strong military regional powers would deal with security threats. Priority security threats would include regional conflicts, weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism. Energy security would likely become one of the main reasons why states wage war against one another.

Scenario 4: Open Regionalism

In this scenario, a multipolar distribution of powers, an increasing influence exerted by non-state actors and the emergence of a cosmopolitan culture intersect. Arguably, this would lead to the creation of regional pockets of influence built around significant regional hegemony with a high degree of openness to the external world and propensity to engage in multilateral processes. Competition between these hegemony will take place mainly through soft power. Regional cooperation and integration will become the key component of a coordinated system of governance. Large public-private corporations would also become more significant, although in different degrees within each regional framework.

Security governance would mainly be dealt with at the regional level by strong regional organizations. The UN at large would turn into a multilateral forum where also non-state actors have a role to play. In this context, regional security regimes would become more common and lead action on the ground; the G20 may simply cease to exist or turn into a Group of 6

regions; and large cities would be likely to play a significant role. Bargaining about resources would be done through diplomacy at the interregional level so the scarcity of resources would lead to stronger interregional cooperation.

Recommendations

The challenges posed to the EU by the four scenarios were discussed in the second workshop. These discussions have led to two sets of recommendations:

1. A first set of recommendations 'Achieving Nirvana' concerns what the EU should do in order to build the **political, economic and institutional condition** to support the creation of a more 'favourable' context for security governance;
2. A second set of recommendations 'Dance with the wolves' focuses on **how the EU should cope with 'less welcome' changes** in order to preserve its core values and objectives while exerting some degree of influence (as residual as it may be) at the global level.

Achieving Nirvana

While the 'Progressive Hegemony' scenario is dominated by a progressive superpower, the 'Open Regionalism' scenario is characterized by a significant diffusion of 'openness' in society, the existence of different poles of influence at the global level and the increasing importance of non-state actors. Even though both cases are relatively enabling for the EU's role, the second one can be considered the 'ideal' scenario. As the future can be shaped through purposeful

action in the present, the EU should aim to shape international politics in order to create the conditions for any of these scenarios to emerge. Among the key recommendations, we include:

- a) Support for **democracy and citizens' participation** throughout the world, so as to promote a peaceful encounter and exchange between civilizations and cultures. In order to achieve this objective the EU will need to revise some of its core security policies and avoid the temptation of adopting 'fortress' legislation;
- b) More inclusion of **civil society** in the running of the EU's internal and external affairs as well as its long-term objectives. Top-down approaches to regional integration are no longer sustainable in the long run. In order to support more openness and inclusivity throughout the world, the EU will need issues concerning legitimacy and democratic accountability very seriously and also promote inclusive regionalism in other areas of the world;
- c) Strengthening **multilateral governance systems** in as many areas of international politics as possible. Giving concessions to partner countries around the world and engaging with other countries and regions on an equal footing can contribute to this. The latter would allow the EU to build strong and durable partnerships while encouraging common approaches to global problems and shared values;

d) Using **soft-power mechanisms** and **socialization processes** to affect the values and priorities of the 'progressive superpower'. In the field of security, this would include taking more direct responsibility in the design and execution of common policies and programmes, as well as in the implementation of initiatives on the ground. Preference should be given to civilian instruments and diplomatic means with a view to achieving 'effective multilateralism' and human security should be considered a key tenet in the running of military operations.

Dance with the Wolves

The 'Backward Hegemony' and 'Fragmented Multipolarity' scenarios present clear challenges to the EU, not only because the fragmentation of the global arena may exert centrifugal pressures on Member States, but also because a world dominated by inward-looking policies and regressive unipolarity would seriously threaten the capacity of the EU to retain its core values. So, what should the EU do to survive and cope with unwelcome global changes?

a) Use its influence to **keep the global security agenda as inclusive as possible**. In both scenarios, it is likely that certain 'hard' security issues will be given a higher priority vis-à-vis softer security challenges. It is also likely that a number of social phenomena will be increasingly 'securitized' and thus treated as matters of internal/international

security rather than political governance. In this case, the task of the EU would be to use its economic and normative influence to keep certain issues on the agenda and avoid, whenever possible, an oxidization of multilateral governance mechanisms;

b) Use its influence to **persuade the 'superpower' to behave as responsible as possible**. Given that some degree of shared responsibility would also be in the interest of an inward-looking global leader, the EU should try and carve out some space for itself with a view to making the system of security governance as fluid as possible. This would probably require the EU to equip itself with a stronger military force in order to become a credible 'partner';

c) **Strengthen ties with likeminded actors** and **create incentive mechanisms** to induce progressive governance reforms in other regions. In this regard, economic means would be essential to build strong ties across regions and generate an area of prosperity that could, if necessary, become the springboard for a long-term alliance (or security community), similar to the way in which NATO was constituted and evolved.



EU-GRASP

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PARTNERS

EU-GRASP is composed by a consortium of nine partners. While the project is coordinated by the United Nations University – Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS), Bruges, Belgium, its other partners are drawn from across the globe. These are, viz: University of Warwick (UK), University of Gothenburg (Sweden), Florence Forum on the Problems of Peace and War (Italy), KULeuven (Belgium), Centre for International Governance Innovation (Canada), Peking University (China), Institute for Security Studies (South Africa) and Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (Israel).

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